instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline void sem_getref_and_unlock(struct sem_array *sma)
{
ipc_rcu_getref(sma);
ipc_unlock(&(sma)->sem_perm);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,974
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
int flags)
{
struct sock_iocb *siocb = kiocb_to_siocb(iocb);
struct scm_cookie tmp_scm;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
int peeked, skip;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags&MSG_OOB)
goto out;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&u->readlock);
if (err) {
err = sock_intr_errno(sock_rcvtimeo(sk, noblock));
goto out;
}
skip = sk_peek_offset(sk, flags);
skb = __skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, &peeked, &skip, &err);
if (!skb) {
unix_state_lock(sk);
/* Signal EOF on disconnected non-blocking SEQPACKET socket. */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && err == -EAGAIN &&
(sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN))
err = 0;
unix_state_unlock(sk);
goto out_unlock;
}
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&u->peer_wait,
POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND);
if (msg->msg_name)
unix_copy_addr(msg, skb->sk);
if (size > skb->len - skip)
size = skb->len - skip;
else if (size < skb->len - skip)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, skip, msg->msg_iov, size);
if (err)
goto out_free;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
__sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
if (!siocb->scm) {
siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
memset(&tmp_scm, 0, sizeof(tmp_scm));
}
scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).uid, UNIXCB(skb).gid);
unix_set_secdata(siocb->scm, skb);
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
unix_detach_fds(siocb->scm, skb);
sk_peek_offset_bwd(sk, skb->len);
} else {
/* It is questionable: on PEEK we could:
- do not return fds - good, but too simple 8)
- return fds, and do not return them on read (old strategy,
apparently wrong)
- clone fds (I chose it for now, it is the most universal
solution)
POSIX 1003.1g does not actually define this clearly
at all. POSIX 1003.1g doesn't define a lot of things
clearly however!
*/
sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, size);
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
siocb->scm->fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp);
}
err = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len - skip : size;
scm_recv(sock, msg, siocb->scm, flags);
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&u->readlock);
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,520
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static double ipow( double n, int exp )
{
double r;
if ( exp < 0 )
return 1.0 / ipow( n, -exp );
r = 1;
while ( exp > 0 ) {
if ( exp & 1 )
r *= n;
exp >>= 1;
n *= n;
}
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,300
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int common_timer_set(struct k_itimer *timr, int flags,
struct itimerspec64 *new_setting,
struct itimerspec64 *old_setting)
{
const struct k_clock *kc = timr->kclock;
bool sigev_none;
ktime_t expires;
if (old_setting)
common_timer_get(timr, old_setting);
/* Prevent rearming by clearing the interval */
timr->it_interval = 0;
/*
* Careful here. On SMP systems the timer expiry function could be
* active and spinning on timr->it_lock.
*/
if (kc->timer_try_to_cancel(timr) < 0)
return TIMER_RETRY;
timr->it_active = 0;
timr->it_requeue_pending = (timr->it_requeue_pending + 2) &
~REQUEUE_PENDING;
timr->it_overrun_last = 0;
/* Switch off the timer when it_value is zero */
if (!new_setting->it_value.tv_sec && !new_setting->it_value.tv_nsec)
return 0;
timr->it_interval = timespec64_to_ktime(new_setting->it_interval);
expires = timespec64_to_ktime(new_setting->it_value);
sigev_none = (timr->it_sigev_notify & ~SIGEV_THREAD_ID) == SIGEV_NONE;
kc->timer_arm(timr, expires, flags & TIMER_ABSTIME, sigev_none);
timr->it_active = !sigev_none;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The timer_create syscall implementation in kernel/time/posix-timers.c in the Linux kernel before 4.14.8 doesn't properly validate the sigevent->sigev_notify field, which leads to out-of-bounds access in the show_timer function (called when /proc/$PID/timers is read). This allows userspace applications to read arbitrary kernel memory (on a kernel built with CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE).
Commit Message: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).
The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.
This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.
Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
Low
| 169,372
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType EncodeImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
const size_t data_size)
{
#define MaxCode(number_bits) ((one << (number_bits))-1)
#define MaxHashTable 5003
#define MaxGIFBits 12UL
#define MaxGIFTable (1UL << MaxGIFBits)
#define GIFOutputCode(code) \
{ \
/* \
Emit a code. \
*/ \
if (bits > 0) \
datum|=(size_t) (code) << bits; \
else \
datum=(size_t) (code); \
bits+=number_bits; \
while (bits >= 8) \
{ \
/* \
Add a character to current packet. \
*/ \
packet[length++]=(unsigned char) (datum & 0xff); \
if (length >= 254) \
{ \
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) length); \
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,packet); \
length=0; \
} \
datum>>=8; \
bits-=8; \
} \
if (free_code > max_code) \
{ \
number_bits++; \
if (number_bits == MaxGIFBits) \
max_code=MaxGIFTable; \
else \
max_code=MaxCode(number_bits); \
} \
}
IndexPacket
index;
short
*hash_code,
*hash_prefix,
waiting_code;
size_t
bits,
clear_code,
datum,
end_of_information_code,
free_code,
length,
max_code,
next_pixel,
number_bits,
one,
pass;
ssize_t
displacement,
offset,
k,
y;
unsigned char
*packet,
*hash_suffix;
/*
Allocate encoder tables.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
one=1;
packet=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(256,sizeof(*packet));
hash_code=(short *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxHashTable,sizeof(*hash_code));
hash_prefix=(short *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxHashTable,sizeof(*hash_prefix));
hash_suffix=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxHashTable,
sizeof(*hash_suffix));
if ((packet == (unsigned char *) NULL) || (hash_code == (short *) NULL) ||
(hash_prefix == (short *) NULL) ||
(hash_suffix == (unsigned char *) NULL))
{
if (packet != (unsigned char *) NULL)
packet=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(packet);
if (hash_code != (short *) NULL)
hash_code=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_code);
if (hash_prefix != (short *) NULL)
hash_prefix=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_prefix);
if (hash_suffix != (unsigned char *) NULL)
hash_suffix=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_suffix);
return(MagickFalse);
}
/*
Initialize GIF encoder.
*/
(void) memset(packet,0,256*sizeof(*packet));
(void) memset(hash_code,0,MaxHashTable*sizeof(*hash_code));
(void) memset(hash_prefix,0,MaxHashTable*sizeof(*hash_prefix));
(void) memset(hash_suffix,0,MaxHashTable*sizeof(*hash_suffix));
number_bits=data_size;
max_code=MaxCode(number_bits);
clear_code=((short) one << (data_size-1));
end_of_information_code=clear_code+1;
free_code=clear_code+2;
length=0;
datum=0;
bits=0;
GIFOutputCode(clear_code);
/*
Encode pixels.
*/
offset=0;
pass=0;
waiting_code=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
if (y == 0)
{
waiting_code=(short) (*indexes);
p++;
}
for (x=(ssize_t) (y == 0 ? 1 : 0); x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
/*
Probe hash table.
*/
index=(IndexPacket) ((size_t) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x) & 0xff);
p++;
k=(ssize_t) (((size_t) index << (MaxGIFBits-8))+waiting_code);
if (k >= MaxHashTable)
k-=MaxHashTable;
next_pixel=MagickFalse;
displacement=1;
if (hash_code[k] > 0)
{
if ((hash_prefix[k] == waiting_code) &&
(hash_suffix[k] == (unsigned char) index))
{
waiting_code=hash_code[k];
continue;
}
if (k != 0)
displacement=MaxHashTable-k;
for ( ; ; )
{
k-=displacement;
if (k < 0)
k+=MaxHashTable;
if (hash_code[k] == 0)
break;
if ((hash_prefix[k] == waiting_code) &&
(hash_suffix[k] == (unsigned char) index))
{
waiting_code=hash_code[k];
next_pixel=MagickTrue;
break;
}
}
if (next_pixel != MagickFalse)
continue;
}
GIFOutputCode(waiting_code);
if (free_code < MaxGIFTable)
{
hash_code[k]=(short) free_code++;
hash_prefix[k]=waiting_code;
hash_suffix[k]=(unsigned char) index;
}
else
{
/*
Fill the hash table with empty entries.
*/
for (k=0; k < MaxHashTable; k++)
hash_code[k]=0;
/*
Reset compressor and issue a clear code.
*/
free_code=clear_code+2;
GIFOutputCode(clear_code);
number_bits=data_size;
max_code=MaxCode(number_bits);
}
waiting_code=(short) index;
}
if (image_info->interlace == NoInterlace)
offset++;
else
switch (pass)
{
case 0:
default:
{
offset+=8;
if (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows)
{
pass++;
offset=4;
}
break;
}
case 1:
{
offset+=8;
if (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows)
{
pass++;
offset=2;
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
offset+=4;
if (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows)
{
pass++;
offset=1;
}
break;
}
case 3:
{
offset+=2;
break;
}
}
}
/*
Flush out the buffered code.
*/
GIFOutputCode(waiting_code);
GIFOutputCode(end_of_information_code);
if (bits > 0)
{
/*
Add a character to current packet.
*/
packet[length++]=(unsigned char) (datum & 0xff);
if (length >= 254)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) length);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,packet);
length=0;
}
}
/*
Flush accumulated data.
*/
if (length > 0)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) length);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,packet);
}
/*
Free encoder memory.
*/
hash_suffix=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_suffix);
hash_prefix=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_prefix);
hash_code=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_code);
packet=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(packet);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer overflow in MagickCore/fourier.c in ComplexImage.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1595
|
Medium
| 169,593
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int do_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pte_t *page_table, pmd_t *pmd,
unsigned int flags, pte_t orig_pte)
{
pgoff_t pgoff = (((address & PAGE_MASK)
- vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + vma->vm_pgoff;
pte_unmap(page_table);
if (!(flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
return do_read_fault(mm, vma, address, pmd, pgoff, flags,
orig_pte);
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
return do_cow_fault(mm, vma, address, pmd, pgoff, flags,
orig_pte);
return do_shared_fault(mm, vma, address, pmd, pgoff, flags, orig_pte);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: mm/memory.c in the Linux kernel before 4.1.4 mishandles anonymous pages, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (page tainting) via a crafted application that triggers writing to page zero.
Commit Message: mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 167,568
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void rds_tcp_kill_sock(struct net *net)
{
struct rds_tcp_connection *tc, *_tc;
LIST_HEAD(tmp_list);
struct rds_tcp_net *rtn = net_generic(net, rds_tcp_netid);
struct socket *lsock = rtn->rds_tcp_listen_sock;
rtn->rds_tcp_listen_sock = NULL;
rds_tcp_listen_stop(lsock, &rtn->rds_tcp_accept_w);
spin_lock_irq(&rds_tcp_conn_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(tc, _tc, &rds_tcp_conn_list, t_tcp_node) {
struct net *c_net = read_pnet(&tc->t_cpath->cp_conn->c_net);
if (net != c_net || !tc->t_sock)
continue;
if (!list_has_conn(&tmp_list, tc->t_cpath->cp_conn)) {
list_move_tail(&tc->t_tcp_node, &tmp_list);
} else {
list_del(&tc->t_tcp_node);
tc->t_tcp_node_detached = true;
}
}
spin_unlock_irq(&rds_tcp_conn_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(tc, _tc, &tmp_list, t_tcp_node)
rds_conn_destroy(tc->t_cpath->cp_conn);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: An issue was discovered in rds_tcp_kill_sock in net/rds/tcp.c in the Linux kernel before 5.0.8. There is a race condition leading to a use-after-free, related to net namespace cleanup.
Commit Message: net: rds: force to destroy connection if t_sock is NULL in rds_tcp_kill_sock().
When it is to cleanup net namespace, rds_tcp_exit_net() will call
rds_tcp_kill_sock(), if t_sock is NULL, it will not call
rds_conn_destroy(), rds_conn_path_destroy() and rds_tcp_conn_free() to free
connection, and the worker cp_conn_w is not stopped, afterwards the net is freed in
net_drop_ns(); While cp_conn_w rds_connect_worker() will call rds_tcp_conn_path_connect()
and reference 'net' which has already been freed.
In rds_tcp_conn_path_connect(), rds_tcp_set_callbacks() will set t_sock = sock before
sock->ops->connect, but if connect() is failed, it will call
rds_tcp_restore_callbacks() and set t_sock = NULL, if connect is always
failed, rds_connect_worker() will try to reconnect all the time, so
rds_tcp_kill_sock() will never to cancel worker cp_conn_w and free the
connections.
Therefore, the condition !tc->t_sock is not needed if it is going to do
cleanup_net->rds_tcp_exit_net->rds_tcp_kill_sock, because tc->t_sock is always
NULL, and there is on other path to cancel cp_conn_w and free
connection. So this patch is to fix this.
rds_tcp_kill_sock():
...
if (net != c_net || !tc->t_sock)
...
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28
net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8003496a4684 by task kworker/u8:4/3721
CPU: 3 PID: 3721 Comm: kworker/u8:4 Not tainted 5.1.0 #11
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: krdsd rds_connect_worker
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3c0 arch/arm64/kernel/time.c:53
show_stack+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:152
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x120/0x188 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x68/0x278 mm/kasan/report.c:253
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x21c/0x348 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x30/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:429
inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
__sock_create+0x4f8/0x770 net/socket.c:1276
sock_create_kern+0x50/0x68 net/socket.c:1322
rds_tcp_conn_path_connect+0x2b4/0x690 net/rds/tcp_connect.c:114
rds_connect_worker+0x108/0x1d0 net/rds/threads.c:175
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
Allocated by task 687:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0x180 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kasan_slab_alloc+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:444 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2705 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2713 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x14c/0x388 mm/slub.c:2718
kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:697 [inline]
net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:384 [inline]
copy_net_ns+0xc4/0x2d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:424
create_new_namespaces+0x300/0x658 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xa0/0x198 kernel/nsproxy.c:206
ksys_unshare+0x340/0x628 kernel/fork.c:2577
__do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2645 [inline]
__se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2643 [inline]
__arm64_sys_unshare+0x38/0x58 kernel/fork.c:2643
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:47 [inline]
el0_svc_common+0x168/0x390 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:83
el0_svc_handler+0x60/0xd0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129
el0_svc+0x8/0xc arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:960
Freed by task 264:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x220 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1370 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1397 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2952 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0xb8/0x3a8 mm/slub.c:2968
net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:400 [inline]
net_drop_ns.part.6+0x78/0x90 net/core/net_namespace.c:407
net_drop_ns net/core/net_namespace.c:406 [inline]
cleanup_net+0x53c/0x6d8 net/core/net_namespace.c:569
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8003496a3f80
which belongs to the cache net_namespace of size 7872
The buggy address is located 1796 bytes inside of
7872-byte region [ffff8003496a3f80, ffff8003496a5e40)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffff7e000d25a800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff80036ce4b000
index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0xffffe0000008100(slab|head)
raw: 0ffffe0000008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff80036ce4b000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8003496a4580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8003496a4680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8003496a4700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 467fa15356ac("RDS-TCP: Support multiple RDS-TCP listen endpoints, one per netns.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 169,679
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void gdImageRectangle (gdImagePtr im, int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2, int color)
{
int x1h = x1, x1v = x1, y1h = y1, y1v = y1, x2h = x2, x2v = x2, y2h = y2, y2v = y2;
int thick = im->thick;
int t;
if (x1 == x2 && y1 == y2 && thick == 1) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x1, y1, color);
return;
}
if (y2 < y1) {
t=y1;
y1 = y2;
y2 = t;
t = x1;
x1 = x2;
x2 = t;
}
x1h = x1; x1v = x1; y1h = y1; y1v = y1; x2h = x2; x2v = x2; y2h = y2; y2v = y2;
if (thick > 1) {
int cx, cy, x1ul, y1ul, x2lr, y2lr;
int half = thick >> 1;
x1ul = x1 - half;
y1ul = y1 - half;
x2lr = x2 + half;
y2lr = y2 + half;
cy = y1ul + thick;
while (cy-- > y1ul) {
cx = x1ul - 1;
while (cx++ < x2lr) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, cx, cy, color);
}
}
cy = y2lr - thick;
while (cy++ < y2lr) {
cx = x1ul - 1;
while (cx++ < x2lr) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, cx, cy, color);
}
}
cy = y1ul + thick - 1;
while (cy++ < y2lr -thick) {
cx = x1ul - 1;
while (cx++ < x1ul + thick) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, cx, cy, color);
}
}
cy = y1ul + thick - 1;
while (cy++ < y2lr -thick) {
cx = x2lr - thick - 1;
while (cx++ < x2lr) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, cx, cy, color);
}
}
return;
} else {
y1v = y1h + 1;
y2v = y2h - 1;
gdImageLine(im, x1h, y1h, x2h, y1h, color);
gdImageLine(im, x1h, y2h, x2h, y2h, color);
gdImageLine(im, x1v, y1v, x1v, y2v, color);
gdImageLine(im, x2v, y1v, x2v, y2v, color);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the gdImageCreate function in gd.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.0.34RC1, as used in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image dimensions.
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
|
Medium
| 167,130
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mrb_obj_clone(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
struct RObject *p;
mrb_value clone;
if (mrb_immediate_p(self)) {
mrb_raisef(mrb, E_TYPE_ERROR, "can't clone %S", self);
}
if (mrb_type(self) == MRB_TT_SCLASS) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_TYPE_ERROR, "can't clone singleton class");
}
p = (struct RObject*)mrb_obj_alloc(mrb, mrb_type(self), mrb_obj_class(mrb, self));
p->c = mrb_singleton_class_clone(mrb, self);
mrb_field_write_barrier(mrb, (struct RBasic*)p, (struct RBasic*)p->c);
clone = mrb_obj_value(p);
init_copy(mrb, clone, self);
p->flags = mrb_obj_ptr(self)->flags;
return clone;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in mruby 1.4.1. There is a NULL pointer dereference in mrb_class, related to certain .clone usage, because mrb_obj_clone in kernel.c copies flags other than the MRB_FLAG_IS_FROZEN flag (e.g., the embedded flag).
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
|
Low
| 169,202
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> objMethodWithArgsCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.objMethodWithArgs");
if (args.Length() < 3)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, intArg, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, strArg, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined));
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(TestObj*, objArg, V8TestObj::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8TestObj::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
return toV8(imp->objMethodWithArgs(intArg, strArg, objArg), args.GetIsolate());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,093
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void add_bytes_l2_c(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src1, uint8_t *src2, int w)
{
long i;
for (i = 0; i <= w - sizeof(long); i += sizeof(long)) {
long a = *(long *)(src1 + i);
long b = *(long *)(src2 + i);
*(long *)(dst + i) = ((a & pb_7f) + (b & pb_7f)) ^ ((a ^ b) & pb_80);
}
for (; i < w; i++)
dst[i] = src1[i] + src2[i];
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer signedness error in the add_bytes_l2_c function in libavcodec/pngdsp.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted PNG data.
Commit Message: avcodec/pngdsp: fix (un)signed type in end comparission
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2919
Found_by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
Medium
| 165,925
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DataReductionProxyConfig::FetchWarmupProbeURL() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!enabled_by_user_) {
RecordWarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent(
WarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent::kProxyNotEnabledByUser);
return;
}
if (!params::FetchWarmupProbeURLEnabled()) {
RecordWarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent(
WarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent::kWarmupURLFetchingDisabled);
return;
}
if (connection_type_ == network::mojom::ConnectionType::CONNECTION_NONE) {
RecordWarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent(
WarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent::kConnectionTypeNone);
return;
}
base::Optional<DataReductionProxyServer> warmup_proxy =
GetProxyConnectionToProbe();
if (!warmup_proxy)
return;
warmup_url_fetch_in_flight_secure_proxy_ = warmup_proxy->IsSecureProxy();
warmup_url_fetch_in_flight_core_proxy_ = warmup_proxy->IsCoreProxy();
size_t previous_attempt_counts = GetWarmupURLFetchAttemptCounts();
network_properties_manager_->OnWarmupFetchInitiated(
warmup_url_fetch_in_flight_secure_proxy_,
warmup_url_fetch_in_flight_core_proxy_);
RecordWarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent(WarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent::kFetchInitiated);
warmup_url_fetcher_->FetchWarmupURL(previous_attempt_counts,
warmup_proxy.value());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
|
Medium
| 172,415
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void perf_callchain_user_64(struct perf_callchain_entry *entry,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long sp, next_sp;
unsigned long next_ip;
unsigned long lr;
long level = 0;
struct signal_frame_64 __user *sigframe;
unsigned long __user *fp, *uregs;
next_ip = perf_instruction_pointer(regs);
lr = regs->link;
sp = regs->gpr[1];
perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip);
for (;;) {
fp = (unsigned long __user *) sp;
if (!valid_user_sp(sp, 1) || read_user_stack_64(fp, &next_sp))
return;
if (level > 0 && read_user_stack_64(&fp[2], &next_ip))
return;
/*
* Note: the next_sp - sp >= signal frame size check
* is true when next_sp < sp, which can happen when
* transitioning from an alternate signal stack to the
* normal stack.
*/
if (next_sp - sp >= sizeof(struct signal_frame_64) &&
(is_sigreturn_64_address(next_ip, sp) ||
(level <= 1 && is_sigreturn_64_address(lr, sp))) &&
sane_signal_64_frame(sp)) {
/*
* This looks like an signal frame
*/
sigframe = (struct signal_frame_64 __user *) sp;
uregs = sigframe->uc.uc_mcontext.gp_regs;
if (read_user_stack_64(&uregs[PT_NIP], &next_ip) ||
read_user_stack_64(&uregs[PT_LNK], &lr) ||
read_user_stack_64(&uregs[PT_R1], &sp))
return;
level = 0;
perf_callchain_store(entry, PERF_CONTEXT_USER);
perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip);
continue;
}
if (level == 0)
next_ip = lr;
perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip);
++level;
sp = next_sp;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The perf_callchain_user_64 function in arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0.2 on ppc64 platforms allows local users to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a deep 64-bit userspace backtrace.
Commit Message: powerpc/perf: Cap 64bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
We cap 32bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
(currently 127), but we forgot to do the same for 64bit backtraces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
Low
| 166,587
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void SendHandwritingStroke(const HandwritingStroke& stroke) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
chromeos::SendHandwritingStroke(input_method_status_connection_, stroke);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,504
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void UpdatePropertyCallback(IBusPanelService* panel,
IBusProperty* ibus_prop,
gpointer user_data) {
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->UpdateProperty(ibus_prop);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,551
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteHDRImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
header[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*property;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
pixel[4],
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
if (IsRGBColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace,exception);
/*
Write header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(header,' ',MagickPathExtent);
length=CopyMagickString(header,"#?RGBE\n",MagickPathExtent);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,(unsigned char *) header);
property=GetImageProperty(image,"comment",exception);
if ((property != (const char *) NULL) &&
(strchr(property,'\n') == (char *) NULL))
{
count=FormatLocaleString(header,MagickPathExtent,"#%s\n",property);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) count,(unsigned char *) header);
}
property=GetImageProperty(image,"hdr:exposure",exception);
if (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
count=FormatLocaleString(header,MagickPathExtent,"EXPOSURE=%g\n",
strtod(property,(char **) NULL));
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) count,(unsigned char *) header);
}
if (image->gamma != 0.0)
{
count=FormatLocaleString(header,MagickPathExtent,"GAMMA=%g\n",image->gamma);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) count,(unsigned char *) header);
}
count=FormatLocaleString(header,MagickPathExtent,
"PRIMARIES=%g %g %g %g %g %g %g %g\n",
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x,image->chromaticity.red_primary.y,
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x,image->chromaticity.green_primary.y,
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x,image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y,
image->chromaticity.white_point.x,image->chromaticity.white_point.y);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) count,(unsigned char *) header);
length=CopyMagickString(header,"FORMAT=32-bit_rle_rgbe\n\n",MagickPathExtent);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,(unsigned char *) header);
count=FormatLocaleString(header,MagickPathExtent,"-Y %.20g +X %.20g\n",
(double) image->rows,(double) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) count,(unsigned char *) header);
/*
Write HDR pixels.
*/
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,4*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if ((image->columns >= 8) && (image->columns <= 0x7ffff))
{
pixel[0]=2;
pixel[1]=2;
pixel[2]=(unsigned char) (image->columns >> 8);
pixel[3]=(unsigned char) (image->columns & 0xff);
count=WriteBlob(image,4*sizeof(*pixel),pixel);
if (count != (ssize_t) (4*sizeof(*pixel)))
break;
}
i=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
double
gamma;
pixel[0]=0;
pixel[1]=0;
pixel[2]=0;
pixel[3]=0;
gamma=QuantumScale*GetPixelRed(image,p);
if ((QuantumScale*GetPixelGreen(image,p)) > gamma)
gamma=QuantumScale*GetPixelGreen(image,p);
if ((QuantumScale*GetPixelBlue(image,p)) > gamma)
gamma=QuantumScale*GetPixelBlue(image,p);
if (gamma > MagickEpsilon)
{
int
exponent;
gamma=frexp(gamma,&exponent)*256.0/gamma;
pixel[0]=(unsigned char) (gamma*QuantumScale*GetPixelRed(image,p));
pixel[1]=(unsigned char) (gamma*QuantumScale*GetPixelGreen(image,p));
pixel[2]=(unsigned char) (gamma*QuantumScale*GetPixelBlue(image,p));
pixel[3]=(unsigned char) (exponent+128);
}
if ((image->columns >= 8) && (image->columns <= 0x7ffff))
{
pixels[x]=pixel[0];
pixels[x+image->columns]=pixel[1];
pixels[x+2*image->columns]=pixel[2];
pixels[x+3*image->columns]=pixel[3];
}
else
{
pixels[i++]=pixel[0];
pixels[i++]=pixel[1];
pixels[i++]=pixel[2];
pixels[i++]=pixel[3];
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns >= 8) && (image->columns <= 0x7ffff))
{
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
length=HDRWriteRunlengthPixels(image,&pixels[i*image->columns]);
}
else
{
count=WriteBlob(image,4*image->columns*sizeof(*pixels),pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) (4*image->columns*sizeof(*pixels)))
break;
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in coders/hdr.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted HDR file.
Commit Message: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/imagemagick/+bug/1537213
|
Medium
| 168,807
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EntrySync* EntrySync::moveTo(DirectoryEntrySync* parent, const String& name, ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
RefPtr<EntrySyncCallbackHelper> helper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->move(this, parent, name, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,422
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gamma_info_imp(gamma_display *dp, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
/* Reuse the standard stuff as appropriate. */
standard_info_part1(&dp->this, pp, pi);
/* If requested strip 16 to 8 bits - this is handled automagically below
* because the output bit depth is read from the library. Note that there
* are interactions with sBIT but, internally, libpng makes sbit at most
* PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8 when doing the following.
*/
if (dp->scale16)
# ifdef PNG_READ_SCALE_16_TO_8_SUPPORTED
png_set_scale_16(pp);
# else
/* The following works both in 1.5.4 and earlier versions: */
# ifdef PNG_READ_16_TO_8_SUPPORTED
png_set_strip_16(pp);
# else
png_error(pp, "scale16 (16 to 8 bit conversion) not supported");
# endif
# endif
if (dp->expand16)
# ifdef PNG_READ_EXPAND_16_SUPPORTED
png_set_expand_16(pp);
# else
png_error(pp, "expand16 (8 to 16 bit conversion) not supported");
# endif
if (dp->do_background >= ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET)
{
# ifdef PNG_READ_ALPHA_MODE_SUPPORTED
{
/* This tests the alpha mode handling, if supported. */
int mode = dp->do_background - ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET;
/* The gamma value is the output gamma, and is in the standard,
* non-inverted, represenation. It provides a default for the PNG file
* gamma, but since the file has a gAMA chunk this does not matter.
*/
PNG_CONST double sg = dp->screen_gamma;
# ifndef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
PNG_CONST png_fixed_point g = fix(sg);
# endif
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
png_set_alpha_mode(pp, mode, sg);
# else
png_set_alpha_mode_fixed(pp, mode, g);
# endif
/* However, for the standard Porter-Duff algorithm the output defaults
* to be linear, so if the test requires non-linear output it must be
* corrected here.
*/
if (mode == PNG_ALPHA_STANDARD && sg != 1)
{
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
png_set_gamma(pp, sg, dp->file_gamma);
# else
png_fixed_point f = fix(dp->file_gamma);
png_set_gamma_fixed(pp, g, f);
# endif
}
}
# else
png_error(pp, "alpha mode handling not supported");
# endif
}
else
{
/* Set up gamma processing. */
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
png_set_gamma(pp, dp->screen_gamma, dp->file_gamma);
# else
{
png_fixed_point s = fix(dp->screen_gamma);
png_fixed_point f = fix(dp->file_gamma);
png_set_gamma_fixed(pp, s, f);
}
# endif
if (dp->do_background)
{
# ifdef PNG_READ_BACKGROUND_SUPPORTED
/* NOTE: this assumes the caller provided the correct background gamma!
*/
PNG_CONST double bg = dp->background_gamma;
# ifndef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
PNG_CONST png_fixed_point g = fix(bg);
# endif
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
png_set_background(pp, &dp->background_color, dp->do_background,
0/*need_expand*/, bg);
# else
png_set_background_fixed(pp, &dp->background_color,
dp->do_background, 0/*need_expand*/, g);
# endif
# else
png_error(pp, "png_set_background not supported");
# endif
}
}
{
int i = dp->this.use_update_info;
/* Always do one call, even if use_update_info is 0. */
do
png_read_update_info(pp, pi);
while (--i > 0);
}
/* Now we may get a different cbRow: */
standard_info_part2(&dp->this, pp, pi, 1 /*images*/);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,613
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: LoginLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetLoginLibrary() {
return login_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,625
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ih264d_rest_of_residual_cav_chroma_dc_block(UWORD32 u4_total_coeff_trail_one,
dec_bit_stream_t *ps_bitstrm)
{
UWORD32 u4_total_zeroes;
WORD16 i;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 u4_bitstream_offset = ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UWORD32 u4_trailing_ones = u4_total_coeff_trail_one & 0xFFFF;
UWORD32 u4_total_coeff = u4_total_coeff_trail_one >> 16;
WORD16 i2_level_arr[4];
tu_sblk4x4_coeff_data_t *ps_tu_4x4;
WORD16 *pi2_coeff_data;
dec_struct_t *ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)ps_bitstrm->pv_codec_handle;
ps_tu_4x4 = (tu_sblk4x4_coeff_data_t *)ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_tu_4x4->u2_sig_coeff_map = 0;
pi2_coeff_data = &ps_tu_4x4->ai2_level[0];
i = u4_total_coeff - 1;
if(u4_trailing_ones)
{
/*********************************************************************/
/* Decode Trailing Ones */
/* read the sign of T1's and put them in level array */
/*********************************************************************/
UWORD32 u4_signs, u4_cnt = u4_trailing_ones;
WORD16 (*ppi2_trlone_lkup)[3] =
(WORD16 (*)[3])gai2_ih264d_trailing_one_level;
WORD16 *pi2_trlone_lkup;
GETBITS(u4_signs, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf, u4_cnt);
pi2_trlone_lkup = ppi2_trlone_lkup[(1 << u4_cnt) - 2 + u4_signs];
while(u4_cnt--)
i2_level_arr[i--] = *pi2_trlone_lkup++;
}
/****************************************************************/
/* Decoding Levels Begins */
/****************************************************************/
if(i >= 0)
{
/****************************************************************/
/* First level is decoded outside the loop as it has lot of */
/* special cases. */
/****************************************************************/
UWORD32 u4_lev_suffix, u4_suffix_len, u4_lev_suffix_size;
UWORD16 u2_lev_code, u2_abs_value;
UWORD32 u4_lev_prefix;
/***************************************************************/
/* u4_suffix_len = 0, Find leading zeros in next 32 bits */
/***************************************************************/
FIND_ONE_IN_STREAM_32(u4_lev_prefix, u4_bitstream_offset,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
/*********************************************************/
/* Special decoding case when trailing ones are 3 */
/*********************************************************/
u2_lev_code = MIN(15, u4_lev_prefix);
u2_lev_code += (3 == u4_trailing_ones) ? 0 : (2);
if(14 == u4_lev_prefix)
u4_lev_suffix_size = 4;
else if(15 <= u4_lev_prefix)
{
u2_lev_code += 15;
u4_lev_suffix_size = u4_lev_prefix - 3;
}
else
u4_lev_suffix_size = 0;
if(16 <= u4_lev_prefix)
{
u2_lev_code += ((1 << (u4_lev_prefix - 3)) - 4096);
}
if(u4_lev_suffix_size)
{
GETBITS(u4_lev_suffix, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf,
u4_lev_suffix_size);
u2_lev_code += u4_lev_suffix;
}
u2_abs_value = (u2_lev_code + 2) >> 1;
/*********************************************************/
/* If Level code is odd, level is negative else positive */
/*********************************************************/
i2_level_arr[i--] = (u2_lev_code & 1) ? -u2_abs_value : u2_abs_value;
u4_suffix_len = (u2_abs_value > 3) ? 2 : 1;
/*********************************************************/
/* Now loop over the remaining levels */
/*********************************************************/
while(i >= 0)
{
/***************************************************************/
/* Find leading zeros in next 32 bits */
/***************************************************************/
FIND_ONE_IN_STREAM_32(u4_lev_prefix, u4_bitstream_offset,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
u4_lev_suffix_size =
(15 <= u4_lev_prefix) ?
(u4_lev_prefix - 3) : u4_suffix_len;
/*********************************************************/
/* Compute level code using prefix and suffix */
/*********************************************************/
GETBITS(u4_lev_suffix, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf,
u4_lev_suffix_size);
u2_lev_code = (MIN(u4_lev_prefix,15) << u4_suffix_len)
+ u4_lev_suffix;
if(16 <= u4_lev_prefix)
{
u2_lev_code += ((1 << (u4_lev_prefix - 3)) - 4096);
}
u2_abs_value = (u2_lev_code + 2) >> 1;
/*********************************************************/
/* If Level code is odd, level is negative else positive */
/*********************************************************/
i2_level_arr[i--] =
(u2_lev_code & 1) ? -u2_abs_value : u2_abs_value;
/*********************************************************/
/* Increment suffix length if required */
/*********************************************************/
u4_suffix_len += (u2_abs_value > (3 << (u4_suffix_len - 1)));
}
/****************************************************************/
/* Decoding Levels Ends */
/****************************************************************/
}
if(u4_total_coeff < 4)
{
UWORD32 u4_max_ldz = (4 - u4_total_coeff);
FIND_ONE_IN_STREAM_LEN(u4_total_zeroes, u4_bitstream_offset,
pu4_bitstrm_buf, u4_max_ldz);
}
else
u4_total_zeroes = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Decode the runs and form the coefficient buffer */
/**************************************************************/
{
const UWORD8 *pu1_table_runbefore;
UWORD32 u4_run;
UWORD32 u4_scan_pos = (u4_total_coeff + u4_total_zeroes - 1);
UWORD32 u4_zeroes_left = u4_total_zeroes;
i = u4_total_coeff - 1;
/**************************************************************/
/* Decoding Runs for 0 < zeros left <=6 */
/**************************************************************/
pu1_table_runbefore = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_table_run_before;
while(u4_zeroes_left && i)
{
UWORD32 u4_code;
NEXTBITS(u4_code, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf, 3);
u4_code = pu1_table_runbefore[u4_code + (u4_zeroes_left << 3)];
u4_run = u4_code >> 2;
FLUSHBITS(u4_bitstream_offset, (u4_code & 0x03));
SET_BIT(ps_tu_4x4->u2_sig_coeff_map, u4_scan_pos);
*pi2_coeff_data++ = i2_level_arr[i--];
u4_zeroes_left -= u4_run;
u4_scan_pos -= (u4_run + 1);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Decoding Runs End */
/**************************************************************/
/**************************************************************/
/* Copy the remaining coefficients */
/**************************************************************/
while(i >= 0)
{
SET_BIT(ps_tu_4x4->u2_sig_coeff_map, u4_scan_pos);
*pi2_coeff_data++ = i2_level_arr[i--];
u4_scan_pos--;
}
}
{
WORD32 offset;
offset = (UWORD8 *)pi2_coeff_data - (UWORD8 *)ps_tu_4x4;
offset = ALIGN4(offset);
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = (void *)((UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data + offset);
}
ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst = u4_bitstream_offset;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer underflows in decoder/ih264d_parse_cavlc.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 26399350.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix stack underflow in CAVLC 4x4 parse functions
Bug: 26399350
Change-Id: Id768751672a7b093ab6e53d4fc0b3188d470920e
|
Low
| 173,915
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static target_ulong disas_insn(CPUX86State *env, DisasContext *s,
target_ulong pc_start)
{
int b, prefixes;
int shift;
TCGMemOp ot, aflag, dflag;
int modrm, reg, rm, mod, op, opreg, val;
target_ulong next_eip, tval;
int rex_w, rex_r;
s->pc_start = s->pc = pc_start;
prefixes = 0;
s->override = -1;
rex_w = -1;
rex_r = 0;
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
s->rex_x = 0;
s->rex_b = 0;
x86_64_hregs = 0;
#endif
s->rip_offset = 0; /* for relative ip address */
s->vex_l = 0;
s->vex_v = 0;
next_byte:
b = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc);
s->pc++;
/* Collect prefixes. */
switch (b) {
case 0xf3:
prefixes |= PREFIX_REPZ;
goto next_byte;
case 0xf2:
prefixes |= PREFIX_REPNZ;
goto next_byte;
case 0xf0:
prefixes |= PREFIX_LOCK;
goto next_byte;
case 0x2e:
s->override = R_CS;
goto next_byte;
case 0x36:
s->override = R_SS;
goto next_byte;
case 0x3e:
s->override = R_DS;
goto next_byte;
case 0x26:
s->override = R_ES;
goto next_byte;
case 0x64:
s->override = R_FS;
goto next_byte;
case 0x65:
s->override = R_GS;
goto next_byte;
case 0x66:
prefixes |= PREFIX_DATA;
goto next_byte;
case 0x67:
prefixes |= PREFIX_ADR;
goto next_byte;
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
case 0x40 ... 0x4f:
if (CODE64(s)) {
/* REX prefix */
rex_w = (b >> 3) & 1;
rex_r = (b & 0x4) << 1;
s->rex_x = (b & 0x2) << 2;
REX_B(s) = (b & 0x1) << 3;
x86_64_hregs = 1; /* select uniform byte register addressing */
goto next_byte;
}
break;
#endif
case 0xc5: /* 2-byte VEX */
case 0xc4: /* 3-byte VEX */
/* VEX prefixes cannot be used except in 32-bit mode.
