instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::string SanitizeRemoteBase(const std::string& value) {
GURL url(value);
std::string path = url.path();
std::vector<std::string> parts = base::SplitString(
path, "/", base::KEEP_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
std::string revision = parts.size() > 2 ? parts[2] : "";
revision = SanitizeRevision(revision);
path = base::StringPrintf("/%s/%s/", kRemoteFrontendPath, revision.c_str());
return SanitizeFrontendURL(url, url::kHttpsScheme,
kRemoteFrontendDomain, path, false).spec();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Windows insufficiently sanitized DevTools URLs, which allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to read filesystem contents via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
|
Medium
| 172,462
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void LocalFileSystem::fileSystemNotAllowedInternal(
PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> context,
PassRefPtr<CallbackWrapper> callbacks)
{
context->postTask(createCrossThreadTask(&reportFailure, callbacks->release(), FileError::ABORT_ERR));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,427
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
int i;
a = BN_new();
b = BN_new();
c = BN_new();
d = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
BN_one(a);
BN_one(b);
BN_zero(c);
if (BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
return 0;
}
BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
if (!BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx))
return (0);
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
BN_print(bp, b);
BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
BN_print(bp, c);
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
}
BN_print(bp, d);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
}
BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx);
BN_sub(e, e, d);
BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx);
if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n");
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
BN_zero(c);
if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with zero modulus "
"succeeded\n");
return 0;
}
BN_set_word(c, 16);
if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with even modulus "
"succeeded\n");
return 0;
}
BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL))
return (00);
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
BN_print(bp, b);
BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
BN_print(bp, c);
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
}
BN_print(bp, d);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
}
BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx);
BN_sub(e, e, d);
BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx);
if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n");
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
BN_free(d);
BN_free(e);
return (1);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The Montgomery squaring implementation in crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl in OpenSSL 1.0.2 before 1.0.2e on the x86_64 platform, as used by the BN_mod_exp function, mishandles carry propagation and produces incorrect output, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain sensitive private-key information via an attack against use of a (1) Diffie-Hellman (DH) or (2) Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral (DHE) ciphersuite.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,721
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: resp_get_length(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bp, int len, const u_char **endp)
{
int result;
u_char c;
int saw_digit;
int neg;
int too_large;
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
too_large = 0;
neg = 0;
if (*bp == '-') {
neg = 1;
bp++;
len--;
}
result = 0;
saw_digit = 0;
for (;;) {
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
c = *bp;
if (!(c >= '0' && c <= '9')) {
if (!saw_digit)
goto invalid;
break;
}
c -= '0';
if (result > (INT_MAX / 10)) {
/* This will overflow an int when we multiply it by 10. */
too_large = 1;
} else {
result *= 10;
if (result == INT_MAX && c > (INT_MAX % 10)) {
/* This will overflow an int when we add c */
too_large = 1;
} else
result += c;
}
bp++;
len--;
saw_digit = 1;
}
if (!saw_digit)
goto invalid;
/*
* OK, the next thing should be \r\n.
*/
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
if (*bp != '\r')
goto invalid;
bp++;
len--;
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
if (*bp != '\n')
goto invalid;
bp++;
len--;
*endp = bp;
if (neg) {
/* -1 means "null", anything else is invalid */
if (too_large || result != 1)
return (-4);
result = -1;
}
return (too_large ? -3 : result);
trunc:
return (-2);
invalid:
return (-5);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: The RESP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could enter an infinite loop due to a bug in print-resp.c:resp_get_length().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12989/RESP: Make sure resp_get_length() advances the pointer for invalid lengths.
Make sure that it always sends *endp before returning and that, for
invalid lengths where we don't like a character in the length string,
what it sets *endp to is past the character in question, so we don't
run the risk of infinitely looping (or doing something else random) if a
character in the length is invalid.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,928
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: double GetGPMFSampleRateAndTimes(size_t handle, GPMF_stream *gs, double rate, uint32_t index, double *in, double *out)
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)handle;
if (mp4 == NULL) return 0.0;
uint32_t key, insamples;
uint32_t repeat, outsamples;
GPMF_stream find_stream;
if (gs == NULL || mp4->metaoffsets == 0 || mp4->indexcount == 0 || mp4->basemetadataduration == 0 || mp4->meta_clockdemon == 0 || in == NULL || out == NULL) return 0.0;
key = GPMF_Key(gs);
repeat = GPMF_Repeat(gs);
if (rate == 0.0)
rate = GetGPMFSampleRate(handle, key, GPMF_SAMPLE_RATE_FAST);
if (rate == 0.0)
{
*in = *out = 0.0;
return 0.0;
}
GPMF_CopyState(gs, &find_stream);
if (GPMF_OK == GPMF_FindPrev(&find_stream, GPMF_KEY_TOTAL_SAMPLES, GPMF_CURRENT_LEVEL))
{
outsamples = BYTESWAP32(*(uint32_t *)GPMF_RawData(&find_stream));
insamples = outsamples - repeat;
*in = ((double)insamples / (double)rate);
*out = ((double)outsamples / (double)rate);
}
else
{
*in = ((double)index * (double)mp4->basemetadataduration / (double)mp4->meta_clockdemon);
*out = ((double)(index + 1) * (double)mp4->basemetadataduration / (double)mp4->meta_clockdemon);
}
return rate;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: GoPro GPMF-parser 1.2.2 has an out-of-bounds write in OpenMP4Source in demo/GPMF_mp4reader.c.
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader
|
Medium
| 169,547
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WebContext* WebContext::FromBrowserContext(oxide::BrowserContext* context) {
BrowserContextDelegate* delegate =
static_cast<BrowserContextDelegate*>(context->GetDelegate());
if (!delegate) {
return nullptr;
}
return delegate->context();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A malicious webview could install long-lived unload handlers that re-use an incognito BrowserContext that is queued for destruction in versions of Oxide before 1.18.3.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,411
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: chdlc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
u_int proto;
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s, ethertype %s (0x%04x), length %u: ",
tok2str(chdlc_cast_values, "0x%02x", p[0]),
tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown", proto),
proto,
length));
}
length -= CHDLC_HDRLEN;
p += CHDLC_HDRLEN;
switch (proto) {
case ETHERTYPE_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case CHDLC_TYPE_SLARP:
chdlc_slarp_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
#if 0
case CHDLC_TYPE_CDP:
chdlc_cdp_print(p, length);
break;
#endif
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS:
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS_MULTI:
mpls_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_ISO:
/* is the fudge byte set ? lets verify by spotting ISO headers */
if (*(p+1) == 0x81 ||
*(p+1) == 0x82 ||
*(p+1) == 0x83)
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1, ndo->ndo_snapend - p - 1);
else
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, ndo->ndo_snapend - p);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown CHDLC protocol (0x%04x)", proto));
break;
}
return (CHDLC_HDRLEN);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Cisco HDLC parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-chdlc.c:chdlc_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13687/CHDLC: Improve bounds and length checks.
Prevent a possible buffer overread in chdlc_print() and replace the
custom check in chdlc_if_print() with a standard check in chdlc_print()
so that the latter certainly does not over-read even when reached via
juniper_chdlc_print(). Add length checks.
|
Low
| 170,022
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static future_t *init(void) {
pthread_mutex_init(&lock, NULL);
config = config_new(CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
if (!config) {
LOG_WARN(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to load config file; attempting to transcode legacy file.", __func__);
config = btif_config_transcode(LEGACY_CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
if (!config) {
LOG_WARN(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to transcode legacy file, starting unconfigured.", __func__);
config = config_new_empty();
if (!config) {
LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to allocate a config object.", __func__);
goto error;
}
}
if (config_save(config, CONFIG_FILE_PATH))
unlink(LEGACY_CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
}
alarm_timer = alarm_new();
if (!alarm_timer) {
LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to create alarm.", __func__);
goto error;
}
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_SUCCESS);
error:;
alarm_free(alarm_timer);
config_free(config);
pthread_mutex_destroy(&lock);
alarm_timer = NULL;
config = NULL;
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_FAIL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: btif_config.c in Bluetooth in Android 6.x before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and persistent daemon crash) by triggering a large number of configuration entries, and consequently exceeding the maximum size of a configuration file, aka internal bug 26071376.
Commit Message: Fix crashes with lots of discovered LE devices
When loads of devices are discovered a config file which is too large
can be written out, which causes the BT daemon to crash on startup.
This limits the number of config entries for unpaired devices which
are initialized, and prevents a large number from being saved to the
filesystem.
Bug: 26071376
Change-Id: I4a74094f57a82b17f94e99a819974b8bc8082184
|
Low
| 173,930
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
bitRate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
bitRate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *h263type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *)params;
if (h263type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
h263type->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
h263type->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_H263ProfileBaseline;
h263type->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_H263Level45;
h263type->bPLUSPTYPEAllowed = OMX_FALSE;
h263type->bForceRoundingTypeToZero = OMX_FALSE;
h263type->nPictureHeaderRepetition = 0;
h263type->nGOBHeaderInterval = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *mpeg4type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *)params;
if (mpeg4type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mpeg4type->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileCore;
mpeg4type->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4Level2;
mpeg4type->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
mpeg4type->nBFrames = 0;
mpeg4type->nIDCVLCThreshold = 0;
mpeg4type->bACPred = OMX_TRUE;
mpeg4type->nMaxPacketSize = 256;
mpeg4type->nTimeIncRes = 1000;
mpeg4type->nHeaderExtension = 0;
mpeg4type->bReversibleVLC = OMX_FALSE;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,209
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WebRTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::localDescription()
{
return m_localDescription;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,360
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void perf_event_output(struct perf_event *event, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_event_header header;
/* protect the callchain buffers */
rcu_read_lock();
perf_prepare_sample(&header, data, event, regs);
if (perf_output_begin(&handle, event, header.size, nmi, 1))
goto exit;
perf_output_sample(&handle, &header, data, event);
perf_output_end(&handle);
exit:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,832
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ContextualSearchFieldTrial::IsNowOnTapBarIntegrationEnabled() {
return GetBooleanParam(
switches::kEnableContextualSearchNowOnTapBarIntegration,
&is_now_on_tap_bar_integration_enabled_cached_,
&is_now_on_tap_bar_integration_enabled_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 38.0.2125.101 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
|
Low
| 171,644
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void logi_dj_recv_add_djhid_device(struct dj_receiver_dev *djrcv_dev,
struct dj_report *dj_report)
{
/* Called in delayed work context */
struct hid_device *djrcv_hdev = djrcv_dev->hdev;
struct usb_interface *intf = to_usb_interface(djrcv_hdev->dev.parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
struct hid_device *dj_hiddev;
struct dj_device *dj_dev;
/* Device index goes from 1 to 6, we need 3 bytes to store the
* semicolon, the index, and a null terminator
*/
unsigned char tmpstr[3];
if (dj_report->report_params[DEVICE_PAIRED_PARAM_SPFUNCTION] &
SPFUNCTION_DEVICE_LIST_EMPTY) {
dbg_hid("%s: device list is empty\n", __func__);
djrcv_dev->querying_devices = false;
return;
}
if ((dj_report->device_index < DJ_DEVICE_INDEX_MIN) ||
(dj_report->device_index > DJ_DEVICE_INDEX_MAX)) {
dev_err(&djrcv_hdev->dev, "%s: invalid device index:%d\n",
__func__, dj_report->device_index);
return;
}
if (djrcv_dev->paired_dj_devices[dj_report->device_index]) {
/* The device is already known. No need to reallocate it. */
dbg_hid("%s: device is already known\n", __func__);
return;
}
dj_hiddev = hid_allocate_device();
if (IS_ERR(dj_hiddev)) {
dev_err(&djrcv_hdev->dev, "%s: hid_allocate_device failed\n",
__func__);
return;
}
dj_hiddev->ll_driver = &logi_dj_ll_driver;
dj_hiddev->dev.parent = &djrcv_hdev->dev;
dj_hiddev->bus = BUS_USB;
dj_hiddev->vendor = le16_to_cpu(usbdev->descriptor.idVendor);
dj_hiddev->product = le16_to_cpu(usbdev->descriptor.idProduct);
snprintf(dj_hiddev->name, sizeof(dj_hiddev->name),
"Logitech Unifying Device. Wireless PID:%02x%02x",
dj_report->report_params[DEVICE_PAIRED_PARAM_EQUAD_ID_MSB],
dj_report->report_params[DEVICE_PAIRED_PARAM_EQUAD_ID_LSB]);
usb_make_path(usbdev, dj_hiddev->phys, sizeof(dj_hiddev->phys));
snprintf(tmpstr, sizeof(tmpstr), ":%d", dj_report->device_index);
strlcat(dj_hiddev->phys, tmpstr, sizeof(dj_hiddev->phys));
dj_dev = kzalloc(sizeof(struct dj_device), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dj_dev) {
dev_err(&djrcv_hdev->dev, "%s: failed allocating dj_device\n",
__func__);
goto dj_device_allocate_fail;
}
dj_dev->reports_supported = get_unaligned_le32(
dj_report->report_params + DEVICE_PAIRED_RF_REPORT_TYPE);
dj_dev->hdev = dj_hiddev;
dj_dev->dj_receiver_dev = djrcv_dev;
dj_dev->device_index = dj_report->device_index;
dj_hiddev->driver_data = dj_dev;
djrcv_dev->paired_dj_devices[dj_report->device_index] = dj_dev;
if (hid_add_device(dj_hiddev)) {
dev_err(&djrcv_hdev->dev, "%s: failed adding dj_device\n",
__func__);
goto hid_add_device_fail;
}
return;
hid_add_device_fail:
djrcv_dev->paired_dj_devices[dj_report->device_index] = NULL;
kfree(dj_dev);
dj_device_allocate_fail:
hid_destroy_device(dj_hiddev);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Array index error in the logi_dj_raw_event function in drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c in the Linux kernel before 3.16.2 allows physically proximate attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (invalid kfree) via a crafted device that provides a malformed REPORT_TYPE_NOTIF_DEVICE_UNPAIRED value.
Commit Message: HID: logitech: perform bounds checking on device_id early enough
device_index is a char type and the size of paired_dj_deivces is 7
elements, therefore proper bounds checking has to be applied to
device_index before it is used.
We are currently performing the bounds checking in
logi_dj_recv_add_djhid_device(), which is too late, as malicious device
could send REPORT_TYPE_NOTIF_DEVICE_UNPAIRED early enough and trigger the
problem in one of the report forwarding functions called from
logi_dj_raw_event().
Fix this by performing the check at the earliest possible ocasion in
logi_dj_raw_event().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
Medium
| 166,378
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: send_results(struct iperf_test *test)
{
int r = 0;
cJSON *j;
cJSON *j_streams;
struct iperf_stream *sp;
cJSON *j_stream;
int sender_has_retransmits;
iperf_size_t bytes_transferred;
int retransmits;
j = cJSON_CreateObject();
if (j == NULL) {
i_errno = IEPACKAGERESULTS;
r = -1;
} else {
cJSON_AddFloatToObject(j, "cpu_util_total", test->cpu_util[0]);
cJSON_AddFloatToObject(j, "cpu_util_user", test->cpu_util[1]);
cJSON_AddFloatToObject(j, "cpu_util_system", test->cpu_util[2]);
if ( ! test->sender )
sender_has_retransmits = -1;
else
sender_has_retransmits = test->sender_has_retransmits;
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "sender_has_retransmits", sender_has_retransmits);
/* If on the server and sending server output, then do this */
if (test->role == 's' && test->get_server_output) {
if (test->json_output) {
/* Add JSON output */
cJSON_AddItemReferenceToObject(j, "server_output_json", test->json_top);
}
else {
/* Add textual output */
size_t buflen = 0;
/* Figure out how much room we need to hold the complete output string */
struct iperf_textline *t;
TAILQ_FOREACH(t, &(test->server_output_list), textlineentries) {
buflen += strlen(t->line);
}
/* Allocate and build it up from the component lines */
char *output = calloc(buflen + 1, 1);
TAILQ_FOREACH(t, &(test->server_output_list), textlineentries) {
strncat(output, t->line, buflen);
buflen -= strlen(t->line);
}
cJSON_AddStringToObject(j, "server_output_text", output);
}
}
j_streams = cJSON_CreateArray();
if (j_streams == NULL) {
i_errno = IEPACKAGERESULTS;
r = -1;
} else {
cJSON_AddItemToObject(j, "streams", j_streams);
SLIST_FOREACH(sp, &test->streams, streams) {
j_stream = cJSON_CreateObject();
if (j_stream == NULL) {
i_errno = IEPACKAGERESULTS;
r = -1;
} else {
cJSON_AddItemToArray(j_streams, j_stream);
bytes_transferred = test->sender ? sp->result->bytes_sent : sp->result->bytes_received;
retransmits = (test->sender && test->sender_has_retransmits) ? sp->result->stream_retrans : -1;
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j_stream, "id", sp->id);
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j_stream, "bytes", bytes_transferred);
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j_stream, "retransmits", retransmits);
cJSON_AddFloatToObject(j_stream, "jitter", sp->jitter);
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j_stream, "errors", sp->cnt_error);
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j_stream, "packets", sp->packet_count);
}
}
if (r == 0 && test->debug) {
printf("send_results\n%s\n", cJSON_Print(j));
}
if (r == 0 && JSON_write(test->ctrl_sck, j) < 0) {
i_errno = IESENDRESULTS;
r = -1;
}
}
cJSON_Delete(j);
}
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,317
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void NaClProcessHost::OnPpapiChannelCreated(
const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle) {
DCHECK(enable_ipc_proxy_);
ReplyToRenderer(channel_handle);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,726
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BufferMeta(const sp<GraphicBuffer> &graphicBuffer)
: mGraphicBuffer(graphicBuffer),
mIsBackup(false) {
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
|
Low
| 173,523
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MostVisitedSitesBridge::JavaObserver::OnIconMadeAvailable(
const GURL& site_url) {
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
Java_MostVisitedURLsObserver_onIconMadeAvailable(
env, observer_, ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, site_url.spec()));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The VpxVideoDecoder::VpxDecode function in media/filters/vpx_video_decoder.cc in the vpxdecoder implementation in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76 does not ensure that alpha-plane dimensions are identical to image dimensions, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via crafted VPx video data.
Commit Message: Rename MostVisitedSites.MostVisitedURLsObserver to Observer.
BUG=677672
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2697543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#449958}
|
Low
| 172,034
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannel(Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,const PSDInfo *psd_info,LayerInfo* layer_info,
const size_t channel,const PSDCompressionType compression,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*channel_image,
*mask;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickBooleanType
status;
channel_image=image;
mask=(Image *) NULL;
if ((layer_info->channel_info[channel].type < -1) &&
(layer_info->mask.page.width > 0) && (layer_info->mask.page.height > 0))
{
const char
*option;
/*
Ignore mask that is not a user supplied layer mask, if the mask is
disabled or if the flags have unsupported values.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"psd:preserve-opacity-mask");
if ((layer_info->channel_info[channel].type != -2) ||
(layer_info->mask.flags > 2) || ((layer_info->mask.flags & 0x02) &&
(IsStringTrue(option) == MagickFalse)))
{
SeekBlob(image,layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_CUR);
return(MagickTrue);
}
mask=CloneImage(image,layer_info->mask.page.width,
layer_info->mask.page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
{
SetImageType(mask,GrayscaleType,exception);
channel_image=mask;
}
}
offset=TellBlob(image);
status=MagickFalse;
switch(compression)
{
case Raw:
status=ReadPSDChannelRaw(channel_image,psd_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,exception);
break;
case RLE:
{
MagickOffsetType
*sizes;
sizes=ReadPSDRLESizes(channel_image,psd_info,channel_image->rows);
if (sizes == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
status=ReadPSDChannelRLE(channel_image,psd_info,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,sizes,exception);
sizes=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sizes);
}
break;
case ZipWithPrediction:
case ZipWithoutPrediction:
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
status=ReadPSDChannelZip(channel_image,layer_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,compression,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,exception);
#else
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateWarning,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn",
"'%s' (ZLIB)",image->filename);
#endif
break;
default:
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),TypeWarning,
"CompressionNotSupported","'%.20g'",(double) compression);
break;
}
SeekBlob(image,offset+layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_SET);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
DestroyImage(mask);
ThrowBinaryException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage",
image->filename);
}
layer_info->mask.image=mask;
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-834
Summary: In coders/psd.c in ImageMagick 7.0.7-0 Q16, a DoS in ReadPSDLayersInternal() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted PSD file, which claims a large *length* field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop over *length* would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.
