instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node(struct assoc_array_edit *edit,
const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
const void *index_key,
struct assoc_array_walk_result *result)
{
struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut, *new_s0;
struct assoc_array_node *node, *new_n0, *new_n1, *side;
struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
unsigned long dissimilarity, base_seg, blank;
size_t keylen;
bool have_meta;
int level, diff;
int slot, next_slot, free_slot, i, j;
node = result->terminal_node.node;
level = result->terminal_node.level;
edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] = result->terminal_node.slot;
pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
/* We arrived at a node which doesn't have an onward node or shortcut
* pointer that we have to follow. This means that (a) the leaf we
* want must go here (either by insertion or replacement) or (b) we
* need to split this node and insert in one of the fragments.
*/
free_slot = -1;
/* Firstly, we have to check the leaves in this node to see if there's
* a matching one we should replace in place.
*/
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
ptr = node->slots[i];
if (!ptr) {
free_slot = i;
continue;
}
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr) &&
ops->compare_object(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr),
index_key)) {
pr_devel("replace in slot %d\n", i);
edit->leaf_p = &node->slots[i];
edit->dead_leaf = node->slots[i];
pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [replace]\n", __func__);
return true;
}
}
/* If there is a free slot in this node then we can just insert the
* leaf here.
*/
if (free_slot >= 0) {
pr_devel("insert in free slot %d\n", free_slot);
edit->leaf_p = &node->slots[free_slot];
edit->adjust_count_on = node;
pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [insert]\n", __func__);
return true;
}
/* The node has no spare slots - so we're either going to have to split
* it or insert another node before it.
*
* Whatever, we're going to need at least two new nodes - so allocate
* those now. We may also need a new shortcut, but we deal with that
* when we need it.
*/
new_n0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_n0)
return false;
edit->new_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
new_n1 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_n1)
return false;
edit->new_meta[1] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n1);
/* We need to find out how similar the leaves are. */
pr_devel("no spare slots\n");
have_meta = false;
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
ptr = node->slots[i];
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
edit->segment_cache[i] = 0xff;
have_meta = true;
continue;
}
base_seg = ops->get_object_key_chunk(
assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr), level);
base_seg >>= level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
edit->segment_cache[i] = base_seg & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
}
if (have_meta) {
pr_devel("have meta\n");
goto split_node;
}
/* The node contains only leaves */
dissimilarity = 0;
base_seg = edit->segment_cache[0];
for (i = 1; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++)
dissimilarity |= edit->segment_cache[i] ^ base_seg;
pr_devel("only leaves; dissimilarity=%lx\n", dissimilarity);
if ((dissimilarity & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK) == 0) {
/* The old leaves all cluster in the same slot. We will need
* to insert a shortcut if the new node wants to cluster with them.
*/
if ((edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] ^ base_seg) == 0)
goto all_leaves_cluster_together;
/* Otherwise we can just insert a new node ahead of the old
* one.
*/
goto present_leaves_cluster_but_not_new_leaf;
}
split_node:
pr_devel("split node\n");
/* We need to split the current node; we know that the node doesn't
* simply contain a full set of leaves that cluster together (it
* contains meta pointers and/or non-clustering leaves).
*
* We need to expel at least two leaves out of a set consisting of the
* leaves in the node and the new leaf.
*
* We need a new node (n0) to replace the current one and a new node to
* take the expelled nodes (n1).
*/
edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
new_n0->back_pointer = node->back_pointer;
new_n0->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
new_n1->back_pointer = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
new_n1->parent_slot = -1; /* Need to calculate this */
do_split_node:
pr_devel("do_split_node\n");
new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch = node->nr_leaves_on_branch;
new_n1->nr_leaves_on_branch = 0;
/* Begin by finding two matching leaves. There have to be at least two
* that match - even if there are meta pointers - because any leaf that
* would match a slot with a meta pointer in it must be somewhere
* behind that meta pointer and cannot be here. Further, given N
* remaining leaf slots, we now have N+1 leaves to go in them.
*/
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
slot = edit->segment_cache[i];
if (slot != 0xff)
for (j = i + 1; j < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1; j++)
if (edit->segment_cache[j] == slot)
goto found_slot_for_multiple_occupancy;
}
found_slot_for_multiple_occupancy:
pr_devel("same slot: %x %x [%02x]\n", i, j, slot);
BUG_ON(i >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT);
BUG_ON(j >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1);
BUG_ON(slot >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT);
new_n1->parent_slot = slot;
/* Metadata pointers cannot change slot */
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++)
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(node->slots[i]))
new_n0->slots[i] = node->slots[i];
else
new_n0->slots[i] = NULL;
BUG_ON(new_n0->slots[slot] != NULL);
new_n0->slots[slot] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n1);
/* Filter the leaf pointers between the new nodes */
free_slot = -1;
next_slot = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(node->slots[i]))
continue;
if (edit->segment_cache[i] == slot) {
new_n1->slots[next_slot++] = node->slots[i];
new_n1->nr_leaves_on_branch++;
} else {
do {
free_slot++;
} while (new_n0->slots[free_slot] != NULL);
new_n0->slots[free_slot] = node->slots[i];
}
}
pr_devel("filtered: f=%x n=%x\n", free_slot, next_slot);
if (edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] != slot) {
do {
free_slot++;
} while (new_n0->slots[free_slot] != NULL);
edit->leaf_p = &new_n0->slots[free_slot];
edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
} else {
edit->leaf_p = &new_n1->slots[next_slot++];
edit->adjust_count_on = new_n1;
}
BUG_ON(next_slot <= 1);
edit->set_backpointers_to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
if (edit->segment_cache[i] == 0xff) {
ptr = node->slots[i];
BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr));
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr)) {
side = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
edit->set_backpointers[i] = &side->back_pointer;
} else {
shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
edit->set_backpointers[i] = &shortcut->back_pointer;
}
}
}
ptr = node->back_pointer;
if (!ptr)
edit->set[0].ptr = &edit->array->root;
else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr))
edit->set[0].ptr = &assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr)->slots[node->parent_slot];
else
edit->set[0].ptr = &assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr)->next_node;
edit->excised_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(node);
pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [split node]\n", __func__);
return true;
present_leaves_cluster_but_not_new_leaf:
/* All the old leaves cluster in the same slot, but the new leaf wants
* to go into a different slot, so we create a new node to hold the new
* leaf and a pointer to a new node holding all the old leaves.
*/
pr_devel("present leaves cluster but not new leaf\n");
new_n0->back_pointer = node->back_pointer;
new_n0->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch = node->nr_leaves_on_branch;
new_n1->back_pointer = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
new_n1->parent_slot = edit->segment_cache[0];
new_n1->nr_leaves_on_branch = node->nr_leaves_on_branch;
edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++)
new_n1->slots[i] = node->slots[i];
new_n0->slots[edit->segment_cache[0]] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
edit->leaf_p = &new_n0->slots[edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT]];
edit->set[0].ptr = &assoc_array_ptr_to_node(node->back_pointer)->slots[node->parent_slot];
edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
edit->excised_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(node);
pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [insert node before]\n", __func__);
return true;
all_leaves_cluster_together:
/* All the leaves, new and old, want to cluster together in this node
* in the same slot, so we have to replace this node with a shortcut to
* skip over the identical parts of the key and then place a pair of
* nodes, one inside the other, at the end of the shortcut and
* distribute the keys between them.
*
* Firstly we need to work out where the leaves start diverging as a
* bit position into their keys so that we know how big the shortcut
* needs to be.
*
* We only need to make a single pass of N of the N+1 leaves because if
* any keys differ between themselves at bit X then at least one of
* them must also differ with the base key at bit X or before.
*/
pr_devel("all leaves cluster together\n");
diff = INT_MAX;
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
int x = ops->diff_objects(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(node->slots[i]),
index_key);
if (x < diff) {
BUG_ON(x < 0);
diff = x;
}
}
BUG_ON(diff == INT_MAX);
BUG_ON(diff < level + ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP);
keylen = round_up(diff, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
keylen >>= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT;
new_s0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_shortcut) +
keylen * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_s0)
return false;
edit->new_meta[2] = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
new_s0->back_pointer = node->back_pointer;
new_s0->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
new_s0->next_node = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
new_n0->back_pointer = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
new_n0->parent_slot = 0;
new_n1->back_pointer = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
new_n1->parent_slot = -1; /* Need to calculate this */
new_s0->skip_to_level = level = diff & ~ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP_MASK;
pr_devel("skip_to_level = %d [diff %d]\n", level, diff);
BUG_ON(level <= 0);
for (i = 0; i < keylen; i++)
new_s0->index_key[i] =
ops->get_key_chunk(index_key, i * ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
blank = ULONG_MAX << (level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK);
pr_devel("blank off [%zu] %d: %lx\n", keylen - 1, level, blank);
new_s0->index_key[keylen - 1] &= ~blank;
/* This now reduces to a node splitting exercise for which we'll need
* to regenerate the disparity table.
*/
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
ptr = node->slots[i];
base_seg = ops->get_object_key_chunk(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr),
level);
base_seg >>= level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
edit->segment_cache[i] = base_seg & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
}
base_seg = ops->get_key_chunk(index_key, level);
base_seg >>= level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] = base_seg & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
goto do_split_node;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node function in lib/assoc_array.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.11 mishandles node splitting, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted application, as demonstrated by the keyring key type, and key addition and link creation operations.
Commit Message: assoc_array: Fix a buggy node-splitting case
This fixes CVE-2017-12193.
Fix a case in the assoc_array implementation in which a new leaf is
added that needs to go into a node that happens to be full, where the
existing leaves in that node cluster together at that level to the
exclusion of new leaf.
What needs to happen is that the existing leaves get moved out to a new
node, N1, at level + 1 and the existing node needs replacing with one,
N0, that has pointers to the new leaf and to N1.
The code that tries to do this gets this wrong in two ways:
(1) The pointer that should've pointed from N0 to N1 is set to point
recursively to N0 instead.
(2) The backpointer from N0 needs to be set correctly in the case N0 is
either the root node or reached through a shortcut.
Fix this by removing this path and using the split_node path instead,
which achieves the same end, but in a more general way (thanks to Eric
Biggers for spotting the redundancy).
The problem manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: assoc_array_apply_edit+0x59/0xe5
Fixes: 3cb989501c26 ("Add a generic associative array implementation.")
Reported-and-tested-by: WU Fan <u3536072@connect.hku.hk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [v3.13-rc1+]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 167,986
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadRLEImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define SkipLinesOp 0x01
#define SetColorOp 0x02
#define SkipPixelsOp 0x03
#define ByteDataOp 0x05
#define RunDataOp 0x06
#define EOFOp 0x07
char
magick[12];
Image
*image;
int
opcode,
operand,
status;
MagickStatusType
flags;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
Quantum
index;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
map_length,
number_colormaps,
number_planes,
number_planes_filled,
one,
pixel_info_length;
ssize_t
count,
offset,
y;
unsigned char
background_color[256],
*colormap,
pixel,
plane,
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Determine if this a RLE file.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 2) || (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
/*
Read image header.
*/
image->page.x=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->page.y=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->columns=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->rows=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
flags=(MagickStatusType) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->alpha_trait=flags & 0x04 ? BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait;
number_planes=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
bits_per_pixel=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
number_colormaps=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
map_length=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (map_length >= 22)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
one=1;
map_length=one << map_length;
if ((number_planes == 0) || (number_planes == 2) ||
((flags & 0x04) && (number_colormaps > 254)) || (bits_per_pixel != 8) ||
(image->columns == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (flags & 0x02)
{
/*
No background color-- initialize to black.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_planes; i++)
background_color[i]=0;
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
{
/*
Initialize background color.
*/
p=background_color;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_planes; i++)
*p++=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
if ((number_planes & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
colormap=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (number_colormaps != 0)
{
/*
Read image colormaps.
*/
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_colormaps,
3*map_length*sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_colormaps; i++)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) map_length; x++)
*p++=(unsigned char) ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
}
if ((flags & 0x08) != 0)
{
char
*comment;
size_t
length;
/*
Read image comment.
*/
length=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (length != 0)
{
comment=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,length-1,(unsigned char *) comment);
comment[length-1]='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment,exception);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
if ((length & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Allocate RLE pixels.
*/
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
number_planes++;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
number_planes_filled=(number_planes % 2 == 0) ? number_planes :
number_planes+1;
if ((number_pixels*number_planes_filled) != (size_t) (number_pixels*
number_planes_filled))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*
MagickMax(number_planes_filled,4)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixel_info_length=image->columns*image->rows*
MagickMax(number_planes_filled,4);
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if ((flags & 0x01) && !(flags & 0x02))
{
ssize_t
j;
/*
Set background color.
*/
p=pixels;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) number_planes; j++)
*p++=background_color[j];
else
{
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) (number_planes-1); j++)
*p++=background_color[j];
*p++=0; /* initialize matte channel */
}
}
}
/*
Read runlength-encoded image.
*/
plane=0;
x=0;
y=0;
opcode=ReadBlobByte(image);
do
{
switch (opcode & 0x3f)
{
case SkipLinesOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
x=0;
y+=operand;
break;
}
case SetColorOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
plane=(unsigned char) operand;
if (plane == 255)
plane=(unsigned char) (number_planes-1);
x=0;
break;
}
case SkipPixelsOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
x+=operand;
break;
}
case ByteDataOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
offset=((image->rows-y-1)*image->columns*number_planes)+x*
number_planes+plane;
operand++;
if ((offset < 0) ||
(offset+((size_t) operand*number_planes) > pixel_info_length))
{
if (number_colormaps != 0)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
p=pixels+offset;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) operand; i++)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((y < (ssize_t) image->rows) &&
((x+i) < (ssize_t) image->columns))
*p=pixel;
p+=number_planes;
}
if (operand & 0x01)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
x+=operand;
break;
}
case RunDataOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset=((image->rows-y-1)*image->columns*number_planes)+x*
number_planes+plane;
operand++;
if ((offset < 0) ||
(offset+((size_t) operand*number_planes) > pixel_info_length))
{
if (number_colormaps != 0)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
p=pixels+offset;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) operand; i++)
{
if ((y < (ssize_t) image->rows) &&
((x+i) < (ssize_t) image->columns))
*p=pixel;
p+=number_planes;
}
x+=operand;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
opcode=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (((opcode & 0x3f) != EOFOp) && (opcode != EOF));
if (number_colormaps != 0)
{
MagickStatusType
mask;
/*
Apply colormap affineation to image.
*/
mask=(MagickStatusType) (map_length-1);
p=pixels;
x=(ssize_t) number_planes;
if (number_colormaps == 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,*p & mask,&index,exception);
*p=colormap[(ssize_t) index];
p++;
}
else
if ((number_planes >= 3) && (number_colormaps >= 3))
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_planes; x++)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(size_t) (x*map_length+
(*p & mask)),&index,exception);
*p=colormap[(ssize_t) index];
p++;
}
if ((i < (ssize_t) number_pixels) || (x < (ssize_t) number_planes))
{
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
if (number_planes >= 3)
{
/*
Convert raster image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
/*
Create colormap.
*/
if (number_colormaps == 0)
map_length=256;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,map_length,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=colormap;
if (number_colormaps == 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
/*
Pseudocolor.
*/
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
}
else
if (number_colormaps > 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum(*p);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+map_length));
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+map_length*2));
p++;
}
p=pixels;
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
/*
Convert raster image to PseudoClass pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
}
else
{
/*
Image has a matte channel-- promote to DirectClass.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) *p++,&index,exception);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
index].red),q);
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) *p++,&index,exception);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
index].green),q);
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) *p++,&index,exception);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
index].blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
break;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
image->colormap);
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
image->colors=0;
}
}
if (number_colormaps != 0)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 0) && (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) == 0))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count != 0) && (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) == 0));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: ImageMagick before 7.0.5-2 and GraphicsMagick before 1.3.24 use uninitialized memory in the RLE decoder, allowing an attacker to leak sensitive information from process memory space, as demonstrated by remote attacks against ImageMagick code in a long-running server process that converts image data on behalf of multiple users. This is caused by a missing initialization step in the ReadRLEImage function in coders/rle.c.
Commit Message: Reset memory for RLE decoder (patch provided by scarybeasts)
|
Low
| 168,126
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::set_config(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE configIndex,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR configData)
{
(void) hComp;
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Config in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret = OMX_ErrorNone;
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_NALSIZE *pNal;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Config Called");
if (configIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData) {
OMX_VENDOR_EXTRADATATYPE *config = (OMX_VENDOR_EXTRADATATYPE *) configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Index OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData called");
if (!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.avc") ||
!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mvc")) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Index OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData AVC");
OMX_U32 extra_size;
nal_length = (config->pData[4] & 0x03) + 1;
extra_size = 0;
if (nal_length > 2) {
/* Presently we assume that only one SPS and one PPS in AvC1 Atom */
extra_size = (nal_length - 2) * 2;
}
OMX_U8 *pSrcBuf = (OMX_U8 *) (&config->pData[6]);
OMX_U8 *pDestBuf;
m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize - 6 - 1 + extra_size;
m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8 *) malloc(m_vendor_config.nDataSize);
OMX_U32 len;
OMX_U8 index = 0;
pDestBuf = m_vendor_config.pData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Rxd SPS+PPS nPortIndex[%u] len[%u] data[%p]",
(unsigned int)m_vendor_config.nPortIndex,
(unsigned int)m_vendor_config.nDataSize,
m_vendor_config.pData);
while (index < 2) {
uint8 *psize;
len = *pSrcBuf;
len = len << 8;
len |= *(pSrcBuf + 1);
psize = (uint8 *) & len;
memcpy(pDestBuf + nal_length, pSrcBuf + 2,len);
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nal_length; i++) {
pDestBuf[i] = psize[nal_length - 1 - i];
}
pDestBuf += len + nal_length;
pSrcBuf += len + 2;
index++;
pSrcBuf++; // skip picture param set
len = 0;
}
} else if (!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg4") ||
!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg2")) {
m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize;
m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8 *) malloc((config->nDataSize));
memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData, config->pData,config->nDataSize);
} else if (!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vc1")) {
if (m_vendor_config.pData) {
free(m_vendor_config.pData);
m_vendor_config.pData = NULL;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = 0;
}
if (((*((OMX_U32 *) config->pData)) &
VC1_SP_MP_START_CODE_MASK) ==
VC1_SP_MP_START_CODE) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - VC1 simple/main profile");
m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize;
m_vendor_config.pData =
(OMX_U8 *) malloc(config->nDataSize);
memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData, config->pData,
config->nDataSize);
m_vc1_profile = VC1_SP_MP_RCV;
} else if (*((OMX_U32 *) config->pData) == VC1_AP_SEQ_START_CODE) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - VC1 Advance profile");
m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize;
m_vendor_config.pData =
(OMX_U8 *) malloc((config->nDataSize));
memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData, config->pData,
config->nDataSize);
m_vc1_profile = VC1_AP;
} else if ((config->nDataSize == VC1_STRUCT_C_LEN)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - VC1 Simple/Main profile struct C only");
m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize;
m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8*)malloc(config->nDataSize);
memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData,config->pData,config->nDataSize);
m_vc1_profile = VC1_SP_MP_RCV;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - Error: Unknown VC1 profile");
}
}
return ret;
} else if (configIndex == OMX_IndexConfigVideoNalSize) {
struct v4l2_control temp;
temp.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_FORMAT;
pNal = reinterpret_cast < OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_NALSIZE * >(configData);
switch (pNal->nNaluBytes) {
case 0:
temp.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NAL_FORMAT_STARTCODES;
break;
case 2:
temp.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NAL_FORMAT_TWO_BYTE_LENGTH;
break;
case 4:
temp.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NAL_FORMAT_FOUR_BYTE_LENGTH;
break;
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (!arbitrary_bytes) {
/* In arbitrary bytes mode, the assembler strips out nal size and replaces
* with start code, so only need to notify driver in frame by frame mode */
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &temp)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_FORMAT");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
}
nal_length = pNal->nNaluBytes;
m_frame_parser.init_nal_length(nal_length);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_IndexConfigVideoNalSize called with Size %d", nal_length);
return ret;
} else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_IndexVendorVideoFrameRate) {
OMX_VENDOR_VIDEOFRAMERATE *config = (OMX_VENDOR_VIDEOFRAMERATE *) configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Index OMX_IndexVendorVideoFrameRate %u", (unsigned int)config->nFps);
if (config->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
if (config->bEnabled) {
if ((config->nFps >> 16) > 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config: frame rate set by omx client : %u",
(unsigned int)config->nFps >> 16);
Q16ToFraction(config->nFps, drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator,
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator);
if (!drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Numerator is zero setting to 30");
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = 30;
}
if (drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator) {
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = (int)
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator / drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator;
}
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator = 1;
frm_int = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator * 1e6 /
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator;
struct v4l2_outputparm oparm;
/*XXX: we're providing timing info as seconds per frame rather than frames
* per second.*/
oparm.timeperframe.numerator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator;
oparm.timeperframe.denominator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator;
struct v4l2_streamparm sparm;
sparm.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
sparm.parm.output = oparm;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_PARM, &sparm)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Unable to convey fps info to driver, \
performance might be affected");
ret = OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
client_set_fps = true;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Frame rate not supported.");
ret = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config: Disabled client's frame rate");
client_set_fps = false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(" Set_config: Bad Port idx %d",
(int)config->nPortIndex);
ret = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
return ret;
} else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_QcomIndexConfigPerfLevel) {
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *perf =
(OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *)configData;
struct v4l2_control control;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set perf level: %d", perf->ePerfLevel);
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_SET_PERF_LEVEL;
switch (perf->ePerfLevel) {
case OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelNominal:
control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_NOMINAL;
break;
case OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelTurbo:
control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_TURBO;
break;
default:
ret = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
break;
}
if (ret == OMX_ErrorNone) {
ret = (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control) < 0) ?
OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting : OMX_ErrorNone;
}
return ret;
} else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_IndexConfigPriority) {
OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *priority = (OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *)configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set_config: priority %d", priority->nU32);
struct v4l2_control control;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PRIORITY;
if (priority->nU32 == 0)
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PRIORITY_REALTIME_ENABLE;
else
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PRIORITY_REALTIME_DISABLE;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set Priority");
ret = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
return ret;
} else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_IndexConfigOperatingRate) {
OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *rate = (OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *)configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set_config: operating-rate %u fps", rate->nU32 >> 16);
struct v4l2_control control;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OPERATING_RATE;
control.value = rate->nU32;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
ret = errno == -EBUSY ? OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources :
OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set operating rate %u fps (%s)",
rate->nU32 >> 16, errno == -EBUSY ? "HW Overload" : strerror(errno));
}
return ret;
}
return OMX_ErrorNotImplemented;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The mm-video-v4l2 vidc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate certain OMX parameter data structures, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27532721.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vidc: validate omx param/config data
Check the sanity of config/param strcuture objects
passed to get/set _ config()/parameter() methods.
Bug: 27533317
Security Vulnerability in MediaServer
omx_vdec::get_config() Can lead to arbitrary write
Change-Id: I6c3243afe12055ab94f1a1ecf758c10e88231809
Conflicts:
mm-core/inc/OMX_QCOMExtns.h
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_base.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_encoder.cpp
|
Medium
| 173,790
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: char * exif_dump_data(int *dump_free, int format, int components, int length, int motorola_intel, char *value_ptr TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *dump;
int len;
*dump_free = 0;
if (format == TAG_FMT_STRING) {
return value_ptr ? value_ptr : "<no data>";
}
if (format == TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED) {
return "<undefined>\n";
}
if (format == TAG_FMT_IFD) {
return "";
}
if (format == TAG_FMT_SINGLE || format == TAG_FMT_DOUBLE) {
return "<not implemented>";
}
*dump_free = 1;
if (components > 1) {
len = spprintf(&dump, 0, "(%d,%d) {", components, length);
} else {
len = spprintf(&dump, 0, "{");
}
while(components > 0) {
switch(format) {
case TAG_FMT_BYTE:
case TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED:
case TAG_FMT_STRING:
case TAG_FMT_SBYTE:
dump = erealloc(dump, len + 4 + 1);
snprintf(dump + len, 4 + 1, "0x%02X", *value_ptr);
len += 4;
value_ptr++;
break;
case TAG_FMT_USHORT:
case TAG_FMT_SSHORT:
dump = erealloc(dump, len + 6 + 1);
snprintf(dump + len, 6 + 1, "0x%04X", php_ifd_get16s(value_ptr, motorola_intel));
len += 6;
value_ptr += 2;
break;
case TAG_FMT_ULONG:
case TAG_FMT_SLONG:
dump = erealloc(dump, len + 6 + 1);
snprintf(dump + len, 6 + 1, "0x%04X", php_ifd_get32s(value_ptr, motorola_intel));
len += 6;
value_ptr += 4;
break;
case TAG_FMT_URATIONAL:
case TAG_FMT_SRATIONAL:
dump = erealloc(dump, len + 13 + 1);
snprintf(dump + len, 13 + 1, "0x%04X/0x%04X", php_ifd_get32s(value_ptr, motorola_intel), php_ifd_get32s(value_ptr+4, motorola_intel));
len += 13;
value_ptr += 8;
break;
}
if (components > 0) {
dump = erealloc(dump, len + 2 + 1);
snprintf(dump + len, 2 + 1, ", ");
len += 2;
components--;
} else{
break;
}
}
dump = erealloc(dump, len + 1 + 1);
snprintf(dump + len, 1 + 1, "}");
return dump;
}
/* }}} */
#endif
/* {{{ exif_convert_any_format
* Evaluate number, be it int, rational, or float from directory. */
static double exif_convert_any_format(void *value, int format, int motorola_intel TSRMLS_DC)
{
int s_den;
unsigned u_den;
switch(format) {
case TAG_FMT_SBYTE: return *(signed char *)value;
case TAG_FMT_BYTE: return *(uchar *)value;
case TAG_FMT_USHORT: return php_ifd_get16u(value, motorola_intel);
case TAG_FMT_ULONG: return php_ifd_get32u(value, motorola_intel);
case TAG_FMT_URATIONAL:
u_den = php_ifd_get32u(4+(char *)value, motorola_intel);
if (u_den == 0) {
return 0;
} else {
return (double)php_ifd_get32u(value, motorola_intel) / u_den;
}
case TAG_FMT_SRATIONAL:
s_den = php_ifd_get32s(4+(char *)value, motorola_intel);
if (s_den == 0) {
return 0;
} else {
return (double)php_ifd_get32s(value, motorola_intel) / s_den;
}
case TAG_FMT_SSHORT: return (signed short)php_ifd_get16u(value, motorola_intel);
case TAG_FMT_SLONG: return php_ifd_get32s(value, motorola_intel);
/* Not sure if this is correct (never seen float used in Exif format) */
case TAG_FMT_SINGLE:
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Found value of type single");
#endif
return (double)*(float *)value;
case TAG_FMT_DOUBLE:
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Found value of type double");
#endif
return *(double *)value;
}
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_convert_any_to_int
* Evaluate number, be it int, rational, or float from directory. */
static size_t exif_convert_any_to_int(void *value, int format, int motorola_intel TSRMLS_DC)
{
int s_den;
unsigned u_den;
switch(format) {
case TAG_FMT_SBYTE: return *(signed char *)value;
case TAG_FMT_BYTE: return *(uchar *)value;
case TAG_FMT_USHORT: return php_ifd_get16u(value, motorola_intel);
case TAG_FMT_ULONG: return php_ifd_get32u(value, motorola_intel);
case TAG_FMT_URATIONAL:
u_den = php_ifd_get32u(4+(char *)value, motorola_intel);
if (u_den == 0) {
return 0;
} else {
return php_ifd_get32u(value, motorola_intel) / u_den;
}
case TAG_FMT_SRATIONAL:
s_den = php_ifd_get32s(4+(char *)value, motorola_intel);
if (s_den == 0) {
return 0;
} else {
return php_ifd_get32s(value, motorola_intel) / s_den;
}
case TAG_FMT_SSHORT: return php_ifd_get16u(value, motorola_intel);
case TAG_FMT_SLONG: return php_ifd_get32s(value, motorola_intel);
/* Not sure if this is correct (never seen float used in Exif format) */
case TAG_FMT_SINGLE:
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Found value of type single");
#endif
return (size_t)*(float *)value;
case TAG_FMT_DOUBLE:
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Found value of type double");
#endif
return (size_t)*(double *)value;
}
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ struct image_info_value, image_info_list
*/
#ifndef WORD
#define WORD unsigned short
#endif
#ifndef DWORD
#define DWORD unsigned int
#endif
typedef struct {
int num;
int den;
} signed_rational;
typedef struct {
unsigned int num;
unsigned int den;
} unsigned_rational;
typedef union _image_info_value {
char *s;
unsigned u;
int i;
float f;
double d;
signed_rational sr;
unsigned_rational ur;
union _image_info_value *list;
} image_info_value;
typedef struct {
WORD tag;
WORD format;
DWORD length;
DWORD dummy; /* value ptr of tiff directory entry */
char *name;
image_info_value value;
} image_info_data;
typedef struct {
int count;
image_info_data *list;
} image_info_list;
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_get_sectionname
Returns the name of a section
*/
#define SECTION_FILE 0
#define SECTION_COMPUTED 1
#define SECTION_ANY_TAG 2
#define SECTION_IFD0 3
#define SECTION_THUMBNAIL 4
#define SECTION_COMMENT 5
#define SECTION_APP0 6
#define SECTION_EXIF 7
#define SECTION_FPIX 8
#define SECTION_GPS 9
#define SECTION_INTEROP 10
#define SECTION_APP12 11
#define SECTION_WINXP 12
#define SECTION_MAKERNOTE 13
#define SECTION_COUNT 14
#define FOUND_FILE (1<<SECTION_FILE)
#define FOUND_COMPUTED (1<<SECTION_COMPUTED)
#define FOUND_ANY_TAG (1<<SECTION_ANY_TAG)
#define FOUND_IFD0 (1<<SECTION_IFD0)
#define FOUND_THUMBNAIL (1<<SECTION_THUMBNAIL)
#define FOUND_COMMENT (1<<SECTION_COMMENT)
#define FOUND_APP0 (1<<SECTION_APP0)
#define FOUND_EXIF (1<<SECTION_EXIF)
#define FOUND_FPIX (1<<SECTION_FPIX)
#define FOUND_GPS (1<<SECTION_GPS)
#define FOUND_INTEROP (1<<SECTION_INTEROP)
#define FOUND_APP12 (1<<SECTION_APP12)
#define FOUND_WINXP (1<<SECTION_WINXP)
#define FOUND_MAKERNOTE (1<<SECTION_MAKERNOTE)
static char *exif_get_sectionname(int section)
{
switch(section) {
case SECTION_FILE: return "FILE";
case SECTION_COMPUTED: return "COMPUTED";
case SECTION_ANY_TAG: return "ANY_TAG";
case SECTION_IFD0: return "IFD0";
case SECTION_THUMBNAIL: return "THUMBNAIL";
case SECTION_COMMENT: return "COMMENT";
case SECTION_APP0: return "APP0";
case SECTION_EXIF: return "EXIF";
case SECTION_FPIX: return "FPIX";
case SECTION_GPS: return "GPS";
case SECTION_INTEROP: return "INTEROP";
case SECTION_APP12: return "APP12";
case SECTION_WINXP: return "WINXP";
case SECTION_MAKERNOTE: return "MAKERNOTE";
}
return "";
}
static tag_table_type exif_get_tag_table(int section)
{
switch(section) {
case SECTION_FILE: return &tag_table_IFD[0];
case SECTION_COMPUTED: return &tag_table_IFD[0];
case SECTION_ANY_TAG: return &tag_table_IFD[0];
case SECTION_IFD0: return &tag_table_IFD[0];
case SECTION_THUMBNAIL: return &tag_table_IFD[0];
case SECTION_COMMENT: return &tag_table_IFD[0];
case SECTION_APP0: return &tag_table_IFD[0];
case SECTION_EXIF: return &tag_table_IFD[0];
case SECTION_FPIX: return &tag_table_IFD[0];
case SECTION_GPS: return &tag_table_GPS[0];
case SECTION_INTEROP: return &tag_table_IOP[0];
case SECTION_APP12: return &tag_table_IFD[0];
case SECTION_WINXP: return &tag_table_IFD[0];
}
return &tag_table_IFD[0];
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_get_sectionlist
Return list of sectionnames specified by sectionlist. Return value must be freed
*/
static char *exif_get_sectionlist(int sectionlist TSRMLS_DC)
{
int i, len, ml = 0;
char *sections;
for(i=0; i<SECTION_COUNT; i++) {
ml += strlen(exif_get_sectionname(i))+2;
}
sections = safe_emalloc(ml, 1, 1);
sections[0] = '\0';
len = 0;
for(i=0; i<SECTION_COUNT; i++) {
if (sectionlist&(1<<i)) {
snprintf(sections+len, ml-len, "%s, ", exif_get_sectionname(i));
len = strlen(sections);
}
}
if (len>2)
sections[len-2] = '\0';
return sections;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ struct image_info_type
This structure stores Exif header image elements in a simple manner
Used to store camera data as extracted from the various ways that it can be
stored in a nexif header
*/
typedef struct {
int type;
size_t size;
uchar *data;
} file_section;
typedef struct {
int count;
file_section *list;
} file_section_list;
typedef struct {
image_filetype filetype;
size_t width, height;
size_t size;
size_t offset;
char *data;
} thumbnail_data;
typedef struct {
char *value;
size_t size;
int tag;
} xp_field_type;
typedef struct {
int count;
xp_field_type *list;
} xp_field_list;
/* This structure is used to store a section of a Jpeg file. */
typedef struct {
php_stream *infile;
char *FileName;
time_t FileDateTime;
size_t FileSize;
image_filetype FileType;
int Height, Width;
int IsColor;
char *make;
char *model;
float ApertureFNumber;
float ExposureTime;
double FocalplaneUnits;
float CCDWidth;
double FocalplaneXRes;
size_t ExifImageWidth;
float FocalLength;
float Distance;
int motorola_intel; /* 1 Motorola; 0 Intel */
char *UserComment;
int UserCommentLength;
char *UserCommentEncoding;
char *encode_unicode;
char *decode_unicode_be;
char *decode_unicode_le;
char *encode_jis;
char *decode_jis_be;
char *decode_jis_le;
char *Copyright;/* EXIF standard defines Copyright as "<Photographer> [ '\0' <Editor> ] ['\0']" */
char *CopyrightPhotographer;
char *CopyrightEditor;
xp_field_list xp_fields;
thumbnail_data Thumbnail;
/* other */
int sections_found; /* FOUND_<marker> */
image_info_list info_list[SECTION_COUNT];
/* for parsing */
int read_thumbnail;
int read_all;
int ifd_nesting_level;
/* internal */
file_section_list file;
} image_info_type;
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_error_docref */
static void exif_error_docref(const char *docref EXIFERR_DC, const image_info_type *ImageInfo, int type, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, format);
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
{
char *buf;
spprintf(&buf, 0, "%s(%d): %s", _file, _line, format);
php_verror(docref, ImageInfo->FileName?ImageInfo->FileName:"", type, buf, args TSRMLS_CC);
efree(buf);
}
#else
php_verror(docref, ImageInfo->FileName?ImageInfo->FileName:"", type, format, args TSRMLS_CC);
#endif
va_end(args);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ jpeg_sof_info
*/
typedef struct {
int bits_per_sample;
size_t width;
size_t height;
int num_components;
} jpeg_sof_info;
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_file_sections_add
Add a file_section to image_info
returns the used block or -1. if size>0 and data == NULL buffer of size is allocated
*/
static int exif_file_sections_add(image_info_type *ImageInfo, int type, size_t size, uchar *data)
{
file_section *tmp;
int count = ImageInfo->file.count;
tmp = safe_erealloc(ImageInfo->file.list, (count+1), sizeof(file_section), 0);
ImageInfo->file.list = tmp;
ImageInfo->file.list[count].type = 0xFFFF;
ImageInfo->file.list[count].data = NULL;
ImageInfo->file.list[count].size = 0;
ImageInfo->file.count = count+1;
if (!size) {
data = NULL;
} else if (data == NULL) {
data = safe_emalloc(size, 1, 0);
}
ImageInfo->file.list[count].type = type;
ImageInfo->file.list[count].data = data;
ImageInfo->file.list[count].size = size;
return count;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_file_sections_realloc
Reallocate a file section returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
*/
static int exif_file_sections_realloc(image_info_type *ImageInfo, int section_index, size_t size TSRMLS_DC)
{
void *tmp;
/* This is not a malloc/realloc check. It is a plausibility check for the
* function parameters (requirements engineering).
*/
if (section_index >= ImageInfo->file.count) {
EXIF_ERRLOG_FSREALLOC(ImageInfo)
return -1;
}
tmp = safe_erealloc(ImageInfo->file.list[section_index].data, 1, size, 0);
ImageInfo->file.list[section_index].data = tmp;
ImageInfo->file.list[section_index].size = size;
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_file_section_free
Discard all file_sections in ImageInfo
*/
static int exif_file_sections_free(image_info_type *ImageInfo)
{
int i;
if (ImageInfo->file.count) {
for (i=0; i<ImageInfo->file.count; i++) {
EFREE_IF(ImageInfo->file.list[i].data);
}
}
EFREE_IF(ImageInfo->file.list);
ImageInfo->file.count = 0;
return TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_iif_add_value
Add a value to image_info
*/
static void exif_iif_add_value(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index, char *name, int tag, int format, int length, void* value, int motorola_intel TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t idex;
void *vptr;
image_info_value *info_value;
image_info_data *info_data;
image_info_data *list;
if (length < 0) {
return;
}
list = safe_erealloc(image_info->info_list[section_index].list, (image_info->info_list[section_index].count+1), sizeof(image_info_data), 0);
image_info->info_list[section_index].list = list;
info_data = &image_info->info_list[section_index].list[image_info->info_list[section_index].count];
memset(info_data, 0, sizeof(image_info_data));
info_data->tag = tag;
info_data->format = format;
info_data->length = length;
info_data->name = estrdup(name);
info_value = &info_data->value;
switch (format) {
case TAG_FMT_STRING:
if (value) {
length = php_strnlen(value, length);
info_value->s = estrndup(value, length);
info_data->length = length;
} else {
info_data->length = 0;
info_value->s = estrdup("");
}
break;
default:
/* Standard says more types possible but skip them...