Otherwise the instruction is LES or LDS. */
if (s->code32 && !s->vm86) {
static const int pp_prefix[4] = {
0, PREFIX_DATA, PREFIX_REPZ, PREFIX_REPNZ
};
int vex3, vex2 = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc);
if (!CODE64(s) && (vex2 & 0xc0) != 0xc0) {
/* 4.1.4.6: In 32-bit mode, bits [7:6] must be 11b,
otherwise the instruction is LES or LDS. */
break;
}
s->pc++;
/* 4.1.1-4.1.3: No preceding lock, 66, f2, f3, or rex prefixes. */
if (prefixes & (PREFIX_REPZ | PREFIX_REPNZ
| PREFIX_LOCK | PREFIX_DATA)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
if (x86_64_hregs) {
goto illegal_op;
}
#endif
rex_r = (~vex2 >> 4) & 8;
if (b == 0xc5) {
vex3 = vex2;
b = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
} else {
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
s->rex_x = (~vex2 >> 3) & 8;
s->rex_b = (~vex2 >> 2) & 8;
#endif
vex3 = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
rex_w = (vex3 >> 7) & 1;
switch (vex2 & 0x1f) {
case 0x01: /* Implied 0f leading opcode bytes. */
b = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++) | 0x100;
break;
case 0x02: /* Implied 0f 38 leading opcode bytes. */
b = 0x138;
break;
case 0x03: /* Implied 0f 3a leading opcode bytes. */
b = 0x13a;
break;
default: /* Reserved for future use. */
goto unknown_op;
}
}
s->vex_v = (~vex3 >> 3) & 0xf;
s->vex_l = (vex3 >> 2) & 1;
prefixes |= pp_prefix[vex3 & 3] | PREFIX_VEX;
}
break;
}
/* Post-process prefixes. */
if (CODE64(s)) {
/* In 64-bit mode, the default data size is 32-bit. Select 64-bit
data with rex_w, and 16-bit data with 0x66; rex_w takes precedence
over 0x66 if both are present. */
dflag = (rex_w > 0 ? MO_64 : prefixes & PREFIX_DATA ? MO_16 : MO_32);
/* In 64-bit mode, 0x67 selects 32-bit addressing. */
aflag = (prefixes & PREFIX_ADR ? MO_32 : MO_64);
} else {
/* In 16/32-bit mode, 0x66 selects the opposite data size. */
if (s->code32 ^ ((prefixes & PREFIX_DATA) != 0)) {
dflag = MO_32;
} else {
dflag = MO_16;
}
/* In 16/32-bit mode, 0x67 selects the opposite addressing. */
if (s->code32 ^ ((prefixes & PREFIX_ADR) != 0)) {
aflag = MO_32;
} else {
aflag = MO_16;
}
}
s->prefix = prefixes;
s->aflag = aflag;
s->dflag = dflag;
/* now check op code */
reswitch:
switch(b) {
case 0x0f:
/**************************/
/* extended op code */
b = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++) | 0x100;
goto reswitch;
/**************************/
/* arith & logic */
case 0x00 ... 0x05:
case 0x08 ... 0x0d:
case 0x10 ... 0x15:
case 0x18 ... 0x1d:
case 0x20 ... 0x25:
case 0x28 ... 0x2d:
case 0x30 ... 0x35:
case 0x38 ... 0x3d:
{
int op, f, val;
op = (b >> 3) & 7;
f = (b >> 1) & 3;
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
switch(f) {
case 0: /* OP Ev, Gv */
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
if (mod != 3) {
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
opreg = OR_TMP0;
} else if (op == OP_XORL && rm == reg) {
xor_zero:
/* xor reg, reg optimisation */
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_CLR);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T0, 0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, reg, cpu_T0);
break;
} else {
opreg = rm;
}
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T1, reg);
gen_op(s, op, ot, opreg);
break;
case 1: /* OP Gv, Ev */
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
if (mod != 3) {
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T1, cpu_A0);
} else if (op == OP_XORL && rm == reg) {
goto xor_zero;
} else {
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T1, rm);
}
gen_op(s, op, ot, reg);
break;
case 2: /* OP A, Iv */
val = insn_get(env, s, ot);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T1, val);
gen_op(s, op, ot, OR_EAX);
break;
}
}
break;
case 0x82:
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
case 0x80: /* GRP1 */
case 0x81:
case 0x83:
{
int val;
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
op = (modrm >> 3) & 7;
if (mod != 3) {
if (b == 0x83)
s->rip_offset = 1;
else
s->rip_offset = insn_const_size(ot);
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
opreg = OR_TMP0;
} else {
opreg = rm;
}
switch(b) {
default:
case 0x80:
case 0x81:
case 0x82:
val = insn_get(env, s, ot);
break;
case 0x83:
val = (int8_t)insn_get(env, s, MO_8);
break;
}
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T1, val);
gen_op(s, op, ot, opreg);
}
break;
/**************************/
/* inc, dec, and other misc arith */
case 0x40 ... 0x47: /* inc Gv */
ot = dflag;
gen_inc(s, ot, OR_EAX + (b & 7), 1);
break;
case 0x48 ... 0x4f: /* dec Gv */
ot = dflag;
gen_inc(s, ot, OR_EAX + (b & 7), -1);
break;
case 0xf6: /* GRP3 */
case 0xf7:
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
op = (modrm >> 3) & 7;
if (mod != 3) {
if (op == 0) {
s->rip_offset = insn_const_size(ot);
}
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
/* For those below that handle locked memory, don't load here. */
if (!(s->prefix & PREFIX_LOCK)
|| op != 2) {
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
}
} else {
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, rm);
}
switch(op) {
case 0: /* test */
val = insn_get(env, s, ot);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T1, val);
gen_op_testl_T0_T1_cc();
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_LOGICB + ot);
break;
case 2: /* not */
if (s->prefix & PREFIX_LOCK) {
if (mod == 3) {
goto illegal_op;
}
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T0, ~0);
tcg_gen_atomic_xor_fetch_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_A0, cpu_T0,
s->mem_index, ot | MO_LE);
} else {
tcg_gen_not_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
if (mod != 3) {
gen_op_st_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
} else {
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, rm, cpu_T0);
}
}
break;
case 3: /* neg */
if (s->prefix & PREFIX_LOCK) {
TCGLabel *label1;
TCGv a0, t0, t1, t2;
if (mod == 3) {
goto illegal_op;
}
a0 = tcg_temp_local_new();
t0 = tcg_temp_local_new();
label1 = gen_new_label();
tcg_gen_mov_tl(a0, cpu_A0);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(t0, cpu_T0);
gen_set_label(label1);
t1 = tcg_temp_new();
t2 = tcg_temp_new();
tcg_gen_mov_tl(t2, t0);
tcg_gen_neg_tl(t1, t0);
tcg_gen_atomic_cmpxchg_tl(t0, a0, t0, t1,
s->mem_index, ot | MO_LE);
tcg_temp_free(t1);
tcg_gen_brcond_tl(TCG_COND_NE, t0, t2, label1);
tcg_temp_free(t2);
tcg_temp_free(a0);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_T0, t0);
tcg_temp_free(t0);
} else {
tcg_gen_neg_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
if (mod != 3) {
gen_op_st_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
} else {
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, rm, cpu_T0);
}
}
gen_op_update_neg_cc();
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_SUBB + ot);
break;
case 4: /* mul */
switch(ot) {
case MO_8:
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_8, cpu_T1, R_EAX);
tcg_gen_ext8u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_ext8u_tl(cpu_T1, cpu_T1);
/* XXX: use 32 bit mul which could be faster */
tcg_gen_mul_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, cpu_T1);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_16, R_EAX, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_T0, 0xff00);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_MULB);
break;
case MO_16:
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_16, cpu_T1, R_EAX);
tcg_gen_ext16u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_ext16u_tl(cpu_T1, cpu_T1);
/* XXX: use 32 bit mul which could be faster */
tcg_gen_mul_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, cpu_T1);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_16, R_EAX, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_shri_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, 16);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_16, R_EDX, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_T0);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_MULW);
break;
default:
case MO_32:
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp3_i32, cpu_regs[R_EAX]);
tcg_gen_mulu2_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp3_i32,
cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp3_i32);
tcg_gen_extu_i32_tl(cpu_regs[R_EAX], cpu_tmp2_i32);
tcg_gen_extu_i32_tl(cpu_regs[R_EDX], cpu_tmp3_i32);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_regs[R_EAX]);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_regs[R_EDX]);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_MULL);
break;
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
case MO_64:
tcg_gen_mulu2_i64(cpu_regs[R_EAX], cpu_regs[R_EDX],
cpu_T0, cpu_regs[R_EAX]);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_regs[R_EAX]);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_regs[R_EDX]);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_MULQ);
break;
#endif
}
break;
case 5: /* imul */
switch(ot) {
case MO_8:
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_8, cpu_T1, R_EAX);
tcg_gen_ext8s_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_ext8s_tl(cpu_T1, cpu_T1);
/* XXX: use 32 bit mul which could be faster */
tcg_gen_mul_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, cpu_T1);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_16, R_EAX, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_ext8s_tl(cpu_tmp0, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_sub_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_T0, cpu_tmp0);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_MULB);
break;
case MO_16:
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_16, cpu_T1, R_EAX);
tcg_gen_ext16s_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_ext16s_tl(cpu_T1, cpu_T1);
/* XXX: use 32 bit mul which could be faster */
tcg_gen_mul_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, cpu_T1);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_16, R_EAX, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_ext16s_tl(cpu_tmp0, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_sub_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_T0, cpu_tmp0);
tcg_gen_shri_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, 16);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_16, R_EDX, cpu_T0);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_MULW);
break;
default:
case MO_32:
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp3_i32, cpu_regs[R_EAX]);
tcg_gen_muls2_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp3_i32,
cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp3_i32);
tcg_gen_extu_i32_tl(cpu_regs[R_EAX], cpu_tmp2_i32);
tcg_gen_extu_i32_tl(cpu_regs[R_EDX], cpu_tmp3_i32);
tcg_gen_sari_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp2_i32, 31);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_regs[R_EAX]);
tcg_gen_sub_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp3_i32);
tcg_gen_extu_i32_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_tmp2_i32);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_MULL);
break;
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
case MO_64:
tcg_gen_muls2_i64(cpu_regs[R_EAX], cpu_regs[R_EDX],
cpu_T0, cpu_regs[R_EAX]);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_regs[R_EAX]);
tcg_gen_sari_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_regs[R_EAX], 63);
tcg_gen_sub_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_cc_src, cpu_regs[R_EDX]);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_MULQ);
break;
#endif
}
break;
case 6: /* div */
switch(ot) {
case MO_8:
gen_helper_divb_AL(cpu_env, cpu_T0);
break;
case MO_16:
gen_helper_divw_AX(cpu_env, cpu_T0);
break;
default:
case MO_32:
gen_helper_divl_EAX(cpu_env, cpu_T0);
break;
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
case MO_64:
gen_helper_divq_EAX(cpu_env, cpu_T0);
break;
#endif
}
break;
case 7: /* idiv */
switch(ot) {
case MO_8:
gen_helper_idivb_AL(cpu_env, cpu_T0);
break;
case MO_16:
gen_helper_idivw_AX(cpu_env, cpu_T0);
break;
default:
case MO_32:
gen_helper_idivl_EAX(cpu_env, cpu_T0);
break;
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
case MO_64:
gen_helper_idivq_EAX(cpu_env, cpu_T0);
break;
#endif
}
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
break;
case 0xfe: /* GRP4 */
case 0xff: /* GRP5 */
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
op = (modrm >> 3) & 7;
if (op >= 2 && b == 0xfe) {
goto unknown_op;
}
if (CODE64(s)) {
if (op == 2 || op == 4) {
/* operand size for jumps is 64 bit */
ot = MO_64;
} else if (op == 3 || op == 5) {
ot = dflag != MO_16 ? MO_32 + (rex_w == 1) : MO_16;
} else if (op == 6) {
/* default push size is 64 bit */
ot = mo_pushpop(s, dflag);
}
}
if (mod != 3) {
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
if (op >= 2 && op != 3 && op != 5)
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
} else {
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, rm);
}
switch(op) {
case 0: /* inc Ev */
if (mod != 3)
opreg = OR_TMP0;
else
opreg = rm;
gen_inc(s, ot, opreg, 1);
break;
case 1: /* dec Ev */
if (mod != 3)
opreg = OR_TMP0;
else
opreg = rm;
gen_inc(s, ot, opreg, -1);
break;
case 2: /* call Ev */
/* XXX: optimize if memory (no 'and' is necessary) */
if (dflag == MO_16) {
tcg_gen_ext16u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
}
next_eip = s->pc - s->cs_base;
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T1, next_eip);
gen_push_v(s, cpu_T1);
gen_op_jmp_v(cpu_T0);
gen_bnd_jmp(s);
gen_eob(s);
break;
case 3: /* lcall Ev */
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T1, cpu_A0);
gen_add_A0_im(s, 1 << ot);
gen_op_ld_v(s, MO_16, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
do_lcall:
if (s->pe && !s->vm86) {
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T0);
gen_helper_lcall_protected(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T1,
tcg_const_i32(dflag - 1),
tcg_const_tl(s->pc - s->cs_base));
} else {
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T0);
gen_helper_lcall_real(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T1,
tcg_const_i32(dflag - 1),
tcg_const_i32(s->pc - s->cs_base));
}
gen_eob(s);
break;
case 4: /* jmp Ev */
if (dflag == MO_16) {
tcg_gen_ext16u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
}
gen_op_jmp_v(cpu_T0);
gen_bnd_jmp(s);
gen_eob(s);
break;
case 5: /* ljmp Ev */
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T1, cpu_A0);
gen_add_A0_im(s, 1 << ot);
gen_op_ld_v(s, MO_16, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
do_ljmp:
if (s->pe && !s->vm86) {
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T0);
gen_helper_ljmp_protected(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T1,
tcg_const_tl(s->pc - s->cs_base));
} else {
gen_op_movl_seg_T0_vm(R_CS);
gen_op_jmp_v(cpu_T1);
}
gen_eob(s);
break;
case 6: /* push Ev */
gen_push_v(s, cpu_T0);
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
break;
case 0x84: /* test Ev, Gv */
case 0x85:
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, ot, OR_TMP0, 0);
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T1, reg);
gen_op_testl_T0_T1_cc();
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_LOGICB + ot);
break;
case 0xa8: /* test eAX, Iv */
case 0xa9:
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
val = insn_get(env, s, ot);
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, OR_EAX);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T1, val);
gen_op_testl_T0_T1_cc();
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_LOGICB + ot);
break;
case 0x98: /* CWDE/CBW */
switch (dflag) {
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
case MO_64:
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_32, cpu_T0, R_EAX);
tcg_gen_ext32s_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_64, R_EAX, cpu_T0);
break;
#endif
case MO_32:
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_16, cpu_T0, R_EAX);
tcg_gen_ext16s_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_32, R_EAX, cpu_T0);
break;
case MO_16:
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_8, cpu_T0, R_EAX);
tcg_gen_ext8s_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_16, R_EAX, cpu_T0);
break;
default:
tcg_abort();
}
break;
case 0x99: /* CDQ/CWD */
switch (dflag) {
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
case MO_64:
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_64, cpu_T0, R_EAX);
tcg_gen_sari_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, 63);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_64, R_EDX, cpu_T0);
break;
#endif
case MO_32:
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_32, cpu_T0, R_EAX);
tcg_gen_ext32s_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_sari_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, 31);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_32, R_EDX, cpu_T0);
break;
case MO_16:
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_16, cpu_T0, R_EAX);
tcg_gen_ext16s_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_sari_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, 15);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_16, R_EDX, cpu_T0);
break;
default:
tcg_abort();
}
break;
case 0x1af: /* imul Gv, Ev */
case 0x69: /* imul Gv, Ev, I */
case 0x6b:
ot = dflag;
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
if (b == 0x69)
s->rip_offset = insn_const_size(ot);
else if (b == 0x6b)
s->rip_offset = 1;
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, ot, OR_TMP0, 0);
if (b == 0x69) {
val = insn_get(env, s, ot);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T1, val);
} else if (b == 0x6b) {
val = (int8_t)insn_get(env, s, MO_8);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T1, val);
} else {
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T1, reg);
}
switch (ot) {
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
case MO_64:
tcg_gen_muls2_i64(cpu_regs[reg], cpu_T1, cpu_T0, cpu_T1);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_regs[reg]);
tcg_gen_sari_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_cc_dst, 63);
tcg_gen_sub_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_cc_src, cpu_T1);
break;
#endif
case MO_32:
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp3_i32, cpu_T1);
tcg_gen_muls2_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp3_i32,
cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp3_i32);
tcg_gen_extu_i32_tl(cpu_regs[reg], cpu_tmp2_i32);
tcg_gen_sari_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp2_i32, 31);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_regs[reg]);
tcg_gen_sub_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp3_i32);
tcg_gen_extu_i32_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_tmp2_i32);
break;
default:
tcg_gen_ext16s_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_ext16s_tl(cpu_T1, cpu_T1);
/* XXX: use 32 bit mul which could be faster */
tcg_gen_mul_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, cpu_T1);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_ext16s_tl(cpu_tmp0, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_sub_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_T0, cpu_tmp0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, reg, cpu_T0);
break;
}
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_MULB + ot);
break;
case 0x1c0:
case 0x1c1: /* xadd Ev, Gv */
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, reg);
if (mod == 3) {
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T1, rm);
tcg_gen_add_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, cpu_T1);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, reg, cpu_T1);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, rm, cpu_T0);
} else {
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
if (s->prefix & PREFIX_LOCK) {
tcg_gen_atomic_fetch_add_tl(cpu_T1, cpu_A0, cpu_T0,
s->mem_index, ot | MO_LE);
tcg_gen_add_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, cpu_T1);
} else {
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T1, cpu_A0);
tcg_gen_add_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, cpu_T1);
gen_op_st_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
}
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, reg, cpu_T1);
}
gen_op_update2_cc();
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_ADDB + ot);
break;
case 0x1b0:
case 0x1b1: /* cmpxchg Ev, Gv */
{
TCGv oldv, newv, cmpv;
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
oldv = tcg_temp_new();
newv = tcg_temp_new();
cmpv = tcg_temp_new();
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, newv, reg);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cmpv, cpu_regs[R_EAX]);
if (s->prefix & PREFIX_LOCK) {
if (mod == 3) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
tcg_gen_atomic_cmpxchg_tl(oldv, cpu_A0, cmpv, newv,
s->mem_index, ot | MO_LE);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, R_EAX, oldv);
} else {
if (mod == 3) {
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, oldv, rm);
} else {
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, oldv, cpu_A0);
rm = 0; /* avoid warning */
}
gen_extu(ot, oldv);
gen_extu(ot, cmpv);
/* store value = (old == cmp ? new : old); */
tcg_gen_movcond_tl(TCG_COND_EQ, newv, oldv, cmpv, newv, oldv);
if (mod == 3) {
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, R_EAX, oldv);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, rm, newv);
} else {
/* Perform an unconditional store cycle like physical cpu;
must be before changing accumulator to ensure
idempotency if the store faults and the instruction
is restarted */
gen_op_st_v(s, ot, newv, cpu_A0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, R_EAX, oldv);
}
}
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_src, oldv);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_srcT, cmpv);
tcg_gen_sub_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cmpv, oldv);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_SUBB + ot);
tcg_temp_free(oldv);
tcg_temp_free(newv);
tcg_temp_free(cmpv);
}
break;
case 0x1c7: /* cmpxchg8b */
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
if ((mod == 3) || ((modrm & 0x38) != 0x8))
goto illegal_op;
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
if (dflag == MO_64) {
if (!(s->cpuid_ext_features & CPUID_EXT_CX16))
goto illegal_op;
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
if ((s->prefix & PREFIX_LOCK) && parallel_cpus) {
gen_helper_cmpxchg16b(cpu_env, cpu_A0);
} else {
gen_helper_cmpxchg16b_unlocked(cpu_env, cpu_A0);
}
} else
#endif
{
if (!(s->cpuid_features & CPUID_CX8))
goto illegal_op;
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
if ((s->prefix & PREFIX_LOCK) && parallel_cpus) {
gen_helper_cmpxchg8b(cpu_env, cpu_A0);
} else {
gen_helper_cmpxchg8b_unlocked(cpu_env, cpu_A0);
}
}
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
break;
/**************************/
/* push/pop */
case 0x50 ... 0x57: /* push */
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_32, cpu_T0, (b & 7) | REX_B(s));
gen_push_v(s, cpu_T0);
break;
case 0x58 ... 0x5f: /* pop */
ot = gen_pop_T0(s);
/* NOTE: order is important for pop %sp */
gen_pop_update(s, ot);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, (b & 7) | REX_B(s), cpu_T0);
break;
case 0x60: /* pusha */
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
gen_pusha(s);
break;
case 0x61: /* popa */
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
gen_popa(s);
break;
case 0x68: /* push Iv */
case 0x6a:
ot = mo_pushpop(s, dflag);
if (b == 0x68)
val = insn_get(env, s, ot);
else
val = (int8_t)insn_get(env, s, MO_8);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T0, val);
gen_push_v(s, cpu_T0);
break;
case 0x8f: /* pop Ev */
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
ot = gen_pop_T0(s);
if (mod == 3) {
/* NOTE: order is important for pop %sp */
gen_pop_update(s, ot);
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, rm, cpu_T0);
} else {
/* NOTE: order is important too for MMU exceptions */
s->popl_esp_hack = 1 << ot;
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, ot, OR_TMP0, 1);
s->popl_esp_hack = 0;
gen_pop_update(s, ot);
}
break;
case 0xc8: /* enter */
{
int level;
val = cpu_lduw_code(env, s->pc);
s->pc += 2;
level = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
gen_enter(s, val, level);
}
break;
case 0xc9: /* leave */
gen_leave(s);
break;
case 0x06: /* push es */
case 0x0e: /* push cs */
case 0x16: /* push ss */
case 0x1e: /* push ds */
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
gen_op_movl_T0_seg(b >> 3);
gen_push_v(s, cpu_T0);
break;
case 0x1a0: /* push fs */
case 0x1a8: /* push gs */
gen_op_movl_T0_seg((b >> 3) & 7);
gen_push_v(s, cpu_T0);
break;
case 0x07: /* pop es */
case 0x17: /* pop ss */
case 0x1f: /* pop ds */
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
reg = b >> 3;
ot = gen_pop_T0(s);
gen_movl_seg_T0(s, reg);
gen_pop_update(s, ot);
/* Note that reg == R_SS in gen_movl_seg_T0 always sets is_jmp. */
if (s->is_jmp) {
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
if (reg == R_SS) {
s->tf = 0;
gen_eob_inhibit_irq(s, true);
} else {
gen_eob(s);
}
}
break;
case 0x1a1: /* pop fs */
case 0x1a9: /* pop gs */
ot = gen_pop_T0(s);
gen_movl_seg_T0(s, (b >> 3) & 7);
gen_pop_update(s, ot);
if (s->is_jmp) {
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
gen_eob(s);
}
break;
/**************************/
/* mov */
case 0x88:
case 0x89: /* mov Gv, Ev */
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
/* generate a generic store */
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, ot, reg, 1);
break;
case 0xc6:
case 0xc7: /* mov Ev, Iv */
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
if (mod != 3) {
s->rip_offset = insn_const_size(ot);
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
}
val = insn_get(env, s, ot);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T0, val);
if (mod != 3) {
gen_op_st_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
} else {
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s), cpu_T0);
}
break;
case 0x8a:
case 0x8b: /* mov Ev, Gv */
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, ot, OR_TMP0, 0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, reg, cpu_T0);
break;
case 0x8e: /* mov seg, Gv */
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = (modrm >> 3) & 7;
if (reg >= 6 || reg == R_CS)
goto illegal_op;
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, MO_16, OR_TMP0, 0);
gen_movl_seg_T0(s, reg);
/* Note that reg == R_SS in gen_movl_seg_T0 always sets is_jmp. */
if (s->is_jmp) {
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
if (reg == R_SS) {
s->tf = 0;
gen_eob_inhibit_irq(s, true);
} else {
gen_eob(s);
}
}
break;
case 0x8c: /* mov Gv, seg */
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = (modrm >> 3) & 7;
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
if (reg >= 6)
goto illegal_op;
gen_op_movl_T0_seg(reg);
ot = mod == 3 ? dflag : MO_16;
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, ot, OR_TMP0, 1);
break;
case 0x1b6: /* movzbS Gv, Eb */
case 0x1b7: /* movzwS Gv, Eb */
case 0x1be: /* movsbS Gv, Eb */
case 0x1bf: /* movswS Gv, Eb */
{
TCGMemOp d_ot;
TCGMemOp s_ot;
/* d_ot is the size of destination */
d_ot = dflag;
/* ot is the size of source */
ot = (b & 1) + MO_8;
/* s_ot is the sign+size of source */
s_ot = b & 8 ? MO_SIGN | ot : ot;
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
if (mod == 3) {
if (s_ot == MO_SB && byte_reg_is_xH(rm)) {
tcg_gen_sextract_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_regs[rm - 4], 8, 8);
} else {
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, rm);
switch (s_ot) {
case MO_UB:
tcg_gen_ext8u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
break;
case MO_SB:
tcg_gen_ext8s_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
break;
case MO_UW:
tcg_gen_ext16u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
break;
default:
case MO_SW:
tcg_gen_ext16s_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
break;
}
}
gen_op_mov_reg_v(d_ot, reg, cpu_T0);
} else {
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
gen_op_ld_v(s, s_ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(d_ot, reg, cpu_T0);
}
}
break;
case 0x8d: /* lea */
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
if (mod == 3)
goto illegal_op;
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
{
AddressParts a = gen_lea_modrm_0(env, s, modrm);
TCGv ea = gen_lea_modrm_1(a);
gen_lea_v_seg(s, s->aflag, ea, -1, -1);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(dflag, reg, cpu_A0);
}
break;
case 0xa0: /* mov EAX, Ov */
case 0xa1:
case 0xa2: /* mov Ov, EAX */
case 0xa3:
{
target_ulong offset_addr;
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
switch (s->aflag) {
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
case MO_64:
offset_addr = cpu_ldq_code(env, s->pc);
s->pc += 8;
break;
#endif
default:
offset_addr = insn_get(env, s, s->aflag);
break;
}
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_A0, offset_addr);
gen_add_A0_ds_seg(s);
if ((b & 2) == 0) {
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, R_EAX, cpu_T0);
} else {
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, R_EAX);
gen_op_st_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
}
}
break;
case 0xd7: /* xlat */
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_A0, cpu_regs[R_EBX]);
tcg_gen_ext8u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_regs[R_EAX]);
tcg_gen_add_tl(cpu_A0, cpu_A0, cpu_T0);
gen_extu(s->aflag, cpu_A0);
gen_add_A0_ds_seg(s);
gen_op_ld_v(s, MO_8, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_8, R_EAX, cpu_T0);
break;
case 0xb0 ... 0xb7: /* mov R, Ib */
val = insn_get(env, s, MO_8);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T0, val);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_8, (b & 7) | REX_B(s), cpu_T0);
break;
case 0xb8 ... 0xbf: /* mov R, Iv */
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
if (dflag == MO_64) {
uint64_t tmp;
/* 64 bit case */
tmp = cpu_ldq_code(env, s->pc);
s->pc += 8;
reg = (b & 7) | REX_B(s);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T0, tmp);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_64, reg, cpu_T0);
} else
#endif
{
ot = dflag;
val = insn_get(env, s, ot);
reg = (b & 7) | REX_B(s);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T0, val);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, reg, cpu_T0);
}
break;
case 0x91 ... 0x97: /* xchg R, EAX */
do_xchg_reg_eax:
ot = dflag;
reg = (b & 7) | REX_B(s);
rm = R_EAX;
goto do_xchg_reg;
case 0x86:
case 0x87: /* xchg Ev, Gv */
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
if (mod == 3) {
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
do_xchg_reg:
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, reg);
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T1, rm);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, rm, cpu_T0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, reg, cpu_T1);
} else {
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, reg);
/* for xchg, lock is implicit */
tcg_gen_atomic_xchg_tl(cpu_T1, cpu_A0, cpu_T0,
s->mem_index, ot | MO_LE);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, reg, cpu_T1);
}
break;
case 0xc4: /* les Gv */
/* In CODE64 this is VEX3; see above. */
op = R_ES;
goto do_lxx;
case 0xc5: /* lds Gv */
/* In CODE64 this is VEX2; see above. */
op = R_DS;
goto do_lxx;
case 0x1b2: /* lss Gv */
op = R_SS;
goto do_lxx;
case 0x1b4: /* lfs Gv */
op = R_FS;
goto do_lxx;
case 0x1b5: /* lgs Gv */
op = R_GS;
do_lxx:
ot = dflag != MO_16 ? MO_32 : MO_16;
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
if (mod == 3)
goto illegal_op;
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T1, cpu_A0);
gen_add_A0_im(s, 1 << ot);
/* load the segment first to handle exceptions properly */
gen_op_ld_v(s, MO_16, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
gen_movl_seg_T0(s, op);
/* then put the data */
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, reg, cpu_T1);
if (s->is_jmp) {
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
gen_eob(s);
}
break;
/************************/
/* shifts */
case 0xc0:
case 0xc1:
/* shift Ev,Ib */
shift = 2;
grp2:
{
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
op = (modrm >> 3) & 7;
if (mod != 3) {
if (shift == 2) {
s->rip_offset = 1;
}
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
opreg = OR_TMP0;
} else {
opreg = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
}
/* simpler op */
if (shift == 0) {
gen_shift(s, op, ot, opreg, OR_ECX);
} else {
if (shift == 2) {
shift = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
}
gen_shifti(s, op, ot, opreg, shift);
}
}
break;
case 0xd0:
case 0xd1:
/* shift Ev,1 */
shift = 1;
goto grp2;
case 0xd2:
case 0xd3:
/* shift Ev,cl */
shift = 0;
goto grp2;
case 0x1a4: /* shld imm */
op = 0;
shift = 1;
goto do_shiftd;
case 0x1a5: /* shld cl */
op = 0;
shift = 0;
goto do_shiftd;
case 0x1ac: /* shrd imm */
op = 1;
shift = 1;
goto do_shiftd;
case 0x1ad: /* shrd cl */
op = 1;
shift = 0;
do_shiftd:
ot = dflag;
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
if (mod != 3) {
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
opreg = OR_TMP0;
} else {
opreg = rm;
}
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T1, reg);
if (shift) {
TCGv imm = tcg_const_tl(cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++));
gen_shiftd_rm_T1(s, ot, opreg, op, imm);
tcg_temp_free(imm);
} else {
gen_shiftd_rm_T1(s, ot, opreg, op, cpu_regs[R_ECX]);
}
break;
/************************/
/* floats */
case 0xd8 ... 0xdf:
if (s->flags & (HF_EM_MASK | HF_TS_MASK)) {
/* if CR0.EM or CR0.TS are set, generate an FPU exception */
/* XXX: what to do if illegal op ? */
gen_exception(s, EXCP07_PREX, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
rm = modrm & 7;
op = ((b & 7) << 3) | ((modrm >> 3) & 7);
if (mod != 3) {
/* memory op */
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
switch(op) {
case 0x00 ... 0x07: /* fxxxs */
case 0x10 ... 0x17: /* fixxxl */
case 0x20 ... 0x27: /* fxxxl */
case 0x30 ... 0x37: /* fixxx */
{
int op1;
op1 = op & 7;
switch(op >> 4) {
case 0:
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUL);
gen_helper_flds_FT0(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32);
break;
case 1:
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUL);
gen_helper_fildl_FT0(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32);
break;
case 2:
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i64(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEQ);
gen_helper_fldl_FT0(cpu_env, cpu_tmp1_i64);
break;
case 3:
default:
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LESW);
gen_helper_fildl_FT0(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32);
break;
}
gen_helper_fp_arith_ST0_FT0(op1);
if (op1 == 3) {
/* fcomp needs pop */
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
}
}
break;
case 0x08: /* flds */
case 0x0a: /* fsts */
case 0x0b: /* fstps */
case 0x18 ... 0x1b: /* fildl, fisttpl, fistl, fistpl */
case 0x28 ... 0x2b: /* fldl, fisttpll, fstl, fstpl */
case 0x38 ... 0x3b: /* filds, fisttps, fists, fistps */
switch(op & 7) {
case 0:
switch(op >> 4) {
case 0:
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUL);
gen_helper_flds_ST0(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32);
break;
case 1:
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUL);
gen_helper_fildl_ST0(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32);
break;
case 2:
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i64(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEQ);
gen_helper_fldl_ST0(cpu_env, cpu_tmp1_i64);
break;
case 3:
default:
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LESW);
gen_helper_fildl_ST0(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32);
break;
}
break;
case 1:
/* XXX: the corresponding CPUID bit must be tested ! */
switch(op >> 4) {
case 1:
gen_helper_fisttl_ST0(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_env);
tcg_gen_qemu_st_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUL);
break;
case 2:
gen_helper_fisttll_ST0(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_env);
tcg_gen_qemu_st_i64(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEQ);
break;
case 3:
default:
gen_helper_fistt_ST0(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_env);
tcg_gen_qemu_st_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUW);
break;
}
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
break;
default:
switch(op >> 4) {
case 0:
gen_helper_fsts_ST0(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_env);
tcg_gen_qemu_st_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUL);
break;
case 1:
gen_helper_fistl_ST0(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_env);
tcg_gen_qemu_st_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUL);
break;
case 2:
gen_helper_fstl_ST0(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_env);
tcg_gen_qemu_st_i64(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEQ);
break;
case 3:
default:
gen_helper_fist_ST0(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_env);
tcg_gen_qemu_st_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUW);
break;
}
if ((op & 7) == 3)
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
break;
}
break;
case 0x0c: /* fldenv mem */
gen_helper_fldenv(cpu_env, cpu_A0, tcg_const_i32(dflag - 1));
break;
case 0x0d: /* fldcw mem */
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUW);
gen_helper_fldcw(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32);
break;
case 0x0e: /* fnstenv mem */
gen_helper_fstenv(cpu_env, cpu_A0, tcg_const_i32(dflag - 1));
break;
case 0x0f: /* fnstcw mem */
gen_helper_fnstcw(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_env);
tcg_gen_qemu_st_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUW);
break;
case 0x1d: /* fldt mem */
gen_helper_fldt_ST0(cpu_env, cpu_A0);
break;
case 0x1f: /* fstpt mem */
gen_helper_fstt_ST0(cpu_env, cpu_A0);
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
break;
case 0x2c: /* frstor mem */
gen_helper_frstor(cpu_env, cpu_A0, tcg_const_i32(dflag - 1));
break;
case 0x2e: /* fnsave mem */
gen_helper_fsave(cpu_env, cpu_A0, tcg_const_i32(dflag - 1));
break;
case 0x2f: /* fnstsw mem */
gen_helper_fnstsw(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_env);
tcg_gen_qemu_st_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUW);
break;
case 0x3c: /* fbld */
gen_helper_fbld_ST0(cpu_env, cpu_A0);
break;
case 0x3e: /* fbstp */
gen_helper_fbst_ST0(cpu_env, cpu_A0);
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
break;
case 0x3d: /* fildll */
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i64(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_A0, s->mem_index, MO_LEQ);
gen_helper_fildll_ST0(cpu_env, cpu_tmp1_i64);
break;
case 0x3f: /* fistpll */
gen_helper_fistll_ST0(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_env);
tcg_gen_qemu_st_i64(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_A0, s->mem_index, MO_LEQ);
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
} else {
/* register float ops */
opreg = rm;
switch(op) {
case 0x08: /* fld sti */
gen_helper_fpush(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fmov_ST0_STN(cpu_env,
tcg_const_i32((opreg + 1) & 7));
break;
case 0x09: /* fxchg sti */
case 0x29: /* fxchg4 sti, undocumented op */
case 0x39: /* fxchg7 sti, undocumented op */
gen_helper_fxchg_ST0_STN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(opreg));
break;
case 0x0a: /* grp d9/2 */
switch(rm) {
case 0: /* fnop */
/* check exceptions (FreeBSD FPU probe) */
gen_helper_fwait(cpu_env);
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
break;
case 0x0c: /* grp d9/4 */
switch(rm) {
case 0: /* fchs */
gen_helper_fchs_ST0(cpu_env);
break;
case 1: /* fabs */
gen_helper_fabs_ST0(cpu_env);
break;
case 4: /* ftst */
gen_helper_fldz_FT0(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fcom_ST0_FT0(cpu_env);
break;
case 5: /* fxam */
gen_helper_fxam_ST0(cpu_env);
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
break;
case 0x0d: /* grp d9/5 */
{
switch(rm) {
case 0:
gen_helper_fpush(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fld1_ST0(cpu_env);
break;
case 1:
gen_helper_fpush(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fldl2t_ST0(cpu_env);
break;
case 2:
gen_helper_fpush(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fldl2e_ST0(cpu_env);
break;
case 3:
gen_helper_fpush(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fldpi_ST0(cpu_env);
break;
case 4:
gen_helper_fpush(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fldlg2_ST0(cpu_env);
break;
case 5:
gen_helper_fpush(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fldln2_ST0(cpu_env);
break;
case 6:
gen_helper_fpush(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fldz_ST0(cpu_env);
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
}
break;
case 0x0e: /* grp d9/6 */
switch(rm) {
case 0: /* f2xm1 */
gen_helper_f2xm1(cpu_env);
break;
case 1: /* fyl2x */
gen_helper_fyl2x(cpu_env);
break;
case 2: /* fptan */
gen_helper_fptan(cpu_env);
break;
case 3: /* fpatan */
gen_helper_fpatan(cpu_env);
break;
case 4: /* fxtract */
gen_helper_fxtract(cpu_env);
break;
case 5: /* fprem1 */
gen_helper_fprem1(cpu_env);
break;
case 6: /* fdecstp */
gen_helper_fdecstp(cpu_env);
break;
default:
case 7: /* fincstp */
gen_helper_fincstp(cpu_env);
break;
}
break;
case 0x0f: /* grp d9/7 */
switch(rm) {
case 0: /* fprem */
gen_helper_fprem(cpu_env);
break;
case 1: /* fyl2xp1 */
gen_helper_fyl2xp1(cpu_env);
break;
case 2: /* fsqrt */
gen_helper_fsqrt(cpu_env);
break;
case 3: /* fsincos */
gen_helper_fsincos(cpu_env);
break;
case 5: /* fscale */
gen_helper_fscale(cpu_env);
break;
case 4: /* frndint */
gen_helper_frndint(cpu_env);
break;
case 6: /* fsin */
gen_helper_fsin(cpu_env);
break;
default:
case 7: /* fcos */
gen_helper_fcos(cpu_env);
break;
}
break;
case 0x00: case 0x01: case 0x04 ... 0x07: /* fxxx st, sti */
case 0x20: case 0x21: case 0x24 ... 0x27: /* fxxx sti, st */
case 0x30: case 0x31: case 0x34 ... 0x37: /* fxxxp sti, st */
{
int op1;
op1 = op & 7;
if (op >= 0x20) {
gen_helper_fp_arith_STN_ST0(op1, opreg);
if (op >= 0x30)
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
} else {
gen_helper_fmov_FT0_STN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(opreg));
gen_helper_fp_arith_ST0_FT0(op1);
}
}
break;
case 0x02: /* fcom */
case 0x22: /* fcom2, undocumented op */
gen_helper_fmov_FT0_STN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(opreg));
gen_helper_fcom_ST0_FT0(cpu_env);
break;
case 0x03: /* fcomp */
case 0x23: /* fcomp3, undocumented op */
case 0x32: /* fcomp5, undocumented op */
gen_helper_fmov_FT0_STN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(opreg));
gen_helper_fcom_ST0_FT0(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
break;
case 0x15: /* da/5 */
switch(rm) {
case 1: /* fucompp */
gen_helper_fmov_FT0_STN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(1));
gen_helper_fucom_ST0_FT0(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
break;
case 0x1c:
switch(rm) {
case 0: /* feni (287 only, just do nop here) */
break;
case 1: /* fdisi (287 only, just do nop here) */
break;
case 2: /* fclex */
gen_helper_fclex(cpu_env);
break;
case 3: /* fninit */
gen_helper_fninit(cpu_env);
break;
case 4: /* fsetpm (287 only, just do nop here) */
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
break;
case 0x1d: /* fucomi */
if (!(s->cpuid_features & CPUID_CMOV)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_helper_fmov_FT0_STN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(opreg));
gen_helper_fucomi_ST0_FT0(cpu_env);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
break;
case 0x1e: /* fcomi */
if (!(s->cpuid_features & CPUID_CMOV)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_helper_fmov_FT0_STN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(opreg));
gen_helper_fcomi_ST0_FT0(cpu_env);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
break;
case 0x28: /* ffree sti */
gen_helper_ffree_STN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(opreg));
break;
case 0x2a: /* fst sti */
gen_helper_fmov_STN_ST0(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(opreg));
break;
case 0x2b: /* fstp sti */
case 0x0b: /* fstp1 sti, undocumented op */
case 0x3a: /* fstp8 sti, undocumented op */
case 0x3b: /* fstp9 sti, undocumented op */
gen_helper_fmov_STN_ST0(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(opreg));
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
break;
case 0x2c: /* fucom st(i) */
gen_helper_fmov_FT0_STN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(opreg));
gen_helper_fucom_ST0_FT0(cpu_env);
break;
case 0x2d: /* fucomp st(i) */
gen_helper_fmov_FT0_STN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(opreg));
gen_helper_fucom_ST0_FT0(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
break;
case 0x33: /* de/3 */
switch(rm) {
case 1: /* fcompp */
gen_helper_fmov_FT0_STN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(1));
gen_helper_fcom_ST0_FT0(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
break;
case 0x38: /* ffreep sti, undocumented op */
gen_helper_ffree_STN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(opreg));
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
break;
case 0x3c: /* df/4 */
switch(rm) {
case 0:
gen_helper_fnstsw(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_env);
tcg_gen_extu_i32_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_tmp2_i32);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_16, R_EAX, cpu_T0);
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
break;
case 0x3d: /* fucomip */
if (!(s->cpuid_features & CPUID_CMOV)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_helper_fmov_FT0_STN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(opreg));
gen_helper_fucomi_ST0_FT0(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
break;
case 0x3e: /* fcomip */
if (!(s->cpuid_features & CPUID_CMOV)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_helper_fmov_FT0_STN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(opreg));
gen_helper_fcomi_ST0_FT0(cpu_env);
gen_helper_fpop(cpu_env);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
break;