Commit Message: Slightly different fix for #714
|
Medium
| 170,016
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadVIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define VFF_CM_genericRGB 15
#define VFF_CM_ntscRGB 1
#define VFF_CM_NONE 0
#define VFF_DEP_DECORDER 0x4
#define VFF_DEP_NSORDER 0x8
#define VFF_DES_RAW 0
#define VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_NONE 0
#define VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE 7
#define VFF_MS_NONE 0
#define VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND 1
#define VFF_MS_SHARED 3
#define VFF_TYP_BIT 0
#define VFF_TYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_TYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_TYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_TYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_TYP_DOUBLE 9
typedef struct _ViffInfo
{
unsigned char
identifier,
file_type,
release,
version,
machine_dependency,
reserve[3];
char
comment[512];
unsigned int
rows,
columns,
subrows;
int
x_offset,
y_offset;
float
x_bits_per_pixel,
y_bits_per_pixel;
unsigned int
location_type,
location_dimension,
number_of_images,
number_data_bands,
data_storage_type,
data_encode_scheme,
map_scheme,
map_storage_type,
map_rows,
map_columns,
map_subrows,
map_enable,
maps_per_cycle,
color_space_model;
} ViffInfo;
double
min_value,
scale_factor,
value;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_pixel,
max_packets,
quantum;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
unsigned long
lsb_first;
ViffInfo
viff_info;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read VIFF header (1024 bytes).
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
do
{
/*
Verify VIFF identifier.
*/
if ((count != 1) || ((unsigned char) viff_info.identifier != 0xab))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NotAVIFFImage");
/*
Initialize VIFF image.
*/
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.file_type),&viff_info.file_type);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.release),&viff_info.release);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.version),&viff_info.version);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.machine_dependency),
&viff_info.machine_dependency);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.reserve),viff_info.reserve);
count=ReadBlob(image,512,(unsigned char *) viff_info.comment);
if (count != 512)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
viff_info.comment[511]='\0';
if (strlen(viff_info.comment) > 4)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",viff_info.comment,exception);
if ((viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_DECORDER) ||
(viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_NSORDER))
image->endian=LSBEndian;
else
image->endian=MSBEndian;
viff_info.rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.x_offset=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
viff_info.y_offset=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.y_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_dimension=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_of_images=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_data_bands=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_encode_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_enable=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.maps_per_cycle=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.color_space_model=ReadBlobLong(image);
for (i=0; i < 420; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) viff_info.columns*viff_info.rows;
if (number_pixels > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (number_pixels != (size_t) number_pixels)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (number_pixels == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageColumnOrRowSizeIsNotSupported");
image->columns=viff_info.rows;
image->rows=viff_info.columns;
image->depth=viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? 8UL :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
image->alpha_trait=viff_info.number_data_bands == 4 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
/*
Verify that we can read this VIFF image.
*/
if ((viff_info.number_data_bands < 1) || (viff_info.number_data_bands > 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_BIT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.data_encode_scheme != VFF_DES_RAW)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_NONE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"MapStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_NONE) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_ntscRGB) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_genericRGB))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColorspaceModelIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.location_type != VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"LocationTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.number_of_images != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"NumberOfImagesIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.map_rows == 0)
viff_info.map_scheme=VFF_MS_NONE;
switch ((int) viff_info.map_scheme)
{
case VFF_MS_NONE:
{
if (viff_info.number_data_bands < 3)
{
/*
Create linear color ramp.
*/
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
image->colors=2;
else
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE)
image->colors=256UL;
else
image->colors=image->depth <= 8 ? 256UL : 65536UL;
status=AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND:
case VFF_MS_SHARED:
{
unsigned char
*viff_colormap;
/*
Allocate VIFF colormap.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
image->colors=viff_info.map_columns;
if ((MagickSizeType) (viff_info.map_rows*image->colors) > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((MagickSizeType) viff_info.map_rows > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if ((MagickSizeType) viff_info.map_rows >
(viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap));
if (viff_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Read VIFF raster colormap.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*viff_info.map_rows,
viff_colormap);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
default: break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (viff_info.map_rows*image->colors); i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*viff_colormap[i]; break;
}
if (i < (ssize_t) image->colors)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
}
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (2*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].green=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].blue=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
}
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(viff_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
/*
Create bi-level colormap.
*/
image->colors=2;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
image->colorspace=GRAYColorspace;
}
/*
Allocate VIFF pixels.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck((image->columns+7UL) >> 3UL,image->rows) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
max_packets=((image->columns+7UL) >> 3UL)*image->rows;
}
else
{
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck((size_t) number_pixels,viff_info.number_data_bands) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
max_packets=(size_t) (number_pixels*viff_info.number_data_bands);
}
if ((MagickSizeType) (bytes_per_pixel*max_packets) > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(
number_pixels,max_packets),bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(pixels,0,MagickMax(number_pixels,max_packets)*
bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets,pixels);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
default: break;
}
min_value=0.0;
scale_factor=1.0;
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE))
{
double
max_value;
/*
Determine scale factor.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[0]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[0]; break;
}
max_value=value;
min_value=value;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (value > max_value)
max_value=value;
else
if (value < min_value)
min_value=value;
}
if ((min_value == 0) && (max_value == 0))
scale_factor=0;
else
if (min_value == max_value)
{
scale_factor=(double) QuantumRange/min_value;
min_value=0;
}
else
scale_factor=(double) QuantumRange/(max_value-min_value);
}
/*
Convert pixels to Quantum size.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE)
{
value=(value-min_value)*scale_factor;
if (value > QuantumRange)
value=QuantumRange;
else
if (value < 0)
value=0;
}
*p=(unsigned char) ((Quantum) value);
p++;
}
/*
Convert VIFF raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) quantum,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (int) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) quantum,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+2*number_pixels)),q);
if (image->colors != 0)
{
ssize_t
index;
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelRed(image,q);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index,exception)].red),q);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelGreen(image,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index,exception)].green),q);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelBlue(image,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index,exception)].blue),q);
}
SetPixelAlpha(image,image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ?
ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels*3)) : OpaqueAlpha,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
if ((count == 1) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count != 0) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick before 7.0.8-50 has a memory leak vulnerability in the function ReadVIFFImage in coders/viff.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1600
|
Medium
| 169,623
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ixheaacd_qmf_hbe_data_reinit(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer,
WORD16 *p_freq_band_tab[2],
WORD16 *p_num_sfb, WORD32 upsamp_4_flag) {
WORD32 synth_size, sfb, patch, stop_patch;
if (ptr_hbe_txposer != NULL) {
ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band = p_freq_band_tab[LOW][0];
ptr_hbe_txposer->end_band = p_freq_band_tab[LOW][p_num_sfb[LOW]];
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size =
4 * ((ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band + 4) / 8 + 1);
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start =
ixheaacd_start_subband2kL_tbl[ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band];
ptr_hbe_txposer->upsamp_4_flag = upsamp_4_flag;
if (upsamp_4_flag) {
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start + ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size > 16)
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start = 16 - ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
} else if (ptr_hbe_txposer->core_frame_length == 768) {
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start + ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size > 24)
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start = 24 - ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
}
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_buf, 0, 1280 * sizeof(FLOAT32));
synth_size = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_buf_offset = 18 * synth_size;
switch (synth_size) {
case 4:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_4;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_8;
ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
break;
case 8:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_8;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_16;
ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
break;
case 12:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_12;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_24;
ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p3;
ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p3;
break;
case 16:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_16;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_32;
ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
break;
case 20:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_20;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_40;
break;
default:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_4;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_8;
ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
}
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_wind_coeff = ixheaacd_map_prot_filter(synth_size);
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_buf, 0, 640 * sizeof(FLOAT32));
synth_size = 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_wind_coeff = ixheaacd_map_prot_filter(synth_size);
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf, 0, MAX_NUM_PATCHES * sizeof(WORD32));
sfb = 0;
if (upsamp_4_flag) {
stop_patch = MAX_NUM_PATCHES;
ptr_hbe_txposer->max_stretch = MAX_STRETCH;
} else {
stop_patch = MAX_STRETCH;
}
for (patch = 1; patch <= stop_patch; patch++) {
while (sfb <= p_num_sfb[LOW] &&
p_freq_band_tab[LOW][sfb] <= patch * ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band)
sfb++;
if (sfb <= p_num_sfb[LOW]) {
if ((patch * ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band -
p_freq_band_tab[LOW][sfb - 1]) <= 3) {
ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf[patch - 1] =
p_freq_band_tab[LOW][sfb - 1];
} else {
WORD32 sfb = 0;
while (sfb <= p_num_sfb[HIGH] &&
p_freq_band_tab[HIGH][sfb] <=
patch * ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band)
sfb++;
ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf[patch - 1] =
p_freq_band_tab[HIGH][sfb - 1];
}
} else {
ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf[patch - 1] = ptr_hbe_txposer->end_band;
ptr_hbe_txposer->max_stretch = min(patch, MAX_STRETCH);
break;
}
}
}
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start < 0) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: In ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p3 of ixheaacd_esbr_fft.c there is a possible out of bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-9.0 Android ID: A-110769924
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
|
Medium
| 174,092
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: asn1_get_octet_der (const unsigned char *der, int der_len,
int *ret_len, unsigned char *str, int str_size,
int *str_len)
{
int len_len;
if (der_len <= 0)
return ASN1_GENERIC_ERROR;
/* if(str==NULL) return ASN1_SUCCESS; */
*str_len = asn1_get_length_der (der, der_len, &len_len);
if (*str_len < 0)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
*ret_len = *str_len + len_len;
if (str_size >= *str_len)
memcpy (str, der + len_len, *str_len);
else
{
return ASN1_MEM_ERROR;
}
return ASN1_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The asn1_get_bit_der function in GNU Libtasn1 before 3.6 does not properly report an error when a negative bit length is identified, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause out-of-bounds access via crafted ASN.1 data.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,178
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: setup_server_realm(krb5_principal sprinc)
{
krb5_error_code kret;
kdc_realm_t *newrealm;
kret = 0;
if (kdc_numrealms > 1) {
if (!(newrealm = find_realm_data(sprinc->realm.data,
(krb5_ui_4) sprinc->realm.length)))
kret = ENOENT;
else
kdc_active_realm = newrealm;
}
else
kdc_active_realm = kdc_realmlist[0];
return(kret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: An unspecified third-party database module for the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.10.x allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) via a crafted request, a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-1418.
Commit Message: Multi-realm KDC null deref [CVE-2013-1418]
If a KDC serves multiple realms, certain requests can cause
setup_server_realm() to dereference a null pointer, crashing the KDC.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
A related but more minor vulnerability requires authentication to
exploit, and is only present if a third-party KDC database module can
dereference a null pointer under certain conditions.
(back ported from commit 5d2d9a1abe46a2c1a8614d4672d08d9d30a5f8bf)
ticket: 7757 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.7
status: resolved
|
Low
| 165,933
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BlobStorageContext::BlobFlattener::BlobFlattener(
const BlobDataBuilder& input_builder,
BlobEntry* output_blob,
BlobStorageRegistry* registry) {
const std::string& uuid = input_builder.uuid_;
std::set<std::string> dependent_blob_uuids;
size_t num_files_with_unknown_size = 0;
size_t num_building_dependent_blobs = 0;
bool found_memory_transport = false;
bool found_file_transport = false;
base::CheckedNumeric<uint64_t> checked_total_size = 0;
base::CheckedNumeric<uint64_t> checked_total_memory_size = 0;
base::CheckedNumeric<uint64_t> checked_transport_quota_needed = 0;
base::CheckedNumeric<uint64_t> checked_copy_quota_needed = 0;
for (scoped_refptr<BlobDataItem> input_item : input_builder.items_) {
const DataElement& input_element = input_item->data_element();
DataElement::Type type = input_element.type();
uint64_t length = input_element.length();
RecordBlobItemSizeStats(input_element);
if (IsBytes(type)) {
DCHECK_NE(0 + DataElement::kUnknownSize, input_element.length());
found_memory_transport = true;
if (found_file_transport) {
status = BlobStatus::ERR_INVALID_CONSTRUCTION_ARGUMENTS;
return;
}
contains_unpopulated_transport_items |=
(type == DataElement::TYPE_BYTES_DESCRIPTION);
checked_transport_quota_needed += length;
checked_total_size += length;
scoped_refptr<ShareableBlobDataItem> item = new ShareableBlobDataItem(
std::move(input_item), ShareableBlobDataItem::QUOTA_NEEDED);
pending_transport_items.push_back(item);
transport_items.push_back(item.get());
output_blob->AppendSharedBlobItem(std::move(item));
continue;
}
if (type == DataElement::TYPE_BLOB) {
BlobEntry* ref_entry = registry->GetEntry(input_element.blob_uuid());
if (!ref_entry || input_element.blob_uuid() == uuid) {
status = BlobStatus::ERR_INVALID_CONSTRUCTION_ARGUMENTS;
return;
}
if (BlobStatusIsError(ref_entry->status())) {
status = BlobStatus::ERR_REFERENCED_BLOB_BROKEN;
return;
}
if (ref_entry->total_size() == DataElement::kUnknownSize) {
status = BlobStatus::ERR_INVALID_CONSTRUCTION_ARGUMENTS;
return;
}
if (dependent_blob_uuids.find(input_element.blob_uuid()) ==
dependent_blob_uuids.end()) {
dependent_blobs.push_back(
std::make_pair(input_element.blob_uuid(), ref_entry));
dependent_blob_uuids.insert(input_element.blob_uuid());
if (BlobStatusIsPending(ref_entry->status())) {
num_building_dependent_blobs++;
}
}
length = length == DataElement::kUnknownSize ? ref_entry->total_size()
: input_element.length();
checked_total_size += length;
if (input_element.offset() == 0 && length == ref_entry->total_size()) {
for (const auto& shareable_item : ref_entry->items()) {
output_blob->AppendSharedBlobItem(shareable_item);
}
continue;
}
if (input_element.offset() + length > ref_entry->total_size()) {
status = BlobStatus::ERR_INVALID_CONSTRUCTION_ARGUMENTS;
return;
}
BlobSlice slice(*ref_entry, input_element.offset(), length);
if (!slice.copying_memory_size.IsValid() ||
!slice.total_memory_size.IsValid()) {
status = BlobStatus::ERR_INVALID_CONSTRUCTION_ARGUMENTS;
return;
}
checked_total_memory_size += slice.total_memory_size;
if (slice.first_source_item) {
copies.push_back(ItemCopyEntry(slice.first_source_item,
slice.first_item_slice_offset,
slice.dest_items.front()));
pending_copy_items.push_back(slice.dest_items.front());
}
if (slice.last_source_item) {
copies.push_back(
ItemCopyEntry(slice.last_source_item, 0, slice.dest_items.back()));
pending_copy_items.push_back(slice.dest_items.back());
}
checked_copy_quota_needed += slice.copying_memory_size;
for (auto& shareable_item : slice.dest_items) {
output_blob->AppendSharedBlobItem(std::move(shareable_item));
}
continue;
}
scoped_refptr<ShareableBlobDataItem> item;
if (BlobDataBuilder::IsFutureFileItem(input_element)) {
found_file_transport = true;
if (found_memory_transport) {
status = BlobStatus::ERR_INVALID_CONSTRUCTION_ARGUMENTS;
return;
}
contains_unpopulated_transport_items = true;
item = new ShareableBlobDataItem(std::move(input_item),
ShareableBlobDataItem::QUOTA_NEEDED);
pending_transport_items.push_back(item);
transport_items.push_back(item.get());
checked_transport_quota_needed += length;
} else {
item = new ShareableBlobDataItem(
std::move(input_item),
ShareableBlobDataItem::POPULATED_WITHOUT_QUOTA);
}
if (length == DataElement::kUnknownSize)
num_files_with_unknown_size++;
checked_total_size += length;
output_blob->AppendSharedBlobItem(std::move(item));
}
if (num_files_with_unknown_size > 1 && input_builder.items_.size() > 1) {
status = BlobStatus::ERR_INVALID_CONSTRUCTION_ARGUMENTS;
return;
}
if (!checked_total_size.IsValid() || !checked_total_memory_size.IsValid() ||
!checked_transport_quota_needed.IsValid() ||
!checked_copy_quota_needed.IsValid()) {
status = BlobStatus::ERR_INVALID_CONSTRUCTION_ARGUMENTS;
return;
}
total_size = checked_total_size.ValueOrDie();
total_memory_size = checked_total_memory_size.ValueOrDie();
transport_quota_needed = checked_transport_quota_needed.ValueOrDie();
copy_quota_needed = checked_copy_quota_needed.ValueOrDie();
transport_quota_type = found_file_transport ? TransportQuotaType::FILE
: TransportQuotaType::MEMORY;
if (transport_quota_needed) {
status = BlobStatus::PENDING_QUOTA;
} else {
status = BlobStatus::PENDING_INTERNALS;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in Blob API in Google Chrome prior to 63.0.3239.84 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page, aka a Blink out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
|
Medium
| 172,927
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Segment::AppendCluster(Cluster* pCluster) {
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index >= 0);
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
long& size = m_clusterSize;
assert(size >= count);
const long idx = pCluster->m_index;
assert(idx == m_clusterCount);
if (count >= size) {
const long n = (size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2 * size;
Cluster** const qq = new Cluster* [n];
Cluster** q = qq;
Cluster** p = m_clusters;
Cluster** const pp = p + count;
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_clusters;
m_clusters = qq;
size = n;
}
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0) {
assert(m_clusters);
Cluster** const p = m_clusters + m_clusterCount;
assert(*p);
assert((*p)->m_index < 0);
Cluster** q = p + m_clusterPreloadCount;
assert(q < (m_clusters + size));
for (;;) {
Cluster** const qq = q - 1;
assert((*qq)->m_index < 0);
*q = *qq;
q = qq;
if (q == p)
break;
}
}
m_clusters[idx] = pCluster;
++m_clusterCount;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,801
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ExtensionTtsController::SpeakNextUtterance() {
while (!utterance_queue_.empty() && !current_utterance_) {
Utterance* utterance = utterance_queue_.front();
utterance_queue_.pop();
SpeakNow(utterance);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,387
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
WORD32 num_mb_skip,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc,
WORD32 prev_slice_err)
{
WORD32 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbsNby2;
UWORD32 u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
UWORD32 i2_mb_skip_run;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row;
const UWORD32 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
UWORD32 u1_slice_end;
UWORD32 u1_tfr_n_mb;
UWORD32 u1_decode_nmb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
parse_pmbarams_t *ps_parse_mb_data;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_deblk_mb_type;
UWORD16 u2_total_mbs_coded;
UWORD32 u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
parse_part_params_t *ps_part_info;
WORD32 ret;
UNUSED(u1_is_idr_slice);
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return 0;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag && (num_mb_skip & 1))
{
num_mb_skip++;
}
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_long_term_reference_flag = 0;
if(prev_slice_err == 1)
{
/* first slice - missing/header corruption */
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
{
WORD32 i, j, poc = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = 0;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic != NULL)
poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc + 2;
j = -1;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS; i++)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].u1_is_valid == TRUE)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].ps_sps->u1_is_valid == TRUE)
{
j = i;
break;
}
}
}
if(j == -1)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
/* call ih264d_start_of_pic only if it was not called earlier*/
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = 1;
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, poc, ps_cur_poc,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->ps_pps[j]);
if(ret != OK)
{
return ret;
}
}
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][0]->u1_pic_buf_id = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 0;
}
else
{
dec_slice_struct_t *ps_parse_cur_slice;
ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf + ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done
&& ps_parse_cur_slice == ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice)
{
if((u1_mbaff) && (ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb & 1))
{
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb - 1;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
}
u1_num_mbs = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs - 1;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info;
}
else
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info
+ ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_prev_nmb - 1;
}
}
ps_dec->u2_mby = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity =
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst -= SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if (ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == P_SLICE
|| ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
}
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next)
&& (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = 1;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 1;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
return 0;
}
/* Inserting new slice only if the current slice has atleast 1 MB*/
if(ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice <
(UWORD32)(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >> ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag))
{
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
}
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf
+ ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
}
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations to new slice */
/******************************************************/
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MIN(MAX_FRAMES, ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init);
num_entries = 2 * ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = (volatile void **)pu1_buf;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >> u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >> u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations specific to P slice */
/******************************************************/
u1_inter_mb_type = P_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_INTER_MB;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb = ih264d_mv_pred_ref_tfr_nby2_pmb;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->u2_mbx =
(MOD(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby =
(DIV(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby <<= u1_mbaff;
/******************************************************/
/* Parsing / decoding the slice */
/******************************************************/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
u1_slice_end = 0;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 0;
u1_decode_nmb = 0;
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
i2_cur_mb_addr = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
i2_mb_skip_run = num_mb_skip;
while(!u1_slice_end)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
break;
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_Mux = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/* Storing Default partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 1;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/**************************************************************/
/* mb_x, mb_y, neighbor availablity, */
if (u1_mbaff)
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
else
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
{
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
}
/* Set appropriate flags in ps_cur_mb_info and ps_dec */
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = MB_SKIP;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_mc_mode = PRED_16x16;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp = 0;
/* Storing Skip partition info */
ps_part_info = ps_dec->ps_part;
ps_part_info->u1_is_direct = PART_DIRECT_16x16;
ps_part_info->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->ps_part++;
/* Update Nnzs */
ih264d_update_nnz_for_skipmb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, CAVLC);
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
i2_mb_skip_run--;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
if (u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
u1_num_mbs++;
u1_num_mbsNby2++;
ps_parse_mb_data++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row and other flags that determine when to */
/* do DMA setup for N/2-Mb, Decode for N-Mb, and Transfer for */
/* N-Mb */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = !i2_mb_skip_run;
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| u1_slice_end;
u1_decode_nmb = u1_tfr_n_mb || u1_slice_end;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbs_next,
u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Mbs in slice: %d\n", ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice);
/* incremented here only if first slice is inserted */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
}
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libavc in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-33551775.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed initialization of first_slice_in_pic
To handle some errors, first_slice_in_pic was being set to 2.