* but allow users to handle data if they know how to
* So not return but use type UNDEFINED
* return;
*/
info_data->tag = TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED;/* otherwise not freed from memory */
case TAG_FMT_SBYTE:
case TAG_FMT_BYTE:
/* in contrast to strings bytes do not need to allocate buffer for NULL if length==0 */
if (!length)
break;
case TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED:
if (value) {
/* do not recompute length here */
info_value->s = estrndup(value, length);
info_data->length = length;
} else {
info_data->length = 0;
info_value->s = estrdup("");
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_USHORT:
case TAG_FMT_ULONG:
case TAG_FMT_URATIONAL:
case TAG_FMT_SSHORT:
case TAG_FMT_SLONG:
case TAG_FMT_SRATIONAL:
case TAG_FMT_SINGLE:
case TAG_FMT_DOUBLE:
if (length==0) {
break;
} else
if (length>1) {
info_value->list = safe_emalloc(length, sizeof(image_info_value), 0);
} else {
info_value = &info_data->value;
}
for (idex=0,vptr=value; idex<(size_t)length; idex++,vptr=(char *) vptr + php_tiff_bytes_per_format[format]) {
if (length>1) {
info_value = &info_data->value.list[idex];
}
switch (format) {
case TAG_FMT_USHORT:
info_value->u = php_ifd_get16u(vptr, motorola_intel);
break;
case TAG_FMT_ULONG:
info_value->u = php_ifd_get32u(vptr, motorola_intel);
break;
case TAG_FMT_URATIONAL:
info_value->ur.num = php_ifd_get32u(vptr, motorola_intel);
info_value->ur.den = php_ifd_get32u(4+(char *)vptr, motorola_intel);
break;
case TAG_FMT_SSHORT:
info_value->i = php_ifd_get16s(vptr, motorola_intel);
break;
case TAG_FMT_SLONG:
info_value->i = php_ifd_get32s(vptr, motorola_intel);
break;
case TAG_FMT_SRATIONAL:
info_value->sr.num = php_ifd_get32u(vptr, motorola_intel);
info_value->sr.den = php_ifd_get32u(4+(char *)vptr, motorola_intel);
break;
case TAG_FMT_SINGLE:
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Found value of type single");
#endif
info_value->f = *(float *)value;
case TAG_FMT_DOUBLE:
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Found value of type double");
#endif
info_value->d = *(double *)value;
break;
}
}
}
image_info->sections_found |= 1<<section_index;
image_info->info_list[section_index].count++;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_iif_add_tag
Add a tag from IFD to image_info
*/
static void exif_iif_add_tag(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index, char *name, int tag, int format, size_t length, void* value TSRMLS_DC)
{
exif_iif_add_value(image_info, section_index, name, tag, format, (int)length, value, image_info->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_iif_add_int
Add an int value to image_info
*/
static void exif_iif_add_int(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index, char *name, int value TSRMLS_DC)
{
image_info_data *info_data;
image_info_data *list;
list = safe_erealloc(image_info->info_list[section_index].list, (image_info->info_list[section_index].count+1), sizeof(image_info_data), 0);
image_info->info_list[section_index].list = list;
info_data = &image_info->info_list[section_index].list[image_info->info_list[section_index].count];
info_data->tag = TAG_NONE;
info_data->format = TAG_FMT_SLONG;
info_data->length = 1;
info_data->name = estrdup(name);
info_data->value.i = value;
image_info->sections_found |= 1<<section_index;
image_info->info_list[section_index].count++;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_iif_add_str
Add a string value to image_info MUST BE NUL TERMINATED
*/
static void exif_iif_add_str(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index, char *name, char *value TSRMLS_DC)
{
image_info_data *info_data;
image_info_data *list;
if (value) {
list = safe_erealloc(image_info->info_list[section_index].list, (image_info->info_list[section_index].count+1), sizeof(image_info_data), 0);
image_info->info_list[section_index].list = list;
info_data = &image_info->info_list[section_index].list[image_info->info_list[section_index].count];
info_data->tag = TAG_NONE;
info_data->format = TAG_FMT_STRING;
info_data->length = 1;
info_data->name = estrdup(name);
info_data->value.s = estrdup(value);
image_info->sections_found |= 1<<section_index;
image_info->info_list[section_index].count++;
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_iif_add_fmt
Add a format string value to image_info MUST BE NUL TERMINATED
*/
static void exif_iif_add_fmt(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index, char *name TSRMLS_DC, char *value, ...)
{
char *tmp;
va_list arglist;
va_start(arglist, value);
if (value) {
vspprintf(&tmp, 0, value, arglist);
exif_iif_add_str(image_info, section_index, name, tmp TSRMLS_CC);
efree(tmp);
}
va_end(arglist);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_iif_add_str
Add a string value to image_info MUST BE NUL TERMINATED
*/
static void exif_iif_add_buffer(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index, char *name, int length, char *value TSRMLS_DC)
{
image_info_data *info_data;
image_info_data *list;
if (value) {
list = safe_erealloc(image_info->info_list[section_index].list, (image_info->info_list[section_index].count+1), sizeof(image_info_data), 0);
image_info->info_list[section_index].list = list;
info_data = &image_info->info_list[section_index].list[image_info->info_list[section_index].count];
info_data->tag = TAG_NONE;
info_data->format = TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED;
info_data->length = length;
info_data->name = estrdup(name);
info_data->value.s = safe_emalloc(length, 1, 1);
memcpy(info_data->value.s, value, length);
info_data->value.s[length] = 0;
image_info->sections_found |= 1<<section_index;
image_info->info_list[section_index].count++;
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_iif_free
Free memory allocated for image_info
*/
static void exif_iif_free(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index) {
int i;
void *f; /* faster */
if (image_info->info_list[section_index].count) {
for (i=0; i < image_info->info_list[section_index].count; i++) {
if ((f=image_info->info_list[section_index].list[i].name) != NULL) {
efree(f);
}
switch(image_info->info_list[section_index].list[i].format) {
case TAG_FMT_SBYTE:
case TAG_FMT_BYTE:
/* in contrast to strings bytes do not need to allocate buffer for NULL if length==0 */
if (image_info->info_list[section_index].list[i].length<1)
break;
default:
case TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED:
case TAG_FMT_STRING:
if ((f=image_info->info_list[section_index].list[i].value.s) != NULL) {
efree(f);
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_USHORT:
case TAG_FMT_ULONG:
case TAG_FMT_URATIONAL:
case TAG_FMT_SSHORT:
case TAG_FMT_SLONG:
case TAG_FMT_SRATIONAL:
case TAG_FMT_SINGLE:
case TAG_FMT_DOUBLE:
/* nothing to do here */
if (image_info->info_list[section_index].list[i].length > 1) {
if ((f=image_info->info_list[section_index].list[i].value.list) != NULL) {
efree(f);
}
}
break;
}
}
}
EFREE_IF(image_info->info_list[section_index].list);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ add_assoc_image_info
* Add image_info to associative array value. */
static void add_assoc_image_info(zval *value, int sub_array, image_info_type *image_info, int section_index TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buffer[64], *val, *name, uname[64];
int i, ap, l, b, idx=0, unknown=0;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
int info_tag;
#endif
image_info_value *info_value;
image_info_data *info_data;
zval *tmpi, *array = NULL;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
/* php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Adding %d infos from section %s", image_info->info_list[section_index].count, exif_get_sectionname(section_index));*/
#endif
if (image_info->info_list[section_index].count) {
if (sub_array) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmpi);
array_init(tmpi);
} else {
tmpi = value;
}
for(i=0; i<image_info->info_list[section_index].count; i++) {
info_data = &image_info->info_list[section_index].list[i];
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
info_tag = info_data->tag; /* conversion */
#endif
info_value = &info_data->value;
if (!(name = info_data->name)) {
snprintf(uname, sizeof(uname), "%d", unknown++);
name = uname;
}
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
/* php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Adding infos: tag(0x%04X,%12s,L=0x%04X): %s", info_tag, exif_get_tagname(info_tag, buffer, -12, exif_get_tag_table(section_index) TSRMLS_CC), info_data->length, info_data->format==TAG_FMT_STRING?(info_value&&info_value->s?info_value->s:"<no data>"):exif_get_tagformat(info_data->format));*/
#endif
if (info_data->length==0) {
add_assoc_null(tmpi, name);
} else {
switch (info_data->format) {
default:
/* Standard says more types possible but skip them...
* but allow users to handle data if they know how to
* So not return but use type UNDEFINED
* return;
*/
case TAG_FMT_BYTE:
case TAG_FMT_SBYTE:
case TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED:
if (!info_value->s) {
add_assoc_stringl(tmpi, name, "", 0, 1);
} else {
add_assoc_stringl(tmpi, name, info_value->s, info_data->length, 1);
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_STRING:
if (!(val = info_value->s)) {
val = "";
}
if (section_index==SECTION_COMMENT) {
add_index_string(tmpi, idx++, val, 1);
} else {
add_assoc_string(tmpi, name, val, 1);
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_URATIONAL:
case TAG_FMT_SRATIONAL:
/*case TAG_FMT_BYTE:
case TAG_FMT_SBYTE:*/
case TAG_FMT_USHORT:
case TAG_FMT_SSHORT:
case TAG_FMT_SINGLE:
case TAG_FMT_DOUBLE:
case TAG_FMT_ULONG:
case TAG_FMT_SLONG:
/* now the rest, first see if it becomes an array */
if ((l = info_data->length) > 1) {
array = NULL;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(array);
array_init(array);
}
for(ap=0; ap<l; ap++) {
if (l>1) {
info_value = &info_data->value.list[ap];
}
switch (info_data->format) {
case TAG_FMT_BYTE:
if (l>1) {
info_value = &info_data->value;
for (b=0;b<l;b++) {
add_index_long(array, b, (int)(info_value->s[b]));
}
break;
}
case TAG_FMT_USHORT:
case TAG_FMT_ULONG:
if (l==1) {
add_assoc_long(tmpi, name, (int)info_value->u);
} else {
add_index_long(array, ap, (int)info_value->u);
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_URATIONAL:
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%i/%i", info_value->ur.num, info_value->ur.den);
if (l==1) {
add_assoc_string(tmpi, name, buffer, 1);
} else {
add_index_string(array, ap, buffer, 1);
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_SBYTE:
if (l>1) {
info_value = &info_data->value;
for (b=0;b<l;b++) {
add_index_long(array, ap, (int)info_value->s[b]);
}
break;
}
case TAG_FMT_SSHORT:
case TAG_FMT_SLONG:
if (l==1) {
add_assoc_long(tmpi, name, info_value->i);
} else {
add_index_long(array, ap, info_value->i);
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_SRATIONAL:
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%i/%i", info_value->sr.num, info_value->sr.den);
if (l==1) {
add_assoc_string(tmpi, name, buffer, 1);
} else {
add_index_string(array, ap, buffer, 1);
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_SINGLE:
if (l==1) {
add_assoc_double(tmpi, name, info_value->f);
} else {
add_index_double(array, ap, info_value->f);
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_DOUBLE:
if (l==1) {
add_assoc_double(tmpi, name, info_value->d);
} else {
add_index_double(array, ap, info_value->d);
}
break;
}
info_value = &info_data->value.list[ap];
}
if (l>1) {
add_assoc_zval(tmpi, name, array);
}
break;
}
}
}
if (sub_array) {
add_assoc_zval(value, exif_get_sectionname(section_index), tmpi);
}
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ Markers
JPEG markers consist of one or more 0xFF bytes, followed by a marker
code byte (which is not an FF). Here are the marker codes of interest
in this program. (See jdmarker.c for a more complete list.)
*/
#define M_TEM 0x01 /* temp for arithmetic coding */
#define M_RES 0x02 /* reserved */
#define M_SOF0 0xC0 /* Start Of Frame N */
#define M_SOF1 0xC1 /* N indicates which compression process */
#define M_SOF2 0xC2 /* Only SOF0-SOF2 are now in common use */
#define M_SOF3 0xC3
#define M_DHT 0xC4
#define M_SOF5 0xC5 /* NB: codes C4 and CC are NOT SOF markers */
#define M_SOF6 0xC6
#define M_SOF7 0xC7
#define M_JPEG 0x08 /* reserved for extensions */
#define M_SOF9 0xC9
#define M_SOF10 0xCA
#define M_SOF11 0xCB
#define M_DAC 0xCC /* arithmetic table */
#define M_SOF13 0xCD
#define M_SOF14 0xCE
#define M_SOF15 0xCF
#define M_RST0 0xD0 /* restart segment */
#define M_RST1 0xD1
#define M_RST2 0xD2
#define M_RST3 0xD3
#define M_RST4 0xD4
#define M_RST5 0xD5
#define M_RST6 0xD6
#define M_RST7 0xD7
#define M_SOI 0xD8 /* Start Of Image (beginning of datastream) */
#define M_EOI 0xD9 /* End Of Image (end of datastream) */
#define M_SOS 0xDA /* Start Of Scan (begins compressed data) */
#define M_DQT 0xDB
#define M_DNL 0xDC
#define M_DRI 0xDD
#define M_DHP 0xDE
#define M_EXP 0xDF
#define M_APP0 0xE0 /* JPEG: 'JFIFF' AND (additional 'JFXX') */
#define M_EXIF 0xE1 /* Exif Attribute Information */
#define M_APP2 0xE2 /* Flash Pix Extension Data? */
#define M_APP3 0xE3
#define M_APP4 0xE4
#define M_APP5 0xE5
#define M_APP6 0xE6
#define M_APP7 0xE7
#define M_APP8 0xE8
#define M_APP9 0xE9
#define M_APP10 0xEA
#define M_APP11 0xEB
#define M_APP12 0xEC
#define M_APP13 0xED /* IPTC International Press Telecommunications Council */
#define M_APP14 0xEE /* Software, Copyright? */
#define M_APP15 0xEF
#define M_JPG0 0xF0
#define M_JPG1 0xF1
#define M_JPG2 0xF2
#define M_JPG3 0xF3
#define M_JPG4 0xF4
#define M_JPG5 0xF5
#define M_JPG6 0xF6
#define M_JPG7 0xF7
#define M_JPG8 0xF8
#define M_JPG9 0xF9
#define M_JPG10 0xFA
#define M_JPG11 0xFB
#define M_JPG12 0xFC
#define M_JPG13 0xFD
#define M_COM 0xFE /* COMment */
#define M_PSEUDO 0x123 /* Extra value. */
/* }}} */
/* {{{ jpeg2000 markers
*/
/* Markers x30 - x3F do not have a segment */
/* Markers x00, x01, xFE, xC0 - xDF ISO/IEC 10918-1 -> M_<xx> */
/* Markers xF0 - xF7 ISO/IEC 10918-3 */
/* Markers xF7 - xF8 ISO/IEC 14495-1 */
/* XY=Main/Tile-header:(R:required, N:not_allowed, O:optional, L:last_marker) */
#define JC_SOC 0x4F /* NN, Start of codestream */
#define JC_SIZ 0x51 /* RN, Image and tile size */
#define JC_COD 0x52 /* RO, Codeing style defaulte */
#define JC_COC 0x53 /* OO, Coding style component */
#define JC_TLM 0x55 /* ON, Tile part length main header */
#define JC_PLM 0x57 /* ON, Packet length main header */
#define JC_PLT 0x58 /* NO, Packet length tile part header */
#define JC_QCD 0x5C /* RO, Quantization default */
#define JC_QCC 0x5D /* OO, Quantization component */
#define JC_RGN 0x5E /* OO, Region of interest */
#define JC_POD 0x5F /* OO, Progression order default */
#define JC_PPM 0x60 /* ON, Packed packet headers main header */
#define JC_PPT 0x61 /* NO, Packet packet headers tile part header */
#define JC_CME 0x64 /* OO, Comment: "LL E <text>" E=0:binary, E=1:ascii */
#define JC_SOT 0x90 /* NR, Start of tile */
#define JC_SOP 0x91 /* NO, Start of packeter default */
#define JC_EPH 0x92 /* NO, End of packet header */
#define JC_SOD 0x93 /* NL, Start of data */
#define JC_EOC 0xD9 /* NN, End of codestream */
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_process_COM
Process a COM marker.
We want to print out the marker contents as legible text;
we must guard against random junk and varying newline representations.
*/
static void exif_process_COM (image_info_type *image_info, char *value, size_t length TSRMLS_DC)
{
exif_iif_add_tag(image_info, SECTION_COMMENT, "Comment", TAG_COMPUTED_VALUE, TAG_FMT_STRING, length-2, value+2 TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_process_CME
Process a CME marker.
We want to print out the marker contents as legible text;
we must guard against random junk and varying newline representations.
*/
#ifdef EXIF_JPEG2000
static void exif_process_CME (image_info_type *image_info, char *value, size_t length TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (length>3) {
switch(value[2]) {
case 0:
exif_iif_add_tag(image_info, SECTION_COMMENT, "Comment", TAG_COMPUTED_VALUE, TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED, length, value TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case 1:
exif_iif_add_tag(image_info, SECTION_COMMENT, "Comment", TAG_COMPUTED_VALUE, TAG_FMT_STRING, length, value);
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Undefined JPEG2000 comment encoding");
break;
}
} else {
exif_iif_add_tag(image_info, SECTION_COMMENT, "Comment", TAG_COMPUTED_VALUE, TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED, 0, NULL);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "JPEG2000 comment section too small");
}
}
#endif
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_process_SOFn
* Process a SOFn marker. This is useful for the image dimensions */
static void exif_process_SOFn (uchar *Data, int marker, jpeg_sof_info *result)
{
/* 0xFF SOSn SectLen(2) Bits(1) Height(2) Width(2) Channels(1) 3*Channels (1) */
result->bits_per_sample = Data[2];
result->height = php_jpg_get16(Data+3);
result->width = php_jpg_get16(Data+5);
result->num_components = Data[7];
/* switch (marker) {
case M_SOF0: process = "Baseline"; break;
case M_SOF1: process = "Extended sequential"; break;
case M_SOF2: process = "Progressive"; break;
case M_SOF3: process = "Lossless"; break;
case M_SOF5: process = "Differential sequential"; break;
case M_SOF6: process = "Differential progressive"; break;
case M_SOF7: process = "Differential lossless"; break;
case M_SOF9: process = "Extended sequential, arithmetic coding"; break;
case M_SOF10: process = "Progressive, arithmetic coding"; break;
case M_SOF11: process = "Lossless, arithmetic coding"; break;
case M_SOF13: process = "Differential sequential, arithmetic coding"; break;
case M_SOF14: process = "Differential progressive, arithmetic coding"; break;
case M_SOF15: process = "Differential lossless, arithmetic coding"; break;
default: process = "Unknown"; break;
}*/
}
/* }}} */
/* forward declarations */
static int exif_process_IFD_in_JPEG(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char *dir_start, char *offset_base, size_t IFDlength, size_t displacement, int section_index TSRMLS_DC);
static int exif_process_IFD_TAG( image_info_type *ImageInfo, char *dir_entry, char *offset_base, size_t IFDlength, size_t displacement, int section_index, int ReadNextIFD, tag_table_type tag_table TSRMLS_DC);
/* {{{ exif_get_markername
Get name of marker */
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
static char * exif_get_markername(int marker)
{
switch(marker) {
case 0xC0: return "SOF0";
case 0xC1: return "SOF1";
case 0xC2: return "SOF2";
case 0xC3: return "SOF3";
case 0xC4: return "DHT";
case 0xC5: return "SOF5";
case 0xC6: return "SOF6";
case 0xC7: return "SOF7";
case 0xC9: return "SOF9";
case 0xCA: return "SOF10";
case 0xCB: return "SOF11";
case 0xCD: return "SOF13";
case 0xCE: return "SOF14";
case 0xCF: return "SOF15";
case 0xD8: return "SOI";
case 0xD9: return "EOI";
case 0xDA: return "SOS";
case 0xDB: return "DQT";
case 0xDC: return "DNL";
case 0xDD: return "DRI";
case 0xDE: return "DHP";
case 0xDF: return "EXP";
case 0xE0: return "APP0";
case 0xE1: return "EXIF";
case 0xE2: return "FPIX";
case 0xE3: return "APP3";
case 0xE4: return "APP4";
case 0xE5: return "APP5";
case 0xE6: return "APP6";
case 0xE7: return "APP7";
case 0xE8: return "APP8";
case 0xE9: return "APP9";
case 0xEA: return "APP10";
case 0xEB: return "APP11";
case 0xEC: return "APP12";
case 0xED: return "APP13";
case 0xEE: return "APP14";
case 0xEF: return "APP15";
case 0xF0: return "JPG0";
case 0xFD: return "JPG13";
case 0xFE: return "COM";
case 0x01: return "TEM";
}
return "Unknown";
}
#endif
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto string exif_tagname(index)
Get headername for index or false if not defined */
PHP_FUNCTION(exif_tagname)
{
long tag;
char *szTemp;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &tag) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
szTemp = exif_get_tagname(tag, NULL, 0, tag_table_IFD TSRMLS_CC);
if (tag < 0 || !szTemp || !szTemp[0]) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRING(szTemp, 1)
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_ifd_make_value
* Create a value for an ifd from an info_data pointer */
static void* exif_ifd_make_value(image_info_data *info_data, int motorola_intel TSRMLS_DC) {
size_t byte_count;
char *value_ptr, *data_ptr;
size_t i;
image_info_value *info_value;
byte_count = php_tiff_bytes_per_format[info_data->format] * info_data->length;
value_ptr = safe_emalloc(max(byte_count, 4), 1, 0);
memset(value_ptr, 0, 4);
if (!info_data->length) {
return value_ptr;
}
if (info_data->format == TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED || info_data->format == TAG_FMT_STRING
|| (byte_count>1 && (info_data->format == TAG_FMT_BYTE || info_data->format == TAG_FMT_SBYTE))
) {
memmove(value_ptr, info_data->value.s, byte_count);
return value_ptr;
} else if (info_data->format == TAG_FMT_BYTE) {
*value_ptr = info_data->value.u;
return value_ptr;
} else if (info_data->format == TAG_FMT_SBYTE) {
*value_ptr = info_data->value.i;
return value_ptr;
} else {
data_ptr = value_ptr;
for(i=0; i<info_data->length; i++) {
if (info_data->length==1) {
info_value = &info_data->value;
} else {
info_value = &info_data->value.list[i];
}
switch(info_data->format) {
case TAG_FMT_USHORT:
php_ifd_set16u(data_ptr, info_value->u, motorola_intel);
data_ptr += 2;
break;
case TAG_FMT_ULONG:
php_ifd_set32u(data_ptr, info_value->u, motorola_intel);
data_ptr += 4;
break;
case TAG_FMT_SSHORT:
php_ifd_set16u(data_ptr, info_value->i, motorola_intel);
data_ptr += 2;
break;
case TAG_FMT_SLONG:
php_ifd_set32u(data_ptr, info_value->i, motorola_intel);
data_ptr += 4;
break;
case TAG_FMT_URATIONAL:
php_ifd_set32u(data_ptr, info_value->sr.num, motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set32u(data_ptr+4, info_value->sr.den, motorola_intel);
data_ptr += 8;
break;
case TAG_FMT_SRATIONAL:
php_ifd_set32u(data_ptr, info_value->ur.num, motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set32u(data_ptr+4, info_value->ur.den, motorola_intel);
data_ptr += 8;
break;
case TAG_FMT_SINGLE:
memmove(data_ptr, &info_value->f, 4);
data_ptr += 4;
break;
case TAG_FMT_DOUBLE:
memmove(data_ptr, &info_value->d, 8);
data_ptr += 8;
break;
}
}
}
return value_ptr;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_thumbnail_build
* Check and build thumbnail */
static void exif_thumbnail_build(image_info_type *ImageInfo TSRMLS_DC) {
size_t new_size, new_move, new_value;
char *new_data;
void *value_ptr;
int i, byte_count;
image_info_list *info_list;
image_info_data *info_data;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
char tagname[64];
#endif
if (!ImageInfo->read_thumbnail || !ImageInfo->Thumbnail.offset || !ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size) {
return; /* ignore this call */
}
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail: filetype = %d", ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype);
#endif
switch(ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype) {
default:
case IMAGE_FILETYPE_JPEG:
/* done */
break;
case IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_II:
case IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_MM:
info_list = &ImageInfo->info_list[SECTION_THUMBNAIL];
new_size = 8 + 2 + info_list->count * 12 + 4;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail: size of signature + directory(%d): 0x%02X", info_list->count, new_size);
#endif
new_value= new_size; /* offset for ifd values outside ifd directory */
for (i=0; i<info_list->count; i++) {
info_data = &info_list->list[i];
byte_count = php_tiff_bytes_per_format[info_data->format] * info_data->length;
if (byte_count > 4) {
new_size += byte_count;
}
}
new_move = new_size;
new_data = safe_erealloc(ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data, 1, ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size, new_size);
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data = new_data;
memmove(ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data + new_move, ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data, ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size);
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size += new_size;
/* fill in data */
if (ImageInfo->motorola_intel) {
memmove(new_data, "MM\x00\x2a\x00\x00\x00\x08", 8);
} else {
memmove(new_data, "II\x2a\x00\x08\x00\x00\x00", 8);
}
new_data += 8;
php_ifd_set16u(new_data, info_list->count, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
new_data += 2;
for (i=0; i<info_list->count; i++) {
info_data = &info_list->list[i];
byte_count = php_tiff_bytes_per_format[info_data->format] * info_data->length;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail: process tag(x%04X=%s): %s%s (%d bytes)", info_data->tag, exif_get_tagname(info_data->tag, tagname, -12, tag_table_IFD TSRMLS_CC), (info_data->length>1)&&info_data->format!=TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED&&info_data->format!=TAG_FMT_STRING?"ARRAY OF ":"", exif_get_tagformat(info_data->format), byte_count);
#endif
if (info_data->tag==TAG_STRIP_OFFSETS || info_data->tag==TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT) {
php_ifd_set16u(new_data + 0, info_data->tag, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set16u(new_data + 2, TAG_FMT_ULONG, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set32u(new_data + 4, 1, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set32u(new_data + 8, new_move, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
} else {
php_ifd_set16u(new_data + 0, info_data->tag, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set16u(new_data + 2, info_data->format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
php_ifd_set32u(new_data + 4, info_data->length, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
value_ptr = exif_ifd_make_value(info_data, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
if (byte_count <= 4) {
memmove(new_data+8, value_ptr, 4);
} else {
php_ifd_set32u(new_data+8, new_value, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail: writing with value offset: 0x%04X + 0x%02X", new_value, byte_count);
#endif
memmove(ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data+new_value, value_ptr, byte_count);
new_value += byte_count;
}
efree(value_ptr);
}
new_data += 12;
}
memset(new_data, 0, 4); /* next ifd pointer */
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail: created");
#endif
break;
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_thumbnail_extract
* Grab the thumbnail, corrected */
static void exif_thumbnail_extract(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char *offset, size_t length TSRMLS_DC) {
if (ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data) {
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_mult_thumb" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Multiple possible thumbnails");
return; /* Should not happen */
}
if (!ImageInfo->read_thumbnail) {
return; /* ignore this call */
}
/* according to exif2.1, the thumbnail is not supposed to be greater than 64K */
if (ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size >= 65536
|| ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size <= 0
|| ImageInfo->Thumbnail.offset <= 0
) {
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Illegal thumbnail size/offset");
return;
}
/* Check to make sure we are not going to go past the ExifLength */
if ((ImageInfo->Thumbnail.offset + ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size) > length) {
EXIF_ERRLOG_THUMBEOF(ImageInfo)
return;
}
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data = estrndup(offset + ImageInfo->Thumbnail.offset, ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size);
exif_thumbnail_build(ImageInfo TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_process_undefined
* Copy a string/buffer in Exif header to a character string and return length of allocated buffer if any. */
static int exif_process_undefined(char **result, char *value, size_t byte_count TSRMLS_DC) {
/* we cannot use strlcpy - here the problem is that we have to copy NUL
* chars up to byte_count, we also have to add a single NUL character to
* force end of string.
* estrndup does not return length
*/
if (byte_count) {
(*result) = estrndup(value, byte_count); /* NULL @ byte_count!!! */
return byte_count+1;
}
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_process_string_raw
* Copy a string in Exif header to a character string returns length of allocated buffer if any. */
static int exif_process_string_raw(char **result, char *value, size_t byte_count) {
/* we cannot use strlcpy - here the problem is that we have to copy NUL
* chars up to byte_count, we also have to add a single NUL character to
* force end of string.
*/
if (byte_count) {
(*result) = safe_emalloc(byte_count, 1, 1);
memcpy(*result, value, byte_count);
(*result)[byte_count] = '\0';
return byte_count+1;
}
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_process_string
* Copy a string in Exif header to a character string and return length of allocated buffer if any.
* In contrast to exif_process_string this function does always return a string buffer */
static int exif_process_string(char **result, char *value, size_t byte_count TSRMLS_DC) {
/* we cannot use strlcpy - here the problem is that we cannot use strlen to
* determin length of string and we cannot use strlcpy with len=byte_count+1
* because then we might get into an EXCEPTION if we exceed an allocated
* memory page...so we use php_strnlen in conjunction with memcpy and add the NUL
* char.
* estrdup would sometimes allocate more memory and does not return length
*/
if ((byte_count=php_strnlen(value, byte_count)) > 0) {
return exif_process_undefined(result, value, byte_count TSRMLS_CC);
}
(*result) = estrndup("", 1); /* force empty string */
return byte_count+1;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_process_user_comment
* Process UserComment in IFD. */
static int exif_process_user_comment(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char **pszInfoPtr, char **pszEncoding, char *szValuePtr, int ByteCount TSRMLS_DC)
{
int a;
char *decode;
size_t len;;
*pszEncoding = NULL;
/* Copy the comment */
if (ByteCount>=8) {
if (!memcmp(szValuePtr, "UNICODE\0", 8)) {
*pszEncoding = estrdup((const char*)szValuePtr);
szValuePtr = szValuePtr+8;
ByteCount -= 8;
/* First try to detect BOM: ZERO WIDTH NOBREAK SPACE (FEFF 16)
* since we have no encoding support for the BOM yet we skip that.