case 0x10 ... 0x13: /* fcmovxx */
case 0x18 ... 0x1b:
{
int op1;
TCGLabel *l1;
static const uint8_t fcmov_cc[8] = {
(JCC_B << 1),
(JCC_Z << 1),
(JCC_BE << 1),
(JCC_P << 1),
};
if (!(s->cpuid_features & CPUID_CMOV)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
op1 = fcmov_cc[op & 3] | (((op >> 3) & 1) ^ 1);
l1 = gen_new_label();
gen_jcc1_noeob(s, op1, l1);
gen_helper_fmov_ST0_STN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(opreg));
gen_set_label(l1);
}
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
}
break;
/************************/
/* string ops */
case 0xa4: /* movsS */
case 0xa5:
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
if (prefixes & (PREFIX_REPZ | PREFIX_REPNZ)) {
gen_repz_movs(s, ot, pc_start - s->cs_base, s->pc - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_movs(s, ot);
}
break;
case 0xaa: /* stosS */
case 0xab:
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
if (prefixes & (PREFIX_REPZ | PREFIX_REPNZ)) {
gen_repz_stos(s, ot, pc_start - s->cs_base, s->pc - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_stos(s, ot);
}
break;
case 0xac: /* lodsS */
case 0xad:
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
if (prefixes & (PREFIX_REPZ | PREFIX_REPNZ)) {
gen_repz_lods(s, ot, pc_start - s->cs_base, s->pc - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_lods(s, ot);
}
break;
case 0xae: /* scasS */
case 0xaf:
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
if (prefixes & PREFIX_REPNZ) {
gen_repz_scas(s, ot, pc_start - s->cs_base, s->pc - s->cs_base, 1);
} else if (prefixes & PREFIX_REPZ) {
gen_repz_scas(s, ot, pc_start - s->cs_base, s->pc - s->cs_base, 0);
} else {
gen_scas(s, ot);
}
break;
case 0xa6: /* cmpsS */
case 0xa7:
ot = mo_b_d(b, dflag);
if (prefixes & PREFIX_REPNZ) {
gen_repz_cmps(s, ot, pc_start - s->cs_base, s->pc - s->cs_base, 1);
} else if (prefixes & PREFIX_REPZ) {
gen_repz_cmps(s, ot, pc_start - s->cs_base, s->pc - s->cs_base, 0);
} else {
gen_cmps(s, ot);
}
break;
case 0x6c: /* insS */
case 0x6d:
ot = mo_b_d32(b, dflag);
tcg_gen_ext16u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_regs[R_EDX]);
gen_check_io(s, ot, pc_start - s->cs_base,
SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK | svm_is_rep(prefixes) | 4);
if (prefixes & (PREFIX_REPZ | PREFIX_REPNZ)) {
gen_repz_ins(s, ot, pc_start - s->cs_base, s->pc - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_ins(s, ot);
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_jmp(s, s->pc - s->cs_base);
}
}
break;
case 0x6e: /* outsS */
case 0x6f:
ot = mo_b_d32(b, dflag);
tcg_gen_ext16u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_regs[R_EDX]);
gen_check_io(s, ot, pc_start - s->cs_base,
svm_is_rep(prefixes) | 4);
if (prefixes & (PREFIX_REPZ | PREFIX_REPNZ)) {
gen_repz_outs(s, ot, pc_start - s->cs_base, s->pc - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_outs(s, ot);
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_jmp(s, s->pc - s->cs_base);
}
}
break;
/************************/
/* port I/O */
case 0xe4:
case 0xe5:
ot = mo_b_d32(b, dflag);
val = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T0, val);
gen_check_io(s, ot, pc_start - s->cs_base,
SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK | svm_is_rep(prefixes));
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_start();
}
tcg_gen_movi_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, val);
gen_helper_in_func(ot, cpu_T1, cpu_tmp2_i32);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, R_EAX, cpu_T1);
gen_bpt_io(s, cpu_tmp2_i32, ot);
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_end();
gen_jmp(s, s->pc - s->cs_base);
}
break;
case 0xe6:
case 0xe7:
ot = mo_b_d32(b, dflag);
val = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T0, val);
gen_check_io(s, ot, pc_start - s->cs_base,
svm_is_rep(prefixes));
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T1, R_EAX);
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_start();
}
tcg_gen_movi_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, val);
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp3_i32, cpu_T1);
gen_helper_out_func(ot, cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp3_i32);
gen_bpt_io(s, cpu_tmp2_i32, ot);
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_end();
gen_jmp(s, s->pc - s->cs_base);
}
break;
case 0xec:
case 0xed:
ot = mo_b_d32(b, dflag);
tcg_gen_ext16u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_regs[R_EDX]);
gen_check_io(s, ot, pc_start - s->cs_base,
SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK | svm_is_rep(prefixes));
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_start();
}
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T0);
gen_helper_in_func(ot, cpu_T1, cpu_tmp2_i32);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, R_EAX, cpu_T1);
gen_bpt_io(s, cpu_tmp2_i32, ot);
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_end();
gen_jmp(s, s->pc - s->cs_base);
}
break;
case 0xee:
case 0xef:
ot = mo_b_d32(b, dflag);
tcg_gen_ext16u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_regs[R_EDX]);
gen_check_io(s, ot, pc_start - s->cs_base,
svm_is_rep(prefixes));
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T1, R_EAX);
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_start();
}
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp3_i32, cpu_T1);
gen_helper_out_func(ot, cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp3_i32);
gen_bpt_io(s, cpu_tmp2_i32, ot);
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_end();
gen_jmp(s, s->pc - s->cs_base);
}
break;
/************************/
/* control */
case 0xc2: /* ret im */
val = cpu_ldsw_code(env, s->pc);
s->pc += 2;
ot = gen_pop_T0(s);
gen_stack_update(s, val + (1 << ot));
/* Note that gen_pop_T0 uses a zero-extending load. */
gen_op_jmp_v(cpu_T0);
gen_bnd_jmp(s);
gen_eob(s);
break;
case 0xc3: /* ret */
ot = gen_pop_T0(s);
gen_pop_update(s, ot);
/* Note that gen_pop_T0 uses a zero-extending load. */
gen_op_jmp_v(cpu_T0);
gen_bnd_jmp(s);
gen_eob(s);
break;
case 0xca: /* lret im */
val = cpu_ldsw_code(env, s->pc);
s->pc += 2;
do_lret:
if (s->pe && !s->vm86) {
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_lret_protected(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(dflag - 1),
tcg_const_i32(val));
} else {
gen_stack_A0(s);
/* pop offset */
gen_op_ld_v(s, dflag, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
/* NOTE: keeping EIP updated is not a problem in case of
exception */
gen_op_jmp_v(cpu_T0);
/* pop selector */
gen_add_A0_im(s, 1 << dflag);
gen_op_ld_v(s, dflag, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
gen_op_movl_seg_T0_vm(R_CS);
/* add stack offset */
gen_stack_update(s, val + (2 << dflag));
}
gen_eob(s);
break;
case 0xcb: /* lret */
val = 0;
goto do_lret;
case 0xcf: /* iret */
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_IRET);
if (!s->pe) {
/* real mode */
gen_helper_iret_real(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(dflag - 1));
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
} else if (s->vm86) {
if (s->iopl != 3) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_helper_iret_real(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(dflag - 1));
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
}
} else {
gen_helper_iret_protected(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(dflag - 1),
tcg_const_i32(s->pc - s->cs_base));
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
}
gen_eob(s);
break;
case 0xe8: /* call im */
{
if (dflag != MO_16) {
tval = (int32_t)insn_get(env, s, MO_32);
} else {
tval = (int16_t)insn_get(env, s, MO_16);
}
next_eip = s->pc - s->cs_base;
tval += next_eip;
if (dflag == MO_16) {
tval &= 0xffff;
} else if (!CODE64(s)) {
tval &= 0xffffffff;
}
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T0, next_eip);
gen_push_v(s, cpu_T0);
gen_bnd_jmp(s);
gen_jmp(s, tval);
}
break;
case 0x9a: /* lcall im */
{
unsigned int selector, offset;
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
ot = dflag;
offset = insn_get(env, s, ot);
selector = insn_get(env, s, MO_16);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T0, selector);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T1, offset);
}
goto do_lcall;
case 0xe9: /* jmp im */
if (dflag != MO_16) {
tval = (int32_t)insn_get(env, s, MO_32);
} else {
tval = (int16_t)insn_get(env, s, MO_16);
}
tval += s->pc - s->cs_base;
if (dflag == MO_16) {
tval &= 0xffff;
} else if (!CODE64(s)) {
tval &= 0xffffffff;
}
gen_bnd_jmp(s);
gen_jmp(s, tval);
break;
case 0xea: /* ljmp im */
{
unsigned int selector, offset;
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
ot = dflag;
offset = insn_get(env, s, ot);
selector = insn_get(env, s, MO_16);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T0, selector);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T1, offset);
}
goto do_ljmp;
case 0xeb: /* jmp Jb */
tval = (int8_t)insn_get(env, s, MO_8);
tval += s->pc - s->cs_base;
if (dflag == MO_16) {
tval &= 0xffff;
}
gen_jmp(s, tval);
break;
case 0x70 ... 0x7f: /* jcc Jb */
tval = (int8_t)insn_get(env, s, MO_8);
goto do_jcc;
case 0x180 ... 0x18f: /* jcc Jv */
if (dflag != MO_16) {
tval = (int32_t)insn_get(env, s, MO_32);
} else {
tval = (int16_t)insn_get(env, s, MO_16);
}
do_jcc:
next_eip = s->pc - s->cs_base;
tval += next_eip;
if (dflag == MO_16) {
tval &= 0xffff;
}
gen_bnd_jmp(s);
gen_jcc(s, b, tval, next_eip);
break;
case 0x190 ... 0x19f: /* setcc Gv */
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
gen_setcc1(s, b, cpu_T0);
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, MO_8, OR_TMP0, 1);
break;
case 0x140 ... 0x14f: /* cmov Gv, Ev */
if (!(s->cpuid_features & CPUID_CMOV)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
ot = dflag;
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
gen_cmovcc1(env, s, ot, b, modrm, reg);
break;
/************************/
/* flags */
case 0x9c: /* pushf */
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_PUSHF);
if (s->vm86 && s->iopl != 3) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_helper_read_eflags(cpu_T0, cpu_env);
gen_push_v(s, cpu_T0);
}
break;
case 0x9d: /* popf */
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_POPF);
if (s->vm86 && s->iopl != 3) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
ot = gen_pop_T0(s);
if (s->cpl == 0) {
if (dflag != MO_16) {
gen_helper_write_eflags(cpu_env, cpu_T0,
tcg_const_i32((TF_MASK | AC_MASK |
ID_MASK | NT_MASK |
IF_MASK |
IOPL_MASK)));
} else {
gen_helper_write_eflags(cpu_env, cpu_T0,
tcg_const_i32((TF_MASK | AC_MASK |
ID_MASK | NT_MASK |
IF_MASK | IOPL_MASK)
& 0xffff));
}
} else {
if (s->cpl <= s->iopl) {
if (dflag != MO_16) {
gen_helper_write_eflags(cpu_env, cpu_T0,
tcg_const_i32((TF_MASK |
AC_MASK |
ID_MASK |
NT_MASK |
IF_MASK)));
} else {
gen_helper_write_eflags(cpu_env, cpu_T0,
tcg_const_i32((TF_MASK |
AC_MASK |
ID_MASK |
NT_MASK |
IF_MASK)
& 0xffff));
}
} else {
if (dflag != MO_16) {
gen_helper_write_eflags(cpu_env, cpu_T0,
tcg_const_i32((TF_MASK | AC_MASK |
ID_MASK | NT_MASK)));
} else {
gen_helper_write_eflags(cpu_env, cpu_T0,
tcg_const_i32((TF_MASK | AC_MASK |
ID_MASK | NT_MASK)
& 0xffff));
}
}
}
gen_pop_update(s, ot);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
/* abort translation because TF/AC flag may change */
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
gen_eob(s);
}
break;
case 0x9e: /* sahf */
if (CODE64(s) && !(s->cpuid_ext3_features & CPUID_EXT3_LAHF_LM))
goto illegal_op;
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_8, cpu_T0, R_AH);
gen_compute_eflags(s);
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_cc_src, CC_O);
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, CC_S | CC_Z | CC_A | CC_P | CC_C);
tcg_gen_or_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_cc_src, cpu_T0);
break;
case 0x9f: /* lahf */
if (CODE64(s) && !(s->cpuid_ext3_features & CPUID_EXT3_LAHF_LM))
goto illegal_op;
gen_compute_eflags(s);
/* Note: gen_compute_eflags() only gives the condition codes */
tcg_gen_ori_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_cc_src, 0x02);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_8, R_AH, cpu_T0);
break;
case 0xf5: /* cmc */
gen_compute_eflags(s);
tcg_gen_xori_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_cc_src, CC_C);
break;
case 0xf8: /* clc */
gen_compute_eflags(s);
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_cc_src, ~CC_C);
break;
case 0xf9: /* stc */
gen_compute_eflags(s);
tcg_gen_ori_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_cc_src, CC_C);
break;
case 0xfc: /* cld */
tcg_gen_movi_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, 1);
tcg_gen_st_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_env, offsetof(CPUX86State, df));
break;
case 0xfd: /* std */
tcg_gen_movi_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, -1);
tcg_gen_st_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_env, offsetof(CPUX86State, df));
break;
/************************/
/* bit operations */
case 0x1ba: /* bt/bts/btr/btc Gv, im */
ot = dflag;
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
op = (modrm >> 3) & 7;
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
if (mod != 3) {
s->rip_offset = 1;
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
if (!(s->prefix & PREFIX_LOCK)) {
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
}
} else {
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, rm);
}
/* load shift */
val = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T1, val);
if (op < 4)
goto unknown_op;
op -= 4;
goto bt_op;
case 0x1a3: /* bt Gv, Ev */
op = 0;
goto do_btx;
case 0x1ab: /* bts */
op = 1;
goto do_btx;
case 0x1b3: /* btr */
op = 2;
goto do_btx;
case 0x1bb: /* btc */
op = 3;
do_btx:
ot = dflag;
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_32, cpu_T1, reg);
if (mod != 3) {
AddressParts a = gen_lea_modrm_0(env, s, modrm);
/* specific case: we need to add a displacement */
gen_exts(ot, cpu_T1);
tcg_gen_sari_tl(cpu_tmp0, cpu_T1, 3 + ot);
tcg_gen_shli_tl(cpu_tmp0, cpu_tmp0, ot);
tcg_gen_add_tl(cpu_A0, gen_lea_modrm_1(a), cpu_tmp0);
gen_lea_v_seg(s, s->aflag, cpu_A0, a.def_seg, s->override);
if (!(s->prefix & PREFIX_LOCK)) {
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
}
} else {
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, rm);
}
bt_op:
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_T1, cpu_T1, (1 << (3 + ot)) - 1);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_tmp0, 1);
tcg_gen_shl_tl(cpu_tmp0, cpu_tmp0, cpu_T1);
if (s->prefix & PREFIX_LOCK) {
switch (op) {
case 0: /* bt */
/* Needs no atomic ops; we surpressed the normal
memory load for LOCK above so do it now. */
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
break;
case 1: /* bts */
tcg_gen_atomic_fetch_or_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_A0, cpu_tmp0,
s->mem_index, ot | MO_LE);
break;
case 2: /* btr */
tcg_gen_not_tl(cpu_tmp0, cpu_tmp0);
tcg_gen_atomic_fetch_and_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_A0, cpu_tmp0,
s->mem_index, ot | MO_LE);
break;
default:
case 3: /* btc */
tcg_gen_atomic_fetch_xor_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_A0, cpu_tmp0,
s->mem_index, ot | MO_LE);
break;
}
tcg_gen_shr_tl(cpu_tmp4, cpu_T0, cpu_T1);
} else {
tcg_gen_shr_tl(cpu_tmp4, cpu_T0, cpu_T1);
switch (op) {
case 0: /* bt */
/* Data already loaded; nothing to do. */
break;
case 1: /* bts */
tcg_gen_or_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, cpu_tmp0);
break;
case 2: /* btr */
tcg_gen_andc_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, cpu_tmp0);
break;
default:
case 3: /* btc */
tcg_gen_xor_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, cpu_tmp0);
break;
}
if (op != 0) {
if (mod != 3) {
gen_op_st_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
} else {
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, rm, cpu_T0);
}
}
}
/* Delay all CC updates until after the store above. Note that
C is the result of the test, Z is unchanged, and the others
are all undefined. */
switch (s->cc_op) {
case CC_OP_MULB ... CC_OP_MULQ:
case CC_OP_ADDB ... CC_OP_ADDQ:
case CC_OP_ADCB ... CC_OP_ADCQ:
case CC_OP_SUBB ... CC_OP_SUBQ:
case CC_OP_SBBB ... CC_OP_SBBQ:
case CC_OP_LOGICB ... CC_OP_LOGICQ:
case CC_OP_INCB ... CC_OP_INCQ:
case CC_OP_DECB ... CC_OP_DECQ:
case CC_OP_SHLB ... CC_OP_SHLQ:
case CC_OP_SARB ... CC_OP_SARQ:
case CC_OP_BMILGB ... CC_OP_BMILGQ:
/* Z was going to be computed from the non-zero status of CC_DST.
We can get that same Z value (and the new C value) by leaving
CC_DST alone, setting CC_SRC, and using a CC_OP_SAR of the
same width. */
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_tmp4);
set_cc_op(s, ((s->cc_op - CC_OP_MULB) & 3) + CC_OP_SARB);
break;
default:
/* Otherwise, generate EFLAGS and replace the C bit. */
gen_compute_eflags(s);
tcg_gen_deposit_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_cc_src, cpu_tmp4,
ctz32(CC_C), 1);
break;
}
break;
case 0x1bc: /* bsf / tzcnt */
case 0x1bd: /* bsr / lzcnt */
ot = dflag;
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, ot, OR_TMP0, 0);
gen_extu(ot, cpu_T0);
/* Note that lzcnt and tzcnt are in different extensions. */
if ((prefixes & PREFIX_REPZ)
&& (b & 1
? s->cpuid_ext3_features & CPUID_EXT3_ABM
: s->cpuid_7_0_ebx_features & CPUID_7_0_EBX_BMI1)) {
int size = 8 << ot;
/* For lzcnt/tzcnt, C bit is defined related to the input. */
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_T0);
if (b & 1) {
/* For lzcnt, reduce the target_ulong result by the
number of zeros that we expect to find at the top. */
tcg_gen_clzi_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, TARGET_LONG_BITS);
tcg_gen_subi_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, TARGET_LONG_BITS - size);
} else {
/* For tzcnt, a zero input must return the operand size. */
tcg_gen_ctzi_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, size);
}
/* For lzcnt/tzcnt, Z bit is defined related to the result. */
gen_op_update1_cc();
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_BMILGB + ot);
} else {
/* For bsr/bsf, only the Z bit is defined and it is related
to the input and not the result. */
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_T0);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_LOGICB + ot);
/* ??? The manual says that the output is undefined when the
input is zero, but real hardware leaves it unchanged, and
real programs appear to depend on that. Accomplish this
by passing the output as the value to return upon zero. */
if (b & 1) {
/* For bsr, return the bit index of the first 1 bit,
not the count of leading zeros. */
tcg_gen_xori_tl(cpu_T1, cpu_regs[reg], TARGET_LONG_BITS - 1);
tcg_gen_clz_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, cpu_T1);
tcg_gen_xori_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, TARGET_LONG_BITS - 1);
} else {
tcg_gen_ctz_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, cpu_regs[reg]);
}
}
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, reg, cpu_T0);
break;
/************************/
/* bcd */
case 0x27: /* daa */
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_helper_daa(cpu_env);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
break;
case 0x2f: /* das */
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_helper_das(cpu_env);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
break;
case 0x37: /* aaa */
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_helper_aaa(cpu_env);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
break;
case 0x3f: /* aas */
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_helper_aas(cpu_env);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
break;
case 0xd4: /* aam */
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
val = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
if (val == 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP00_DIVZ, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_helper_aam(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(val));
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_LOGICB);
}
break;
case 0xd5: /* aad */
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
val = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
gen_helper_aad(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(val));
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_LOGICB);
break;
/************************/
/* misc */
case 0x90: /* nop */
/* XXX: correct lock test for all insn */
if (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK) {
goto illegal_op;
}
/* If REX_B is set, then this is xchg eax, r8d, not a nop. */
if (REX_B(s)) {
goto do_xchg_reg_eax;
}
if (prefixes & PREFIX_REPZ) {
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_pause(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(s->pc - pc_start));
s->is_jmp = DISAS_TB_JUMP;
}
break;
case 0x9b: /* fwait */
if ((s->flags & (HF_MP_MASK | HF_TS_MASK)) ==
(HF_MP_MASK | HF_TS_MASK)) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP07_PREX, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_helper_fwait(cpu_env);
}
break;
case 0xcc: /* int3 */
gen_interrupt(s, EXCP03_INT3, pc_start - s->cs_base, s->pc - s->cs_base);
break;
case 0xcd: /* int N */
val = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
if (s->vm86 && s->iopl != 3) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_interrupt(s, val, pc_start - s->cs_base, s->pc - s->cs_base);
}
break;
case 0xce: /* into */
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_into(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(s->pc - pc_start));
break;
#ifdef WANT_ICEBP
case 0xf1: /* icebp (undocumented, exits to external debugger) */
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_ICEBP);
#if 1
gen_debug(s, pc_start - s->cs_base);
#else
/* start debug */
tb_flush(CPU(x86_env_get_cpu(env)));
qemu_set_log(CPU_LOG_INT | CPU_LOG_TB_IN_ASM);
#endif
break;
#endif
case 0xfa: /* cli */
if (!s->vm86) {
if (s->cpl <= s->iopl) {
gen_helper_cli(cpu_env);
} else {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
}
} else {
if (s->iopl == 3) {
gen_helper_cli(cpu_env);
} else {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
}
}
break;
case 0xfb: /* sti */
if (s->vm86 ? s->iopl == 3 : s->cpl <= s->iopl) {
gen_helper_sti(cpu_env);
/* interruptions are enabled only the first insn after sti */
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
gen_eob_inhibit_irq(s, true);
} else {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
}
break;
case 0x62: /* bound */
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
ot = dflag;
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = (modrm >> 3) & 7;
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
if (mod == 3)
goto illegal_op;
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, reg);
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T0);
if (ot == MO_16) {
gen_helper_boundw(cpu_env, cpu_A0, cpu_tmp2_i32);
} else {
gen_helper_boundl(cpu_env, cpu_A0, cpu_tmp2_i32);
}
break;
case 0x1c8 ... 0x1cf: /* bswap reg */
reg = (b & 7) | REX_B(s);
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
if (dflag == MO_64) {
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_64, cpu_T0, reg);
tcg_gen_bswap64_i64(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_64, reg, cpu_T0);
} else
#endif
{
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_32, cpu_T0, reg);
tcg_gen_ext32u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_bswap32_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_32, reg, cpu_T0);
}
break;
case 0xd6: /* salc */
if (CODE64(s))
goto illegal_op;
gen_compute_eflags_c(s, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_neg_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(MO_8, R_EAX, cpu_T0);
break;
case 0xe0: /* loopnz */
case 0xe1: /* loopz */
case 0xe2: /* loop */
case 0xe3: /* jecxz */
{
TCGLabel *l1, *l2, *l3;
tval = (int8_t)insn_get(env, s, MO_8);
next_eip = s->pc - s->cs_base;
tval += next_eip;
if (dflag == MO_16) {
tval &= 0xffff;
}
l1 = gen_new_label();
l2 = gen_new_label();
l3 = gen_new_label();
b &= 3;
switch(b) {
case 0: /* loopnz */
case 1: /* loopz */
gen_op_add_reg_im(s->aflag, R_ECX, -1);
gen_op_jz_ecx(s->aflag, l3);
gen_jcc1(s, (JCC_Z << 1) | (b ^ 1), l1);
break;
case 2: /* loop */
gen_op_add_reg_im(s->aflag, R_ECX, -1);
gen_op_jnz_ecx(s->aflag, l1);
break;
default:
case 3: /* jcxz */
gen_op_jz_ecx(s->aflag, l1);
break;
}
gen_set_label(l3);
gen_jmp_im(next_eip);
tcg_gen_br(l2);
gen_set_label(l1);
gen_jmp_im(tval);
gen_set_label(l2);
gen_eob(s);
}
break;
case 0x130: /* wrmsr */
case 0x132: /* rdmsr */
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
if (b & 2) {
gen_helper_rdmsr(cpu_env);
} else {
gen_helper_wrmsr(cpu_env);
}
}
break;
case 0x131: /* rdtsc */
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_start();
}
gen_helper_rdtsc(cpu_env);
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_end();
gen_jmp(s, s->pc - s->cs_base);
}
break;
case 0x133: /* rdpmc */
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_rdpmc(cpu_env);
break;
case 0x134: /* sysenter */
/* For Intel SYSENTER is valid on 64-bit */
if (CODE64(s) && env->cpuid_vendor1 != CPUID_VENDOR_INTEL_1)
goto illegal_op;
if (!s->pe) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_helper_sysenter(cpu_env);
gen_eob(s);
}
break;
case 0x135: /* sysexit */
/* For Intel SYSEXIT is valid on 64-bit */
if (CODE64(s) && env->cpuid_vendor1 != CPUID_VENDOR_INTEL_1)
goto illegal_op;
if (!s->pe) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_helper_sysexit(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(dflag - 1));
gen_eob(s);
}
break;
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
case 0x105: /* syscall */
/* XXX: is it usable in real mode ? */
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_syscall(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(s->pc - pc_start));
/* TF handling for the syscall insn is different. The TF bit is checked
after the syscall insn completes. This allows #DB to not be
generated after one has entered CPL0 if TF is set in FMASK. */
gen_eob_worker(s, false, true);
break;
case 0x107: /* sysret */
if (!s->pe) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_helper_sysret(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(dflag - 1));
/* condition codes are modified only in long mode */
if (s->lma) {
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
}
/* TF handling for the sysret insn is different. The TF bit is
checked after the sysret insn completes. This allows #DB to be
generated "as if" the syscall insn in userspace has just
completed. */
gen_eob_worker(s, false, true);
}
break;
#endif
case 0x1a2: /* cpuid */
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_cpuid(cpu_env);
break;
case 0xf4: /* hlt */
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_hlt(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(s->pc - pc_start));
s->is_jmp = DISAS_TB_JUMP;
}
break;
case 0x100:
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
op = (modrm >> 3) & 7;
switch(op) {
case 0: /* sldt */
if (!s->pe || s->vm86)
goto illegal_op;
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_LDTR_READ);
tcg_gen_ld32u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_env,
offsetof(CPUX86State, ldt.selector));
ot = mod == 3 ? dflag : MO_16;
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, ot, OR_TMP0, 1);
break;
case 2: /* lldt */
if (!s->pe || s->vm86)
goto illegal_op;
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_LDTR_WRITE);
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, MO_16, OR_TMP0, 0);
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T0);
gen_helper_lldt(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32);
}
break;
case 1: /* str */
if (!s->pe || s->vm86)
goto illegal_op;
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_TR_READ);
tcg_gen_ld32u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_env,
offsetof(CPUX86State, tr.selector));
ot = mod == 3 ? dflag : MO_16;
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, ot, OR_TMP0, 1);
break;
case 3: /* ltr */
if (!s->pe || s->vm86)
goto illegal_op;
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_TR_WRITE);
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, MO_16, OR_TMP0, 0);
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T0);
gen_helper_ltr(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32);
}
break;
case 4: /* verr */
case 5: /* verw */
if (!s->pe || s->vm86)
goto illegal_op;
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, MO_16, OR_TMP0, 0);
gen_update_cc_op(s);
if (op == 4) {
gen_helper_verr(cpu_env, cpu_T0);
} else {
gen_helper_verw(cpu_env, cpu_T0);
}
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
break;
case 0x101:
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
switch (modrm) {
CASE_MODRM_MEM_OP(0): /* sgdt */
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_GDTR_READ);
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
tcg_gen_ld32u_tl(cpu_T0,
cpu_env, offsetof(CPUX86State, gdt.limit));
gen_op_st_v(s, MO_16, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
gen_add_A0_im(s, 2);
tcg_gen_ld_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_env, offsetof(CPUX86State, gdt.base));
if (dflag == MO_16) {
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, 0xffffff);
}
gen_op_st_v(s, CODE64(s) + MO_32, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
break;
case 0xc8: /* monitor */
if (!(s->cpuid_ext_features & CPUID_EXT_MONITOR) || s->cpl != 0) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_A0, cpu_regs[R_EAX]);
gen_extu(s->aflag, cpu_A0);
gen_add_A0_ds_seg(s);
gen_helper_monitor(cpu_env, cpu_A0);
break;
case 0xc9: /* mwait */
if (!(s->cpuid_ext_features & CPUID_EXT_MONITOR) || s->cpl != 0) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_mwait(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(s->pc - pc_start));
gen_eob(s);
break;
case 0xca: /* clac */
if (!(s->cpuid_7_0_ebx_features & CPUID_7_0_EBX_SMAP)
|| s->cpl != 0) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_helper_clac(cpu_env);
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
gen_eob(s);
break;
case 0xcb: /* stac */
if (!(s->cpuid_7_0_ebx_features & CPUID_7_0_EBX_SMAP)
|| s->cpl != 0) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_helper_stac(cpu_env);
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
gen_eob(s);
break;
CASE_MODRM_MEM_OP(1): /* sidt */
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_IDTR_READ);
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
tcg_gen_ld32u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_env, offsetof(CPUX86State, idt.limit));
gen_op_st_v(s, MO_16, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
gen_add_A0_im(s, 2);
tcg_gen_ld_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_env, offsetof(CPUX86State, idt.base));
if (dflag == MO_16) {
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, 0xffffff);
}
gen_op_st_v(s, CODE64(s) + MO_32, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
break;
case 0xd0: /* xgetbv */
if ((s->cpuid_ext_features & CPUID_EXT_XSAVE) == 0
|| (s->prefix & (PREFIX_LOCK | PREFIX_DATA
| PREFIX_REPZ | PREFIX_REPNZ))) {
goto illegal_op;
}
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_regs[R_ECX]);
gen_helper_xgetbv(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32);
tcg_gen_extr_i64_tl(cpu_regs[R_EAX], cpu_regs[R_EDX], cpu_tmp1_i64);
break;
case 0xd1: /* xsetbv */
if ((s->cpuid_ext_features & CPUID_EXT_XSAVE) == 0
|| (s->prefix & (PREFIX_LOCK | PREFIX_DATA
| PREFIX_REPZ | PREFIX_REPNZ))) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
tcg_gen_concat_tl_i64(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_regs[R_EAX],
cpu_regs[R_EDX]);
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_regs[R_ECX]);
gen_helper_xsetbv(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp1_i64);
/* End TB because translation flags may change. */
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
gen_eob(s);
break;
case 0xd8: /* VMRUN */
if (!(s->flags & HF_SVME_MASK) || !s->pe) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_vmrun(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(s->aflag - 1),
tcg_const_i32(s->pc - pc_start));
tcg_gen_exit_tb(0);
s->is_jmp = DISAS_TB_JUMP;
break;
case 0xd9: /* VMMCALL */
if (!(s->flags & HF_SVME_MASK)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_vmmcall(cpu_env);
break;
case 0xda: /* VMLOAD */
if (!(s->flags & HF_SVME_MASK) || !s->pe) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_vmload(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(s->aflag - 1));
break;
case 0xdb: /* VMSAVE */
if (!(s->flags & HF_SVME_MASK) || !s->pe) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_vmsave(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(s->aflag - 1));
break;
case 0xdc: /* STGI */
if ((!(s->flags & HF_SVME_MASK)
&& !(s->cpuid_ext3_features & CPUID_EXT3_SKINIT))
|| !s->pe) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_stgi(cpu_env);
break;
case 0xdd: /* CLGI */
if (!(s->flags & HF_SVME_MASK) || !s->pe) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_clgi(cpu_env);
break;
case 0xde: /* SKINIT */
if ((!(s->flags & HF_SVME_MASK)
&& !(s->cpuid_ext3_features & CPUID_EXT3_SKINIT))
|| !s->pe) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_skinit(cpu_env);
break;
case 0xdf: /* INVLPGA */
if (!(s->flags & HF_SVME_MASK) || !s->pe) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_invlpga(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(s->aflag - 1));
break;
CASE_MODRM_MEM_OP(2): /* lgdt */
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_GDTR_WRITE);
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
gen_op_ld_v(s, MO_16, cpu_T1, cpu_A0);
gen_add_A0_im(s, 2);
gen_op_ld_v(s, CODE64(s) + MO_32, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
if (dflag == MO_16) {
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, 0xffffff);
}
tcg_gen_st_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_env, offsetof(CPUX86State, gdt.base));
tcg_gen_st32_tl(cpu_T1, cpu_env, offsetof(CPUX86State, gdt.limit));
break;
CASE_MODRM_MEM_OP(3): /* lidt */
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_IDTR_WRITE);
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
gen_op_ld_v(s, MO_16, cpu_T1, cpu_A0);
gen_add_A0_im(s, 2);
gen_op_ld_v(s, CODE64(s) + MO_32, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
if (dflag == MO_16) {
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, 0xffffff);
}
tcg_gen_st_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_env, offsetof(CPUX86State, idt.base));
tcg_gen_st32_tl(cpu_T1, cpu_env, offsetof(CPUX86State, idt.limit));
break;
CASE_MODRM_OP(4): /* smsw */
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0);
tcg_gen_ld_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_env, offsetof(CPUX86State, cr[0]));
if (CODE64(s)) {
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
ot = (mod != 3 ? MO_16 : s->dflag);
} else {
ot = MO_16;
}
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, ot, OR_TMP0, 1);
break;
case 0xee: /* rdpkru */
if (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK) {
goto illegal_op;
}
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_regs[R_ECX]);
gen_helper_rdpkru(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32);
tcg_gen_extr_i64_tl(cpu_regs[R_EAX], cpu_regs[R_EDX], cpu_tmp1_i64);
break;
case 0xef: /* wrpkru */
if (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK) {
goto illegal_op;
}
tcg_gen_concat_tl_i64(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_regs[R_EAX],
cpu_regs[R_EDX]);
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_regs[R_ECX]);
gen_helper_wrpkru(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp1_i64);
break;
CASE_MODRM_OP(6): /* lmsw */
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0);
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, MO_16, OR_TMP0, 0);
gen_helper_lmsw(cpu_env, cpu_T0);
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
gen_eob(s);
break;
CASE_MODRM_MEM_OP(7): /* invlpg */
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
gen_helper_invlpg(cpu_env, cpu_A0);
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
gen_eob(s);
break;
case 0xf8: /* swapgs */
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
if (CODE64(s)) {
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_seg_base[R_GS]);
tcg_gen_ld_tl(cpu_seg_base[R_GS], cpu_env,
offsetof(CPUX86State, kernelgsbase));
tcg_gen_st_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_env,
offsetof(CPUX86State, kernelgsbase));
}
break;
}
#endif
goto illegal_op;
case 0xf9: /* rdtscp */
if (!(s->cpuid_ext2_features & CPUID_EXT2_RDTSCP)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_start();
}
gen_helper_rdtscp(cpu_env);
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_end();
gen_jmp(s, s->pc - s->cs_base);
}
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
break;
case 0x108: /* invd */
case 0x109: /* wbinvd */
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, (b & 2) ? SVM_EXIT_INVD : SVM_EXIT_WBINVD);
/* nothing to do */
}
break;
case 0x63: /* arpl or movslS (x86_64) */
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
if (CODE64(s)) {
int d_ot;
/* d_ot is the size of destination */
d_ot = dflag;
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
if (mod == 3) {
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_32, cpu_T0, rm);
/* sign extend */
if (d_ot == MO_64) {
tcg_gen_ext32s_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
}
gen_op_mov_reg_v(d_ot, reg, cpu_T0);
} else {
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
gen_op_ld_v(s, MO_32 | MO_SIGN, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(d_ot, reg, cpu_T0);
}
} else
#endif
{
TCGLabel *label1;
TCGv t0, t1, t2, a0;
if (!s->pe || s->vm86)
goto illegal_op;
t0 = tcg_temp_local_new();
t1 = tcg_temp_local_new();
t2 = tcg_temp_local_new();
ot = MO_16;
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = (modrm >> 3) & 7;
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
rm = modrm & 7;
if (mod != 3) {
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, t0, cpu_A0);
a0 = tcg_temp_local_new();
tcg_gen_mov_tl(a0, cpu_A0);
} else {
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, t0, rm);
TCGV_UNUSED(a0);
}
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, t1, reg);
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_tmp0, t0, 3);
tcg_gen_andi_tl(t1, t1, 3);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(t2, 0);
label1 = gen_new_label();
tcg_gen_brcond_tl(TCG_COND_GE, cpu_tmp0, t1, label1);
tcg_gen_andi_tl(t0, t0, ~3);
tcg_gen_or_tl(t0, t0, t1);
tcg_gen_movi_tl(t2, CC_Z);
gen_set_label(label1);
if (mod != 3) {
gen_op_st_v(s, ot, t0, a0);
tcg_temp_free(a0);
} else {
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, rm, t0);
}
gen_compute_eflags(s);
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_cc_src, ~CC_Z);
tcg_gen_or_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_cc_src, t2);
tcg_temp_free(t0);
tcg_temp_free(t1);
tcg_temp_free(t2);
}
break;
case 0x102: /* lar */
case 0x103: /* lsl */
{
TCGLabel *label1;
TCGv t0;
if (!s->pe || s->vm86)
goto illegal_op;
ot = dflag != MO_16 ? MO_32 : MO_16;
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, MO_16, OR_TMP0, 0);
t0 = tcg_temp_local_new();
gen_update_cc_op(s);
if (b == 0x102) {
gen_helper_lar(t0, cpu_env, cpu_T0);
} else {
gen_helper_lsl(t0, cpu_env, cpu_T0);
}
tcg_gen_andi_tl(cpu_tmp0, cpu_cc_src, CC_Z);
label1 = gen_new_label();
tcg_gen_brcondi_tl(TCG_COND_EQ, cpu_tmp0, 0, label1);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, reg, t0);
gen_set_label(label1);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_EFLAGS);
tcg_temp_free(t0);
}
break;
case 0x118:
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
op = (modrm >> 3) & 7;
switch(op) {
case 0: /* prefetchnta */
case 1: /* prefetchnt0 */
case 2: /* prefetchnt0 */
case 3: /* prefetchnt0 */
if (mod == 3)
goto illegal_op;
gen_nop_modrm(env, s, modrm);
/* nothing more to do */
break;
default: /* nop (multi byte) */
gen_nop_modrm(env, s, modrm);
break;
}
break;
case 0x11a:
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
if (s->flags & HF_MPX_EN_MASK) {
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
if (prefixes & PREFIX_REPZ) {
/* bndcl */
if (reg >= 4
|| (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK)
|| s->aflag == MO_16) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_bndck(env, s, modrm, TCG_COND_LTU, cpu_bndl[reg]);
} else if (prefixes & PREFIX_REPNZ) {
/* bndcu */
if (reg >= 4
|| (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK)
|| s->aflag == MO_16) {
goto illegal_op;
}
TCGv_i64 notu = tcg_temp_new_i64();
tcg_gen_not_i64(notu, cpu_bndu[reg]);
gen_bndck(env, s, modrm, TCG_COND_GTU, notu);
tcg_temp_free_i64(notu);
} else if (prefixes & PREFIX_DATA) {
/* bndmov -- from reg/mem */
if (reg >= 4 || s->aflag == MO_16) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (mod == 3) {
int reg2 = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
if (reg2 >= 4 || (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (s->flags & HF_MPX_IU_MASK) {
tcg_gen_mov_i64(cpu_bndl[reg], cpu_bndl[reg2]);
tcg_gen_mov_i64(cpu_bndu[reg], cpu_bndu[reg2]);
}
} else {
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
if (CODE64(s)) {
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i64(cpu_bndl[reg], cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEQ);
tcg_gen_addi_tl(cpu_A0, cpu_A0, 8);
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i64(cpu_bndu[reg], cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEQ);
} else {
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i64(cpu_bndl[reg], cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUL);
tcg_gen_addi_tl(cpu_A0, cpu_A0, 4);
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i64(cpu_bndu[reg], cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUL);
}
/* bnd registers are now in-use */
gen_set_hflag(s, HF_MPX_IU_MASK);
}
} else if (mod != 3) {
/* bndldx */
AddressParts a = gen_lea_modrm_0(env, s, modrm);
if (reg >= 4
|| (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK)
|| s->aflag == MO_16
|| a.base < -1) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (a.base >= 0) {
tcg_gen_addi_tl(cpu_A0, cpu_regs[a.base], a.disp);
} else {
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_A0, 0);
}
gen_lea_v_seg(s, s->aflag, cpu_A0, a.def_seg, s->override);
if (a.index >= 0) {
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_regs[a.index]);
} else {
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T0, 0);
}
if (CODE64(s)) {
gen_helper_bndldx64(cpu_bndl[reg], cpu_env, cpu_A0, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_ld_i64(cpu_bndu[reg], cpu_env,
offsetof(CPUX86State, mmx_t0.MMX_Q(0)));
} else {
gen_helper_bndldx32(cpu_bndu[reg], cpu_env, cpu_A0, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_ext32u_i64(cpu_bndl[reg], cpu_bndu[reg]);
tcg_gen_shri_i64(cpu_bndu[reg], cpu_bndu[reg], 32);
}
gen_set_hflag(s, HF_MPX_IU_MASK);
}
}
gen_nop_modrm(env, s, modrm);
break;
case 0x11b:
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
if (s->flags & HF_MPX_EN_MASK) {
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
if (mod != 3 && (prefixes & PREFIX_REPZ)) {
/* bndmk */
if (reg >= 4
|| (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK)
|| s->aflag == MO_16) {
goto illegal_op;
}
AddressParts a = gen_lea_modrm_0(env, s, modrm);
if (a.base >= 0) {
tcg_gen_extu_tl_i64(cpu_bndl[reg], cpu_regs[a.base]);
if (!CODE64(s)) {
tcg_gen_ext32u_i64(cpu_bndl[reg], cpu_bndl[reg]);
}
} else if (a.base == -1) {
/* no base register has lower bound of 0 */
tcg_gen_movi_i64(cpu_bndl[reg], 0);
} else {
/* rip-relative generates #ud */
goto illegal_op;
}
tcg_gen_not_tl(cpu_A0, gen_lea_modrm_1(a));
if (!CODE64(s)) {
tcg_gen_ext32u_tl(cpu_A0, cpu_A0);
}
tcg_gen_extu_tl_i64(cpu_bndu[reg], cpu_A0);
/* bnd registers are now in-use */
gen_set_hflag(s, HF_MPX_IU_MASK);
break;
} else if (prefixes & PREFIX_REPNZ) {
/* bndcn */
if (reg >= 4
|| (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK)
|| s->aflag == MO_16) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_bndck(env, s, modrm, TCG_COND_GTU, cpu_bndu[reg]);
} else if (prefixes & PREFIX_DATA) {
/* bndmov -- to reg/mem */
if (reg >= 4 || s->aflag == MO_16) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (mod == 3) {
int reg2 = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
if (reg2 >= 4 || (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (s->flags & HF_MPX_IU_MASK) {
tcg_gen_mov_i64(cpu_bndl[reg2], cpu_bndl[reg]);
tcg_gen_mov_i64(cpu_bndu[reg2], cpu_bndu[reg]);
}
} else {
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
if (CODE64(s)) {
tcg_gen_qemu_st_i64(cpu_bndl[reg], cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEQ);
tcg_gen_addi_tl(cpu_A0, cpu_A0, 8);
tcg_gen_qemu_st_i64(cpu_bndu[reg], cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEQ);
} else {
tcg_gen_qemu_st_i64(cpu_bndl[reg], cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUL);
tcg_gen_addi_tl(cpu_A0, cpu_A0, 4);
tcg_gen_qemu_st_i64(cpu_bndu[reg], cpu_A0,
s->mem_index, MO_LEUL);
}
}
} else if (mod != 3) {
/* bndstx */
AddressParts a = gen_lea_modrm_0(env, s, modrm);
if (reg >= 4
|| (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK)
|| s->aflag == MO_16
|| a.base < -1) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (a.base >= 0) {
tcg_gen_addi_tl(cpu_A0, cpu_regs[a.base], a.disp);
} else {
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_A0, 0);
}
gen_lea_v_seg(s, s->aflag, cpu_A0, a.def_seg, s->override);
if (a.index >= 0) {
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_regs[a.index]);
} else {
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T0, 0);
}
if (CODE64(s)) {
gen_helper_bndstx64(cpu_env, cpu_A0, cpu_T0,
cpu_bndl[reg], cpu_bndu[reg]);
} else {
gen_helper_bndstx32(cpu_env, cpu_A0, cpu_T0,
cpu_bndl[reg], cpu_bndu[reg]);
}
}
}
gen_nop_modrm(env, s, modrm);
break;
case 0x119: case 0x11c ... 0x11f: /* nop (multi byte) */
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
gen_nop_modrm(env, s, modrm);
break;
case 0x120: /* mov reg, crN */
case 0x122: /* mov crN, reg */
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
/* Ignore the mod bits (assume (modrm&0xc0)==0xc0).