This is now cleaned up and first_slice_in_pic is set to 1 only once per pic.
This will ensure picture level initializations are done only once even in case
of error clips
Bug: 33717589
Bug: 33551775
Bug: 33716442
Bug: 33677995
Change-Id: If341436b3cbaa724017eedddd88c2e6fac36d8ba
|
Medium
| 174,039
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadHALDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
cube_size,
level;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Create HALD color lookup table image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
level=0;
if (*image_info->filename != '\0')
level=StringToUnsignedLong(image_info->filename);
if (level < 2)
level=8;
status=MagickTrue;
cube_size=level*level;
image->columns=(size_t) (level*cube_size);
image->rows=(size_t) (level*cube_size);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=(ssize_t) level)
{
ssize_t
blue,
green,
red;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,(size_t) level,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
blue=y/(ssize_t) level;
for (green=0; green < (ssize_t) cube_size; green++)
{
for (red=0; red < (ssize_t) cube_size; red++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType)
(QuantumRange*red/(cube_size-1.0))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType)
(QuantumRange*green/(cube_size-1.0))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType)
(QuantumRange*blue/(cube_size-1.0))));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,569
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: process_tgs_req(struct server_handle *handle, krb5_data *pkt,
const krb5_fulladdr *from, krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_keyblock *header_key = NULL;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry *server = NULL;
krb5_db_entry *stkt_server = NULL;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime = 0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_principal cprinc = NULL, sprinc = NULL, altcprinc = NULL;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
int errcode;
const char *status = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* TGT */
krb5_enc_tkt_part *subject_tkt = NULL; /* TGT or evidence ticket */
krb5_db_entry *client = NULL, *header_server = NULL;
krb5_db_entry *local_tgt, *local_tgt_storage = NULL;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
krb5_boolean is_referral;
const char *emsg = NULL;
krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0;
struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/
krb5_data scratch;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = NULL;
krb5_audit_state *au_state = NULL;
krb5_data **auth_indicators = NULL;
memset(&reply, 0, sizeof(reply));
memset(&reply_encpart, 0, sizeof(reply_encpart));
memset(&ticket_reply, 0, sizeof(ticket_reply));
memset(&enc_tkt_reply, 0, sizeof(enc_tkt_reply));
session_key.contents = NULL;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
/* Save pointer to client-requested service principal, in case of
* errors before a successful call to search_sprinc(). */
sprinc = request->server;
if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE;
}
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
kdc_active_realm = setup_server_realm(handle, request->server);
if (kdc_active_realm == NULL) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM;
}
errcode = kdc_make_rstate(kdc_active_realm, &state);
if (errcode !=0) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return errcode;
}
/* Initialize audit state. */
errcode = kau_init_kdc_req(kdc_context, request, from, &au_state);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return errcode;
}
/* Seed the audit trail with the request ID and basic information. */
kau_tgs_req(kdc_context, TRUE, au_state);
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(kdc_active_realm,
request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
&header_server, &header_key, &subkey,
&pa_tgs_req);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2)
cprinc = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, header_ticket,
&au_state->tkt_in_id);
if (errcode) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length;
scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents;
errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state, NULL);
/* Reset sprinc because kdc_find_fast() can replace request. */
sprinc = request->server;
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "FIND_FAST";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = get_local_tgt(kdc_context, &sprinc->realm, header_server,
&local_tgt, &local_tgt_storage);
if (errcode) {
status = "GET_LOCAL_TGT";
goto cleanup;
}
/* Ignore (for now) the request modification due to FAST processing. */
au_state->request = request;
/*
* Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
* replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
* if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
* special cases for constrained delegation.
*/
header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
au_state->stage = SRVC_PRINC;
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ALIAS_OK);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
}
errcode = search_sprinc(kdc_active_realm, request, s_flags, &server,
&status);
if (errcode != 0)
goto cleanup;
sprinc = server->princ;
/* If we got a cross-realm TGS which is not the requested server, we are
* issuing a referral (or alternate TGT, which we treat similarly). */
is_referral = is_cross_tgs_principal(server->princ) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, server->princ);
au_state->stage = VALIDATE_POL;
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(kdc_active_realm,
request, *server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status, &e_data))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
if (retval == KDC_ERR_POLICY || retval == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm, header_enc_tkt->client))
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
/* Check for protocol transition */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
header_enc_tkt->client,
server,
subkey,
header_enc_tkt->session,
kdc_time,
&s4u_x509_user,
&client,
&status);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL || errcode != 0) {
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
au_state->s4u2self_user = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
if (errcode == KDC_ERR_POLICY || errcode == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
au_state->status = status;
kau_s4u2self(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
au_state->s4u2self_user = NULL;
}
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
if (is_referral) {
/* The requesting server appears to no longer exist, and we found
* a referral instead. Treat this as a server lookup failure. */
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Deal with user-to-user and constrained delegation */
errcode = decrypt_2ndtkt(kdc_active_realm, request, c_flags,
&stkt_server, &status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
/* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
stkt_server,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
request->server,
&status);
if (errcode == KDC_ERR_POLICY || errcode == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
else if (errcode)
au_state->violation = LOCAL_POLICY;
au_state->status = status;
retval = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, request->second_ticket[st_idx],
&au_state->evid_tkt_id);
if (retval) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
errcode = retval;
goto cleanup;
}
kau_s4u2proxy(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
assert(client == NULL); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
client = stkt_server;
stkt_server = NULL;
} else if (request->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, stkt_server);
stkt_server = NULL;
} else
assert(stkt_server == NULL);
au_state->stage = ISSUE_TKT;
errcode = gen_session_key(kdc_active_realm, request, server, &session_key,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
/*
* subject_tkt will refer to the evidence ticket (for constrained
* delegation) or the TGT. The distinction from header_enc_tkt is
* necessary because the TGS signature only protects some fields:
* the others could be forged by a malicious server.
*/
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION))
subject_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
else
subject_tkt = header_enc_tkt;
authtime = subject_tkt->times.authtime;
/* Extract auth indicators from the subject ticket, except for S4U2Proxy
* requests (where the client didn't authenticate). */
if (s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
errcode = get_auth_indicators(kdc_context, subject_tkt, local_tgt,
&auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
status = "GET_AUTH_INDICATORS";
goto cleanup;
}
}
errcode = check_indicators(kdc_context, server, auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
status = "HIGHER_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED";
goto cleanup;
}
if (is_referral)
ticket_reply.server = server->princ;
else
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = OPTS2FLAGS(request->kdc_options);
enc_tkt_reply.flags |= COPY_TKT_FLAGS(header_enc_tkt->flags);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
/* Indicate support for encrypted padata (RFC 6806). */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ENC_PA_REP);
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/*
* It should be noted that local policy may affect the
* processing of any of these flags. For example, some
* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) {
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
/*
* If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as
* unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is
* different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error
* (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued.
*
* Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to
* validate_forwardable().
*/
if (client != NULL &&
isflagset(client->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* Forwardable flag is propagated along referral path.
*/
else if (!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting
* S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned.
*/
else if (!is_referral &&
!isflagset(server->attributes,
KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED) ||
isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
/* We don't currently handle issuing anonymous tickets based on
* non-anonymous ones, so just ignore the option. */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_REQUEST_ANONYMOUS) &&
!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_timestamp old_starttime;
krb5_deltat old_life;
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
old_starttime = enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime ?
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime : enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime;
old_life = ts_delta(enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime, old_starttime);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
ts_min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
ts_incr(kdc_time, old_life));
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
kdc_get_ticket_endtime(kdc_active_realm, enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime,
header_enc_tkt->times.endtime, request->till,
client, server, &enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime);
}
kdc_get_ticket_renewtime(kdc_active_realm, request, header_enc_tkt, client,
server, &enc_tkt_reply);
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header or evidence ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = authtime;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
altcprinc = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
} else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
altcprinc = subject_tkt->client;
} else {
altcprinc = NULL;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Convert server.key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
/*
* Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
* delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
* the ability to validate that delegation was used.
*/
clear(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
}
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
/*
* If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
* try to lookup the client principal so plugins can add additional
* authorization information.
*
* Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
* because we must validate the KDC signatures.
*/
if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U)) {
/* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
/* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
assert(client == NULL); /* should not have been set already */
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, subject_tkt->client,
c_flags, &client);
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM))
enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
else
enc_tkt_reply.client = subject_tkt->client;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "VALIDATE_TRANSIT_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
memset(&enc_tkt_reply.transited, 0, sizeof(enc_tkt_reply.transited));
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TO_TRANSITED_LIST";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
server, header_server);
if (errcode) {
status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_active_realm,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else {
log_tgs_badtrans(kdc_context, cprinc, sprinc,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents, errcode);
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("not checking transit path"));
if (kdc_active_realm->realm_reject_bad_transit &&
!isflagset(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
au_state->violation = LOCAL_POLICY;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context, c_flags, client, server,
header_server, local_tgt,
subkey != NULL ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
header_key,
pkt,
request,
s4u_x509_user ?
s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL,
subject_tkt,
auth_indicators,
&enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
altcprinc = client2;
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
au_state->status = status;
kau_u2u(kdc_context, FALSE, au_state);
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
kau_u2u(kdc_context, TRUE, au_state);
st_idx++;
} else {
ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCRYPT_TICKET";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno;
/* Start assembling the response */
au_state->stage = ENCR_REP;
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
krb5int_find_pa_data(kdc_context, request->padata,
KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) {
errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context,
subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
s4u_x509_user,
&reply,
&reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "MAKE_S4U2SELF_PADATA";
au_state->status = status;
}
kau_s4u2self(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
}
reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrentry.magic = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply,
subkey ? subkey->enctype : header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
if (errcode !=0 ) {
status = "MAKE_FAST_RESPONSE";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state,
subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "MAKE_FAST_REPLY_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, pkt, request,
reply_key, server, &reply_encpart,
is_referral &&
isflagset(s_flags,
KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE));
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, &ticket_reply, &au_state->tkt_out_id);
if (errcode) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto cleanup;
}
if (kdc_fast_hide_client(state))
reply.client = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
reply_key,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
assert(status != NULL);
if (reply_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
au_state->status = status;
if (!errcode)
au_state->reply = &reply;
kau_tgs_req(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
kau_free_kdc_req(au_state);
log_tgs_req(kdc_context, from, request, &reply, cprinc,
sprinc, altcprinc, authtime,
c_flags, status, errcode, emsg);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > KRB_ERR_MAX)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode,
(server != NULL) ? server->princ : NULL,
response, status, e_data);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket != NULL)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request != NULL)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (state)
kdc_free_rstate(state);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, stkt_server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, header_server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, client);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, local_tgt_storage);
if (session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user);
if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
if (subkey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
if (header_key != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, header_key);
if (reply.padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata);
if (reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, e_data);
k5_free_data_ptr_list(auth_indicators);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: In MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause a KDC assertion failure by sending invalid S4U2Self or S4U2Proxy requests.
Commit Message: Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 168,040
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct r_bin_dyldcache_lib_t *r_bin_dyldcache_extract(struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t* bin, int idx, int *nlib) {
ut64 liboff, linkedit_offset;
ut64 dyld_vmbase;
ut32 addend = 0;
struct r_bin_dyldcache_lib_t *ret = NULL;
struct dyld_cache_image_info* image_infos = NULL;
struct mach_header *mh;
ut8 *data, *cmdptr;
int cmd, libsz = 0;
RBuffer* dbuf;
char *libname;
if (!bin) {
return NULL;
}
if (bin->size < 1) {
eprintf ("Empty file? (%s)\n", bin->file? bin->file: "(null)");
return NULL;
}
if (bin->nlibs < 0 || idx < 0 || idx >= bin->nlibs) {
return NULL;
}
*nlib = bin->nlibs;
ret = R_NEW0 (struct r_bin_dyldcache_lib_t);
if (!ret) {
perror ("malloc (ret)");
return NULL;
}
if (bin->hdr.startaddr > bin->size) {
eprintf ("corrupted dyldcache");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
if (bin->hdr.startaddr > bin->size || bin->hdr.baseaddroff > bin->size) {
eprintf ("corrupted dyldcache");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
image_infos = (struct dyld_cache_image_info*) (bin->b->buf + bin->hdr.startaddr);
dyld_vmbase = *(ut64 *)(bin->b->buf + bin->hdr.baseaddroff);
liboff = image_infos[idx].address - dyld_vmbase;
if (liboff > bin->size) {
eprintf ("Corrupted file\n");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
ret->offset = liboff;
if (image_infos[idx].pathFileOffset > bin->size) {
eprintf ("corrupted file\n");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
libname = (char *)(bin->b->buf + image_infos[idx].pathFileOffset);
/* Locate lib hdr in cache */
data = bin->b->buf + liboff;
mh = (struct mach_header *)data;
/* Check it is mach-o */
if (mh->magic != MH_MAGIC && mh->magic != MH_MAGIC_64) {
if (mh->magic == 0xbebafeca) { //FAT binary
eprintf ("FAT Binary\n");
}
eprintf ("Not mach-o\n");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
/* Write mach-o hdr */
if (!(dbuf = r_buf_new ())) {
eprintf ("new (dbuf)\n");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
addend = mh->magic == MH_MAGIC? sizeof (struct mach_header) : sizeof (struct mach_header_64);
r_buf_set_bytes (dbuf, data, addend);
cmdptr = data + addend;
/* Write load commands */
for (cmd = 0; cmd < mh->ncmds; cmd++) {
struct load_command *lc = (struct load_command *)cmdptr;
r_buf_append_bytes (dbuf, (ut8*)lc, lc->cmdsize);
cmdptr += lc->cmdsize;
}
cmdptr = data + addend;
/* Write segments */
for (cmd = linkedit_offset = 0; cmd < mh->ncmds; cmd++) {
struct load_command *lc = (struct load_command *)cmdptr;
cmdptr += lc->cmdsize;
switch (lc->cmd) {
case LC_SEGMENT:
{
/* Write segment and patch offset */
struct segment_command *seg = (struct segment_command *)lc;
int t = seg->filesize;
if (seg->fileoff + seg->filesize > bin->size || seg->fileoff > bin->size) {
eprintf ("malformed dyldcache\n");
free (ret);
r_buf_free (dbuf);
return NULL;
}
r_buf_append_bytes (dbuf, bin->b->buf+seg->fileoff, t);
r_bin_dyldcache_apply_patch (dbuf, dbuf->length, (ut64)((size_t)&seg->fileoff - (size_t)data));
/* Patch section offsets */
int sect_offset = seg->fileoff - libsz;
libsz = dbuf->length;
if (!strcmp (seg->segname, "__LINKEDIT")) {
linkedit_offset = sect_offset;
}
if (seg->nsects > 0) {
struct section *sects = (struct section *)((ut8 *)seg + sizeof(struct segment_command));
int nsect;
for (nsect = 0; nsect < seg->nsects; nsect++) {
if (sects[nsect].offset > libsz) {
r_bin_dyldcache_apply_patch (dbuf, sects[nsect].offset - sect_offset,
(ut64)((size_t)§s[nsect].offset - (size_t)data));
}
}
}
}
break;
case LC_SYMTAB:
{
struct symtab_command *st = (struct symtab_command *)lc;
NZ_OFFSET (st->symoff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->stroff);
}
break;
case LC_DYSYMTAB:
{
struct dysymtab_command *st = (struct dysymtab_command *)lc;
NZ_OFFSET (st->tocoff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->modtaboff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->extrefsymoff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->indirectsymoff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->extreloff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->locreloff);
}
break;
case LC_DYLD_INFO:
case LC_DYLD_INFO_ONLY:
{
struct dyld_info_command *st = (struct dyld_info_command *)lc;
NZ_OFFSET (st->rebase_off);
NZ_OFFSET (st->bind_off);
NZ_OFFSET (st->weak_bind_off);
NZ_OFFSET (st->lazy_bind_off);
NZ_OFFSET (st->export_off);
}
break;
}
}
/* Fill r_bin_dyldcache_lib_t ret */
ret->b = dbuf;
strncpy (ret->path, libname, sizeof (ret->path) - 1);
ret->size = libsz;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In radare2 prior to 3.1.1, r_bin_dyldcache_extract in libr/bin/format/mach0/dyldcache.c may allow attackers to cause a denial-of-service (application crash caused by out-of-bounds read) by crafting an input file.
Commit Message: Fix #12374 - oobread crash in truncated dyldcache ##bin
|
Medium
| 168,954
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PromoResourceService::PromoResourceStateChange() {
web_resource_update_scheduled_ = false;
content::NotificationService* service =
content::NotificationService::current();
service->Notify(chrome::NOTIFICATION_PROMO_RESOURCE_STATE_CHANGED,
content::Source<WebResourceService>(this),
content::NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Refresh promo notifications as they're fetched
The "guard" existed for notification scheduling was preventing
"turn-off a promo" and "update a promo" scenarios.