*/
if (!memcmp(szValuePtr, "\xFE\xFF", 2)) {
decode = "UCS-2BE";
szValuePtr = szValuePtr+2;
ByteCount -= 2;
} else if (!memcmp(szValuePtr, "\xFF\xFE", 2)) {
decode = "UCS-2LE";
szValuePtr = szValuePtr+2;
ByteCount -= 2;
} else if (ImageInfo->motorola_intel) {
decode = ImageInfo->decode_unicode_be;
} else {
decode = ImageInfo->decode_unicode_le;
}
/* XXX this will fail again if encoding_converter returns on error something different than SIZE_MAX */
if (zend_multibyte_encoding_converter(
(unsigned char**)pszInfoPtr,
&len,
(unsigned char*)szValuePtr,
ByteCount,
zend_multibyte_fetch_encoding(ImageInfo->encode_unicode TSRMLS_CC),
zend_multibyte_fetch_encoding(decode TSRMLS_CC)
TSRMLS_CC) == (size_t)-1) {
len = exif_process_string_raw(pszInfoPtr, szValuePtr, ByteCount);
}
return len;
} else if (!memcmp(szValuePtr, "ASCII\0\0\0", 8)) {
*pszEncoding = estrdup((const char*)szValuePtr);
szValuePtr = szValuePtr+8;
ByteCount -= 8;
} else if (!memcmp(szValuePtr, "JIS\0\0\0\0\0", 8)) {
/* JIS should be tanslated to MB or we leave it to the user - leave it to the user */
*pszEncoding = estrdup((const char*)szValuePtr);
szValuePtr = szValuePtr+8;
ByteCount -= 8;
/* XXX this will fail again if encoding_converter returns on error something different than SIZE_MAX */
if (zend_multibyte_encoding_converter(
(unsigned char**)pszInfoPtr,
&len,
(unsigned char*)szValuePtr,
ByteCount,
zend_multibyte_fetch_encoding(ImageInfo->encode_jis TSRMLS_CC),
zend_multibyte_fetch_encoding(ImageInfo->motorola_intel ? ImageInfo->decode_jis_be : ImageInfo->decode_jis_le TSRMLS_CC)
TSRMLS_CC) == (size_t)-1) {
len = exif_process_string_raw(pszInfoPtr, szValuePtr, ByteCount);
}
return len;
} else if (!memcmp(szValuePtr, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8)) {
/* 8 NULL means undefined and should be ASCII... */
*pszEncoding = estrdup("UNDEFINED");
szValuePtr = szValuePtr+8;
ByteCount -= 8;
}
}
/* Olympus has this padded with trailing spaces. Remove these first. */
if (ByteCount>0) {
for (a=ByteCount-1;a && szValuePtr[a]==' ';a--) {
(szValuePtr)[a] = '\0';
}
}
/* normal text without encoding */
exif_process_string(pszInfoPtr, szValuePtr, ByteCount TSRMLS_CC);
return strlen(*pszInfoPtr);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_process_unicode
* Process unicode field in IFD. */
static int exif_process_unicode(image_info_type *ImageInfo, xp_field_type *xp_field, int tag, char *szValuePtr, int ByteCount TSRMLS_DC)
{
xp_field->tag = tag;
xp_field->value = NULL;
/* XXX this will fail again if encoding_converter returns on error something different than SIZE_MAX */
if (zend_multibyte_encoding_converter(
(unsigned char**)&xp_field->value,
&xp_field->size,
(unsigned char*)szValuePtr,
ByteCount,
zend_multibyte_fetch_encoding(ImageInfo->encode_unicode TSRMLS_CC),
zend_multibyte_fetch_encoding(ImageInfo->motorola_intel ? ImageInfo->decode_unicode_be : ImageInfo->decode_unicode_le TSRMLS_CC)
TSRMLS_CC) == (size_t)-1) {
xp_field->size = exif_process_string_raw(&xp_field->value, szValuePtr, ByteCount);
}
return xp_field->size;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_process_IFD_in_MAKERNOTE
* Process nested IFDs directories in Maker Note. */
static int exif_process_IFD_in_MAKERNOTE(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char * value_ptr, int value_len, char *offset_base, size_t IFDlength, size_t displacement TSRMLS_DC)
{
int de, i=0, section_index = SECTION_MAKERNOTE;
int NumDirEntries, old_motorola_intel, offset_diff;
const maker_note_type *maker_note;
char *dir_start;
for (i=0; i<=sizeof(maker_note_array)/sizeof(maker_note_type); i++) {
if (i==sizeof(maker_note_array)/sizeof(maker_note_type))
return FALSE;
maker_note = maker_note_array+i;
/*exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "check (%s,%s)", maker_note->make?maker_note->make:"", maker_note->model?maker_note->model:"");*/
if (maker_note->make && (!ImageInfo->make || strcmp(maker_note->make, ImageInfo->make)))
continue;
if (maker_note->model && (!ImageInfo->model || strcmp(maker_note->model, ImageInfo->model)))
continue;
if (maker_note->id_string && strncmp(maker_note->id_string, value_ptr, maker_note->id_string_len))
continue;
break;
}
dir_start = value_ptr + maker_note->offset;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Process %s @x%04X + 0x%04X=%d: %s", exif_get_sectionname(section_index), (int)dir_start-(int)offset_base+maker_note->offset+displacement, value_len, value_len, exif_char_dump(value_ptr, value_len, (int)dir_start-(int)offset_base+maker_note->offset+displacement));
#endif
ImageInfo->sections_found |= FOUND_MAKERNOTE;
old_motorola_intel = ImageInfo->motorola_intel;
switch (maker_note->byte_order) {
case MN_ORDER_INTEL:
ImageInfo->motorola_intel = 0;
break;
case MN_ORDER_MOTOROLA:
ImageInfo->motorola_intel = 1;
break;
default:
case MN_ORDER_NORMAL:
break;
}
NumDirEntries = php_ifd_get16u(dir_start, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
switch (maker_note->offset_mode) {
case MN_OFFSET_MAKER:
offset_base = value_ptr;
break;
case MN_OFFSET_GUESS:
offset_diff = 2 + NumDirEntries*12 + 4 - php_ifd_get32u(dir_start+10, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Using automatic offset correction: 0x%04X", ((int)dir_start-(int)offset_base+maker_note->offset+displacement) + offset_diff);
#endif
offset_base = value_ptr + offset_diff;
break;
default:
case MN_OFFSET_NORMAL:
break;
}
if ((2+NumDirEntries*12) > value_len) {
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Illegal IFD size: 2 + x%04X*12 = x%04X > x%04X", NumDirEntries, 2+NumDirEntries*12, value_len);
return FALSE;
}
for (de=0;de<NumDirEntries;de++) {
if (!exif_process_IFD_TAG(ImageInfo, dir_start + 2 + 12 * de,
offset_base, IFDlength, displacement, section_index, 0, maker_note->tag_table TSRMLS_CC)) {
return FALSE;
}
}
ImageInfo->motorola_intel = old_motorola_intel;
/* NextDirOffset (must be NULL) = php_ifd_get32u(dir_start+2+12*de, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);*/
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Subsection %s done", exif_get_sectionname(SECTION_MAKERNOTE));
#endif
return TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_process_IFD_TAG
* Process one of the nested IFDs directories. */
static int exif_process_IFD_TAG(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char *dir_entry, char *offset_base, size_t IFDlength, size_t displacement, int section_index, int ReadNextIFD, tag_table_type tag_table TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t length;
int tag, format, components;
char *value_ptr, tagname[64], cbuf[32], *outside=NULL;
size_t byte_count, offset_val, fpos, fgot;
int64_t byte_count_signed;
xp_field_type *tmp_xp;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
char *dump_data;
int dump_free;
#endif /* EXIF_DEBUG */
/* Protect against corrupt headers */
if (ImageInfo->ifd_nesting_level > MAX_IFD_NESTING_LEVEL) {
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "corrupt EXIF header: maximum directory nesting level reached");
return FALSE;
}
ImageInfo->ifd_nesting_level++;
tag = php_ifd_get16u(dir_entry, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
format = php_ifd_get16u(dir_entry+2, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
components = php_ifd_get32u(dir_entry+4, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
if (!format || format > NUM_FORMATS) {
/* (-1) catches illegal zero case as unsigned underflows to positive large. */
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Process tag(x%04X=%s): Illegal format code 0x%04X, suppose BYTE", tag, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, -12, tag_table TSRMLS_CC), format);
format = TAG_FMT_BYTE;
/*return TRUE;*/
}
if (components < 0) {
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Process tag(x%04X=%s): Illegal components(%ld)", tag, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, -12, tag_table TSRMLS_CC), components);
return FALSE;
}
byte_count_signed = (int64_t)components * php_tiff_bytes_per_format[format];
if (byte_count_signed < 0 || (byte_count_signed > INT32_MAX)) {
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Process tag(x%04X=%s): Illegal byte_count", tag, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, -12, tag_table TSRMLS_CC));
return FALSE;
}
byte_count = (size_t)byte_count_signed;
if (byte_count > 4) {
offset_val = php_ifd_get32u(dir_entry+8, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
/* If its bigger than 4 bytes, the dir entry contains an offset. */
value_ptr = offset_base+offset_val;
/*
dir_entry is ImageInfo->file.list[sn].data+2+i*12
offset_base is ImageInfo->file.list[sn].data-dir_offset
dir_entry - offset_base is dir_offset+2+i*12
*/
if (byte_count > IFDlength || offset_val > IFDlength-byte_count || value_ptr < dir_entry || offset_val < (size_t)(dir_entry-offset_base)) {
/* It is important to check for IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF
* JPEG does not use absolute pointers instead its pointers are
* relative to the start of the TIFF header in APP1 section. */
if (byte_count > ImageInfo->FileSize || offset_val>ImageInfo->FileSize-byte_count || (ImageInfo->FileType!=IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_II && ImageInfo->FileType!=IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_MM && ImageInfo->FileType!=IMAGE_FILETYPE_JPEG)) {
if (value_ptr < dir_entry) {
/* we can read this if offset_val > 0 */
/* some files have their values in other parts of the file */
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Process tag(x%04X=%s): Illegal pointer offset(x%04X < x%04X)", tag, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, -12, tag_table TSRMLS_CC), offset_val, dir_entry);
} else {
/* this is for sure not allowed */
/* exception are IFD pointers */
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Process tag(x%04X=%s): Illegal pointer offset(x%04X + x%04X = x%04X > x%04X)", tag, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, -12, tag_table TSRMLS_CC), offset_val, byte_count, offset_val+byte_count, IFDlength);
}
return FALSE;
}
if (byte_count>sizeof(cbuf)) {
/* mark as outside range and get buffer */
value_ptr = safe_emalloc(byte_count, 1, 0);
outside = value_ptr;
} else {
/* In most cases we only access a small range so
* it is faster to use a static buffer there
* BUT it offers also the possibility to have
* pointers read without the need to free them
* explicitley before returning. */
memset(&cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf));
value_ptr = cbuf;
}
fpos = php_stream_tell(ImageInfo->infile);
php_stream_seek(ImageInfo->infile, offset_val, SEEK_SET);
fgot = php_stream_tell(ImageInfo->infile);
if (fgot!=offset_val) {
EFREE_IF(outside);
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Wrong file pointer: 0x%08X != 0x%08X", fgot, offset_val);
return FALSE;
}
fgot = php_stream_read(ImageInfo->infile, value_ptr, byte_count);
php_stream_seek(ImageInfo->infile, fpos, SEEK_SET);
if (fgot<byte_count) {
EFREE_IF(outside);
EXIF_ERRLOG_FILEEOF(ImageInfo)
return FALSE;
}
}
} else {
/* 4 bytes or less and value is in the dir entry itself */
value_ptr = dir_entry+8;
offset_val= value_ptr-offset_base;
}
ImageInfo->sections_found |= FOUND_ANY_TAG;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
dump_data = exif_dump_data(&dump_free, format, components, length, ImageInfo->motorola_intel, value_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Process tag(x%04X=%s,@x%04X + x%04X(=%d)): %s%s %s", tag, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, -12, tag_table TSRMLS_CC), offset_val+displacement, byte_count, byte_count, (components>1)&&format!=TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED&&format!=TAG_FMT_STRING?"ARRAY OF ":"", exif_get_tagformat(format), dump_data);
if (dump_free) {
efree(dump_data);
}
#endif
if (section_index==SECTION_THUMBNAIL) {
if (!ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data) {
switch(tag) {
case TAG_IMAGEWIDTH:
case TAG_COMP_IMAGE_WIDTH:
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.width = exif_convert_any_to_int(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_IMAGEHEIGHT:
case TAG_COMP_IMAGE_HEIGHT:
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.height = exif_convert_any_to_int(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_STRIP_OFFSETS:
case TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT:
/* accept both formats */
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.offset = exif_convert_any_to_int(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_STRIP_BYTE_COUNTS:
if (ImageInfo->FileType == IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_II || ImageInfo->FileType == IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_MM) {
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype = ImageInfo->FileType;
} else {
/* motorola is easier to read */
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype = IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_MM;
}
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size = exif_convert_any_to_int(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT_LEN:
if (ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype == IMAGE_FILETYPE_UNKNOWN) {
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype = IMAGE_FILETYPE_JPEG;
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size = exif_convert_any_to_int(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
}
break;
}
}
} else {
if (section_index==SECTION_IFD0 || section_index==SECTION_EXIF)
switch(tag) {
case TAG_COPYRIGHT:
/* check for "<photographer> NUL <editor> NUL" */
if (byte_count>1 && (length=php_strnlen(value_ptr, byte_count)) > 0) {
if (length<byte_count-1) {
/* When there are any characters after the first NUL */
ImageInfo->CopyrightPhotographer = estrdup(value_ptr);
ImageInfo->CopyrightEditor = estrndup(value_ptr+length+1, byte_count-length-1);
spprintf(&ImageInfo->Copyright, 0, "%s, %s", value_ptr, value_ptr+length+1);
/* format = TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED; this musn't be ASCII */
/* but we are not supposed to change this */
/* keep in mind that image_info does not store editor value */
} else {
ImageInfo->Copyright = estrndup(value_ptr, byte_count);
}
}
break;
case TAG_USERCOMMENT:
ImageInfo->UserCommentLength = exif_process_user_comment(ImageInfo, &(ImageInfo->UserComment), &(ImageInfo->UserCommentEncoding), value_ptr, byte_count TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_XP_TITLE:
case TAG_XP_COMMENTS:
case TAG_XP_AUTHOR:
case TAG_XP_KEYWORDS:
case TAG_XP_SUBJECT:
tmp_xp = (xp_field_type*)safe_erealloc(ImageInfo->xp_fields.list, (ImageInfo->xp_fields.count+1), sizeof(xp_field_type), 0);
ImageInfo->sections_found |= FOUND_WINXP;
ImageInfo->xp_fields.list = tmp_xp;
ImageInfo->xp_fields.count++;
exif_process_unicode(ImageInfo, &(ImageInfo->xp_fields.list[ImageInfo->xp_fields.count-1]), tag, value_ptr, byte_count TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_FNUMBER:
/* Simplest way of expressing aperture, so I trust it the most.
(overwrite previously computed value if there is one) */
ImageInfo->ApertureFNumber = (float)exif_convert_any_format(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_APERTURE:
case TAG_MAX_APERTURE:
/* More relevant info always comes earlier, so only use this field if we don't
have appropriate aperture information yet. */
if (ImageInfo->ApertureFNumber == 0) {
ImageInfo->ApertureFNumber
= (float)exp(exif_convert_any_format(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC)*log(2)*0.5);
}
break;
case TAG_SHUTTERSPEED:
/* More complicated way of expressing exposure time, so only use
this value if we don't already have it from somewhere else.
SHUTTERSPEED comes after EXPOSURE TIME
*/
if (ImageInfo->ExposureTime == 0) {
ImageInfo->ExposureTime
= (float)(1/exp(exif_convert_any_format(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC)*log(2)));
}
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURETIME:
ImageInfo->ExposureTime = -1;
break;
case TAG_COMP_IMAGE_WIDTH:
ImageInfo->ExifImageWidth = exif_convert_any_to_int(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_FOCALPLANE_X_RES:
ImageInfo->FocalplaneXRes = exif_convert_any_format(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_SUBJECT_DISTANCE:
/* Inidcates the distacne the autofocus camera is focused to.
Tends to be less accurate as distance increases. */
ImageInfo->Distance = (float)exif_convert_any_format(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_FOCALPLANE_RESOLUTION_UNIT:
switch((int)exif_convert_any_format(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC)) {
case 1: ImageInfo->FocalplaneUnits = 25.4; break; /* inch */
case 2:
/* According to the information I was using, 2 measn meters.
But looking at the Cannon powershot's files, inches is the only
sensible value. */
ImageInfo->FocalplaneUnits = 25.4;
break;
case 3: ImageInfo->FocalplaneUnits = 10; break; /* centimeter */
case 4: ImageInfo->FocalplaneUnits = 1; break; /* milimeter */
case 5: ImageInfo->FocalplaneUnits = .001; break; /* micrometer */
}
break;
case TAG_SUB_IFD:
if (format==TAG_FMT_IFD) {
/* If this is called we are either in a TIFFs thumbnail or a JPEG where we cannot handle it */
/* TIFF thumbnail: our data structure cannot store a thumbnail of a thumbnail */
/* JPEG do we have the data area and what to do with it */
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Skip SUB IFD");
}
break;
case TAG_MAKE:
ImageInfo->make = estrndup(value_ptr, byte_count);
break;
case TAG_MODEL:
ImageInfo->model = estrndup(value_ptr, byte_count);
break;
case TAG_MAKER_NOTE:
exif_process_IFD_in_MAKERNOTE(ImageInfo, value_ptr, byte_count, offset_base, IFDlength, displacement TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_EXIF_IFD_POINTER:
case TAG_GPS_IFD_POINTER:
case TAG_INTEROP_IFD_POINTER:
if (ReadNextIFD) {
char *Subdir_start;
int sub_section_index = 0;
switch(tag) {
case TAG_EXIF_IFD_POINTER:
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Found EXIF");
#endif
ImageInfo->sections_found |= FOUND_EXIF;
sub_section_index = SECTION_EXIF;
break;
case TAG_GPS_IFD_POINTER:
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Found GPS");
#endif
ImageInfo->sections_found |= FOUND_GPS;
sub_section_index = SECTION_GPS;
break;
case TAG_INTEROP_IFD_POINTER:
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Found INTEROPERABILITY");
#endif
ImageInfo->sections_found |= FOUND_INTEROP;
sub_section_index = SECTION_INTEROP;
break;
}
Subdir_start = offset_base + php_ifd_get32u(value_ptr, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
if (Subdir_start < offset_base || Subdir_start > offset_base+IFDlength) {
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Illegal IFD Pointer");
return FALSE;
}
if (!exif_process_IFD_in_JPEG(ImageInfo, Subdir_start, offset_base, IFDlength, displacement, sub_section_index TSRMLS_CC)) {
return FALSE;
}
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Subsection %s done", exif_get_sectionname(sub_section_index));
#endif
}
}
}
exif_iif_add_tag(ImageInfo, section_index, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, sizeof(tagname), tag_table TSRMLS_CC), tag, format, components, value_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
EFREE_IF(outside);
return TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_process_IFD_in_JPEG
* Process one of the nested IFDs directories. */
static int exif_process_IFD_in_JPEG(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char *dir_start, char *offset_base, size_t IFDlength, size_t displacement, int section_index TSRMLS_DC)
{
int de;
int NumDirEntries;
int NextDirOffset;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Process %s (x%04X(=%d))", exif_get_sectionname(section_index), IFDlength, IFDlength);
#endif
ImageInfo->sections_found |= FOUND_IFD0;
NumDirEntries = php_ifd_get16u(dir_start, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
if ((dir_start+2+NumDirEntries*12) > (offset_base+IFDlength)) {
if (!exif_process_IFD_TAG(ImageInfo, dir_start + 2 + 12 * de,
offset_base, IFDlength, displacement, section_index, 1, exif_get_tag_table(section_index) TSRMLS_CC)) {
return FALSE;
}
}
/*
* Ignore IFD2 if it purportedly exists
*/
if (section_index == SECTION_THUMBNAIL) {
return TRUE;
}
/*
* Hack to make it process IDF1 I hope
* There are 2 IDFs, the second one holds the keys (0x0201 and 0x0202) to the thumbnail
*/
NextDirOffset = php_ifd_get32u(dir_start+2+12*de, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
if (NextDirOffset) {
* Hack to make it process IDF1 I hope
* There are 2 IDFs, the second one holds the keys (0x0201 and 0x0202) to the thumbnail
*/
NextDirOffset = php_ifd_get32u(dir_start+2+12*de, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
if (NextDirOffset) {
/* the next line seems false but here IFDlength means length of all IFDs */
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail size: 0x%04X", ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size);
#endif
if (ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype != IMAGE_FILETYPE_UNKNOWN
&& ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size
&& ImageInfo->Thumbnail.offset
&& ImageInfo->read_thumbnail
) {
exif_thumbnail_extract(ImageInfo, offset_base, IFDlength TSRMLS_CC);
}
return TRUE;
} else {
return FALSE;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ exif_process_TIFF_in_JPEG
Process a TIFF header in a JPEG file
*/
static void exif_process_TIFF_in_JPEG(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char *CharBuf, size_t length, size_t displacement TSRMLS_DC)
{
unsigned exif_value_2a, offset_of_ifd;
/* set the thumbnail stuff to nothing so we can test to see if they get set up */
if (memcmp(CharBuf, "II", 2) == 0) {
ImageInfo->motorola_intel = 0;
} else if (memcmp(CharBuf, "MM", 2) == 0) {
ImageInfo->motorola_intel = 1;
} else {
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Invalid TIFF alignment marker");
return;
}
/* Check the next two values for correctness. */
exif_value_2a = php_ifd_get16u(CharBuf+2, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
offset_of_ifd = php_ifd_get32u(CharBuf+4, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
if ( exif_value_2a != 0x2a || offset_of_ifd < 0x08) {
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Invalid TIFF start (1)");
return;
}
}
/* Check the next two values for correctness. */
exif_value_2a = php_ifd_get16u(CharBuf+2, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
offset_of_ifd = php_ifd_get32u(CharBuf+4, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
if ( exif_value_2a != 0x2a || offset_of_ifd < 0x08) {
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Invalid TIFF start (1)");
return;
}
/* Compute the CCD width, in milimeters. */
if (ImageInfo->FocalplaneXRes != 0) {
ImageInfo->CCDWidth = (float)(ImageInfo->ExifImageWidth * ImageInfo->FocalplaneUnits / ImageInfo->FocalplaneXRes);
}
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The exif_process_TIFF_in_JPEG function in ext/exif/exif.c in PHP before 5.5.35, 5.6.x before 5.6.21, and 7.x before 7.0.6 does not validate TIFF start data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted header data.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,031
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: views::NonClientFrameView* ShellWindowViews::CreateNonClientFrameView(
views::Widget* widget) {
ShellWindowFrameView* frame_view = new ShellWindowFrameView();
frame_view->Init(window_);
return frame_view;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via vectors involving frames, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,710
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t ucma_process_join(struct ucma_file *file,
struct rdma_ucm_join_mcast *cmd, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_create_id_resp resp;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
struct ucma_multicast *mc;
struct sockaddr *addr;
int ret;
u8 join_state;
if (out_len < sizeof(resp))
return -ENOSPC;
addr = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd->addr;
if (cmd->addr_size != rdma_addr_size(addr))
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else
return -EINVAL;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx_dev(file, cmd->id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
mutex_lock(&file->mut);
mc = ucma_alloc_multicast(ctx);
if (!mc) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err1;
}
mc->join_state = join_state;
mc->uid = cmd->uid;
memcpy(&mc->addr, addr, cmd->addr_size);
ret = rdma_join_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)&mc->addr,
join_state, mc);
if (ret)
goto err2;
resp.id = mc->id;
if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->response),
&resp, sizeof(resp))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err3;
}
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return 0;
err3:
rdma_leave_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &mc->addr);
ucma_cleanup_mc_events(mc);
err2:
mutex_lock(&mut);
idr_remove(&multicast_idr, mc->id);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
list_del(&mc->list);
kfree(mc);
err1:
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c in the Linux kernel through 4.17.11 allows ucma_leave_multicast to access a certain data structure after a cleanup step in ucma_process_join, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free).
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@beyondsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
|
Low
| 169,110
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiVP9Accelerator::CreateVP9Picture() {
scoped_refptr<VaapiDecodeSurface> va_surface = vaapi_dec_->CreateSurface();
if (!va_surface)
return nullptr;
return new VaapiVP9Picture(std::move(va_surface));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
|
High
| 172,799
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::JobRecord::JobRecord(
scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> input_frame,
scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> output_frame,
int quality,
int32_t task_id,
BitstreamBuffer* exif_buffer)
: input_frame(input_frame),
output_frame(output_frame),
quality(quality),
task_id(task_id),
output_shm(base::SharedMemoryHandle(), 0, true), // dummy
exif_shm(nullptr) {
if (exif_buffer) {
exif_shm.reset(new UnalignedSharedMemory(exif_buffer->TakeRegion(),
exif_buffer->size(), false));
exif_offset = exif_buffer->offset();
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
|
Medium
| 172,318
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(xml_parse_into_struct)
{
xml_parser *parser;
zval *pind, **xdata, **info = NULL;
char *data;
int data_len, ret;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rsZ|Z", &pind, &data, &data_len, &xdata, &info) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (info) {
zval_dtor(*info);
array_init(*info);
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(parser,xml_parser *, &pind, -1, "XML Parser", le_xml_parser);
zval_dtor(*xdata);
array_init(*xdata);
parser->data = *xdata;
if (info) {
parser->info = *info;
}
parser->level = 0;
parser->ltags = safe_emalloc(XML_MAXLEVEL, sizeof(char *), 0);
XML_SetDefaultHandler(parser->parser, _xml_defaultHandler);
XML_SetElementHandler(parser->parser, _xml_startElementHandler, _xml_endElementHandler);
XML_SetCharacterDataHandler(parser->parser, _xml_characterDataHandler);
parser->isparsing = 1;
ret = XML_Parse(parser->parser, data, data_len, 1);
parser->isparsing = 0;
RETVAL_LONG(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The xml_parse_into_struct function in ext/xml/xml.c in PHP before 5.5.35, 5.6.x before 5.6.21, and 7.x before 7.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer under-read and segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted XML data in the second argument, leading to a parser level of zero.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,037
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool HarfBuzzShaper::shape(GlyphBuffer* glyphBuffer)
{
if (!createHarfBuzzRuns())
return false;
m_totalWidth = 0;
if (!shapeHarfBuzzRuns())
return false;
if (glyphBuffer && !fillGlyphBuffer(glyphBuffer))
return false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
R=leviw@chromium.org
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 172,005
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: setv4key_principal_2_svc(setv4key_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setv4key_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keyblock);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setv4key_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setv4key_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 167,527
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: check_symlinks(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
#if !defined(HAVE_LSTAT)
/* Platform doesn't have lstat, so we can't look for symlinks. */
(void)a; /* UNUSED */
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
#else
char *pn;
char c;
int r;
struct stat st;
/*
* Guard against symlink tricks. Reject any archive entry whose
* destination would be altered by a symlink.
*/
/* Whatever we checked last time doesn't need to be re-checked. */
pn = a->name;
if (archive_strlen(&(a->path_safe)) > 0) {
char *p = a->path_safe.s;
while ((*pn != '\0') && (*p == *pn))
++p, ++pn;
}
/* Skip the root directory if the path is absolute. */
if(pn == a->name && pn[0] == '/')
++pn;
c = pn[0];
/* Keep going until we've checked the entire name. */
while (pn[0] != '\0' && (pn[0] != '/' || pn[1] != '\0')) {
/* Skip the next path element. */
while (*pn != '\0' && *pn != '/')
++pn;
c = pn[0];
pn[0] = '\0';
/* Check that we haven't hit a symlink. */
r = lstat(a->name, &st);
if (r != 0) {
/* We've hit a dir that doesn't exist; stop now. */
if (errno == ENOENT) {
break;
} else {
/* Note: This effectively disables deep directory
* support when security checks are enabled.
* Otherwise, very long pathnames that trigger
* an error here could evade the sandbox.
* TODO: We could do better, but it would probably
* require merging the symlink checks with the
* deep-directory editing. */
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
} else if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
if (c == '\0') {
/*
* Last element is symlink; remove it
* so we can overwrite it with the
* item being extracted.
*/
if (unlink(a->name)) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Could not remove symlink %s",
a->name);
pn[0] = c;
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
a->pst = NULL;
/*
* Even if we did remove it, a warning
* is in order. The warning is silly,
* though, if we're just replacing one
* symlink with another symlink.
*/
if (!S_ISLNK(a->mode)) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
"Removing symlink %s",
a->name);
}
/* Symlink gone. No more problem! */
pn[0] = c;
return (0);
} else if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_UNLINK) {
/* User asked us to remove problems. */
if (unlink(a->name) != 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
"Cannot remove intervening symlink %s",
a->name);
pn[0] = c;
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
a->pst = NULL;
} else {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
"Cannot extract through symlink %s",
a->name);
pn[0] = c;
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
}
pn[0] = c;
if (pn[0] != '\0')
pn++; /* Advance to the next segment. */
}
pn[0] = c;
/* We've checked and/or cleaned the whole path, so remember it. */
archive_strcpy(&a->path_safe, a->name);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The sandboxing code in libarchive 3.2.0 and earlier mishandles hardlink archive entries of non-zero data size, which might allow remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a crafted archive file.
Commit Message: Fixes for Issue #745 and Issue #746 from Doran Moppert.
|
Low
| 167,135
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void finalizeStreamTask(void* context)
{
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> blobRegistryContext = adoptPtr(static_cast<BlobRegistryContext*>(context));
blobRegistry().finalizeStream(blobRegistryContext->url);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,683
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline void find_entity_for_char(
unsigned int k,
enum entity_charset charset,
const entity_stage1_row *table,
const unsigned char **entity,
size_t *entity_len,
unsigned char *old,
size_t oldlen,
size_t *cursor)
{
unsigned stage1_idx = ENT_STAGE1_INDEX(k);
const entity_stage3_row *c;
if (stage1_idx > 0x1D) {
*entity = NULL;
*entity_len = 0;
return;
}
c = &table[stage1_idx][ENT_STAGE2_INDEX(k)][ENT_STAGE3_INDEX(k)];
if (!c->ambiguous) {
*entity = (const unsigned char *)c->data.ent.entity;
*entity_len = c->data.ent.entity_len;
} else {
/* peek at next char */
size_t cursor_before = *cursor;
int status = SUCCESS;
unsigned next_char;
if (!(*cursor < oldlen))
goto no_suitable_2nd;
next_char = get_next_char(charset, old, oldlen, cursor, &status);
if (status == FAILURE)
goto no_suitable_2nd;
{
const entity_multicodepoint_row *s, *e;
s = &c->data.multicodepoint_table[1];
e = s - 1 + c->data.multicodepoint_table[0].leading_entry.size;
/* we could do a binary search but it's not worth it since we have
* at most two entries... */
for ( ; s <= e; s++) {
if (s->normal_entry.second_cp == next_char) {
*entity = s->normal_entry.entity;
*entity_len = s->normal_entry.entity_len;
return;
}
}
}
no_suitable_2nd:
*cursor = cursor_before;
*entity = (const unsigned char *)
c->data.multicodepoint_table[0].leading_entry.default_entity;
*entity_len = c->data.multicodepoint_table[0].leading_entry.default_entity_len;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
|
Low
| 167,171
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ShellWindow::ShellWindow(Profile* profile,
const extensions::Extension* extension,
const GURL& url)
: profile_(profile),
extension_(extension),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(
extension_function_dispatcher_(profile, this)) {
web_contents_ = WebContents::Create(
profile, SiteInstance::CreateForURL(profile, url), MSG_ROUTING_NONE, NULL,
NULL);
contents_.reset(new TabContents(web_contents_));
content::WebContentsObserver::Observe(web_contents_);
web_contents_->SetDelegate(this);
chrome::SetViewType(web_contents_, chrome::VIEW_TYPE_APP_SHELL);
web_contents_->GetMutableRendererPrefs()->
browser_handles_all_top_level_requests = true;
web_contents_->GetRenderViewHost()->SyncRendererPrefs();
web_contents_->GetController().LoadURL(
url, content::Referrer(), content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
std::string());
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_UNLOADED,
content::Source<Profile>(profile_));
registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_APP_TERMINATING,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
TabContents* tab_contents = TabContents::FromWebContents(web_contents_);
InfoBarTabHelper* infobar_helper = tab_contents->infobar_tab_helper();
infobar_helper->set_infobars_enabled(false);
browser::StartKeepAlive();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,814
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ConvertLoopSequence(ModSample &smp, STPLoopList &loopList)
{
if(!smp.HasSampleData() || loopList.size() < 2) return;
ModSample newSmp = smp;
newSmp.nLength = 0;
newSmp.pSample = nullptr;
size_t numLoops = loopList.size();
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
if((newSmp.nLength + info.loopLength > MAX_SAMPLE_LENGTH) ||
(info.loopLength > MAX_SAMPLE_LENGTH) ||
(info.loopStart + info.loopLength > smp.nLength))
{
numLoops = i;
break;
}
newSmp.nLength += info.loopLength;
}
if(!newSmp.AllocateSample())
{
return;
}
SmpLength start = 0;
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
memcpy(newSmp.pSample8 + start, smp.pSample8 + info.loopStart, info.loopLength);
info.loopStart = start;
if(i > 0 && i <= mpt::size(newSmp.cues))
{
newSmp.cues[i - 1] = start;
}
start += info.loopLength;
}
smp.FreeSample();
smp = newSmp;
smp.nLoopStart = 0;
smp.nLoopEnd = smp.nLength;
smp.uFlags.set(CHN_LOOP);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: soundlib/Load_stp.cpp in OpenMPT through 1.27.04.00, and libopenmpt before 0.3.6, has an out-of-bounds read via a malformed STP file.
Commit Message: [Fix] STP: Possible out-of-bounds memory read with malformed STP files (caught with afl-fuzz).
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@9567 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
|
Medium
| 169,337
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HeapObjectHeader::Finalize(Address object, size_t object_size) {
HeapAllocHooks::FreeHookIfEnabled(object);
const GCInfo* gc_info = ThreadHeap::GcInfo(GcInfoIndex());
if (gc_info->HasFinalizer())
gc_info->finalize_(object);
ASAN_RETIRE_CONTAINER_ANNOTATION(object, object_size);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition in Oilpan in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
|
High
| 173,139
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int __kprobes do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
unsigned long error_code)
{
struct vm_area_struct * vma;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
siginfo_t info;
int code = SEGV_MAPERR;
int is_write = 0, ret;
int trap = TRAP(regs);
int is_exec = trap == 0x400;
#if !(defined(CONFIG_4xx) || defined(CONFIG_BOOKE))
/*
* Fortunately the bit assignments in SRR1 for an instruction
* fault and DSISR for a data fault are mostly the same for the
* bits we are interested in. But there are some bits which
* indicate errors in DSISR but can validly be set in SRR1.
*/
if (trap == 0x400)
error_code &= 0x48200000;
else
is_write = error_code & DSISR_ISSTORE;
#else
is_write = error_code & ESR_DST;
#endif /* CONFIG_4xx || CONFIG_BOOKE */
if (notify_page_fault(regs))
return 0;
if (unlikely(debugger_fault_handler(regs)))
return 0;
/* On a kernel SLB miss we can only check for a valid exception entry */
if (!user_mode(regs) && (address >= TASK_SIZE))
return SIGSEGV;
#if !(defined(CONFIG_4xx) || defined(CONFIG_BOOKE) || \
defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64))
if (error_code & DSISR_DABRMATCH) {
/* DABR match */
do_dabr(regs, address, error_code);
return 0;
}
#endif
if (in_atomic() || mm == NULL) {
if (!user_mode(regs))
return SIGSEGV;
/* in_atomic() in user mode is really bad,
as is current->mm == NULL. */
printk(KERN_EMERG "Page fault in user mode with "
"in_atomic() = %d mm = %p\n", in_atomic(), mm);
printk(KERN_EMERG "NIP = %lx MSR = %lx\n",
regs->nip, regs->msr);
die("Weird page fault", regs, SIGSEGV);
}
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
/* When running in the kernel we expect faults to occur only to
* addresses in user space. All other faults represent errors in the
* kernel and should generate an OOPS. Unfortunately, in the case of an
* erroneous fault occurring in a code path which already holds mmap_sem
* we will deadlock attempting to validate the fault against the
* address space. Luckily the kernel only validly references user
* space from well defined areas of code, which are listed in the
* exceptions table.
*
* As the vast majority of faults will be valid we will only perform
* the source reference check when there is a possibility of a deadlock.
* Attempt to lock the address space, if we cannot we then validate the
* source. If this is invalid we can skip the address space check,
* thus avoiding the deadlock.
*/
if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
if (!user_mode(regs) && !search_exception_tables(regs->nip))
goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto bad_area;
if (vma->vm_start <= address)
goto good_area;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto bad_area;
/*
* N.B. The POWER/Open ABI allows programs to access up to
* 288 bytes below the stack pointer.
* The kernel signal delivery code writes up to about 1.5kB
* below the stack pointer (r1) before decrementing it.
* The exec code can write slightly over 640kB to the stack
* before setting the user r1. Thus we allow the stack to
* expand to 1MB without further checks.
*/
if (address + 0x100000 < vma->vm_end) {
/* get user regs even if this fault is in kernel mode */
struct pt_regs *uregs = current->thread.regs;
if (uregs == NULL)
goto bad_area;
/*
* A user-mode access to an address a long way below
* the stack pointer is only valid if the instruction
* is one which would update the stack pointer to the
* address accessed if the instruction completed,
* i.e. either stwu rs,n(r1) or stwux rs,r1,rb
* (or the byte, halfword, float or double forms).
*
* If we don't check this then any write to the area
* between the last mapped region and the stack will
* expand the stack rather than segfaulting.
*/
if (address + 2048 < uregs->gpr[1]
&& (!user_mode(regs) || !store_updates_sp(regs)))
goto bad_area;
}
if (expand_stack(vma, address))
goto bad_area;
good_area:
code = SEGV_ACCERR;
#if defined(CONFIG_6xx)
if (error_code & 0x95700000)
/* an error such as lwarx to I/O controller space,
address matching DABR, eciwx, etc. */
goto bad_area;
#endif /* CONFIG_6xx */
#if defined(CONFIG_8xx)
/* 8xx sometimes need to load a invalid/non-present TLBs.
* These must be invalidated separately as linux mm don't.
*/
if (error_code & 0x40000000) /* no translation? */
_tlbil_va(address, 0, 0, 0);
/* The MPC8xx seems to always set 0x80000000, which is
* "undefined". Of those that can be set, this is the only
* one which seems bad.
*/
if (error_code & 0x10000000)
/* Guarded storage error. */
goto bad_area;
#endif /* CONFIG_8xx */
if (is_exec) {
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU
/* Protection fault on exec go straight to failure on
* Hash based MMUs as they either don't support per-page
* execute permission, or if they do, it's handled already
* at the hash level. This test would probably have to
* be removed if we change the way this works to make hash
* processors use the same I/D cache coherency mechanism
* as embedded.
*/
if (error_code & DSISR_PROTFAULT)
goto bad_area;
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU */
/*
* Allow execution from readable areas if the MMU does not
* provide separate controls over reading and executing.
*
* Note: That code used to not be enabled for 4xx/BookE.
* It is now as I/D cache coherency for these is done at
* set_pte_at() time and I see no reason why the test
* below wouldn't be valid on those processors. This -may-
* break programs compiled with a really old ABI though.
*/
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) &&
(cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_NOEXECUTE) ||
!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE))))
goto bad_area;
/* a write */
} else if (is_write) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
goto bad_area;
/* a read */
} else {
/* protection fault */
if (error_code & 0x08000000)
goto bad_area;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_WRITE)))
goto bad_area;
}
/*
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
* the fault.
*/
ret = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, is_write ? FAULT_FLAG_WRITE : 0);
if (unlikely(ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR)) {
if (ret & VM_FAULT_OOM)
goto out_of_memory;
else if (ret & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS)
goto do_sigbus;
BUG();
}
if (ret & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
current->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0,
regs, address);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SMLPAR
if (firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_CMO)) {
preempt_disable();
get_lppaca()->page_ins += (1 << PAGE_FACTOR);
preempt_enable();
}
#endif
} else {
current->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return 0;
bad_area:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
bad_area_nosemaphore:
/* User mode accesses cause a SIGSEGV */
if (user_mode(regs)) {
_exception(SIGSEGV, regs, code, address);
return 0;
}
if (is_exec && (error_code & DSISR_PROTFAULT)
&& printk_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_CRIT "kernel tried to execute NX-protected"
" page (%lx) - exploit attempt? (uid: %d)\n",
address, current_uid());
return SIGSEGV;
/*
* We ran out of memory, or some other thing happened to us that made
* us unable to handle the page fault gracefully.
*/
out_of_memory:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (!user_mode(regs))
return SIGKILL;
pagefault_out_of_memory();
return 0;
do_sigbus:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (user_mode(regs)) {
info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = BUS_ADRERR;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)address;
force_sig_info(SIGBUS, &info, current);
return 0;
}
return SIGBUS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,793
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Load_SBit_Png( FT_GlyphSlot slot,
FT_Int x_offset,
FT_Int y_offset,
FT_Int pix_bits,
TT_SBit_Metrics metrics,
FT_Memory memory,
FT_Byte* data,
FT_UInt png_len,
FT_Bool populate_map_and_metrics )
{
FT_Bitmap *map = &slot->bitmap;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_StreamRec stream;
png_structp png;
png_infop info;
png_uint_32 imgWidth, imgHeight;
int bitdepth, color_type, interlace;
FT_Int i;
png_byte* *rows = NULL; /* pacify compiler */
if ( x_offset < 0 ||
y_offset < 0 )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
goto Exit;
}
if ( !populate_map_and_metrics &&
( x_offset + metrics->width > map->width ||
y_offset + metrics->height > map->rows ||
pix_bits != 32 ||
map->pixel_mode != FT_PIXEL_MODE_BGRA ) )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
goto Exit;
}
FT_Stream_OpenMemory( &stream, data, png_len );
png = png_create_read_struct( PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,
&error,
error_callback,
warning_callback );
if ( !png )
{
error = FT_THROW( Out_Of_Memory );
goto Exit;
}
info = png_create_info_struct( png );
if ( !info )
{
error = FT_THROW( Out_Of_Memory );
png_destroy_read_struct( &png, NULL, NULL );
goto Exit;
}
if ( ft_setjmp( png_jmpbuf( png ) ) )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto DestroyExit;
}
png_set_read_fn( png, &stream, read_data_from_FT_Stream );
png_read_info( png, info );
png_get_IHDR( png, info,
&imgWidth, &imgHeight,
&bitdepth, &color_type, &interlace,
NULL, NULL );
if ( error ||
( !populate_map_and_metrics &&
( (FT_Int)imgWidth != metrics->width ||
(FT_Int)imgHeight != metrics->height ) ) )
goto DestroyExit;
if ( populate_map_and_metrics )
{
FT_Long size;
metrics->width = (FT_Int)imgWidth;
metrics->height = (FT_Int)imgHeight;
map->width = metrics->width;
map->rows = metrics->height;
map->pixel_mode = FT_PIXEL_MODE_BGRA;
map->pitch = map->width * 4;
map->num_grays = 256;
/* reject too large bitmaps similarly to the rasterizer */
if ( map->rows > 0x7FFF || map->width > 0x7FFF )
{
error = FT_THROW( Array_Too_Large );
goto DestroyExit;
}
size = map->rows * map->pitch;
error = ft_glyphslot_alloc_bitmap( slot, size );
if ( error )
goto DestroyExit;
}
/* convert palette/gray image to rgb */
if ( color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE )
png_set_palette_to_rgb( png );
/* expand gray bit depth if needed */
if ( color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY )
{
#if PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10209
png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8( png );
#else
png_set_gray_1_2_4_to_8( png );
#endif
}
/* transform transparency to alpha */
if ( png_get_valid(png, info, PNG_INFO_tRNS ) )
png_set_tRNS_to_alpha( png );
if ( bitdepth == 16 )
png_set_strip_16( png );
if ( bitdepth < 8 )
png_set_packing( png );
/* convert grayscale to RGB */
if ( color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY ||
color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA )
png_set_gray_to_rgb( png );
if ( interlace != PNG_INTERLACE_NONE )
png_set_interlace_handling( png );
png_set_filler( png, 0xFF, PNG_FILLER_AFTER );
/* recheck header after setting EXPAND options */
png_read_update_info(png, info );
png_get_IHDR( png, info,
&imgWidth, &imgHeight,
&bitdepth, &color_type, &interlace,
NULL, NULL );
if ( bitdepth != 8 ||
!( color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB ||
color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA ) )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto DestroyExit;
}
switch ( color_type )
{
default:
/* Shouldn't happen, but fall through. */
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA:
png_set_read_user_transform_fn( png, premultiply_data );
break;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB:
/* Humm, this smells. Carry on though. */
png_set_read_user_transform_fn( png, convert_bytes_to_data );
break;
}
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( rows, imgHeight ) )
{
error = FT_THROW( Out_Of_Memory );
goto DestroyExit;
}
for ( i = 0; i < (FT_Int)imgHeight; i++ )
rows[i] = map->buffer + ( y_offset + i ) * map->pitch + x_offset * 4;
png_read_image( png, rows );
FT_FREE( rows );
png_read_end( png, info );
DestroyExit:
png_destroy_read_struct( &png, &info, NULL );
FT_Stream_Close( &stream );
Exit:
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Load_SBit_Png function in sfnt/pngshim.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 does not restrict the rows and pitch values of PNG data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact by embedding a PNG file in a .ttf font file.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,854
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _client_protocol_timeout (GsmXSMPClient *client)
{
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: client_protocol_timeout for client '%s' in ICE status %d",
client->priv->description,
IceConnectionStatus (client->priv->ice_connection));
gsm_client_set_status (GSM_CLIENT (client), GSM_CLIENT_FAILED);
gsm_client_disconnected (GSM_CLIENT (client));
return FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: Bad reference counting in the context of accept_ice_connection() in gsm-xsmp-server.c in old versions of gnome-session up until version 2.29.92 allows a local attacker to establish ICE connections to gnome-session with invalid authentication data (an invalid magic cookie). Each failed authentication attempt will leak a file descriptor in gnome-session. When the maximum number of file descriptors is exhausted in the gnome-session process, it will enter an infinite loop trying to communicate without success, consuming 100% of the CPU. The graphical session associated with the gnome-session process will stop working correctly, because communication with gnome-session is no longer possible.