* AMD documentation (24594.pdf) and testing of
* intel 386 and 486 processors all show that the mod bits
* are assumed to be 1's, regardless of actual values.
*/
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
if (CODE64(s))
ot = MO_64;
else
ot = MO_32;
if ((prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK) && (reg == 0) &&
(s->cpuid_ext3_features & CPUID_EXT3_CR8LEG)) {
reg = 8;
}
switch(reg) {
case 0:
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
case 8:
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
if (b & 2) {
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, rm);
gen_helper_write_crN(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(reg),
cpu_T0);
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
gen_eob(s);
} else {
gen_helper_read_crN(cpu_T0, cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(reg));
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, rm, cpu_T0);
}
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
}
break;
case 0x121: /* mov reg, drN */
case 0x123: /* mov drN, reg */
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
/* Ignore the mod bits (assume (modrm&0xc0)==0xc0).
* AMD documentation (24594.pdf) and testing of
* intel 386 and 486 processors all show that the mod bits
* are assumed to be 1's, regardless of actual values.
*/
rm = (modrm & 7) | REX_B(s);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
if (CODE64(s))
ot = MO_64;
else
ot = MO_32;
if (reg >= 8) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (b & 2) {
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR0 + reg);
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, rm);
tcg_gen_movi_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, reg);
gen_helper_set_dr(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_T0);
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
gen_eob(s);
} else {
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0 + reg);
tcg_gen_movi_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, reg);
gen_helper_get_dr(cpu_T0, cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, rm, cpu_T0);
}
}
break;
case 0x106: /* clts */
if (s->cpl != 0) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP0D_GPF, pc_start - s->cs_base);
} else {
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0);
gen_helper_clts(cpu_env);
/* abort block because static cpu state changed */
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
gen_eob(s);
}
break;
/* MMX/3DNow!/SSE/SSE2/SSE3/SSSE3/SSE4 support */
case 0x1c3: /* MOVNTI reg, mem */
if (!(s->cpuid_features & CPUID_SSE2))
goto illegal_op;
ot = mo_64_32(dflag);
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
if (mod == 3)
goto illegal_op;
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
/* generate a generic store */
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, ot, reg, 1);
break;
case 0x1ae:
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
switch (modrm) {
CASE_MODRM_MEM_OP(0): /* fxsave */
if (!(s->cpuid_features & CPUID_FXSR)
|| (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if ((s->flags & HF_EM_MASK) || (s->flags & HF_TS_MASK)) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP07_PREX, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
gen_helper_fxsave(cpu_env, cpu_A0);
break;
CASE_MODRM_MEM_OP(1): /* fxrstor */
if (!(s->cpuid_features & CPUID_FXSR)
|| (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if ((s->flags & HF_EM_MASK) || (s->flags & HF_TS_MASK)) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP07_PREX, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
gen_helper_fxrstor(cpu_env, cpu_A0);
break;
CASE_MODRM_MEM_OP(2): /* ldmxcsr */
if ((s->flags & HF_EM_MASK) || !(s->flags & HF_OSFXSR_MASK)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (s->flags & HF_TS_MASK) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP07_PREX, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_A0, s->mem_index, MO_LEUL);
gen_helper_ldmxcsr(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32);
break;
CASE_MODRM_MEM_OP(3): /* stmxcsr */
if ((s->flags & HF_EM_MASK) || !(s->flags & HF_OSFXSR_MASK)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (s->flags & HF_TS_MASK) {
gen_exception(s, EXCP07_PREX, pc_start - s->cs_base);
break;
}
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
tcg_gen_ld32u_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_env, offsetof(CPUX86State, mxcsr));
gen_op_st_v(s, MO_32, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
break;
CASE_MODRM_MEM_OP(4): /* xsave */
if ((s->cpuid_ext_features & CPUID_EXT_XSAVE) == 0
|| (prefixes & (PREFIX_LOCK | PREFIX_DATA
| PREFIX_REPZ | PREFIX_REPNZ))) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
tcg_gen_concat_tl_i64(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_regs[R_EAX],
cpu_regs[R_EDX]);
gen_helper_xsave(cpu_env, cpu_A0, cpu_tmp1_i64);
break;
CASE_MODRM_MEM_OP(5): /* xrstor */
if ((s->cpuid_ext_features & CPUID_EXT_XSAVE) == 0
|| (prefixes & (PREFIX_LOCK | PREFIX_DATA
| PREFIX_REPZ | PREFIX_REPNZ))) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
tcg_gen_concat_tl_i64(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_regs[R_EAX],
cpu_regs[R_EDX]);
gen_helper_xrstor(cpu_env, cpu_A0, cpu_tmp1_i64);
/* XRSTOR is how MPX is enabled, which changes how
we translate. Thus we need to end the TB. */
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
gen_eob(s);
break;
CASE_MODRM_MEM_OP(6): /* xsaveopt / clwb */
if (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (prefixes & PREFIX_DATA) {
/* clwb */
if (!(s->cpuid_7_0_ebx_features & CPUID_7_0_EBX_CLWB)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_nop_modrm(env, s, modrm);
} else {
/* xsaveopt */
if ((s->cpuid_ext_features & CPUID_EXT_XSAVE) == 0
|| (s->cpuid_xsave_features & CPUID_XSAVE_XSAVEOPT) == 0
|| (prefixes & (PREFIX_REPZ | PREFIX_REPNZ))) {
goto illegal_op;
}
gen_lea_modrm(env, s, modrm);
tcg_gen_concat_tl_i64(cpu_tmp1_i64, cpu_regs[R_EAX],
cpu_regs[R_EDX]);
gen_helper_xsaveopt(cpu_env, cpu_A0, cpu_tmp1_i64);
}
break;
CASE_MODRM_MEM_OP(7): /* clflush / clflushopt */
if (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK) {
goto illegal_op;
}
if (prefixes & PREFIX_DATA) {
/* clflushopt */
if (!(s->cpuid_7_0_ebx_features & CPUID_7_0_EBX_CLFLUSHOPT)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
} else {
/* clflush */
if ((s->prefix & (PREFIX_REPZ | PREFIX_REPNZ))
|| !(s->cpuid_features & CPUID_CLFLUSH)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
}
gen_nop_modrm(env, s, modrm);
break;
case 0xc0 ... 0xc7: /* rdfsbase (f3 0f ae /0) */
case 0xc8 ... 0xc8: /* rdgsbase (f3 0f ae /1) */
case 0xd0 ... 0xd7: /* wrfsbase (f3 0f ae /2) */
case 0xd8 ... 0xd8: /* wrgsbase (f3 0f ae /3) */
if (CODE64(s)
&& (prefixes & PREFIX_REPZ)
&& !(prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK)
&& (s->cpuid_7_0_ebx_features & CPUID_7_0_EBX_FSGSBASE)) {
TCGv base, treg, src, dst;
/* Preserve hflags bits by testing CR4 at runtime. */
tcg_gen_movi_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, CR4_FSGSBASE_MASK);
gen_helper_cr4_testbit(cpu_env, cpu_tmp2_i32);
base = cpu_seg_base[modrm & 8 ? R_GS : R_FS];
treg = cpu_regs[(modrm & 7) | REX_B(s)];
if (modrm & 0x10) {
/* wr*base */
dst = base, src = treg;
} else {
/* rd*base */
dst = treg, src = base;
}
if (s->dflag == MO_32) {
tcg_gen_ext32u_tl(dst, src);
} else {
tcg_gen_mov_tl(dst, src);
}
break;
}
goto unknown_op;
case 0xf8: /* sfence / pcommit */
if (prefixes & PREFIX_DATA) {
/* pcommit */
if (!(s->cpuid_7_0_ebx_features & CPUID_7_0_EBX_PCOMMIT)
|| (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
break;
}
/* fallthru */
case 0xf9 ... 0xff: /* sfence */
if (!(s->cpuid_features & CPUID_SSE)
|| (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
tcg_gen_mb(TCG_MO_ST_ST | TCG_BAR_SC);
break;
case 0xe8 ... 0xef: /* lfence */
if (!(s->cpuid_features & CPUID_SSE)
|| (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
tcg_gen_mb(TCG_MO_LD_LD | TCG_BAR_SC);
break;
case 0xf0 ... 0xf7: /* mfence */
if (!(s->cpuid_features & CPUID_SSE2)
|| (prefixes & PREFIX_LOCK)) {
goto illegal_op;
}
tcg_gen_mb(TCG_MO_ALL | TCG_BAR_SC);
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
break;
case 0x10d: /* 3DNow! prefetch(w) */
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
mod = (modrm >> 6) & 3;
if (mod == 3)
goto illegal_op;
gen_nop_modrm(env, s, modrm);
break;
case 0x1aa: /* rsm */
gen_svm_check_intercept(s, pc_start, SVM_EXIT_RSM);
if (!(s->flags & HF_SMM_MASK))
goto illegal_op;
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(s->pc - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_rsm(cpu_env);
gen_eob(s);
break;
case 0x1b8: /* SSE4.2 popcnt */
if ((prefixes & (PREFIX_REPZ | PREFIX_LOCK | PREFIX_REPNZ)) !=
PREFIX_REPZ)
goto illegal_op;
if (!(s->cpuid_ext_features & CPUID_EXT_POPCNT))
goto illegal_op;
modrm = cpu_ldub_code(env, s->pc++);
reg = ((modrm >> 3) & 7) | rex_r;
if (s->prefix & PREFIX_DATA) {
ot = MO_16;
} else {
ot = mo_64_32(dflag);
}
gen_ldst_modrm(env, s, modrm, ot, OR_TMP0, 0);
gen_extu(ot, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_ctpop_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, reg, cpu_T0);
set_cc_op(s, CC_OP_POPCNT);
break;
case 0x10e ... 0x10f:
/* 3DNow! instructions, ignore prefixes */
s->prefix &= ~(PREFIX_REPZ | PREFIX_REPNZ | PREFIX_DATA);
case 0x110 ... 0x117:
case 0x128 ... 0x12f:
case 0x138 ... 0x13a:
case 0x150 ... 0x179:
case 0x17c ... 0x17f:
case 0x1c2:
case 0x1c4 ... 0x1c6:
case 0x1d0 ... 0x1fe:
gen_sse(env, s, b, pc_start, rex_r);
break;
default:
goto unknown_op;
}
return s->pc;
illegal_op:
gen_illegal_opcode(s);
return s->pc;
unknown_op:
gen_unknown_opcode(env, s);
return s->pc;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-94
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** The disas_insn function in target/i386/translate.c in QEMU before 2.9.0, when TCG mode without hardware acceleration is used, does not limit the instruction size, which allows local users to gain privileges by creating a modified basic block that injects code into a setuid program, as demonstrated by procmail. NOTE: the vendor has stated *this bug does not violate any security guarantees QEMU makes.*
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Medium
| 168,205
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int iwl_process_add_sta_resp(struct iwl_priv *priv,
struct iwl_addsta_cmd *addsta,
struct iwl_rx_packet *pkt)
{
u8 sta_id = addsta->sta.sta_id;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = -EIO;
if (pkt->hdr.flags & IWL_CMD_FAILED_MSK) {
IWL_ERR(priv, "Bad return from REPLY_ADD_STA (0x%08X)\n",
pkt->hdr.flags);
return ret;
}
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "Processing response for adding station %u\n",
sta_id);
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
switch (pkt->u.add_sta.status) {
case ADD_STA_SUCCESS_MSK:
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "REPLY_ADD_STA PASSED\n");
iwl_sta_ucode_activate(priv, sta_id);
ret = 0;
break;
case ADD_STA_NO_ROOM_IN_TABLE:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Adding station %d failed, no room in table.\n",
sta_id);
break;
case ADD_STA_NO_BLOCK_ACK_RESOURCE:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Adding station %d failed, no block ack "
"resource.\n", sta_id);
break;
case ADD_STA_MODIFY_NON_EXIST_STA:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Attempting to modify non-existing station %d\n",
sta_id);
break;
default:
IWL_DEBUG_ASSOC(priv, "Received REPLY_ADD_STA:(0x%08X)\n",
pkt->u.add_sta.status);
break;
}
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "%s station id %u addr %pM\n",
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.mode ==
STA_CONTROL_MODIFY_MSK ? "Modified" : "Added",
sta_id, priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.addr);
/*
* XXX: The MAC address in the command buffer is often changed from
* the original sent to the device. That is, the MAC address
* written to the command buffer often is not the same MAC address
* read from the command buffer when the command returns. This
* issue has not yet been resolved and this debugging is left to
* observe the problem.
*/
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "%s station according to cmd buffer %pM\n",
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.mode ==
STA_CONTROL_MODIFY_MSK ? "Modified" : "Added",
addsta->sta.addr);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 3.4, a buffer overflow occurs in drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/iwl-agn-sta.c, which will cause at least memory corruption.
Commit Message: iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but adding the sanity check to prevent memory
corruption
Signed-off-by: Wey-Yi Guy <wey-yi.w.guy@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
|
Low
| 169,868
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xsltShallowCopyElem(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr insert, int isLRE)
{
xmlNodePtr copy;
if ((node->type == XML_DTD_NODE) || (insert == NULL))
return(NULL);
if ((node->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) ||
(node->type == XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE))
return(xsltCopyText(ctxt, insert, node, 0));
copy = xmlDocCopyNode(node, insert->doc, 0);
if (copy != NULL) {
copy->doc = ctxt->output;
copy = xsltAddChild(insert, copy);
if (node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
/*
* Add namespaces as they are needed
*/
if (node->nsDef != NULL) {
/*
* TODO: Remove the LRE case in the refactored code
* gets enabled.
*/
if (isLRE)
xsltCopyNamespaceList(ctxt, copy, node->nsDef);
else
xsltCopyNamespaceListInternal(copy, node->nsDef);
}
/*
* URGENT TODO: The problem with this is that it does not
* copy over all namespace nodes in scope.
* The damn thing about this is, that we would need to
* use the xmlGetNsList(), for every single node; this is
* also done in xsltCopyTreeInternal(), but only for the top node.
*/
if (node->ns != NULL) {
if (isLRE) {
/*
* REVISIT TODO: Since the non-refactored code still does
* ns-aliasing, we need to call xsltGetNamespace() here.
* Remove this when ready.
*/
copy->ns = xsltGetNamespace(ctxt, node, node->ns, copy);
} else {
copy->ns = xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt,
node, node->ns->href, node->ns->prefix, copy);
}
} else if ((insert->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(insert->ns != NULL))
{
/*
* "Undeclare" the default namespace.
*/
xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt, node, NULL, NULL, copy);
}
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, node,
"xsltShallowCopyElem: copy %s failed\n", node->name);
}
return(copy);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 173,330
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void cJSON_AddItemToObject( cJSON *object, const char *string, cJSON *item )
{
if ( ! item )
return;
if ( item->string )
cJSON_free( item->string );
item->string = cJSON_strdup( string );
cJSON_AddItemToArray( object, item );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,268
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool dstBufferSizeHasOverflow(ParsedOptions options) {
CheckedNumeric<size_t> totalBytes = options.cropRect.width();
totalBytes *= options.cropRect.height();
totalBytes *= options.bytesPerPixel;
if (!totalBytes.IsValid())
return true;
if (!options.shouldScaleInput)
return false;
totalBytes = options.resizeWidth;
totalBytes *= options.resizeHeight;
totalBytes *= options.bytesPerPixel;
if (!totalBytes.IsValid())
return true;
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Bad casting in bitmap manipulation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
|
Medium
| 172,501
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PasswordInputType::EnableSecureTextInput() {
LocalFrame* frame = GetElement().GetDocument().GetFrame();
if (!frame)
return;
frame->Selection().SetUseSecureKeyboardEntryWhenActive(true);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 46.0.2490.71 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
Low
| 171,859
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool getCoverageFormat4(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kSegCountOffset = 6;
const size_t kEndCountOffset = 14;
const size_t kHeaderSize = 16;
const size_t kSegmentSize = 8; // total size of array elements for one segment
if (kEndCountOffset > size) {
return false;
}
size_t segCount = readU16(data, kSegCountOffset) >> 1;
if (kHeaderSize + segCount * kSegmentSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < segCount; i++) {
uint32_t end = readU16(data, kEndCountOffset + 2 * i);
uint32_t start = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (segCount + i));
if (end < start) {
return false;
}
uint32_t rangeOffset = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (3 * segCount + i));
if (rangeOffset == 0) {
uint32_t delta = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (2 * segCount + i));
if (((end + delta) & 0xffff) > end - start) {
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1);
} else {
for (uint32_t j = start; j < end + 1; j++) {
if (((j + delta) & 0xffff) != 0) {
addRange(coverage, j, j + 1);
}
}
}
} else {
for (uint32_t j = start; j < end + 1; j++) {
uint32_t actualRangeOffset = kHeaderSize + 6 * segCount + rangeOffset +
(i + j - start) * 2;
if (actualRangeOffset + 2 > size) {
continue;
}
uint32_t glyphId = readU16(data, actualRangeOffset);
if (glyphId != 0) {
addRange(coverage, j, j + 1);
}
}
}
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Minikin library in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not properly consider negative size values in font data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and reboot loop) via a crafted font, aka internal bug 26413177.
Commit Message: Add error logging on invalid cmap - DO NOT MERGE
This patch logs instances of fonts with invalid cmap tables.
Bug: 25645298
Bug: 26413177
Change-Id: I183985e9784a97a2b4307a22e036382b1fc90e5e
|
Low
| 173,896
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: spnego_gss_verify_mic(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_buffer_t msg_buffer,
const gss_buffer_t token_buffer,
gss_qop_t *qop_state)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_verify_mic(minor_status,
context_handle,
msg_buffer,
token_buffer,
qop_state);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,669
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ScaleYUVToRGB32(const uint8* y_buf,
const uint8* u_buf,
const uint8* v_buf,
uint8* rgb_buf,
int source_width,
int source_height,
int width,
int height,
int y_pitch,
int uv_pitch,
int rgb_pitch,
YUVType yuv_type,
Rotate view_rotate,
ScaleFilter filter) {
const int kFilterBufferSize = 4096;
if (source_width > kFilterBufferSize || view_rotate)
filter = FILTER_NONE;
unsigned int y_shift = yuv_type;
if ((view_rotate == ROTATE_180) ||
(view_rotate == ROTATE_270) ||
(view_rotate == MIRROR_ROTATE_0) ||
(view_rotate == MIRROR_ROTATE_90)) {
y_buf += source_width - 1;
u_buf += source_width / 2 - 1;
v_buf += source_width / 2 - 1;
source_width = -source_width;
}
if ((view_rotate == ROTATE_90) ||
(view_rotate == ROTATE_180) ||
(view_rotate == MIRROR_ROTATE_90) ||
(view_rotate == MIRROR_ROTATE_180)) {
y_buf += (source_height - 1) * y_pitch;
u_buf += ((source_height >> y_shift) - 1) * uv_pitch;
v_buf += ((source_height >> y_shift) - 1) * uv_pitch;
source_height = -source_height;
}
if (width == 0 || height == 0)
return;
int source_dx = source_width * kFractionMax / width;
int source_dy = source_height * kFractionMax / height;
#if USE_MMX && defined(_MSC_VER)
int source_dx_uv = source_dx;
#endif
if ((view_rotate == ROTATE_90) ||
(view_rotate == ROTATE_270)) {
int tmp = height;
height = width;
width = tmp;
tmp = source_height;
source_height = source_width;
source_width = tmp;
int original_dx = source_dx;
int original_dy = source_dy;
source_dx = ((original_dy >> kFractionBits) * y_pitch) << kFractionBits;
#if USE_MMX && defined(_MSC_VER)
source_dx_uv = ((original_dy >> kFractionBits) * uv_pitch) << kFractionBits;
#endif
source_dy = original_dx;
if (view_rotate == ROTATE_90) {
y_pitch = -1;
uv_pitch = -1;
source_height = -source_height;
} else {
y_pitch = 1;
uv_pitch = 1;
}
}
uint8 yuvbuf[16 + kFilterBufferSize * 3 + 16];
uint8* ybuf =
reinterpret_cast<uint8*>(reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(yuvbuf + 15) & ~15);
uint8* ubuf = ybuf + kFilterBufferSize;
uint8* vbuf = ubuf + kFilterBufferSize;
int yscale_fixed = (source_height << kFractionBits) / height;
for (int y = 0; y < height; ++y) {
uint8* dest_pixel = rgb_buf + y * rgb_pitch;
int source_y_subpixel = (y * yscale_fixed);
if (yscale_fixed >= (kFractionMax * 2)) {
source_y_subpixel += kFractionMax / 2; // For 1/2 or less, center filter.
}
int source_y = source_y_subpixel >> kFractionBits;
const uint8* y0_ptr = y_buf + source_y * y_pitch;
const uint8* y1_ptr = y0_ptr + y_pitch;
const uint8* u0_ptr = u_buf + (source_y >> y_shift) * uv_pitch;
const uint8* u1_ptr = u0_ptr + uv_pitch;
const uint8* v0_ptr = v_buf + (source_y >> y_shift) * uv_pitch;
const uint8* v1_ptr = v0_ptr + uv_pitch;
int source_y_fraction = (source_y_subpixel & kFractionMask) >> 8;
int source_uv_fraction =
((source_y_subpixel >> y_shift) & kFractionMask) >> 8;
const uint8* y_ptr = y0_ptr;
const uint8* u_ptr = u0_ptr;
const uint8* v_ptr = v0_ptr;
if (filter & media::FILTER_BILINEAR_V) {
if (yscale_fixed != kFractionMax &&
source_y_fraction && ((source_y + 1) < source_height)) {
FilterRows(ybuf, y0_ptr, y1_ptr, source_width, source_y_fraction);
} else {
memcpy(ybuf, y0_ptr, source_width);
}
y_ptr = ybuf;
ybuf[source_width] = ybuf[source_width-1];
int uv_source_width = (source_width + 1) / 2;
if (yscale_fixed != kFractionMax &&
source_uv_fraction &&
(((source_y >> y_shift) + 1) < (source_height >> y_shift))) {
FilterRows(ubuf, u0_ptr, u1_ptr, uv_source_width, source_uv_fraction);
FilterRows(vbuf, v0_ptr, v1_ptr, uv_source_width, source_uv_fraction);
} else {
memcpy(ubuf, u0_ptr, uv_source_width);
memcpy(vbuf, v0_ptr, uv_source_width);
}
u_ptr = ubuf;
v_ptr = vbuf;
ubuf[uv_source_width] = ubuf[uv_source_width - 1];
vbuf[uv_source_width] = vbuf[uv_source_width - 1];
}
if (source_dx == kFractionMax) { // Not scaled
FastConvertYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width);
} else {
if (filter & FILTER_BILINEAR_H) {
LinearScaleYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width, source_dx);
} else {
#if USE_MMX && defined(_MSC_VER)
if (width == (source_width * 2)) {
DoubleYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width);
} else if ((source_dx & kFractionMask) == 0) {
ConvertYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width,
source_dx >> kFractionBits);
} else if (source_dx_uv == source_dx) { // Not rotated.
ScaleYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width, source_dx);
} else {
RotateConvertYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width,
source_dx >> kFractionBits,
source_dx_uv >> kFractionBits);
}
#else
ScaleYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width, source_dx);
#endif
}
}
}
EMMS();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle video, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Add check for zero-sized source YUV + tests.
Took the time to clean up said tests for improved coverage.
BUG=90173
TEST=media_unittests
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7794016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@99113 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,314
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadRAWImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*canvas_image,
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
/*
Create virtual canvas to support cropping (i.e. image.gray[100x100+10+20]).
*/
canvas_image=CloneImage(image,image->extract_info.width,1,MagickFalse,
exception);
(void) SetImageVirtualPixelMethod(canvas_image,BlackVirtualPixelMethod);
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,canvas_image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
while (image->scene < image_info->scene)
{
/*
Skip to next image.
*/
image->scene++;
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
}
scene=0;
count=0;
length=0;
do
{
/*
Read pixels to virtual canvas image then push to image.
*/
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
image->columns,1,exception);
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,image->columns,
1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) || (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,GetPixelRed(p));
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelGreen(p));
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelBlue(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (count == (ssize_t) length)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
scene++;
} while (count == (ssize_t) length);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
InheritException(&image->exception,&canvas_image->exception);
canvas_image=DestroyImage(canvas_image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,596
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadDCMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThrowDCMException(exception,message) \
{ \
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL) \
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data); \
if (stream_info != (DCMStreamInfo *) NULL) \
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info); \
ThrowReaderException((exception),(message)); \
}
char
explicit_vr[MaxTextExtent],
implicit_vr[MaxTextExtent],
magick[MaxTextExtent],
photometric[MaxTextExtent];
DCMInfo
info;
DCMStreamInfo
*stream_info;
Image
*image;
int
*bluemap,
datum,
*greenmap,
*graymap,
*redmap;
MagickBooleanType
explicit_file,
explicit_retry,
sequence,
use_explicit;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
register unsigned char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
colors,
height,
length,
number_scenes,
quantum,
status,
width;
ssize_t
count,
scene;
unsigned char
*data;
unsigned short
group,
element;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image->depth=8UL;
image->endian=LSBEndian;
/*
Read DCM preamble.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*stream_info));
if (stream_info == (DCMStreamInfo *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(stream_info,0,sizeof(*stream_info));
count=ReadBlob(image,128,(unsigned char *) magick);
if (count != 128)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 4) || (LocaleNCompare(magick,"DICM",4) != 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,0L,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
/*
Read DCM Medical image.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ",MaxTextExtent);
info.polarity=MagickFalse;
info.scale=(Quantum *) NULL;
info.bits_allocated=8;
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
info.depth=8;
info.mask=0xffff;
info.max_value=255UL;
info.samples_per_pixel=1;
info.signed_data=(~0UL);
info.significant_bits=0;
info.rescale=MagickFalse;
info.rescale_intercept=0.0;
info.rescale_slope=1.0;
info.window_center=0.0;
info.window_width=0.0;
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
element=0;
explicit_vr[2]='\0';
explicit_file=MagickFalse;
colors=0;
redmap=(int *) NULL;
greenmap=(int *) NULL;
bluemap=(int *) NULL;
graymap=(int *) NULL;
height=0;
number_scenes=1;
sequence=MagickFalse;
use_explicit=MagickFalse;
explicit_retry = MagickFalse;
width=0;
for (group=0; (group != 0x7FE0) || (element != 0x0010) ||
(sequence != MagickFalse); )
{
/*
Read a group.
*/
image->offset=(ssize_t) TellBlob(image);
group=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
element=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((group != 0x0002) && (image->endian == MSBEndian))
{
group=(unsigned short) ((group << 8) | ((group >> 8) & 0xFF));
element=(unsigned short) ((element << 8) | ((element >> 8) & 0xFF));
}
quantum=0;
/*
Find corresponding VR for this group and element.
*/
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].group < 0xffff; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) && (element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,dicom_info[i].vr,MaxTextExtent);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) explicit_vr);
if (count != 2)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Check for "explicitness", but meta-file headers always explicit.
*/
if ((explicit_file == MagickFalse) && (group != 0x0002))
explicit_file=(isupper((unsigned char) *explicit_vr) != MagickFalse) &&
(isupper((unsigned char) *(explicit_vr+1)) != MagickFalse) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
use_explicit=((group == 0x0002) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse)) ||
(explicit_file != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((use_explicit != MagickFalse) && (strncmp(implicit_vr,"xs",2) == 0))
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,explicit_vr,MaxTextExtent);
if ((use_explicit == MagickFalse) || (strncmp(implicit_vr,"!!",2) == 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) -2,SEEK_CUR);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
quantum=4;
}
else
{
/*
Assume explicit type.
*/
quantum=2;
if ((strncmp(explicit_vr,"OB",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"UN",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"OW",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"SQ",2) == 0))
{
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
quantum=4;
}
}
datum=0;
if (quantum == 4)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
}
else
if (quantum == 2)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedShort(image);
}
quantum=0;
length=1;
if (datum != 0)
{
if ((strncmp(implicit_vr,"SS",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"US",2) == 0))
quantum=2;
else
if ((strncmp(implicit_vr,"UL",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"SL",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"FL",2) == 0))
quantum=4;
else
if (strncmp(implicit_vr,"FD",2) != 0)
quantum=1;
else
quantum=8;
if (datum != ~0)
length=(size_t) datum/quantum;
else
{
/*
Sequence and item of undefined length.
*/
quantum=0;
length=0;
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Display Dicom info.
*/
if (use_explicit == MagickFalse)
explicit_vr[0]='\0';
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"0x%04lX %4ld %s-%s (0x%04lx,0x%04lx)",
(unsigned long) image->offset,(long) length,implicit_vr,explicit_vr,
(unsigned long) group,(unsigned long) element);
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout," %s",dicom_info[i].description);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,": ");
}
if ((sequence == MagickFalse) && (group == 0x7FE0) && (element == 0x0010))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
break;
}
/*
Allocate space and read an array.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 1))
datum=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 2))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedShort(image);
}
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 4))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
}
else
if ((quantum != 0) && (length != 0))
{
if (length > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (~length >= 1)
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,quantum*
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) quantum*length,data);
if (count != (ssize_t) (quantum*length))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"count=%d quantum=%d "
"length=%d group=%d\n",(int) count,(int) quantum,(int)
length,(int) group);
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
data[length*quantum]='\0';
}
else
if ((unsigned int) datum == 0xFFFFFFFFU)
{
sequence=MagickTrue;
continue;
}
if ((unsigned int) ((group << 16) | element) == 0xFFFEE0DD)
{
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
sequence=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
if (sequence != MagickFalse)
{
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
continue;
}
switch (group)
{
case 0x0002:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0010:
{
char
transfer_syntax[MaxTextExtent];
/*
Transfer Syntax.
*/
if ((datum == 0) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse))
{
explicit_retry=MagickTrue;
(void) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) 0,SEEK_SET);
group=0;
element=0;
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,
"Corrupted image - trying explicit format\n");
break;
}
*transfer_syntax='\0';
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(transfer_syntax,(char *) data,
MaxTextExtent);
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"transfer_syntax=%s\n",
(const char *) transfer_syntax);
if (strncmp(transfer_syntax,"1.2.840.10008.1.2",17) == 0)
{
int
count,
subtype,
type;
type=1;
subtype=0;
if (strlen(transfer_syntax) > 17)
{
count=sscanf(transfer_syntax+17,".%d.%d",&type,&subtype);
if (count < 1)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,
"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (type)
{
case 1:
{
image->endian=LSBEndian;
break;
}
case 2:
{
image->endian=MSBEndian;
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((subtype >= 80) && (subtype <= 81))
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
else
if ((subtype >= 90) && (subtype <= 93))
image->compression=JPEG2000Compression;
else
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
break;
}
case 5:
{
image->compression=RLECompression;
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x0028:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0002:
{
/*
Samples per pixel.
*/
info.samples_per_pixel=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0004:
{
/*
Photometric interpretation.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMin(length,MaxTextExtent-1); i++)
photometric[i]=(char) data[i];
photometric[i]='\0';
info.polarity=LocaleCompare(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ") == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 0x0006:
{
/*
Planar configuration.
*/
if (datum == 1)
image->interlace=PlaneInterlace;
break;
}
case 0x0008:
{
/*
Number of frames.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
number_scenes=StringToUnsignedLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x0010:
{
/*
Image rows.
*/
height=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0011:
{
/*
Image columns.
*/
width=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0100:
{
/*
Bits allocated.
*/
info.bits_allocated=(size_t) datum;
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (datum > 8)
info.bytes_per_pixel=2;
info.depth=info.bits_allocated;
if (info.depth > 32)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
info.max_value=(1UL << info.bits_allocated)-1;
image->depth=info.depth;
break;
}
case 0x0101:
{
/*
Bits stored.
*/
info.significant_bits=(size_t) datum;
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (info.significant_bits > 8)
info.bytes_per_pixel=2;
info.depth=info.significant_bits;
if (info.depth > 32)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
info.max_value=(1UL << info.significant_bits)-1;
info.mask=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(info.significant_bits);
image->depth=info.depth;
break;
}
case 0x0102:
{
/*
High bit.
*/
break;
}
case 0x0103:
{
/*
Pixel representation.