Yet I do not believe it was adding any actual safety: if things
on a server backend go wrong, the clients will be affected one
way or the other, and it is better to have an option to shut
the malformed promo down "as quickly as possible" (~in 12-24 hours).
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10696204
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,783
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: hfs_cat_traverse(HFS_INFO * hfs,
TSK_HFS_BTREE_CB a_cb, void *ptr)
{
TSK_FS_INFO *fs = &(hfs->fs_info);
uint32_t cur_node; /* node id of the current node */
char *node;
uint16_t nodesize;
uint8_t is_done = 0;
tsk_error_reset();
nodesize = tsk_getu16(fs->endian, hfs->catalog_header.nodesize);
if ((node = (char *) tsk_malloc(nodesize)) == NULL)
return 1;
/* start at root node */
cur_node = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, hfs->catalog_header.rootNode);
/* if the root node is zero, then the extents btree is empty */
/* if no files have overflow extents, the Extents B-tree still
exists on disk, but is an empty B-tree containing only
the header node */
if (cur_node == 0) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr, "hfs_cat_traverse: "
"empty extents btree\n");
free(node);
return 1;
}
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr, "hfs_cat_traverse: starting at "
"root node %" PRIu32 "; nodesize = %"
PRIu16 "\n", cur_node, nodesize);
/* Recurse down to the needed leaf nodes and then go forward */
is_done = 0;
while (is_done == 0) {
TSK_OFF_T cur_off; /* start address of cur_node */
uint16_t num_rec; /* number of records in this node */
ssize_t cnt;
hfs_btree_node *node_desc;
if (cur_node > tsk_getu32(fs->endian,
hfs->catalog_header.totalNodes)) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: Node %d too large for file", cur_node);
free(node);
return 1;
}
cur_off = cur_node * nodesize;
cnt = tsk_fs_attr_read(hfs->catalog_attr, cur_off,
node, nodesize, 0);
if (cnt != nodesize) {
if (cnt >= 0) {
tsk_error_reset();
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_READ);
}
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_traverse: Error reading node %d at offset %"
PRIuOFF, cur_node, cur_off);
free(node);
return 1;
}
if (nodesize < sizeof(hfs_btree_node)) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: Node size %d is too small to be valid", nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
node_desc = (hfs_btree_node *) node;
num_rec = tsk_getu16(fs->endian, node_desc->num_rec);
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr, "hfs_cat_traverse: node %" PRIu32
" @ %" PRIu64 " has %" PRIu16 " records\n",
cur_node, cur_off, num_rec);
if (num_rec == 0) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr("hfs_cat_traverse: zero records in node %"
PRIu32, cur_node);
free(node);
return 1;
}
/* With an index node, find the record with the largest key that is smaller
* to or equal to cnid */
if (node_desc->type == HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_IDX) {
uint32_t next_node = 0;
int rec;
for (rec = 0; rec < num_rec; ++rec) {
size_t rec_off;
hfs_btree_key_cat *key;
uint8_t retval;
uint16_t keylen;
rec_off =
tsk_getu16(fs->endian,
&node[nodesize - (rec + 1) * 2]);
if (rec_off > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: offset of record %d in index node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, (int) rec_off,
nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
key = (hfs_btree_key_cat *) & node[rec_off];
keylen = 2 + tsk_getu16(hfs->fs_info.endian, key->key_len);
if ((keylen) > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: length of key %d in index node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, keylen, nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
/*
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_cat_traverse: record %" PRIu16
" ; keylen %" PRIu16 " (%" PRIu32 ")\n", rec,
tsk_getu16(fs->endian, key->key_len),
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, key->parent_cnid));
*/
/* save the info from this record unless it is too big */
retval =
a_cb(hfs, HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_IDX, key,
cur_off + rec_off, ptr);
if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_ERR) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_traverse: Callback returned error");
free(node);
return 1;
}
else if ((retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_IDX_LT)
|| (next_node == 0)) {
hfs_btree_index_record *idx_rec;
int keylen =
2 + hfs_get_idxkeylen(hfs, tsk_getu16(fs->endian,
key->key_len), &(hfs->catalog_header));
if (rec_off + keylen > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: offset of record and keylength %d in index node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node,
(int) rec_off + keylen, nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
idx_rec =
(hfs_btree_index_record *) & node[rec_off +
keylen];
next_node = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, idx_rec->childNode);
}
if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_IDX_EQGT) {
break;
}
}
if (next_node == 0) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: did not find any keys in index node %d",
cur_node);
is_done = 1;
break;
}
if (next_node == cur_node) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: node %d references itself as next node",
cur_node);
is_done = 1;
break;
}
cur_node = next_node;
}
/* With a leaf, we look for the specific record. */
else if (node_desc->type == HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_LEAF) {
int rec;
for (rec = 0; rec < num_rec; ++rec) {
size_t rec_off;
hfs_btree_key_cat *key;
uint8_t retval;
uint16_t keylen;
rec_off =
tsk_getu16(fs->endian,
&node[nodesize - (rec + 1) * 2]);
if (rec_off > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: offset of record %d in leaf node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, (int) rec_off,
nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
key = (hfs_btree_key_cat *) & node[rec_off];
keylen = 2 + tsk_getu16(hfs->fs_info.endian, key->key_len);
if ((keylen) > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: length of key %d in leaf node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, keylen, nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
/*
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_cat_traverse: record %" PRIu16
"; keylen %" PRIu16 " (%" PRIu32 ")\n", rec,
tsk_getu16(fs->endian, key->key_len),
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, key->parent_cnid));
*/
retval =
a_cb(hfs, HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_LEAF, key,
cur_off + rec_off, ptr);
if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_LEAF_STOP) {
is_done = 1;
break;
}
else if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_ERR) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_traverse: Callback returned error");
free(node);
return 1;
}
}
if (is_done == 0) {
cur_node = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, node_desc->flink);
if (cur_node == 0) {
is_done = 1;
}
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_cat_traverse: moving forward to next leaf");
}
}
else {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr("hfs_cat_traverse: btree node %" PRIu32
" (%" PRIu64 ") is neither index nor leaf (%" PRIu8 ")",
cur_node, cur_off, node_desc->type);
free(node);
return 1;
}
}
free(node);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: The Sleuth Kit 4.6.0 and earlier is affected by: Integer Overflow. The impact is: Opening crafted disk image triggers crash in tsk/fs/hfs_dent.c:237. The component is: Overflow in fls tool used on HFS image. Bug is in tsk/fs/hfs.c file in function hfs_cat_traverse() in lines: 952, 1062. The attack vector is: Victim must open a crafted HFS filesystem image.
Commit Message: hfs: fix keylen check in hfs_cat_traverse()
If key->key_len is 65535, calculating "uint16_t keylen' would
cause an overflow:
uint16_t keylen;
...
keylen = 2 + tsk_getu16(hfs->fs_info.endian, key->key_len)
so the code bypasses the sanity check "if (keylen > nodesize)"
which results in crash later:
./toolfs/fstools/fls -b 512 -f hfs <image>
=================================================================
==16==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x6210000256a4 (pc 0x00000054812b bp 0x7ffca548a8f0 sp 0x7ffca548a480 T0)
==16==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
#0 0x54812a in hfs_dir_open_meta_cb /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs_dent.c:237:20
#1 0x51a96c in hfs_cat_traverse /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs.c:1082:21
#2 0x547785 in hfs_dir_open_meta /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs_dent.c:480:9
#3 0x50f57d in tsk_fs_dir_open_meta /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/fs_dir.c:290:14
#4 0x54af17 in tsk_fs_path2inum /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/ifind_lib.c:237:23
#5 0x522266 in hfs_open /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs.c:6579:9
#6 0x508e89 in main /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tools/fstools/fls.cpp:267:19
#7 0x7f9daf67c2b0 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x202b0)
#8 0x41d679 in _start (/fuzzing/sleuthkit/tools/fstools/fls+0x41d679)
Make 'keylen' int type to prevent the overflow and fix that.
Now, I get proper error message instead of crash:
./toolfs/fstools/fls -b 512 -f hfs <image>
General file system error (hfs_cat_traverse: length of key 3 in leaf node 1 too large (65537 vs 4096))
|
Medium
| 169,482
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WebSocketJob::WebSocketJob(SocketStream::Delegate* delegate)
: delegate_(delegate),
state_(INITIALIZED),
waiting_(false),
callback_(NULL),
handshake_request_(new WebSocketHandshakeRequestHandler),
handshake_response_(new WebSocketHandshakeResponseHandler),
started_to_send_handshake_request_(false),
handshake_request_sent_(0),
response_cookies_save_index_(0),
send_frame_handler_(new WebSocketFrameHandler),
receive_frame_handler_(new WebSocketFrameHandler) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The WebSockets implementation in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,308
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
{
int *fdp = (int*)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
struct scm_fp_list *fpl = *fplp;
struct file **fpp;
int i, num;
num = (cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))/sizeof(int);
if (num <= 0)
return 0;
if (num > SCM_MAX_FD)
return -EINVAL;
if (!fpl)
{
fpl = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scm_fp_list), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fpl)
return -ENOMEM;
*fplp = fpl;
fpl->count = 0;
fpl->max = SCM_MAX_FD;
}
fpp = &fpl->fp[fpl->count];
if (fpl->count + num > fpl->max)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Verify the descriptors and increment the usage count.
*/
for (i=0; i< num; i++)
{
int fd = fdp[i];
struct file *file;
if (fd < 0 || !(file = fget_raw(fd)))
return -EBADF;
*fpp++ = file;
fpl->count++;
}
return num;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Linux kernel before 4.5 allows local users to bypass file-descriptor limits and cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by leveraging incorrect tracking of descriptor ownership and sending each descriptor over a UNIX socket before closing it. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2013-4312.
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,392
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DisconnectWindowLinux::Hide() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to display box rendering.
Commit Message: Initial implementation of DisconnectWindow on Linux.
BUG=None
TEST=Manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88889 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,473
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> V8Console::createConsole(InspectedContext* inspectedContext, bool hasMemoryAttribute)
{
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = inspectedContext->context();
v8::Context::Scope contextScope(context);
v8::Isolate* isolate = context->GetIsolate();
v8::MicrotasksScope microtasksScope(isolate, v8::MicrotasksScope::kDoNotRunMicrotasks);
v8::Local<v8::Object> console = v8::Object::New(isolate);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "debug", V8Console::debugCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "error", V8Console::errorCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "info", V8Console::infoCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "log", V8Console::logCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "warn", V8Console::warnCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "dir", V8Console::dirCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "dirxml", V8Console::dirxmlCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "table", V8Console::tableCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "trace", V8Console::traceCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "group", V8Console::groupCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "groupCollapsed", V8Console::groupCollapsedCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "groupEnd", V8Console::groupEndCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "clear", V8Console::clearCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "count", V8Console::countCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "assert", V8Console::assertCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "markTimeline", V8Console::markTimelineCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "profile", V8Console::profileCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "profileEnd", V8Console::profileEndCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "timeline", V8Console::timelineCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "timelineEnd", V8Console::timelineEndCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "time", V8Console::timeCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "timeEnd", V8Console::timeEndCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "timeStamp", V8Console::timeStampCallback);
bool success = console->SetPrototype(context, v8::Object::New(isolate)).FromMaybe(false);
DCHECK(success);
if (hasMemoryAttribute)
console->SetAccessorProperty(toV8StringInternalized(isolate, "memory"), V8_FUNCTION_NEW_REMOVE_PROTOTYPE(context, V8Console::memoryGetterCallback, console, 0).ToLocalChecked(), V8_FUNCTION_NEW_REMOVE_PROTOTYPE(context, V8Console::memorySetterCallback, v8::Local<v8::Value>(), 0).ToLocalChecked(), static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), v8::DEFAULT);
console->SetPrivate(context, inspectedContextPrivateKey(isolate), v8::External::New(isolate, inspectedContext));
return console;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in WebKit/Source/platform/v8_inspector/V8Debugger.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML into the Developer Tools (aka DevTools) subsystem via a crafted web site, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
|
Medium
| 172,063
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: InterstitialPage* WebContentsImpl::GetInterstitialPage() const {
return GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
|
Medium
| 172,329
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::ClearResolvedFilters() {
for (auto& state : state_stack_)
state->ClearResolvedFilter();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Displacement map filters being applied to cross-origin images in Blink SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
|
Medium
| 172,905
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RunInvTxfm(const int16_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
inv_txfm_(out, dst, stride, tx_type_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,553
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::MediaElementAudioSourceHandler(
AudioNode& node,
HTMLMediaElement& media_element)
: AudioHandler(kNodeTypeMediaElementAudioSource,
node,
node.context()->sampleRate()),
media_element_(media_element),
source_number_of_channels_(0),
source_sample_rate_(0),
passes_current_src_cors_access_check_(
PassesCurrentSrcCORSAccessCheck(media_element.currentSrc())),
maybe_print_cors_message_(!passes_current_src_cors_access_check_),
current_src_string_(media_element.currentSrc().GetString()) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
AddOutput(2);
if (Context()->GetExecutionContext()) {
task_runner_ = Context()->GetExecutionContext()->GetTaskRunner(
TaskType::kMediaElementEvent);
}
Initialize();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
|
Medium
| 173,144
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderLayerScrollableArea::setScrollOffset(const IntPoint& newScrollOffset)
{
if (!box().isMarquee()) {
if (m_scrollDimensionsDirty)
computeScrollDimensions();
}
if (scrollOffset() == toIntSize(newScrollOffset))
return;
setScrollOffset(toIntSize(newScrollOffset));
LocalFrame* frame = box().frame();
ASSERT(frame);
RefPtr<FrameView> frameView = box().frameView();
TRACE_EVENT1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("devtools.timeline"), "ScrollLayer", "data", InspectorScrollLayerEvent::data(&box()));
InspectorInstrumentation::willScrollLayer(&box());
const RenderLayerModelObject* paintInvalidationContainer = box().containerForPaintInvalidation();
if (!frameView->isInPerformLayout()) {
layer()->clipper().clearClipRectsIncludingDescendants();
box().setPreviousPaintInvalidationRect(box().boundsRectForPaintInvalidation(paintInvalidationContainer));
frameView->updateAnnotatedRegions();
frameView->updateWidgetPositions();
RELEASE_ASSERT(frameView->renderView());
updateCompositingLayersAfterScroll();
}
frame->selection().setCaretRectNeedsUpdate();
FloatQuad quadForFakeMouseMoveEvent = FloatQuad(layer()->renderer()->previousPaintInvalidationRect());
quadForFakeMouseMoveEvent = paintInvalidationContainer->localToAbsoluteQuad(quadForFakeMouseMoveEvent);
frame->eventHandler().dispatchFakeMouseMoveEventSoonInQuad(quadForFakeMouseMoveEvent);
bool requiresPaintInvalidation = true;
if (!box().isMarquee() && box().view()->compositor()->inCompositingMode()) {
DisableCompositingQueryAsserts disabler;
bool onlyScrolledCompositedLayers = scrollsOverflow()
&& !layer()->hasVisibleNonLayerContent()
&& !layer()->hasNonCompositedChild()
&& !layer()->hasBlockSelectionGapBounds()
&& box().style()->backgroundLayers().attachment() != LocalBackgroundAttachment;
if (usesCompositedScrolling() || onlyScrolledCompositedLayers)
requiresPaintInvalidation = false;
}
if (requiresPaintInvalidation) {
if (box().frameView()->isInPerformLayout())
box().setShouldDoFullPaintInvalidation(true);
else
box().invalidatePaintUsingContainer(paintInvalidationContainer, layer()->renderer()->previousPaintInvalidationRect(), InvalidationScroll);
}
if (box().node())
box().node()->document().enqueueScrollEventForNode(box().node());
if (AXObjectCache* cache = box().document().existingAXObjectCache())
cache->handleScrollPositionChanged(&box());
InspectorInstrumentation::didScrollLayer(&box());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 38.0.2125.101, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code that triggers a widget-position update that improperly interacts with the render tree, related to the FrameView::updateLayoutAndStyleForPainting function in core/frame/FrameView.cpp and the RenderLayerScrollableArea::setScrollOffset function in core/rendering/RenderLayerScrollableArea.cpp.
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,637
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int CIFSFindNext(const int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
__u16 searchHandle, struct cifs_search_info *psrch_inf)
{
TRANSACTION2_FNEXT_REQ *pSMB = NULL;
TRANSACTION2_FNEXT_RSP *pSMBr = NULL;
T2_FNEXT_RSP_PARMS *parms;
char *response_data;
int rc = 0;
int bytes_returned, name_len;
__u16 params, byte_count;
cFYI(1, "In FindNext");
if (psrch_inf->endOfSearch)
return -ENOENT;
rc = smb_init(SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2, 15, tcon, (void **) &pSMB,
(void **) &pSMBr);
if (rc)
return rc;
params = 14; /* includes 2 bytes of null string, converted to LE below*/
byte_count = 0;
pSMB->TotalDataCount = 0; /* no EAs */
pSMB->MaxParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(8);
pSMB->MaxDataCount =
cpu_to_le16((tcon->ses->server->maxBuf - MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE) &
0xFFFFFF00);
pSMB->MaxSetupCount = 0;
pSMB->Reserved = 0;
pSMB->Flags = 0;
pSMB->Timeout = 0;
pSMB->Reserved2 = 0;
pSMB->ParameterOffset = cpu_to_le16(
offsetof(struct smb_com_transaction2_fnext_req,SearchHandle) - 4);
pSMB->DataCount = 0;
pSMB->DataOffset = 0;
pSMB->SetupCount = 1;
pSMB->Reserved3 = 0;
pSMB->SubCommand = cpu_to_le16(TRANS2_FIND_NEXT);
pSMB->SearchHandle = searchHandle; /* always kept as le */
pSMB->SearchCount =
cpu_to_le16(CIFSMaxBufSize / sizeof(FILE_UNIX_INFO));
pSMB->InformationLevel = cpu_to_le16(psrch_inf->info_level);
pSMB->ResumeKey = psrch_inf->resume_key;
pSMB->SearchFlags =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_SEARCH_CLOSE_AT_END | CIFS_SEARCH_RETURN_RESUME);
name_len = psrch_inf->resume_name_len;
params += name_len;
if (name_len < PATH_MAX) {
memcpy(pSMB->ResumeFileName, psrch_inf->presume_name, name_len);
byte_count += name_len;
/* 14 byte parm len above enough for 2 byte null terminator */
pSMB->ResumeFileName[name_len] = 0;
pSMB->ResumeFileName[name_len+1] = 0;
} else {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto FNext2_err_exit;
}
byte_count = params + 1 /* pad */ ;
pSMB->TotalParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(params);
pSMB->ParameterCount = pSMB->TotalParameterCount;
inc_rfc1001_len(pSMB, byte_count);
pSMB->ByteCount = cpu_to_le16(byte_count);
rc = SendReceive(xid, tcon->ses, (struct smb_hdr *) pSMB,
(struct smb_hdr *) pSMBr, &bytes_returned, 0);
cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->num_fnext);
if (rc) {
if (rc == -EBADF) {
psrch_inf->endOfSearch = true;
cifs_buf_release(pSMB);
rc = 0; /* search probably was closed at end of search*/
} else
cFYI(1, "FindNext returned = %d", rc);
} else { /* decode response */
rc = validate_t2((struct smb_t2_rsp *)pSMBr);
if (rc == 0) {
unsigned int lnoff;
/* BB fixme add lock for file (srch_info) struct here */
if (pSMBr->hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE)
psrch_inf->unicode = true;
else
psrch_inf->unicode = false;
response_data = (char *) &pSMBr->hdr.Protocol +
le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->t2.ParameterOffset);
parms = (T2_FNEXT_RSP_PARMS *)response_data;
response_data = (char *)&pSMBr->hdr.Protocol +
le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->t2.DataOffset);
if (psrch_inf->smallBuf)
cifs_small_buf_release(
psrch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start);
else
cifs_buf_release(psrch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start);
psrch_inf->srch_entries_start = response_data;
psrch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start = (char *)pSMB;
psrch_inf->smallBuf = 0;
if (parms->EndofSearch)
psrch_inf->endOfSearch = true;
else
psrch_inf->endOfSearch = false;
psrch_inf->entries_in_buffer =
le16_to_cpu(parms->SearchCount);
psrch_inf->index_of_last_entry +=
psrch_inf->entries_in_buffer;
lnoff = le16_to_cpu(parms->LastNameOffset);
if (tcon->ses->server->maxBuf - MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE <
lnoff) {
cERROR(1, "ignoring corrupt resume name");
psrch_inf->last_entry = NULL;
return rc;
} else
psrch_inf->last_entry =
psrch_inf->srch_entries_start + lnoff;
/* cFYI(1, "fnxt2 entries in buf %d index_of_last %d",
psrch_inf->entries_in_buffer, psrch_inf->index_of_last_entry); */
/* BB fixme add unlock here */
}
}
/* BB On error, should we leave previous search buf (and count and
last entry fields) intact or free the previous one? */
/* Note: On -EAGAIN error only caller can retry on handle based calls
since file handle passed in no longer valid */
FNext2_err_exit:
if (rc != 0)
cifs_buf_release(pSMB);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer signedness error in the CIFSFindNext function in fs/cifs/cifssmb.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1 allows remote CIFS servers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large length value in a response to a read request for a directory.