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
|
Low
| 168,048
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MediaStreamManager::OpenDevice(int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
int page_request_id,
const std::string& device_id,
MediaStreamType type,
MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin salt_and_origin,
OpenDeviceCallback open_device_cb,
DeviceStoppedCallback device_stopped_cb) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(type == MEDIA_DEVICE_AUDIO_CAPTURE ||
type == MEDIA_DEVICE_VIDEO_CAPTURE);
DVLOG(1) << "OpenDevice ({page_request_id = " << page_request_id << "})";
StreamControls controls;
if (IsAudioInputMediaType(type)) {
controls.audio.requested = true;
controls.audio.stream_type = type;
controls.audio.device_id = device_id;
} else if (IsVideoInputMediaType(type)) {
controls.video.requested = true;
controls.video.stream_type = type;
controls.video.device_id = device_id;
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
DeviceRequest* request = new DeviceRequest(
render_process_id, render_frame_id, page_request_id,
false /* user gesture */, MEDIA_OPEN_DEVICE_PEPPER_ONLY, controls,
std::move(salt_and_origin), std::move(device_stopped_cb));
const std::string& label = AddRequest(request);
request->open_device_cb = std::move(open_device_cb);
base::PostTaskWithTraits(FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::IO},
base::BindOnce(&MediaStreamManager::SetUpRequest,
base::Unretained(this), label));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
|
Medium
| 173,105
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: HeapObjectHeader* NormalPage::findHeaderFromAddress(Address address) {
if (address < payload())
return nullptr;
if (!m_objectStartBitMapComputed)
populateObjectStartBitMap();
size_t objectOffset = address - payload();
size_t objectStartNumber = objectOffset / allocationGranularity;
size_t mapIndex = objectStartNumber / 8;
ASSERT(mapIndex < objectStartBitMapSize);
size_t bit = objectStartNumber & 7;
uint8_t byte = m_objectStartBitMap[mapIndex] & ((1 << (bit + 1)) - 1);
while (!byte) {
ASSERT(mapIndex > 0);
byte = m_objectStartBitMap[--mapIndex];
}
int leadingZeroes = numberOfLeadingZeroes(byte);
objectStartNumber = (mapIndex * 8) + 7 - leadingZeroes;
objectOffset = objectStartNumber * allocationGranularity;
Address objectAddress = objectOffset + payload();
HeapObjectHeader* header = reinterpret_cast<HeapObjectHeader*>(objectAddress);
if (header->isFree())
return nullptr;
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
return header;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Inline metadata in GarbageCollection in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
|
Medium
| 172,711
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long long mkvparser::ReadUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long& len) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
int status;
len = 1;
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) // error or underflow
return status;
if (status > 0) // interpreted as "underflow"
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if (b == 0) // we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m)) {
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
long long result = b & (~m);
++pos;
for (int i = 1; i < len; ++i) {
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) {
len = 1;
return status;
}
if (status > 0) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,862
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: FileStream::FileStream(base::File file,
const scoped_refptr<base::TaskRunner>& task_runner)
: context_(base::MakeUnique<Context>(std::move(file), task_runner)) {}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-311
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in ChromeVox in Google Chrome OS prior to 62.0.3202.74 allowed a remote attacker in a privileged network position to observe or tamper with certain cleartext HTTP requests by leveraging that position.
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
|
Medium
| 173,263
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool getCoverageFormat4(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kSegCountOffset = 6;
const size_t kEndCountOffset = 14;
const size_t kHeaderSize = 16;
const size_t kSegmentSize = 8; // total size of array elements for one segment
if (kEndCountOffset > size) {
return false;
}
size_t segCount = readU16(data, kSegCountOffset) >> 1;
if (kHeaderSize + segCount * kSegmentSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < segCount; i++) {
int end = readU16(data, kEndCountOffset + 2 * i);
int start = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (segCount + i));
int rangeOffset = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (3 * segCount + i));
if (rangeOffset == 0) {
int delta = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (2 * segCount + i));
if (((end + delta) & 0xffff) > end - start) {
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1);
} else {
for (int j = start; j < end + 1; j++) {
if (((j + delta) & 0xffff) != 0) {
addRange(coverage, j, j + 1);
}
}
}
} else {
for (int j = start; j < end + 1; j++) {
uint32_t actualRangeOffset = kHeaderSize + 6 * segCount + rangeOffset +
(i + j - start) * 2;
if (actualRangeOffset + 2 > size) {
return false;
}
int glyphId = readU16(data, actualRangeOffset);
if (glyphId != 0) {
addRange(coverage, j, j + 1);
}
}
}
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Minikin library in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not properly consider negative size values in font data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and reboot loop) via a crafted font, aka internal bug 26413177.
Commit Message: Reject fonts with invalid ranges in cmap
A corrupt or malicious font may have a negative size in its cmap
range, which in turn could lead to memory corruption. This patch
detects the case and rejects the font, and also includes an assertion
in the sparse bit set implementation if we missed any such case.
External issue:
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=192618
Bug: 26413177
Change-Id: Icc0c80e4ef389abba0964495b89aa0fae3e9f4b2
|
Low
| 174,235
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message &msg) {
if (!render_frame_created_)
return false;
ScopedActiveURL scoped_active_url(this);
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderFrameHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RenderProcessGone, OnRenderProcessGone)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (handled)
return true;
if (delegate_->OnMessageReceived(this, msg))
return true;
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetProxyToParent();
if (proxy && proxy->cross_process_frame_connector() &&
proxy->cross_process_frame_connector()->OnMessageReceived(msg))
return true;
handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderFrameHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole,
OnDidAddMessageToConsole)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_Detach, OnDetach)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FrameFocused, OnFrameFocused)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError,
OnDidFailProvisionalLoadWithError)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFailLoadWithError,
OnDidFailLoadWithError)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateState, OnUpdateState)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_OpenURL, OnOpenURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_BeforeUnload_ACK, OnBeforeUnloadACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SwapOut_ACK, OnSwapOutACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ContextMenu, OnContextMenu)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_VisualStateResponse,
OnVisualStateResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(FrameHostMsg_RunJavaScriptDialog,
OnRunJavaScriptDialog)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(FrameHostMsg_RunBeforeUnloadConfirm,
OnRunBeforeUnloadConfirm)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAccessInitialDocument,
OnDidAccessInitialDocument)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeOpener, OnDidChangeOpener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAddContentSecurityPolicies,
OnDidAddContentSecurityPolicies)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeFramePolicy,
OnDidChangeFramePolicy)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeFrameOwnerProperties,
OnDidChangeFrameOwnerProperties)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateTitle, OnUpdateTitle)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidBlockFramebust, OnDidBlockFramebust)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_AbortNavigation, OnAbortNavigation)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DispatchLoad, OnDispatchLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ForwardResourceTimingToParent,
OnForwardResourceTimingToParent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_TextSurroundingSelectionResponse,
OnTextSurroundingSelectionResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_EventBundle, OnAccessibilityEvents)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_LocationChanges,
OnAccessibilityLocationChanges)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_FindInPageResult,
OnAccessibilityFindInPageResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_ChildFrameHitTestResult,
OnAccessibilityChildFrameHitTestResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_SnapshotResponse,
OnAccessibilitySnapshotResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_EnterFullscreen, OnEnterFullscreen)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ExitFullscreen, OnExitFullscreen)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SuddenTerminationDisablerChanged,
OnSuddenTerminationDisablerChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidStopLoading, OnDidStopLoading)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeLoadProgress,
OnDidChangeLoadProgress)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SelectionChanged, OnSelectionChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FocusedNodeChanged, OnFocusedNodeChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateUserActivationState,
OnUpdateUserActivationState)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation,
OnSetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SetNeedsOcclusionTracking,
OnSetNeedsOcclusionTracking);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ScrollRectToVisibleInParentFrame,
OnScrollRectToVisibleInParentFrame)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_BubbleLogicalScrollInParentFrame,
OnBubbleLogicalScrollInParentFrame)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FrameDidCallFocus, OnFrameDidCallFocus)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RenderFallbackContentInParentProcess,
OnRenderFallbackContentInParentProcess)
#if BUILDFLAG(USE_EXTERNAL_POPUP_MENU)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ShowPopup, OnShowPopup)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_HidePopup, OnHidePopup)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RequestOverlayRoutingToken,
OnRequestOverlayRoutingToken)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ShowCreatedWindow, OnShowCreatedWindow)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
Medium
| 172,486
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: hcom_client_init
(
OUT p_hsm_com_client_hdl_t *p_hdl,
IN char *server_path,
IN char *client_path,
IN int max_data_len
)
{
hsm_com_client_hdl_t *hdl = NULL;
hsm_com_errno_t res = HSM_COM_OK;
if((strlen(server_path) > (HSM_COM_SVR_MAX_PATH - 1)) ||
(strlen(server_path) == 0)){
res = HSM_COM_PATH_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if((strlen(client_path) > (HSM_COM_SVR_MAX_PATH - 1)) ||
(strlen(client_path) == 0)){
res = HSM_COM_PATH_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if((hdl = calloc(1,sizeof(hsm_com_client_hdl_t))) == NULL)
{
res = HSM_COM_NO_MEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if((hdl->scr.scratch = malloc(max_data_len)) == NULL)
{
res = HSM_COM_NO_MEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if((hdl->recv_buf = malloc(max_data_len)) == NULL)
{
res = HSM_COM_NO_MEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if((hdl->send_buf = malloc(max_data_len)) == NULL)
{
res = HSM_COM_NO_MEM;
goto cleanup;
}
hdl->scr.scratch_fill = 0;
hdl->scr.scratch_len = max_data_len;
hdl->buf_len = max_data_len;
hdl->trans_id = 1;
strcpy(hdl->s_path,server_path);
strcpy(hdl->c_path,client_path);
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_IN;
*p_hdl = hdl;
return res;
cleanup:
if(hdl)
{
if (hdl->scr.scratch) {
free(hdl->scr.scratch);
}
if (hdl->recv_buf) {
free(hdl->recv_buf);
}
free(hdl);
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race conditions in opa-fm before 10.4.0.0.196 and opa-ff before 10.4.0.0.197.
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
|
Medium
| 170,129
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor> RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::remoteDescription()
{
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,348
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gss_unwrap_aead (minor_status,
context_handle,
input_message_buffer,
input_assoc_buffer,
output_payload_buffer,
conf_state,
qop_state)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer;
gss_buffer_t input_assoc_buffer;
gss_buffer_t output_payload_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_qop_t *qop_state;
{
OM_uint32 status;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
gss_mechanism mech;
status = val_unwrap_aead_args(minor_status, context_handle,
input_message_buffer, input_assoc_buffer,
output_payload_buffer,
conf_state, qop_state);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (!mech)
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
return gssint_unwrap_aead(mech, minor_status, ctx,
input_message_buffer, input_assoc_buffer,
output_payload_buffer, conf_state, qop_state);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving automatic deletion of security contexts on error.
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 168,024
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void xenvif_disconnect(struct xenvif *vif)
{
struct net_device *dev = vif->dev;
if (netif_carrier_ok(dev)) {
rtnl_lock();
netif_carrier_off(dev); /* discard queued packets */
if (netif_running(dev))
xenvif_down(vif);
rtnl_unlock();
xenvif_put(vif);
}
atomic_dec(&vif->refcnt);
wait_event(vif->waiting_to_free, atomic_read(&vif->refcnt) == 0);
del_timer_sync(&vif->credit_timeout);
if (vif->irq)
unbind_from_irqhandler(vif->irq, vif);
unregister_netdev(vif->dev);
xen_netbk_unmap_frontend_rings(vif);
free_netdev(vif->dev);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Xen netback functionality in the Linux kernel before 3.7.8 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (loop) by triggering ring pointer corruption.
Commit Message: xen/netback: shutdown the ring if it contains garbage.
A buggy or malicious frontend should not be able to confuse netback.
If we spot anything which is not as it should be then shutdown the
device and don't try to continue with the ring in a potentially
hostile state. Well behaved and non-hostile frontends will not be
penalised.
As well as making the existing checks for such errors fatal also add a
new check that ensures that there isn't an insane number of requests
on the ring (i.e. more than would fit in the ring). If the ring
contains garbage then previously is was possible to loop over this
insane number, getting an error each time and therefore not generating
any more pending requests and therefore not exiting the loop in
xen_netbk_tx_build_gops for an externded period.
Also turn various netdev_dbg calls which no precipitate a fatal error
into netdev_err, they are rate limited because the device is shutdown
afterwards.
This fixes at least one known DoS/softlockup of the backend domain.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 166,171
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void InspectorController::initializeDeferredAgents()
{
if (m_deferredAgentsInitialized)
return;
m_deferredAgentsInitialized = true;
InjectedScriptManager* injectedScriptManager = m_injectedScriptManager.get();
InspectorOverlay* overlay = m_overlay.get();
OwnPtr<InspectorResourceAgent> resourceAgentPtr(InspectorResourceAgent::create(m_pageAgent, m_inspectorClient));
InspectorResourceAgent* resourceAgent = resourceAgentPtr.get();
m_agents.append(resourceAgentPtr.release());
m_agents.append(InspectorCSSAgent::create(m_domAgent, m_pageAgent, resourceAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorDOMStorageAgent::create(m_pageAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorMemoryAgent::create());
m_agents.append(InspectorApplicationCacheAgent::create(m_pageAgent));
PageScriptDebugServer* pageScriptDebugServer = &PageScriptDebugServer::shared();
OwnPtr<InspectorDebuggerAgent> debuggerAgentPtr(PageDebuggerAgent::create(pageScriptDebugServer, m_pageAgent, injectedScriptManager, overlay));
InspectorDebuggerAgent* debuggerAgent = debuggerAgentPtr.get();
m_agents.append(debuggerAgentPtr.release());
m_agents.append(InspectorDOMDebuggerAgent::create(m_domAgent, debuggerAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorProfilerAgent::create(injectedScriptManager, overlay));
m_agents.append(InspectorHeapProfilerAgent::create(injectedScriptManager));
m_agents.append(InspectorCanvasAgent::create(m_pageAgent, injectedScriptManager));
m_agents.append(InspectorInputAgent::create(m_page, m_inspectorClient));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, does not properly load Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,344
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::OnShutdownTaskQueue(
const scoped_refptr<MainThreadTaskQueue>& task_queue) {
if (main_thread_only().was_shutdown)
return;
if (task_queue_throttler_)
task_queue_throttler_->ShutdownTaskQueue(task_queue.get());
if (task_runners_.erase(task_queue)) {
switch (task_queue->queue_class()) {
case MainThreadTaskQueue::QueueClass::kTimer:
task_queue->RemoveTaskObserver(
&main_thread_only().timer_task_cost_estimator);
case MainThreadTaskQueue::QueueClass::kLoading:
task_queue->RemoveTaskObserver(
&main_thread_only().loading_task_cost_estimator);
default:
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect object lifecycle in WebAudio in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
|
Medium
| 172,603
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
/* init things to blank */
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
if (s->cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return(-1);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
* already got and don't await it anymore, because
* Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
*/
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
{
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
}
#endif
for (;;)
{
state=s->state;
switch (s->state)
{
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate=1;
/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
s->server=1;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0,
s->version, NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
return -1;
}
s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
{
if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
* the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
*/
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
}
else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
{
/* Server attempting to renegotiate with
* client that doesn't support secure
* renegotiation.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
else
{
/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
* we will just send a HelloRequest */
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
{
int al;
if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
{
/* callback indicates firther work to be done */
s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
goto end;
}
if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
/* This is not really an error but the only means to
for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
}
#endif
s->renegotiate = 2;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->hit)
{
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
}
#else
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
#endif
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
#else
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
* even when forbidden by protocol specs
* (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
* be able to handle this) */
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
else
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
* RSA but we have a sign only certificate
*
* PSK: may send PSK identity hints
*
* For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
* message only if the cipher suite is either
* ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
* server certificate contains the server's
* public key for key exchange.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
* hint if provided */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
|| (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
#endif
|| (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
|| (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
)
)
)
)
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
* don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
* (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
* and in RFC 2246): */
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
/* ... except when the application insists on verification
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
/* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
/* With normal PSK Certificates and
* Certificate Requests are omitted */
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
/* no cert request */
skip=1;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
#else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
/* This code originally checked to see if
* any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
* and then flushed. This caused problems
* as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
* fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
* as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
* still exist. So instead we just flush
* unconditionally.
*/
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
{
ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2)
{
/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
* the client sends its ECDH pub key in
* a certificate, the CertificateVerify
* message is not sent.
* Also for GOST ciphersuites when
* the client uses its key from the certificate
* for key exchange.
*/
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
}
else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->session->peer)
break;
/* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
* at this point and digest cached records.
*/
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
}
else
{
int offset=0;
int dgst_num;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
* a client cert, it can be verified
* FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
* should be generalized. But it is next step
*/
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
{
int dgst_size;
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
if (dgst_size < 0)
{
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
offset+=dgst_size;
}
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
/*
* This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
* extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
* to set this here because we don't know if we're
* expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
/*
* Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
* In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
* SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
* already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
* the client's Finished message is read.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
/*
* Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
* In a full handshake, we end up here through
* SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
* already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
* the client's Finished message is read.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
{ ret= -1; goto end; }
ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit)
{
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
{
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
}
else
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
}
else
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
/* remove buffering on output */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num=0;
if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
{
s->renegotiate=0;
s->new_session=0;
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
/* s->server=1; */
s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
}
ret = 1;
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret= -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
{
if (s->debug)
{
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
{
new_state=s->state;
s->state=state;
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
s->state=new_state;
}
}
skip=0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The ssl3_get_key_exchange function in s3_clnt.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zd, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k allows remote SSL servers to conduct RSA-to-EXPORT_RSA downgrade attacks and facilitate brute-force decryption by offering a weak ephemeral RSA key in a noncompliant role, related to the *FREAK* issue. NOTE: the scope of this CVE is only client code based on OpenSSL, not EXPORT_RSA issues associated with servers or other TLS implementations.
Commit Message: Only allow ephemeral RSA keys in export ciphersuites.
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
Medium
| 166,753
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChooserController::PostErrorCallback(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult error) {
if (!base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(error_callback_, error))) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No TaskRunner.";
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in filter processing in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
|
Medium
| 172,445
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::CreateThrottlesForNavigation(
content::NavigationHandle* handle) {
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationThrottle>> throttles;
if (handle->IsInMainFrame()) {
throttles.push_back(
page_load_metrics::MetricsNavigationThrottle::Create(handle));
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationThrottle> flash_url_throttle =
FlashDownloadInterception::MaybeCreateThrottleFor(handle);
if (flash_url_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(flash_url_throttle));
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_SUPERVISED_USERS)
std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationThrottle> supervised_user_throttle =
SupervisedUserNavigationThrottle::MaybeCreateThrottleFor(handle);
if (supervised_user_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(supervised_user_throttle));
#endif
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
prerender::PrerenderContents* prerender_contents =
prerender::PrerenderContents::FromWebContents(handle->GetWebContents());
if (!prerender_contents && handle->IsInMainFrame()) {
throttles.push_back(
navigation_interception::InterceptNavigationDelegate::CreateThrottleFor(
handle));
}
throttles.push_back(InterceptOMADownloadNavigationThrottle::Create(handle));
#elif BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
if (handle->IsInMainFrame()) {
auto url_to_app_throttle =
PlatformAppNavigationRedirector::MaybeCreateThrottleFor(handle);
if (url_to_app_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(url_to_app_throttle));
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kDesktopPWAWindowing)) {
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kDesktopPWAsLinkCapturing)) {
auto bookmark_app_experimental_throttle =
extensions::BookmarkAppExperimentalNavigationThrottle::
MaybeCreateThrottleFor(handle);
if (bookmark_app_experimental_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(bookmark_app_experimental_throttle));
} else if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kDesktopPWAsStayInWindow)) {
auto bookmark_app_throttle =
extensions::BookmarkAppNavigationThrottle::MaybeCreateThrottleFor(
handle);
if (bookmark_app_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(bookmark_app_throttle));
}
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kMimeHandlerViewInCrossProcessFrame)) {
auto plugin_frame_attach_throttle =
extensions::ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::MaybeCreateThrottle(
handle);
if (plugin_frame_attach_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(plugin_frame_attach_throttle));
}
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (handle->IsInMainFrame()) {
if (merge_session_throttling_utils::ShouldAttachNavigationThrottle() &&
!merge_session_throttling_utils::AreAllSessionMergedAlready() &&
handle->GetURL().SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS()) {
throttles.push_back(MergeSessionNavigationThrottle::Create(handle));
}
auto url_to_apps_throttle =
chromeos::AppsNavigationThrottle::MaybeCreate(handle);
if (url_to_apps_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(url_to_apps_throttle));
}
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
throttles.push_back(
std::make_unique<extensions::ExtensionNavigationThrottle>(handle));
std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationThrottle> user_script_throttle =
extensions::ExtensionsBrowserClient::Get()
->GetUserScriptListener()
->CreateNavigationThrottle(handle);
if (user_script_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(user_script_throttle));
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_SUPERVISED_USERS)
std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationThrottle> supervised_user_nav_throttle =
SupervisedUserGoogleAuthNavigationThrottle::MaybeCreate(handle);
if (supervised_user_nav_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(supervised_user_nav_throttle));
#endif
content::WebContents* web_contents = handle->GetWebContents();
if (auto* subresource_filter_client =
ChromeSubresourceFilterClient::FromWebContents(web_contents)) {
subresource_filter_client->MaybeAppendNavigationThrottles(handle,
&throttles);
}
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationThrottle>
background_tab_navigation_throttle = resource_coordinator::
BackgroundTabNavigationThrottle::MaybeCreateThrottleFor(handle);
if (background_tab_navigation_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(background_tab_navigation_throttle));
#endif
#if defined(SAFE_BROWSING_DB_LOCAL)
std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationThrottle>
password_protection_navigation_throttle =
safe_browsing::MaybeCreateNavigationThrottle(handle);
if (password_protection_navigation_throttle) {
throttles.push_back(std::move(password_protection_navigation_throttle));
}
#endif
std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationThrottle> pdf_iframe_throttle =
PDFIFrameNavigationThrottle::MaybeCreateThrottleFor(handle);
if (pdf_iframe_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(pdf_iframe_throttle));
std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationThrottle> tab_under_throttle =
TabUnderNavigationThrottle::MaybeCreate(handle);
if (tab_under_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(tab_under_throttle));
throttles.push_back(std::make_unique<PolicyBlacklistNavigationThrottle>(
handle, handle->GetWebContents()->GetBrowserContext()));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kSSLCommittedInterstitials)) {
throttles.push_back(std::make_unique<SSLErrorNavigationThrottle>(
handle,
std::make_unique<CertificateReportingServiceCertReporter>(web_contents),
base::Bind(&SSLErrorHandler::HandleSSLError)));
}
std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationThrottle> https_upgrade_timing_throttle =
TypedNavigationTimingThrottle::MaybeCreateThrottleFor(handle);
if (https_upgrade_timing_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(https_upgrade_timing_throttle));
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationThrottle> devtools_throttle =
DevToolsWindow::MaybeCreateNavigationThrottle(handle);
if (devtools_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(devtools_throttle));
std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationThrottle> new_tab_page_throttle =
NewTabPageNavigationThrottle::MaybeCreateThrottleFor(handle);
if (new_tab_page_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(new_tab_page_throttle));
std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationThrottle>
google_password_manager_throttle =
GooglePasswordManagerNavigationThrottle::MaybeCreateThrottleFor(
handle);
if (google_password_manager_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(google_password_manager_throttle));
#endif
std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationThrottle> previews_lite_page_throttle =
PreviewsLitePageDecider::MaybeCreateThrottleFor(handle);
if (previews_lite_page_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(previews_lite_page_throttle));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(safe_browsing::kCommittedSBInterstitials)) {
throttles.push_back(
std::make_unique<safe_browsing::SafeBrowsingNavigationThrottle>(
handle));
}
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_MACOSX) || \
(defined(OS_LINUX) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS))
std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationThrottle> browser_switcher_throttle =
browser_switcher::BrowserSwitcherNavigationThrottle ::
MaybeCreateThrottleFor(handle);
if (browser_switcher_throttle)
throttles.push_back(std::move(browser_switcher_throttle));
#endif
return throttles;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Data race in extensions guest view in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
|
High
| 173,035
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void perf_event_interrupt(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int i;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
struct perf_event *event;
unsigned long val;
int found = 0;
int nmi;
if (cpuhw->n_limited)
freeze_limited_counters(cpuhw, mfspr(SPRN_PMC5),
mfspr(SPRN_PMC6));
perf_read_regs(regs);
nmi = perf_intr_is_nmi(regs);
if (nmi)
nmi_enter();
else
irq_enter();
for (i = 0; i < cpuhw->n_events; ++i) {
event = cpuhw->event[i];
if (!event->hw.idx || is_limited_pmc(event->hw.idx))
continue;
val = read_pmc(event->hw.idx);
if ((int)val < 0) {
/* event has overflowed */
found = 1;
record_and_restart(event, val, regs, nmi);
}
}
/*
* In case we didn't find and reset the event that caused
* the interrupt, scan all events and reset any that are
* negative, to avoid getting continual interrupts.
* Any that we processed in the previous loop will not be negative.
*/
if (!found) {
for (i = 0; i < ppmu->n_counter; ++i) {
if (is_limited_pmc(i + 1))
continue;
val = read_pmc(i + 1);
if ((int)val < 0)
write_pmc(i + 1, 0);
}
}
/*
* Reset MMCR0 to its normal value. This will set PMXE and
* clear FC (freeze counters) and PMAO (perf mon alert occurred)
* and thus allow interrupts to occur again.
* XXX might want to use MSR.PM to keep the events frozen until
* we get back out of this interrupt.
*/
write_mmcr0(cpuhw, cpuhw->mmcr[0]);
if (nmi)
nmi_exit();
else
irq_exit();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the perf_event_interrupt function in arch/powerpc/kernel/perf_event.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 on powerpc platforms allows local users to cause a denial of service (unhandled performance monitor exception) via vectors that trigger certain outcomes of performance events.
Commit Message: perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,679
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagetruecolortopalette)
{
zval *IM;
zend_bool dither;
long ncolors;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rbl", &IM, &dither, &ncolors) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (ncolors <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number of colors has to be greater than zero");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
gdImageTrueColorToPalette(im, dither, ncolors);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The imagetruecolortopalette function in ext/gd/gd.c in PHP before 5.6.25 and 7.x before 7.0.10 does not properly validate the number of colors, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (select_colors allocation error and out-of-bounds write) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large value in the third argument.
Commit Message: Fix bug#72697 - select_colors write out-of-bounds
|
Low
| 166,953
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void usage()
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNG2PNM\n");
fprintf (stderr, " by Willem van Schaik, 1999\n");
#ifdef __TURBOC__
fprintf (stderr, " for Turbo-C and Borland-C compilers\n");
#else
fprintf (stderr, " for Linux (and Unix) compilers\n");
#endif
fprintf (stderr, "Usage: png2pnm [options] <file>.png [<file>.pnm]\n");
fprintf (stderr, " or: ... | png2pnm [options]\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Options:\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -r[aw] write pnm-file in binary format (P4/P5/P6) (default)\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -n[oraw] write pnm-file in ascii format (P1/P2/P3)\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -a[lpha] <file>.pgm write PNG alpha channel as pgm-file\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -h | -? print this help-information\n");
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,724
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: juniper_mlfr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_MLFR;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
/* suppress Bundle-ID if frame was captured on a child-link */
if (ndo->ndo_eflag && EXTRACT_32BITS(l2info.cookie) != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Bundle-ID %u, ", l2info.bundle));
switch (l2info.proto) {
case (LLC_UI):
case (LLC_UI<<8):
isoclns_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen);
break;
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_Q933):
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_IP):
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_IP6):
/* pass IP{4,6} to the OSI layer for proper link-layer printing */
isoclns_print(ndo, p - 1, l2info.length + 1, l2info.caplen + 1);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown protocol 0x%04x, length %u", l2info.proto, l2info.length));
}
return l2info.header_len;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,951
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int nbd_negotiate_write(QIOChannel *ioc, const void *buffer, size_t size)
{
ssize_t ret;
guint watch;
assert(qemu_in_coroutine());
/* Negotiation are always in main loop. */
watch = qio_channel_add_watch(ioc,
G_IO_OUT,
nbd_negotiate_continue,
qemu_coroutine_self(),
NULL);
ret = nbd_write(ioc, buffer, size, NULL);
g_source_remove(watch);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An assertion-failure flaw was found in Qemu before 2.10.1, in the Network Block Device (NBD) server's initial connection negotiation, where the I/O coroutine was undefined. This could crash the qemu-nbd server if a client sent unexpected data during connection negotiation. A remote user or process could use this flaw to crash the qemu-nbd server resulting in denial of service.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,455
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AppResult::Open(int event_flags) {
RecordHistogram(APP_SEARCH_RESULT);
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_service()
->GetInstalledExtension(app_id_);
if (!extension)
return;
if (!extensions::util::IsAppLaunchable(app_id_, profile_))
return;
if (RunExtensionEnableFlow())
return;
if (display_type() != DISPLAY_RECOMMENDATION) {
extensions::RecordAppListSearchLaunch(extension);
content::RecordAction(
base::UserMetricsAction("AppList_ClickOnAppFromSearch"));
}
controller_->ActivateApp(
profile_,
extension,
AppListControllerDelegate::LAUNCH_FROM_APP_LIST_SEARCH,
event_flags);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 32.0.1700.76 on Windows and before 32.0.1700.77 on Mac OS X and Linux allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
|
Low
| 171,726
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void snd_timer_user_tinterrupt(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri,
unsigned long resolution,
unsigned long ticks)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu = timeri->callback_data;
struct snd_timer_tread *r, r1;
struct timespec tstamp;
int prev, append = 0;
memset(&tstamp, 0, sizeof(tstamp));
spin_lock(&tu->qlock);
if ((tu->filter & ((1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION) |
(1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK))) == 0) {
spin_unlock(&tu->qlock);
return;
}
if (tu->last_resolution != resolution || ticks > 0) {
if (timer_tstamp_monotonic)
ktime_get_ts(&tstamp);
else
getnstimeofday(&tstamp);
}
if ((tu->filter & (1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)) &&
tu->last_resolution != resolution) {
r1.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION;
r1.tstamp = tstamp;
r1.val = resolution;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
tu->last_resolution = resolution;
append++;
}
if ((tu->filter & (1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK)) == 0)
goto __wake;
if (ticks == 0)
goto __wake;
if (tu->qused > 0) {
prev = tu->qtail == 0 ? tu->queue_size - 1 : tu->qtail - 1;
r = &tu->tqueue[prev];
if (r->event == SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK) {
r->tstamp = tstamp;
r->val += ticks;
append++;
goto __wake;
}
}
r1.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK;
r1.tstamp = tstamp;
r1.val = ticks;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
append++;
__wake:
spin_unlock(&tu->qlock);
if (append == 0)
return;
kill_fasync(&tu->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
wake_up(&tu->qchange_sleep);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: sound/core/timer.c in the Linux kernel through 4.6 does not initialize certain r1 data structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via crafted use of the ALSA timer interface, related to the (1) snd_timer_user_ccallback and (2) snd_timer_user_tinterrupt functions.
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Low
| 167,236
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct sock *unix_create1(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int kern)
{
struct sock *sk = NULL;
struct unix_sock *u;
atomic_long_inc(&unix_nr_socks);
if (atomic_long_read(&unix_nr_socks) > 2 * get_max_files())
goto out;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_UNIX, GFP_KERNEL, &unix_proto, kern);
if (!sk)
goto out;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
lockdep_set_class(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock,
&af_unix_sk_receive_queue_lock_key);
sk->sk_write_space = unix_write_space;
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = net->unx.sysctl_max_dgram_qlen;
sk->sk_destruct = unix_sock_destructor;
u = unix_sk(sk);
u->path.dentry = NULL;
u->path.mnt = NULL;
spin_lock_init(&u->lock);
atomic_long_set(&u->inflight, 0);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&u->link);
mutex_init(&u->readlock); /* single task reading lock */
init_waitqueue_head(&u->peer_wait);
unix_insert_socket(unix_sockets_unbound(sk), sk);
out:
if (sk == NULL)
atomic_long_dec(&unix_nr_socks);
else {
local_bh_disable();
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, 1);
local_bh_enable();
}
return sk;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in net/unix/af_unix.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 allows local users to bypass intended AF_UNIX socket permissions or cause a denial of service (panic) via crafted epoll_ctl calls.
Commit Message: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 166,833
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ndp_sock_recv(struct ndp *ndp)
{
struct ndp_msg *msg;
enum ndp_msg_type msg_type;
size_t len;
int err;
msg = ndp_msg_alloc();
if (!msg)
return -ENOMEM;
len = ndp_msg_payload_maxlen(msg);
err = myrecvfrom6(ndp->sock, msg->buf, &len, 0,
&msg->addrto, &msg->ifindex);
if (err) {
err(ndp, "Failed to receive message");
goto free_msg;
}
dbg(ndp, "rcvd from: %s, ifindex: %u",
str_in6_addr(&msg->addrto), msg->ifindex);
if (len < sizeof(*msg->icmp6_hdr)) {
warn(ndp, "rcvd icmp6 packet too short (%luB)", len);
err = 0;
goto free_msg;
}
err = ndp_msg_type_by_raw_type(&msg_type, msg->icmp6_hdr->icmp6_type);
if (err) {
err = 0;
goto free_msg;
}
ndp_msg_init(msg, msg_type);
ndp_msg_payload_len_set(msg, len);
if (!ndp_msg_check_valid(msg)) {
warn(ndp, "rcvd invalid ND message");
err = 0;
goto free_msg;
}
dbg(ndp, "rcvd %s, len: %zuB",
ndp_msg_type_info(msg_type)->strabbr, len);
if (!ndp_msg_check_opts(msg)) {
err = 0;
goto free_msg;
}
err = ndp_call_handlers(ndp, msg);;
free_msg:
ndp_msg_destroy(msg);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: libndp before 1.6, as used in NetworkManager, does not properly validate the origin of Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) messages, which allows remote attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks or cause a denial of service (network connectivity disruption) by advertising a node as a router from a non-local network.
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
|
Medium
| 167,350
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ProcPanoramiXGetScreenSize(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReq);
WindowPtr pWin;
xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReply rep;
int rc;
if (stuff->screen >= PanoramiXNumScreens)
return BadMatch;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReq);
rc = dixLookupWindow(&pWin, stuff->window, client, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
rep = (xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReply) {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = 0,
/* screen dimensions */
.width = screenInfo.screens[stuff->screen]->width,
.height = screenInfo.screens[stuff->screen]->height,
.window = stuff->window,
.screen = stuff->screen
};
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&rep.sequenceNumber);
swapl(&rep.length);
swapl(&rep.width);
swapl(&rep.height);
swapl(&rep.window);
swapl(&rep.screen);
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReply), &rep);
return Success;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was missing length validation in RENDER extension allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,432
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xfs_acl_from_disk(struct xfs_acl *aclp)
{
struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e;
struct posix_acl *acl;
struct xfs_acl_entry *ace;
int count, i;
count = be32_to_cpu(aclp->acl_cnt);
acl = posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
acl_e = &acl->a_entries[i];
ace = &aclp->acl_entry[i];
/*
* The tag is 32 bits on disk and 16 bits in core.