*/
info.signed_data=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x1050:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: center.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.window_center=StringToDouble((char *) data,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1051:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: width.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.window_width=StringToDouble((char *) data,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1052:
{
/*
Rescale intercept
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.rescale_intercept=StringToDouble((char *) data,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1053:
{
/*
Rescale slope
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.rescale_slope=StringToDouble((char *) data,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1200:
case 0x3006:
{
/*
Populate graymap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/info.bytes_per_pixel);
datum=(int) colors;
graymap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*graymap));
if (graymap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
if (info.bytes_per_pixel == 1)
graymap[i]=(int) data[i];
else
graymap[i]=(int) ((short *) data)[i];
break;
}
case 0x1201:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate redmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
redmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*redmap));
if (redmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
redmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1202:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate greenmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
greenmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*greenmap));
if (greenmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
greenmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1203:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate bluemap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
bluemap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*bluemap));
if (bluemap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
bluemap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x2050:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0020:
{
if ((data != (unsigned char *) NULL) &&
(strncmp((char *) data,"INVERSE",7) == 0))
info.polarity=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
char
*attribute;
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
{
attribute=AcquireString("dcm:");
(void) ConcatenateString(&attribute,dicom_info[i].description);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i == (ssize_t) length) || (length > 4))
{
(void) SubstituteString(&attribute," ","");
(void) SetImageProperty(image,attribute,(char *) data);
}
attribute=DestroyString(attribute);
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d\n",datum);
else
{
/*
Display group data.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i != (ssize_t) length) && (length <= 4))
{
ssize_t
j;
datum=0;
for (j=(ssize_t) length-1; j >= 0; j--)
datum=(256*datum+data[j]);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d",datum);
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",data[i]);
else
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",'.');
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
}
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
}
if ((width == 0) || (height == 0))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
if (info.signed_data == 0xffff)
info.signed_data=(size_t) (info.significant_bits == 16 ? 1 : 0);
if ((image->compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(image->compression == JPEG2000Compression))
{
Image
*images;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c;
size_t
length;
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) tag;
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
MagickOffsetType
offset;
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
offset=TellBlob(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
/*
Handle non-native image formats.
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
images=NewImageList();
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
char
filename[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*property;
FILE
*file;
Image
*jpeg_image;
int
unique_file;
unsigned int
tag;
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (tag == 0xFFFEE0DD)
break; /* sequence delimiter tag */
if (tag != 0xFFFEE000)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if (file == (FILE *) NULL)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,
"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile",filename);
break;
}
for ( ; length != 0; length--)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
(void) fputc(c,file);
}
(void) fclose(file);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"jpeg:%s",
filename);
if (image->compression == JPEG2000Compression)
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"j2k:%s",
filename);
jpeg_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
if (jpeg_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
ResetImagePropertyIterator(image);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
while (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(jpeg_image,property,
GetImageProperty(image,property));
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
}
AppendImageToList(&images,jpeg_image);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
}
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
image=DestroyImage(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(images));
}
if (info.depth != (1UL*MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH))
{
QuantumAny
range;
size_t
length;
/*
Compute pixel scaling table.
*/
length=(size_t) (GetQuantumRange(info.depth)+1);
info.scale=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*info.scale));
if (info.scale == (Quantum *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
range=GetQuantumRange(info.depth);
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) GetQuantumRange(info.depth); i++)
info.scale[i]=ScaleAnyToQuantum((size_t) i,range);
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
size_t
length;
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) tag;
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
MagickOffsetType
offset;
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
offset=TellBlob(image)+8;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
}
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
break;
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=info.depth;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
break;
}
image->colorspace=RGBColorspace;
if ((image->colormap == (PixelPacket *) NULL) &&
(info.samples_per_pixel == 1))
{
int
index;
size_t
one;
one=1;
if (colors == 0)
colors=one << info.depth;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=redmap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) index;
}
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=greenmap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) index;
}
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=bluemap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) index;
}
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=graymap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) index;
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) index;
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) index;
}
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE segment table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
stream_info->remaining=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((tag != 0xFFFEE000) || (stream_info->remaining <= 64) ||
(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
stream_info->count=0;
stream_info->segment_count=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
for (i=0; i < 15; i++)
stream_info->segments[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
stream_info->remaining-=64;
if (stream_info->segment_count > 1)
{
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
info.depth=8;
if (stream_info->offset_count > 0)
(void) SeekBlob(image,stream_info->offsets[0]+
stream_info->segments[0],SEEK_SET);
}
}
if ((info.samples_per_pixel > 1) && (image->interlace == PlaneInterlace))
{
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Convert Planar RGB DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) info.samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
switch ((int) i)
{
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)));
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)));
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)));
break;
}
case 3:
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)));
break;
}
default:
break;
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
}
else
{
const char
*option;
/*
Convert DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:display-range");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"reset") == 0)
info.window_width=0;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:window");
if (option != (char *) NULL)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
flags=ParseGeometry(option,&geometry_info);
if (flags & RhoValue)
info.window_center=geometry_info.rho;
if (flags & SigmaValue)
info.window_width=geometry_info.sigma;
info.rescale=MagickTrue;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:rescale");
if (option != (char *) NULL)
info.rescale=IsStringTrue(option);
if ((info.window_center != 0) && (info.window_width == 0))
info.window_width=info.window_center;
status=ReadDCMPixels(image,&info,stream_info,MagickTrue,exception);
if ((status != MagickFalse) && (stream_info->segment_count > 1))
{
if (stream_info->offset_count > 0)
(void) SeekBlob(image,stream_info->offsets[0]+
stream_info->segments[1],SEEK_SET);
(void) ReadDCMPixels(image,&info,stream_info,MagickFalse,exception);
}
}
if (SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (scene < (ssize_t) (number_scenes-1))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
/*
Free resources.
*/
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info);
if (info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
info.scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info.scale);
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap);
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap);
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap);
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.6-1 has a memory leak vulnerability in ReadDCMImage in codersdcm.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/551
|
Medium
| 167,978
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static unsigned int help(struct sk_buff *skb,
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo,
unsigned int protoff,
unsigned int matchoff,
unsigned int matchlen,
struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp)
{
char buffer[sizeof("4294967296 65635")];
u_int16_t port;
unsigned int ret;
/* Reply comes from server. */
exp->saved_proto.tcp.port = exp->tuple.dst.u.tcp.port;
exp->dir = IP_CT_DIR_REPLY;
exp->expectfn = nf_nat_follow_master;
/* Try to get same port: if not, try to change it. */
for (port = ntohs(exp->saved_proto.tcp.port); port != 0; port++) {
int ret;
exp->tuple.dst.u.tcp.port = htons(port);
ret = nf_ct_expect_related(exp);
if (ret == 0)
break;
else if (ret != -EBUSY) {
port = 0;
break;
}
}
if (port == 0) {
nf_ct_helper_log(skb, exp->master, "all ports in use");
return NF_DROP;
}
ret = nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet(skb, exp->master, ctinfo,
protoff, matchoff, matchlen, buffer,
strlen(buffer));
if (ret != NF_ACCEPT) {
nf_ct_helper_log(skb, exp->master, "cannot mangle packet");
nf_ct_unexpect_related(exp);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The help function in net/netfilter/nf_nat_irc.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.8 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by establishing an IRC DCC session in which incorrect packet data is transmitted during use of the NAT mangle feature.
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_nat: fix access to uninitialized buffer in IRC NAT helper
Commit 5901b6be885e attempted to introduce IPv6 support into
IRC NAT helper. By doing so, the following code seemed to be removed
by accident:
ip = ntohl(exp->master->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.dst.u3.ip);
sprintf(buffer, "%u %u", ip, port);
pr_debug("nf_nat_irc: inserting '%s' == %pI4, port %u\n", buffer, &ip, port);
This leads to the fact that buffer[] was left uninitialized and
contained some stack value. When we call nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet(),
we call strlen(buffer) on excatly this uninitialized buffer. If we
are unlucky and the skb has enough tailroom, we overwrite resp. leak
contents with values that sit on our stack into the packet and send
that out to the receiver.
Since the rather informal DCC spec [1] does not seem to specify
IPv6 support right now, we log such occurences so that admins can
act accordingly, and drop the packet. I've looked into XChat source,
and IPv6 is not supported there: addresses are in u32 and print
via %u format string.
Therefore, restore old behaviour as in IPv4, use snprintf(). The
IRC helper does not support IPv6 by now. By this, we can safely use
strlen(buffer) in nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet() and prevent a buffer
overflow. Also simplify some code as we now have ct variable anyway.
[1] http://www.irchelp.org/irchelp/rfc/ctcpspec.html
Fixes: 5901b6be885e ("netfilter: nf_nat: support IPv6 in IRC NAT helper")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
High
| 166,436
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int hci_uart_set_proto(struct hci_uart *hu, int id)
{
const struct hci_uart_proto *p;
int err;
p = hci_uart_get_proto(id);
if (!p)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
hu->proto = p;
set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
err = hci_uart_register_dev(hu);
if (err) {
clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
return err;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.5. There is a use-after-free issue when hci_uart_register_dev() fails in hci_uart_set_proto() in drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c.
Commit Message: Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Postpone HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit set in hci_uart_set_proto()
task A: task B:
hci_uart_set_proto flush_to_ldisc
- p->open(hu) -> h5_open //alloc h5 - receive_buf
- set_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY - tty_port_default_receive_buf
- hci_uart_register_dev - tty_ldisc_receive_buf
- hci_uart_tty_receive
- test_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY
- h5_recv
- clear_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY while() {
- p->open(hu) -> h5_close //free h5
- h5_rx_3wire_hdr
- h5_reset() //use-after-free
}
It could use ioctl to set hci uart proto, but there is
a use-after-free issue when hci_uart_register_dev() fail in
hci_uart_set_proto(), see stack above, fix this by setting
HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit only when hci_uart_register_dev()
return success.
Reported-by: syzbot+899a33dc0fa0dbaf06a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
Low
| 169,528
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *usin = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)uaddr;
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_type;
int err;
dp->dccps_role = DCCP_ROLE_CLIENT;
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = usin->sin6_flowinfo & IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
IP6_ECN_flow_init(fl6.flowlabel);
if (fl6.flowlabel & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel;
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
}
}
/*
* connect() to INADDR_ANY means loopback (BSD'ism).
*/
if (ipv6_addr_any(&usin->sin6_addr))
usin->sin6_addr.s6_addr[15] = 1;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&usin->sin6_addr);
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)
return -ENETUNREACH;
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
usin->sin6_scope_id) {
/* If interface is set while binding, indices
* must coincide.
*/
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if &&
sk->sk_bound_dev_if != usin->sin6_scope_id)
return -EINVAL;
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = usin->sin6_scope_id;
}
/* Connect to link-local address requires an interface */
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
return -EINVAL;
}
sk->sk_v6_daddr = usin->sin6_addr;
np->flow_label = fl6.flowlabel;
/*
* DCCP over IPv4
*/
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
u32 exthdrlen = icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "connect: ipv4 mapped\n");
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -ENETUNREACH;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = usin->sin6_port;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = usin->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3];
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &dccp_ipv6_mapped;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = dccp_v4_do_rcv;
err = dccp_v4_connect(sk, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
if (err) {
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = exthdrlen;
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &dccp_ipv6_af_ops;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = dccp_v6_do_rcv;
goto failure;
}
np->saddr = sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
return err;
}
if (!ipv6_addr_any(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr))
saddr = &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_DCCP;
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.saddr = saddr ? *saddr : np->saddr;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.fl6_dport = usin->sin6_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
goto failure;
}
if (saddr == NULL) {
saddr = &fl6.saddr;
sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = *saddr;
}
/* set the source address */
np->saddr = *saddr;
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
__ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (np->opt != NULL)
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (np->opt->opt_flen +
np->opt->opt_nflen);
inet->inet_dport = usin->sin6_port;
dccp_set_state(sk, DCCP_REQUESTING);
err = inet6_hash_connect(&dccp_death_row, sk);
if (err)
goto late_failure;
dp->dccps_iss = secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(np->saddr.s6_addr32,
sk->sk_v6_daddr.s6_addr32,
inet->inet_sport,
inet->inet_dport);
err = dccp_connect(sk);
if (err)
goto late_failure;
return 0;
late_failure:
dccp_set_state(sk, DCCP_CLOSED);
__sk_dst_reset(sk);
failure:
inet->inet_dport = 0;
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,324
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, setInfoClass)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zend_class_entry *ce = spl_ce_SplFileInfo;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|C", &ce) == SUCCESS) {
intern->info_class = ce;
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,041
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiH264Accelerator::SubmitSlice(
const H264PPS* pps,
const H264SliceHeader* slice_hdr,
const H264Picture::Vector& ref_pic_list0,
const H264Picture::Vector& ref_pic_list1,
const scoped_refptr<H264Picture>& pic,
const uint8_t* data,
size_t size) {
VASliceParameterBufferH264 slice_param;
memset(&slice_param, 0, sizeof(slice_param));
slice_param.slice_data_size = slice_hdr->nalu_size;
slice_param.slice_data_offset = 0;
slice_param.slice_data_flag = VA_SLICE_DATA_FLAG_ALL;
slice_param.slice_data_bit_offset = slice_hdr->header_bit_size;
#define SHDRToSP(a) slice_param.a = slice_hdr->a
SHDRToSP(first_mb_in_slice);
slice_param.slice_type = slice_hdr->slice_type % 5;
SHDRToSP(direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag);
SHDRToSP(num_ref_idx_l0_active_minus1);
SHDRToSP(num_ref_idx_l1_active_minus1);
SHDRToSP(cabac_init_idc);
SHDRToSP(slice_qp_delta);
SHDRToSP(disable_deblocking_filter_idc);
SHDRToSP(slice_alpha_c0_offset_div2);
SHDRToSP(slice_beta_offset_div2);
if (((slice_hdr->IsPSlice() || slice_hdr->IsSPSlice()) &&
pps->weighted_pred_flag) ||
(slice_hdr->IsBSlice() && pps->weighted_bipred_idc == 1)) {
SHDRToSP(luma_log2_weight_denom);
SHDRToSP(chroma_log2_weight_denom);
SHDRToSP(luma_weight_l0_flag);
SHDRToSP(luma_weight_l1_flag);
SHDRToSP(chroma_weight_l0_flag);
SHDRToSP(chroma_weight_l1_flag);
for (int i = 0; i <= slice_param.num_ref_idx_l0_active_minus1; ++i) {
slice_param.luma_weight_l0[i] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l0.luma_weight[i];
slice_param.luma_offset_l0[i] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l0.luma_offset[i];
for (int j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
slice_param.chroma_weight_l0[i][j] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l0.chroma_weight[i][j];
slice_param.chroma_offset_l0[i][j] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l0.chroma_offset[i][j];
}
}
if (slice_hdr->IsBSlice()) {
for (int i = 0; i <= slice_param.num_ref_idx_l1_active_minus1; ++i) {
slice_param.luma_weight_l1[i] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l1.luma_weight[i];
slice_param.luma_offset_l1[i] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l1.luma_offset[i];
for (int j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
slice_param.chroma_weight_l1[i][j] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l1.chroma_weight[i][j];
slice_param.chroma_offset_l1[i][j] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l1.chroma_offset[i][j];
}
}
}
}
static_assert(
arraysize(slice_param.RefPicList0) == arraysize(slice_param.RefPicList1),
"Invalid RefPicList sizes");
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(slice_param.RefPicList0); ++i) {
InitVAPicture(&slice_param.RefPicList0[i]);
InitVAPicture(&slice_param.RefPicList1[i]);
}
for (size_t i = 0;
i < ref_pic_list0.size() && i < arraysize(slice_param.RefPicList0);
++i) {
if (ref_pic_list0[i])
FillVAPicture(&slice_param.RefPicList0[i], ref_pic_list0[i]);
}
for (size_t i = 0;
i < ref_pic_list1.size() && i < arraysize(slice_param.RefPicList1);
++i) {
if (ref_pic_list1[i])
FillVAPicture(&slice_param.RefPicList1[i], ref_pic_list1[i]);
}
if (!vaapi_wrapper_->SubmitBuffer(VASliceParameterBufferType,
sizeof(slice_param), &slice_param))
return false;
void* non_const_ptr = const_cast<uint8_t*>(data);
return vaapi_wrapper_->SubmitBuffer(VASliceDataBufferType, size,
non_const_ptr);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
|
High
| 172,812
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool MessageLoop::DoDelayedWork(TimeTicks* next_delayed_work_time) {
if (!nestable_tasks_allowed_ ||
!SweepDelayedWorkQueueAndReturnTrueIfStillHasWork()) {
recent_time_ = *next_delayed_work_time = TimeTicks();
return false;
}
TimeTicks next_run_time = delayed_work_queue_.top().delayed_run_time;
if (next_run_time > recent_time_) {
recent_time_ = TimeTicks::Now(); // Get a better view of Now();
if (next_run_time > recent_time_) {
*next_delayed_work_time = next_run_time;
return false;
}
}
PendingTask pending_task =
std::move(const_cast<PendingTask&>(delayed_work_queue_.top()));
delayed_work_queue_.pop();
if (SweepDelayedWorkQueueAndReturnTrueIfStillHasWork())
*next_delayed_work_time = delayed_work_queue_.top().delayed_run_time;
return DeferOrRunPendingTask(std::move(pending_task));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SkMatrix::invertNonIdentity function in core/SkMatrix.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering the use of matrix elements that lead to an infinite result during an inversion calculation.
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
|
Low
| 171,863
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long vhost_dev_ioctl(struct vhost_dev *d, unsigned int ioctl, void __user *argp)
{
struct file *eventfp, *filep = NULL;
struct eventfd_ctx *ctx = NULL;
u64 p;
long r;
int i, fd;
/* If you are not the owner, you can become one */
if (ioctl == VHOST_SET_OWNER) {
r = vhost_dev_set_owner(d);
goto done;
}
/* You must be the owner to do anything else */
r = vhost_dev_check_owner(d);
if (r)
goto done;
switch (ioctl) {
case VHOST_SET_MEM_TABLE:
r = vhost_set_memory(d, argp);
break;
case VHOST_SET_LOG_BASE:
if (copy_from_user(&p, argp, sizeof p)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if ((u64)(unsigned long)p != p) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < d->nvqs; ++i) {
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
void __user *base = (void __user *)(unsigned long)p;
vq = d->vqs[i];
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
/* If ring is inactive, will check when it's enabled. */
if (vq->private_data && !vq_log_access_ok(vq, base))
r = -EFAULT;
else
vq->log_base = base;
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
}
break;
case VHOST_SET_LOG_FD:
r = get_user(fd, (int __user *)argp);
if (r < 0)
break;
eventfp = fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(fd);
if (IS_ERR(eventfp)) {
r = PTR_ERR(eventfp);
break;
}
if (eventfp != d->log_file) {
filep = d->log_file;
ctx = d->log_ctx;
d->log_ctx = eventfp ?
eventfd_ctx_fileget(eventfp) : NULL;
} else
filep = eventfp;
for (i = 0; i < d->nvqs; ++i) {
mutex_lock(&d->vqs[i]->mutex);
d->vqs[i]->log_ctx = d->log_ctx;
mutex_unlock(&d->vqs[i]->mutex);
}
if (ctx)
eventfd_ctx_put(ctx);
if (filep)
fput(filep);
break;
default:
r = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
break;
}
done:
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The vhost_dev_ioctl function in drivers/vhost/vhost.c in the Linux kernel before 4.1.5 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a VHOST_SET_LOG_FD ioctl call that triggers permanent file-descriptor allocation.
Commit Message: vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,591
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct net *get_net_ns_by_id(struct net *net, int id)
{
struct net *peer;
if (id < 0)
return NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
spin_lock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id);
if (peer)
get_net(peer);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
return peer;
}
Vulnerability Type: Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use-after-free vulnerability was found in network namespaces code affecting the Linux kernel before 4.14.11. The function get_net_ns_by_id() in net/core/net_namespace.c does not check for the net::count value after it has found a peer network in netns_ids idr, which could lead to double free and memory corruption. This vulnerability could allow an unprivileged local user to induce kernel memory corruption on the system, leading to a crash. Due to the nature of the flaw, privilege escalation cannot be fully ruled out, although it is thought to be unlikely.
Commit Message: net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()
(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)
Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.
It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been
finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory
corruption:
put_net(peer) rtnl_lock()
atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ...
__put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id)
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id)
| get_net(peer) [count=1]
| ...
| (use after final put)
v ...
cleanup_net() ...
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ...
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
... ...
... put_net(peer)
... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]
... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... queue_work()
... rtnl_unlock()
rtnl_lock() ...
for_each_net(tmp) { ...
id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ...
spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ...
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ...
... ...
net_drop_ns() ...
net_free(peer) ...
} ...
|
v
cleanup_net()
...
(Second free of peer)
Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list
will be corrupted.
Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while
put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be
enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick
the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely.
The patch fixes the problem in standard way.
(Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires
check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but
in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be
safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should
be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send
a separate message to netdev@ later).
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids"
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 169,427
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: get_policy_2_svc(gpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gpol_ret ret;
kadm5_ret_t ret2;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_principal_ent_rec caller_ent;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gpol_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_get_policy";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->name;
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
if (!CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) && kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE, NULL, NULL))
ret.code = KADM5_OK;
else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_principal(handle->lhandle,
handle->current_caller,
&caller_ent,
KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK);
if (ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
if (caller_ent.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY &&
strcmp(caller_ent.policy, arg->name) == 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_OK;
} else ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
ret2 = kadm5_free_principal_ent(handle->lhandle,
&caller_ent);
ret.code = ret.code ? ret.code : ret2;
}
}
if (ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
ret.code = kadm5_get_policy(handle, arg->name, &ret.rec);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname,
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
} else {
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 167,513
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SSLErrorHandler::SSLErrorHandler(base::WeakPtr<Delegate> delegate,
const content::GlobalRequestID& id,
ResourceType::Type resource_type,
const GURL& url,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id)
: manager_(NULL),
request_id_(id),
delegate_(delegate),
render_process_id_(render_process_id),
render_view_id_(render_view_id),
request_url_(url),
resource_type_(resource_type),
request_has_been_notified_(false) {
DCHECK(!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(delegate);
AddRef();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebSockets implementation in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52 does not properly handle use of SSL, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,995
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int Chapters::GetEditionCount() const
{
return m_editions_count;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,311
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CNB::SetupLSO(virtio_net_hdr_basic *VirtioHeader, PVOID IpHeader, ULONG EthPayloadLength) const
{
PopulateIPLength(reinterpret_cast<IPv4Header*>(IpHeader), static_cast<USHORT>(EthPayloadLength));
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult packetReview;
packetReview = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerifyFlat(reinterpret_cast<IPv4Header*>(IpHeader), EthPayloadLength,
pcrIpChecksum | pcrFixIPChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrFixPHChecksum,
__FUNCTION__);
if (packetReview.xxpCheckSum == ppresPCSOK || packetReview.fixedXxpCS)
{
auto IpHeaderOffset = m_Context->Offload.ipHeaderOffset;
auto VHeader = static_cast<virtio_net_hdr_basic*>(VirtioHeader);
auto PriorityHdrLen = (m_ParentNBL->TCI() != 0) ? ETH_PRIORITY_HEADER_SIZE : 0;
VHeader->flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
VHeader->gso_type = packetReview.ipStatus == ppresIPV4 ? VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4 : VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6;
VHeader->hdr_len = (USHORT)(packetReview.XxpIpHeaderSize + IpHeaderOffset + PriorityHdrLen);
VHeader->gso_size = (USHORT)m_ParentNBL->MSS();
VHeader->csum_start = (USHORT)(m_ParentNBL->TCPHeaderOffset() + PriorityHdrLen);
VHeader->csum_offset = TCP_CHECKSUM_OFFSET;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
|
Low
| 170,142
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::getConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexConfigCommonOutputCrop:
{
OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE *rectParams = (OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE *)params;
if (rectParams->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
rectParams->nLeft = mCropLeft;
rectParams->nTop = mCropTop;
rectParams->nWidth = mCropWidth;
rectParams->nHeight = mCropHeight;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,224
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
volatile int summary = 1; /* Print the error summary at the end */
volatile int memstats = 0; /* Print memory statistics at the end */
/* Create the given output file on success: */
PNG_CONST char *volatile touch = NULL;
/* This is an array of standard gamma values (believe it or not I've seen
* every one of these mentioned somewhere.)
*
* In the following list the most useful values are first!
*/
static double
gammas[]={2.2, 1.0, 2.2/1.45, 1.8, 1.5, 2.4, 2.5, 2.62, 2.9};
/* This records the command and arguments: */
size_t cp = 0;
char command[1024];
anon_context(&pm.this);
/* Add appropriate signal handlers, just the ANSI specified ones: */
signal(SIGABRT, signal_handler);
signal(SIGFPE, signal_handler);
signal(SIGILL, signal_handler);
signal(SIGINT, signal_handler);
signal(SIGSEGV, signal_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler);
#ifdef HAVE_FEENABLEEXCEPT
/* Only required to enable FP exceptions on platforms where they start off
* disabled; this is not necessary but if it is not done pngvalid will likely
* end up ignoring FP conditions that other platforms fault.
*/
feenableexcept(FE_DIVBYZERO | FE_INVALID | FE_OVERFLOW);
#endif
modifier_init(&pm);
/* Preallocate the image buffer, because we know how big it needs to be,
* note that, for testing purposes, it is deliberately mis-aligned by tag
* bytes either side. All rows have an additional five bytes of padding for
* overwrite checking.
*/
store_ensure_image(&pm.this, NULL, 2, TRANSFORM_ROWMAX, TRANSFORM_HEIGHTMAX);
/* Don't give argv[0], it's normally some horrible libtool string: */
cp = safecat(command, sizeof command, cp, "pngvalid");
/* Default to error on warning: */
pm.this.treat_warnings_as_errors = 1;
/* Default assume_16_bit_calculations appropriately; this tells the checking
* code that 16-bit arithmetic is used for 8-bit samples when it would make a
* difference.
*/
pm.assume_16_bit_calculations = PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10700;
/* Currently 16 bit expansion happens at the end of the pipeline, so the
* calculations are done in the input bit depth not the output.
*
* TODO: fix this
*/
pm.calculations_use_input_precision = 1U;
/* Store the test gammas */
pm.gammas = gammas;
pm.ngammas = (sizeof gammas) / (sizeof gammas[0]);
pm.ngamma_tests = 0; /* default to off */
/* And the test encodings */
pm.encodings = test_encodings;
pm.nencodings = (sizeof test_encodings) / (sizeof test_encodings[0]);
pm.sbitlow = 8U; /* because libpng doesn't do sBIT below 8! */
/* The following allows results to pass if they correspond to anything in the
* transformed range [input-.5,input+.5]; this is is required because of the
* way libpng treates the 16_TO_8 flag when building the gamma tables in
* releases up to 1.6.0.
*
* TODO: review this
*/
pm.use_input_precision_16to8 = 1U;
pm.use_input_precision_sbit = 1U; /* because libpng now rounds sBIT */
/* Some default values (set the behavior for 'make check' here).
* These values simply control the maximum error permitted in the gamma
* transformations. The practial limits for human perception are described
* below (the setting for maxpc16), however for 8 bit encodings it isn't
* possible to meet the accepted capabilities of human vision - i.e. 8 bit
* images can never be good enough, regardless of encoding.
*/
pm.maxout8 = .1; /* Arithmetic error in *encoded* value */
pm.maxabs8 = .00005; /* 1/20000 */
pm.maxcalc8 = 1./255; /* +/-1 in 8 bits for compose errors */
pm.maxpc8 = .499; /* I.e., .499% fractional error */
pm.maxout16 = .499; /* Error in *encoded* value */
pm.maxabs16 = .00005;/* 1/20000 */
pm.maxcalc16 =1./65535;/* +/-1 in 16 bits for compose errors */
pm.maxcalcG = 1./((1<<PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8)-1);
/* NOTE: this is a reasonable perceptual limit. We assume that humans can
* perceive light level differences of 1% over a 100:1 range, so we need to
* maintain 1 in 10000 accuracy (in linear light space), which is what the
* following guarantees. It also allows significantly higher errors at
* higher 16 bit values, which is important for performance. The actual
* maximum 16 bit error is about +/-1.9 in the fixed point implementation but
* this is only allowed for values >38149 by the following:
*/
pm.maxpc16 = .005; /* I.e., 1/200% - 1/20000 */
/* Now parse the command line options. */
while (--argc >= 1)
{
int catmore = 0; /* Set if the argument has an argument. */
/* Record each argument for posterity: */
cp = safecat(command, sizeof command, cp, " ");
cp = safecat(command, sizeof command, cp, *++argv);
if (strcmp(*argv, "-v") == 0)
pm.this.verbose = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-l") == 0)
pm.log = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-q") == 0)
summary = pm.this.verbose = pm.log = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-w") == 0)
pm.this.treat_warnings_as_errors = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--speed") == 0)
pm.this.speed = 1, pm.ngamma_tests = pm.ngammas, pm.test_standard = 0,
summary = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--memory") == 0)
memstats = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--size") == 0)
pm.test_size = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nosize") == 0)
pm.test_size = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--standard") == 0)
pm.test_standard = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nostandard") == 0)
pm.test_standard = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--transform") == 0)
pm.test_transform = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--notransform") == 0)
pm.test_transform = 0;
#ifdef PNG_READ_TRANSFORMS_SUPPORTED
else if (strncmp(*argv, "--transform-disable=",
sizeof "--transform-disable") == 0)
{
pm.test_transform = 1;
transform_disable(*argv + sizeof "--transform-disable");
}
else if (strncmp(*argv, "--transform-enable=",
sizeof "--transform-enable") == 0)
{
pm.test_transform = 1;
transform_enable(*argv + sizeof "--transform-enable");
}
#endif /* PNG_READ_TRANSFORMS_SUPPORTED */
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--gamma") == 0)
{
/* Just do two gamma tests here (2.2 and linear) for speed: */
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U;
pm.test_gamma_threshold = 1;
pm.test_gamma_transform = 1;
pm.test_gamma_sbit = 1;
pm.test_gamma_scale16 = 1;
pm.test_gamma_background = 1;
pm.test_gamma_alpha_mode = 1;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nogamma") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--gamma-threshold") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U, pm.test_gamma_threshold = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nogamma-threshold") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_threshold = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--gamma-transform") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U, pm.test_gamma_transform = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nogamma-transform") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_transform = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--gamma-sbit") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U, pm.test_gamma_sbit = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nogamma-sbit") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_sbit = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--gamma-16-to-8") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U, pm.test_gamma_scale16 = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nogamma-16-to-8") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_scale16 = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--gamma-background") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U, pm.test_gamma_background = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nogamma-background") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_background = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--gamma-alpha-mode") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U, pm.test_gamma_alpha_mode = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nogamma-alpha-mode") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_alpha_mode = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--expand16") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_expand16 = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--noexpand16") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_expand16 = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--more-gammas") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 3U;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--all-gammas") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = pm.ngammas;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--progressive-read") == 0)
pm.this.progressive = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--use-update-info") == 0)
++pm.use_update_info; /* Can call multiple times */
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--interlace") == 0)
{
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
pm.interlace_type = PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7;
# else
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: no write interlace support\n");
return SKIP;
# endif
}
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--use-input-precision") == 0)
pm.use_input_precision = 1U;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--use-calculation-precision") == 0)
pm.use_input_precision = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--calculations-use-input-precision") == 0)
pm.calculations_use_input_precision = 1U;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--assume-16-bit-calculations") == 0)
pm.assume_16_bit_calculations = 1U;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--calculations-follow-bit-depth") == 0)
pm.calculations_use_input_precision =
pm.assume_16_bit_calculations = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--exhaustive") == 0)
pm.test_exhaustive = 1;
else if (argc > 1 && strcmp(*argv, "--sbitlow") == 0)
--argc, pm.sbitlow = (png_byte)atoi(*++argv), catmore = 1;
else if (argc > 1 && strcmp(*argv, "--touch") == 0)
--argc, touch = *++argv, catmore = 1;
else if (argc > 1 && strncmp(*argv, "--max", 5) == 0)
{
--argc;
if (strcmp(5+*argv, "abs8") == 0)
pm.maxabs8 = atof(*++argv);
else if (strcmp(5+*argv, "abs16") == 0)
pm.maxabs16 = atof(*++argv);
else if (strcmp(5+*argv, "calc8") == 0)
pm.maxcalc8 = atof(*++argv);
else if (strcmp(5+*argv, "calc16") == 0)
pm.maxcalc16 = atof(*++argv);
else if (strcmp(5+*argv, "out8") == 0)
pm.maxout8 = atof(*++argv);
else if (strcmp(5+*argv, "out16") == 0)
pm.maxout16 = atof(*++argv);
else if (strcmp(5+*argv, "pc8") == 0)
pm.maxpc8 = atof(*++argv);
else if (strcmp(5+*argv, "pc16") == 0)
pm.maxpc16 = atof(*++argv);
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: %s: unknown 'max' option\n", *argv);
exit(99);
}
catmore = 1;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--log8") == 0)
--argc, pm.log8 = atof(*++argv), catmore = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--log16") == 0)
--argc, pm.log16 = atof(*++argv), catmore = 1;
#ifdef PNG_SET_OPTION_SUPPORTED
else if (strncmp(*argv, "--option=", 9) == 0)
{
/* Syntax of the argument is <option>:{on|off} */
const char *arg = 9+*argv;
unsigned char option=0, setting=0;
#ifdef PNG_ARM_NEON_API_SUPPORTED
if (strncmp(arg, "arm-neon:", 9) == 0)
option = PNG_ARM_NEON, arg += 9;
else
#endif
#ifdef PNG_MAXIMUM_INFLATE_WINDOW
if (strncmp(arg, "max-inflate-window:", 19) == 0)
option = PNG_MAXIMUM_INFLATE_WINDOW, arg += 19;
else
#endif
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: %s: %s: unknown option\n", *argv, arg);
exit(99);
}
if (strcmp(arg, "off") == 0)
setting = PNG_OPTION_OFF;
else if (strcmp(arg, "on") == 0)
setting = PNG_OPTION_ON;
else
{
fprintf(stderr,
"pngvalid: %s: %s: unknown setting (use 'on' or 'off')\n",
*argv, arg);
exit(99);
}
pm.this.options[pm.this.noptions].option = option;
pm.this.options[pm.this.noptions++].setting = setting;
}
#endif /* PNG_SET_OPTION_SUPPORTED */
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: %s: unknown argument\n", *argv);
exit(99);
}
if (catmore) /* consumed an extra *argv */
{
cp = safecat(command, sizeof command, cp, " ");
cp = safecat(command, sizeof command, cp, *argv);
}
}
/* If pngvalid is run with no arguments default to a reasonable set of the
* tests.
*/
if (pm.test_standard == 0 && pm.test_size == 0 && pm.test_transform == 0 &&
pm.ngamma_tests == 0)
{
/* Make this do all the tests done in the test shell scripts with the same
* parameters, where possible. The limitation is that all the progressive
* read and interlace stuff has to be done in separate runs, so only the
* basic 'standard' and 'size' tests are done.
*/
pm.test_standard = 1;
pm.test_size = 1;
pm.test_transform = 1;
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U;
}
if (pm.ngamma_tests > 0 &&
pm.test_gamma_threshold == 0 && pm.test_gamma_transform == 0 &&
pm.test_gamma_sbit == 0 && pm.test_gamma_scale16 == 0 &&
pm.test_gamma_background == 0 && pm.test_gamma_alpha_mode == 0)
{
pm.test_gamma_threshold = 1;
pm.test_gamma_transform = 1;
pm.test_gamma_sbit = 1;
pm.test_gamma_scale16 = 1;
pm.test_gamma_background = 1;
pm.test_gamma_alpha_mode = 1;
}
else if (pm.ngamma_tests == 0)
{
/* Nothing to test so turn everything off: */
pm.test_gamma_threshold = 0;
pm.test_gamma_transform = 0;
pm.test_gamma_sbit = 0;
pm.test_gamma_scale16 = 0;
pm.test_gamma_background = 0;
pm.test_gamma_alpha_mode = 0;
}
Try
{
/* Make useful base images */
make_transform_images(&pm.this);
/* Perform the standard and gamma tests. */
if (pm.test_standard)
{
perform_interlace_macro_validation();
perform_formatting_test(&pm.this);
# ifdef PNG_READ_SUPPORTED
perform_standard_test(&pm);
# endif
perform_error_test(&pm);
}
/* Various oddly sized images: */
if (pm.test_size)
{
make_size_images(&pm.this);
# ifdef PNG_READ_SUPPORTED
perform_size_test(&pm);
# endif
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_TRANSFORMS_SUPPORTED
/* Combinatorial transforms: */
if (pm.test_transform)
perform_transform_test(&pm);
#endif /* PNG_READ_TRANSFORMS_SUPPORTED */
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
if (pm.ngamma_tests > 0)
perform_gamma_test(&pm, summary);
#endif
}
Catch_anonymous
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: test aborted (probably failed in cleanup)\n");
if (!pm.this.verbose)
{
if (pm.this.error[0] != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: first error: %s\n", pm.this.error);
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: run with -v to see what happened\n");
}
exit(1);
}
if (summary)
{
printf("%s: %s (%s point arithmetic)\n",
(pm.this.nerrors || (pm.this.treat_warnings_as_errors &&
pm.this.nwarnings)) ? "FAIL" : "PASS",
command,
#if defined(PNG_FLOATING_ARITHMETIC_SUPPORTED) || PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10500
"floating"
#else
"fixed"
#endif
);
}
if (memstats)
{
printf("Allocated memory statistics (in bytes):\n"
"\tread %lu maximum single, %lu peak, %lu total\n"
"\twrite %lu maximum single, %lu peak, %lu total\n",
(unsigned long)pm.this.read_memory_pool.max_max,
(unsigned long)pm.this.read_memory_pool.max_limit,
(unsigned long)pm.this.read_memory_pool.max_total,
(unsigned long)pm.this.write_memory_pool.max_max,
(unsigned long)pm.this.write_memory_pool.max_limit,
(unsigned long)pm.this.write_memory_pool.max_total);
}
/* Do this here to provoke memory corruption errors in memory not directly
* allocated by libpng - not a complete test, but better than nothing.
*/
store_delete(&pm.this);
/* Error exit if there are any errors, and maybe if there are any
* warnings.
*/
if (pm.this.nerrors || (pm.this.treat_warnings_as_errors &&
pm.this.nwarnings))
{
if (!pm.this.verbose)
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: %s\n", pm.this.error);
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: %d errors, %d warnings\n", pm.this.nerrors,
pm.this.nwarnings);
exit(1);
}
/* Success case. */
if (touch != NULL)
{
FILE *fsuccess = fopen(touch, "wt");
if (fsuccess != NULL)
{
int error = 0;
fprintf(fsuccess, "PNG validation succeeded\n");
fflush(fsuccess);
error = ferror(fsuccess);
if (fclose(fsuccess) || error)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: write failed\n", touch);
exit(1);
}
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: open failed\n", touch);
exit(1);
}
}
/* This is required because some very minimal configurations do not use it:
*/
UNUSED(fail)
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,660
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: NetworkLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetNetworkLibrary() {
return network_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,627
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int spl_filesystem_file_is_empty_line(spl_filesystem_object *intern TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (intern->u.file.current_line) {
return intern->u.file.current_line_len == 0;
} else if (intern->u.file.current_zval) {
switch(Z_TYPE_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)) {
case IS_STRING:
return Z_STRLEN_P(intern->u.file.current_zval) == 0;
case IS_ARRAY:
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_CSV)
&& zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)) == 1) {
zval ** first = Z_ARRVAL_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)->pListHead->pData;
return Z_TYPE_PP(first) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_PP(first) == 0;
}
return zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)) == 0;
case IS_NULL:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
} else {
return 1;
}
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,074
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void InputEngine::ProcessText(const std::string& message,
ProcessTextCallback callback) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED(); // Text message not used in the rulebased engine.
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: A use after free in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.133 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 57.0.2987.132 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: ime-service: Delete InputEngine.ProcessText.
It is deprecated and no longer used.