Commit Message: cifs: fix possible memory corruption in CIFSFindNext
The name_len variable in CIFSFindNext is a signed int that gets set to
the resume_name_len in the cifs_search_info. The resume_name_len however
is unsigned and for some infolevels is populated directly from a 32 bit
value sent by the server.
If the server sends a very large value for this, then that value could
look negative when converted to a signed int. That would make that
value pass the PATH_MAX check later in CIFSFindNext. The name_len would
then be used as a length value for a memcpy. It would then be treated
as unsigned again, and the memcpy scribbles over a ton of memory.
Fix this by making the name_len an unsigned value in CIFSFindNext.
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Darren Lavender <dcl@hppine99.gbr.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
Low
| 165,759
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int srpt_rx_mgmt_fn_tag(struct srpt_send_ioctx *ioctx, u64 tag)
{
struct srpt_device *sdev;
struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch;
struct srpt_send_ioctx *target;
int ret, i;
ret = -EINVAL;
ch = ioctx->ch;
BUG_ON(!ch);
BUG_ON(!ch->sport);
sdev = ch->sport->sdev;
BUG_ON(!sdev);
spin_lock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
for (i = 0; i < ch->rq_size; ++i) {
target = ch->ioctx_ring[i];
if (target->cmd.se_lun == ioctx->cmd.se_lun &&
target->cmd.tag == tag &&
srpt_get_cmd_state(target) != SRPT_STATE_DONE) {
ret = 0;
/* now let the target core abort &target->cmd; */
break;
}
}
spin_unlock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) by using an ABORT_TASK command to abort a device write operation.
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 167,001
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int putint(jas_stream_t *out, int sgnd, int prec, long val)
{
int n;
int c;
bool s;
ulong tmp;
assert((!sgnd && prec >= 1) || (sgnd && prec >= 2));
if (sgnd) {
val = encode_twos_comp(val, prec);
}
assert(val >= 0);
val &= (1 << prec) - 1;
n = (prec + 7) / 8;
while (--n >= 0) {
c = (val >> (n * 8)) & 0xff;
if (jas_stream_putc(out, c) != c)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,696
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: zstatus(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
switch (r_type(op)) {
case t_file:
{
stream *s;
make_bool(op, (file_is_valid(s, op) ? 1 : 0));
}
return 0;
case t_string:
{
gs_parsed_file_name_t pname;
struct stat fstat;
int code = parse_file_name(op, &pname,
i_ctx_p->LockFilePermissions, imemory);
if (code < 0) {
if (code == gs_error_undefinedfilename) {
make_bool(op, 0);
code = 0;
}
return code;
}
code = gs_terminate_file_name(&pname, imemory, "status");
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = gs_terminate_file_name(&pname, imemory, "status");
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = (*pname.iodev->procs.file_status)(pname.iodev,
pname.fname, &fstat);
switch (code) {
case 0:
check_ostack(4);
make_int(op - 4, stat_blocks(&fstat));
make_int(op - 3, fstat.st_size);
/*
* We can't check the value simply by using ==,
* because signed/unsigned == does the wrong thing.
* Instead, since integer assignment only keeps the
* bottom bits, we convert the values to double
* and then test for equality. This handles all
* cases of signed/unsigned or width mismatch.
*/
if ((double)op[-4].value.intval !=
(double)stat_blocks(&fstat) ||
(double)op[-3].value.intval !=
(double)fstat.st_size
)
return_error(gs_error_limitcheck);
make_int(op - 2, fstat.st_mtime);
make_int(op - 1, fstat.st_ctime);
make_bool(op, 1);
break;
case gs_error_undefinedfilename:
make_bool(op, 0);
code = 0;
}
gs_free_file_name(&pname, "status");
return code;
}
default:
return_op_typecheck(op);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: psi/zfile.c in Artifex Ghostscript before 9.21rc1 permits the status command even if -dSAFER is used, which might allow remote attackers to determine the existence and size of arbitrary files, a similar issue to CVE-2016-7977.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,829
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: iasecc_get_serialnr(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_serial_number *serial)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct sc_iin *iin = &card->serialnr.iin;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char rbuf[0xC0];
size_t ii, offs;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
if (card->serialnr.len)
goto end;
memset(&card->serialnr, 0, sizeof(card->serialnr));
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xB0, 0x80 | IASECC_SFI_EF_SN, 0);
apdu.le = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Get 'serial number' data failed");
if (rbuf[0] != ISO7812_PAN_SN_TAG)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED, "serial number parse error");
iin->mii = (rbuf[2] >> 4) & 0x0F;
iin->country = 0;
for (ii=5; ii<8; ii++) {
iin->country *= 10;
iin->country += (rbuf[ii/2] >> ((ii & 0x01) ? 0 : 4)) & 0x0F;
}
iin->issuer_id = 0;
for (ii=8; ii<10; ii++) {
iin->issuer_id *= 10;
iin->issuer_id += (rbuf[ii/2] >> (ii & 0x01 ? 0 : 4)) & 0x0F;
}
offs = rbuf[1] > 8 ? rbuf[1] - 8 : 0;
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_SAGEM) {
/* 5A 0A 92 50 00 20 10 10 25 00 01 3F */
/* 00 02 01 01 02 50 00 13 */
for (ii=0; ii < rbuf[1] - offs; ii++)
*(card->serialnr.value + ii) = ((rbuf[ii + offs + 1] & 0x0F) << 4)
+ ((rbuf[ii + offs + 2] & 0xF0) >> 4) ;
card->serialnr.len = ii;
}
else {
for (ii=0; ii < rbuf[1] - offs; ii++)
*(card->serialnr.value + ii) = rbuf[ii + offs + 2];
card->serialnr.len = ii;
}
do {
char txt[0x200];
for (ii=0;ii<card->serialnr.len;ii++)
sprintf(txt + ii*2, "%02X", *(card->serialnr.value + ii));
sc_log(ctx, "serial number '%s'; mii %i; country %i; issuer_id %li", txt, iin->mii, iin->country, iin->issuer_id);
} while(0);
end:
if (serial)
memcpy(serial, &card->serialnr, sizeof(*serial));
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Various out of bounds reads when handling responses in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to potentially crash the opensc library using programs.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
Low
| 169,057
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int swp_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int instr)
{
unsigned int address, destreg, data, type;
unsigned int res = 0;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, regs->ARM_pc);
if (current->pid != previous_pid) {
pr_debug("\"%s\" (%ld) uses deprecated SWP{B} instruction\n",
current->comm, (unsigned long)current->pid);
previous_pid = current->pid;
}
address = regs->uregs[EXTRACT_REG_NUM(instr, RN_OFFSET)];
data = regs->uregs[EXTRACT_REG_NUM(instr, RT2_OFFSET)];
destreg = EXTRACT_REG_NUM(instr, RT_OFFSET);
type = instr & TYPE_SWPB;
pr_debug("addr in r%d->0x%08x, dest is r%d, source in r%d->0x%08x)\n",
EXTRACT_REG_NUM(instr, RN_OFFSET), address,
destreg, EXTRACT_REG_NUM(instr, RT2_OFFSET), data);
/* Check access in reasonable access range for both SWP and SWPB */
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, (address & ~3), 4)) {
pr_debug("SWP{B} emulation: access to %p not allowed!\n",
(void *)address);
res = -EFAULT;
} else {
res = emulate_swpX(address, &data, type);
}
if (res == 0) {
/*
* On successful emulation, revert the adjustment to the PC
* made in kernel/traps.c in order to resume execution at the
* instruction following the SWP{B}.
*/
regs->ARM_pc += 4;
regs->uregs[destreg] = data;
} else if (res == -EFAULT) {
/*
* Memory errors do not mean emulation failed.
* Set up signal info to return SEGV, then return OK
*/
set_segfault(regs, address);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,778
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int cdrom_ioctl_drive_status(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
unsigned long arg)
{
cd_dbg(CD_DO_IOCTL, "entering CDROM_DRIVE_STATUS\n");
if (!(cdi->ops->capability & CDC_DRIVE_STATUS))
return -ENOSYS;
if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_SELECT_DISC) ||
(arg == CDSL_CURRENT || arg == CDSL_NONE))
return cdi->ops->drive_status(cdi, CDSL_CURRENT);
if (((int)arg >= cdi->capacity))
return -EINVAL;
return cdrom_slot_status(cdi, arg);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.18.6. An information leak in cdrom_ioctl_drive_status in drivers/cdrom/cdrom.c could be used by local attackers to read kernel memory because a cast from unsigned long to int interferes with bounds checking. This is similar to CVE-2018-10940.
Commit Message: cdrom: Fix info leak/OOB read in cdrom_ioctl_drive_status
Like d88b6d04: "cdrom: information leak in cdrom_ioctl_media_changed()"
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <scott.bauer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
Low
| 169,035
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
const BIGNUM *scalar, const EC_POINT *point,
BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int i, cardinality_bits, group_top, kbit, pbit, Z_is_one;
EC_POINT *p = NULL;
EC_POINT *s = NULL;
BIGNUM *k = NULL;
BIGNUM *lambda = NULL;
BIGNUM *cardinality = NULL;
int ret = 0;
/* early exit if the input point is the point at infinity */
if (point != NULL && EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point))
return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
if (BN_is_zero(group->order)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER);
return 0;
}
if (BN_is_zero(group->cofactor)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, EC_R_UNKNOWN_COFACTOR);
return 0;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if (((p = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
|| ((s = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (point == NULL) {
if (!EC_POINT_copy(p, group->generator)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
} else {
if (!EC_POINT_copy(p, point)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(s, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
cardinality = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
lambda = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
k = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (k == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mul(cardinality, group->order, group->cofactor, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/*
* Group cardinalities are often on a word boundary.
* So when we pad the scalar, some timing diff might
* pop if it needs to be expanded due to carries.
* So expand ahead of time.
*/
cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality);
group_top = bn_get_top(cardinality);
if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 1) == NULL)
|| (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 1) == NULL)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_copy(k, scalar)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if ((BN_num_bits(k) > cardinality_bits) || (BN_is_negative(k))) {
/*-
* this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee
* constant-timeness
*/
if (!BN_nnmod(k, k, cardinality, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_add(lambda, k, cardinality)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
BN_set_flags(lambda, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_add(k, lambda, cardinality)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/*
* lambda := scalar + cardinality
* k := scalar + 2*cardinality
*/
kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits);
BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 1);
group_top = bn_get_top(group->field);
if ((bn_wexpand(s->X, group_top) == NULL)
|| (bn_wexpand(s->Y, group_top) == NULL)
|| (bn_wexpand(s->Z, group_top) == NULL)
|| (bn_wexpand(r->X, group_top) == NULL)
|| (bn_wexpand(r->Y, group_top) == NULL)
|| (bn_wexpand(r->Z, group_top) == NULL)
|| (bn_wexpand(p->X, group_top) == NULL)
|| (bn_wexpand(p->Y, group_top) == NULL)
|| (bn_wexpand(p->Z, group_top) == NULL)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/*-
* Apply coordinate blinding for EC_POINT.
*
* The underlying EC_METHOD can optionally implement this function:
* ec_point_blind_coordinates() returns 0 in case of errors or 1 on
* success or if coordinate blinding is not implemented for this
* group.
*/
if (!ec_point_blind_coordinates(group, p, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, EC_R_POINT_COORDINATES_BLIND_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Initialize the Montgomery ladder */
if (!ec_point_ladder_pre(group, r, s, p, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, EC_R_LADDER_PRE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* top bit is a 1, in a fixed pos */
pbit = 1;
#define EC_POINT_CSWAP(c, a, b, w, t) do { \
BN_consttime_swap(c, (a)->X, (b)->X, w); \
BN_consttime_swap(c, (a)->Y, (b)->Y, w); \
BN_consttime_swap(c, (a)->Z, (b)->Z, w); \
t = ((a)->Z_is_one ^ (b)->Z_is_one) & (c); \
(a)->Z_is_one ^= (t); \
(b)->Z_is_one ^= (t); \
} while(0)
/*-
* The ladder step, with branches, is
*
* k[i] == 0: S = add(R, S), R = dbl(R)
* k[i] == 1: R = add(S, R), S = dbl(S)
*
* Swapping R, S conditionally on k[i] leaves you with state
*
* k[i] == 0: T, U = R, S
* k[i] == 1: T, U = S, R
*
* Then perform the ECC ops.
*
* U = add(T, U)
* T = dbl(T)
*
* Which leaves you with state
*
* k[i] == 0: U = add(R, S), T = dbl(R)
* k[i] == 1: U = add(S, R), T = dbl(S)
*
* Swapping T, U conditionally on k[i] leaves you with state
*
* k[i] == 0: R, S = T, U
* k[i] == 1: R, S = U, T
*
* Which leaves you with state
*
* k[i] == 0: S = add(R, S), R = dbl(R)
* k[i] == 1: R = add(S, R), S = dbl(S)
*
* So we get the same logic, but instead of a branch it's a
* conditional swap, followed by ECC ops, then another conditional swap.
*
* Optimization: The end of iteration i and start of i-1 looks like
*
* ...
* CSWAP(k[i], R, S)
* ECC
* CSWAP(k[i], R, S)
* (next iteration)
* CSWAP(k[i-1], R, S)
* ECC
* CSWAP(k[i-1], R, S)
* ...
*
* So instead of two contiguous swaps, you can merge the condition
* bits and do a single swap.
*
* k[i] k[i-1] Outcome
* 0 0 No Swap
* 0 1 Swap
* 1 0 Swap
* 1 1 No Swap
*
* This is XOR. pbit tracks the previous bit of k.
*/
for (i = cardinality_bits - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
kbit = BN_is_bit_set(k, i) ^ pbit;
EC_POINT_CSWAP(kbit, r, s, group_top, Z_is_one);
/* Perform a single step of the Montgomery ladder */
if (!ec_point_ladder_step(group, r, s, p, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, EC_R_LADDER_STEP_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* pbit logic merges this cswap with that of the
* next iteration
*/
pbit ^= kbit;
}
/* one final cswap to move the right value into r */
EC_POINT_CSWAP(pbit, r, s, group_top, Z_is_one);
#undef EC_POINT_CSWAP
/* Finalize ladder (and recover full point coordinates) */
if (!ec_point_ladder_post(group, r, s, p, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, EC_R_LADDER_POST_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
EC_POINT_free(p);
EC_POINT_free(s);
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-320
Summary: The OpenSSL ECDSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing algorithm to recover the private key. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0j (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0i). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1a (Affected 1.1.1).
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,330
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool GIFImageReader::parseData(size_t dataPosition, size_t len, GIFImageDecoder::GIFParseQuery query)
{
if (!len) {
return true;
}
if (len < m_bytesToConsume)
return true;
while (len >= m_bytesToConsume) {
const size_t currentComponentPosition = dataPosition;
const unsigned char* currentComponent = data(dataPosition);
dataPosition += m_bytesToConsume;
len -= m_bytesToConsume;
switch (m_state) {
case GIFLZW:
ASSERT(!m_frames.isEmpty());
m_frames.last()->addLzwBlock(currentComponentPosition, m_bytesToConsume);
GETN(1, GIFSubBlock);
break;
case GIFLZWStart: {
ASSERT(!m_frames.isEmpty());
m_frames.last()->setDataSize(*currentComponent);
GETN(1, GIFSubBlock);
break;
}
case GIFType: {
if (!strncmp((char*)currentComponent, "GIF89a", 6))
m_version = 89;
else if (!strncmp((char*)currentComponent, "GIF87a", 6))
m_version = 87;
else
return false;
GETN(7, GIFGlobalHeader);
break;
}
case GIFGlobalHeader: {
m_screenWidth = GETINT16(currentComponent);
m_screenHeight = GETINT16(currentComponent + 2);
if (m_client && !m_client->setSize(m_screenWidth, m_screenHeight))
return false;
const size_t globalColorMapColors = 2 << (currentComponent[4] & 0x07);
if ((currentComponent[4] & 0x80) && globalColorMapColors > 0) { /* global map */
m_globalColorMap.setTablePositionAndSize(dataPosition, globalColorMapColors);
GETN(BYTES_PER_COLORMAP_ENTRY * globalColorMapColors, GIFGlobalColormap);
break;
}
GETN(1, GIFImageStart);
break;
}
case GIFGlobalColormap: {
m_globalColorMap.setDefined();
GETN(1, GIFImageStart);
break;
}
case GIFImageStart: {
if (*currentComponent == '!') { // extension.
GETN(2, GIFExtension);
break;
}
if (*currentComponent == ',') { // image separator.
GETN(9, GIFImageHeader);
break;
}
GETN(0, GIFDone);
break;
}
case GIFExtension: {
size_t bytesInBlock = currentComponent[1];
GIFState exceptionState = GIFSkipBlock;
switch (*currentComponent) {
case 0xf9:
exceptionState = GIFControlExtension;
bytesInBlock = std::max(bytesInBlock, static_cast<size_t>(4));
break;
case 0x01:
break;
case 0xff:
exceptionState = GIFApplicationExtension;
break;
case 0xfe:
exceptionState = GIFConsumeComment;
break;
}
if (bytesInBlock)
GETN(bytesInBlock, exceptionState);
else
GETN(1, GIFImageStart);
break;
}
case GIFConsumeBlock: {
if (!*currentComponent)
GETN(1, GIFImageStart);
else
GETN(*currentComponent, GIFSkipBlock);
break;
}
case GIFSkipBlock: {
GETN(1, GIFConsumeBlock);
break;
}
case GIFControlExtension: {
addFrameIfNecessary();
GIFFrameContext* currentFrame = m_frames.last().get();
if (*currentComponent & 0x1)
currentFrame->setTransparentPixel(currentComponent[3]);
int disposalMethod = ((*currentComponent) >> 2) & 0x7;
if (disposalMethod < 4) {
currentFrame->setDisposalMethod(static_cast<blink::ImageFrame::DisposalMethod>(disposalMethod));
} else if (disposalMethod == 4) {
currentFrame->setDisposalMethod(blink::ImageFrame::DisposeOverwritePrevious);
}
currentFrame->setDelayTime(GETINT16(currentComponent + 1) * 10);
GETN(1, GIFConsumeBlock);
break;
}
case GIFCommentExtension: {
if (*currentComponent)
GETN(*currentComponent, GIFConsumeComment);
else
GETN(1, GIFImageStart);
break;
}
case GIFConsumeComment: {
GETN(1, GIFCommentExtension);
break;
}
case GIFApplicationExtension: {
if (m_bytesToConsume == 11
&& (!strncmp((char*)currentComponent, "NETSCAPE2.0", 11) || !strncmp((char*)currentComponent, "ANIMEXTS1.0", 11)))
GETN(1, GIFNetscapeExtensionBlock);
else
GETN(1, GIFConsumeBlock);
break;
}
case GIFNetscapeExtensionBlock: {
if (*currentComponent)
GETN(std::max(3, static_cast<int>(*currentComponent)), GIFConsumeNetscapeExtension);
else
GETN(1, GIFImageStart);
break;
}
case GIFConsumeNetscapeExtension: {
int netscapeExtension = currentComponent[0] & 7;
if (netscapeExtension == 1) {
m_loopCount = GETINT16(currentComponent + 1);
if (!m_loopCount)
m_loopCount = blink::cAnimationLoopInfinite;
GETN(1, GIFNetscapeExtensionBlock);
} else if (netscapeExtension == 2) {
GETN(1, GIFNetscapeExtensionBlock);
} else {
return false;
}
break;
}
case GIFImageHeader: {
unsigned height, width, xOffset, yOffset;
/* Get image offsets, with respect to the screen origin */
xOffset = GETINT16(currentComponent);
yOffset = GETINT16(currentComponent + 2);
/* Get image width and height. */
width = GETINT16(currentComponent + 4);
height = GETINT16(currentComponent + 6);
/* Work around broken GIF files where the logical screen
* size has weird width or height. We assume that GIF87a
* files don't contain animations.