*
* Because every access to it goes through the core
* format first this is not a problem.
*/
acl_e->e_tag = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_tag);
acl_e->e_perm = be16_to_cpu(ace->ae_perm);
switch (acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
case ACL_GROUP:
acl_e->e_id = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_id);
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
acl_e->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
return acl;
fail:
posix_acl_release(acl);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the xfs_acl_from_disk function in fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1.9 allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) via a filesystem with a malformed ACL, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: xfs: validate acl count
This prevents in-memory corruption and possible panics if the on-disk
ACL is badly corrupted.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
|
Low
| 165,656
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(semtimedop, int, semid, struct sembuf __user *, tsops,
unsigned, nsops, const struct timespec __user *, timeout)
{
int error = -EINVAL;
struct sem_array *sma;
struct sembuf fast_sops[SEMOPM_FAST];
struct sembuf* sops = fast_sops, *sop;
struct sem_undo *un;
int undos = 0, alter = 0, max;
struct sem_queue queue;
unsigned long jiffies_left = 0;
struct ipc_namespace *ns;
struct list_head tasks;
ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
if (nsops < 1 || semid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (nsops > ns->sc_semopm)
return -E2BIG;
if(nsops > SEMOPM_FAST) {
sops = kmalloc(sizeof(*sops)*nsops,GFP_KERNEL);
if(sops==NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (copy_from_user (sops, tsops, nsops * sizeof(*tsops))) {
error=-EFAULT;
goto out_free;
}
if (timeout) {
struct timespec _timeout;
if (copy_from_user(&_timeout, timeout, sizeof(*timeout))) {
error = -EFAULT;
goto out_free;
}
if (_timeout.tv_sec < 0 || _timeout.tv_nsec < 0 ||
_timeout.tv_nsec >= 1000000000L) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
jiffies_left = timespec_to_jiffies(&_timeout);
}
max = 0;
for (sop = sops; sop < sops + nsops; sop++) {
if (sop->sem_num >= max)
max = sop->sem_num;
if (sop->sem_flg & SEM_UNDO)
undos = 1;
if (sop->sem_op != 0)
alter = 1;
}
if (undos) {
un = find_alloc_undo(ns, semid);
if (IS_ERR(un)) {
error = PTR_ERR(un);
goto out_free;
}
} else
un = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tasks);
rcu_read_lock();
sma = sem_obtain_object_check(ns, semid);
if (IS_ERR(sma)) {
if (un)
rcu_read_unlock();
error = PTR_ERR(sma);
goto out_free;
}
error = -EFBIG;
if (max >= sma->sem_nsems) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_wakeup;
}
error = -EACCES;
if (ipcperms(ns, &sma->sem_perm, alter ? S_IWUGO : S_IRUGO)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_wakeup;
}
error = security_sem_semop(sma, sops, nsops, alter);
if (error) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_wakeup;
}
/*
* semid identifiers are not unique - find_alloc_undo may have
* allocated an undo structure, it was invalidated by an RMID
* and now a new array with received the same id. Check and fail.
* This case can be detected checking un->semid. The existence of
* "un" itself is guaranteed by rcu.
*/
error = -EIDRM;
ipc_lock_object(&sma->sem_perm);
if (un) {
if (un->semid == -1) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_unlock_free;
} else {
/*
* rcu lock can be released, "un" cannot disappear:
* - sem_lock is acquired, thus IPC_RMID is
* impossible.
* - exit_sem is impossible, it always operates on
* current (or a dead task).
*/
rcu_read_unlock();
}
}
error = try_atomic_semop (sma, sops, nsops, un, task_tgid_vnr(current));
if (error <= 0) {
if (alter && error == 0)
do_smart_update(sma, sops, nsops, 1, &tasks);
goto out_unlock_free;
}
/* We need to sleep on this operation, so we put the current
* task into the pending queue and go to sleep.
*/
queue.sops = sops;
queue.nsops = nsops;
queue.undo = un;
queue.pid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
queue.alter = alter;
if (nsops == 1) {
struct sem *curr;
curr = &sma->sem_base[sops->sem_num];
if (alter)
list_add_tail(&queue.list, &curr->sem_pending);
else
list_add(&queue.list, &curr->sem_pending);
} else {
if (alter)
list_add_tail(&queue.list, &sma->sem_pending);
else
list_add(&queue.list, &sma->sem_pending);
sma->complex_count++;
}
queue.status = -EINTR;
queue.sleeper = current;
sleep_again:
current->state = TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE;
sem_unlock(sma);
if (timeout)
jiffies_left = schedule_timeout(jiffies_left);
else
schedule();
error = get_queue_result(&queue);
if (error != -EINTR) {
/* fast path: update_queue already obtained all requested
* resources.
* Perform a smp_mb(): User space could assume that semop()
* is a memory barrier: Without the mb(), the cpu could
* speculatively read in user space stale data that was
* overwritten by the previous owner of the semaphore.
*/
smp_mb();
goto out_free;
}
sma = sem_obtain_lock(ns, semid);
/*
* Wait until it's guaranteed that no wakeup_sem_queue_do() is ongoing.
*/
error = get_queue_result(&queue);
/*
* Array removed? If yes, leave without sem_unlock().
*/
if (IS_ERR(sma)) {
goto out_free;
}
/*
* If queue.status != -EINTR we are woken up by another process.
* Leave without unlink_queue(), but with sem_unlock().
*/
if (error != -EINTR) {
goto out_unlock_free;
}
/*
* If an interrupt occurred we have to clean up the queue
*/
if (timeout && jiffies_left == 0)
error = -EAGAIN;
/*
* If the wakeup was spurious, just retry
*/
if (error == -EINTR && !signal_pending(current))
goto sleep_again;
unlink_queue(sma, &queue);
out_unlock_free:
sem_unlock(sma);
out_wakeup:
wake_up_sem_queue_do(&tasks);
out_free:
if(sops != fast_sops)
kfree(sops);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,968
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static long vhost_net_set_backend(struct vhost_net *n, unsigned index, int fd)
{
struct socket *sock, *oldsock;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq;
struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *ubufs, *oldubufs = NULL;
int r;
mutex_lock(&n->dev.mutex);
r = vhost_dev_check_owner(&n->dev);
if (r)
goto err;
if (index >= VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX) {
r = -ENOBUFS;
goto err;
}
vq = &n->vqs[index].vq;
nvq = &n->vqs[index];
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
/* Verify that ring has been setup correctly. */
if (!vhost_vq_access_ok(vq)) {
r = -EFAULT;
goto err_vq;
}
sock = get_socket(fd);
if (IS_ERR(sock)) {
r = PTR_ERR(sock);
goto err_vq;
}
/* start polling new socket */
oldsock = rcu_dereference_protected(vq->private_data,
lockdep_is_held(&vq->mutex));
if (sock != oldsock) {
ubufs = vhost_net_ubuf_alloc(vq,
sock && vhost_sock_zcopy(sock));
if (IS_ERR(ubufs)) {
r = PTR_ERR(ubufs);
goto err_ubufs;
}
vhost_net_disable_vq(n, vq);
rcu_assign_pointer(vq->private_data, sock);
r = vhost_init_used(vq);
if (r)
goto err_used;
r = vhost_net_enable_vq(n, vq);
if (r)
goto err_used;
oldubufs = nvq->ubufs;
nvq->ubufs = ubufs;
n->tx_packets = 0;
n->tx_zcopy_err = 0;
n->tx_flush = false;
}
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
if (oldubufs) {
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(oldubufs);
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
vhost_zerocopy_signal_used(n, vq);
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
}
if (oldsock) {
vhost_net_flush_vq(n, index);
fput(oldsock->file);
}
mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
return 0;
err_used:
rcu_assign_pointer(vq->private_data, oldsock);
vhost_net_enable_vq(n, vq);
if (ubufs)
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(ubufs);
err_ubufs:
fput(sock->file);
err_vq:
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
err:
mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the vhost_net_set_backend function in drivers/vhost/net.c in the Linux kernel through 3.10.3 allows local users to cause a denial of service (OOPS and system crash) via vectors involving powering on a virtual machine.
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 166,020
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct user_key_payload *zap = NULL;
int ret;
/* check the quota and attach the new data */
ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->datalen);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* attach the new data, displacing the old */
key->expiry = prep->expiry;
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
zap = dereference_key_locked(key);
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]);
prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
if (zap)
call_rcu(&zap->rcu, user_free_payload_rcu);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
Low
| 167,710
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static plist_t parse_bin_node(struct bplist_data *bplist, const char** object)
{
uint16_t type = 0;
uint64_t size = 0;
if (!object)
return NULL;
type = (**object) & BPLIST_MASK;
size = (**object) & BPLIST_FILL;
(*object)++;
if (size == BPLIST_FILL) {
switch (type) {
case BPLIST_DATA:
case BPLIST_STRING:
case BPLIST_UNICODE:
case BPLIST_ARRAY:
case BPLIST_SET:
case BPLIST_DICT:
{
uint16_t next_size = **object & BPLIST_FILL;
if ((**object & BPLIST_MASK) != BPLIST_UINT) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: invalid size node type for node type 0x%02x: found 0x%02x, expected 0x%02x\n", __func__, type, **object & BPLIST_MASK, BPLIST_UINT);
return NULL;
}
(*object)++;
next_size = 1 << next_size;
if (*object + next_size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: size node data bytes for node type 0x%02x point outside of valid range\n", __func__, type);
return NULL;
}
size = UINT_TO_HOST(*object, next_size);
(*object) += next_size;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
switch (type)
{
case BPLIST_NULL:
switch (size)
{
case BPLIST_TRUE:
{
plist_data_t data = plist_new_plist_data();
data->type = PLIST_BOOLEAN;
data->boolval = TRUE;
data->length = 1;
return node_create(NULL, data);
}
case BPLIST_FALSE:
{
plist_data_t data = plist_new_plist_data();
data->type = PLIST_BOOLEAN;
data->boolval = FALSE;
data->length = 1;
return node_create(NULL, data);
}
case BPLIST_NULL:
default:
return NULL;
}
case BPLIST_UINT:
if (*object + (uint64_t)(1 << size) > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_UINT data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_uint_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_REAL:
if (*object + (uint64_t)(1 << size) > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_REAL data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_real_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_DATE:
if (3 != size) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: invalid data size for BPLIST_DATE node\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
if (*object + (uint64_t)(1 << size) > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_DATE data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_date_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_DATA:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_DATA data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_data_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_STRING:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_STRING data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_string_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_UNICODE:
if (size*2 < size) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: Integer overflow when calculating BPLIST_UNICODE data size.\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
if (*object + size*2 > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_UNICODE data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_unicode_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_SET:
case BPLIST_ARRAY:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_ARRAY data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_array_node(bplist, object, size);
case BPLIST_UID:
if (*object + size+1 > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_UID data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_uid_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_DICT:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_REAL data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_dict_node(bplist, object, size);
default:
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: unexpected node type 0x%02x\n", __func__, type);
return NULL;
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the parse_string_node function in bplist.c in libimobiledevice libplist 1.12 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted plist file.
Commit Message: bplist: Fix data range check for string/data/dict/array nodes
Passing a size of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF to parse_string_node() might result
in a memcpy with a size of -1, leading to undefined behavior.
This commit makes sure that the actual node data (which depends on the size)
is in the range start_of_object..start_of_object+size.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
|
Medium
| 168,334
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int decode_nal_unit(HEVCContext *s, const H2645NAL *nal)
{
HEVCLocalContext *lc = s->HEVClc;
GetBitContext *gb = &lc->gb;
int ctb_addr_ts, ret;
*gb = nal->gb;
s->nal_unit_type = nal->type;
s->temporal_id = nal->temporal_id;
switch (s->nal_unit_type) {
case HEVC_NAL_VPS:
if (s->avctx->hwaccel && s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params) {
ret = s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params(s->avctx,
nal->type,
nal->raw_data,
nal->raw_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
}
ret = ff_hevc_decode_nal_vps(gb, s->avctx, &s->ps);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
break;
case HEVC_NAL_SPS:
if (s->avctx->hwaccel && s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params) {
ret = s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params(s->avctx,
nal->type,
nal->raw_data,
nal->raw_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
}
ret = ff_hevc_decode_nal_sps(gb, s->avctx, &s->ps,
s->apply_defdispwin);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
break;
case HEVC_NAL_PPS:
if (s->avctx->hwaccel && s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params) {
ret = s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params(s->avctx,
nal->type,
nal->raw_data,
nal->raw_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
}
ret = ff_hevc_decode_nal_pps(gb, s->avctx, &s->ps);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
break;
case HEVC_NAL_SEI_PREFIX:
case HEVC_NAL_SEI_SUFFIX:
if (s->avctx->hwaccel && s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params) {
ret = s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params(s->avctx,
nal->type,
nal->raw_data,
nal->raw_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
}
ret = ff_hevc_decode_nal_sei(gb, s->avctx, &s->sei, &s->ps, s->nal_unit_type);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
break;
case HEVC_NAL_TRAIL_R:
case HEVC_NAL_TRAIL_N:
case HEVC_NAL_TSA_N:
case HEVC_NAL_TSA_R:
case HEVC_NAL_STSA_N:
case HEVC_NAL_STSA_R:
case HEVC_NAL_BLA_W_LP:
case HEVC_NAL_BLA_W_RADL:
case HEVC_NAL_BLA_N_LP:
case HEVC_NAL_IDR_W_RADL:
case HEVC_NAL_IDR_N_LP:
case HEVC_NAL_CRA_NUT:
case HEVC_NAL_RADL_N:
case HEVC_NAL_RADL_R:
case HEVC_NAL_RASL_N:
case HEVC_NAL_RASL_R:
ret = hls_slice_header(s);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (
(s->avctx->skip_frame >= AVDISCARD_BIDIR && s->sh.slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_B) ||
(s->avctx->skip_frame >= AVDISCARD_NONINTRA && s->sh.slice_type != HEVC_SLICE_I) ||
(s->avctx->skip_frame >= AVDISCARD_NONKEY && !IS_IRAP(s))) {
break;
}
if (s->sh.first_slice_in_pic_flag) {
if (s->ref) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Two slices reporting being the first in the same frame.\n");
goto fail;
}
if (s->max_ra == INT_MAX) {
if (s->nal_unit_type == HEVC_NAL_CRA_NUT || IS_BLA(s)) {
s->max_ra = s->poc;
} else {
if (IS_IDR(s))
s->max_ra = INT_MIN;
}
}
if ((s->nal_unit_type == HEVC_NAL_RASL_R || s->nal_unit_type == HEVC_NAL_RASL_N) &&
s->poc <= s->max_ra) {
s->is_decoded = 0;
break;
} else {
if (s->nal_unit_type == HEVC_NAL_RASL_R && s->poc > s->max_ra)
s->max_ra = INT_MIN;
}
s->overlap ++;
ret = hevc_frame_start(s);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
} else if (!s->ref) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "First slice in a frame missing.\n");
goto fail;
}
if (s->nal_unit_type != s->first_nal_type) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Non-matching NAL types of the VCL NALUs: %d %d\n",
s->first_nal_type, s->nal_unit_type);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (!s->sh.dependent_slice_segment_flag &&
s->sh.slice_type != HEVC_SLICE_I) {
ret = ff_hevc_slice_rpl(s);
if (ret < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Error constructing the reference lists for the current slice.\n");
goto fail;
}
}
if (s->sh.first_slice_in_pic_flag && s->avctx->hwaccel) {
ret = s->avctx->hwaccel->start_frame(s->avctx, NULL, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
}
if (s->avctx->hwaccel) {
ret = s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_slice(s->avctx, nal->raw_data, nal->raw_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
} else {
if (s->threads_number > 1 && s->sh.num_entry_point_offsets > 0)
ctb_addr_ts = hls_slice_data_wpp(s, nal);
else
ctb_addr_ts = hls_slice_data(s);
if (ctb_addr_ts >= (s->ps.sps->ctb_width * s->ps.sps->ctb_height)) {
s->is_decoded = 1;
}
if (ctb_addr_ts < 0) {
ret = ctb_addr_ts;
goto fail;
}
}
break;
case HEVC_NAL_EOS_NUT:
case HEVC_NAL_EOB_NUT:
s->seq_decode = (s->seq_decode + 1) & 0xff;
s->max_ra = INT_MAX;
break;
case HEVC_NAL_AUD:
case HEVC_NAL_FD_NUT:
break;
default:
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_INFO,
"Skipping NAL unit %d\n", s->nal_unit_type);
}
return 0;
fail:
if (s->avctx->err_recognition & AV_EF_EXPLODE)
return ret;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libavcodec/hevcdec.c in FFmpeg 4.1.2 mishandles detection of duplicate first slices, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and out-of-array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted HEVC data.
Commit Message: avcodec/hevcdec: Avoid only partly skiping duplicate first slices
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference and out of array access
Fixes: 13871/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5746167087890432
Fixes: 13845/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5650370728034304
This also fixes the return code for explode mode
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 169,706
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator::LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator(PageSerializer* serializer, Document* document, Vector<Node*>* nodes, LinkLocalPathMap* links, String directoryName)
: SerializerMarkupAccumulator(serializer, document, nodes)
, m_replaceLinks(links)
, m_directoryName(directoryName)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly handle image data in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,562
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void __exit pf_exit(void)
{
struct pf_unit *pf;
int unit;
unregister_blkdev(major, name);
for (pf = units, unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; pf++, unit++) {
if (pf->present)
del_gendisk(pf->disk);
blk_cleanup_queue(pf->disk->queue);
blk_mq_free_tag_set(&pf->tag_set);
put_disk(pf->disk);
if (pf->present)
pi_release(pf->pi);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.9. There is a NULL pointer dereference for a pf data structure if alloc_disk fails in drivers/block/paride/pf.c.
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
Low
| 169,522
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: tt_sbit_decoder_load_image( TT_SBitDecoder decoder,
FT_UInt glyph_index,
FT_Int x_pos,
FT_Int y_pos )
{
/*
* First, we find the correct strike range that applies to this
* glyph index.
*/
FT_Byte* p = decoder->eblc_base + decoder->strike_index_array;
FT_Byte* p_limit = decoder->eblc_limit;
FT_ULong num_ranges = decoder->strike_index_count;
FT_UInt start, end, index_format, image_format;
FT_ULong image_start = 0, image_end = 0, image_offset;
for ( ; num_ranges > 0; num_ranges-- )
{
start = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
end = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( glyph_index >= start && glyph_index <= end )
goto FoundRange;
p += 4; /* ignore index offset */
}
goto NoBitmap;
FoundRange:
image_offset = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
/* overflow check */
p = decoder->eblc_base + decoder->strike_index_array;
if ( image_offset > (FT_ULong)( p_limit - p ) )
goto Failure;
p += image_offset;
if ( p + 8 > p_limit )
goto NoBitmap;
/* now find the glyph's location and extend within the ebdt table */
index_format = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
image_format = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
image_offset = FT_NEXT_ULONG ( p );
switch ( index_format )
{
case 1: /* 4-byte offsets relative to `image_offset' */
p += 4 * ( glyph_index - start );
if ( p + 8 > p_limit )
goto NoBitmap;
image_start = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
image_end = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( image_start == image_end ) /* missing glyph */
goto NoBitmap;
break;
case 2: /* big metrics, constant image size */
{
FT_ULong image_size;
if ( p + 12 > p_limit )
goto NoBitmap;
image_size = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( tt_sbit_decoder_load_metrics( decoder, &p, p_limit, 1 ) )
goto NoBitmap;
image_start = image_size * ( glyph_index - start );
image_end = image_start + image_size;
}
break;
case 3: /* 2-byte offsets relative to 'image_offset' */
p += 2 * ( glyph_index - start );
if ( p + 4 > p_limit )
goto NoBitmap;
image_start = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
image_end = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( image_start == image_end ) /* missing glyph */
goto NoBitmap;
break;
case 4: /* sparse glyph array with (glyph,offset) pairs */
{
FT_ULong mm, num_glyphs;
if ( p + 4 > p_limit )
goto NoBitmap;
num_glyphs = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
/* overflow check for p + ( num_glyphs + 1 ) * 4 */
if ( num_glyphs > (FT_ULong)( ( ( p_limit - p ) >> 2 ) - 1 ) )
goto NoBitmap;
for ( mm = 0; mm < num_glyphs; mm++ )
FT_UInt gindex = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( gindex == glyph_index )
{
image_start = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
p += 2;
image_end = FT_PEEK_USHORT( p );
break;
}
p += 2;
}
if ( mm >= num_glyphs )
goto NoBitmap;
}
break;
case 5: /* constant metrics with sparse glyph codes */
case 19:
{
FT_ULong image_size, mm, num_glyphs;
if ( p + 16 > p_limit )
goto NoBitmap;
image_size = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( tt_sbit_decoder_load_metrics( decoder, &p, p_limit, 1 ) )
goto NoBitmap;
num_glyphs = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
/* overflow check for p + 2 * num_glyphs */
if ( num_glyphs > (FT_ULong)( ( p_limit - p ) >> 1 ) )
goto NoBitmap;
for ( mm = 0; mm < num_glyphs; mm++ )
{
FT_UInt gindex = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( gindex == glyph_index )
break;
}
if ( mm >= num_glyphs )
goto NoBitmap;
image_start = image_size * mm;
image_end = image_start + image_size;
}
break;
default:
goto NoBitmap;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The tt_sbit_decoder_load_image function in sfnt/ttsbit.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 does not properly check for an integer overflow, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted OpenType font.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,866
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
int closing, int tx_ring)
{
struct pgv *pg_vec = NULL;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
int was_running, order = 0;
struct packet_ring_buffer *rb;
struct sk_buff_head *rb_queue;
__be16 num;
int err = -EINVAL;
/* Added to avoid minimal code churn */
struct tpacket_req *req = &req_u->req;
/* Opening a Tx-ring is NOT supported in TPACKET_V3 */
if (!closing && tx_ring && (po->tp_version > TPACKET_V2)) {
net_warn_ratelimited("Tx-ring is not supported.\n");
goto out;
}
rb = tx_ring ? &po->tx_ring : &po->rx_ring;
rb_queue = tx_ring ? &sk->sk_write_queue : &sk->sk_receive_queue;
err = -EBUSY;
if (!closing) {
if (atomic_read(&po->mapped))
goto out;
if (packet_read_pending(rb))
goto out;
}
if (req->tp_block_nr) {
/* Sanity tests and some calculations */
err = -EBUSY;
if (unlikely(rb->pg_vec))
goto out;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V1:
po->tp_hdrlen = TPACKET_HDRLEN;
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
po->tp_hdrlen = TPACKET2_HDRLEN;
break;
case TPACKET_V3:
po->tp_hdrlen = TPACKET3_HDRLEN;
break;
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely((int)req->tp_block_size <= 0))
goto out;
if (unlikely(!PAGE_ALIGNED(req->tp_block_size)))
goto out;
if (po->tp_version >= TPACKET_V3 &&
(int)(req->tp_block_size -
BLK_PLUS_PRIV(req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv)) <= 0)
goto out;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_size < po->tp_hdrlen +
po->tp_reserve))
goto out;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_size & (TPACKET_ALIGNMENT - 1)))
goto out;
rb->frames_per_block = req->tp_block_size / req->tp_frame_size;
if (unlikely(rb->frames_per_block == 0))
goto out;
if (unlikely((rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr) !=
req->tp_frame_nr))
goto out;
err = -ENOMEM;
order = get_order(req->tp_block_size);
pg_vec = alloc_pg_vec(req, order);
if (unlikely(!pg_vec))
goto out;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V3:
/* Transmit path is not supported. We checked
* it above but just being paranoid
*/
if (!tx_ring)
init_prb_bdqc(po, rb, pg_vec, req_u);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* Done */
else {
err = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_nr))
goto out;
}
lock_sock(sk);
/* Detach socket from network */
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
was_running = po->running;
num = po->num;
if (was_running) {
po->num = 0;
__unregister_prot_hook(sk, false);
}
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
synchronize_net();
err = -EBUSY;
mutex_lock(&po->pg_vec_lock);
if (closing || atomic_read(&po->mapped) == 0) {
err = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&rb_queue->lock);
swap(rb->pg_vec, pg_vec);
rb->frame_max = (req->tp_frame_nr - 1);
rb->head = 0;
rb->frame_size = req->tp_frame_size;
spin_unlock_bh(&rb_queue->lock);
swap(rb->pg_vec_order, order);
swap(rb->pg_vec_len, req->tp_block_nr);
rb->pg_vec_pages = req->tp_block_size/PAGE_SIZE;
po->prot_hook.func = (po->rx_ring.pg_vec) ?
tpacket_rcv : packet_rcv;
skb_queue_purge(rb_queue);
if (atomic_read(&po->mapped))
pr_err("packet_mmap: vma is busy: %d\n",
atomic_read(&po->mapped));
}
mutex_unlock(&po->pg_vec_lock);
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
if (was_running) {
po->num = num;
register_prot_hook(sk);
}
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
if (closing && (po->tp_version > TPACKET_V2)) {
/* Because we don't support block-based V3 on tx-ring */
if (!tx_ring)
prb_shutdown_retire_blk_timer(po, rb_queue);
}
release_sock(sk);
if (pg_vec)
free_pg_vec(pg_vec, order, req->tp_block_nr);
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel through 4.8.12 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) by leveraging the CAP_NET_RAW capability to change a socket version, related to the packet_set_ring and packet_setsockopt functions.
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,909
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void php_html_entities(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int all)
{
char *str, *hint_charset = NULL;
int str_len, hint_charset_len = 0;
size_t new_len;
long flags = ENT_COMPAT;
char *replaced;
zend_bool double_encode = 1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|ls!b", &str, &str_len, &flags, &hint_charset, &hint_charset_len, &double_encode) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
replaced = php_escape_html_entities_ex(str, str_len, &new_len, all, (int) flags, hint_charset, double_encode TSRMLS_CC);
RETVAL_STRINGL(replaced, (int)new_len, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
|
Low
| 167,175
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void svc_rdma_send_error(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt, struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
int status)
{
struct ib_send_wr err_wr;
struct page *p;
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
enum rpcrdma_errcode err;
__be32 *va;
int length;
int ret;
ret = svc_rdma_repost_recv(xprt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret)
return;
p = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
return;
va = page_address(p);
/* XDR encode an error reply */
err = ERR_CHUNK;
if (status == -EPROTONOSUPPORT)
err = ERR_VERS;
length = svc_rdma_xdr_encode_error(xprt, rmsgp, err, va);
ctxt = svc_rdma_get_context(xprt);
ctxt->direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
ctxt->count = 1;
ctxt->pages[0] = p;
/* Prepare SGE for local address */
ctxt->sge[0].lkey = xprt->sc_pd->local_dma_lkey;
ctxt->sge[0].length = length;
ctxt->sge[0].addr = ib_dma_map_page(xprt->sc_cm_id->device,
p, 0, length, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (ib_dma_mapping_error(xprt->sc_cm_id->device, ctxt->sge[0].addr)) {
dprintk("svcrdma: Error mapping buffer for protocol error\n");
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
return;
}
svc_rdma_count_mappings(xprt, ctxt);
/* Prepare SEND WR */
memset(&err_wr, 0, sizeof(err_wr));
ctxt->cqe.done = svc_rdma_wc_send;
err_wr.wr_cqe = &ctxt->cqe;
err_wr.sg_list = ctxt->sge;
err_wr.num_sge = 1;
err_wr.opcode = IB_WR_SEND;
err_wr.send_flags = IB_SEND_SIGNALED;
/* Post It */
ret = svc_rdma_send(xprt, &err_wr);
if (ret) {
dprintk("svcrdma: Error %d posting send for protocol error\n",
ret);
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,174
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SetBuildInfoAnnotations(std::map<std::string, std::string>* annotations) {
base::android::BuildInfo* info = base::android::BuildInfo::GetInstance();
(*annotations)["android_build_id"] = info->android_build_id();
(*annotations)["android_build_fp"] = info->android_build_fp();
(*annotations)["device"] = info->device();
(*annotations)["model"] = info->model();
(*annotations)["brand"] = info->brand();
(*annotations)["board"] = info->board();
(*annotations)["installer_package_name"] = info->installer_package_name();
(*annotations)["abi_name"] = info->abi_name();
(*annotations)["custom_themes"] = info->custom_themes();
(*annotations)["resources_verison"] = info->resources_version();
(*annotations)["gms_core_version"] = info->gms_version_code();
if (info->firebase_app_id()[0] != '\0') {
(*annotations)["package"] = std::string(info->firebase_app_id()) + " v" +
info->package_version_code() + " (" +
info->package_version_name() + ")";
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: A timing attack on denormalized floating point arithmetic in SVG filters in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Add Android SDK version to crash reports.
Bug: 911669
Change-Id: I62a97d76a0b88099a5a42b93463307f03be9b3e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1361104
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Conn <peconn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Michael van Ouwerkerk <mvanouwerkerk@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615851}
|
Medium
| 172,546
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadWPGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct
{
size_t FileId;
MagickOffsetType DataOffset;
unsigned int ProductType;
unsigned int FileType;
unsigned char MajorVersion;
unsigned char MinorVersion;
unsigned int EncryptKey;
unsigned int Reserved;
} WPGHeader;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char RecType;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPGRecord;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char Class;
unsigned char RecType;
size_t Extension;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPG2Record;
typedef struct
{
unsigned HorizontalUnits;
unsigned VerticalUnits;
unsigned char PosSizePrecision;
} WPG2Start;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned char Depth;
unsigned char Compression;
} WPG2BitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int RotAngle;
unsigned int LowLeftX;
unsigned int LowLeftY;
unsigned int UpRightX;
unsigned int UpRightY;
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType2;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int StartIndex;
unsigned int NumOfEntries;
} WPGColorMapRec;
/*
typedef struct {
size_t PS_unknown1;
unsigned int PS_unknown2;
unsigned int PS_unknown3;
} WPGPSl1Record;
*/
Image
*image;
unsigned int
status;
WPGHeader
Header;
WPGRecord
Rec;
WPG2Record
Rec2;
WPG2Start StartWPG;
WPGBitmapType1
BitmapHeader1;
WPG2BitmapType1
Bitmap2Header1;
WPGBitmapType2
BitmapHeader2;
WPGColorMapRec
WPG_Palette;
int
i,
bpp,
WPG2Flags;
ssize_t
ldblk;
size_t
one;
unsigned char
*BImgBuff;
tCTM CTM; /*current transform matrix*/
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
one=1;
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
image->depth=8;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read WPG image.
*/
Header.FileId=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.DataOffset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.ProductType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.FileType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.MajorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.MinorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.EncryptKey=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.FileId!=0x435057FF || (Header.ProductType>>8)!=0x16)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (Header.EncryptKey!=0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"EncryptedWPGImageFileNotSupported");
image->columns = 1;
image->rows = 1;
image->colors = 0;
bpp=0;
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=0;
switch(Header.FileType)
{
case 1: /* WPG level 1 */
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec.RecordLength;
switch(Rec.RecType)
{
case 0x0B: /* bitmap type 1 */
BitmapHeader1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader1.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader1.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(BitmapHeader1.HorzRes && BitmapHeader1.VertRes)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->resolution.x=BitmapHeader1.HorzRes/470.0;
image->resolution.y=BitmapHeader1.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader1.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader1.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader1.Depth;
goto UnpackRaster;
case 0x0E: /*Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
goto NoMemory;
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
}
break;
case 0x11: /* Start PS l1 */
if(Rec.RecordLength > 8)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+8, /* skip PS header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-8,exception);
break;
case 0x14: /* bitmap type 2 */
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader2.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader2.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader2.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->page.width=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightX)/470.0);
image->page.height=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightY)/470.0);
image->page.x=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
image->page.y=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
if(BitmapHeader2.HorzRes && BitmapHeader2.VertRes)
{
image->resolution.x=BitmapHeader2.HorzRes/470.0;
image->resolution.y=BitmapHeader2.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader2.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader2.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader2.Depth;
UnpackRaster:
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
{
NoMemory:
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/* printf("Load default colormap \n"); */
for (i=0; (i < (int) image->colors) && (i < 256); i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Blue);
}
}
else
{
if (bpp < 24)
if ( (image->colors < (one << bpp)) && (bpp != 24) )
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
if (bpp == 1)
{
if(image->colormap[0].red==0 &&
image->colormap[0].green==0 &&
image->colormap[0].blue==0 &&
image->colormap[1].red==0 &&
image->colormap[1].green==0 &&
image->colormap[1].blue==0)
{ /* fix crippled monochrome palette */
image->colormap[1].red =
image->colormap[1].green =
image->colormap[1].blue = QuantumRange;
}
}
if(UnpackWPGRaster(image,bpp,exception) < 0)
/* The raster cannot be unpacked */
{
DecompressionFailed:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage");
}
if(Rec.RecType==0x14 && BitmapHeader2.RotAngle!=0 && !image_info->ping)
{
/* flop command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x8000)
{
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
}
/* flip command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x2000)
{
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
}
/* rotate command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x0FFF)
{
Image
*rotate_image;
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle &
0x0FFF), exception);
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(rotate_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,rotate_image);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x1B: /* Postscript l2 */
if(Rec.RecordLength>0x3C)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+0x3C, /* skip PS l2 header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-0x3C,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* WPG level 2 */
(void) memset(CTM,0,sizeof(CTM));
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision = 0;
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec2.Class=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rec2.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.Extension);
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec2.RecordLength;
switch(Rec2.RecType)
{
case 1:
StartWPG.HorizontalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.VerticalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision=ReadBlobByte(image);
break;
case 0x0C: /* Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /*Opacity??*/
}
break;
case 0x0E:
Bitmap2Header1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((Bitmap2Header1.Width == 0) || (Bitmap2Header1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
Bitmap2Header1.Depth=ReadBlobByte(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Compression=ReadBlobByte(image);
if(Bitmap2Header1.Compression > 1)
continue; /*Unknown compression method */
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Depth)
{
case 1:
bpp=1;
break;
case 2:
bpp=2;
break;
case 3:
bpp=4;
break;
case 4:
bpp=8;
break;
case 8:
bpp=24;
break;
default:
continue; /*Ignore raster with unknown depth*/
}
image->columns=Bitmap2Header1.Width;
image->rows=Bitmap2Header1.Height;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
goto NoMemory;
}
else
{
if(bpp < 24)
if( image->colors<(one << bpp) && bpp!=24 )
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Compression)
{
case 0: /*Uncompressed raster*/
{
ldblk=(ssize_t) ((bpp*image->columns+7)/8);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
ldblk+1,sizeof(*BImgBuff));
if (BImgBuff == (unsigned char *) NULL)
goto NoMemory;
for(i=0; i< (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
{
(void) ReadBlob(image,ldblk,BImgBuff);
InsertRow(image,BImgBuff,i,bpp,exception);
}
if(BImgBuff)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
break;
}
case 1: /*RLE for WPG2 */
{
if( UnpackWPG2Raster(image,bpp,exception) < 0)
goto DecompressionFailed;
break;
}
}
if(CTM[0][0]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
Tx(0,0)=-1; Tx(1,0)=0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)=(WPG._2Rect.X_ur+WPG._2Rect.X_ll);
Tx(1,2)=0; Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
if(CTM[1][1]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
float_matrix Tx(3,3);
Tx(0,0)= 1; Tx(1,0)= 0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=-1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)= 0; Tx(1,2)=(WPG._2Rect.Y_ur+WPG._2Rect.Y_ll);
Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x12: /* Postscript WPG2*/
i=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(Rec2.RecordLength > (unsigned int) i)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+i, /*skip PS header in the wpg2*/
(ssize_t) (Rec2.RecordLength-i-2),exception);
break;
case 0x1B: /*bitmap rectangle*/
WPG2Flags = LoadWPG2Flags(image,StartWPG.PosSizePrecision,NULL,&CTM);
(void) WPG2Flags;
break;
}
}
break;
default:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
}
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
Finish:
(void) CloseBlob(image);
{
Image
*p;
ssize_t
scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers.
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=(size_t) scene++;
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageFileDoesNotContainAnyImageData");
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WPG parser in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-4 and 7.x before 7.0.1-5, when a memory limit is set, allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the SetImageExtent return-value check, which trigger (1) a heap-based buffer overflow in the SetPixelIndex function or an invalid write operation in the (2) ScaleCharToQuantum or (3) SetPixelIndex functions.