Bug: 1009903
Change-Id: I6774a4506bd0bb41a5d1a5909a40a2a781564b16
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1833029
Auto-Submit: Darren Shen <shend@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keith Lee <keithlee@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Shu Chen <shuchen@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Darren Shen <shend@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#705445}
|
Medium
| 172,406
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DOMArrayBuffer* FileReaderLoader::ArrayBufferResult() {
DCHECK_EQ(read_type_, kReadAsArrayBuffer);
if (array_buffer_result_)
return array_buffer_result_;
if (!raw_data_ || error_code_ != FileErrorCode::kOK)
return nullptr;
DOMArrayBuffer* result = DOMArrayBuffer::Create(raw_data_->ToArrayBuffer());
if (finished_loading_) {
array_buffer_result_ = result;
AdjustReportedMemoryUsageToV8(
-1 * static_cast<int64_t>(raw_data_->ByteLength()));
raw_data_.reset();
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Object lifetime issue in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.121 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform out of bounds memory access via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: FileReader: Make a copy of the ArrayBuffer when returning partial results.
This is to avoid accidentally ending up with multiple references to the
same underlying ArrayBuffer. The extra performance overhead of this is
minimal as usage of partial results is very rare anyway (as can be seen
on https://www.chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/2158).
Bug: 936448
Change-Id: Icd1081adc1c889829fe7fa4af9cf4440097e8854
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1492873
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Klein <adamk@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#636251}
|
Medium
| 173,063
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int BrowserNonClientFrameViewAura::NonClientTopBorderHeight(
bool force_restored) const {
if (frame()->widget_delegate() &&
frame()->widget_delegate()->ShouldShowWindowTitle()) {
return close_button_->bounds().bottom();
}
if (!frame()->IsMaximized() || force_restored)
return kTabstripTopSpacingRestored;
return kTabstripTopSpacingMaximized;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger unknown function calls.
Commit Message: Ash: Fix fullscreen window bounds
I was computing the non-client frame top border height incorrectly for fullscreen windows, so it was trying to draw a few pixels of transparent non-client border.
BUG=118774
TEST=visual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9810014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@128014 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,004
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void LocalSiteCharacteristicsWebContentsObserver::DidFinishNavigation(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
DCHECK(navigation_handle);
if (!navigation_handle->IsInMainFrame() ||
navigation_handle->IsSameDocument()) {
return;
}
first_time_title_set_ = false;
first_time_favicon_set_ = false;
if (!navigation_handle->HasCommitted())
return;
const url::Origin new_origin =
url::Origin::Create(navigation_handle->GetURL());
if (writer_ && new_origin == writer_origin_)
return;
writer_.reset();
writer_origin_ = url::Origin();
if (!navigation_handle->GetURL().SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS())
return;
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents()->GetBrowserContext());
DCHECK(profile);
SiteCharacteristicsDataStore* data_store =
LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataStoreFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
DCHECK(data_store);
writer_ = data_store->GetWriterForOrigin(
new_origin,
ContentVisibilityToRCVisibility(web_contents()->GetVisibility()));
if (TabLoadTracker::Get()->GetLoadingState(web_contents()) ==
LoadingState::LOADED) {
writer_->NotifySiteLoaded();
}
writer_origin_ = new_origin;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the formfiller implementation in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document, related to improper tracking of the destruction of (1) IPWL_FocusHandler and (2) IPWL_Provider objects.
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
|
Medium
| 172,216
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: read_header(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
char head_type)
{
const void *h;
const char *p, *endp;
struct rar *rar;
struct rar_header rar_header;
struct rar_file_header file_header;
int64_t header_size;
unsigned filename_size, end;
char *filename;
char *strp;
char packed_size[8];
char unp_size[8];
int ttime;
struct archive_string_conv *sconv, *fn_sconv;
unsigned long crc32_val;
int ret = (ARCHIVE_OK), ret2;
rar = (struct rar *)(a->format->data);
/* Setup a string conversion object for non-rar-unicode filenames. */
sconv = rar->opt_sconv;
if (sconv == NULL) {
if (!rar->init_default_conversion) {
rar->sconv_default =
archive_string_default_conversion_for_read(
&(a->archive));
rar->init_default_conversion = 1;
}
sconv = rar->sconv_default;
}
if ((h = __archive_read_ahead(a, 7, NULL)) == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
p = h;
memcpy(&rar_header, p, sizeof(rar_header));
rar->file_flags = archive_le16dec(rar_header.flags);
header_size = archive_le16dec(rar_header.size);
if (header_size < (int64_t)sizeof(file_header) + 7) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid header size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
crc32_val = crc32(0, (const unsigned char *)p + 2, 7 - 2);
__archive_read_consume(a, 7);
if (!(rar->file_flags & FHD_SOLID))
{
rar->compression_method = 0;
rar->packed_size = 0;
rar->unp_size = 0;
rar->mtime = 0;
rar->ctime = 0;
rar->atime = 0;
rar->arctime = 0;
rar->mode = 0;
memset(&rar->salt, 0, sizeof(rar->salt));
rar->atime = 0;
rar->ansec = 0;
rar->ctime = 0;
rar->cnsec = 0;
rar->mtime = 0;
rar->mnsec = 0;
rar->arctime = 0;
rar->arcnsec = 0;
}
else
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"RAR solid archive support unavailable.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if ((h = __archive_read_ahead(a, (size_t)header_size - 7, NULL)) == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
/* File Header CRC check. */
crc32_val = crc32(crc32_val, h, (unsigned)(header_size - 7));
if ((crc32_val & 0xffff) != archive_le16dec(rar_header.crc)) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Header CRC error");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* If no CRC error, Go on parsing File Header. */
p = h;
endp = p + header_size - 7;
memcpy(&file_header, p, sizeof(file_header));
p += sizeof(file_header);
rar->compression_method = file_header.method;
ttime = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_time);
rar->mtime = get_time(ttime);
rar->file_crc = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_crc);
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_PASSWORD)
{
archive_entry_set_is_data_encrypted(entry, 1);
rar->has_encrypted_entries = 1;
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"RAR encryption support unavailable.");
/* Since it is only the data part itself that is encrypted we can at least
extract information about the currently processed entry and don't need
to return ARCHIVE_FATAL here. */
/*return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);*/
}
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_LARGE)
{
memcpy(packed_size, file_header.pack_size, 4);
memcpy(packed_size + 4, p, 4); /* High pack size */
p += 4;
memcpy(unp_size, file_header.unp_size, 4);
memcpy(unp_size + 4, p, 4); /* High unpack size */
p += 4;
rar->packed_size = archive_le64dec(&packed_size);
rar->unp_size = archive_le64dec(&unp_size);
}
else
{
rar->packed_size = archive_le32dec(file_header.pack_size);
rar->unp_size = archive_le32dec(file_header.unp_size);
}
if (rar->packed_size < 0 || rar->unp_size < 0)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid sizes specified.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->bytes_remaining = rar->packed_size;
/* TODO: RARv3 subblocks contain comments. For now the complete block is
* consumed at the end.
*/
if (head_type == NEWSUB_HEAD) {
size_t distance = p - (const char *)h;
header_size += rar->packed_size;
/* Make sure we have the extended data. */
if ((h = __archive_read_ahead(a, (size_t)header_size - 7, NULL)) == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
p = h;
endp = p + header_size - 7;
p += distance;
}
filename_size = archive_le16dec(file_header.name_size);
if (p + filename_size > endp) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid filename size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (rar->filename_allocated < filename_size * 2 + 2) {
char *newptr;
size_t newsize = filename_size * 2 + 2;
newptr = realloc(rar->filename, newsize);
if (newptr == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Couldn't allocate memory.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->filename = newptr;
rar->filename_allocated = newsize;
}
filename = rar->filename;
memcpy(filename, p, filename_size);
filename[filename_size] = '\0';
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_UNICODE)
{
if (filename_size != strlen(filename))
{
unsigned char highbyte, flagbits, flagbyte;
unsigned fn_end, offset;
end = filename_size;
fn_end = filename_size * 2;
filename_size = 0;
offset = (unsigned)strlen(filename) + 1;
highbyte = *(p + offset++);
flagbits = 0;
flagbyte = 0;
while (offset < end && filename_size < fn_end)
{
if (!flagbits)
{
flagbyte = *(p + offset++);
flagbits = 8;
}
flagbits -= 2;
switch((flagbyte >> flagbits) & 3)
{
case 0:
filename[filename_size++] = '\0';
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset++);
break;
case 1:
filename[filename_size++] = highbyte;
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset++);
break;
case 2:
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset + 1);
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset);
offset += 2;
break;
case 3:
{
char extra, high;
uint8_t length = *(p + offset++);
if (length & 0x80) {
extra = *(p + offset++);
high = (char)highbyte;
} else
extra = high = 0;
length = (length & 0x7f) + 2;
while (length && filename_size < fn_end) {
unsigned cp = filename_size >> 1;
filename[filename_size++] = high;
filename[filename_size++] = p[cp] + extra;
length--;
}
}
break;
}
}
if (filename_size > fn_end) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid filename");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
filename[filename_size++] = '\0';
filename[filename_size++] = '\0';
/* Decoded unicode form is UTF-16BE, so we have to update a string
* conversion object for it. */
if (rar->sconv_utf16be == NULL) {
rar->sconv_utf16be = archive_string_conversion_from_charset(
&a->archive, "UTF-16BE", 1);
if (rar->sconv_utf16be == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
fn_sconv = rar->sconv_utf16be;
strp = filename;
while (memcmp(strp, "\x00\x00", 2))
{
if (!memcmp(strp, "\x00\\", 2))
*(strp + 1) = '/';
strp += 2;
}
p += offset;
} else {
/*
* If FHD_UNICODE is set but no unicode data, this file name form
* is UTF-8, so we have to update a string conversion object for
* it accordingly.
*/
if (rar->sconv_utf8 == NULL) {
rar->sconv_utf8 = archive_string_conversion_from_charset(
&a->archive, "UTF-8", 1);
if (rar->sconv_utf8 == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
fn_sconv = rar->sconv_utf8;
while ((strp = strchr(filename, '\\')) != NULL)
*strp = '/';
p += filename_size;
}
}
else
{
fn_sconv = sconv;
while ((strp = strchr(filename, '\\')) != NULL)
*strp = '/';
p += filename_size;
}
/* Split file in multivolume RAR. No more need to process header. */
if (rar->filename_save &&
filename_size == rar->filename_save_size &&
!memcmp(rar->filename, rar->filename_save, filename_size + 1))
{
__archive_read_consume(a, header_size - 7);
rar->cursor++;
if (rar->cursor >= rar->nodes)
{
rar->nodes++;
if ((rar->dbo =
realloc(rar->dbo, sizeof(*rar->dbo) * rar->nodes)) == NULL)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, "Couldn't allocate memory.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].header_size = header_size;
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset = -1;
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].end_offset = -1;
}
if (rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset < 0)
{
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset = a->filter->position;
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].end_offset = rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset +
rar->packed_size;
}
return ret;
}
rar->filename_save = (char*)realloc(rar->filename_save,
filename_size + 1);
memcpy(rar->filename_save, rar->filename, filename_size + 1);
rar->filename_save_size = filename_size;
/* Set info for seeking */
free(rar->dbo);
if ((rar->dbo = calloc(1, sizeof(*rar->dbo))) == NULL)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, "Couldn't allocate memory.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->dbo[0].header_size = header_size;
rar->dbo[0].start_offset = -1;
rar->dbo[0].end_offset = -1;
rar->cursor = 0;
rar->nodes = 1;
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_SALT)
{
if (p + 8 > endp) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid header size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
memcpy(rar->salt, p, 8);
p += 8;
}
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_EXTTIME) {
if (read_exttime(p, rar, endp) < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid header size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
}
__archive_read_consume(a, header_size - 7);
rar->dbo[0].start_offset = a->filter->position;
rar->dbo[0].end_offset = rar->dbo[0].start_offset + rar->packed_size;
switch(file_header.host_os)
{
case OS_MSDOS:
case OS_OS2:
case OS_WIN32:
rar->mode = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_attr);
if (rar->mode & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY)
rar->mode = AE_IFDIR | S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH;
else
rar->mode = AE_IFREG;
rar->mode |= S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH;
break;
case OS_UNIX:
case OS_MAC_OS:
case OS_BEOS:
rar->mode = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_attr);
break;
default:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unknown file attributes from RAR file's host OS");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->bytes_uncopied = rar->bytes_unconsumed = 0;
rar->lzss.position = rar->offset = 0;
rar->offset_seek = 0;
rar->dictionary_size = 0;
rar->offset_outgoing = 0;
rar->br.cache_avail = 0;
rar->br.avail_in = 0;
rar->crc_calculated = 0;
rar->entry_eof = 0;
rar->valid = 1;
rar->is_ppmd_block = 0;
rar->start_new_table = 1;
free(rar->unp_buffer);
rar->unp_buffer = NULL;
rar->unp_offset = 0;
rar->unp_buffer_size = UNP_BUFFER_SIZE;
memset(rar->lengthtable, 0, sizeof(rar->lengthtable));
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Free(&rar->ppmd7_context, &g_szalloc);
rar->ppmd_valid = rar->ppmd_eod = 0;
/* Don't set any archive entries for non-file header types */
if (head_type == NEWSUB_HEAD)
return ret;
archive_entry_set_mtime(entry, rar->mtime, rar->mnsec);
archive_entry_set_ctime(entry, rar->ctime, rar->cnsec);
archive_entry_set_atime(entry, rar->atime, rar->ansec);
archive_entry_set_size(entry, rar->unp_size);
archive_entry_set_mode(entry, rar->mode);
if (archive_entry_copy_pathname_l(entry, filename, filename_size, fn_sconv))
{
if (errno == ENOMEM)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory for Pathname");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Pathname cannot be converted from %s to current locale.",
archive_string_conversion_charset_name(fn_sconv));
ret = (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
if (((rar->mode) & AE_IFMT) == AE_IFLNK)
{
/* Make sure a symbolic-link file does not have its body. */
rar->bytes_remaining = 0;
archive_entry_set_size(entry, 0);
/* Read a symbolic-link name. */
if ((ret2 = read_symlink_stored(a, entry, sconv)) < (ARCHIVE_WARN))
return ret2;
if (ret > ret2)
ret = ret2;
}
if (rar->bytes_remaining == 0)
rar->entry_eof = 1;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: read_header in archive_read_support_format_rar.c in libarchive 3.3.2 suffers from an off-by-one error for UTF-16 names in RAR archives, leading to an out-of-bounds read in archive_read_format_rar_read_header.
Commit Message: Avoid a read off-by-one error for UTF16 names in RAR archives.
Reported-By: OSS-Fuzz issue 573
|
Low
| 167,754
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t o2nm_node_ipv4_address_store(struct config_item *item,
const char *page,
size_t count)
{
struct o2nm_node *node = to_o2nm_node(item);
struct o2nm_cluster *cluster = to_o2nm_cluster_from_node(node);
int ret, i;
struct rb_node **p, *parent;
unsigned int octets[4];
__be32 ipv4_addr = 0;
ret = sscanf(page, "%3u.%3u.%3u.%3u", &octets[3], &octets[2],
&octets[1], &octets[0]);
if (ret != 4)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(octets); i++) {
if (octets[i] > 255)
return -ERANGE;
be32_add_cpu(&ipv4_addr, octets[i] << (i * 8));
}
ret = 0;
write_lock(&cluster->cl_nodes_lock);
if (o2nm_node_ip_tree_lookup(cluster, ipv4_addr, &p, &parent))
ret = -EEXIST;
else if (test_and_set_bit(O2NM_NODE_ATTR_ADDRESS,
&node->nd_set_attributes))
ret = -EBUSY;
else {
rb_link_node(&node->nd_ip_node, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(&node->nd_ip_node, &cluster->cl_node_ip_tree);
}
write_unlock(&cluster->cl_nodes_lock);
if (ret)
return ret;
memcpy(&node->nd_ipv4_address, &ipv4_addr, sizeof(ipv4_addr));
return count;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: In fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.c in the Linux kernel before 4.15, local users can cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and BUG) because a required mutex is not used.
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EEAA69.9080703@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59E9B36A.10700@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 169,405
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(recvfrom, int, fd, void __user *, ubuf, size_t, size,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int __user *, addr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct iovec iov;
struct msghdr msg;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err, err2;
int fput_needed;
if (size > INT_MAX)
size = INT_MAX;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
iov.iov_len = size;
iov.iov_base = ubuf;
msg.msg_name = (struct sockaddr *)&address;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(address);
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
err = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, size, flags);
if (err >= 0 && addr != NULL) {
err2 = move_addr_to_user(&address,
msg.msg_namelen, addr, addr_len);
if (err2 < 0)
err = err2;
}
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,515
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xfs_ioctl_setattr(
xfs_inode_t *ip,
struct fsxattr *fa,
int mask)
{
struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount;
struct xfs_trans *tp;
unsigned int lock_flags = 0;
struct xfs_dquot *udqp = NULL;
struct xfs_dquot *pdqp = NULL;
struct xfs_dquot *olddquot = NULL;
int code;
trace_xfs_ioctl_setattr(ip);
if (mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY)
return XFS_ERROR(EROFS);
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(mp))
return XFS_ERROR(EIO);
/*
* Disallow 32bit project ids when projid32bit feature is not enabled.
*/
if ((mask & FSX_PROJID) && (fa->fsx_projid > (__uint16_t)-1) &&
!xfs_sb_version_hasprojid32bit(&ip->i_mount->m_sb))
return XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
/*
* If disk quotas is on, we make sure that the dquots do exist on disk,
* before we start any other transactions. Trying to do this later
* is messy. We don't care to take a readlock to look at the ids
* in inode here, because we can't hold it across the trans_reserve.
* If the IDs do change before we take the ilock, we're covered
* because the i_*dquot fields will get updated anyway.
*/
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_ON(mp) && (mask & FSX_PROJID)) {
code = xfs_qm_vop_dqalloc(ip, ip->i_d.di_uid,
ip->i_d.di_gid, fa->fsx_projid,
XFS_QMOPT_PQUOTA, &udqp, NULL, &pdqp);
if (code)
return code;
}
/*
* For the other attributes, we acquire the inode lock and
* first do an error checking pass.
*/
tp = xfs_trans_alloc(mp, XFS_TRANS_SETATTR_NOT_SIZE);
code = xfs_trans_reserve(tp, &M_RES(mp)->tr_ichange, 0, 0);
if (code)
goto error_return;
lock_flags = XFS_ILOCK_EXCL;
xfs_ilock(ip, lock_flags);
/*
* CAP_FOWNER overrides the following restrictions:
*
* The user ID of the calling process must be equal
* to the file owner ID, except in cases where the
* CAP_FSETID capability is applicable.
*/
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(VFS_I(ip))) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EPERM);
goto error_return;
}
/*
* Do a quota reservation only if projid is actually going to change.
* Only allow changing of projid from init_user_ns since it is a
* non user namespace aware identifier.
*/
if (mask & FSX_PROJID) {
if (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error_return;
}
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_RUNNING(mp) &&
XFS_IS_PQUOTA_ON(mp) &&
xfs_get_projid(ip) != fa->fsx_projid) {
ASSERT(tp);
code = xfs_qm_vop_chown_reserve(tp, ip, udqp, NULL,
pdqp, capable(CAP_FOWNER) ?
XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES : 0);
if (code) /* out of quota */
goto error_return;
}
}
if (mask & FSX_EXTSIZE) {
/*
* Can't change extent size if any extents are allocated.
*/
if (ip->i_d.di_nextents &&
((ip->i_d.di_extsize << mp->m_sb.sb_blocklog) !=
fa->fsx_extsize)) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL); /* EFBIG? */
goto error_return;
}
/*
* Extent size must be a multiple of the appropriate block
* size, if set at all. It must also be smaller than the
* maximum extent size supported by the filesystem.
*
* Also, for non-realtime files, limit the extent size hint to
* half the size of the AGs in the filesystem so alignment
* doesn't result in extents larger than an AG.
*/
if (fa->fsx_extsize != 0) {
xfs_extlen_t size;
xfs_fsblock_t extsize_fsb;
extsize_fsb = XFS_B_TO_FSB(mp, fa->fsx_extsize);
if (extsize_fsb > MAXEXTLEN) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error_return;
}
if (XFS_IS_REALTIME_INODE(ip) ||
((mask & FSX_XFLAGS) &&
(fa->fsx_xflags & XFS_XFLAG_REALTIME))) {
size = mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize <<
mp->m_sb.sb_blocklog;
} else {
size = mp->m_sb.sb_blocksize;
if (extsize_fsb > mp->m_sb.sb_agblocks / 2) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error_return;
}
}
if (fa->fsx_extsize % size) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error_return;
}
}
}
if (mask & FSX_XFLAGS) {
/*
* Can't change realtime flag if any extents are allocated.
*/
if ((ip->i_d.di_nextents || ip->i_delayed_blks) &&
(XFS_IS_REALTIME_INODE(ip)) !=
(fa->fsx_xflags & XFS_XFLAG_REALTIME)) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL); /* EFBIG? */
goto error_return;
}
/*
* If realtime flag is set then must have realtime data.
*/
if ((fa->fsx_xflags & XFS_XFLAG_REALTIME)) {
if ((mp->m_sb.sb_rblocks == 0) ||
(mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize == 0) ||
(ip->i_d.di_extsize % mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize)) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error_return;
}
}
/*
* Can't modify an immutable/append-only file unless
* we have appropriate permission.
*/
if ((ip->i_d.di_flags &
(XFS_DIFLAG_IMMUTABLE|XFS_DIFLAG_APPEND) ||
(fa->fsx_xflags &
(XFS_XFLAG_IMMUTABLE | XFS_XFLAG_APPEND))) &&
!capable(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE)) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EPERM);
goto error_return;
}
}
xfs_trans_ijoin(tp, ip, 0);
/*
* Change file ownership. Must be the owner or privileged.
*/
if (mask & FSX_PROJID) {
/*
* CAP_FSETID overrides the following restrictions:
*
* The set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits of a file will be
* cleared upon successful return from chown()
*/
if ((ip->i_d.di_mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)) &&
!inode_capable(VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID))
ip->i_d.di_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
/*
* Change the ownerships and register quota modifications
* in the transaction.
*/
if (xfs_get_projid(ip) != fa->fsx_projid) {
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_RUNNING(mp) && XFS_IS_PQUOTA_ON(mp)) {
olddquot = xfs_qm_vop_chown(tp, ip,
&ip->i_pdquot, pdqp);
}
xfs_set_projid(ip, fa->fsx_projid);
/*
* We may have to rev the inode as well as
* the superblock version number since projids didn't
* exist before DINODE_VERSION_2 and SB_VERSION_NLINK.
*/
if (ip->i_d.di_version == 1)
xfs_bump_ino_vers2(tp, ip);
}
}
if (mask & FSX_EXTSIZE)
ip->i_d.di_extsize = fa->fsx_extsize >> mp->m_sb.sb_blocklog;
if (mask & FSX_XFLAGS) {
xfs_set_diflags(ip, fa->fsx_xflags);
xfs_diflags_to_linux(ip);
}
xfs_trans_ichgtime(tp, ip, XFS_ICHGTIME_CHG);
xfs_trans_log_inode(tp, ip, XFS_ILOG_CORE);
XFS_STATS_INC(xs_ig_attrchg);
/*
* If this is a synchronous mount, make sure that the
* transaction goes to disk before returning to the user.
* This is slightly sub-optimal in that truncates require
* two sync transactions instead of one for wsync filesystems.
* One for the truncate and one for the timestamps since we
* don't want to change the timestamps unless we're sure the
* truncate worked. Truncates are less than 1% of the laddis
* mix so this probably isn't worth the trouble to optimize.
*/
if (mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_WSYNC)
xfs_trans_set_sync(tp);
code = xfs_trans_commit(tp, 0);
xfs_iunlock(ip, lock_flags);
/*
* Release any dquot(s) the inode had kept before chown.
*/
xfs_qm_dqrele(olddquot);
xfs_qm_dqrele(udqp);
xfs_qm_dqrele(pdqp);
return code;
error_return:
xfs_qm_dqrele(udqp);
xfs_qm_dqrele(pdqp);
xfs_trans_cancel(tp, 0);
if (lock_flags)
xfs_iunlock(ip, lock_flags);
return code;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The capabilities implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.14.8 does not properly consider that namespaces are inapplicable to inodes, which allows local users to bypass intended chmod restrictions by first creating a user namespace, as demonstrated by setting the setgid bit on a file with group ownership of root.
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
High
| 166,322
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GpuChannelHost::GpuChannelHost(
GpuChannelHostFactory* factory, int gpu_process_id, int client_id)
: factory_(factory),
gpu_process_id_(gpu_process_id),
client_id_(client_id),
state_(kUnconnected) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,929
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static zval *xml_call_handler(xml_parser *parser, zval *handler, zend_function *function_ptr, int argc, zval **argv)
{
int i;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
if (parser && handler && !EG(exception)) {
zval ***args;
zval *retval;
int result;
zend_fcall_info fci;
args = safe_emalloc(sizeof(zval **), argc, 0);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
args[i] = &argv[i];
}
fci.size = sizeof(fci);
fci.function_table = EG(function_table);
fci.function_name = handler;
fci.symbol_table = NULL;
fci.object_ptr = parser->object;
fci.retval_ptr_ptr = &retval;
fci.param_count = argc;
fci.params = args;
fci.no_separation = 0;
/*fci.function_handler_cache = &function_ptr;*/
result = zend_call_function(&fci, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
if (result == FAILURE) {
zval **method;
zval **obj;
if (Z_TYPE_P(handler) == IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call handler %s()", Z_STRVAL_P(handler));
} else if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(handler), 0, (void **) &obj) == SUCCESS &&
zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(handler), 1, (void **) &method) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(obj) == IS_OBJECT &&
Z_TYPE_PP(method) == IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call handler %s::%s()", Z_OBJCE_PP(obj)->name, Z_STRVAL_PP(method));
} else
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call handler");
}
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
zval_ptr_dtor(args[i]);
}
efree(args);
if (result == FAILURE) {
return NULL;
} else {
return EG(exception) ? NULL : retval;
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[i]);
}
return NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The xml_parse_into_struct function in ext/xml/xml.c in PHP before 5.5.35, 5.6.x before 5.6.21, and 7.x before 7.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer under-read and segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted XML data in the second argument, leading to a parser level of zero.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,046
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FakeCrosDisksClient::Mount(const std::string& source_path,
const std::string& source_format,
const std::string& mount_label,
const std::vector<std::string>& mount_options,
MountAccessMode access_mode,
RemountOption remount,
VoidDBusMethodCallback callback) {
MountType type =
source_format.empty() ? MOUNT_TYPE_DEVICE : MOUNT_TYPE_ARCHIVE;
if (GURL(source_path).is_valid())
type = MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE;
base::FilePath mounted_path;
switch (type) {
case MOUNT_TYPE_ARCHIVE:
mounted_path = GetArchiveMountPoint().Append(
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(mount_label));
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_DEVICE:
mounted_path = GetRemovableDiskMountPoint().Append(
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(mount_label));
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE:
if (custom_mount_point_callback_) {
mounted_path =
custom_mount_point_callback_.Run(source_path, mount_options);
}
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_INVALID:
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
mounted_paths_.insert(mounted_path);
base::PostTaskWithTraitsAndReplyWithResult(
FROM_HERE,
{base::MayBlock(), base::TaskShutdownBehavior::CONTINUE_ON_SHUTDOWN},
base::BindOnce(&PerformFakeMount, source_path, mounted_path),
base::BindOnce(&FakeCrosDisksClient::DidMount,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), source_path, type,
mounted_path, std::move(callback)));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.80 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
|
Low
| 171,730
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
int err;
elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!elem)
goto err;
elem->insn_idx = insn_idx;
elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
elem->next = env->head;
env->head = elem;
env->stack_size++;
err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur);
if (err)
goto err;
if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK) {
verbose(env, "BPF program is too complex\n");
goto err;
}
return &elem->st;
err:
free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true);
env->cur_state = NULL;
/* pop all elements and return */
while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel before 4.20.6 performs undesirable out-of-bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic in various cases, including cases of different branches with different state or limits to sanitize, leading to side-channel attacks.
Commit Message: bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient
to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access
for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such
that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program
and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected
from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user
data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with
unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for
example:
- Load a map value pointer into R6
- Load an index into R7
- Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that
loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for
high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy)
- Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch)
- Load R0 = R6[R7]
- Load R0 = R6[R0]
For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier
where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee
safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't
allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown
scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value
pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another
option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar,
for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm>
followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the
original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed
entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still
precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU
executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known
scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option
only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted
as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit)
would be filled with many dependent computations such that
the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait
for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing
speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a
different execution port, or any other form of mistraining
as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited
to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access
is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users
and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under
speculation.
In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now
sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any
out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the
pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will
stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as
in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation,
there are three options that were considered: i) new insn
for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined
BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF.
Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved
bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require
each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning
mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements
it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii)
have both in common that a temporary register is needed in
order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we
are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push /
pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it
requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it
first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also
be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which
has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation
and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is
option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is
already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where
it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there)
and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can
be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints.
The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped
into extending the register set with hidden ax register and
reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the
prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This
allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter,
and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as
long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions.
The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the
map value or stack pointer currently holds.
There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration
for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows:
ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be
sanitized could reside either in source or in destination
register, and the limit is different depending on whether
the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the
current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as
follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For
subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because
we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would
temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown
value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at
verification time whether the actual runtime value would
be either negative or positive. For example, we have a
derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded
one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier
requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer
must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting
smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map
value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of
access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive
the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction
and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off +
ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for
the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val,
or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that
the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the
value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value
where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source
register if the value was in source.
The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully
sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could
happen ...
PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm)
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
[...]
... which under speculation could end up as ...
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
[...]
... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such
case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out
of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is
also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore
"branch off" and push the current verification state after the
ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later
analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is
likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any
case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and
therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In
terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification
state from speculative execution simulation must never prune
a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier
state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier
detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from
one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will
reject such program.
Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for
unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could
affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the
majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use
case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu
restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the
sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected
in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of
instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by
using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests.
For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o
and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb
we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We
found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier
with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none.
balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and
7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex
program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated
and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other
tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For
the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small
increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed
before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed
after the change. Other programs from that object file had
similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and
remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes
JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes
(634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained
in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic
by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access
is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to
optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from
branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in
terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well
as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's
Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access,
thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could
be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also
brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the
blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or
overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific
pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under
given constraints.
With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on
unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows:
# bpftool prog dump xlated id 282
[...]
28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)
29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8)
30: (57) r1 &= 15
31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608)
32: (57) r3 &= 1
33: (47) r3 |= 1
34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19
35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 |
36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer
37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers
38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known
39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent
40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation.
41: (0f) r4 += r11 |
42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0)
43: (6f) r4 <<= r1
[...]
For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register
as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted
for the above example:
[...]
16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479
17: (1f) r11 -= r2
18: (4f) r11 |= r2
19: (87) r11 = -r11
20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
21: (5f) r2 &= r11
22: (0f) r2 += r0
23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10:
[...]
d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _
d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi |
da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and
e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f.
e7: and %r10,%rdi |_
ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d |
f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10
f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each
f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions
f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp
fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.)
100: add %rax,%rdi |_
103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax
[...]
Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier
and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled
on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully.
[0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative
Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf
[1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and
Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz,
Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens,
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
Medium
| 170,244
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::didFocusOnControl()
{
element()->setFocus(true);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.95 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to not properly considering focus during the processing of JavaScript events in the presence of a multiple-fields input type.
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,212
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: spnego_gss_delete_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *ctx =
(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *)context_handle;
*minor_status = 0;
if (context_handle == NULL)
return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
if (*ctx == NULL)
return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
/*
* If this is still an SPNEGO mech, release it locally.
*/
if ((*ctx)->magic_num == SPNEGO_MAGIC_ID) {
(void) gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
&(*ctx)->ctx_handle,
output_token);
(void) release_spnego_ctx(ctx);
} else {
ret = gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
context_handle,
output_token);
}
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,654
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::ResetFeaturePolicy() {
RenderFrameHostImpl* parent_frame_host = GetParent();
const FeaturePolicy* parent_policy =
parent_frame_host ? parent_frame_host->get_feature_policy() : nullptr;
ParsedFeaturePolicyHeader container_policy =
frame_tree_node()->effective_container_policy();
feature_policy_ = FeaturePolicy::CreateFromParentPolicy(
parent_policy, container_policy, last_committed_origin_);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: content/browser/web_contents/web_contents_impl.cc in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that a PDF document's modal dialog is closed upon navigation to an interstitial page, which allows remote attackers to spoof URLs via a crafted document, as demonstrated by the alert_dialog.pdf document.
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
|
Medium
| 171,964
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: hstore_from_arrays(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
int32 buflen;
HStore *out;
Pairs *pairs;
Datum *key_datums;
bool *key_nulls;
int key_count;
Datum *value_datums;
bool *value_nulls;
int value_count;
ArrayType *key_array;
ArrayType *value_array;
int i;
if (PG_ARGISNULL(0))
PG_RETURN_NULL();
key_array = PG_GETARG_ARRAYTYPE_P(0);
Assert(ARR_ELEMTYPE(key_array) == TEXTOID);
/*
* must check >1 rather than != 1 because empty arrays have 0 dimensions,
* not 1
*/
if (ARR_NDIM(key_array) > 1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("wrong number of array subscripts")));
deconstruct_array(key_array,
TEXTOID, -1, false, 'i',
&key_datums, &key_nulls, &key_count);
/* value_array might be NULL */
if (PG_ARGISNULL(1))
{
value_array = NULL;
value_count = key_count;
value_datums = NULL;
value_nulls = NULL;
}
else
{
value_array = PG_GETARG_ARRAYTYPE_P(1);
Assert(ARR_ELEMTYPE(value_array) == TEXTOID);
if (ARR_NDIM(value_array) > 1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("wrong number of array subscripts")));
if ((ARR_NDIM(key_array) > 0 || ARR_NDIM(value_array) > 0) &&
(ARR_NDIM(key_array) != ARR_NDIM(value_array) ||
ARR_DIMS(key_array)[0] != ARR_DIMS(value_array)[0] ||
ARR_LBOUND(key_array)[0] != ARR_LBOUND(value_array)[0]))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("arrays must have same bounds")));
deconstruct_array(value_array,
TEXTOID, -1, false, 'i',
&value_datums, &value_nulls, &value_count);
Assert(key_count == value_count);
}
pairs = palloc(key_count * sizeof(Pairs));
for (i = 0; i < key_count; ++i)
{
if (key_nulls[i])
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_NULL_VALUE_NOT_ALLOWED),
errmsg("null value not allowed for hstore key")));
if (!value_nulls || value_nulls[i])
{
pairs[i].key = VARDATA_ANY(key_datums[i]);
pairs[i].val = NULL;
pairs[i].keylen = hstoreCheckKeyLen(VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(key_datums[i]));
pairs[i].vallen = 4;
pairs[i].isnull = true;
pairs[i].needfree = false;
}
else
{
pairs[i].key = VARDATA_ANY(key_datums[i]);
pairs[i].val = VARDATA_ANY(value_datums[i]);
pairs[i].keylen = hstoreCheckKeyLen(VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(key_datums[i]));
pairs[i].vallen = hstoreCheckValLen(VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(value_datums[i]));
pairs[i].isnull = false;
pairs[i].needfree = false;
}
}
key_count = hstoreUniquePairs(pairs, key_count, &buflen);
out = hstorePairs(pairs, key_count, buflen);
PG_RETURN_POINTER(out);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c in PostgreSQL 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the (1) hstore_recv, (2) hstore_from_arrays, and (3) hstore_from_array functions in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c; and the (4) hstoreArrayToPairs function in contrib/hstore/hstore_op.c, which triggers a buffer overflow. NOTE: this issue was SPLIT from CVE-2014-0064 because it has a different set of affected versions.
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
Low
| 166,397
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool SetImeConfig(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (!IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "SetImeConfig: IBus connection is not alive";
return false;
}
bool is_preload_engines = false;
std::vector<std::string> string_list;
if ((value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList) &&
(section == kGeneralSectionName) &&
(config_name == kPreloadEnginesConfigName)) {
FilterInputMethods(value.string_list_value, &string_list);
is_preload_engines = true;
} else {
string_list = value.string_list_value;
}
GVariant* variant = NULL;
switch (value.type) {
case ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeString:
variant = g_variant_new_string(value.string_value.c_str());
break;
case ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeInt:
variant = g_variant_new_int32(value.int_value);
break;
case ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeBool:
variant = g_variant_new_boolean(value.bool_value);
break;
case ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList:
GVariantBuilder variant_builder;
g_variant_builder_init(&variant_builder, G_VARIANT_TYPE("as"));
const size_t size = string_list.size(); // don't use string_list_value.
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
g_variant_builder_add(&variant_builder, "s", string_list[i].c_str());
}
variant = g_variant_builder_end(&variant_builder);
break;
}
if (!variant) {
LOG(ERROR) << "SetImeConfig: variant is NULL";
return false;
}
DCHECK(g_variant_is_floating(variant));
ibus_config_set_value_async(ibus_config_,
section.c_str(),
config_name.c_str(),
variant,
-1, // use the default ibus timeout
NULL, // cancellable
SetImeConfigCallback,
g_object_ref(ibus_config_));
if (is_preload_engines) {
DLOG(INFO) << "SetImeConfig: " << section << "/" << config_name
<< ": " << value.ToString();
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,547
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long long BlockGroup::GetNextTimeCode() const
{
return m_next;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,348
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client, void *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_port_info *info = arg;
struct snd_seq_client_port *port;
struct snd_seq_port_callback *callback;
/* it is not allowed to create the port for an another client */
if (info->addr.client != client->number)
return -EPERM;
port = snd_seq_create_port(client, (info->flags & SNDRV_SEQ_PORT_FLG_GIVEN_PORT) ? info->addr.port : -1);
if (port == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (client->type == USER_CLIENT && info->kernel) {
snd_seq_delete_port(client, port->addr.port);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (client->type == KERNEL_CLIENT) {
if ((callback = info->kernel) != NULL) {
if (callback->owner)
port->owner = callback->owner;
port->private_data = callback->private_data;
port->private_free = callback->private_free;
port->event_input = callback->event_input;
port->c_src.open = callback->subscribe;
port->c_src.close = callback->unsubscribe;
port->c_dest.open = callback->use;
port->c_dest.close = callback->unuse;
}
}
info->addr = port->addr;
snd_seq_set_port_info(port, info);
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start(port->addr.client, port->addr.port);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in the ALSA subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted /dev/snd/seq ioctl calls, related to sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c and sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c.
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Medium
| 167,728
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Microtask::performCheckpoint()
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
V8PerIsolateData* isolateData = V8PerIsolateData::from(isolate);
ASSERT(isolateData);
if (isolateData->recursionLevel() || isolateData->performingMicrotaskCheckpoint() || isolateData->destructionPending() || ScriptForbiddenScope::isScriptForbidden())
return;
isolateData->setPerformingMicrotaskCheckpoint(true);
{
V8RecursionScope recursionScope(isolate);
isolate->RunMicrotasks();
}
isolateData->setPerformingMicrotaskCheckpoint(false);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: core/loader/ImageLoader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly determine the V8 context of a microtask, which allows remote attackers to bypass Content Security Policy (CSP) restrictions by providing an image from an unintended source.