*/
if (currentFrameIsFirstFrame()
&& ((m_screenHeight < height) || (m_screenWidth < width) || (m_version == 87))) {
m_screenHeight = height;
m_screenWidth = width;
xOffset = 0;
yOffset = 0;
if (m_client && !m_client->setSize(m_screenWidth, m_screenHeight))
return false;
}
if (!height || !width) {
height = m_screenHeight;
width = m_screenWidth;
if (!height || !width)
return false;
}
if (query == GIFImageDecoder::GIFSizeQuery) {
setRemainingBytes(len + 9);
GETN(9, GIFImageHeader);
return true;
}
addFrameIfNecessary();
GIFFrameContext* currentFrame = m_frames.last().get();
currentFrame->setHeaderDefined();
currentFrame->setRect(xOffset, yOffset, width, height);
m_screenWidth = std::max(m_screenWidth, width);
m_screenHeight = std::max(m_screenHeight, height);
currentFrame->setInterlaced(currentComponent[8] & 0x40);
currentFrame->setProgressiveDisplay(currentFrameIsFirstFrame());
const bool isLocalColormapDefined = currentComponent[8] & 0x80;
if (isLocalColormapDefined) {
const size_t numColors = 2 << (currentComponent[8] & 0x7);
currentFrame->localColorMap().setTablePositionAndSize(dataPosition, numColors);
GETN(BYTES_PER_COLORMAP_ENTRY * numColors, GIFImageColormap);
break;
}
GETN(1, GIFLZWStart);
break;
}
case GIFImageColormap: {
ASSERT(!m_frames.isEmpty());
m_frames.last()->localColorMap().setDefined();
GETN(1, GIFLZWStart);
break;
}
case GIFSubBlock: {
const size_t bytesInBlock = *currentComponent;
if (bytesInBlock)
GETN(bytesInBlock, GIFLZW);
else {
ASSERT(!m_frames.isEmpty());
m_frames.last()->setComplete();
GETN(1, GIFImageStart);
}
break;
}
case GIFDone: {
m_parseCompleted = true;
return true;
}
default:
return false;
break;
}
}
setRemainingBytes(len);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the GIFImageReader::parseData function in platform/image-decoders/gif/GIFImageReader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted frame size in a GIF image.
Commit Message: Fix handling of broken GIFs with weird frame sizes
Code didn't handle well if a GIF frame has dimension greater than the
"screen" dimension. This will break deferred image decoding.
This change reports the size as final only when the first frame is
encountered.
Added a test to verify this behavior. Frame size reported by the decoder
should be constant.
BUG=437651
R=pkasting@chromium.org, senorblanco@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/813943003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@188423 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 172,029
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadCAPTIONImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
*caption,
geometry[MaxTextExtent],
*property,
*text;
const char
*gravity,
*option;
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
split,
status;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
height,
width;
TypeMetric
metrics;
/*
Initialize Image structure.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
(void) ResetImagePage(image,"0x0+0+0");
/*
Format caption.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"filename");
if (option == (const char *) NULL)
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,image_info->filename);
else
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"caption:",8) == 0)
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,option+8);
else
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,option);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"caption",property);
property=DestroyString(property);
caption=ConstantString(GetImageProperty(image,"caption"));
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(image_info,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,caption);
gravity=GetImageOption(image_info,"gravity");
if (gravity != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->gravity=(GravityType) ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,
MagickFalse,gravity);
split=MagickFalse;
status=MagickTrue;
if (image->columns == 0)
{
text=AcquireString(caption);
i=FormatMagickCaption(image,draw_info,split,&metrics,&text);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,text);
text=DestroyString(text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
width=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
image->columns=width;
}
if (image->rows == 0)
{
split=MagickTrue;
text=AcquireString(caption);
i=FormatMagickCaption(image,draw_info,split,&metrics,&text);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,text);
text=DestroyString(text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
image->rows=(size_t) ((i+1)*(metrics.ascent-metrics.descent+
draw_info->interline_spacing+draw_info->stroke_width)+0.5);
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image) == MagickFalse)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if ((fabs(image_info->pointsize) < MagickEpsilon) && (strlen(caption) > 0))
{
double
high,
low;
/*
Auto fit text into bounding box.
*/
for ( ; ; draw_info->pointsize*=2.0)
{
text=AcquireString(caption);
i=FormatMagickCaption(image,draw_info,split,&metrics,&text);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,text);
text=DestroyString(text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
(void) status;
width=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
height=(size_t) floor(metrics.height+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
{
if ((width >= image->columns) && (height >= image->rows))
break;
}
else
if (((image->columns != 0) && (width >= image->columns)) ||
((image->rows != 0) && (height >= image->rows)))
break;
}
high=draw_info->pointsize;
for (low=1.0; (high-low) > 0.5; )
{
draw_info->pointsize=(low+high)/2.0;
text=AcquireString(caption);
i=FormatMagickCaption(image,draw_info,split,&metrics,&text);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,text);
text=DestroyString(text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
(void) GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
width=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
height=(size_t) floor(metrics.height+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
{
if ((width < image->columns) && (height < image->rows))
low=draw_info->pointsize+0.5;
else
high=draw_info->pointsize-0.5;
}
else
if (((image->columns != 0) && (width < image->columns)) ||
((image->rows != 0) && (height < image->rows)))
low=draw_info->pointsize+0.5;
else
high=draw_info->pointsize-0.5;
}
draw_info->pointsize=floor((low+high)/2.0-0.5);
}
/*
Draw caption.
*/
i=FormatMagickCaption(image,draw_info,split,&metrics,&caption);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,caption);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",MagickMax(
draw_info->direction == RightToLeftDirection ? image->columns-
metrics.bounds.x2 : -metrics.bounds.x1,0.0),draw_info->gravity ==
UndefinedGravity ? metrics.ascent : 0.0);
draw_info->geometry=AcquireString(geometry);
status=AnnotateImage(image,draw_info);
if (image_info->pointsize == 0.0)
{
char
pointsize[MaxTextExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(pointsize,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g",
draw_info->pointsize);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"caption:pointsize",pointsize);
}
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
caption=DestroyString(caption);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in the caption and label handling code in ImageMagick allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix a small memory leak
|
Low
| 168,522
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int cg_mkdir(const char *path, mode_t mode)
{
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char *fpath = NULL, *path1, *cgdir = NULL, *controller;
const char *cgroup;
int ret;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
controller = pick_controller_from_path(fc, path);
if (!controller)
return -EINVAL;
cgroup = find_cgroup_in_path(path);
if (!cgroup)
return -EINVAL;
get_cgdir_and_path(cgroup, &cgdir, &fpath);
if (!fpath)
path1 = "/";
else
path1 = cgdir;
if (!fc_may_access(fc, controller, path1, NULL, O_RDWR)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
if (!caller_is_in_ancestor(fc->pid, controller, path1, NULL)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
ret = cgfs_create(controller, cgroup, fc->uid, fc->gid);
printf("cgfs_create returned %d for %s %s\n", ret, controller, cgroup);
out:
free(cgdir);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: LXCFS before 0.12 does not properly enforce directory escapes, which might allow local users to gain privileges by (1) querying or (2) updating a cgroup.
Commit Message: Fix checking of parent directories
Taken from the justification in the launchpad bug:
To a task in freezer cgroup /a/b/c/d, it should appear that there are no
cgroups other than its descendents. Since this is a filesystem, we must have
the parent directories, but each parent cgroup should only contain the child
which the task can see.
So, when this task looks at /a/b, it should see only directory 'c' and no
files. Attempt to create /a/b/x should result in -EPERM, whether /a/b/x already
exists or not. Attempts to query /a/b/x should result in -ENOENT whether /a/b/x
exists or not. Opening /a/b/tasks should result in -ENOENT.
The caller_may_see_dir checks specifically whether a task may see a cgroup
directory - i.e. /a/b/x if opening /a/b/x/tasks, and /a/b/c/d if doing
opendir('/a/b/c/d').
caller_is_in_ancestor() will return true if the caller in /a/b/c/d looks at
/a/b/c/d/e. If the caller is in a child cgroup of the queried one - i.e. if the
task in /a/b/c/d queries /a/b, then *nextcg will container the next (the only)
directory which he can see in the path - 'c'.
Beyond this, regular DAC permissions should apply, with the
root-in-user-namespace privilege over its mapped uids being respected. The
fc_may_access check does this check for both directories and files.
This is CVE-2015-1342 (LP: #1508481)
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
|
Low
| 166,705
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: accept_ice_connection (GIOChannel *source,
GIOCondition condition,
GsmIceConnectionData *data)
{
IceListenObj listener;
IceConn ice_conn;
IceAcceptStatus status;
GsmClient *client;
GsmXsmpServer *server;
listener = data->listener;
server = data->server;
g_debug ("GsmXsmpServer: accept_ice_connection()");
ice_conn = IceAcceptConnection (listener, &status);
if (status != IceAcceptSuccess) {
g_debug ("GsmXsmpServer: IceAcceptConnection returned %d", status);
return TRUE;
}
client = gsm_xsmp_client_new (ice_conn);
ice_conn->context = client;
gsm_store_add (server->priv->client_store, gsm_client_peek_id (client), G_OBJECT (client));
/* the store will own the ref */
g_object_unref (client);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: Bad reference counting in the context of accept_ice_connection() in gsm-xsmp-server.c in old versions of gnome-session up until version 2.29.92 allows a local attacker to establish ICE connections to gnome-session with invalid authentication data (an invalid magic cookie). Each failed authentication attempt will leak a file descriptor in gnome-session. When the maximum number of file descriptors is exhausted in the gnome-session process, it will enter an infinite loop trying to communicate without success, consuming 100% of the CPU. The graphical session associated with the gnome-session process will stop working correctly, because communication with gnome-session is no longer possible.
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
|
Low
| 168,052
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int sas_discover_sata(struct domain_device *dev)
{
int res;
if (dev->dev_type == SAS_SATA_PM)
return -ENODEV;
dev->sata_dev.class = sas_get_ata_command_set(dev);
sas_fill_in_rphy(dev, dev->rphy);
res = sas_notify_lldd_dev_found(dev);
if (res)
return res;
sas_discover_event(dev->port, DISCE_PROBE);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.15.9 mishandles a mutex within libsas, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) by triggering certain error-handling code.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
|
Low
| 169,383
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ClientControlledShellSurface::OnPreWidgetCommit() {
if (!widget_) {
if (!pending_geometry_.IsEmpty())
origin_ = pending_geometry_.origin();
CreateShellSurfaceWidget(ash::ToWindowShowState(pending_window_state_));
}
ash::wm::WindowState* window_state = GetWindowState();
if (window_state->GetStateType() == pending_window_state_) {
if (window_state->IsPip() && !window_state->is_dragged()) {
client_controlled_state_->set_next_bounds_change_animation_type(
ash::wm::ClientControlledState::kAnimationAnimated);
}
return true;
}
if (IsPinned(window_state)) {
VLOG(1) << "State change was requested while pinned";
return true;
}
auto animation_type = ash::wm::ClientControlledState::kAnimationNone;
switch (pending_window_state_) {
case ash::WindowStateType::kNormal:
if (widget_->IsMaximized() || widget_->IsFullscreen()) {
animation_type = ash::wm::ClientControlledState::kAnimationCrossFade;
}
break;
case ash::WindowStateType::kMaximized:
case ash::WindowStateType::kFullscreen:
if (!window_state->IsPip())
animation_type = ash::wm::ClientControlledState::kAnimationCrossFade;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (pending_window_state_ == ash::WindowStateType::kPip) {
if (ash::features::IsPipRoundedCornersEnabled()) {
decorator_ = std::make_unique<ash::RoundedCornerDecorator>(
window_state->window(), host_window(), host_window()->layer(),
ash::kPipRoundedCornerRadius);
}
} else {
decorator_.reset(); // Remove rounded corners.
}
bool wasPip = window_state->IsPip();
if (client_controlled_state_->EnterNextState(window_state,
pending_window_state_)) {
client_controlled_state_->set_next_bounds_change_animation_type(
animation_type);
}
if (wasPip && !window_state->IsMinimized()) {
ash::Shell::Get()->split_view_controller()->EndSplitView(
ash::SplitViewController::EndReason::kPipExpanded);
window_state->Activate();
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Windows could be made to increment off the end of a buffer, which allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
|
Medium
| 172,409
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int cac_get_serial_nr_from_CUID(sc_card_t* card, sc_serial_number_t* serial)
{
cac_private_data_t * priv = CAC_DATA(card);
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL);
if (card->serialnr.len) {
*serial = card->serialnr;
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_SUCCESS);
}
if (priv->cac_id_len) {
serial->len = MIN(priv->cac_id_len, SC_MAX_SERIALNR);
memcpy(serial->value, priv->cac_id, priv->cac_id_len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_SUCCESS);
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: A double free when handling responses from an HSM Card in sc_pkcs15emu_sc_hsm_init in libopensc/pkcs15-sc-hsm.c in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
|
Low
| 169,071
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GLOzone* X11SurfaceFactory::GetGLOzone(gl::GLImplementation implementation) {
switch (implementation) {
case gl::kGLImplementationDesktopGL:
return glx_implementation_.get();
case gl::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2:
return egl_implementation_.get();
default:
return nullptr;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65 on Android does not prevent navigation to a URL in cases where an intent for the URL lacks CATEGORY_BROWSABLE, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Add ThreadChecker for Ozone X11 GPU.
Ensure Ozone X11 tests the same thread constraints we have in Ozone GBM.
BUG=none
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2366643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421817}
|
Low
| 171,603
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int rose_parse_facilities(unsigned char *p,
struct rose_facilities_struct *facilities)
{
int facilities_len, len;
facilities_len = *p++;
if (facilities_len == 0)
return 0;
while (facilities_len > 0) {
if (*p == 0x00) {
facilities_len--;
p++;
switch (*p) {
case FAC_NATIONAL: /* National */
len = rose_parse_national(p + 1, facilities, facilities_len - 1);
facilities_len -= len + 1;
p += len + 1;
break;
case FAC_CCITT: /* CCITT */
len = rose_parse_ccitt(p + 1, facilities, facilities_len - 1);
facilities_len -= len + 1;
p += len + 1;
break;
default:
printk(KERN_DEBUG "ROSE: rose_parse_facilities - unknown facilities family %02X\n", *p);
facilities_len--;
p++;
break;
}
} else
break; /* Error in facilities format */
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The rose_parse_ccitt function in net/rose/rose_subr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not validate the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP fields, which allows remote attackers to (1) cause a denial of service (integer underflow, heap memory corruption, and panic) via a small length value in data sent to a ROSE socket, or (2) conduct stack-based buffer overflow attacks via a large length value in data sent to a ROSE socket.
Commit Message: ROSE: prevent heap corruption with bad facilities
When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's possible for
a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected, resulting in
heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent overflows, and
abort facilities parsing on failure.
Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and
FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide a length
of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy size, causing a
kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length of greater than
20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign array. Abort facilities
parsing on these invalid length values.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,672
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline signed int ReadPropertyMSBLong(const unsigned char **p,
size_t *length)
{
union
{
unsigned int
unsigned_value;
signed int
signed_value;
} quantum;
int
c;
register ssize_t
i;
unsigned char
buffer[4];
size_t
value;
if (*length < 4)
return(-1);
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
c=(int) (*(*p)++);
(*length)--;
buffer[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
value=(size_t) (buffer[0] << 24);
value|=buffer[1] << 16;
value|=buffer[2] << 8;
value|=buffer[3];
quantum.unsigned_value=(value & 0xffffffff);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: MagickCore/property.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.2-1 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive memory information via vectors involving the q variable, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
|
Low
| 169,952
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::string ExtensionTtsController::GetMatchingExtensionId(
Utterance* utterance) {
ExtensionService* service = utterance->profile()->GetExtensionService();
DCHECK(service);
ExtensionEventRouter* event_router =
utterance->profile()->GetExtensionEventRouter();
DCHECK(event_router);
const ExtensionList* extensions = service->extensions();
ExtensionList::const_iterator iter;
for (iter = extensions->begin(); iter != extensions->end(); ++iter) {
const Extension* extension = *iter;
if (!event_router->ExtensionHasEventListener(
extension->id(), events::kOnSpeak) ||
!event_router->ExtensionHasEventListener(
extension->id(), events::kOnStop)) {
continue;
}
const std::vector<Extension::TtsVoice>& tts_voices =
extension->tts_voices();
for (size_t i = 0; i < tts_voices.size(); ++i) {
const Extension::TtsVoice& voice = tts_voices[i];
if (!voice.voice_name.empty() &&
!utterance->voice_name().empty() &&
voice.voice_name != utterance->voice_name()) {
continue;
}
if (!voice.locale.empty() &&
!utterance->locale().empty() &&
voice.locale != utterance->locale()) {
continue;
}
if (!voice.gender.empty() &&
!utterance->gender().empty() &&
voice.gender != utterance->gender()) {
continue;
}
return extension->id();
}
}
return std::string();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,380
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAMRNBEncoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.amrnb",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if ((formatParams->nPortIndex == 0
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM)
|| (formatParams->nPortIndex == 1
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingAMR)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAmr:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *amrParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *)params;
if (amrParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (amrParams->nChannels != 1
|| amrParams->eAMRDTXMode != OMX_AUDIO_AMRDTXModeOff
|| amrParams->eAMRFrameFormat
!= OMX_AUDIO_AMRFrameFormatFSF
|| amrParams->eAMRBandMode < OMX_AUDIO_AMRBandModeNB0
|| amrParams->eAMRBandMode > OMX_AUDIO_AMRBandModeNB7) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitRate = amrParams->nBitRate;
mMode = amrParams->eAMRBandMode - 1;
amrParams->eAMRDTXMode = OMX_AUDIO_AMRDTXModeOff;
amrParams->eAMRFrameFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AMRFrameFormatFSF;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (pcmParams->nChannels != 1
|| pcmParams->nSamplingRate != (OMX_U32)kSampleRate) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,195
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void scsi_dma_restart_bh(void *opaque)
{
SCSIDiskState *s = opaque;
SCSIRequest *req;
SCSIDiskReq *r;
qemu_bh_delete(s->bh);
s->bh = NULL;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(req, &s->qdev.requests, next) {
r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
if (r->status & SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY) {
int status = r->status;
int ret;
r->status &=
~(SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY | SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_TYPE_MASK);
switch (status & SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_TYPE_MASK) {
case SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_READ:
scsi_read_data(&r->req);
break;
case SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_WRITE:
scsi_write_data(&r->req);
break;
case SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_FLUSH:
ret = scsi_disk_emulate_command(r, r->iov.iov_base);
if (ret == 0) {
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
}
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in hw/scsi-disk.c in the SCSI subsystem in QEMU before 0.15.2, as used by Xen, might allow local guest users with permission to access the CD-ROM to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted SAI READ CAPACITY SCSI command. NOTE: this is only a vulnerability when root has manually modified certain permissions or ACLs.