Commit Message: Ensure image extent does not exceed maximum
|
Medium
| 169,958
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ZEND_API void zend_object_store_ctor_failed(zval *zobject TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_handle handle = Z_OBJ_HANDLE_P(zobject);
zend_object_store_bucket *obj_bucket = &EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle];
obj_bucket->bucket.obj.handlers = Z_OBJ_HT_P(zobject);;
obj_bucket->destructor_called = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ext/standard/var_unserializer.re in PHP before 5.6.26 mishandles object-deserialization failures, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an unserialize call that references a partially constructed object.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
|
Low
| 166,938
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int compile_search(struct Context *ctx, const struct Pattern *pat, struct Buffer *buf)
{
if (do_search(pat, 0) == 0)
return 0;
if (pat->not)
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "NOT ");
if (pat->child)
{
int clauses;
clauses = do_search(pat->child, 1);
if (clauses > 0)
{
const struct Pattern *clause = pat->child;
mutt_buffer_addch(buf, '(');
while (clauses)
{
if (do_search(clause, 0))
{
if (pat->op == MUTT_OR && clauses > 1)
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "OR ");
clauses--;
if (compile_search(ctx, clause, buf) < 0)
return -1;
if (clauses)
mutt_buffer_addch(buf, ' ');
}
clause = clause->next;
}
mutt_buffer_addch(buf, ')');
}
}
else
{
char term[STRING];
char *delim = NULL;
switch (pat->op)
{
case MUTT_HEADER:
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "HEADER ");
/* extract header name */
delim = strchr(pat->p.str, ':');
if (!delim)
{
mutt_error(_("Header search without header name: %s"), pat->p.str);
return -1;
}
*delim = '\0';
imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str);
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term);
mutt_buffer_addch(buf, ' ');
/* and field */
*delim = ':';
delim++;
SKIPWS(delim);
imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), delim);
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term);
break;
case MUTT_BODY:
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "BODY ");
imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str);
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term);
break;
case MUTT_WHOLE_MSG:
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "TEXT ");
imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str);
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term);
break;
case MUTT_SERVERSEARCH:
{
struct ImapData *idata = ctx->data;
if (!mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, X_GM_EXT1))
{
mutt_error(_("Server-side custom search not supported: %s"), pat->p.str);
return -1;
}
}
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "X-GM-RAW ");
imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str);
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term);
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-77
Summary: An issue was discovered in Mutt before 1.10.1 and NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. They allow remote IMAP servers to execute arbitrary commands via backquote characters, related to the mailboxes command associated with an automatic subscription.
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
|
Low
| 169,135
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: setkey_principal_2_svc(setkey_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setkey_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keyblocks, arg->n_keys);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 167,526
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Document::InitSecurityContext(const DocumentInit& initializer) {
DCHECK(!GetSecurityOrigin());
if (!initializer.HasSecurityContext()) {
cookie_url_ = KURL(g_empty_string);
SetSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::CreateUniqueOpaque());
InitContentSecurityPolicy();
ApplyFeaturePolicy({});
return;
}
SandboxFlags sandbox_flags = initializer.GetSandboxFlags();
if (fetcher_->Archive()) {
sandbox_flags |=
kSandboxAll &
~(kSandboxPopups | kSandboxPropagatesToAuxiliaryBrowsingContexts);
}
EnforceSandboxFlags(sandbox_flags);
SetInsecureRequestPolicy(initializer.GetInsecureRequestPolicy());
if (initializer.InsecureNavigationsToUpgrade()) {
for (auto to_upgrade : *initializer.InsecureNavigationsToUpgrade())
AddInsecureNavigationUpgrade(to_upgrade);
}
const ContentSecurityPolicy* policy_to_inherit = nullptr;
if (IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin)) {
cookie_url_ = url_;
scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> security_origin =
SecurityOrigin::CreateUniqueOpaque();
Document* owner = initializer.OwnerDocument();
if (owner) {
if (owner->GetSecurityOrigin()->IsPotentiallyTrustworthy())
security_origin->SetOpaqueOriginIsPotentiallyTrustworthy(true);
if (owner->GetSecurityOrigin()->CanLoadLocalResources())
security_origin->GrantLoadLocalResources();
policy_to_inherit = owner->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
}
SetSecurityOrigin(std::move(security_origin));
} else if (Document* owner = initializer.OwnerDocument()) {
cookie_url_ = owner->CookieURL();
SetSecurityOrigin(owner->GetMutableSecurityOrigin());
policy_to_inherit = owner->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
} else {
cookie_url_ = url_;
SetSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::Create(url_));
}
if (initializer.IsHostedInReservedIPRange()) {
SetAddressSpace(GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocalhost()
? mojom::IPAddressSpace::kLocal
: mojom::IPAddressSpace::kPrivate);
} else if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocal()) {
SetAddressSpace(mojom::IPAddressSpace::kLocal);
} else {
SetAddressSpace(mojom::IPAddressSpace::kPublic);
}
if (ImportsController()) {
SetContentSecurityPolicy(
ImportsController()->Master()->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
} else {
InitContentSecurityPolicy(nullptr, policy_to_inherit,
initializer.PreviousDocumentCSP());
}
if (Settings* settings = initializer.GetSettings()) {
if (!settings->GetWebSecurityEnabled()) {
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->GrantUniversalAccess();
} else if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocal()) {
if (settings->GetAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs()) {
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->GrantUniversalAccess();
} else if (!settings->GetAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs()) {
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->BlockLocalAccessFromLocalOrigin();
}
}
}
if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsOpaque() &&
SecurityOrigin::Create(url_)->IsPotentiallyTrustworthy())
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->SetOpaqueOriginIsPotentiallyTrustworthy(true);
ApplyFeaturePolicy({});
InitSecureContextState();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect inheritance of a new document's policy in Content Security Policy in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
|
Medium
| 173,053
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct gengetopt_args_info args_info;
char *line = NULL;
size_t linelen = 0;
char *p, *r;
uint32_t *q;
unsigned cmdn = 0;
int rc;
setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
set_program_name (argv[0]);
bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
textdomain (PACKAGE);
if (cmdline_parser (argc, argv, &args_info) != 0)
return EXIT_FAILURE;
if (args_info.version_given)
{
version_etc (stdout, "idn", PACKAGE_NAME, VERSION,
"Simon Josefsson", (char *) NULL);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
if (args_info.help_given)
usage (EXIT_SUCCESS);
/* Backwards compatibility: -n has always been the documented short
form for --nfkc but, before v1.10, -k was the implemented short
form. We now accept both to avoid documentation changes. */
if (args_info.hidden_nfkc_given)
args_info.nfkc_given = 1;
if (!args_info.stringprep_given &&
!args_info.punycode_encode_given && !args_info.punycode_decode_given &&
!args_info.idna_to_ascii_given && !args_info.idna_to_unicode_given &&
!args_info.nfkc_given)
args_info.idna_to_ascii_given = 1;
if ((args_info.stringprep_given ? 1 : 0) +
(args_info.punycode_encode_given ? 1 : 0) +
(args_info.punycode_decode_given ? 1 : 0) +
(args_info.idna_to_ascii_given ? 1 : 0) +
(args_info.idna_to_unicode_given ? 1 : 0) +
(args_info.nfkc_given ? 1 : 0) != 1)
{
error (0, 0, _("only one of -s, -e, -d, -a, -u or -n can be specified"));
usage (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (!args_info.quiet_given
&& args_info.inputs_num == 0
&& isatty (fileno (stdin)))
fprintf (stderr, "%s %s\n" GREETING, PACKAGE, VERSION);
if (args_info.debug_given)
fprintf (stderr, _("Charset `%s'.\n"), stringprep_locale_charset ());
if (!args_info.quiet_given
&& args_info.inputs_num == 0
&& isatty (fileno (stdin)))
fprintf (stderr, _("Type each input string on a line by itself, "
"terminated by a newline character.\n"));
do
{
if (cmdn < args_info.inputs_num)
line = strdup (args_info.inputs[cmdn++]);
else if (getline (&line, &linelen, stdin) == -1)
{
if (feof (stdin))
break;
error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("input error"));
}
if (line[strlen (line) - 1] == '\n')
line[strlen (line) - 1] = '\0';
if (args_info.stringprep_given)
{
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from %s to UTF-8"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (p, -1, NULL);
if (!q)
{
free (p);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
}
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "input[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
free (q);
rc = stringprep_profile (p, &r,
args_info.profile_given ?
args_info.profile_arg : "Nameprep", 0);
free (p);
if (rc != STRINGPREP_OK)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("stringprep_profile: %s"),
stringprep_strerror (rc));
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (r, -1, NULL);
if (!q)
{
free (r);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
}
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "output[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
free (q);
p = stringprep_utf8_to_locale (r);
free (r);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from UTF-8 to %s"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
if (args_info.punycode_encode_given)
{
char encbuf[BUFSIZ];
size_t len, len2;
p = stringprep_locale_to_utf8 (line);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from %s to UTF-8"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (p, -1, &len);
free (p);
if (!q)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "input[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
len2 = BUFSIZ - 1;
rc = punycode_encode (len, q, NULL, &len2, encbuf);
free (q);
if (rc != PUNYCODE_SUCCESS)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("punycode_encode: %s"),
punycode_strerror (rc));
encbuf[len2] = '\0';
p = stringprep_utf8_to_locale (encbuf);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from UTF-8 to %s"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
if (args_info.punycode_decode_given)
{
size_t len;
len = BUFSIZ;
q = (uint32_t *) malloc (len * sizeof (q[0]));
if (!q)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, ENOMEM, N_("malloc"));
rc = punycode_decode (strlen (line), line, &len, q, NULL);
if (rc != PUNYCODE_SUCCESS)
{
free (q);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("punycode_decode: %s"),
punycode_strerror (rc));
}
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "output[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
q[len] = 0;
r = stringprep_ucs4_to_utf8 (q, -1, NULL, NULL);
free (q);
if (!r)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UCS-4 to UTF-8"));
p = stringprep_utf8_to_locale (r);
free (r);
if (!r)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from UTF-8 to %s"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
if (args_info.idna_to_ascii_given)
{
p = stringprep_locale_to_utf8 (line);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from %s to UTF-8"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (p, -1, NULL);
free (p);
if (!q)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UCS-4 to UTF-8"));
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "input[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
rc = idna_to_ascii_4z (q, &p,
(args_info.allow_unassigned_given ?
IDNA_ALLOW_UNASSIGNED : 0) |
(args_info.usestd3asciirules_given ?
IDNA_USE_STD3_ASCII_RULES : 0));
free (q);
if (rc != IDNA_SUCCESS)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("idna_to_ascii_4z: %s"),
idna_strerror (rc));
#ifdef WITH_TLD
if (args_info.tld_flag && !args_info.no_tld_flag)
{
size_t errpos;
rc = idna_to_unicode_8z4z (p, &q,
(args_info.allow_unassigned_given ?
IDNA_ALLOW_UNASSIGNED : 0) |
(args_info.usestd3asciirules_given ?
IDNA_USE_STD3_ASCII_RULES : 0));
if (rc != IDNA_SUCCESS)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("idna_to_unicode_8z4z (TLD): %s"),
idna_strerror (rc));
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "tld[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
rc = tld_check_4z (q, &errpos, NULL);
free (q);
if (rc == TLD_INVALID)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("tld_check_4z (position %lu): %s"),
(unsigned long) errpos, tld_strerror (rc));
if (rc != TLD_SUCCESS)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("tld_check_4z: %s"),
tld_strerror (rc));
}
#endif
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; p[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "output[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, p[i]);
}
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
if (args_info.idna_to_unicode_given)
{
p = stringprep_locale_to_utf8 (line);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from %s to UTF-8"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (p, -1, NULL);
if (!q)
{
free (p);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UCS-4 to UTF-8"));
}
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "input[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
free (q);
rc = idna_to_unicode_8z4z (p, &q,
(args_info.allow_unassigned_given ?
IDNA_ALLOW_UNASSIGNED : 0) |
(args_info.usestd3asciirules_given ?
IDNA_USE_STD3_ASCII_RULES : 0));
free (p);
if (rc != IDNA_SUCCESS)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("idna_to_unicode_8z4z: %s"),
idna_strerror (rc));
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "output[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
#ifdef WITH_TLD
if (args_info.tld_flag)
{
size_t errpos;
rc = tld_check_4z (q, &errpos, NULL);
if (rc == TLD_INVALID)
{
free (q);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("tld_check_4z (position %lu): %s"),
(unsigned long) errpos, tld_strerror (rc));
}
if (rc != TLD_SUCCESS)
{
free (q);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("tld_check_4z: %s"),
tld_strerror (rc));
}
}
#endif
r = stringprep_ucs4_to_utf8 (q, -1, NULL, NULL);
free (q);
if (!r)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
p = stringprep_utf8_to_locale (r);
free (r);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from UTF-8 to %s"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
if (args_info.nfkc_given)
{
p = stringprep_locale_to_utf8 (line);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from %s to UTF-8"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (p, -1, NULL);
if (!q)
{
free (p);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
}
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "input[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
free (q);
}
r = stringprep_utf8_nfkc_normalize (p, -1);
free (p);
if (!r)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not do NFKC normalization"));
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (r, -1, NULL);
if (!q)
{
free (r);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
}
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "output[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
free (q);
}
p = stringprep_utf8_to_locale (r);
free (r);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from UTF-8 to %s"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
fflush (stdout);
}
while (!feof (stdin) && !ferror (stdin) && (args_info.inputs_num == 0 ||
cmdn < args_info.inputs_num));
free (line);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: idn in libidn before 1.33 might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive memory information by reading a zero byte as input, which triggers an out-of-bounds read, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-8948.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,985
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
unsigned int mss;
unsigned int unfrag_ip6hlen, unfrag_len;
struct frag_hdr *fptr;
u8 *mac_start, *prevhdr;
u8 nexthdr;
u8 frag_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
int offset;
__wsum csum;
mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
goto out;
if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) {
/* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. */
int type = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type;
if (unlikely(type & ~(SKB_GSO_UDP | SKB_GSO_DODGY) ||
!(type & (SKB_GSO_UDP))))
goto out;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss);
segs = NULL;
goto out;
}
/* Do software UFO. Complete and fill in the UDP checksum as HW cannot
* do checksum of UDP packets sent as multiple IP fragments.
*/
offset = skb->csum_start - skb_headroom(skb);
csum = skb_checksum(skb, offset, skb->len- offset, 0);
offset += skb->csum_offset;
*(__sum16 *)(skb->data + offset) = csum_fold(csum);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
/* Check if there is enough headroom to insert fragment header. */
if ((skb_headroom(skb) < frag_hdr_sz) &&
pskb_expand_head(skb, frag_hdr_sz, 0, GFP_ATOMIC))
goto out;
/* Find the unfragmentable header and shift it left by frag_hdr_sz
* bytes to insert fragment header.
*/
unfrag_ip6hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
unfrag_len = skb_network_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb) +
unfrag_ip6hlen;
mac_start = skb_mac_header(skb);
memmove(mac_start-frag_hdr_sz, mac_start, unfrag_len);
skb->mac_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
skb->network_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + unfrag_ip6hlen);
fptr->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fptr->reserved = 0;
ipv6_select_ident(fptr);
/* Fragment the skb. ipv6 header and the remaining fields of the
* fragment header are updated in ipv6_gso_segment()
*/
segs = skb_segment(skb, features);
out:
return segs;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The udp6_ufo_fragment function in net/ipv6/udp.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39, when a certain UDP Fragmentation Offload (UFO) configuration is enabled, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) by sending fragmented IPv6 UDP packets to a bridge device.
Commit Message: ipv6: udp: fix the wrong headroom check
At this point, skb->data points to skb_transport_header.
So, headroom check is wrong.
For some case:bridge(UFO is on) + eth device(UFO is off),
there is no enough headroom for IPv6 frag head.
But headroom check is always false.
This will bring about data be moved to there prior to skb->head,
when adding IPv6 frag header to skb.
Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 165,681
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int pptp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
int sockaddr_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_pppox *sp = (struct sockaddr_pppox *) uservaddr;
struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk);
struct pptp_opt *opt = &po->proto.pptp;
struct rtable *rt;
struct flowi4 fl4;
int error = 0;
if (sp->sa_protocol != PX_PROTO_PPTP)
return -EINVAL;
if (lookup_chan_dst(sp->sa_addr.pptp.call_id, sp->sa_addr.pptp.sin_addr.s_addr))
return -EALREADY;
lock_sock(sk);
/* Check for already bound sockets */
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_CONNECTED) {
error = -EBUSY;
goto end;
}
/* Check for already disconnected sockets, on attempts to disconnect */
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_DEAD) {
error = -EALREADY;
goto end;
}
if (!opt->src_addr.sin_addr.s_addr || !sp->sa_addr.pptp.sin_addr.s_addr) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto end;
}
po->chan.private = sk;
po->chan.ops = &pptp_chan_ops;
rt = ip_route_output_ports(sock_net(sk), &fl4, sk,
opt->dst_addr.sin_addr.s_addr,
opt->src_addr.sin_addr.s_addr,
0, 0,
IPPROTO_GRE, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), 0);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
error = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto end;
}
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
po->chan.mtu = dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
if (!po->chan.mtu)
po->chan.mtu = PPP_MRU;
ip_rt_put(rt);
po->chan.mtu -= PPTP_HEADER_OVERHEAD;
po->chan.hdrlen = 2 + sizeof(struct pptp_gre_header);
error = ppp_register_channel(&po->chan);
if (error) {
pr_err("PPTP: failed to register PPP channel (%d)\n", error);
goto end;
}
opt->dst_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp;
sk->sk_state = PPPOX_CONNECTED;
end:
release_sock(sk);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The (1) pptp_bind and (2) pptp_connect functions in drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c in the Linux kernel through 4.3.3 do not verify an address length, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory and bypass the KASLR protection mechanism via a crafted application.
Commit Message: pptp: verify sockaddr_len in pptp_bind() and pptp_connect()
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 166,561
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CleanUp(DownloadId id) {
MockDownloadFile* file = download_file_factory_->GetExistingFile(id);
ASSERT_TRUE(file != NULL);
EXPECT_CALL(*file, Cancel());
download_file_manager_->CancelDownload(id);
EXPECT_TRUE(NULL == download_file_manager_->GetDownloadFile(id));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,879
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), nullptr, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(DangerousPatternTLS().Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"(\u0131[\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"([ijl]\u0307)",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
DangerousPatternTLS().Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Incorrect handling of confusable characters in URL Formatter in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Add a few more confusability mapping entries
U+0153(œ) => ce
U+00E6(æ), U+04D5 (ӕ) => ae
U+0499(ҙ) => 3
U+0525(ԥ) => n
Bug: 835554, 826019, 836885
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: Ic89211f70359d3d67cc25c1805b426b72cdb16ae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1055894
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#558928}
|
Medium
| 173,157
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::Resize(const gfx::Size& size,
float scale_factor,
ColorSpace color_space,
bool has_alpha) {
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 52.0.2743.82 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
|
Medium
| 172,110
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: fpDiff(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
assert((cc%(bps*stride))==0);
if (!tmp)
return;
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[byte * wc + count] = tmp[bps * count + byte];
#else
cp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count] =
tmp[bps * count + byte];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
cp += cc - stride - 1;
for (count = cc; count > stride; count -= stride)
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] = (unsigned char)((cp[stride] - cp[0])&0xff); cp--)
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
|
Low
| 166,881
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
const unsigned char *limit)
{
/* This is used only by servers. */
SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
int fatal = 0;
int try_session_cache = 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int r;
#endif
if (session_id + len > limit) {
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
if (len == 0)
try_session_cache = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */
r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret);
switch (r) {
case -1: /* Error during processing */
fatal = 1;
goto err;
case 0: /* No ticket found */
case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */
break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
try_session_cache = 0;
break;
default:
abort();
}
#endif
if (try_session_cache &&
ret == NULL &&
!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
SSL_SESSION data;
data.ssl_version = s->version;
data.session_id_length = len;
if (len == 0)
return 0;
memcpy(data.session_id, session_id, len);
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data);
if (ret != NULL) {
/* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
}
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ret == NULL)
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
}
if (try_session_cache &&
ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
int copy = 1;
if ((ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, session_id, len, ©))) {
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
/*
* Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us
* to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the
* callback are shared between threads, it must handle the
* reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be
* thread-safe).
*/
if (copy)
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
/*
* Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as
* well if and only if we are supposed to.
*/
if (!
(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
/*
* The following should not return 1, otherwise, things are
* very strange
*/
SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
}
}
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
/* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) {
/*
* We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to
* use it in this context.
*/
goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
}
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
/*
* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context,
* which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application
* should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error
* case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a
* cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to
* effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone
* noticing).
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,
SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
if (ret->cipher == NULL) {
unsigned char buf[5], *p;
unsigned long l;
p = buf;
l = ret->cipher_id;
l2n(l, p);
if ((ret->ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[2]));
else
ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[1]));
if (ret->cipher == NULL)
goto err;
}
if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) { /* timeout */
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
if (try_session_cache) {
/* session was from the cache, so remove it */
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
}
goto err;
}
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
if (s->session != NULL)
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = ret;
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
return 1;
err:
if (ret != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (!try_session_cache) {
/*
* The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for
* the new session
*/
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
}
#endif
}
if (fatal)
return -1;
else
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: OpenSSL through 1.0.2h incorrectly uses pointer arithmetic for heap-buffer boundary checks, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging unexpected malloc behavior, related to s3_srvr.c, ssl_sess.c, and t1_lib.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,201
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType load_tile(Image *image,Image *tile_image,
XCFDocInfo *inDocInfo,XCFLayerInfo *inLayerInfo,size_t data_length,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
ssize_t
y;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*q;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*graydata;
XCFPixelInfo
*xcfdata,
*xcfodata;
xcfdata=(XCFPixelInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory(data_length,sizeof(*xcfdata));
if (xcfdata == (XCFPixelInfo *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
xcfodata=xcfdata;
graydata=(unsigned char *) xcfdata; /* used by gray and indexed */
count=ReadBlob(image,data_length,(unsigned char *) xcfdata);
if (count != (ssize_t) data_length)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"NotEnoughPixelData",
image->filename);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (inDocInfo->image_type == GIMP_GRAY)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelGray(tile_image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*graydata),q);
SetPixelAlpha(tile_image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
inLayerInfo->alpha),q);
graydata++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(tile_image);
}
}
else
if (inDocInfo->image_type == GIMP_RGB)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(tile_image,ScaleCharToQuantum(xcfdata->red),q);
SetPixelGreen(tile_image,ScaleCharToQuantum(xcfdata->green),q);
SetPixelBlue(tile_image,ScaleCharToQuantum(xcfdata->blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(tile_image,xcfdata->alpha == 255U ? TransparentAlpha :
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) inLayerInfo->alpha),q);
xcfdata++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(tile_image);
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(tile_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
xcfodata=(XCFPixelInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xcfodata);
return MagickTrue;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: coders/xcf.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted XCF file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/104
|
Medium
| 168,800
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCropThreshold(gdImagePtr im, const unsigned int color, const float threshold)
{
const int width = gdImageSX(im);
const int height = gdImageSY(im);
int x,y;
int match;
gdRect crop;
crop.x = 0;
crop.y = 0;
crop.width = 0;
crop.height = 0;
/* Pierre: crop everything sounds bad */
if (threshold > 100.0) {
return NULL;
}
/* TODO: Add gdImageGetRowPtr and works with ptr at the row level
* for the true color and palette images
* new formats will simply work with ptr
*/
match = 1;
for (y = 0; match && y < height; y++) {
for (x = 0; match && x < width; x++) {
match = (gdColorMatch(im, color, gdImageGetPixel(im, x,y), threshold)) > 0;
}
}
/* Pierre
* Nothing to do > bye
* Duplicate the image?
*/
if (y == height - 1) {
return NULL;
}
crop.y = y -1;
match = 1;
for (y = height - 1; match && y >= 0; y--) {
for (x = 0; match && x < width; x++) {
match = (gdColorMatch(im, color, gdImageGetPixel(im, x, y), threshold)) > 0;
}
}
if (y == 0) {
crop.height = height - crop.y + 1;
} else {
crop.height = y - crop.y + 2;
}
match = 1;
for (x = 0; match && x < width; x++) {
for (y = 0; match && y < crop.y + crop.height - 1; y++) {
match = (gdColorMatch(im, color, gdImageGetPixel(im, x,y), threshold)) > 0;
}
}
crop.x = x - 1;
match = 1;
for (x = width - 1; match && x >= 0; x--) {
for (y = 0; match && y < crop.y + crop.height - 1; y++) {
match = (gdColorMatch(im, color, gdImageGetPixel(im, x,y), threshold)) > 0;
}
}
crop.width = x - crop.x + 2;
return gdImageCrop(im, &crop);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The gdImageCropThreshold function in gd_crop.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.3, as used in PHP before 7.0.9, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via an invalid color index.
Commit Message: fix php 72494, invalid color index not handled, can lead to crash
|
Low
| 169,944
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, int *ok)
{
/*-
* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
* if so:
* (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
* (2) update s->init_num
*/
pitem *item;
hm_fragment *frag;
int al;
*ok = 0;
item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
if (item == NULL)
return 0;
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
/* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
frag->msg_header.frag_len);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The DTLS implementation in OpenSSL before 1.1.0 does not properly restrict the lifetime of queue entries associated with unused out-of-order messages, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by maintaining many crafted DTLS sessions simultaneously, related to d1_lib.c, statem_dtls.c, statem_lib.c, and statem_srvr.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,197
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: load(ImlibImage * im, ImlibProgressFunction progress, char progress_granularity,
char immediate_load)
{
static const int intoffset[] = { 0, 4, 2, 1 };
static const int intjump[] = { 8, 8, 4, 2 };
int rc;
DATA32 *ptr;
GifFileType *gif;
GifRowType *rows;
GifRecordType rec;
ColorMapObject *cmap;
int i, j, done, bg, r, g, b, w = 0, h = 0;
float per = 0.0, per_inc;
int last_per = 0, last_y = 0;
int transp;
int fd;
done = 0;
rows = NULL;
transp = -1;
/* if immediate_load is 1, then dont delay image laoding as below, or */
/* already data in this image - dont load it again */
if (im->data)
return 0;
fd = open(im->real_file, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
return 0;
#if GIFLIB_MAJOR >= 5
gif = DGifOpenFileHandle(fd, NULL);
#else
gif = DGifOpenFileHandle(fd);
#endif
if (!gif)
{
close(fd);
return 0;
}
rc = 0; /* Failure */
do
{
if (DGifGetRecordType(gif, &rec) == GIF_ERROR)
{
/* PrintGifError(); */
rec = TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE;
}
if ((rec == IMAGE_DESC_RECORD_TYPE) && (!done))
{
if (DGifGetImageDesc(gif) == GIF_ERROR)
{
/* PrintGifError(); */
rec = TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE;
}
w = gif->Image.Width;
h = gif->Image.Height;
if (!IMAGE_DIMENSIONS_OK(w, h))
goto quit2;
rows = calloc(h, sizeof(GifRowType *));
if (!rows)
goto quit2;
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
{
rows[i] = malloc(w * sizeof(GifPixelType));
if (!rows[i])
goto quit;
}
if (gif->Image.Interlace)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
for (j = intoffset[i]; j < h; j += intjump[i])
{
DGifGetLine(gif, rows[j], w);
}
}
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
{
DGifGetLine(gif, rows[i], w);
}
}
done = 1;
}
else if (rec == EXTENSION_RECORD_TYPE)
{
int ext_code;
GifByteType *ext;
ext = NULL;
DGifGetExtension(gif, &ext_code, &ext);
while (ext)
{
if ((ext_code == 0xf9) && (ext[1] & 1) && (transp < 0))
{
transp = (int)ext[4];
}
ext = NULL;
DGifGetExtensionNext(gif, &ext);
}
}
}
while (rec != TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE);
if (transp >= 0)
{
SET_FLAG(im->flags, F_HAS_ALPHA);
}
else
{
UNSET_FLAG(im->flags, F_HAS_ALPHA);
}
/* set the format string member to the lower-case full extension */
/* name for the format - so example names would be: */
/* "png", "jpeg", "tiff", "ppm", "pgm", "pbm", "gif", "xpm" ... */
im->w = w;
im->h = h;
if (!im->format)
im->format = strdup("gif");
if (im->loader || immediate_load || progress)
{
bg = gif->SBackGroundColor;
cmap = (gif->Image.ColorMap ? gif->Image.ColorMap : gif->SColorMap);
im->data = (DATA32 *) malloc(sizeof(DATA32) * w * h);
if (!im->data)
goto quit;
ptr = im->data;
per_inc = 100.0 / (((float)w) * h);
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
*ptr++ = 0x00ffffff & ((r << 16) | (g << 8) | b);
}
else
{
r = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Red;
g = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Green;
b = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Blue;
*ptr++ = (0xff << 24) | (r << 16) | (g << 8) | b;
}
per += per_inc;
if (progress && (((int)per) != last_per)
&& (((int)per) % progress_granularity == 0))
{
last_per = (int)per;
if (!(progress(im, (int)per, 0, last_y, w, i)))
{
rc = 2;
goto quit;
}
last_y = i;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: imlib2 before 1.4.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) via a GIF image without a colormap.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,340
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len)
{
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
int mode = ctxt->mode;
int def_op_bytes, def_ad_bytes, goffset, simd_prefix;
bool op_prefix = false;
bool has_seg_override = false;
struct opcode opcode;
ctxt->memop.type = OP_NONE;
ctxt->memopp = NULL;
ctxt->_eip = ctxt->eip;
ctxt->fetch.ptr = ctxt->fetch.data;
ctxt->fetch.end = ctxt->fetch.data + insn_len;
ctxt->opcode_len = 1;
if (insn_len > 0)
memcpy(ctxt->fetch.data, insn, insn_len);
else {
rc = __do_insn_fetch_bytes(ctxt, 1);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
}
switch (mode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_REAL:
case X86EMUL_MODE_VM86:
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16:
def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 2;
break;
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 4;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
def_op_bytes = 4;
def_ad_bytes = 8;
break;
#endif
default:
return EMULATION_FAILED;
}
ctxt->op_bytes = def_op_bytes;
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes;
/* Legacy prefixes. */
for (;;) {
switch (ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt)) {
case 0x66: /* operand-size override */
op_prefix = true;
/* switch between 2/4 bytes */
ctxt->op_bytes = def_op_bytes ^ 6;
break;
case 0x67: /* address-size override */
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
/* switch between 4/8 bytes */
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 12;
else
/* switch between 2/4 bytes */
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 6;
break;
case 0x26: /* ES override */
case 0x2e: /* CS override */
case 0x36: /* SS override */
case 0x3e: /* DS override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = (ctxt->b >> 3) & 3;
break;
case 0x64: /* FS override */
case 0x65: /* GS override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = ctxt->b & 7;
break;
case 0x40 ... 0x4f: /* REX */
if (mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
goto done_prefixes;
ctxt->rex_prefix = ctxt->b;
continue;
case 0xf0: /* LOCK */
ctxt->lock_prefix = 1;
break;
case 0xf2: /* REPNE/REPNZ */
case 0xf3: /* REP/REPE/REPZ */
ctxt->rep_prefix = ctxt->b;
break;
default:
goto done_prefixes;
}
/* Any legacy prefix after a REX prefix nullifies its effect. */
ctxt->rex_prefix = 0;
}
done_prefixes:
/* REX prefix. */
if (ctxt->rex_prefix & 8)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8; /* REX.W */
/* Opcode byte(s). */
opcode = opcode_table[ctxt->b];
/* Two-byte opcode? */
if (ctxt->b == 0x0f) {
ctxt->opcode_len = 2;
ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
opcode = twobyte_table[ctxt->b];
/* 0F_38 opcode map */
if (ctxt->b == 0x38) {
ctxt->opcode_len = 3;
ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
opcode = opcode_map_0f_38[ctxt->b];
}
}
ctxt->d = opcode.flags;
if (ctxt->d & ModRM)
ctxt->modrm = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
/* vex-prefix instructions are not implemented */
if (ctxt->opcode_len == 1 && (ctxt->b == 0xc5 || ctxt->b == 0xc4) &&
(mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 || (ctxt->modrm & 0xc0) == 0xc0)) {
ctxt->d = NotImpl;
}
while (ctxt->d & GroupMask) {
switch (ctxt->d & GroupMask) {
case Group:
goffset = (ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7;
opcode = opcode.u.group[goffset];
break;
case GroupDual:
goffset = (ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7;
if ((ctxt->modrm >> 6) == 3)
opcode = opcode.u.gdual->mod3[goffset];
else
opcode = opcode.u.gdual->mod012[goffset];
break;
case RMExt:
goffset = ctxt->modrm & 7;
opcode = opcode.u.group[goffset];
break;
case Prefix:
if (ctxt->rep_prefix && op_prefix)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
simd_prefix = op_prefix ? 0x66 : ctxt->rep_prefix;
switch (simd_prefix) {
case 0x00: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_no; break;
case 0x66: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_66; break;
case 0xf2: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_f2; break;
case 0xf3: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_f3; break;
}
break;
case Escape:
if (ctxt->modrm > 0xbf)
opcode = opcode.u.esc->high[ctxt->modrm - 0xc0];
else
opcode = opcode.u.esc->op[(ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7];
break;
case InstrDual:
if ((ctxt->modrm >> 6) == 3)
opcode = opcode.u.idual->mod3;
else
opcode = opcode.u.idual->mod012;
break;
case ModeDual:
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
opcode = opcode.u.mdual->mode64;
else
opcode = opcode.u.mdual->mode32;
break;
default:
return EMULATION_FAILED;
}
ctxt->d &= ~(u64)GroupMask;
ctxt->d |= opcode.flags;
}
/* Unrecognised? */
if (ctxt->d == 0)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
ctxt->execute = opcode.u.execute;
if (unlikely(ctxt->ud) && likely(!(ctxt->d & EmulateOnUD)))
return EMULATION_FAILED;
if (unlikely(ctxt->d &
(NotImpl|Stack|Op3264|Sse|Mmx|Intercept|CheckPerm|NearBranch|
No16))) {
/*
* These are copied unconditionally here, and checked unconditionally
* in x86_emulate_insn.
*/
ctxt->check_perm = opcode.check_perm;
ctxt->intercept = opcode.intercept;
if (ctxt->d & NotImpl)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) {
if (ctxt->op_bytes == 4 && (ctxt->d & Stack))
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
else if (ctxt->d & NearBranch)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
}
if (ctxt->d & Op3264) {
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
else
ctxt->op_bytes = 4;
}
if ((ctxt->d & No16) && ctxt->op_bytes == 2)
ctxt->op_bytes = 4;
if (ctxt->d & Sse)
ctxt->op_bytes = 16;
else if (ctxt->d & Mmx)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
}
/* ModRM and SIB bytes. */
if (ctxt->d & ModRM) {
rc = decode_modrm(ctxt, &ctxt->memop);
if (!has_seg_override) {
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = ctxt->modrm_seg;
}
} else if (ctxt->d & MemAbs)
rc = decode_abs(ctxt, &ctxt->memop);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
if (!has_seg_override)
ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_DS;
ctxt->memop.addr.mem.seg = ctxt->seg_override;
/*
* Decode and fetch the source operand: register, memory
* or immediate.
*/
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src, (ctxt->d >> SrcShift) & OpMask);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
/*
* Decode and fetch the second source operand: register, memory
* or immediate.
*/
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src2, (ctxt->d >> Src2Shift) & OpMask);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
/* Decode and fetch the destination operand: register or memory. */
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->dst, (ctxt->d >> DstShift) & OpMask);
if (ctxt->rip_relative)
ctxt->memopp->addr.mem.ea = address_mask(ctxt,
ctxt->memopp->addr.mem.ea + ctxt->_eip);
done:
return (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) ? EMULATION_FAILED : EMULATION_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The x86_decode_insn function in arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.7, when KVM is enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (host OS crash) via a certain use of a ModR/M byte in an undefined instruction.
Commit Message: kvm: x86: Check memopp before dereference (CVE-2016-8630)
Commit 41061cdb98 ("KVM: emulate: do not initialize memopp") removes a
check for non-NULL under incorrect assumptions. An undefined instruction
with a ModR/M byte with Mod=0 and R/M-5 (e.g. 0xc7 0x15) will attempt
to dereference a null pointer here.
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Message-Id: <1477592752-126650-2-git-send-email-osh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Owen Hofmann <osh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,918
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int piv_match_card_continued(sc_card_t *card)
{
int i;
int type = -1;
piv_private_data_t *priv = NULL;
int saved_type = card->type;
/* Since we send an APDU, the card's logout function may be called...
* however it may be in dirty memory */
card->ops->logout = NULL;
/* piv_match_card may be called with card->type, set by opensc.conf */
/* user provide card type must be one we know */
switch (card->type) {
case -1:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GENERIC:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_HIST:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_NEO:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_YUBIKEY4:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GI_DE:
type = card->type;
break;
default:
return 0; /* can not handle the card */
}
if (type == -1) {
/*
*try to identify card by ATR or historical data in ATR
* currently all PIV card will respond to piv_find_aid
* the same. But in future may need to know card type first,
* so do it here.
*/
if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes != NULL) {
if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len == 8 &&
!(memcmp(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes, "Yubikey4", 8))) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_YUBIKEY4;
}
else if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len >= 7 &&
!(memcmp(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes, "Yubikey", 7))) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_NEO;
}
/*
* https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp1239.pdf
* lists 2 ATRS with historical bytes:
* 73 66 74 65 2D 63 64 30 38 30
* 73 66 74 65 20 63 64 31 34 34
* will check for 73 66 74 65
*/
else if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len >= 4 &&
!(memcmp(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes, "sfte", 4))) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GI_DE;
}
else if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes[0] == 0x80u) { /* compact TLV */
size_t datalen;
const u8 *data = sc_compacttlv_find_tag(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes + 1,
card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len - 1,
0xF0, &datalen);
if (data != NULL) {
int k;
for (k = 0; piv_aids[k].len_long != 0; k++) {
if (datalen == piv_aids[k].len_long
&& !memcmp(data, piv_aids[k].value, datalen)) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_HIST;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
if (type == -1)
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GENERIC;
}
/* allocate and init basic fields */
priv = calloc(1, sizeof(piv_private_data_t));
if (!priv)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
if (card->type == -1)
card->type = type;
card->drv_data = priv; /* will free if no match, or pass on to piv_init */
priv->aid_file = sc_file_new();
priv->selected_obj = -1;
priv->pin_preference = 0x80; /* 800-73-3 part 1, table 3 */
priv->logged_in = SC_PIN_STATE_UNKNOWN;
priv->tries_left = 10; /* will assume OK at start */
priv->pstate = PIV_STATE_MATCH;
/* Some objects will only be present if History object says so */
for (i=0; i < PIV_OBJ_LAST_ENUM -1; i++)
if(piv_objects[i].flags & PIV_OBJECT_NOT_PRESENT)
priv->obj_cache[i].flags |= PIV_OBJ_CACHE_NOT_PRESENT;
sc_lock(card);
/*
* detect if active AID is PIV. NIST 800-73 says Only one PIV application per card
* and PIV must be the default application
* This can avoid doing doing a select_aid and losing the login state on some cards
* We may get interference on some cards by other drivers trying SELECT_AID before
* we get to see if PIV application is still active.