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,945
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ikev1_sig_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_SIG)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_SIG)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IKEv2 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,793
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: vsock_stream_recvmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb,
struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct vsock_sock *vsk;
int err;
size_t target;
ssize_t copied;
long timeout;
struct vsock_transport_recv_notify_data recv_data;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
sk = sock->sk;
vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
err = 0;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != SS_CONNECTED) {
/* Recvmsg is supposed to return 0 if a peer performs an
* orderly shutdown. Differentiate between that case and when a
* peer has not connected or a local shutdown occured with the
* SOCK_DONE flag.
*/
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
err = 0;
else
err = -ENOTCONN;
goto out;
}
if (flags & MSG_OOB) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
/* We don't check peer_shutdown flag here since peer may actually shut
* down, but there can be data in the queue that a local socket can
* receive.
*/
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) {
err = 0;
goto out;
}
/* It is valid on Linux to pass in a zero-length receive buffer. This
* is not an error. We may as well bail out now.
*/
if (!len) {
err = 0;
goto out;
}
/* We must not copy less than target bytes into the user's buffer
* before returning successfully, so we wait for the consume queue to
* have that much data to consume before dequeueing. Note that this
* makes it impossible to handle cases where target is greater than the
* queue size.
*/
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len);
if (target >= transport->stream_rcvhiwat(vsk)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
timeout = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
copied = 0;
err = transport->notify_recv_init(vsk, target, &recv_data);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
while (1) {
s64 ready = vsock_stream_has_data(vsk);
if (ready < 0) {
/* Invalid queue pair content. XXX This should be
* changed to a connection reset in a later change.
*/
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_wait;
} else if (ready > 0) {
ssize_t read;
err = transport->notify_recv_pre_dequeue(
vsk, target, &recv_data);
if (err < 0)
break;
read = transport->stream_dequeue(
vsk, msg->msg_iov,
len - copied, flags);
if (read < 0) {
err = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
copied += read;
err = transport->notify_recv_post_dequeue(
vsk, target, read,
!(flags & MSG_PEEK), &recv_data);
if (err < 0)
goto out_wait;
if (read >= target || flags & MSG_PEEK)
break;
target -= read;
} else {
if (sk->sk_err != 0 || (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
|| (vsk->peer_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN)) {
break;
}
/* Don't wait for non-blocking sockets. */
if (timeout == 0) {
err = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
err = transport->notify_recv_pre_block(
vsk, target, &recv_data);
if (err < 0)
break;
release_sock(sk);
timeout = schedule_timeout(timeout);
lock_sock(sk);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeout);
break;
} else if (timeout == 0) {
err = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait,
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
}
}
if (sk->sk_err)
err = -sk->sk_err;
else if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
err = 0;
if (copied > 0) {
/* We only do these additional bookkeeping/notification steps
* if we actually copied something out of the queue pair
* instead of just peeking ahead.
*/
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
/* If the other side has shutdown for sending and there
* is nothing more to read, then modify the socket
* state.
*/
if (vsk->peer_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) {
if (vsock_stream_has_data(vsk) <= 0) {
sk->sk_state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE);
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
}
}
}
err = copied;
}
out_wait:
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,522
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ExtensionTtsController::ClearUtteranceQueue() {
while (!utterance_queue_.empty()) {
Utterance* utterance = utterance_queue_.front();
utterance_queue_.pop();
utterance->set_error(kSpeechRemovedFromQueueError);
utterance->FinishAndDestroy();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,375
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int get_next_block(bunzip_data *bd)
{
struct group_data *hufGroup;
int dbufCount, dbufSize, groupCount, *base, *limit, selector,
i, j, runPos, symCount, symTotal, nSelectors, byteCount[256];
int runCnt = runCnt; /* for compiler */
uint8_t uc, symToByte[256], mtfSymbol[256], *selectors;
uint32_t *dbuf;
unsigned origPtr, t;
dbuf = bd->dbuf;
dbufSize = bd->dbufSize;
selectors = bd->selectors;
/* In bbox, we are ok with aborting through setjmp which is set up in start_bunzip */
#if 0
/* Reset longjmp I/O error handling */
i = setjmp(bd->jmpbuf);
if (i) return i;
#endif
/* Read in header signature and CRC, then validate signature.
(last block signature means CRC is for whole file, return now) */
i = get_bits(bd, 24);
j = get_bits(bd, 24);
bd->headerCRC = get_bits(bd, 32);
if ((i == 0x177245) && (j == 0x385090)) return RETVAL_LAST_BLOCK;
if ((i != 0x314159) || (j != 0x265359)) return RETVAL_NOT_BZIP_DATA;
/* We can add support for blockRandomised if anybody complains. There was
some code for this in busybox 1.0.0-pre3, but nobody ever noticed that
it didn't actually work. */
if (get_bits(bd, 1)) return RETVAL_OBSOLETE_INPUT;
origPtr = get_bits(bd, 24);
if ((int)origPtr > dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
/* mapping table: if some byte values are never used (encoding things
like ascii text), the compression code removes the gaps to have fewer
symbols to deal with, and writes a sparse bitfield indicating which
values were present. We make a translation table to convert the symbols
back to the corresponding bytes. */
symTotal = 0;
i = 0;
t = get_bits(bd, 16);
do {
if (t & (1 << 15)) {
unsigned inner_map = get_bits(bd, 16);
do {
if (inner_map & (1 << 15))
symToByte[symTotal++] = i;
inner_map <<= 1;
i++;
} while (i & 15);
i -= 16;
}
t <<= 1;
i += 16;
} while (i < 256);
/* How many different Huffman coding groups does this block use? */
groupCount = get_bits(bd, 3);
if (groupCount < 2 || groupCount > MAX_GROUPS)
return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
/* nSelectors: Every GROUP_SIZE many symbols we select a new Huffman coding
group. Read in the group selector list, which is stored as MTF encoded
bit runs. (MTF=Move To Front, as each value is used it's moved to the
start of the list.) */
for (i = 0; i < groupCount; i++)
mtfSymbol[i] = i;
nSelectors = get_bits(bd, 15);
if (!nSelectors)
return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
for (i = 0; i < nSelectors; i++) {
uint8_t tmp_byte;
/* Get next value */
int n = 0;
while (get_bits(bd, 1)) {
if (n >= groupCount) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
n++;
}
/* Decode MTF to get the next selector */
tmp_byte = mtfSymbol[n];
while (--n >= 0)
mtfSymbol[n + 1] = mtfSymbol[n];
mtfSymbol[0] = selectors[i] = tmp_byte;
}
/* Read the Huffman coding tables for each group, which code for symTotal
literal symbols, plus two run symbols (RUNA, RUNB) */
symCount = symTotal + 2;
for (j = 0; j < groupCount; j++) {
uint8_t length[MAX_SYMBOLS];
/* 8 bits is ALMOST enough for temp[], see below */
unsigned temp[MAX_HUFCODE_BITS+1];
int minLen, maxLen, pp, len_m1;
/* Read Huffman code lengths for each symbol. They're stored in
a way similar to mtf; record a starting value for the first symbol,
and an offset from the previous value for every symbol after that.
(Subtracting 1 before the loop and then adding it back at the end is
an optimization that makes the test inside the loop simpler: symbol
length 0 becomes negative, so an unsigned inequality catches it.) */
len_m1 = get_bits(bd, 5) - 1;
for (i = 0; i < symCount; i++) {
for (;;) {
int two_bits;
if ((unsigned)len_m1 > (MAX_HUFCODE_BITS-1))
return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
/* If first bit is 0, stop. Else second bit indicates whether
to increment or decrement the value. Optimization: grab 2
bits and unget the second if the first was 0. */
two_bits = get_bits(bd, 2);
if (two_bits < 2) {
bd->inbufBitCount++;
break;
}
/* Add one if second bit 1, else subtract 1. Avoids if/else */
len_m1 += (((two_bits+1) & 2) - 1);
}
/* Correct for the initial -1, to get the final symbol length */
length[i] = len_m1 + 1;
}
/* Find largest and smallest lengths in this group */
minLen = maxLen = length[0];
for (i = 1; i < symCount; i++) {
if (length[i] > maxLen) maxLen = length[i];
else if (length[i] < minLen) minLen = length[i];
}
/* Calculate permute[], base[], and limit[] tables from length[].
*
* permute[] is the lookup table for converting Huffman coded symbols
* into decoded symbols. base[] is the amount to subtract from the
* value of a Huffman symbol of a given length when using permute[].
*
* limit[] indicates the largest numerical value a symbol with a given
* number of bits can have. This is how the Huffman codes can vary in
* length: each code with a value>limit[length] needs another bit.
*/
hufGroup = bd->groups + j;
hufGroup->minLen = minLen;
hufGroup->maxLen = maxLen;
/* Note that minLen can't be smaller than 1, so we adjust the base
and limit array pointers so we're not always wasting the first
entry. We do this again when using them (during symbol decoding). */
base = hufGroup->base - 1;
limit = hufGroup->limit - 1;
/* Calculate permute[]. Concurrently, initialize temp[] and limit[]. */
pp = 0;
for (i = minLen; i <= maxLen; i++) {
int k;
temp[i] = limit[i] = 0;
for (k = 0; k < symCount; k++)
if (length[k] == i)
hufGroup->permute[pp++] = k;
}
/* Count symbols coded for at each bit length */
/* NB: in pathological cases, temp[8] can end ip being 256.
* That's why uint8_t is too small for temp[]. */
for (i = 0; i < symCount; i++) temp[length[i]]++;
/* Calculate limit[] (the largest symbol-coding value at each bit
* length, which is (previous limit<<1)+symbols at this level), and
* base[] (number of symbols to ignore at each bit length, which is
* limit minus the cumulative count of symbols coded for already). */
pp = t = 0;
for (i = minLen; i < maxLen;) {
unsigned temp_i = temp[i];
pp += temp_i;
/* We read the largest possible symbol size and then unget bits
after determining how many we need, and those extra bits could
be set to anything. (They're noise from future symbols.) At
each level we're really only interested in the first few bits,
so here we set all the trailing to-be-ignored bits to 1 so they
don't affect the value>limit[length] comparison. */
limit[i] = (pp << (maxLen - i)) - 1;
pp <<= 1;
t += temp_i;
base[++i] = pp - t;
}
limit[maxLen] = pp + temp[maxLen] - 1;
limit[maxLen+1] = INT_MAX; /* Sentinel value for reading next sym. */
base[minLen] = 0;
}
/* We've finished reading and digesting the block header. Now read this
block's Huffman coded symbols from the file and undo the Huffman coding
and run length encoding, saving the result into dbuf[dbufCount++] = uc */
/* Initialize symbol occurrence counters and symbol Move To Front table */
/*memset(byteCount, 0, sizeof(byteCount)); - smaller, but slower */
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
byteCount[i] = 0;
mtfSymbol[i] = (uint8_t)i;
}
/* Loop through compressed symbols. */
runPos = dbufCount = selector = 0;
for (;;) {
int nextSym;
/* Fetch next Huffman coding group from list. */
symCount = GROUP_SIZE - 1;
if (selector >= nSelectors) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
hufGroup = bd->groups + selectors[selector++];
base = hufGroup->base - 1;
limit = hufGroup->limit - 1;
continue_this_group:
/* Read next Huffman-coded symbol. */
/* Note: It is far cheaper to read maxLen bits and back up than it is
to read minLen bits and then add additional bit at a time, testing
as we go. Because there is a trailing last block (with file CRC),
there is no danger of the overread causing an unexpected EOF for a
valid compressed file.
*/
if (1) {
/* As a further optimization, we do the read inline
(falling back to a call to get_bits if the buffer runs dry).
*/
int new_cnt;
while ((new_cnt = bd->inbufBitCount - hufGroup->maxLen) < 0) {
/* bd->inbufBitCount < hufGroup->maxLen */
if (bd->inbufPos == bd->inbufCount) {
nextSym = get_bits(bd, hufGroup->maxLen);
goto got_huff_bits;
}
bd->inbufBits = (bd->inbufBits << 8) | bd->inbuf[bd->inbufPos++];
bd->inbufBitCount += 8;
};
bd->inbufBitCount = new_cnt; /* "bd->inbufBitCount -= hufGroup->maxLen;" */
nextSym = (bd->inbufBits >> new_cnt) & ((1 << hufGroup->maxLen) - 1);
got_huff_bits: ;
} else { /* unoptimized equivalent */
nextSym = get_bits(bd, hufGroup->maxLen);
}
/* Figure how many bits are in next symbol and unget extras */
i = hufGroup->minLen;
while (nextSym > limit[i]) ++i;
j = hufGroup->maxLen - i;
if (j < 0)
return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
bd->inbufBitCount += j;
/* Huffman decode value to get nextSym (with bounds checking) */
nextSym = (nextSym >> j) - base[i];
if ((unsigned)nextSym >= MAX_SYMBOLS)
return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
nextSym = hufGroup->permute[nextSym];
/* We have now decoded the symbol, which indicates either a new literal
byte, or a repeated run of the most recent literal byte. First,
check if nextSym indicates a repeated run, and if so loop collecting
how many times to repeat the last literal. */
if ((unsigned)nextSym <= SYMBOL_RUNB) { /* RUNA or RUNB */
/* If this is the start of a new run, zero out counter */
if (runPos == 0) {
runPos = 1;
runCnt = 0;
}
/* Neat trick that saves 1 symbol: instead of or-ing 0 or 1 at
each bit position, add 1 or 2 instead. For example,
1011 is 1<<0 + 1<<1 + 2<<2. 1010 is 2<<0 + 2<<1 + 1<<2.
You can make any bit pattern that way using 1 less symbol than
the basic or 0/1 method (except all bits 0, which would use no
symbols, but a run of length 0 doesn't mean anything in this
context). Thus space is saved. */
runCnt += (runPos << nextSym); /* +runPos if RUNA; +2*runPos if RUNB */
if (runPos < dbufSize) runPos <<= 1;
////The 32-bit overflow of runCnt wasn't yet seen, but probably can happen.
////This would be the fix (catches too large count way before it can overflow):
//// if (runCnt > bd->dbufSize) {
//// dbg("runCnt:%u > dbufSize:%u RETVAL_DATA_ERROR",
//// runCnt, bd->dbufSize);
//// return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
//// }
goto end_of_huffman_loop;
}
dbg("dbufCount:%d+runCnt:%d %d > dbufSize:%d RETVAL_DATA_ERROR",
dbufCount, runCnt, dbufCount + runCnt, dbufSize);
return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
literal used is the one at the head of the mtfSymbol array.) */
if (runPos != 0) {
uint8_t tmp_byte;
if (dbufCount + runCnt > dbufSize) {
dbg("dbufCount:%d+runCnt:%d %d > dbufSize:%d RETVAL_DATA_ERROR",
dbufCount, runCnt, dbufCount + runCnt, dbufSize);
return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
}
tmp_byte = symToByte[mtfSymbol[0]];
byteCount[tmp_byte] += runCnt;
while (--runCnt >= 0) dbuf[dbufCount++] = (uint32_t)tmp_byte;
runPos = 0;
}
as part of a run above. Therefore 1 unused mtf position minus
2 non-literal nextSym values equals -1.) */
if (dbufCount >= dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
i = nextSym - 1;
uc = mtfSymbol[i];
/* Adjust the MTF array. Since we typically expect to move only a
first symbol in the mtf array, position 0, would have been handled
as part of a run above. Therefore 1 unused mtf position minus
2 non-literal nextSym values equals -1.) */
if (dbufCount >= dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
i = nextSym - 1;
uc = mtfSymbol[i];
uc = symToByte[uc];
/* We have our literal byte. Save it into dbuf. */
byteCount[uc]++;
dbuf[dbufCount++] = (uint32_t)uc;
/* Skip group initialization if we're not done with this group. Done
* this way to avoid compiler warning. */
end_of_huffman_loop:
if (--symCount >= 0) goto continue_this_group;
}
/* At this point, we've read all the Huffman-coded symbols (and repeated
runs) for this block from the input stream, and decoded them into the
intermediate buffer. There are dbufCount many decoded bytes in dbuf[].
Now undo the Burrows-Wheeler transform on dbuf.
See http://dogma.net/markn/articles/bwt/bwt.htm
*/
/* Turn byteCount into cumulative occurrence counts of 0 to n-1. */
j = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
int tmp_count = j + byteCount[i];
byteCount[i] = j;
j = tmp_count;
}
/* Figure out what order dbuf would be in if we sorted it. */
for (i = 0; i < dbufCount; i++) {
uint8_t tmp_byte = (uint8_t)dbuf[i];
int tmp_count = byteCount[tmp_byte];
dbuf[tmp_count] |= (i << 8);
byteCount[tmp_byte] = tmp_count + 1;
}
/* Decode first byte by hand to initialize "previous" byte. Note that it
doesn't get output, and if the first three characters are identical
it doesn't qualify as a run (hence writeRunCountdown=5). */
if (dbufCount) {
uint32_t tmp;
if ((int)origPtr >= dbufCount) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
tmp = dbuf[origPtr];
bd->writeCurrent = (uint8_t)tmp;
bd->writePos = (tmp >> 8);
bd->writeRunCountdown = 5;
}
bd->writeCount = dbufCount;
return RETVAL_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: The get_next_block function in archival/libarchive/decompress_bunzip2.c in BusyBox 1.27.2 has an Integer Overflow that may lead to a write access violation.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,650
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int perf_config(config_fn_t fn, void *data)
{
int ret = 0, found = 0;
char *repo_config = NULL;
const char *home = NULL;
/* Setting $PERF_CONFIG makes perf read _only_ the given config file. */
if (config_exclusive_filename)
return perf_config_from_file(fn, config_exclusive_filename, data);
if (perf_config_system() && !access(perf_etc_perfconfig(), R_OK)) {
ret += perf_config_from_file(fn, perf_etc_perfconfig(),
data);
found += 1;
}
home = getenv("HOME");
if (perf_config_global() && home) {
char *user_config = strdup(mkpath("%s/.perfconfig", home));
if (!access(user_config, R_OK)) {
ret += perf_config_from_file(fn, user_config, data);
found += 1;
}
free(user_config);
}
repo_config = perf_pathdup("config");
if (!access(repo_config, R_OK)) {
ret += perf_config_from_file(fn, repo_config, data);
found += 1;
}
free(repo_config);
if (found == 0)
return -1;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Untrusted search path vulnerability in the perf_config function in tools/perf/util/config.c in perf, as distributed in the Linux kernel before 3.1, allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files via a crafted config file in the current working directory.
Commit Message: perf tools: do not look at ./config for configuration
In addition to /etc/perfconfig and $HOME/.perfconfig, perf looks for
configuration in the file ./config, imitating git which looks at
$GIT_DIR/config. If ./config is not a perf configuration file, it
fails, or worse, treats it as a configuration file and changes behavior
in some unexpected way.
"config" is not an unusual name for a file to be lying around and perf
does not have a private directory dedicated for its own use, so let's
just stop looking for configuration in the cwd. Callers needing
context-sensitive configuration can use the PERF_CONFIG environment
variable.
Requested-by: Christian Ohm <chr.ohm@gmx.net>
Cc: 632923@bugs.debian.org
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Ohm <chr.ohm@gmx.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20110805165838.GA7237@elie.gateway.2wire.net
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
High
| 166,220
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: http_splitheader(struct http *hp, int req)
{
char *p, *q, **hh;
int n;
char buf[20];
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(hp, HTTP_MAGIC);
if (req) {
memset(hp->req, 0, sizeof hp->req);
hh = hp->req;
} else {
memset(hp->resp, 0, sizeof hp->resp);
hh = hp->resp;
}
n = 0;
p = hp->rxbuf;
/* REQ/PROTO */
while (vct_islws(*p))
p++;
hh[n++] = p;
while (!vct_islws(*p))
p++;
assert(!vct_iscrlf(*p));
*p++ = '\0';
/* URL/STATUS */
while (vct_issp(*p)) /* XXX: H space only */
p++;
assert(!vct_iscrlf(*p));
hh[n++] = p;
while (!vct_islws(*p))
p++;
if (vct_iscrlf(*p)) {
hh[n++] = NULL;
q = p;
p += vct_skipcrlf(p);
*q = '\0';
} else {
*p++ = '\0';
/* PROTO/MSG */
while (vct_issp(*p)) /* XXX: H space only */
p++;
hh[n++] = p;
while (!vct_iscrlf(*p))
p++;
q = p;
p += vct_skipcrlf(p);
*q = '\0';
}
assert(n == 3);
while (*p != '\0') {
assert(n < MAX_HDR);
if (vct_iscrlf(*p))
break;
hh[n++] = p++;
while (*p != '\0' && !vct_iscrlf(*p))
p++;
q = p;
p += vct_skipcrlf(p);
*q = '\0';
}
p += vct_skipcrlf(p);
assert(*p == '\0');
for (n = 0; n < 3 || hh[n] != NULL; n++) {
sprintf(buf, "http[%2d] ", n);
vtc_dump(hp->vl, 4, buf, hh[n], -1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Http R.Spl.
CWE ID:
Summary: Varnish 3.x before 3.0.7, when used in certain stacked installations, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers and conduct HTTP response splitting attacks via a header line terminated by a r (carriage return) character in conjunction with multiple Content-Length headers in an HTTP request.
Commit Message: Do not consider a CR by itself as a valid line terminator
Varnish (prior to version 4.0) was not following the standard with
regard to line separator.
Spotted and analyzed by: Régis Leroy [regilero] regis.leroy@makina-corpus.com
|
Low
| 170,000
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: setElementTypePrefix(XML_Parser parser, ELEMENT_TYPE *elementType)
{
DTD * const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
const XML_Char *name;
for (name = elementType->name; *name; name++) {
if (*name == XML_T(ASCII_COLON)) {
PREFIX *prefix;
const XML_Char *s;
for (s = elementType->name; s != name; s++) {
if (!poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, *s))
return 0;
}
if (!poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, XML_T('\0')))
return 0;
prefix = (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes, poolStart(&dtd->pool),
sizeof(PREFIX));
if (!prefix)
return 0;
if (prefix->name == poolStart(&dtd->pool))
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
else
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
elementType->prefix = prefix;
}
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-611
Summary: In libexpat in Expat before 2.2.7, XML input including XML names that contain a large number of colons could make the XML parser consume a high amount of RAM and CPU resources while processing (enough to be usable for denial-of-service attacks).
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
|
Low
| 169,775
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
/* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return -1;
}
if (rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, NULL, sigalg, pkey))
/* Carry on */
return 2;
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ASN.1 signature-verification implementation in the rsa_item_verify function in crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c in OpenSSL 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via crafted RSA PSS parameters to an endpoint that uses the certificate-verification feature.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,820
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __init fm10k_init_module(void)
{
pr_info("%s - version %s\n", fm10k_driver_string, fm10k_driver_version);
pr_info("%s\n", fm10k_copyright);
/* create driver workqueue */
fm10k_workqueue = alloc_workqueue("%s", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, 0,
fm10k_driver_name);
fm10k_dbg_init();
return fm10k_register_pci_driver();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.11. fm10k_init_module in drivers/net/ethernet/intel/fm10k/fm10k_main.c has a NULL pointer dereference because there is no -ENOMEM upon an alloc_workqueue failure.
Commit Message: fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
|
Low
| 169,516
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: swabHorDiff32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint32* wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 4;
horDiff32(tif, cp0, cc);
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong(wp, wc);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
|
Low
| 166,891
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int store_asoundrc(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
/* coverity[toctou] */
char* rp = realpath(src, NULL);
if (!rp) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: Cannot access %s\n", src);
exit(1);
}
if (strncmp(rp, cfg.homedir, strlen(cfg.homedir)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: .asoundrc is a symbolic link pointing to a file outside home directory\n");
exit(1);
}
free(rp);
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .asoundrc in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Firejail before 0.9.44.6 and 0.9.38.x LTS before 0.9.38.10 LTS does not comprehensively address dotfile cases during its attempt to prevent accessing user files with an euid of zero, which allows local users to conduct sandbox-escape attacks via vectors involving a symlink and the --private option. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-5180.
Commit Message: replace copy_file with copy_file_as_user
|
Low
| 170,094
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: main(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngfix does not work without read support\n");
return 77;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,735
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int mp_unpack_full(lua_State *L, int limit, int offset) {
size_t len;
const char *s;
mp_cur c;
int cnt; /* Number of objects unpacked */
int decode_all = (!limit && !offset);
s = luaL_checklstring(L,1,&len); /* if no match, exits */
if (offset < 0 || limit < 0) /* requesting negative off or lim is invalid */
return luaL_error(L,
"Invalid request to unpack with offset of %d and limit of %d.",
offset, len);
else if (offset > len)
return luaL_error(L,
"Start offset %d greater than input length %d.", offset, len);
if (decode_all) limit = INT_MAX;
mp_cur_init(&c,(const unsigned char *)s+offset,len-offset);
/* We loop over the decode because this could be a stream
* of multiple top-level values serialized together */
for(cnt = 0; c.left > 0 && cnt < limit; cnt++) {
mp_decode_to_lua_type(L,&c);
if (c.err == MP_CUR_ERROR_EOF) {
return luaL_error(L,"Missing bytes in input.");
} else if (c.err == MP_CUR_ERROR_BADFMT) {
return luaL_error(L,"Bad data format in input.");
}
}
if (!decode_all) {
/* c->left is the remaining size of the input buffer.
* subtract the entire buffer size from the unprocessed size
* to get our next start offset */
int offset = len - c.left;
/* Return offset -1 when we have have processed the entire buffer. */
lua_pushinteger(L, c.left == 0 ? -1 : offset);
/* Results are returned with the arg elements still
* in place. Lua takes care of only returning
* elements above the args for us.
* In this case, we have one arg on the stack
* for this function, so we insert our first return
* value at position 2. */
lua_insert(L, 2);
cnt += 1; /* increase return count by one to make room for offset */
}
return cnt;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Memory Corruption was discovered in the cmsgpack library in the Lua subsystem in Redis before 3.2.12, 4.x before 4.0.10, and 5.x before 5.0 RC2 because of stack-based buffer overflows.
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
|
Low
| 169,242
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadCompleting(DownloadFileManager* file_manager) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
VLOG(20) << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " needs rename = " << NeedsRename()
<< " " << DebugString(true);
DCHECK(!GetTargetName().empty());
DCHECK_NE(DANGEROUS, GetSafetyState());
DCHECK(file_manager);
bool should_overwrite =
(GetTargetDisposition() != DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_UNIQUIFY);
DownloadFileManager::RenameCompletionCallback callback =
base::Bind(&DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadRenamedToFinalName,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::Unretained(file_manager));
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadFileManager::RenameCompletingDownloadFile,
file_manager, GetGlobalId(), GetTargetFilePath(),
should_overwrite, callback));
} else {
Completed();
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadFileManager::CompleteDownload,
file_manager, download_id_));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,882
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void usage()
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNM2PNG\n");
fprintf (stderr, " by Willem van Schaik, 1999\n");
#ifdef __TURBOC__
fprintf (stderr, " for Turbo-C and Borland-C compilers\n");
#else
fprintf (stderr, " for Linux (and Unix) compilers\n");
#endif
fprintf (stderr, "Usage: pnm2png [options] <file>.<pnm> [<file>.png]\n");
fprintf (stderr, " or: ... | pnm2png [options]\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Options:\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -i[nterlace] write png-file with interlacing on\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -a[lpha] <file>.pgm read PNG alpha channel as pgm-file\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -h | -? print this help-information\n");
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,726
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: smbhash(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *key)
{
int rc;
unsigned char key2[8];
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm_des;
struct scatterlist sgin, sgout;
struct skcipher_request *req;
str_to_key(key, key2);
tfm_des = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(des)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm_des)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(tfm_des);
cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate des crypto API\n");
goto smbhash_err;
}
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm_des, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate des crypto API\n");
goto smbhash_free_skcipher;
}
crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm_des, key2, 8);
sg_init_one(&sgin, in, 8);
sg_init_one(&sgout, out, 8);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sgin, &sgout, 8, NULL);
rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
if (rc)
cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not encrypt crypt key rc: %d\n", rc);
skcipher_request_free(req);
smbhash_free_skcipher:
crypto_free_skcipher(tfm_des);
smbhash_err:
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The smbhash function in fs/cifs/smbencrypt.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.1 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a scatterlist.
Commit Message: cifs: Fix smbencrypt() to stop pointing a scatterlist at the stack
smbencrypt() points a scatterlist to the stack, which is breaks if
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.
Fix it by switching to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(). The new code
should be considerably faster as an added benefit.
This code is nearly identical to some code that Eric Biggers
suggested.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9 only
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
|
Low
| 168,518
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const BlockEntry* Cluster::GetEntry(const CuePoint& cp,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition& tp) const {
assert(m_pSegment);
#if 0
LoadBlockEntries();
if (m_entries == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long count = m_entries_count;
if (count <= 0)
return NULL;
const long long tc = cp.GetTimeCode();
if ((tp.m_block > 0) && (tp.m_block <= count))
{
const size_t block = static_cast<size_t>(tp.m_block);
const size_t index = block - 1;
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if ((pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == tp.m_track) &&
(pBlock->GetTimeCode(this) == tc))
{
return pEntry;
}
}
const BlockEntry* const* i = m_entries;
const BlockEntry* const* const j = i + count;
while (i != j)
{
#ifdef _DEBUG
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_entries;
idx;
#endif
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = *i++;
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != tp.m_track)
continue;
const long long tc_ = pBlock->GetTimeCode(this);
assert(tc_ >= 0);
if (tc_ < tc)
continue;
if (tc_ > tc)
return NULL;
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(tp.m_track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long type = pTrack->GetType();
if (type == 2) //audio
return pEntry;
if (type != 1) //not video
return NULL;
if (!pBlock->IsKey())
return NULL;
return pEntry;
}
return NULL;
#else
const long long tc = cp.GetTimeCode();
if (tp.m_block > 0) {
const long block = static_cast<long>(tp.m_block);
const long index = block - 1;
while (index >= m_entries_count) {
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) // TODO: can this happen?
return NULL;
if (status > 0) // nothing remains to be parsed
return NULL;
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if ((pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == tp.m_track) &&
(pBlock->GetTimeCode(this) == tc)) {
return pEntry;
}
}
long index = 0;
for (;;) {
if (index >= m_entries_count) {
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) // TODO: can this happen?
return NULL;
if (status > 0) // nothing remains to be parsed
return NULL;
assert(m_entries);
assert(index < m_entries_count);
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != tp.m_track) {
++index;
continue;
}
const long long tc_ = pBlock->GetTimeCode(this);
if (tc_ < tc) {
++index;
continue;
}
if (tc_ > tc)
return NULL;
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(tp.m_track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long type = pTrack->GetType();
if (type == 2) // audio
return pEntry;
if (type != 1) // not video
return NULL;
if (!pBlock->IsKey())
return NULL;
return pEntry;
}
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,817
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnError(PipelineStatus status) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK_NE(status, PIPELINE_OK);
if (suppress_destruction_errors_)
return;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (status == PipelineStatus::DEMUXER_ERROR_DETECTED_HLS) {
renderer_factory_selector_->SetUseMediaPlayer(true);
pipeline_controller_.Stop();
SetMemoryReportingState(false);
main_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&WebMediaPlayerImpl::StartPipeline, AsWeakPtr()));
return;
}
#endif
ReportPipelineError(load_type_, status, media_log_.get());
media_log_->AddEvent(media_log_->CreatePipelineErrorEvent(status));
media_metrics_provider_->OnError(status);
if (watch_time_reporter_)
watch_time_reporter_->OnError(status);
if (ready_state_ == WebMediaPlayer::kReadyStateHaveNothing) {
SetNetworkState(WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError);
} else {
SetNetworkState(PipelineErrorToNetworkState(status));
}
pipeline_controller_.Stop();
UpdatePlayState();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-346
Summary: A missing origin check related to HLS manifests in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix HasSingleSecurityOrigin for HLS
HLS manifests can request segments from a different origin than the
original manifest's origin. We do not inspect HLS manifests within
Chromium, and instead delegate to Android's MediaPlayer. This means we
need to be conservative, and always assume segments might come from a
different origin. HasSingleSecurityOrigin should always return false
when decoding HLS.
Bug: 864283
Change-Id: Ie16849ac6f29ae7eaa9caf342ad0509a226228ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142691
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Thomas Guilbert <tguilbert@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576378}
|
Medium
| 173,179
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Initialize(ChannelLayout channel_layout, int bits_per_channel) {
AudioParameters params(
media::AudioParameters::AUDIO_PCM_LINEAR, channel_layout,
kSamplesPerSecond, bits_per_channel, kRawDataSize);
algorithm_.Initialize(1, params, base::Bind(
&AudioRendererAlgorithmTest::EnqueueData, base::Unretained(this)));
EnqueueData();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via vectors involving seek operations on video data.
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,534
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline quint32 swapBgrToRgb(quint32 pixel)
{
return ((pixel << 16) & 0xff0000) | ((pixel >> 16) & 0xff) | (pixel & 0xff00ff00);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The extension implementation in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.46 does not properly handle sandboxed origins, which might allow remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [Qt] Remove an unnecessary masking from swapBgrToRgb()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103630
Reviewed by Zoltan Herczeg.
Get rid of a masking command in swapBgrToRgb() to speed up a little bit.
* platform/graphics/qt/GraphicsContext3DQt.cpp:
(WebCore::swapBgrToRgb):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@136375 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,963
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<content::BluetoothChooser> Browser::RunBluetoothChooser(
content::RenderFrameHost* frame,
const content::BluetoothChooser::EventHandler& event_handler) {
std::unique_ptr<BluetoothChooserController> bluetooth_chooser_controller(
new BluetoothChooserController(frame, event_handler));
std::unique_ptr<BluetoothChooserDesktop> bluetooth_chooser_desktop(
new BluetoothChooserDesktop(bluetooth_chooser_controller.get()));
std::unique_ptr<ChooserBubbleDelegate> chooser_bubble_delegate(
new ChooserBubbleDelegate(frame,
std::move(bluetooth_chooser_controller)));
Browser* browser = chrome::FindBrowserWithWebContents(
WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(frame));
BubbleReference bubble_reference = browser->GetBubbleManager()->ShowBubble(
std::move(chooser_bubble_delegate));
return std::move(bluetooth_chooser_desktop);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition between permission prompts and navigations in Prompts in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
|
High
| 173,203
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int try_read_command(conn *c) {
assert(c != NULL);
assert(c->rcurr <= (c->rbuf + c->rsize));
assert(c->rbytes > 0);
if (c->protocol == negotiating_prot || c->transport == udp_transport) {
if ((unsigned char)c->rbuf[0] == (unsigned char)PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ) {
c->protocol = binary_prot;
} else {
c->protocol = ascii_prot;
}
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Client using the %s protocol\n", c->sfd,
prot_text(c->protocol));
}
}
if (c->protocol == binary_prot) {
/* Do we have the complete packet header? */
if (c->rbytes < sizeof(c->binary_header)) {
/* need more data! */
return 0;
} else {
#ifdef NEED_ALIGN
if (((long)(c->rcurr)) % 8 != 0) {
/* must realign input buffer */
memmove(c->rbuf, c->rcurr, c->rbytes);
c->rcurr = c->rbuf;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Realign input buffer\n", c->sfd);
}
}
#endif
protocol_binary_request_header* req;
req = (protocol_binary_request_header*)c->rcurr;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
/* Dump the packet before we convert it to host order */
int ii;
fprintf(stderr, "<%d Read binary protocol data:", c->sfd);
for (ii = 0; ii < sizeof(req->bytes); ++ii) {
if (ii % 4 == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n<%d ", c->sfd);
}
fprintf(stderr, " 0x%02x", req->bytes[ii]);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
c->binary_header = *req;
c->binary_header.request.keylen = ntohs(req->request.keylen);
c->binary_header.request.bodylen = ntohl(req->request.bodylen);
c->binary_header.request.cas = ntohll(req->request.cas);
if (c->binary_header.request.magic != PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ) {
if (settings.verbose) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid magic: %x\n",
c->binary_header.request.magic);
}
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
return -1;
}
c->msgcurr = 0;
c->msgused = 0;
c->iovused = 0;
if (add_msghdr(c) != 0) {
out_string(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory");
return 0;
}
c->cmd = c->binary_header.request.opcode;
c->keylen = c->binary_header.request.keylen;
c->opaque = c->binary_header.request.opaque;
/* clear the returned cas value */
c->cas = 0;
dispatch_bin_command(c);
c->rbytes -= sizeof(c->binary_header);
c->rcurr += sizeof(c->binary_header);
}
} else {
char *el, *cont;
if (c->rbytes == 0)
return 0;
el = memchr(c->rcurr, '\n', c->rbytes);
if (!el)
return 0;
cont = el + 1;
if ((el - c->rcurr) > 1 && *(el - 1) == '\r') {
el--;
}
*el = '\0';
assert(cont <= (c->rcurr + c->rbytes));
process_command(c, c->rcurr);
c->rbytes -= (cont - c->rcurr);
c->rcurr = cont;
assert(c->rcurr <= (c->rbuf + c->rsize));
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: memcached.c in memcached before 1.4.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon hang or crash) via a long line that triggers excessive memory allocation. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
|
Low
| 169,875
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: perform_formatting_test(png_store *volatile ps)
{
#ifdef PNG_TIME_RFC1123_SUPPORTED
/* The handle into the formatting code is the RFC1123 support; this test does
* nothing if that is compiled out.
*/
context(ps, fault);
Try
{
png_const_charp correct = "29 Aug 2079 13:53:60 +0000";
png_const_charp result;
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10600
char timestring[29];
# endif
png_structp pp;
png_time pt;
pp = set_store_for_write(ps, NULL, "libpng formatting test");
if (pp == NULL)
Throw ps;
/* Arbitrary settings: */
pt.year = 2079;
pt.month = 8;
pt.day = 29;
pt.hour = 13;
pt.minute = 53;
pt.second = 60; /* a leap second */
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10600
result = png_convert_to_rfc1123(pp, &pt);
# else
if (png_convert_to_rfc1123_buffer(timestring, &pt))
result = timestring;
else
result = NULL;
# endif
if (result == NULL)
png_error(pp, "png_convert_to_rfc1123 failed");
if (strcmp(result, correct) != 0)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char msg[128];
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "png_convert_to_rfc1123(");
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, correct);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, ") returned: '");
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, result);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "'");
png_error(pp, msg);
}
store_write_reset(ps);
}
Catch(fault)
{
store_write_reset(fault);
}
#else
UNUSED(ps)
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,678
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHPAPI void php_pcre_match_impl(pcre_cache_entry *pce, char *subject, int subject_len, zval *return_value,
zval *subpats, int global, int use_flags, long flags, long start_offset TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval *result_set, /* Holds a set of subpatterns after
a global match */
**match_sets = NULL; /* An array of sets of matches for each
subpattern after a global match */
pcre_extra *extra = pce->extra;/* Holds results of studying */
pcre_extra extra_data; /* Used locally for exec options */
int exoptions = 0; /* Execution options */
int count = 0; /* Count of matched subpatterns */
int *offsets; /* Array of subpattern offsets */
int num_subpats; /* Number of captured subpatterns */
int size_offsets; /* Size of the offsets array */
int matched; /* Has anything matched */
int g_notempty = 0; /* If the match should not be empty */
const char **stringlist; /* Holds list of subpatterns */
char **subpat_names; /* Array for named subpatterns */
int i, rc;
int subpats_order; /* Order of subpattern matches */
int offset_capture; /* Capture match offsets: yes/no */
/* Overwrite the passed-in value for subpatterns with an empty array. */
if (subpats != NULL) {
zval_dtor(subpats);
array_init(subpats);
}
subpats_order = global ? PREG_PATTERN_ORDER : 0;
if (use_flags) {
offset_capture = flags & PREG_OFFSET_CAPTURE;
/*
* subpats_order is pre-set to pattern mode so we change it only if
* necessary.