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
|
High
| 166,552
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: main(int argc, const char **argv)
{
const char * prog = *argv;
const char * outfile = NULL;
const char * suffix = NULL;
const char * prefix = NULL;
int done = 0; /* if at least one file is processed */
struct global global;
global_init(&global);
while (--argc > 0)
{
++argv;
if (strcmp(*argv, "--debug") == 0)
{
/* To help debugging problems: */
global.errors = global.warnings = 1;
global.quiet = 0;
global.verbose = 7;
}
else if (strncmp(*argv, "--max=", 6) == 0)
{
global.idat_max = (png_uint_32)atol(6+*argv);
if (global.skip < SKIP_UNSAFE)
global.skip = SKIP_UNSAFE;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--max") == 0)
{
global.idat_max = 0x7fffffff;
if (global.skip < SKIP_UNSAFE)
global.skip = SKIP_UNSAFE;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--optimize") == 0 || strcmp(*argv, "-o") == 0)
global.optimize_zlib = 1;
else if (strncmp(*argv, "--out=", 6) == 0)
outfile = 6+*argv;
else if (strncmp(*argv, "--suffix=", 9) == 0)
suffix = 9+*argv;
else if (strncmp(*argv, "--prefix=", 9) == 0)
prefix = 9+*argv;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--strip=none") == 0)
global.skip = SKIP_NONE;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--strip=crc") == 0)
global.skip = SKIP_BAD_CRC;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--strip=unsafe") == 0)
global.skip = SKIP_UNSAFE;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--strip=unused") == 0)
global.skip = SKIP_UNUSED;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--strip=transform") == 0)
global.skip = SKIP_TRANSFORM;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--strip=color") == 0)
global.skip = SKIP_COLOR;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--strip=all") == 0)
global.skip = SKIP_ALL;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--errors") == 0 || strcmp(*argv, "-e") == 0)
global.errors = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--warnings") == 0 || strcmp(*argv, "-w") == 0)
global.warnings = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--quiet") == 0 || strcmp(*argv, "-q") == 0)
{
if (global.quiet)
global.quiet = 2;
else
global.quiet = 1;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--verbose") == 0 || strcmp(*argv, "-v") == 0)
++global.verbose;
#if 0
/* NYI */
# ifdef PNG_MAXIMUM_INFLATE_WINDOW
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--test") == 0)
++set_option;
# endif
#endif
else if ((*argv)[0] == '-')
usage(prog);
else
{
size_t outlen = strlen(*argv);
char temp_name[FILENAME_MAX+1];
if (outfile == NULL) /* else this takes precedence */
{
/* Consider the prefix/suffix options */
if (prefix != NULL)
{
size_t prefixlen = strlen(prefix);
if (prefixlen+outlen > FILENAME_MAX)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: output file name too long: %s%s%s\n",
prog, prefix, *argv, suffix ? suffix : "");
global.status_code |= WRITE_ERROR;
continue;
}
memcpy(temp_name, prefix, prefixlen);
memcpy(temp_name+prefixlen, *argv, outlen);
outlen += prefixlen;
outfile = temp_name;
}
else if (suffix != NULL)
memcpy(temp_name, *argv, outlen);
temp_name[outlen] = 0;
if (suffix != NULL)
{
size_t suffixlen = strlen(suffix);
if (outlen+suffixlen > FILENAME_MAX)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: output file name too long: %s%s\n",
prog, *argv, suffix);
global.status_code |= WRITE_ERROR;
continue;
}
memcpy(temp_name+outlen, suffix, suffixlen);
outlen += suffixlen;
temp_name[outlen] = 0;
outfile = temp_name;
}
}
(void)one_file(&global, *argv, outfile);
++done;
outfile = NULL;
}
}
if (!done)
usage(prog);
return global_end(&global);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,733
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ahci_uninit(AHCIState *s)
{
g_free(s->dev);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: Memory leak in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator), when built with IDE AHCI Emulation support, allows local guest OS privileged users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by repeatedly hot-unplugging the AHCI device.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,797
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::DrawingBufferClientRestorePixelPackAlignment() {
if (!ContextGL())
return;
ContextGL()->PixelStorei(GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT, pack_alignment_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 61.0.3163.79 for Windows allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
Medium
| 172,289
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm,
pte_t *dst_pte,
struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma,
unsigned long dst_addr,
unsigned long src_addr,
struct page **pagep)
{
int vm_shared = dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED;
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(dst_vma);
pte_t _dst_pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
int ret;
struct page *page;
if (!*pagep) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
page = alloc_huge_page(dst_vma, dst_addr, 0);
if (IS_ERR(page))
goto out;
ret = copy_huge_page_from_user(page,
(const void __user *) src_addr,
pages_per_huge_page(h), false);
/* fallback to copy_from_user outside mmap_sem */
if (unlikely(ret)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
*pagep = page;
/* don't free the page */
goto out;
}
} else {
page = *pagep;
*pagep = NULL;
}
/*
* The memory barrier inside __SetPageUptodate makes sure that
* preceding stores to the page contents become visible before
* the set_pte_at() write.
*/
__SetPageUptodate(page);
set_page_huge_active(page);
/*
* If shared, add to page cache
*/
if (vm_shared) {
struct address_space *mapping = dst_vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
pgoff_t idx = vma_hugecache_offset(h, dst_vma, dst_addr);
ret = huge_add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, idx);
if (ret)
goto out_release_nounlock;
}
ptl = huge_pte_lockptr(h, dst_mm, dst_pte);
spin_lock(ptl);
ret = -EEXIST;
if (!huge_pte_none(huge_ptep_get(dst_pte)))
goto out_release_unlock;
if (vm_shared) {
page_dup_rmap(page, true);
} else {
ClearPagePrivate(page);
hugepage_add_new_anon_rmap(page, dst_vma, dst_addr);
}
_dst_pte = make_huge_pte(dst_vma, page, dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE);
if (dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
_dst_pte = huge_pte_mkdirty(_dst_pte);
_dst_pte = pte_mkyoung(_dst_pte);
set_huge_pte_at(dst_mm, dst_addr, dst_pte, _dst_pte);
(void)huge_ptep_set_access_flags(dst_vma, dst_addr, dst_pte, _dst_pte,
dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE);
hugetlb_count_add(pages_per_huge_page(h), dst_mm);
/* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
update_mmu_cache(dst_vma, dst_addr, dst_pte);
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (vm_shared)
unlock_page(page);
ret = 0;
out:
return ret;
out_release_unlock:
spin_unlock(ptl);
out_release_nounlock:
if (vm_shared)
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: A flaw was found in the hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte function in mm/hugetlb.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13. A superfluous implicit page unlock for VM_SHARED hugetlbfs mapping could trigger a local denial of service (BUG).
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: remove superfluous page unlock in VM_SHARED case
huge_add_to_page_cache->add_to_page_cache implicitly unlocks the page
before returning in case of errors.
The error returned was -EEXIST by running UFFDIO_COPY on a non-hole
offset of a VM_SHARED hugetlbfs mapping. It was an userland bug that
triggered it and the kernel must cope with it returning -EEXIST from
ioctl(UFFDIO_COPY) as expected.
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageLocked(page))
kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:964!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 22582 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.11.11-300.fc26.x86_64 #1
RIP: unlock_page+0x4a/0x50
Call Trace:
hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte+0xc0/0x320
mcopy_atomic+0x96f/0xbe0
userfaultfd_ioctl+0x218/0xe90
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa5/0x600
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa9
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170802165145.22628-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexey Perevalov <a.perevalov@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 169,429
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void *bpf_any_get(void *raw, enum bpf_type type)
{
switch (type) {
case BPF_TYPE_PROG:
atomic_inc(&((struct bpf_prog *)raw)->aux->refcnt);
break;
case BPF_TYPE_MAP:
bpf_map_inc(raw, true);
break;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
break;
}
return raw;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The BPF subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.5.5 mishandles reference counts, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application on (1) a system with more than 32 Gb of memory, related to the program reference count or (2) a 1 Tb system, related to the map reference count.
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 167,250
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ikev1_attrmap_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, const u_char *ep,
const struct attrmap *map, size_t nmap)
{
int totlen;
uint32_t t, v;
if (p[0] & 0x80)
totlen = 4;
else
totlen = 4 + EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (ep < p + totlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|attr]"));
return ep + 1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
t = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[0]) & 0x7fff;
if (map && t < nmap && map[t].type)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=%s ", map[t].type));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=#%d ", t));
if (p[0] & 0x80) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"value="));
v = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (map && t < nmap && v < map[t].nvalue && map[t].value[v])
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s", map[t].value[v]));
else
rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[2], 2);
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"len=%d value=", EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2])));
rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[4], EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
return p + totlen;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISAKMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13039/IKEv1: Do more bounds checking.
Have ikev1_attrmap_print() and ikev1_attr_print() do full bounds
checking, and return null on a bounds overflow. Have their callers
check for a null return.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
|
Low
| 167,840
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
struct vmcb_save_area *save = &svm->vmcb->save;
svm->vcpu.fpu_active = 1;
svm->vcpu.arch.hflags = 0;
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
set_dr_intercepts(svm);
set_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
set_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR);
set_exception_intercept(svm, AC_VECTOR);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_NMI);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SMI);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDPMC);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CPUID);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVD);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_HLT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPGA);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IOIO_PROT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_TASK_SWITCH);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMRUN);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMMCALL);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CLGI);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SKINIT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_WBINVD);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MONITOR);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MWAIT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
control->iopm_base_pa = iopm_base;
control->msrpm_base_pa = __pa(svm->msrpm);
control->int_ctl = V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;
init_seg(&save->es);
init_seg(&save->ss);
init_seg(&save->ds);
init_seg(&save->fs);
init_seg(&save->gs);
save->cs.selector = 0xf000;
save->cs.base = 0xffff0000;
/* Executable/Readable Code Segment */
save->cs.attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_READ_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK |
SVM_SELECTOR_S_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_CODE_MASK;
save->cs.limit = 0xffff;
save->gdtr.limit = 0xffff;
save->idtr.limit = 0xffff;
init_sys_seg(&save->ldtr, SEG_TYPE_LDT);
init_sys_seg(&save->tr, SEG_TYPE_BUSY_TSS16);
svm_set_efer(&svm->vcpu, 0);
save->dr6 = 0xffff0ff0;
kvm_set_rflags(&svm->vcpu, 2);
save->rip = 0x0000fff0;
svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP] = save->rip;
/*
* svm_set_cr0() sets PG and WP and clears NW and CD on save->cr0.
* It also updates the guest-visible cr0 value.
*/
svm_set_cr0(&svm->vcpu, X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_ET);
kvm_mmu_reset_context(&svm->vcpu);
save->cr4 = X86_CR4_PAE;
/* rdx = ?? */
if (npt_enabled) {
/* Setup VMCB for Nested Paging */
control->nested_ctl = 1;
clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
clr_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
clr_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
clr_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
save->g_pat = svm->vcpu.arch.pat;
save->cr3 = 0;
save->cr4 = 0;
}
svm->asid_generation = 0;
svm->nested.vmcb = 0;
svm->vcpu.arch.hflags = 0;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER)) {
control->pause_filter_count = 3000;
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PAUSE);
}
mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
enable_gif(svm);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.2.6, and Xen 4.3.x through 4.6.x, allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS panic or hang) by triggering many #DB (aka Debug) exceptions, related to svm.c.
Commit Message: KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Medium
| 166,570
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xfs_attr3_leaf_getvalue(
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_local *name_loc;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote *name_rmt;
int valuelen;
leaf = bp->b_addr;
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(&ichdr, leaf);
ASSERT(ichdr.count < XFS_LBSIZE(args->dp->i_mount) / 8);
ASSERT(args->index < ichdr.count);
entry = &xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf)[args->index];
if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) {
name_loc = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_local(leaf, args->index);
ASSERT(name_loc->namelen == args->namelen);
ASSERT(memcmp(args->name, name_loc->nameval, args->namelen) == 0);
valuelen = be16_to_cpu(name_loc->valuelen);
if (args->flags & ATTR_KERNOVAL) {
args->valuelen = valuelen;
return 0;
}
if (args->valuelen < valuelen) {
args->valuelen = valuelen;
return XFS_ERROR(ERANGE);
}
args->valuelen = valuelen;
memcpy(args->value, &name_loc->nameval[args->namelen], valuelen);
} else {
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, args->index);
ASSERT(name_rmt->namelen == args->namelen);
ASSERT(memcmp(args->name, name_rmt->name, args->namelen) == 0);
valuelen = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valuelen);
args->rmtblkno = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valueblk);
args->rmtblkcnt = xfs_attr3_rmt_blocks(args->dp->i_mount,
valuelen);
if (args->flags & ATTR_KERNOVAL) {
args->valuelen = valuelen;
return 0;
}
if (args->valuelen < valuelen) {
args->valuelen = valuelen;
return XFS_ERROR(ERANGE);
}
args->valuelen = valuelen;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The XFS implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15 improperly uses an old size value during remote attribute replacement, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (transaction overrun and data corruption) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging XFS filesystem access.
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
|
Low
| 166,736
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static jas_image_cmpt_t *jas_image_cmpt_create(int_fast32_t tlx,
int_fast32_t tly, int_fast32_t hstep, int_fast32_t vstep,
int_fast32_t width, int_fast32_t height, uint_fast16_t depth, bool sgnd,
uint_fast32_t inmem)
{
jas_image_cmpt_t *cmpt;
size_t size;
cmpt = 0;
if (width < 0 || height < 0 || hstep <= 0 || vstep <= 0) {
goto error;
}
if (!jas_safe_intfast32_add(tlx, width, 0) ||
!jas_safe_intfast32_add(tly, height, 0)) {
goto error;
}
if (!(cmpt = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_image_cmpt_t)))) {
goto error;
}
cmpt->type_ = JAS_IMAGE_CT_UNKNOWN;
cmpt->tlx_ = tlx;
cmpt->tly_ = tly;
cmpt->hstep_ = hstep;
cmpt->vstep_ = vstep;
cmpt->width_ = width;
cmpt->height_ = height;
cmpt->prec_ = depth;
cmpt->sgnd_ = sgnd;
cmpt->stream_ = 0;
cmpt->cps_ = (depth + 7) / 8;
if (!jas_safe_size_mul(cmpt->width_, cmpt->height_, &size) ||
!jas_safe_size_mul(size, cmpt->cps_, &size)) {
goto error;
}
cmpt->stream_ = (inmem) ? jas_stream_memopen2(0, size) :
jas_stream_tmpfile();
if (!cmpt->stream_) {
goto error;
}
/* Zero the component data. This isn't necessary, but it is
convenient for debugging purposes. */
/* Note: conversion of size - 1 to long can overflow */
if (size > 0) {
if (size - 1 > LONG_MAX) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_seek(cmpt->stream_, size - 1, SEEK_SET) < 0 ||
jas_stream_putc(cmpt->stream_, 0) == EOF ||
jas_stream_seek(cmpt->stream_, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
goto error;
}
}
return cmpt;
error:
if (cmpt) {
jas_image_cmpt_destroy(cmpt);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,693
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline bool cfs_rq_is_decayed(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq)
{
if (cfs_rq->load.weight)
return false;
if (cfs_rq->avg.load_sum)
return false;
if (cfs_rq->avg.util_sum)
return false;
if (cfs_rq->avg.runnable_load_sum)
return false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.20.2, kernel/sched/fair.c mishandles leaf cfs_rq's, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop in update_blocked_averages) or possibly have unspecified other impact by inducing a high load.
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
Low
| 169,784
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr_storage *address, int mode)
{
int size, ct, err;
if (m->msg_namelen) {
if (mode == VERIFY_READ) {
void __user *namep;
namep = (void __user __force *) m->msg_name;
err = move_addr_to_kernel(namep, m->msg_namelen,
address);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
m->msg_name = address;
} else {
m->msg_name = NULL;
}
size = m->msg_iovlen * sizeof(struct iovec);
if (copy_from_user(iov, (void __user __force *) m->msg_iov, size))
return -EFAULT;
m->msg_iov = iov;
err = 0;
for (ct = 0; ct < m->msg_iovlen; ct++) {
size_t len = iov[ct].iov_len;
if (len > INT_MAX - err) {
len = INT_MAX - err;
iov[ct].iov_len = len;
}
err += len;
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,499
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Location::SetLocation(const String& url,
LocalDOMWindow* current_window,
LocalDOMWindow* entered_window,
ExceptionState* exception_state,
SetLocationPolicy set_location_policy) {
if (!IsAttached())
return;
if (!current_window->GetFrame())
return;
Document* entered_document = entered_window->document();
if (!entered_document)
return;
KURL completed_url = entered_document->CompleteURL(url);
if (completed_url.IsNull())
return;
if (!current_window->GetFrame()->CanNavigate(*dom_window_->GetFrame(),
completed_url)) {
if (exception_state) {
exception_state->ThrowSecurityError(
"The current window does not have permission to navigate the target "
"frame to '" +
url + "'.");
}
return;
}
if (exception_state && !completed_url.IsValid()) {
exception_state->ThrowDOMException(DOMExceptionCode::kSyntaxError,
"'" + url + "' is not a valid URL.");
return;
}
if (dom_window_->IsInsecureScriptAccess(*current_window, completed_url))
return;
V8DOMActivityLogger* activity_logger =
V8DOMActivityLogger::CurrentActivityLoggerIfIsolatedWorld();
if (activity_logger) {
Vector<String> argv;
argv.push_back("LocalDOMWindow");
argv.push_back("url");
argv.push_back(entered_document->Url());
argv.push_back(completed_url);
activity_logger->LogEvent("blinkSetAttribute", argv.size(), argv.data());
}
WebFrameLoadType frame_load_type = WebFrameLoadType::kStandard;
if (set_location_policy == SetLocationPolicy::kReplaceThisFrame)
frame_load_type = WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem;
dom_window_->GetFrame()->ScheduleNavigation(*current_window->document(),
completed_url, frame_load_type,
UserGestureStatus::kNone);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Content Security Policy in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Check the source browsing context's CSP in Location::SetLocation prior to dispatching a navigation to a `javascript:` URL.
Makes `javascript:` navigations via window.location.href compliant with
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate, which states that the source
browsing context must be checked (rather than the current browsing
context).