* putting PIV driver first might help.
* This may fail if the wrong AID is active
*/
i = piv_find_discovery(card);
if (i < 0) {
/* Detect by selecting applet */
sc_file_t aidfile;
i = piv_find_aid(card, &aidfile);
}
if (i >= 0) {
/*
* We now know PIV AID is active, test DISCOVERY object
* Some CAC cards with PIV don't support DISCOVERY and return
* SC_ERROR_INCORRECT_PARAMETERS. Any error other then
* SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND means we cannot use discovery
* to test for active AID.
*/
int i7e = piv_find_discovery(card);
if (i7e != 0 && i7e != SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND) {
priv->card_issues |= CI_DISCOVERY_USELESS;
priv->obj_cache[PIV_OBJ_DISCOVERY].flags |= PIV_OBJ_CACHE_NOT_PRESENT;
}
}
if (i < 0) {
/* don't match. Does not have a PIV applet. */
sc_unlock(card);
piv_finish(card);
card->type = saved_type;
return 0;
}
/* Matched, caller will use or free priv and sc_lock as needed */
priv->pstate=PIV_STATE_INIT;
return 1; /* match */
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Various out of bounds reads when handling responses in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to potentially crash the opensc library using programs.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
Low
| 169,062
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CL_Init( void ) {
Com_Printf( "----- Client Initialization -----\n" );
Con_Init();
if(!com_fullyInitialized)
{
CL_ClearState();
clc.state = CA_DISCONNECTED; // no longer CA_UNINITIALIZED
cl_oldGameSet = qfalse;
}
cls.realtime = 0;
CL_InitInput();
cl_noprint = Cvar_Get( "cl_noprint", "0", 0 );
#ifdef UPDATE_SERVER_NAME
cl_motd = Cvar_Get( "cl_motd", "1", 0 );
#endif
cl_timeout = Cvar_Get( "cl_timeout", "200", 0 );
cl_timeNudge = Cvar_Get( "cl_timeNudge", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_shownet = Cvar_Get( "cl_shownet", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_showSend = Cvar_Get( "cl_showSend", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_showTimeDelta = Cvar_Get( "cl_showTimeDelta", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_freezeDemo = Cvar_Get( "cl_freezeDemo", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
rcon_client_password = Cvar_Get( "rconPassword", "", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_activeAction = Cvar_Get( "activeAction", "", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_timedemo = Cvar_Get( "timedemo", "0", 0 );
cl_timedemoLog = Cvar_Get ("cl_timedemoLog", "", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_autoRecordDemo = Cvar_Get ("cl_autoRecordDemo", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_aviFrameRate = Cvar_Get ("cl_aviFrameRate", "25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_aviMotionJpeg = Cvar_Get ("cl_aviMotionJpeg", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_avidemo = Cvar_Get( "cl_avidemo", "0", 0 );
cl_forceavidemo = Cvar_Get( "cl_forceavidemo", "0", 0 );
rconAddress = Cvar_Get( "rconAddress", "", 0 );
cl_yawspeed = Cvar_Get( "cl_yawspeed", "140", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_pitchspeed = Cvar_Get( "cl_pitchspeed", "140", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_anglespeedkey = Cvar_Get( "cl_anglespeedkey", "1.5", 0 );
cl_maxpackets = Cvar_Get( "cl_maxpackets", "38", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_packetdup = Cvar_Get( "cl_packetdup", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_run = Cvar_Get( "cl_run", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_sensitivity = Cvar_Get( "sensitivity", "5", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_mouseAccel = Cvar_Get( "cl_mouseAccel", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_freelook = Cvar_Get( "cl_freelook", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_mouseAccelStyle = Cvar_Get( "cl_mouseAccelStyle", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_mouseAccelOffset = Cvar_Get( "cl_mouseAccelOffset", "5", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_CheckRange(cl_mouseAccelOffset, 0.001f, 50000.0f, qfalse);
cl_showMouseRate = Cvar_Get( "cl_showmouserate", "0", 0 );
cl_allowDownload = Cvar_Get( "cl_allowDownload", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
#ifdef USE_CURL_DLOPEN
cl_cURLLib = Cvar_Get("cl_cURLLib", DEFAULT_CURL_LIB, CVAR_ARCHIVE);
#endif
Cvar_Get( "cg_autoswitch", "2", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_wolfparticles", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_conXOffset = Cvar_Get( "cl_conXOffset", "0", 0 );
cl_inGameVideo = Cvar_Get( "r_inGameVideo", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_serverStatusResendTime = Cvar_Get( "cl_serverStatusResendTime", "750", 0 );
cl_recoilPitch = Cvar_Get( "cg_recoilPitch", "0", CVAR_ROM );
m_pitch = Cvar_Get( "m_pitch", "0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_yaw = Cvar_Get( "m_yaw", "0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_forward = Cvar_Get( "m_forward", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_side = Cvar_Get( "m_side", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_filter = Cvar_Get( "m_filter", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
j_pitch = Cvar_Get ("j_pitch", "0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_yaw = Cvar_Get ("j_yaw", "-0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_forward = Cvar_Get ("j_forward", "-0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_side = Cvar_Get ("j_side", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_up = Cvar_Get ("j_up", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_pitch_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_pitch_axis", "3", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_yaw_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_yaw_axis", "2", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_forward_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_forward_axis", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_side_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_side_axis", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_up_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_up_axis", "4", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_pitch_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_yaw_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_forward_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_side_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_up_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
cl_motdString = Cvar_Get( "cl_motdString", "", CVAR_ROM );
Cvar_Get( "cl_maxPing", "800", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_lanForcePackets = Cvar_Get ("cl_lanForcePackets", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_guidServerUniq = Cvar_Get ("cl_guidServerUniq", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_consoleKeys = Cvar_Get( "cl_consoleKeys", "~ ` 0x7e 0x60", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
Cvar_Get( "name", "WolfPlayer", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_rate = Cvar_Get( "rate", "25000", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE ); // NERVE - SMF - changed from 3000
Cvar_Get( "snaps", "20", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "model", "bj2", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "head", "default", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "color", "4", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "handicap", "100", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "sex", "male", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cl_anonymous", "0", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "password", "", CVAR_USERINFO );
Cvar_Get( "cg_predictItems", "1", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
#ifdef USE_MUMBLE
cl_useMumble = Cvar_Get ("cl_useMumble", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE | CVAR_LATCH);
cl_mumbleScale = Cvar_Get ("cl_mumbleScale", "0.0254", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
#endif
#ifdef USE_VOIP
cl_voipSend = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipSend", "0", 0);
cl_voipSendTarget = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipSendTarget", "spatial", 0);
cl_voipGainDuringCapture = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipGainDuringCapture", "0.2", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipCaptureMult = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipCaptureMult", "2.0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipUseVAD = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipUseVAD", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipVADThreshold = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipVADThreshold", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipShowMeter = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipShowMeter", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voip = Cvar_Get ("cl_voip", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
Cvar_CheckRange( cl_voip, 0, 1, qtrue );
cl_voipProtocol = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipProtocol", cl_voip->integer ? "opus" : "", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ROM);
#endif
Cvar_Get( "cg_autoactivate", "1", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_emptyswitch", "0", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_viewsize", "100", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get ("cg_stereoSeparation", "0", CVAR_ROM);
cl_missionStats = Cvar_Get( "g_missionStats", "0", CVAR_ROM );
cl_waitForFire = Cvar_Get( "cl_waitForFire", "0", CVAR_ROM );
cl_language = Cvar_Get( "cl_language", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_debugTranslation = Cvar_Get( "cl_debugTranslation", "0", 0 );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cmd", CL_ForwardToServer_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "configstrings", CL_Configstrings_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "clientinfo", CL_Clientinfo_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "snd_restart", CL_Snd_Restart_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "vid_restart", CL_Vid_Restart_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "disconnect", CL_Disconnect_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "record", CL_Record_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "demo", CL_PlayDemo_f );
Cmd_SetCommandCompletionFunc( "demo", CL_CompleteDemoName );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cinematic", CL_PlayCinematic_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "stoprecord", CL_StopRecord_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "connect", CL_Connect_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "reconnect", CL_Reconnect_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "localservers", CL_LocalServers_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "globalservers", CL_GlobalServers_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "rcon", CL_Rcon_f );
Cmd_SetCommandCompletionFunc( "rcon", CL_CompleteRcon );
Cmd_AddCommand( "ping", CL_Ping_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "serverstatus", CL_ServerStatus_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "showip", CL_ShowIP_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "fs_openedList", CL_OpenedPK3List_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "fs_referencedList", CL_ReferencedPK3List_f );
Cmd_AddCommand ("video", CL_Video_f );
Cmd_AddCommand ("stopvideo", CL_StopVideo_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_startgather", CL_Cache_StartGather_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_usedfile", CL_Cache_UsedFile_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_setindex", CL_Cache_SetIndex_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_mapchange", CL_Cache_MapChange_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_endgather", CL_Cache_EndGather_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "updatehunkusage", CL_UpdateLevelHunkUsage );
Cmd_AddCommand( "updatescreen", SCR_UpdateScreen );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cld", CL_ClientDamageCommand );
Cmd_AddCommand( "startMultiplayer", CL_startMultiplayer_f ); // NERVE - SMF
Cmd_AddCommand( "shellExecute", CL_ShellExecute_URL_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "map_restart", CL_MapRestart_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "setRecommended", CL_SetRecommended_f );
CL_InitRef();
SCR_Init();
Cvar_Set( "cl_running", "1" );
CL_GenerateQKey();
Cvar_Get( "cl_guid", "", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ROM );
CL_UpdateGUID( NULL, 0 );
Com_Printf( "----- Client Initialization Complete -----\n" );
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: In ioquake3 before 2017-03-14, the auto-downloading feature has insufficient content restrictions. This also affects Quake III Arena, OpenArena, OpenJK, iortcw, and other id Tech 3 (aka Quake 3 engine) forks. A malicious auto-downloaded file can trigger loading of crafted auto-downloaded files as native code DLLs. A malicious auto-downloaded file can contain configuration defaults that override the user's. Executable bytecode in a malicious auto-downloaded file can set configuration variables to values that will result in unwanted native code DLLs being loaded, resulting in sandbox escape.
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
|
Medium
| 170,085
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int base64decode_block(unsigned char *target, const char *data, size_t data_size)
{
int w1,w2,w3,w4;
int i;
size_t n;
if (!data || (data_size <= 0)) {
return 0;
}
n = 0;
i = 0;
while (n < data_size-3) {
w1 = base64_table[(int)data[n]];
w2 = base64_table[(int)data[n+1]];
w3 = base64_table[(int)data[n+2]];
w4 = base64_table[(int)data[n+3]];
if (w2 >= 0) {
target[i++] = (char)((w1*4 + (w2 >> 4)) & 255);
}
if (w3 >= 0) {
target[i++] = (char)((w2*16 + (w3 >> 2)) & 255);
}
if (w4 >= 0) {
target[i++] = (char)((w3*64 + w4) & 255);
}
n+=4;
}
return i;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The base64decode function in base64.c in libimobiledevice libplist through 1.12 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory or cause a denial of service (buffer over-read) via split encoded Apple Property List data.
Commit Message: base64: Rework base64decode to handle split encoded data correctly
|
Low
| 168,417
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int db_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct kvm_run *kvm_run = svm->vcpu.run;
if (!(svm->vcpu.guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) &&
!svm->nmi_singlestep) {
kvm_queue_exception(&svm->vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
if (svm->nmi_singlestep) {
svm->nmi_singlestep = false;
if (!(svm->vcpu.guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP))
svm->vmcb->save.rflags &=
~(X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
update_db_bp_intercept(&svm->vcpu);
}
if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) {
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
kvm_run->debug.arch.pc =
svm->vmcb->save.cs.base + svm->vmcb->save.rip;
kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.2.6, and Xen 4.3.x through 4.6.x, allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS panic or hang) by triggering many #DB (aka Debug) exceptions, related to svm.c.
Commit Message: KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Medium
| 166,568
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int verify_source_vc(char **ret_path, const char *src_vc) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
char *path;
int r;
fd = open_terminal(src_vc, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
if (fd < 0)
return log_error_errno(fd, "Failed to open %s: %m", src_vc);
r = verify_vc_device(fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Device %s is not a virtual console: %m", src_vc);
r = verify_vc_allocation_byfd(fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Virtual console %s is not allocated: %m", src_vc);
r = verify_vc_kbmode(fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Virtual console %s is not in K_XLATE or K_UNICODE: %m", src_vc);
path = strdup(src_vc);
if (!path)
return log_oom();
*ret_path = path;
return TAKE_FD(fd);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-255
Summary: systemd 242 changes the VT1 mode upon a logout, which allows attackers to read cleartext passwords in certain circumstances, such as watching a shutdown, or using Ctrl-Alt-F1 and Ctrl-Alt-F2. This occurs because the KDGKBMODE (aka current keyboard mode) check is mishandled.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
|
Low
| 169,780
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ConnectIBusSignals() {
if (!ibus_) {
return;
}
g_signal_connect_after(ibus_,
"connected",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusConnectedCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_,
"disconnected",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusDisconnectedCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_,
"global-engine-changed",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusGlobalEngineChangedCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_,
"name-owner-changed",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusNameOwnerChangedCallback),
this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,529
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BrowserPolicyConnector::SetDeviceCredentials(
const std::string& owner_email,
const std::string& token,
TokenType token_type) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (device_data_store_.get()) {
device_data_store_->set_user_name(owner_email);
switch (token_type) {
case TOKEN_TYPE_OAUTH:
device_data_store_->SetOAuthToken(token);
break;
case TOKEN_TYPE_GAIA:
device_data_store_->SetGaiaToken(token);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid token type " << token_type;
}
}
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the Google V8 bindings.
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,280
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool SoftVPX::outputBuffers(bool flushDecoder, bool display, bool eos, bool *portWillReset) {
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
BufferInfo *outInfo = NULL;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = NULL;
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
if (flushDecoder && mFrameParallelMode) {
if (vpx_codec_decode((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
ALOGE("Failed to flush on2 decoder.");
return false;
}
}
if (!display) {
if (!flushDecoder) {
ALOGE("Invalid operation.");
return false;
}
while ((mImg = vpx_codec_get_frame((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, &iter))) {
}
return true;
}
while (!outQueue.empty()) {
if (mImg == NULL) {
mImg = vpx_codec_get_frame((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, &iter);
if (mImg == NULL) {
break;
}
}
uint32_t width = mImg->d_w;
uint32_t height = mImg->d_h;
outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
CHECK_EQ(mImg->fmt, VPX_IMG_FMT_I420);
handlePortSettingsChange(portWillReset, width, height);
if (*portWillReset) {
return true;
}
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = *(OMX_TICKS *)mImg->user_priv;
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer;
const uint8_t *srcY = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y];
const uint8_t *srcU = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_U];
const uint8_t *srcV = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_V];
size_t srcYStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y];
size_t srcUStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_U];
size_t srcVStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_V];
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
mImg = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
if (!eos) {
return true;
}
if (!outQueue.empty()) {
outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
mEOSStatus = OUTPUT_FRAMES_FLUSHED;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: codecs/on2/dec/SoftVPX.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 does not validate VPX output buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27597103.
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
|
Medium
| 173,880
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WandExport MagickBooleanType MogrifyImageList(ImageInfo *image_info,
const int argc,const char **argv,Image **images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
ChannelType
channel;
const char
*option;
ImageInfo
*mogrify_info;
MagickStatusType
status;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
index;
/*
Apply options to the image list.
*/
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(images != (Image **) NULL);
assert((*images)->previous == (Image *) NULL);
assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
(*images)->filename);
if ((argc <= 0) || (*argv == (char *) NULL))
return(MagickTrue);
mogrify_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(mogrify_info);
channel=mogrify_info->channel;
status=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) argc; i++)
{
if (*images == (Image *) NULL)
break;
option=argv[i];
if (IsCommandOption(option) == MagickFalse)
continue;
count=ParseCommandOption(MagickCommandOptions,MagickFalse,option);
count=MagickMax(count,0L);
if ((i+count) >= (ssize_t) argc)
break;
status=MogrifyImageInfo(mogrify_info,(int) count+1,argv+i,exception);
switch (*(option+1))
{
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare("affinity",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("append",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*append_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
append_image=AppendImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,exception);
if (append_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=append_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("average",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*average_image;
/*
Average an image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
average_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MeanEvaluateOperator,
exception);
if (average_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=average_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channel",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
{
channel=DefaultChannels;
break;
}
channel=(ChannelType) ParseChannelOption(argv[i+1]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*clut_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
clut_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (clut_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) ClutImageChannel(image,channel,clut_image);
clut_image=DestroyImage(clut_image);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("coalesce",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*coalesce_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
coalesce_image=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (coalesce_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=coalesce_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("combine",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*combine_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
combine_image=CombineImages(*images,channel,exception);
if (combine_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=combine_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("compare",option+1) == 0)
{
const char
*option;
double
distortion;
Image
*difference_image,
*image,
*reconstruct_image;
MetricType
metric;
/*
Mathematically and visually annotate the difference between an
image and its reconstruction.
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
reconstruct_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (reconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
metric=UndefinedMetric;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"metric");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
metric=(MetricType) ParseCommandOption(MagickMetricOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
difference_image=CompareImageChannels(image,reconstruct_image,
channel,metric,&distortion,exception);
if (difference_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
reconstruct_image=DestroyImage(reconstruct_image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=difference_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("complex",option+1) == 0)
{
ComplexOperator
op;
Image
*complex_images;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
op=(ComplexOperator) ParseCommandOption(MagickComplexOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
complex_images=ComplexImages(*images,op,exception);
if (complex_images == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=complex_images;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("composite",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*mask_image,
*composite_image,
*image;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
composite_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (composite_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) TransformImage(&composite_image,(char *) NULL,
composite_image->geometry);
SetGeometry(composite_image,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(composite_image->geometry,&geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(image->columns,image->rows,image->gravity,
&geometry);
mask_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (mask_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
if ((image->compose == DisplaceCompositeOp) ||
(image->compose == DistortCompositeOp))
{
/*
Merge Y displacement into X displacement image.
*/
(void) CompositeImage(composite_image,CopyGreenCompositeOp,
mask_image,0,0);
mask_image=DestroyImage(mask_image);
}
else
{
/*
Set a blending mask for the composition.
*/
if (image->mask != (Image *) NULL)
image->mask=DestroyImage(image->mask);
image->mask=mask_image;
(void) NegateImage(image->mask,MagickFalse);
}
}
(void) CompositeImageChannel(image,channel,image->compose,
composite_image,geometry.x,geometry.y);
if (mask_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
image->mask=DestroyImage(image->mask);
mask_image=image->mask;
}
composite_image=DestroyImage(composite_image);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("copy",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*source_image;
OffsetInfo
offset;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Copy image pixels.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
(void) ParsePageGeometry(*images,argv[i+2],&geometry,exception);
offset.x=geometry.x;
offset.y=geometry.y;
source_image=(*images);
if (source_image->next != (Image *) NULL)
source_image=source_image->next;
(void) ParsePageGeometry(source_image,argv[i+1],&geometry,
exception);
status=CopyImagePixels(*images,source_image,&geometry,&offset,
exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("deconstruct",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*deconstruct_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
deconstruct_image=DeconstructImages(*images,exception);
if (deconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=deconstruct_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("delete",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
DeleteImages(images,"-1",exception);
else
DeleteImages(images,argv[i+1],exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("dither",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
{
quantize_info->dither=MagickFalse;
break;
}
quantize_info->dither=MagickTrue;
quantize_info->dither_method=(DitherMethod) ParseCommandOption(
MagickDitherOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("duplicate",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*duplicate_images;
if (*option == '+')
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,1,"-1",exception);
else
{
const char
*p;
size_t
number_duplicates;
number_duplicates=(size_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=strchr(argv[i+1],',');
if (p == (const char *) NULL)
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,
"-1",exception);
else
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,p,
exception);
}
AppendImageToList(images, duplicate_images);
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare("evaluate-sequence",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*evaluate_image;
MagickEvaluateOperator
op;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
op=(MagickEvaluateOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickEvaluateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
evaluate_image=EvaluateImages(*images,op,exception);
if (evaluate_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=evaluate_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare("fft",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image;
/*
Implements the discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
fourier_image=ForwardFourierTransformImage(*images,*option == '-' ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("flatten",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*flatten_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
flatten_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,FlattenLayer,exception);
if (flatten_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=flatten_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("fx",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fx_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
fx_image=FxImageChannel(*images,channel,argv[i+1],exception);
if (fx_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fx_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("hald-clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*hald_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
hald_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (hald_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) HaldClutImageChannel(image,channel,hald_image);
hald_image=DestroyImage(hald_image);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("ift",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image,
*magnitude_image,
*phase_image;
/*
Implements the inverse fourier discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
magnitude_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
phase_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (phase_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
fourier_image=InverseFourierTransformImage(magnitude_image,
phase_image,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("insert",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q;
index=0;
if (*option != '+')
index=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=RemoveLastImageFromList(images);
if (p == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
q=p;
if (index == 0)
PrependImageToList(images,q);
else
if (index == (ssize_t) GetImageListLength(*images))
AppendImageToList(images,q);
else
{
q=GetImageFromList(*images,index-1);
if (q == (Image *) NULL)
{
p=DestroyImage(p);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InsertImageInList(&q,p);
}
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("layers",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*layers;
ImageLayerMethod
method;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
layers=(Image *) NULL;
method=(ImageLayerMethod) ParseCommandOption(MagickLayerOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
switch (method)
{
case CoalesceLayer:
{
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case CompareAnyLayer:
case CompareClearLayer:
case CompareOverlayLayer:
default:
{
layers=CompareImageLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case MergeLayer:
case FlattenLayer:
case MosaicLayer:
case TrimBoundsLayer:
{
layers=MergeImageLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case DisposeLayer:
{
layers=DisposeImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeImageLayer:
{
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizePlusLayer:
{
layers=OptimizePlusImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeTransLayer:
{
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveDupsLayer:
{
RemoveDuplicateLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveZeroLayer:
{
RemoveZeroDelayLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeLayer:
{
/*
General Purpose, GIF Animation Optimizer.
*/
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InheritException(exception,&layers->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InheritException(exception,&layers->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=(Image *) NULL;
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL);
break;
}
case CompositeLayer:
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
Image
*source;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Split image sequence at the first 'NULL:' image.
*/
source=(*images);
while (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
source=GetNextImageInList(source);
if ((source != (Image *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(source->magick,"NULL") == 0))
break;
}
if (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
if ((GetPreviousImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL) ||
(GetNextImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL))
source=(Image *) NULL;
else
{
/*
Separate the two lists, junk the null: image.
*/
source=SplitImageList(source->previous);
DeleteImageFromList(&source);
}
}
if (source == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"MissingNullSeparator","layers Composite");
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
/*
Adjust offset with gravity and virtual canvas.
*/
SetGeometry(*images,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry((*images)->geometry,&geometry);
geometry.width=source->page.width != 0 ?
source->page.width : source->columns;
geometry.height=source->page.height != 0 ?
source->page.height : source->rows;
GravityAdjustGeometry((*images)->page.width != 0 ?
(*images)->page.width : (*images)->columns,
(*images)->page.height != 0 ? (*images)->page.height :
(*images)->rows,(*images)->gravity,&geometry);
compose=OverCompositeOp;
option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,option);
CompositeLayers(*images,compose,source,geometry.x,geometry.y,
exception);
source=DestroyImageList(source);
break;
}
}
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
break;
InheritException(exception,&layers->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare("map",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("maximum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*maximum_image;
/*
Maximum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
maximum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MaxEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (maximum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=maximum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("minimum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*minimum_image;
/*
Minimum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
minimum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MinEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (minimum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=minimum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("morph",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*morph_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
morph_image=MorphImages(*images,StringToUnsignedLong(argv[i+1]),
exception);
if (morph_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=morph_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("mosaic",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*mosaic_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
mosaic_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,MosaicLayer,exception);
if (mosaic_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=mosaic_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("poly",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*args,
token[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*p;
double
*arguments;
Image
*polynomial_image;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
number_arguments;
/*
Polynomial image.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
args=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1]);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
if (args == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; *p != '\0'; x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
}
number_arguments=(size_t) x;
arguments=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_arguments,
sizeof(*arguments));
if (arguments == (double *) NULL)
ThrowWandFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed",(*images)->filename);
(void) memset(arguments,0,number_arguments*
sizeof(*arguments));
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; (x < (ssize_t) number_arguments) && (*p != '\0'); x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
arguments[x]=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
}
args=DestroyString(args);
polynomial_image=PolynomialImageChannel(*images,channel,
number_arguments >> 1,arguments,exception);
arguments=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
if (polynomial_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=polynomial_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("print",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*string;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
string=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1]);
if (string == (char *) NULL)
break;
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%s",string);
string=DestroyString(string);
}
if (LocaleCompare("process",option+1) == 0)
{
char
**arguments;
int
j,
number_arguments;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
arguments=StringToArgv(argv[i+1],&number_arguments);
if (arguments == (char **) NULL)
break;
if ((argc > 1) && (strchr(arguments[1],'=') != (char *) NULL))
{
char
breaker,
quote,
*token;
const char
*arguments;
int
next,
status;
size_t
length;
TokenInfo
*token_info;
/*
Support old style syntax, filter="-option arg".
*/
length=strlen(argv[i+1]);
token=(char *) NULL;
if (~length >= (MaxTextExtent-1))
token=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MaxTextExtent,
sizeof(*token));
if (token == (char *) NULL)
break;
next=0;
arguments=argv[i+1];
token_info=AcquireTokenInfo();
status=Tokenizer(token_info,0,token,length,arguments,"","=",
"\"",'\0',&breaker,&next,"e);
token_info=DestroyTokenInfo(token_info);
if (status == 0)
{
const char
*argv;
argv=(&(arguments[next]));
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(token,&(*images),1,&argv,
exception);
}
token=DestroyString(token);
break;
}
(void) SubstituteString(&arguments[1],"-","");
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(arguments[1],&(*images),
number_arguments-2,(const char **) arguments+2,exception);
for (j=0; j < number_arguments; j++)
arguments[j]=DestroyString(arguments[j]);
arguments=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("reverse",option+1) == 0)
{
ReverseImageList(images);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare("smush",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*smush_image;
ssize_t
offset;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
offset=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
smush_image=SmushImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,offset,exception);
if (smush_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=smush_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("swap",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q,
*u,
*v;
ssize_t
swap_index;
index=(-1);
swap_index=(-2);
if (*option != '+')
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
swap_index=(-1);
flags=ParseGeometry(argv[i+1],&geometry_info);
index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
swap_index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.sigma;
}
p=GetImageFromList(*images,index);
q=GetImageFromList(*images,swap_index);
if ((p == (Image *) NULL) || (q == (Image *) NULL))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",(*images)->filename);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (p == q)
break;
u=CloneImage(p,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (u == (Image *) NULL)
break;
v=CloneImage(q,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (v == (Image *) NULL)
{
u=DestroyImage(u);
break;
}
ReplaceImageInList(&p,v);
ReplaceImageInList(&q,u);
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare("write",option+1) == 0)
{
char
key[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*write_images;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MaxTextExtent,"cache:%s",argv[i+1]);
(void) DeleteImageRegistry(key);
write_images=(*images);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=CloneImageList(*images,exception);
write_info=CloneImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=WriteImages(write_info,write_images,argv[i+1],exception);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=DestroyImageList(write_images);
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
i+=count;
}
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
mogrify_info=DestroyImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=MogrifyImageInfo(image_info,argc,argv,exception);
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has memory leaks at AcquireMagickMemory because of a wand/mogrify.c error.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1623
|
Medium
| 169,591
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
/* find the key first */
key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = -ENOKEY;
goto error;
}
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
ret = -ENOKEY;
goto error2;
}
/* see if we can read it directly */
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ);
if (ret == 0)
goto can_read_key;
if (ret != -EACCES)
goto error2;
/* we can't; see if it's searchable from this process's keyrings
* - we automatically take account of the fact that it may be
* dangling off an instantiation key
*/
if (!is_key_possessed(key_ref)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto error2;
}
/* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
can_read_key:
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (key->type->read) {
/* Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep)
* to protect against the key being updated or revoked.
*/
down_read(&key->sem);
ret = key_validate(key);
if (ret == 0)
ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
up_read(&key->sem);
}
error2:
key_put(key);
error:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
Low
| 167,701
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p,
struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
mm->mmap = NULL;
mm->mm_rb = RB_ROOT;
mm->vmacache_seqnum = 0;
atomic_set(&mm->mm_users, 1);
atomic_set(&mm->mm_count, 1);
init_rwsem(&mm->mmap_sem);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mm->mmlist);
mm->core_state = NULL;
atomic_long_set(&mm->nr_ptes, 0);
mm_nr_pmds_init(mm);
mm->map_count = 0;
mm->locked_vm = 0;
mm->pinned_vm = 0;
memset(&mm->rss_stat, 0, sizeof(mm->rss_stat));
spin_lock_init(&mm->page_table_lock);
mm_init_cpumask(mm);
mm_init_aio(mm);
mm_init_owner(mm, p);
mmu_notifier_mm_init(mm);
init_tlb_flush_pending(mm);
#if defined(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE) && !USE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCKS
mm->pmd_huge_pte = NULL;
#endif
if (current->mm) {
mm->flags = current->mm->flags & MMF_INIT_MASK;
mm->def_flags = current->mm->def_flags & VM_INIT_DEF_MASK;
} else {
mm->flags = default_dump_filter;
mm->def_flags = 0;
}
if (mm_alloc_pgd(mm))
goto fail_nopgd;
if (init_new_context(p, mm))
goto fail_nocontext;
mm->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
return mm;
fail_nocontext:
mm_free_pgd(mm);
fail_nopgd:
free_mm(mm);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The mm_init function in kernel/fork.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.10 does not clear the ->exe_file member of a new process's mm_struct, allowing a local attacker to achieve a use-after-free or possibly have unspecified other impact by running a specially crafted program.
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 167,656
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PostScript_MetaHandler::ParsePSFile()
{
bool found = false;
IOBuffer ioBuf;
XMP_IO* fileRef = this->parent->ioRef;
XMP_AbortProc abortProc = this->parent->abortProc;
void * abortArg = this->parent->abortArg;
const bool checkAbort = (abortProc != 0);
if ( ! PostScript_Support::IsValidPSFile(fileRef,this->fileformat) ) return ;
fileRef->Rewind();
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 4 ) ) return ;
XMP_Uns32 fileheader = GetUns32BE ( ioBuf.ptr );
if ( fileheader == 0xC5D0D3C6 )
{
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 30 ) ) return ;
XMP_Uns32 psOffset = GetUns32LE ( ioBuf.ptr+4 ); // PostScript offset.
XMP_Uns32 psLength = GetUns32LE ( ioBuf.ptr+8 ); // PostScript length.
setTokenInfo(kPS_EndPostScript,psOffset+psLength,0);
MoveToOffset ( fileRef, psOffset, &ioBuf );
}
while ( true )
{
if ( checkAbort && abortProc(abortArg) ) {
XMP_Throw ( "PostScript_MetaHandler::FindPostScriptHint - User abort", kXMPErr_UserAbort );
}
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, kPSContainsForString.length() ) ) return ;
if ( (CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, kPSEndCommentString.length() )&&
CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr(kPSEndCommentString.c_str()), kPSEndCommentString.length() )
)|| *ioBuf.ptr!='%' || !(*(ioBuf.ptr+1)>32 && *(ioBuf.ptr+1)<=126 )) // implicit endcomment check
{
if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr(kPSEndCommentString.c_str()), kPSEndCommentString.length() ))
{
setTokenInfo(kPS_EndComments,ioBuf.filePos+ioBuf.ptr-ioBuf.data,kPSEndCommentString.length());
ioBuf.ptr+=kPSEndCommentString.length();
}
else
{
setTokenInfo(kPS_EndComments,ioBuf.filePos+ioBuf.ptr-ioBuf.data,0);
}
while(true)
{
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ) ) return ;
if (! IsWhitespace (*ioBuf.ptr)) break;
++ioBuf.ptr;
}
while(true)
{
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 5 ) ) return ;
if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("/DOCI"), 5 )
&& CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, kPSContainsDocInfoString.length() )
&&CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr(kPSContainsDocInfoString.c_str()), kPSContainsDocInfoString.length() ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=kPSContainsDocInfoString.length();
ExtractDocInfoDict(ioBuf);
}// DOCINFO Not found in document
else if(CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("%%Beg"), 5 ))
{//possibly one of %%BeginProlog %%BeginSetup %%BeginBinary %%BeginData
XMP_Int64 begStartpos=ioBuf.filePos+ioBuf.ptr-ioBuf.data;
ioBuf.ptr+=5;
if (!CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 6 )) return;
if(CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("inProl"), 6 ))
{//%%BeginProlog
ioBuf.ptr+=6;
if (!CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 2 ))return;
if(CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("og"), 2 ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=2;
setTokenInfo(kPS_BeginProlog,begStartpos,13);
}
}
else if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("inSetu"), 6 ))
{//%%BeginSetup
ioBuf.ptr+=6;
if (!CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ))return;
if(CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("p"), 1 ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=1;
setTokenInfo(kPS_BeginSetup,begStartpos,12);
}
}
else if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("inBina"), 6 ))
{//%%BeginBinary
ioBuf.ptr+=6;
if (!CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 3 ))return;
if(CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("ry"), 3 ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=3;
while(true)
{
if (!CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 12 ))return;
if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("%%EndBinary"), 11 ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=11;
if (IsWhitespace(*ioBuf.ptr))
{
ioBuf.ptr++;
break;
}
}
++ioBuf.ptr;
}
}
}
else if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("inData"), 6 ))
{//%%BeginData
ioBuf.ptr+=6;
if (!CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ))return;
if(CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr(":"), 1 ))
{
while(true)
{
if (!CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 10 ))return;
if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("%%EndData"), 9 ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=9;
if (IsWhitespace(*ioBuf.ptr))
{
ioBuf.ptr++;
break;
}
}
++ioBuf.ptr;
}
}
}
else if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("inDocu"), 6 ))
{// %%BeginDocument
ioBuf.ptr+=6;
if (!CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 5 ))return;
if(CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("ment:"), 5 ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=5;
while(true)
{
if (!CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 14 ))return;
if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("%%EndDocument"), 13 ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=13;
if (IsWhitespace(*ioBuf.ptr))
{
ioBuf.ptr++;
break;
}
}
++ioBuf.ptr;
}
}
}
else if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("inPage"), 6 ))
{// %%BeginPageSetup
ioBuf.ptr+=6;
if (!CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 5 ))return;
if(CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("Setup"), 5 ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=5;
setTokenInfo(kPS_BeginPageSetup,begStartpos,16);
}
}
}
else if(CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("%%End"), 5 ))
{//possibly %%EndProlog %%EndSetup %%EndPageSetup %%EndPageComments
XMP_Int64 begStartpos=ioBuf.filePos+ioBuf.ptr-ioBuf.data;
ioBuf.ptr+=5;
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 5 ) ) return ;
if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("Prolo"), 5 ))
{// %%EndProlog
ioBuf.ptr+=5;
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ) ) return ;
if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("g"), 1 ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=1;
setTokenInfo(kPS_EndProlog,begStartpos,11);
}
}
else if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("Setup"), 5 ))
{//%%EndSetup
ioBuf.ptr+=5;
setTokenInfo(kPS_EndSetup,begStartpos,10);
}
else if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("PageS"), 5 ))
{//%%EndPageSetup
ioBuf.ptr+=5;
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 4 ) ) return ;
if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("etup"), 4 ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=4;
setTokenInfo(kPS_EndPageSetup,begStartpos,14);
}
}
else if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("PageC"), 5 ))
{//%%EndPageComments
ioBuf.ptr+=5;
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 7 ) ) return ;
if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("omments"), 7 ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=7;
setTokenInfo(kPS_EndPageComments,begStartpos,17);
}
}
}
else if(CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("%%Pag"), 5 ))
{
XMP_Int64 begStartpos=ioBuf.filePos+ioBuf.ptr-ioBuf.data;
ioBuf.ptr+=5;
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 2 ) ) return ;
if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr(":"), 2 ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=2;
while(!IsNewline(*ioBuf.ptr))
{
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ) ) return ;
++ioBuf.ptr;
}
setTokenInfo(kPS_Page,begStartpos,ioBuf.filePos+ioBuf.ptr-ioBuf.data-begStartpos);
}
}
else if(CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("%%Tra"), 5 ))
{
XMP_Int64 begStartpos=ioBuf.filePos+ioBuf.ptr-ioBuf.data;
ioBuf.ptr+=5;
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 4 ) ) return ;
if (CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("iler"), 4 ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=4;
while(!IsNewline(*ioBuf.ptr)) ++ioBuf.ptr;
setTokenInfo(kPS_Trailer,begStartpos,ioBuf.filePos+ioBuf.ptr-ioBuf.data-begStartpos);
}
}
ioBuf.ptr+=5;
setTokenInfo(kPS_EOF,ioBuf.filePos+ioBuf.ptr-ioBuf.data,5);
}
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ) ) return ;
++ioBuf.ptr;
}
return;
}else if (!(kPS_Creator & dscFlags) &&
CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, kPSContainsForString.length() )&&
CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr(kPSContainsForString.c_str()), kPSContainsForString.length() ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=kPSContainsForString.length();
if ( ! ExtractDSCCommentValue(ioBuf,kPS_dscFor) ) return ;
}
else if (!(kPS_CreatorTool & dscFlags) &&
CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, kPSContainsCreatorString.length() )&&
CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr(kPSContainsCreatorString.c_str()), kPSContainsCreatorString.length() ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=kPSContainsCreatorString.length();
if ( ! ExtractDSCCommentValue(ioBuf,kPS_dscCreator) ) return ;
}
else if (!(kPS_CreateDate & dscFlags) &&
CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, kPSContainsCreateDateString.length() )&&
CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr(kPSContainsCreateDateString.c_str()), kPSContainsCreateDateString.length() ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=kPSContainsCreateDateString.length();
if ( ! ExtractDSCCommentValue(ioBuf,kPS_dscCreateDate) ) return ;
}
else if (!(kPS_Title & dscFlags) &&
CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, kPSContainsTitleString.length() )&&
CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr(kPSContainsTitleString.c_str()), kPSContainsTitleString.length() ))
{
ioBuf.ptr+=kPSContainsTitleString.length();
if ( ! ExtractDSCCommentValue(ioBuf,kPS_dscTitle) ) return ;
}
else if( CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, kPSContainsXMPString.length() )&&
( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr(kPSContainsXMPString.c_str()), kPSContainsXMPString.length() ) )) {
XMP_Int64 containsXMPStartpos=ioBuf.filePos+ioBuf.ptr-ioBuf.data;
ioBuf.ptr += kPSContainsXMPString.length();
ExtractContainsXMPHint(ioBuf,containsXMPStartpos);
} // Found "%ADO_ContainsXMP:".
if ( ! PostScript_Support::SkipUntilNewline(fileRef,ioBuf) ) return ;
} // Outer marker loop.