*/
if (flags & 0xff) {
subpats_order = flags & 0xff;
}
if ((global && (subpats_order < PREG_PATTERN_ORDER || subpats_order > PREG_SET_ORDER)) ||
(!global && subpats_order != 0)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid flags specified");
return;
}
} else {
offset_capture = 0;
}
/* Negative offset counts from the end of the string. */
if (start_offset < 0) {
start_offset = subject_len + start_offset;
if (start_offset < 0) {
start_offset = 0;
}
}
if (extra == NULL) {
extra_data.flags = PCRE_EXTRA_MATCH_LIMIT | PCRE_EXTRA_MATCH_LIMIT_RECURSION;
extra = &extra_data;
}
extra->match_limit = PCRE_G(backtrack_limit);
extra->match_limit_recursion = PCRE_G(recursion_limit);
/* Calculate the size of the offsets array, and allocate memory for it. */
rc = pcre_fullinfo(pce->re, extra, PCRE_INFO_CAPTURECOUNT, &num_subpats);
if (rc < 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Internal pcre_fullinfo() error %d", rc);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
num_subpats++;
size_offsets = num_subpats * 3;
/*
* Build a mapping from subpattern numbers to their names. We will always
* allocate the table, even though there may be no named subpatterns. This
* avoids somewhat more complicated logic in the inner loops.
*/
subpat_names = make_subpats_table(num_subpats, pce TSRMLS_CC);
if (!subpat_names) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
offsets = (int *)safe_emalloc(size_offsets, sizeof(int), 0);
/* Allocate match sets array and initialize the values. */
if (global && subpats && subpats_order == PREG_PATTERN_ORDER) {
match_sets = (zval **)safe_emalloc(num_subpats, sizeof(zval *), 0);
for (i=0; i<num_subpats; i++) {
ALLOC_ZVAL(match_sets[i]);
array_init(match_sets[i]);
INIT_PZVAL(match_sets[i]);
}
}
matched = 0;
PCRE_G(error_code) = PHP_PCRE_NO_ERROR;
do {
/* Execute the regular expression. */
count = pcre_exec(pce->re, extra, subject, subject_len, start_offset,
exoptions|g_notempty, offsets, size_offsets);
/* the string was already proved to be valid UTF-8 */
exoptions |= PCRE_NO_UTF8_CHECK;
/* Check for too many substrings condition. */
if (count == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Matched, but too many substrings");
count = size_offsets/3;
}
/* If something has matched */
if (count > 0) {
matched++;
/* If subpatterns array has been passed, fill it in with values. */
if (subpats != NULL) {
/* Try to get the list of substrings and display a warning if failed. */
if (pcre_get_substring_list(subject, offsets, count, &stringlist) < 0) {
efree(subpat_names);
efree(offsets);
if (match_sets) efree(match_sets);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Get subpatterns list failed");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (global) { /* global pattern matching */
if (subpats && subpats_order == PREG_PATTERN_ORDER) {
/* For each subpattern, insert it into the appropriate array. */
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (offset_capture) {
add_offset_pair(match_sets[i], (char *)stringlist[i],
offsets[(i<<1)+1] - offsets[i<<1], offsets[i<<1], NULL);
} else {
add_next_index_stringl(match_sets[i], (char *)stringlist[i],
offsets[(i<<1)+1] - offsets[i<<1], 1);
}
}
/*
* If the number of captured subpatterns on this run is
* less than the total possible number, pad the result
* arrays with empty strings.
*/
if (count < num_subpats) {
for (; i < num_subpats; i++) {
add_next_index_string(match_sets[i], "", 1);
}
}
} else {
/* Allocate the result set array */
ALLOC_ZVAL(result_set);
array_init(result_set);
INIT_PZVAL(result_set);
/* Add all the subpatterns to it */
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (offset_capture) {
add_offset_pair(result_set, (char *)stringlist[i],
offsets[(i<<1)+1] - offsets[i<<1], offsets[i<<1], subpat_names[i]);
} else {
if (subpat_names[i]) {
add_assoc_stringl(result_set, subpat_names[i], (char *)stringlist[i],
offsets[(i<<1)+1] - offsets[i<<1], 1);
}
add_next_index_stringl(result_set, (char *)stringlist[i],
offsets[(i<<1)+1] - offsets[i<<1], 1);
}
}
/* And add it to the output array */
zend_hash_next_index_insert(Z_ARRVAL_P(subpats), &result_set, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
} else { /* single pattern matching */
/* For each subpattern, insert it into the subpatterns array. */
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (offset_capture) {
add_offset_pair(subpats, (char *)stringlist[i],
offsets[(i<<1)+1] - offsets[i<<1],
offsets[i<<1], subpat_names[i]);
} else {
if (subpat_names[i]) {
add_assoc_stringl(subpats, subpat_names[i], (char *)stringlist[i],
offsets[(i<<1)+1] - offsets[i<<1], 1);
}
add_next_index_stringl(subpats, (char *)stringlist[i],
offsets[(i<<1)+1] - offsets[i<<1], 1);
}
}
}
pcre_free((void *) stringlist);
}
} else if (count == PCRE_ERROR_NOMATCH) {
/* If we previously set PCRE_NOTEMPTY after a null match,
this is not necessarily the end. We need to advance
the start offset, and continue. Fudge the offset values
to achieve this, unless we're already at the end of the string. */
if (g_notempty != 0 && start_offset < subject_len) {
offsets[0] = start_offset;
offsets[1] = start_offset + 1;
} else
break;
} else {
pcre_handle_exec_error(count TSRMLS_CC);
break;
}
/* If we have matched an empty string, mimic what Perl's /g options does.
This turns out to be rather cunning. First we set PCRE_NOTEMPTY and try
the match again at the same point. If this fails (picked up above) we
advance to the next character. */
g_notempty = (offsets[1] == offsets[0])? PCRE_NOTEMPTY | PCRE_ANCHORED : 0;
/* Advance to the position right after the last full match */
start_offset = offsets[1];
} while (global);
/* Add the match sets to the output array and clean up */
if (global && subpats && subpats_order == PREG_PATTERN_ORDER) {
for (i = 0; i < num_subpats; i++) {
if (subpat_names[i]) {
zend_hash_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(subpats), subpat_names[i],
strlen(subpat_names[i])+1, &match_sets[i], sizeof(zval *), NULL);
Z_ADDREF_P(match_sets[i]);
}
zend_hash_next_index_insert(Z_ARRVAL_P(subpats), &match_sets[i], sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
efree(match_sets);
}
efree(offsets);
efree(subpat_names);
/* Did we encounter an error? */
if (PCRE_G(error_code) == PHP_PCRE_NO_ERROR) {
RETVAL_LONG(matched);
} else {
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The match function in pcre_exec.c in PCRE before 8.37 mishandles the /(?:((abcd))|(((?:(?:(?:(?:abc|(?:abcdef))))b)abcdefghi)abc)|((*ACCEPT)))/ pattern and related patterns involving (*ACCEPT), which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory or cause a denial of service (partially initialized memory and application crash) via a crafted regular expression, as demonstrated by a JavaScript RegExp object encountered by Konqueror, aka ZDI-CAN-2547.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,565
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: LockServer(void)
{
char tmp[PATH_MAX], pid_str[12];
int lfd, i, haslock, l_pid, t;
char *tmppath = NULL;
int len;
char port[20];
if (nolock) return;
/*
* Path names
*/
tmppath = LOCK_DIR;
sprintf(port, "%d", atoi(display));
len = strlen(LOCK_PREFIX) > strlen(LOCK_TMP_PREFIX) ? strlen(LOCK_PREFIX) :
strlen(LOCK_TMP_PREFIX);
len += strlen(tmppath) + strlen(port) + strlen(LOCK_SUFFIX) + 1;
if (len > sizeof(LockFile))
FatalError("Display name `%s' is too long\n", port);
(void)sprintf(tmp, "%s" LOCK_TMP_PREFIX "%s" LOCK_SUFFIX, tmppath, port);
(void)sprintf(LockFile, "%s" LOCK_PREFIX "%s" LOCK_SUFFIX, tmppath, port);
/*
* Create a temporary file containing our PID. Attempt three times
* to create the file.
*/
StillLocking = TRUE;
i = 0;
do {
i++;
lfd = open(tmp, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY, 0644);
if (lfd < 0)
sleep(2);
else
break;
} while (i < 3);
if (lfd < 0) {
unlink(tmp);
i = 0;
do {
i++;
lfd = open(tmp, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY, 0644);
if (lfd < 0)
sleep(2);
else
break;
} while (i < 3);
}
if (lfd < 0)
FatalError("Could not create lock file in %s\n", tmp);
(void) sprintf(pid_str, "%10ld\n", (long)getpid());
(void) write(lfd, pid_str, 11);
(void) chmod(tmp, 0444);
(void) close(lfd);
/*
* OK. Now the tmp file exists. Try three times to move it in place
* for the lock.
*/
i = 0;
haslock = 0;
while ((!haslock) && (i++ < 3)) {
haslock = (link(tmp,LockFile) == 0);
if (haslock) {
/*
* We're done.
*/
break;
}
else {
/*
* Read the pid from the existing file
*/
lfd = open(LockFile, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW);
if (lfd < 0) {
unlink(tmp);
FatalError("Can't read lock file %s\n", LockFile);
}
pid_str[0] = '\0';
if (read(lfd, pid_str, 11) != 11) {
/*
* Bogus lock file.
*/
unlink(LockFile);
close(lfd);
continue;
}
pid_str[11] = '\0';
sscanf(pid_str, "%d", &l_pid);
close(lfd);
/*
* Now try to kill the PID to see if it exists.
*/
errno = 0;
t = kill(l_pid, 0);
if ((t< 0) && (errno == ESRCH)) {
/*
* Stale lock file.
*/
unlink(LockFile);
continue;
}
else if (((t < 0) && (errno == EPERM)) || (t == 0)) {
/*
* Process is still active.
*/
unlink(tmp);
FatalError("Server is already active for display %s\n%s %s\n%s\n",
port, "\tIf this server is no longer running, remove",
LockFile, "\tand start again.");
}
}
}
unlink(tmp);
if (!haslock)
FatalError("Could not create server lock file: %s\n", LockFile);
StillLocking = FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The LockServer function in os/utils.c in X.Org xserver before 1.11.2 allows local users to change the permissions of arbitrary files to 444, read those files, and possibly cause a denial of service (removed execution permission) via a symlink attack on a temporary lock file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,236
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void mptsas_fetch_request(MPTSASState *s)
{
PCIDevice *pci = (PCIDevice *) s;
char req[MPTSAS_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE];
MPIRequestHeader *hdr = (MPIRequestHeader *)req;
hwaddr addr;
int size;
if (s->state != MPI_IOC_STATE_OPERATIONAL) {
mptsas_set_fault(s, MPI_IOCSTATUS_INVALID_STATE);
return;
}
/* Read the message header from the guest first. */
addr = s->host_mfa_high_addr | MPTSAS_FIFO_GET(s, request_post);
pci_dma_read(pci, addr, req, sizeof(hdr));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The mptsas_fetch_requests function in hw/scsi/mptsas.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (infinite loop, and CPU consumption or QEMU process crash) via vectors involving s->state.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,017
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadVICARImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
keyword[MaxTextExtent],
value[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*image;
int
c;
MagickBooleanType
status,
value_expected;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register PixelPacket
*q;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Decode image header.
*/
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
count=1;
if (c == EOF)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=0;
image->columns=0;
image->rows=0;
while (isgraph(c) && ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0)))
{
if (isalnum(c) == MagickFalse)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
count++;
}
else
{
register char
*p;
/*
Determine a keyword and its value.
*/
p=keyword;
do
{
if ((size_t) (p-keyword) < (MaxTextExtent-1))
*p++=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
count++;
} while (isalnum(c) || (c == '_'));
*p='\0';
value_expected=MagickFalse;
while ((isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0) || (c == '='))
{
if (c == '=')
value_expected=MagickTrue;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
count++;
}
if (value_expected == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=value;
while (isalnum(c))
{
if ((size_t) (p-value) < (MaxTextExtent-1))
*p++=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
count++;
}
*p='\0';
/*
Assign a value to the specified keyword.
*/
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"Label_RECORDS") == 0)
length=(ssize_t) StringToLong(value);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"LBLSIZE") == 0)
length=(ssize_t) StringToLong(value);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"RECORD_BYTES") == 0)
image->columns=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"NS") == 0)
image->columns=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"LINES") == 0)
image->rows=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"NL") == 0)
image->rows=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
}
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
count++;
}
}
while (count < (ssize_t) length)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
count++;
}
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
image->depth=8;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Read VICAR pixels.
*/
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
length=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,616
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int crypto_aead_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_aead raead;
struct aead_alg *aead = &alg->cra_aead;
snprintf(raead.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "aead");
snprintf(raead.geniv, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s",
aead->geniv ?: "<built-in>");
raead.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
raead.maxauthsize = aead->maxauthsize;
raead.ivsize = aead->ivsize;
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_AEAD,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_aead), &raead))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The crypto_report_one function in crypto/crypto_user.c in the report API in the crypto user configuration API in the Linux kernel through 3.8.2 uses an incorrect length value during a copy operation, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 166,063
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *dst_reg;
bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value,
smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
dst_reg = ®s[dst];
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (smin_val != smax_val))) {
print_verifier_state(env, env->cur_state);
verbose(env,
"verifier internal error: known but bad sbounds\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (umin_val != umax_val))) {
print_verifier_state(env, env->cur_state);
verbose(env,
"verifier internal error: known but bad ubounds\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
/* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env,
"R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL prohibited, null-check it first\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
if (ptr_reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) {
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END prohibited\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
/* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id.
* The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset.
*/
dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type;
dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
* the s32 'off' field
*/
if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val ==
(s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) {
/* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val;
dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range;
break;
}
/* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off
* == 0, since it's a scalar.
* dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive
* integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id'
* if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET.
* this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets
* added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset
* from ptr_reg.
*/
if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) ||
signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) {
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val;
}
if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr ||
umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
dst_reg->range = 0;
}
break;
case BPF_SUB:
if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
/* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
/* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to
* test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not
* be able to deal with it.
*/
if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val ==
(s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) {
/* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val;
dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range;
break;
}
/* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known
* nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good.
*/
if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) ||
signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val;
}
if (umin_ptr < umax_val) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
if (smin_val < 0)
dst_reg->range = 0;
}
break;
case BPF_AND:
case BPF_OR:
case BPF_XOR:
/* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit for now.
* (However, in principle we could allow some cases, e.g.
* ptr &= ~3 which would reduce min_value by 3.)
*/
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
return -EACCES;
default:
/* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
return -EACCES;
}
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging unrestricted integer values for pointer arithmetic.
Commit Message: bpf: fix integer overflows
There were various issues related to the limited size of integers used in
the verifier:
- `off + size` overflow in __check_map_access()
- `off + reg->off` overflow in check_mem_access()
- `off + reg->var_off.value` overflow or 32-bit truncation of
`reg->var_off.value` in check_mem_access()
- 32-bit truncation in check_stack_boundary()
Make sure that any integer math cannot overflow by not allowing
pointer math with large values.
Also reduce the scope of "scalar op scalar" tracking.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
Low
| 167,643
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int l2tp_ip_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_l2tpip *addr = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip *) uaddr;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
int ret;
int chk_addr_ret;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_l2tpip))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->l2tp_family != AF_INET)
return -EINVAL;
ret = -EADDRINUSE;
read_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
if (__l2tp_ip_bind_lookup(net, addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr,
sk->sk_bound_dev_if, addr->l2tp_conn_id))
goto out_in_use;
read_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE || addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_l2tpip))
goto out;
chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(net, addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr);
ret = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr && chk_addr_ret != RTN_LOCAL &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_MULTICAST && chk_addr_ret != RTN_BROADCAST)
goto out;
if (addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr)
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = inet->inet_saddr = addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr;
if (chk_addr_ret == RTN_MULTICAST || chk_addr_ret == RTN_BROADCAST)
inet->inet_saddr = 0; /* Use device */
sk_dst_reset(sk);
l2tp_ip_sk(sk)->conn_id = addr->l2tp_conn_id;
write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
sk_add_bind_node(sk, &l2tp_ip_bind_table);
sk_del_node_init(sk);
write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
ret = 0;
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
out_in_use:
read_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in the L2TPv3 IP Encapsulation feature in the Linux kernel before 4.8.14 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) by making multiple bind system calls without properly ascertaining whether a socket has the SOCK_ZAPPED status, related to net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c and net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c.
Commit Message: l2tp: fix racy SOCK_ZAPPED flag check in l2tp_ip{,6}_bind()
Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff829f835b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8174d3cc>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
[< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
[<ffffffff8174d666>] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
[< inline >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
[<ffffffff8174db7e>] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
[< inline >] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
[< inline >] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
[< inline >] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
[<ffffffff8579047e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
[<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c9ad>] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cee2>] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817476a8>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4f6a9>] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c58ac8>] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851ddf67>] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4af7b>] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4b46f>] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d685>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cf61>] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81748b28>] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c541eb>] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5aca4>] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5ad33>] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5af23>] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5cb6c>] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8579044e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.
Fixes: c51ce49735c1 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 168,489
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int phar_parse_zipfile(php_stream *fp, char *fname, int fname_len, char *alias, int alias_len, phar_archive_data** pphar, char **error) /* {{{ */
{
phar_zip_dir_end locator;
char buf[sizeof(locator) + 65536];
zend_long size;
php_uint16 i;
phar_archive_data *mydata = NULL;
phar_entry_info entry = {0};
char *p = buf, *ext, *actual_alias = NULL;
char *metadata = NULL;
size = php_stream_tell(fp);
if (size > sizeof(locator) + 65536) {
/* seek to max comment length + end of central directory record */
size = sizeof(locator) + 65536;
if (FAILURE == php_stream_seek(fp, -size, SEEK_END)) {
php_stream_close(fp);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: unable to search for end of central directory in zip-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
} else {
php_stream_seek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
}
if (!php_stream_read(fp, buf, size)) {
php_stream_close(fp);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: unable to read in data to search for end of central directory in zip-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
while ((p=(char *) memchr(p + 1, 'P', (size_t) (size - (p + 1 - buf)))) != NULL) {
if ((p - buf) + sizeof(locator) <= size && !memcmp(p + 1, "K\5\6", 3)) {
memcpy((void *)&locator, (void *) p, sizeof(locator));
if (PHAR_GET_16(locator.centraldisk) != 0 || PHAR_GET_16(locator.disknumber) != 0) {
/* split archives not handled */
php_stream_close(fp);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: split archives spanning multiple zips cannot be processed in zip-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
if (PHAR_GET_16(locator.counthere) != PHAR_GET_16(locator.count)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: corrupt zip archive, conflicting file count in end of central directory record in zip-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
return FAILURE;
}
mydata = pecalloc(1, sizeof(phar_archive_data), PHAR_G(persist));
mydata->is_persistent = PHAR_G(persist);
/* read in archive comment, if any */
if (PHAR_GET_16(locator.comment_len)) {
metadata = p + sizeof(locator);
if (PHAR_GET_16(locator.comment_len) != size - (metadata - buf)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: corrupt zip archive, zip file comment truncated in zip-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
pefree(mydata, mydata->is_persistent);
return FAILURE;
}
mydata->metadata_len = PHAR_GET_16(locator.comment_len);
if (phar_parse_metadata(&metadata, &mydata->metadata, PHAR_GET_16(locator.comment_len)) == FAILURE) {
mydata->metadata_len = 0;
/* if not valid serialized data, it is a regular string */
ZVAL_NEW_STR(&mydata->metadata, zend_string_init(metadata, PHAR_GET_16(locator.comment_len), mydata->is_persistent));
}
} else {
ZVAL_UNDEF(&mydata->metadata);
}
goto foundit;
}
}
php_stream_close(fp);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: end of central directory not found in zip-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
return FAILURE;
foundit:
mydata->fname = pestrndup(fname, fname_len, mydata->is_persistent);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(mydata->fname, fname_len);
#endif
mydata->is_zip = 1;
mydata->fname_len = fname_len;
ext = strrchr(mydata->fname, '/');
if (ext) {
mydata->ext = memchr(ext, '.', (mydata->fname + fname_len) - ext);
if (mydata->ext == ext) {
mydata->ext = memchr(ext + 1, '.', (mydata->fname + fname_len) - ext - 1);
}
if (mydata->ext) {
mydata->ext_len = (mydata->fname + fname_len) - mydata->ext;
}
}
/* clean up on big-endian systems */
/* seek to central directory */
php_stream_seek(fp, PHAR_GET_32(locator.cdir_offset), SEEK_SET);
/* read in central directory */
zend_hash_init(&mydata->manifest, PHAR_GET_16(locator.count),
zend_get_hash_value, destroy_phar_manifest_entry, (zend_bool)mydata->is_persistent);
zend_hash_init(&mydata->mounted_dirs, 5,
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, (zend_bool)mydata->is_persistent);
zend_hash_init(&mydata->virtual_dirs, PHAR_GET_16(locator.count) * 2,
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, (zend_bool)mydata->is_persistent);
entry.phar = mydata;
entry.is_zip = 1;
entry.fp_type = PHAR_FP;
entry.is_persistent = mydata->is_persistent;
#define PHAR_ZIP_FAIL_FREE(errmsg, save) \
zend_hash_destroy(&mydata->manifest); \
mydata->manifest.u.flags = 0; \
zend_hash_destroy(&mydata->mounted_dirs); \
mydata->mounted_dirs.u.flags = 0; \
zend_hash_destroy(&mydata->virtual_dirs); \
mydata->virtual_dirs.u.flags = 0; \
php_stream_close(fp); \
zval_dtor(&mydata->metadata); \
if (mydata->signature) { \
efree(mydata->signature); \
} \
if (error) { \
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: %s in zip-based phar \"%s\"", errmsg, mydata->fname); \
} \
pefree(mydata->fname, mydata->is_persistent); \
if (mydata->alias) { \
pefree(mydata->alias, mydata->is_persistent); \
} \
pefree(mydata, mydata->is_persistent); \
efree(save); \
return FAILURE;
#define PHAR_ZIP_FAIL(errmsg) \
zend_hash_destroy(&mydata->manifest); \
mydata->manifest.u.flags = 0; \
zend_hash_destroy(&mydata->mounted_dirs); \
mydata->mounted_dirs.u.flags = 0; \
zend_hash_destroy(&mydata->virtual_dirs); \
mydata->virtual_dirs.u.flags = 0; \
php_stream_close(fp); \
zval_dtor(&mydata->metadata); \
if (mydata->signature) { \
efree(mydata->signature); \
} \
if (error) { \
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: %s in zip-based phar \"%s\"", errmsg, mydata->fname); \
} \
pefree(mydata->fname, mydata->is_persistent); \
if (mydata->alias) { \
pefree(mydata->alias, mydata->is_persistent); \
} \
pefree(mydata, mydata->is_persistent); \
return FAILURE;
/* add each central directory item to the manifest */
for (i = 0; i < PHAR_GET_16(locator.count); ++i) {
phar_zip_central_dir_file zipentry;
zend_off_t beforeus = php_stream_tell(fp);
if (sizeof(zipentry) != php_stream_read(fp, (char *) &zipentry, sizeof(zipentry))) {
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to read central directory entry, truncated");
}
/* clean up for bigendian systems */
if (memcmp("PK\1\2", zipentry.signature, 4)) {
/* corrupted entry */
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("corrupted central directory entry, no magic signature");
}
if (entry.is_persistent) {
entry.manifest_pos = i;
}
entry.compressed_filesize = PHAR_GET_32(zipentry.compsize);
entry.uncompressed_filesize = PHAR_GET_32(zipentry.uncompsize);
entry.crc32 = PHAR_GET_32(zipentry.crc32);
/* do not PHAR_GET_16 either on the next line */
entry.timestamp = phar_zip_d2u_time(zipentry.timestamp, zipentry.datestamp);
entry.flags = PHAR_ENT_PERM_DEF_FILE;
entry.header_offset = PHAR_GET_32(zipentry.offset);
entry.offset = entry.offset_abs = PHAR_GET_32(zipentry.offset) + sizeof(phar_zip_file_header) + PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.filename_len) +
PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.extra_len);
if (PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.flags) & PHAR_ZIP_FLAG_ENCRYPTED) {
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("Cannot process encrypted zip files");
}
if (!PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.filename_len)) {
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("Cannot process zips created from stdin (zero-length filename)");
}
entry.filename_len = PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.filename_len);
entry.filename = (char *) pemalloc(entry.filename_len + 1, entry.is_persistent);
if (entry.filename_len != php_stream_read(fp, entry.filename, entry.filename_len)) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to read in filename from central directory, truncated");
}
entry.filename[entry.filename_len] = '\0';
if (entry.filename[entry.filename_len - 1] == '/') {
entry.is_dir = 1;
if(entry.filename_len > 1) {
entry.filename_len--;
}
entry.flags |= PHAR_ENT_PERM_DEF_DIR;
} else {
entry.is_dir = 0;
}
if (entry.filename_len == sizeof(".phar/signature.bin")-1 && !strncmp(entry.filename, ".phar/signature.bin", sizeof(".phar/signature.bin")-1)) {
size_t read;
php_stream *sigfile;
zend_off_t now;
char *sig;
now = php_stream_tell(fp);
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
sigfile = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (!sigfile) {
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("couldn't open temporary file");
}
php_stream_seek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
/* copy file contents + local headers and zip comment, if any, to be hashed for signature */
php_stream_copy_to_stream_ex(fp, sigfile, entry.header_offset, NULL);
/* seek to central directory */
php_stream_seek(fp, PHAR_GET_32(locator.cdir_offset), SEEK_SET);
/* copy central directory header */
php_stream_copy_to_stream_ex(fp, sigfile, beforeus - PHAR_GET_32(locator.cdir_offset), NULL);
if (metadata) {
php_stream_write(sigfile, metadata, PHAR_GET_16(locator.comment_len));
}
php_stream_seek(fp, sizeof(phar_zip_file_header) + entry.header_offset + entry.filename_len + PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.extra_len), SEEK_SET);
sig = (char *) emalloc(entry.uncompressed_filesize);
read = php_stream_read(fp, sig, entry.uncompressed_filesize);
if (read != entry.uncompressed_filesize) {
php_stream_close(sigfile);
efree(sig);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("signature cannot be read");
}
mydata->sig_flags = PHAR_GET_32(sig);
if (FAILURE == phar_verify_signature(sigfile, php_stream_tell(sigfile), mydata->sig_flags, sig + 8, entry.uncompressed_filesize - 8, fname, &mydata->signature, &mydata->sig_len, error)) {
efree(sig);
if (error) {
char *save;
php_stream_close(sigfile);
spprintf(&save, 4096, "signature cannot be verified: %s", *error);
efree(*error);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL_FREE(save, save);
} else {
php_stream_close(sigfile);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("signature cannot be verified");
}
}
php_stream_close(sigfile);
efree(sig);
/* signature checked out, let's ensure this is the last file in the phar */
if (i != PHAR_GET_16(locator.count) - 1) {
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("entries exist after signature, invalid phar");
}
continue;
}
phar_add_virtual_dirs(mydata, entry.filename, entry.filename_len);
if (PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.extra_len)) {
zend_off_t loc = php_stream_tell(fp);
if (FAILURE == phar_zip_process_extra(fp, &entry, PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.extra_len))) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("Unable to process extra field header for file in central directory");
}
php_stream_seek(fp, loc + PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.extra_len), SEEK_SET);
}
switch (PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.compressed)) {
case PHAR_ZIP_COMP_NONE :
/* compression flag already set */
break;
case PHAR_ZIP_COMP_DEFLATE :
entry.flags |= PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_GZ;
if (!PHAR_G(has_zlib)) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("zlib extension is required");
}
break;
case PHAR_ZIP_COMP_BZIP2 :
entry.flags |= PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_BZ2;
if (!PHAR_G(has_bz2)) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("bzip2 extension is required");
}
break;
case 1 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (Shrunk) used in this zip");
case 2 :
case 3 :
case 4 :
case 5 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (Reduce) used in this zip");
case 6 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (Implode) used in this zip");
case 7 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (Tokenize) used in this zip");
case 9 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (Deflate64) used in this zip");
case 10 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (PKWare Implode/old IBM TERSE) used in this zip");
case 14 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (LZMA) used in this zip");
case 18 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (IBM TERSE) used in this zip");
case 19 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (IBM LZ77) used in this zip");
case 97 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (WavPack) used in this zip");
case 98 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (PPMd) used in this zip");
default :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (unknown) used in this zip");
}
/* get file metadata */
if (PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.comment_len)) {
if (PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.comment_len) != php_stream_read(fp, buf, PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.comment_len))) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to read in file comment, truncated");
}
p = buf;
entry.metadata_len = PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.comment_len);
if (phar_parse_metadata(&p, &(entry.metadata), PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.comment_len)) == FAILURE) {
entry.metadata_len = 0;
/* if not valid serialized data, it is a regular string */
ZVAL_NEW_STR(&entry.metadata, zend_string_init(buf, PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.comment_len), entry.is_persistent));
}
} else {
ZVAL_UNDEF(&entry.metadata);
}
if (!actual_alias && entry.filename_len == sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1 && !strncmp(entry.filename, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1)) {
php_stream_filter *filter;
zend_off_t saveloc;
/* verify local file header */
phar_zip_file_header local;
/* archive alias found */
saveloc = php_stream_tell(fp);
php_stream_seek(fp, PHAR_GET_32(zipentry.offset), SEEK_SET);
if (sizeof(local) != php_stream_read(fp, (char *) &local, sizeof(local))) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("phar error: internal corruption of zip-based phar (cannot read local file header for alias)");
}
/* verify local header */
if (entry.filename_len != PHAR_GET_16(local.filename_len) || entry.crc32 != PHAR_GET_32(local.crc32) || entry.uncompressed_filesize != PHAR_GET_32(local.uncompsize) || entry.compressed_filesize != PHAR_GET_32(local.compsize)) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("phar error: internal corruption of zip-based phar (local header of alias does not match central directory)");
}
/* construct actual offset to file start - local extra_len can be different from central extra_len */
entry.offset = entry.offset_abs =
sizeof(local) + entry.header_offset + PHAR_GET_16(local.filename_len) + PHAR_GET_16(local.extra_len);
php_stream_seek(fp, entry.offset, SEEK_SET);
/* these next lines should be for php < 5.2.6 after 5.3 filters are fixed */
fp->writepos = 0;
fp->readpos = 0;
php_stream_seek(fp, entry.offset, SEEK_SET);
fp->writepos = 0;
fp->readpos = 0;
/* the above lines should be for php < 5.2.6 after 5.3 filters are fixed */
mydata->alias_len = entry.uncompressed_filesize;
if (entry.flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_GZ) {
filter = php_stream_filter_create("zlib.inflate", NULL, php_stream_is_persistent(fp));
if (!filter) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to decompress alias, zlib filter creation failed");
}
php_stream_filter_append(&fp->readfilters, filter);
{
zend_string *str = php_stream_copy_to_mem(fp, entry.uncompressed_filesize, 0);
if (str) {
entry.uncompressed_filesize = ZSTR_LEN(str);
actual_alias = estrndup(ZSTR_VAL(str), ZSTR_LEN(str));
zend_string_release(str);
} else {
actual_alias = NULL;
entry.uncompressed_filesize = 0;
}
}
if (!entry.uncompressed_filesize || !actual_alias) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to read in alias, truncated");
}
php_stream_filter_flush(filter, 1);
php_stream_filter_remove(filter, 1);
} else if (entry.flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_BZ2) {
filter = php_stream_filter_create("bzip2.decompress", NULL, php_stream_is_persistent(fp));
if (!filter) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to read in alias, bzip2 filter creation failed");
}
php_stream_filter_append(&fp->readfilters, filter);
{
zend_string *str = php_stream_copy_to_mem(fp, entry.uncompressed_filesize, 0);
if (str) {
entry.uncompressed_filesize = ZSTR_LEN(str);
actual_alias = estrndup(ZSTR_VAL(str), ZSTR_LEN(str));
zend_string_release(str);
} else {
actual_alias = NULL;
entry.uncompressed_filesize = 0;
}
}
if (!entry.uncompressed_filesize || !actual_alias) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to read in alias, truncated");
}
php_stream_filter_flush(filter, 1);
php_stream_filter_remove(filter, 1);
} else {
{
zend_string *str = php_stream_copy_to_mem(fp, entry.uncompressed_filesize, 0);
if (str) {
entry.uncompressed_filesize = ZSTR_LEN(str);
actual_alias = estrndup(ZSTR_VAL(str), ZSTR_LEN(str));
zend_string_release(str);
} else {
actual_alias = NULL;
entry.uncompressed_filesize = 0;
}
}
if (!entry.uncompressed_filesize || !actual_alias) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to read in alias, truncated");
}
}
/* return to central directory parsing */
php_stream_seek(fp, saveloc, SEEK_SET);
}
phar_set_inode(&entry);
zend_hash_str_add_mem(&mydata->manifest, entry.filename, entry.filename_len, (void *)&entry, sizeof(phar_entry_info));
}
mydata->fp = fp;
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&(mydata->manifest), ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
mydata->is_data = 0;
} else {
mydata->is_data = 1;
}
zend_hash_str_add_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), mydata->fname, fname_len, mydata);
if (actual_alias) {
phar_archive_data *fd_ptr;
if (!phar_validate_alias(actual_alias, mydata->alias_len)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: invalid alias \"%s\" in zip-based phar \"%s\"", actual_alias, fname);
}
efree(actual_alias);
zend_hash_str_del(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), mydata->fname, fname_len);
return FAILURE;
}
mydata->is_temporary_alias = 0;
if (NULL != (fd_ptr = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_alias_map)), actual_alias, mydata->alias_len))) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_free_alias(fd_ptr, actual_alias, mydata->alias_len)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add zip-based phar \"%s\" with implicit alias, alias is already in use", fname);
}
efree(actual_alias);
zend_hash_str_del(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), mydata->fname, fname_len);
return FAILURE;
}
}
mydata->alias = entry.is_persistent ? pestrndup(actual_alias, mydata->alias_len, 1) : actual_alias;
if (entry.is_persistent) {
efree(actual_alias);
}
zend_hash_str_add_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_alias_map)), actual_alias, mydata->alias_len, mydata);
} else {
phar_archive_data *fd_ptr;
if (alias_len) {
if (NULL != (fd_ptr = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_alias_map)), alias, alias_len))) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_free_alias(fd_ptr, alias, alias_len)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add zip-based phar \"%s\" with explicit alias, alias is already in use", fname);
}
zend_hash_str_del(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), mydata->fname, fname_len);
return FAILURE;
}
}
zend_hash_str_add_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_alias_map)), actual_alias, mydata->alias_len, mydata);
mydata->alias = pestrndup(alias, alias_len, mydata->is_persistent);
mydata->alias_len = alias_len;
} else {
mydata->alias = pestrndup(mydata->fname, fname_len, mydata->is_persistent);
mydata->alias_len = fname_len;
}
mydata->is_temporary_alias = 1;
}
if (pphar) {
*pphar = mydata;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ZIP signature-verification feature in PHP before 5.6.26 and 7.x before 7.0.11 does not ensure that the uncompressed_filesize field is large enough, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PHAR archive, related to ext/phar/util.c and ext/phar/zip.c.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72928 - Out of bound when verify signature of zip phar in phar_parse_zipfile
(cherry picked from commit 19484ab77466f99c78fc0e677f7e03da0584d6a2)
|
Low
| 166,935
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
{
int i;
if (old->curframe != cur->curframe)
return false;
/* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same
* and all frame states need to be equivalent
*/
for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) {
if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite)
return false;
if (!func_states_equal(old->frame[i], cur->frame[i]))
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel before 4.20.6 performs undesirable out-of-bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic in various cases, including cases of different branches with different state or limits to sanitize, leading to side-channel attacks.
Commit Message: bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient
to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access
for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such
that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program
and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected
from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user
data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with
unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for
example:
- Load a map value pointer into R6
- Load an index into R7
- Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that
loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for
high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy)
- Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch)
- Load R0 = R6[R7]
- Load R0 = R6[R0]
For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier
where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee
safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't
allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown
scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value
pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another
option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar,
for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm>
followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the
original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed
entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still
precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU
executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known
scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option
only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted
as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit)
would be filled with many dependent computations such that
the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait
for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing
speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a
different execution port, or any other form of mistraining
as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited
to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access
is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users
and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under
speculation.
In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now
sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any
out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the
pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will
stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as
in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation,
there are three options that were considered: i) new insn
for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined
BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF.
Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved
bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require
each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning
mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements
it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii)
have both in common that a temporary register is needed in
order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we
are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push /
pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it
requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it
first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also
be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which
has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation
and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is
option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is
already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where
it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there)
and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can
be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints.
The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped
into extending the register set with hidden ax register and
reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the
prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This
allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter,
and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as
long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions.
The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the
map value or stack pointer currently holds.
There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration
for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows:
ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be
sanitized could reside either in source or in destination
register, and the limit is different depending on whether
the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the
current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as
follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For
subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because
we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would
temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown
value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at
verification time whether the actual runtime value would
be either negative or positive. For example, we have a
derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded
one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier
requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer
must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting
smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map
value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of
access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive
the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction
and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off +
ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for
the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val,
or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that
the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the
value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value
where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source
register if the value was in source.
The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully
sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could
happen ...
PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm)
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
[...]
... which under speculation could end up as ...
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
[...]
... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such
case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out
of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is
also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore
"branch off" and push the current verification state after the
ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later
analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is
likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any
case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and
therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In
terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification
state from speculative execution simulation must never prune
a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier
state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier
detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from
one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will
reject such program.
Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for
unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could
affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the
majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use
case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu
restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the
sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected
in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of
instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by
using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests.
For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o
and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb
we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We
found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier
with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none.
balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and
7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex
program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated
and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other
tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For
the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small
increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed
before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed
after the change. Other programs from that object file had
similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and
remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes
JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes
(634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained
in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic
by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access
is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to
optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from
branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in
terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well
as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's
Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access,
thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could
be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also
brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the
blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or
overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific
pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under
given constraints.
With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on
unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows:
# bpftool prog dump xlated id 282
[...]
28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)
29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8)
30: (57) r1 &= 15
31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608)
32: (57) r3 &= 1
33: (47) r3 |= 1
34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19
35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 |
36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer
37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers
38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known
39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent
40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation.
41: (0f) r4 += r11 |
42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0)
43: (6f) r4 <<= r1
[...]
For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register
as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted
for the above example:
[...]
16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479
17: (1f) r11 -= r2
18: (4f) r11 |= r2
19: (87) r11 = -r11
20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
21: (5f) r2 &= r11
22: (0f) r2 += r0
23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10:
[...]
d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _
d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi |
da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and
e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f.
e7: and %r10,%rdi |_
ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d |
f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10
f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each
f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions
f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp
fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.)
100: add %rax,%rdi |_
103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax
[...]
Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier
and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled
on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully.
[0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative
Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf
[1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and
Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz,
Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens,
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
Medium
| 170,245
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WarmupURLFetcher::FetchWarmupURL(
size_t previous_attempt_counts,
const DataReductionProxyServer& proxy_server) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
previous_attempt_counts_ = previous_attempt_counts;
DCHECK_LE(0u, previous_attempt_counts_);
DCHECK_GE(2u, previous_attempt_counts_);
fetch_delay_timer_.Stop();
if (previous_attempt_counts_ == 0) {
FetchWarmupURLNow(proxy_server);
return;
}
fetch_delay_timer_.Start(
FROM_HERE, GetFetchWaitTime(),
base::BindOnce(&WarmupURLFetcher::FetchWarmupURLNow,
base::Unretained(this), proxy_server));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
|
Medium
| 172,424
|
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