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in Exempi through 2.4.4. There is a stack-based buffer over-read in the PostScript_MetaHandler::ParsePSFile() function in XMPFiles/source/FileHandlers/PostScript_Handler.cpp.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,995
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int check_line_charstring(void)
{
char *p = line;
while (isspace(*p))
p++;
return (*p == '/' || (p[0] == 'd' && p[1] == 'u' && p[2] == 'p'));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the set_cs_start function in t1disasm.c in t1utils before 1.39 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted font file.
Commit Message: Security fixes.
- Don't overflow the small cs_start buffer (reported by Niels
Thykier via the debian tracker (Jakub Wilk), found with a
fuzzer ("American fuzzy lop")).
- Cast arguments to <ctype.h> functions to unsigned char.
|
Low
| 166,620
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void set_sda(int state)
{
qrio_set_opendrain_gpio(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SDA1, state);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Das U-Boot versions 2016.09 through 2019.07-rc4 can memset() too much data while reading a crafted ext4 filesystem, which results in a stack buffer overflow and likely code execution.
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
|
Medium
| 169,633
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void sctp_generate_proto_unreach_event(unsigned long data)
{
struct sctp_transport *transport = (struct sctp_transport *) data;
struct sctp_association *asoc = transport->asoc;
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
bh_lock_sock(asoc->base.sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(asoc->base.sk)) {
pr_debug("%s: sock is busy\n", __func__);
/* Try again later. */
if (!mod_timer(&transport->proto_unreach_timer,
jiffies + (HZ/20)))
sctp_association_hold(asoc);
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Is this structure just waiting around for us to actually
* get destroyed?
*/
if (asoc->base.dead)
goto out_unlock;
sctp_do_sm(net, SCTP_EVENT_T_OTHER,
SCTP_ST_OTHER(SCTP_EVENT_ICMP_PROTO_UNREACH),
asoc->state, asoc->ep, asoc, transport, GFP_ATOMIC);
out_unlock:
bh_unlock_sock(asoc->base.sk);
sctp_association_put(asoc);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3 does not properly manage the relationship between a lock and a socket, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) via a crafted sctp_accept call.
Commit Message: sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,501
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ras_validate(jas_stream_t *in)
{
uchar buf[RAS_MAGICLEN];
int i;
int n;
uint_fast32_t magic;
assert(JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK >= RAS_MAGICLEN);
/* Read the validation data (i.e., the data used for detecting
the format). */
if ((n = jas_stream_read(in, buf, RAS_MAGICLEN)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
/* Put the validation data back onto the stream, so that the
stream position will not be changed. */
for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
if (jas_stream_ungetc(in, buf[i]) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
/* Did we read enough data? */
if (n < RAS_MAGICLEN) {
return -1;
}
magic = (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, buf[0]) << 24) |
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, buf[1]) << 16) |
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, buf[2]) << 8) |
buf[3];
/* Is the signature correct for the Sun Rasterfile format? */
if (magic != RAS_MAGIC) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,729
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_decode_slice(UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD8 u1_nal_ref_idc,
dec_struct_t *ps_dec /* Decoder parameters */
)
{
dec_bit_stream_t * ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_pic_params_t *ps_pps;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
pocstruct_t s_tmp_poc;
WORD32 i_delta_poc[2];
WORD32 i4_poc = 0;
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frame_num;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag, u1_redundant_pic_cnt = 0, u1_slice_type;
UWORD32 u4_idr_pic_id = 0;
UWORD8 u1_bottom_field_flag, u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
UWORD8 u1_nal_unit_type;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
WORD8 i1_is_end_of_poc;
WORD32 ret, end_of_frame;
WORD32 prev_slice_err, num_mb_skipped;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc;
UWORD32 u4_temp;
WORD32 i_temp;
UWORD32 u4_call_end_of_pic = 0;
/* read FirstMbInSlice and slice type*/
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_dpb_commands_read_slc = 0;
u2_first_mb_in_slice = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice
> (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
/*we currently don not support ASO*/
if(((u2_first_mb_in_slice << ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
<= ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr) && (ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr != 0)
&& (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: first_mb_in_slice",u2_first_mb_in_slice);
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > 9)
return ERROR_INV_SLC_TYPE_T;
u1_slice_type = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_type",(u1_slice_type));
ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 0;
/* Find Out the Slice Type is 5 to 9 or not then Set the Flag */
/* u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 1 .Which tells that all the slices in the Pic*/
/* will be of same type of current */
if(u1_slice_type > 4)
{
u1_slice_type -= 5;
ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 1;
}
{
UWORD32 skip;
if((ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_PB)
|| (ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_PB))
{
UWORD32 u4_bit_stream_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
skip = 0;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
}
else if((I_SLICE == u1_slice_type)
&& (1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames))
{
skip = 0;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
}
/* If one frame worth of data is already skipped, do not skip the next one */
if((0 == u2_first_mb_in_slice) && (1 == ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped))
{
skip = 0;
}
if(skip)
{
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 1;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_PB;
return 0;
}
else
{
/* If the previous NAL was skipped, then
do not process that buffer in this call.
Return to app and process it in the next call.
This is necessary to handle cases where I/IDR is not complete in
the current buffer and application intends to fill the remaining part of the bitstream
later. This ensures we process only frame worth of data in every call */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 1;
return 0;
}
}
}
}
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp & MASK_ERR_PIC_SET_ID)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
/* discard slice if pic param is invalid */
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: pic_parameter_set_id", u4_temp);
ps_pps = &ps_dec->ps_pps[u4_temp];
if(FALSE == ps_pps->u1_is_valid)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
ps_seq = ps_pps->ps_sps;
if(!ps_seq)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
if(FALSE == ps_seq->u1_is_valid)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
/* Get the frame num */
u2_frame_num = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm,
ps_seq->u1_bits_in_frm_num);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: frame_num", u2_frame_num);
/* Get the field related flags */
if(!ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
{
u1_field_pic_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: field_pic_flag", u1_field_pic_flag);
u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_fld;
u1_bottom_field_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: bottom_field_flag", u1_bottom_field_flag);
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan;
}
}
else
{
u1_field_pic_flag = 0;
u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan;
}
u1_nal_unit_type = SLICE_NAL;
if(u1_is_idr_slice)
{
if(0 == u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
u1_nal_unit_type = IDR_SLICE_NAL;
u4_idr_pic_id = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_idr_pic_id > 65535)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: ", u4_idr_pic_id);
}
/* read delta pic order count information*/
i_delta_poc[0] = i_delta_poc[1] = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = 0;
u1_pic_order_cnt_type = ps_seq->u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
if(u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 0)
{
i_temp = ih264d_get_bits_h264(
ps_bitstrm,
ps_seq->u1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus);
if(i_temp < 0 || i_temp >= ps_seq->i4_max_pic_order_cntLsb)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: pic_order_cnt_lsb", s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb);
if((ps_pps->u1_pic_order_present_flag == 1) && (!u1_field_pic_flag))
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom);
}
}
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = 0;
if(u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 1
&& (!ps_seq->u1_delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag))
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt[0]",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0]);
if(ps_pps->u1_pic_order_present_flag && !u1_field_pic_flag)
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt[1]",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1]);
}
}
if(ps_pps->u1_redundant_pic_cnt_present_flag)
{
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > MAX_REDUNDANT_PIC_CNT)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: redundant_pic_cnt", u1_redundant_pic_cnt);
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Check if the slice is part of new picture */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
i1_is_end_of_poc = 0;
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
i1_is_end_of_poc = ih264d_is_end_of_pic(u2_frame_num, u1_nal_ref_idc,
&s_tmp_poc, &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc,
ps_cur_slice, u1_pic_order_cnt_type,
u1_nal_unit_type, u4_idr_pic_id,
u1_field_pic_flag,
u1_bottom_field_flag);
/* since we support only Full frame decode, every new process should
* process a new pic
*/
if((ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2) && (i1_is_end_of_poc == 0))
{
/* if it is the first slice is process call ,it should be a new frame. If it is not
* reject current pic and dont add it to dpb
*/
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag |= REJECT_CUR_PIC;
i1_is_end_of_poc = 1;
}
else
{
/* reset REJECT_CUR_PIC */
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag &= MASK_REJECT_CUR_PIC;
}
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Check for error in slice and parse the missing/corrupted MB's */
/* as skip-MB's in an inserted P-slice */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
u1_mbaff = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag && (!u1_field_pic_flag);
prev_slice_err = 0;
if(i1_is_end_of_poc || ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
if(u2_frame_num != ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num
&& ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded != 0
&& ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded
!= (TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY))
{
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 1;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic)
{
prev_slice_err = 1;
}
else
{
prev_slice_err = 2;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded ==TOP_FIELD_ONLY)
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 1;
else
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
u1_is_idr_slice = ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL;
}
else if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice > 0)
{
prev_slice_err = 1;
num_mb_skipped = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
ps_cur_slice->u4_idr_pic_id = u4_idr_pic_id;
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_cur_slice->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb =
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u1_redundant_pic_cnt;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = u1_nal_ref_idc;
ps_cur_slice->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
}
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic)
{
/* if valid slice header is not decoded do start of pic processing
* since in the current process call, frame num is not updated in the slice structure yet
* ih264d_is_end_of_pic is checked with valid frame num of previous process call,
* although i1_is_end_of_poc is set there could be more slices in the frame,
* so conceal only till cur slice */
prev_slice_err = 1;
num_mb_skipped = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
}
else
{
/* since i1_is_end_of_poc is set ,means new frame num is encountered. so conceal the current frame
* completely */
prev_slice_err = 2;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
}
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
}
}
else
{
if((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff) > ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded)
{
prev_slice_err = 2;
num_mb_skipped = (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
}
else if((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff) < ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded)
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
}
if(prev_slice_err)
{
ret = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num, ps_cur_poc, prev_slice_err);
if(ps_dec->u1_dangling_field == 1)
{
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 1 - ps_dec->u1_second_field;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC;
}
if(prev_slice_err == 2)
{
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
/* return if all MBs in frame are parsed*/
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return ERROR_NEW_FRAME_EXPECTED;
}
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
i1_is_end_of_poc = 0;
}
if (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0)
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* If the slice is part of new picture, do End of Pic processing. */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
UWORD8 uc_mbs_exceed = 0;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
== (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1))
{
/*u2_total_mbs_coded is forced to u2_max_mb_addr+ 1 at the end of decode ,so
,if it is first slice in pic dont consider u2_total_mbs_coded to detect new picture */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0)
uc_mbs_exceed = 1;
}
if(i1_is_end_of_poc || uc_mbs_exceed)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded)
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
#if WIN32
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT(" ------ PIC SKIPPED ------\n");
#endif
return RET_LAST_SKIP;
}
else
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
}
}
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
}
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5)
{
WORD32 i4_temp_poc;
WORD32 i4_top_field_order_poc, i4_bot_field_order_poc;
if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag) // or a complementary field pair
{
i4_top_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
i4_bot_field_order_poc =
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
i4_temp_poc = MIN(i4_top_field_order_poc,
i4_bot_field_order_poc);
}
else if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
i4_temp_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
else
i4_temp_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt = i4_temp_poc
- ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt = i4_temp_poc
- ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc = i4_temp_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = i4_temp_poc;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
ret = ih264d_decode_pic_order_cnt(u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc,
&s_tmp_poc, ps_cur_slice, ps_pps,
u1_nal_ref_idc,
u1_bottom_field_flag,
u1_field_pic_flag, &i4_poc);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
/* Display seq no calculations */
if(i4_poc >= ps_dec->i4_max_poc)
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = i4_poc;
/* IDR Picture or POC wrap around */
if(i4_poc == 0)
{
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq
+ ps_dec->i4_max_poc
+ ps_dec->u1_max_dec_frame_buffering + 1;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
}
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Copy the values read from the bitstream to the slice header and then*/
/* If the slice is first slice in picture, then do Start of Picture */
/* processing. */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_cur_slice->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = i_delta_poc[0];
ps_cur_slice->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = i_delta_poc[1];
ps_cur_slice->u4_idr_pic_id = u4_idr_pic_id;
ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = u2_first_mb_in_slice;
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = u1_slice_type;
ps_cur_slice->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u1_redundant_pic_cnt;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = u1_nal_ref_idc;
ps_cur_slice->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
if(ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag =
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag;
else
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag = 1;
if(u1_slice_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(
ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag",
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag);
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag)
ps_cur_slice->pf_decodeDirect = ih264d_decode_spatial_direct;
else
ps_cur_slice->pf_decodeDirect = ih264d_decode_temporal_direct;
if(!((ps_pps->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag) && (!u1_field_pic_flag)))
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaffB;
}
else
{
if(!((ps_pps->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag) && (!u1_field_pic_flag)))
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice == 0)
{
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, i4_poc, &s_tmp_poc, u2_frame_num, ps_pps);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
/* INITIALIZATION of fn ptrs for MC and formMbPartInfo functions */
{
UWORD8 uc_nofield_nombaff;
uc_nofield_nombaff = ((ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag == 0)
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag == 0)
&& (u1_slice_type != B_SLICE)
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_wted_pred_flag == 0));
/* Initialise MC and formMbPartInfo fn ptrs one time based on profile_idc */
if(uc_nofield_nombaff)
{
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
}
else
{
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_mp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_mp;
}
}
/*
* Decide whether to decode the current picture or not
*/
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_err->u4_frm_sei_sync == u2_frame_num)
{
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
ps_err->u4_frm_sei_sync = SYNC_FRM_DEFAULT;
}
ps_err->u4_cur_frm = u2_frame_num;
}
/* Decision for decoding if the picture is to be skipped */
{
WORD32 i4_skip_b_pic, i4_skip_p_pic;
i4_skip_b_pic = (ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask & B_SLC_BIT)
&& (B_SLICE == u1_slice_type) && (0 == u1_nal_ref_idc);
i4_skip_p_pic = (ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask & P_SLC_BIT)
&& (P_SLICE == u1_slice_type) && (0 == u1_nal_ref_idc);
/**************************************************************/
/* Skip the B picture if skip mask is set for B picture and */
/* Current B picture is a non reference B picture or there is */
/* no user for reference B picture */
/**************************************************************/
if(i4_skip_b_pic)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= B_SLC_BIT;
/* Don't decode the picture in SKIP-B mode if that picture is B */
/* and also it is not to be used as a reference picture */
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 1;
return OK;
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Skip the P picture if skip mask is set for P picture and */
/* Current P picture is a non reference P picture or there is */
/* no user for reference P picture */
/**************************************************************/
if(i4_skip_p_pic)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= P_SLC_BIT;
/* Don't decode the picture in SKIP-P mode if that picture is P */
/* and also it is not to be used as a reference picture */
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 1;
return OK;
}
}
{
UWORD16 u2_mb_x, u2_mb_y;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst = ((u2_first_mb_in_slice
<< ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag) * SUB_BLK_SIZE)
- SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_aff;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic;
UWORD16 u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
u2_frm_wd_in_mbs = ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
u1_mb_aff = ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
u1_field_pic = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
{
UWORD32 x_offset;
UWORD32 y_offset;
UWORD32 u4_frame_stride;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_trns_addr; // = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
}
else
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
}
u2_mb_x = MOD(u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frm_wd_in_mbs);
u2_mb_y = DIV(u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frm_wd_in_mbs);
u2_mb_y <<= u1_mb_aff;
if((u2_mb_x > u2_frm_wd_in_mbs - 1)
|| (u2_mb_y > ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs - 1))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
u4_frame_stride = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y << u1_field_pic;
x_offset = u2_mb_x << 4;
y_offset = (u2_mb_y * u4_frame_stride) << 4;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
u4_frame_stride = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv << u1_field_pic;
x_offset >>= 1;
y_offset = (u2_mb_y * u4_frame_stride) << 3;
x_offset *= YUV420SP_FACTOR;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_y = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_u = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_v = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic
+ (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic
+ (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
}
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv
+ ((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff) << 4);
}
}
else
{
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_trns_addr;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
}
else
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
}
u2_mb_x = 0xffff;
u2_mb_y = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_y = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_u = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_v = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v;
}
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->u2_mbx =
(MOD(u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby =
(DIV(u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby <<= ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
}
/* RBSP stop bit is used for CABAC decoding*/
ps_bitstrm->u4_max_ofst += ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode;
ps_dec->u1_B = (u1_slice_type == B_SLICE);
ps_dec->u4_next_mb_skip = 0;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type;
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 1;
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MAX_FRAMES;
if((1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames) &&
(0 == ps_dec->i4_display_delay))
{
num_entries = 1;
}
num_entries = ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
if(BASE_PROFILE_IDC != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_profile_idc)
{
num_entries *= 2;
}
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = ( void *)pu1_buf;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
if(u1_slice_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= I_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_islice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type != B_SLICE && ps_dec->i4_pic_type != P_SLICE)
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = I_SLICE;
}
else if(u1_slice_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= P_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_pslice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = u1_slice_type;
if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type != B_SLICE)
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = P_SLICE;
}
else if(u1_slice_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= B_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_bslice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = u1_slice_type;
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = B_SLICE;
}
else
return ERROR_INV_SLC_TYPE_T;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done)
{
/* set to zero to indicate a valid slice has been decoded */
/* first slice header successfully decoded */
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 0;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
}
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
/* storing last Mb X and MbY of the slice */
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
/* End of Picture detection */
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >= (ps_seq->u2_max_mb_addr + 1))
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if((ps_err->u1_err_flag & REJECT_PB_PICS)
&& (ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type == PIC_TYPE_I))
{
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
}
}
PRINT_BIN_BIT_RATIO(ps_dec)
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ih264d decoder in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-08-01 mishandles slice numbers, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28673410.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix slice number increment for error clips
Bug: 28673410
|
Low
| 173,544
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8TestInterface::constructorCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestInterface.Constructor");
if (!args.IsConstructCall())
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("DOM object constructor cannot be called as a function.");
if (ConstructorMode::current() == ConstructorMode::WrapExistingObject)
return args.Holder();
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str1, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str2, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined));
ScriptExecutionContext* context = getScriptExecutionContext();
if (!context)
return V8Proxy::throwError(V8Proxy::ReferenceError, "TestInterface constructor's associated context is not available", args.GetIsolate());
RefPtr<TestInterface> impl = TestInterface::create(context, str1, str2, ec);
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper = args.Holder();
if (ec)
goto fail;
V8DOMWrapper::setDOMWrapper(wrapper, &info, impl.get());
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForActiveDOMObject(impl.release(), v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper), args.GetIsolate());
return args.Holder();
fail:
return throwError(ec, args.GetIsolate());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,072
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_get_key_size)
{
char *cipher;
char *module;
int cipher_len, module_len;
char *cipher_dir_string;
char *module_dir_string;
MCRYPT td;
MCRYPT_GET_INI
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss",
&cipher, &cipher_len, &module, &module_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
td = mcrypt_module_open(cipher, cipher_dir_string, module, module_dir_string);
if (td != MCRYPT_FAILED) {
RETVAL_LONG(mcrypt_enc_get_key_size(td));
mcrypt_module_close(td);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, MCRYPT_OPEN_MODULE_FAILED);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
|
Low
| 167,103
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void LocalFileSystem::requestFileSystem(ExecutionContext* context, FileSystemType type, long long size, PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks)
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> contextPtr(context);
RefPtr<CallbackWrapper> wrapper = adoptRef(new CallbackWrapper(callbacks));
requestFileSystemAccessInternal(context,
bind(&LocalFileSystem::fileSystemAllowedInternal, this, contextPtr, type, wrapper),
bind(&LocalFileSystem::fileSystemNotAllowedInternal, this, contextPtr, wrapper));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,429
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SafeBrowsingBlockingPage::CommandReceived(const std::string& cmd) {
std::string command(cmd); // Make a local copy so we can modify it.
if (command.length() > 1 && command[0] == '"') {
command = command.substr(1, command.length() - 2);
}
RecordUserReactionTime(command);
if (command == kDoReportCommand) {
SetReportingPreference(true);
return;
}
if (command == kDontReportCommand) {
SetReportingPreference(false);
return;
}
if (command == kLearnMoreCommand) {
GURL url;
SBThreatType threat_type = unsafe_resources_[0].threat_type;
if (threat_type == SB_THREAT_TYPE_URL_MALWARE) {
url = google_util::AppendGoogleLocaleParam(GURL(kLearnMoreMalwareUrl));
} else if (threat_type == SB_THREAT_TYPE_URL_PHISHING ||
threat_type == SB_THREAT_TYPE_CLIENT_SIDE_PHISHING_URL) {
url = google_util::AppendGoogleLocaleParam(GURL(kLearnMorePhishingUrl));
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
OpenURLParams params(
url, Referrer(), CURRENT_TAB, content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, false);
web_contents_->OpenURL(params);
return;
}
if (command == kLearnMoreCommandV2) {
GURL url;
SBThreatType threat_type = unsafe_resources_[0].threat_type;
if (threat_type == SB_THREAT_TYPE_URL_MALWARE) {
url = google_util::AppendGoogleLocaleParam(GURL(kLearnMoreMalwareUrlV2));
} else if (threat_type == SB_THREAT_TYPE_URL_PHISHING ||
threat_type == SB_THREAT_TYPE_CLIENT_SIDE_PHISHING_URL) {
url = google_util::AppendGoogleLocaleParam(GURL(kLearnMorePhishingUrlV2));
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
OpenURLParams params(
url, Referrer(), CURRENT_TAB, content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, false);
web_contents_->OpenURL(params);
return;
}
if (command == kShowPrivacyCommand) {
GURL url(l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_SAFE_BROWSING_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL));
OpenURLParams params(
url, Referrer(), CURRENT_TAB, content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, false);
web_contents_->OpenURL(params);
return;
}
bool proceed_blocked = false;
if (command == kProceedCommand) {
if (IsPrefEnabled(prefs::kSafeBrowsingProceedAnywayDisabled)) {
proceed_blocked = true;
} else {
interstitial_page_->Proceed();
return;
}
}
if (command == kTakeMeBackCommand || proceed_blocked) {
if (is_main_frame_load_blocked_) {
interstitial_page_->DontProceed();
return;
}
if (web_contents_->GetController().CanGoBack()) {
web_contents_->GetController().GoBack();
} else {
web_contents_->GetController().LoadURL(
GURL(chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL),
content::Referrer(),
content::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL,
std::string());
}
return;
}
int element_index = 0;
size_t colon_index = command.find(':');
if (colon_index != std::string::npos) {
DCHECK(colon_index < command.size() - 1);
bool result = base::StringToInt(base::StringPiece(command.begin() +
colon_index + 1,
command.end()),
&element_index);
command = command.substr(0, colon_index);
DCHECK(result);
}
if (element_index >= static_cast<int>(unsafe_resources_.size())) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
std::string bad_url_spec = unsafe_resources_[element_index].url.spec();
if (command == kReportErrorCommand) {
SBThreatType threat_type = unsafe_resources_[element_index].threat_type;
DCHECK(threat_type == SB_THREAT_TYPE_URL_PHISHING ||
threat_type == SB_THREAT_TYPE_CLIENT_SIDE_PHISHING_URL);
GURL report_url =
safe_browsing_util::GeneratePhishingReportUrl(
kSbReportPhishingErrorUrl,
bad_url_spec,
threat_type == SB_THREAT_TYPE_CLIENT_SIDE_PHISHING_URL);
OpenURLParams params(
report_url, Referrer(), CURRENT_TAB, content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
false);
web_contents_->OpenURL(params);
return;
}
if (command == kShowDiagnosticCommand) {
std::string diagnostic =
base::StringPrintf(kSbDiagnosticUrl,
net::EscapeQueryParamValue(bad_url_spec, true).c_str());
GURL diagnostic_url(diagnostic);
diagnostic_url = google_util::AppendGoogleLocaleParam(diagnostic_url);
DCHECK(unsafe_resources_[element_index].threat_type ==
SB_THREAT_TYPE_URL_MALWARE);
OpenURLParams params(
diagnostic_url, Referrer(), CURRENT_TAB, content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
false);
web_contents_->OpenURL(params);
return;
}
if (command == kExpandedSeeMore) {
return;
}
NOTREACHED() << "Unexpected command: " << command;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the IPC layer in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Check for a negative integer properly.
BUG=169966
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11892002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176879 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,396
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static PixelChannels **AcquirePixelThreadSet(const Image *image)
{
PixelChannels
**pixels;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
number_threads;
number_threads=(size_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource);
pixels=(PixelChannels **) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_threads,
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (PixelChannels **) NULL)
return((PixelChannels **) NULL);
(void) memset(pixels,0,number_threads*sizeof(*pixels));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_threads; i++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
pixels[i]=(PixelChannels *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,
sizeof(**pixels));
if (pixels[i] == (PixelChannels *) NULL)
return(DestroyPixelThreadSet(pixels));
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) image->columns; j++)
{
register ssize_t
k;
for (k=0; k < MaxPixelChannels; k++)
pixels[i][j].channel[k]=0.0;
}
}
return(pixels);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer overflow at MagickCore/statistic.c in EvaluateImages because of mishandling columns.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1586
|
Medium
| 170,205
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int do_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int access,
unsigned long trans_exc_code)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long address;
unsigned int flags;
int fault;
if (notify_page_fault(regs))
return 0;
tsk = current;
mm = tsk->mm;
/*
* Verify that the fault happened in user space, that
* we are not in an interrupt and that there is a
* user context.
*/
fault = VM_FAULT_BADCONTEXT;
if (unlikely(!user_space_fault(trans_exc_code) || in_atomic() || !mm))
goto out;
address = trans_exc_code & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
if (access == VM_WRITE || (trans_exc_code & store_indication) == 0x400)
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
retry:
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto out_up;
if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > address)) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto out_up;
if (expand_stack(vma, address))
goto out_up;
}
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
* we can handle it..
*/
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & access)))
goto out_up;
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
address &= HPAGE_MASK;
/*
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
* the fault.
*/
fault = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, flags);
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR))
goto out_up;
/*
* Major/minor page fault accounting is only done on the
* initial attempt. If we go through a retry, it is extremely
* likely that the page will be found in page cache at that point.
*/
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY) {
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
tsk->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0,
regs, address);
} else {
tsk->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
/* Clear FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY to avoid any risk
* of starvation. */
flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
goto retry;
}
}
/*
* The instruction that caused the program check will
* be repeated. Don't signal single step via SIGTRAP.
*/
clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_PER_TRAP);
fault = 0;
out_up:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
out:
return fault;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,794
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void php_snmp_internal(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int st,
struct snmp_session *session,
struct objid_query *objid_query)
{
struct snmp_session *ss;
struct snmp_pdu *pdu=NULL, *response;
struct variable_list *vars;
oid root[MAX_NAME_LEN];
size_t rootlen = 0;
int status, count, found;
char buf[2048];
char buf2[2048];
int keepwalking=1;
char *err;
zval *snmpval = NULL;
int snmp_errno;
/* we start with retval=FALSE. If any actual data is acquired, retval will be set to appropriate type */
RETVAL_FALSE;
/* reset errno and errstr */
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR, "");
if (st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) { /* remember root OID */
memmove((char *)root, (char *)(objid_query->vars[0].name), (objid_query->vars[0].name_length) * sizeof(oid));
rootlen = objid_query->vars[0].name_length;
objid_query->offset = objid_query->count;
}
if ((ss = snmp_open(session)) == NULL) {
snmp_error(session, NULL, NULL, &err);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not open snmp connection: %s", err);
free(err);
RETVAL_FALSE;
return;
}
if ((st & SNMP_CMD_SET) && objid_query->count > objid_query->step) {
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_MULTIPLE_SET_QUERIES, "Can not fit all OIDs for SET query into one packet, using multiple queries");
}
while (keepwalking) {
keepwalking = 0;
if (st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) {
if (session->version == SNMP_VERSION_1) {
pdu = snmp_pdu_create(SNMP_MSG_GETNEXT);
} else {
pdu = snmp_pdu_create(SNMP_MSG_GETBULK);
pdu->non_repeaters = objid_query->non_repeaters;
pdu->max_repetitions = objid_query->max_repetitions;
}
snmp_add_null_var(pdu, objid_query->vars[0].name, objid_query->vars[0].name_length);
} else {
if (st & SNMP_CMD_GET) {
pdu = snmp_pdu_create(SNMP_MSG_GET);
} else if (st & SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT) {
pdu = snmp_pdu_create(SNMP_MSG_GETNEXT);
} else if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
pdu = snmp_pdu_create(SNMP_MSG_SET);
} else {
snmp_close(ss);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_ERROR, "Unknown SNMP command (internals)");
RETVAL_FALSE;
return;
}
for (count = 0; objid_query->offset < objid_query->count && count < objid_query->step; objid_query->offset++, count++){
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if ((snmp_errno = snmp_add_var(pdu, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name_length, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].type, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].value))) {
snprint_objid(buf, sizeof(buf), objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name_length);
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_OID_PARSING_ERROR, "Could not add variable: OID='%s' type='%c' value='%s': %s", buf, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].type, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].value, snmp_api_errstring(snmp_errno));
snmp_free_pdu(pdu);
snmp_close(ss);
RETVAL_FALSE;
return;
}
} else {
snmp_add_null_var(pdu, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name_length);
}
}
if(pdu->variables == NULL){
snmp_free_pdu(pdu);
snmp_close(ss);
RETVAL_FALSE;
return;
}
}
retry:
status = snmp_synch_response(ss, pdu, &response);
if (status == STAT_SUCCESS) {
if (response->errstat == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) {
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (objid_query->offset < objid_query->count) { /* we have unprocessed OIDs */
keepwalking = 1;
continue;
}
snmp_free_pdu(response);
snmp_close(ss);
RETVAL_TRUE;
return;
}
for (vars = response->variables; vars; vars = vars->next_variable) {
/* do not output errors as values */
if ( vars->type == SNMP_ENDOFMIBVIEW ||
vars->type == SNMP_NOSUCHOBJECT ||
vars->type == SNMP_NOSUCHINSTANCE ) {
if ((st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) && Z_TYPE_P(return_value) == IS_ARRAY) {
break;
}
snprint_objid(buf, sizeof(buf), vars->name, vars->name_length);
snprint_value(buf2, sizeof(buf2), vars->name, vars->name_length, vars);
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_ERROR_IN_REPLY, "Error in packet at '%s': %s", buf, buf2);
continue;
}
if ((st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) &&
(vars->name_length < rootlen || memcmp(root, vars->name, rootlen * sizeof(oid)))) { /* not part of this subtree */
if (Z_TYPE_P(return_value) == IS_ARRAY) { /* some records are fetched already, shut down further lookup */
keepwalking = 0;
} else {
/* first fetched OID is out of subtree, fallback to GET query */
st |= SNMP_CMD_GET;
st ^= SNMP_CMD_WALK;
objid_query->offset = 0;
keepwalking = 1;
}
break;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(snmpval);
php_snmp_getvalue(vars, snmpval TSRMLS_CC, objid_query->valueretrieval);
if (objid_query->array_output) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(return_value) == IS_BOOL) {
array_init(return_value);
}
if (st & SNMP_NUMERIC_KEYS) {
add_next_index_zval(return_value, snmpval);
} else if (st & SNMP_ORIGINAL_NAMES_AS_KEYS && st & SNMP_CMD_GET) {
found = 0;
for (count = 0; count < objid_query->count; count++) {
if (objid_query->vars[count].name_length == vars->name_length && snmp_oid_compare(objid_query->vars[count].name, objid_query->vars[count].name_length, vars->name, vars->name_length) == 0) {
found = 1;
objid_query->vars[count].name_length = 0; /* mark this name as used */
break;
}
}
if (found) {
add_assoc_zval(return_value, objid_query->vars[count].oid, snmpval);
} else {
snprint_objid(buf2, sizeof(buf2), vars->name, vars->name_length);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not find original OID name for '%s'", buf2);
}
} else if (st & SNMP_USE_SUFFIX_AS_KEYS && st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) {
snprint_objid(buf2, sizeof(buf2), vars->name, vars->name_length);
if (rootlen <= vars->name_length && snmp_oid_compare(root, rootlen, vars->name, rootlen) == 0) {
buf2[0] = '\0';
count = rootlen;
while(count < vars->name_length){
sprintf(buf, "%lu.", vars->name[count]);
strcat(buf2, buf);
count++;
}
buf2[strlen(buf2) - 1] = '\0'; /* remove trailing '.' */
}
add_assoc_zval(return_value, buf2, snmpval);
} else {
snprint_objid(buf2, sizeof(buf2), vars->name, vars->name_length);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, buf2, snmpval);
}
} else {
*return_value = *snmpval;
zval_copy_ctor(return_value);
zval_ptr_dtor(&snmpval);
break;
}
/* OID increase check */
if (st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) {
if (objid_query->oid_increasing_check == TRUE && snmp_oid_compare(objid_query->vars[0].name, objid_query->vars[0].name_length, vars->name, vars->name_length) >= 0) {
snprint_objid(buf2, sizeof(buf2), vars->name, vars->name_length);
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_OID_NOT_INCREASING, "Error: OID not increasing: %s", buf2);
keepwalking = 0;
} else {
memmove((char *)(objid_query->vars[0].name), (char *)vars->name, vars->name_length * sizeof(oid));
objid_query->vars[0].name_length = vars->name_length;
keepwalking = 1;
}
}
}
if (objid_query->offset < objid_query->count) { /* we have unprocessed OIDs */
keepwalking = 1;
}
} else {
if (st & SNMP_CMD_WALK && response->errstat == SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG && objid_query->max_repetitions > 1) { /* Answer will not fit into single packet */
objid_query->max_repetitions /= 2;
snmp_free_pdu(response);
keepwalking = 1;
continue;
}
if (!(st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) || response->errstat != SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHNAME || Z_TYPE_P(return_value) == IS_BOOL) {
for ( count=1, vars = response->variables;
vars && count != response->errindex;
vars = vars->next_variable, count++);
if (st & (SNMP_CMD_GET | SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT) && response->errstat == SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG && objid_query->step > 1) { /* Answer will not fit into single packet */
objid_query->offset = ((objid_query->offset > objid_query->step) ? (objid_query->offset - objid_query->step) : 0 );
objid_query->step /= 2;
snmp_free_pdu(response);
keepwalking = 1;
continue;
}
if (vars) {
snprint_objid(buf, sizeof(buf), vars->name, vars->name_length);
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_ERROR_IN_REPLY, "Error in packet at '%s': %s", buf, snmp_errstring(response->errstat));
} else {
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_ERROR_IN_REPLY, "Error in packet at %u object_id: %s", response->errindex, snmp_errstring(response->errstat));
}
if (st & (SNMP_CMD_GET | SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT)) { /* cut out bogus OID and retry */
if ((pdu = snmp_fix_pdu(response, ((st & SNMP_CMD_GET) ? SNMP_MSG_GET : SNMP_MSG_GETNEXT) )) != NULL) {
snmp_free_pdu(response);
goto retry;
}
}
snmp_free_pdu(response);
snmp_close(ss);
if (objid_query->array_output) {
zval_dtor(return_value);
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
return;
}
}
} else if (status == STAT_TIMEOUT) {
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_TIMEOUT, "No response from %s", session->peername);
if (objid_query->array_output) {
zval_dtor(return_value);
}
snmp_close(ss);
RETVAL_FALSE;
return;
} else { /* status == STAT_ERROR */
snmp_error(ss, NULL, NULL, &err);
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_GENERIC, "Fatal error: %s", err);
free(err);
if (objid_query->array_output) {
zval_dtor(return_value);
}
snmp_close(ss);
RETVAL_FALSE;
return;
}
if (response) {
snmp_free_pdu(response);
}
} /* keepwalking */
snmp_close(ss);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: ext/snmp/snmp.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 improperly interacts with the unserialize implementation and garbage collection, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted serialized data, a related issue to CVE-2016-5773.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,976
|
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