Bug: 909865
Change-Id: Id6aef6eef56865e164816c67eb9fe07ea1cb1b4e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1359823
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrew Comminos <acomminos@fb.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#614451}
|
Medium
| 173,061
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void registerBlobURLTask(void* context)
{
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> blobRegistryContext = adoptPtr(static_cast<BlobRegistryContext*>(context));
blobRegistry().registerBlobURL(blobRegistryContext->url, blobRegistryContext->blobData.release());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,687
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadTXTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
colorspace[MaxTextExtent],
text[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
*indexes;
long
type,
x_offset,
y,
y_offset;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickPixelPacket
pixel;
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned long
depth,
height,
max_value,
width;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(text,0,sizeof(text));
(void) ReadBlobString(image,text);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) != 0)
return(ReadTEXTImage(image_info,image,text,exception));
do
{
width=0;
height=0;
max_value=0;
*colorspace='\0';
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text+32,"%lu,%lu,%lu,%s",&width,&height,&max_value,
colorspace);
if ((count != 4) || (width == 0) || (height == 0) || (max_value == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
for (depth=1; (GetQuantumRange(depth)+1) < max_value; depth++) ;
image->depth=depth;
LocaleLower(colorspace);
i=(ssize_t) strlen(colorspace)-1;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
if ((i > 0) && (colorspace[i] == 'a'))
{
colorspace[i]='\0';
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
type=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,colorspace);
if (type < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->colorspace=(ColorspaceType) type;
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&pixel,0,sizeof(pixel));
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
range=GetQuantumRange(image->depth);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
double
blue,
green,
index,
opacity,
red;
red=0.0;
green=0.0;
blue=0.0;
index=0.0;
opacity=0.0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (ReadBlobString(image,text) == (char *) NULL)
break;
switch (image->colorspace)
{
case GRAYColorspace:
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&opacity);
green=red;
blue=red;
break;
}
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red);
green=red;
blue=red;
break;
}
case CMYKColorspace:
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&index,&opacity);
break;
}
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&index);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&opacity);
break;
}
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,&y_offset,
&red,&green,&blue);
break;
}
}
if (strchr(text,'%') != (char *) NULL)
{
red*=0.01*range;
green*=0.01*range;
blue*=0.01*range;
index*=0.01*range;
opacity*=0.01*range;
}
if (image->colorspace == LabColorspace)
{
green+=(range+1)/2.0;
blue+=(range+1)/2.0;
}
pixel.red=ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (red+0.5),range);
pixel.green=ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (green+0.5),range);
pixel.blue=ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (blue+0.5),range);
pixel.index=ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (index+0.5),range);
pixel.opacity=ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (opacity+0.5),range);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,x_offset,y_offset,1,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
continue;
SetPixelRed(q,pixel.red);
SetPixelGreen(q,pixel.green);
SetPixelBlue(q,pixel.blue);
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
SetPixelIndex(indexes,pixel.index);
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,pixel.opacity);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) ReadBlobString(image,text);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) == 0)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) == 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,614
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: beep_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
if (l_strnstart("MSG", 4, (const char *)bp, length)) /* A REQuest */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP MSG"));
else if (l_strnstart("RPY ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP RPY"));
else if (l_strnstart("ERR ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ERR"));
else if (l_strnstart("ANS ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ANS"));
else if (l_strnstart("NUL ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP NUL"));
else if (l_strnstart("SEQ ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP SEQ"));
else if (l_strnstart("END", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP END"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP (payload or undecoded)"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The BEEP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-beep.c:l_strnstart().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13010/BEEP: Do bounds checking when comparing strings.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,884
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ssize_t socket_read(const socket_t *socket, void *buf, size_t count) {
assert(socket != NULL);
assert(buf != NULL);
return recv(socket->fd, buf, count, MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,486
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BOOL nsc_process_message(NSC_CONTEXT* context, UINT16 bpp,
UINT32 width, UINT32 height,
const BYTE* data, UINT32 length,
BYTE* pDstData, UINT32 DstFormat,
UINT32 nDstStride,
UINT32 nXDst, UINT32 nYDst, UINT32 nWidth,
UINT32 nHeight, UINT32 flip)
{
wStream* s;
BOOL ret;
s = Stream_New((BYTE*)data, length);
if (!s)
return FALSE;
if (nDstStride == 0)
nDstStride = nWidth * GetBytesPerPixel(DstFormat);
switch (bpp)
{
case 32:
context->format = PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRA32;
break;
case 24:
context->format = PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR24;
break;
case 16:
context->format = PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR16;
break;
case 8:
context->format = PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB8;
break;
case 4:
context->format = PIXEL_FORMAT_A4;
break;
default:
Stream_Free(s, TRUE);
return FALSE;
}
context->width = width;
context->height = height;
ret = nsc_context_initialize(context, s);
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
if (!ret)
return FALSE;
/* RLE decode */
PROFILER_ENTER(context->priv->prof_nsc_rle_decompress_data)
nsc_rle_decompress_data(context);
PROFILER_EXIT(context->priv->prof_nsc_rle_decompress_data)
/* Colorloss recover, Chroma supersample and AYCoCg to ARGB Conversion in one step */
PROFILER_ENTER(context->priv->prof_nsc_decode)
context->decode(context);
PROFILER_EXIT(context->priv->prof_nsc_decode)
if (!freerdp_image_copy(pDstData, DstFormat, nDstStride, nXDst, nYDst,
width, height, context->BitmapData,
PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRA32, 0, 0, 0, NULL, flip))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains an Out-Of-Bounds Write of up to 4 bytes in function nsc_rle_decode() that results in a memory corruption and possibly even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
Low
| 169,283
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int bin_entry(RCore *r, int mode, ut64 laddr, int va, bool inifin) {
char str[R_FLAG_NAME_SIZE];
RList *entries = r_bin_get_entries (r->bin);
RListIter *iter;
RBinAddr *entry = NULL;
int i = 0;
ut64 baddr = r_bin_get_baddr (r->bin);
if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("fs symbols\n");
} else if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("[");
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
if (inifin) {
r_cons_printf ("[Constructors]\n");
} else {
r_cons_printf ("[Entrypoints]\n");
}
}
r_list_foreach (entries, iter, entry) {
ut64 paddr = entry->paddr;
ut64 haddr = UT64_MAX;
if (mode != R_CORE_BIN_SET) {
if (inifin) {
if (entry->type == R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_PROGRAM) {
continue;
}
} else {
if (entry->type != R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_PROGRAM) {
continue;
}
}
}
switch (entry->type) {
case R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_INIT:
case R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_FINI:
case R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_PREINIT:
if (r->io->va && entry->paddr == entry->vaddr) {
RIOMap *map = r_io_map_get (r->io, entry->vaddr);
if (map) {
paddr = entry->vaddr - map->itv.addr + map->delta;
}
}
}
if (entry->haddr) {
haddr = entry->haddr;
}
ut64 at = rva (r->bin, paddr, entry->vaddr, va);
const char *type = r_bin_entry_type_string (entry->type);
if (!type) {
type = "unknown";
}
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
r_flag_space_set (r->flags, "symbols");
if (entry->type == R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_INIT) {
snprintf (str, R_FLAG_NAME_SIZE, "entry%i.init", i);
} else if (entry->type == R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_FINI) {
snprintf (str, R_FLAG_NAME_SIZE, "entry%i.fini", i);
} else if (entry->type == R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_PREINIT) {
snprintf (str, R_FLAG_NAME_SIZE, "entry%i.preinit", i);
} else {
snprintf (str, R_FLAG_NAME_SIZE, "entry%i", i);
}
r_flag_set (r->flags, str, at, 1);
} else if (IS_MODE_SIMPLE (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", at);
} else if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("%s{\"vaddr\":%" PFMT64d ","
"\"paddr\":%" PFMT64d ","
"\"baddr\":%" PFMT64d ","
"\"laddr\":%" PFMT64d ","
"\"haddr\":%" PFMT64d ","
"\"type\":\"%s\"}",
iter->p ? "," : "", at, paddr, baddr, laddr, haddr, type);
} else if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
char *name = NULL;
if (entry->type == R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_INIT) {
name = r_str_newf ("entry%i.init", i);
} else if (entry->type == R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_FINI) {
name = r_str_newf ("entry%i.fini", i);
} else if (entry->type == R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_PREINIT) {
name = r_str_newf ("entry%i.preinit", i);
} else {
name = r_str_newf ("entry%i", i);
}
r_cons_printf ("f %s 1 @ 0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", name, at);
r_cons_printf ("f %s_haddr 1 @ 0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", name, haddr);
r_cons_printf ("s %s\n", name);
free (name);
} else {
r_cons_printf (
"vaddr=0x%08"PFMT64x
" paddr=0x%08"PFMT64x
" baddr=0x%08"PFMT64x
" laddr=0x%08"PFMT64x,
at, paddr, baddr, laddr);
if (haddr == UT64_MAX) {
r_cons_printf (
" haddr=%"PFMT64d
" type=%s\n",
haddr, type);
} else {
r_cons_printf (
" haddr=0x%08"PFMT64x
" type=%s\n",
haddr, type);
}
}
i++;
}
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
if (entry) {
ut64 at = rva (r->bin, entry->paddr, entry->vaddr, va);
r_core_seek (r, at, 0);
}
} else if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("]");
r_cons_newline ();
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("\n%i entrypoints\n", i);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The r_read_le32() function in radare2 2.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted ELF file.
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
|
Medium
| 169,233
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SampleTable::SampleTable(const sp<DataSource> &source)
: mDataSource(source),
mChunkOffsetOffset(-1),
mChunkOffsetType(0),
mNumChunkOffsets(0),
mSampleToChunkOffset(-1),
mNumSampleToChunkOffsets(0),
mSampleSizeOffset(-1),
mSampleSizeFieldSize(0),
mDefaultSampleSize(0),
mNumSampleSizes(0),
mTimeToSampleCount(0),
mTimeToSample(NULL),
mSampleTimeEntries(NULL),
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries(NULL),
mNumCompositionTimeDeltaEntries(0),
mCompositionDeltaLookup(new CompositionDeltaLookup),
mSyncSampleOffset(-1),
mNumSyncSamples(0),
mSyncSamples(NULL),
mLastSyncSampleIndex(0),
mSampleToChunkEntries(NULL) {
mSampleIterator = new SampleIterator(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: SampleTable.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 28076789.
Commit Message: Resolve merge conflict when cp'ing ag/931301 to mnc-mr1-release
Change-Id: I079d1db2d30d126f8aed348bd62451acf741037d
|
Medium
| 174,171
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: read_one_file(Image *image)
{
if (!(image->opts & READ_FILE) || (image->opts & USE_STDIO))
{
/* memory or stdio. */
FILE *f = fopen(image->file_name, "rb");
if (f != NULL)
{
if (image->opts & READ_FILE)
image->input_file = f;
else /* memory */
{
if (fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END) == 0)
{
long int cb = ftell(f);
if (cb > 0 && (unsigned long int)cb < (size_t)~(size_t)0)
{
png_bytep b = voidcast(png_bytep, malloc((size_t)cb));
if (b != NULL)
{
rewind(f);
if (fread(b, (size_t)cb, 1, f) == 1)
{
fclose(f);
image->input_memory_size = cb;
image->input_memory = b;
}
else
{
free(b);
return logclose(image, f, image->file_name,
": read failed: ");
}
}
else
return logclose(image, f, image->file_name,
": out of memory: ");
}
else if (cb == 0)
return logclose(image, f, image->file_name,
": zero length: ");
else
return logclose(image, f, image->file_name,
": tell failed: ");
}
else
return logclose(image, f, image->file_name, ": seek failed: ");
}
}
else
return logerror(image, image->file_name, ": open failed: ",
strerror(errno));
}
return read_file(image, FORMAT_NO_CHANGE, NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,596
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void StoreExistingGroupExistingCache() {
MakeCacheAndGroup(kManifestUrl, 1, 1, true);
EXPECT_EQ(kDefaultEntrySize, storage()->usage_map_[kOrigin]);
base::Time now = base::Time::Now();
cache_->AddEntry(kEntryUrl, AppCacheEntry(AppCacheEntry::MASTER, 1, 100));
cache_->set_update_time(now);
PushNextTask(base::BindOnce(
&AppCacheStorageImplTest::Verify_StoreExistingGroupExistingCache,
base::Unretained(this), now));
EXPECT_EQ(cache_.get(), group_->newest_complete_cache());
storage()->StoreGroupAndNewestCache(group_.get(), cache_.get(), delegate());
EXPECT_FALSE(delegate()->stored_group_success_);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
Medium
| 172,990
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Chapters::Atom::ParseDisplay(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size)
{
if (!ExpandDisplaysArray())
return -1;
Display& d = m_displays[m_displays_count++];
d.Init();
return d.Parse(pReader, pos, size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,422
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
struct ext4_extent *ex;
int depth;
int err = 0;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ext_debug("ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu, max_blocks %u\n", inode->i_ino,
(unsigned long long)le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block),
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex));
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
/* first mark the extent as initialized */
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
/* note: ext4_ext_correct_indexes() isn't needed here because
* borders are not changed
*/
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
/* Mark modified extent as dirty */
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in fs/ext4/extents.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.16 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from a deleted file by reading an extent that was not properly marked as uninitialized.
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
Medium
| 165,531
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ossl_cipher_update(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
unsigned char *in;
long in_len, out_len;
VALUE data, str;
rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "11", &data, &str);
StringValue(data);
in = (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(data);
if ((in_len = RSTRING_LEN(data)) == 0)
ossl_raise(rb_eArgError, "data must not be empty");
GetCipher(self, ctx);
out_len = in_len+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
if (out_len <= 0) {
ossl_raise(rb_eRangeError,
"data too big to make output buffer: %ld bytes", in_len);
}
if (NIL_P(str)) {
str = rb_str_new(0, out_len);
} else {
StringValue(str);
rb_str_resize(str, out_len);
}
if (!ossl_cipher_update_long(ctx, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(str), &out_len, in, in_len))
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
assert(out_len < RSTRING_LEN(str));
rb_str_set_len(str, out_len);
return str;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The openssl gem for Ruby uses the same initialization vector (IV) in GCM Mode (aes-*-gcm) when the IV is set before the key, which makes it easier for context-dependent attackers to bypass the encryption protection mechanism.
Commit Message: cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
|
Low
| 168,783
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: create_bits (pixman_format_code_t format,
int width,
int height,
int * rowstride_bytes,
pixman_bool_t clear)
{
int stride;
size_t buf_size;
int bpp;
/* what follows is a long-winded way, avoiding any possibility of integer
* overflows, of saying:
* stride = ((width * bpp + 0x1f) >> 5) * sizeof (uint32_t);
*/
bpp = PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP (format);
if (_pixman_multiply_overflows_int (width, bpp))
return NULL;
stride = width * bpp;
if (_pixman_addition_overflows_int (stride, 0x1f))
return NULL;
stride += 0x1f;
stride >>= 5;
stride *= sizeof (uint32_t);
if (_pixman_multiply_overflows_size (height, stride))
return NULL;
buf_size = height * stride;
if (rowstride_bytes)
*rowstride_bytes = stride;
if (clear)
return calloc (buf_size, 1);
else
return malloc (buf_size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the create_bits function in pixman-bits-image.c in Pixman before 0.32.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via large height and stride values.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,337
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags,
u32 val, ktime_t *abs_time, u32 bitset,
u32 __user *uaddr2)
{
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to = NULL;
struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter;
struct rt_mutex *pi_mutex = NULL;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
union futex_key key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
int res, ret;
if (uaddr == uaddr2)
return -EINVAL;
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
if (abs_time) {
to = &timeout;
hrtimer_init_on_stack(&to->timer, (flags & FLAGS_CLOCKRT) ?
CLOCK_REALTIME : CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
hrtimer_init_sleeper(to, current);
hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(&to->timer, *abs_time,
current->timer_slack_ns);
}
/*
* The waiter is allocated on our stack, manipulated by the requeue
* code while we sleep on uaddr.
*/
debug_rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&rt_waiter.pi_tree_entry);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&rt_waiter.tree_entry);
rt_waiter.task = NULL;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, VERIFY_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
q.bitset = bitset;
q.rt_waiter = &rt_waiter;
q.requeue_pi_key = &key2;
/*
* Prepare to wait on uaddr. On success, increments q.key (key1) ref
* count.
*/
ret = futex_wait_setup(uaddr, val, flags, &q, &hb);
if (ret)
goto out_key2;
/* Queue the futex_q, drop the hb lock, wait for wakeup. */
futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
ret = handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(hb, &q, &key2, to);
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
if (ret)
goto out_put_keys;
/*
* In order for us to be here, we know our q.key == key2, and since
* we took the hb->lock above, we also know that futex_requeue() has
* completed and we no longer have to concern ourselves with a wakeup
* race with the atomic proxy lock acquisition by the requeue code. The
* futex_requeue dropped our key1 reference and incremented our key2
* reference count.
*/
/* Check if the requeue code acquired the second futex for us. */
if (!q.rt_waiter) {
/*
* Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we
* did a lock-steal - fix up the PI-state in that case.
*/
if (q.pi_state && (q.pi_state->owner != current)) {
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr2, &q, current);
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
}
} else {
/*
* We have been woken up by futex_unlock_pi(), a timeout, or a
* signal. futex_unlock_pi() will not destroy the lock_ptr nor
* the pi_state.
*/
WARN_ON(!q.pi_state);
pi_mutex = &q.pi_state->pi_mutex;
ret = rt_mutex_finish_proxy_lock(pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter, 1);
debug_rt_mutex_free_waiter(&rt_waiter);
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
/*
* Fixup the pi_state owner and possibly acquire the lock if we
* haven't already.
*/
res = fixup_owner(uaddr2, &q, !ret);
/*
* If fixup_owner() returned an error, proprogate that. If it
* acquired the lock, clear -ETIMEDOUT or -EINTR.
*/
if (res)
ret = (res < 0) ? res : 0;
/* Unqueue and drop the lock. */
unqueue_me_pi(&q);
}
/*
* If fixup_pi_state_owner() faulted and was unable to handle the
* fault, unlock the rt_mutex and return the fault to userspace.
*/
if (ret == -EFAULT) {
if (pi_mutex && rt_mutex_owner(pi_mutex) == current)
rt_mutex_unlock(pi_mutex);
} else if (ret == -EINTR) {
/*
* We've already been requeued, but cannot restart by calling
* futex_lock_pi() directly. We could restart this syscall, but
* it would detect that the user space "val" changed and return
* -EWOULDBLOCK. Save the overhead of the restart and return
* -EWOULDBLOCK directly.
*/
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
}
out_put_keys:
put_futex_key(&q.key);
out_key2:
put_futex_key(&key2);
out:
if (to) {
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The futex_requeue function in kernel/futex.c in the Linux kernel through 3.14.5 does not ensure that calls have two different futex addresses, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted FUTEX_REQUEUE command that facilitates unsafe waiter modification.
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 166,382
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void InitNavigateParams(FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params* params,
int nav_entry_id,
bool did_create_new_entry,
const GURL& url,
ui::PageTransition transition) {
params->nav_entry_id = nav_entry_id;
params->url = url;
params->referrer = Referrer();
params->transition = transition;
params->redirects = std::vector<GURL>();
params->should_update_history = false;
params->searchable_form_url = GURL();
params->searchable_form_encoding = std::string();
params->did_create_new_entry = did_create_new_entry;
params->gesture = NavigationGestureUser;
params->was_within_same_document = false;
params->method = "GET";
params->page_state = PageState::CreateFromURL(url);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: content/browser/web_contents/web_contents_impl.cc in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that a PDF document's modal dialog is closed upon navigation to an interstitial page, which allows remote attackers to spoof URLs via a crafted document, as demonstrated by the alert_dialog.pdf document.
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
|
Medium
| 171,965
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int fetch_uidl(char *line, void *data)
{
int i, index;
struct Context *ctx = (struct Context *) data;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
char *endp = NULL;
errno = 0;
index = strtol(line, &endp, 10);
if (errno)
return -1;
while (*endp == ' ')
endp++;
memmove(line, endp, strlen(endp) + 1);
for (i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
if (mutt_str_strcmp(line, ctx->hdrs[i]->data) == 0)
break;
if (i == ctx->msgcount)
{
mutt_debug(1, "new header %d %s\n", index, line);
if (i >= ctx->hdrmax)
mx_alloc_memory(ctx);
ctx->msgcount++;
ctx->hdrs[i] = mutt_header_new();
ctx->hdrs[i]->data = mutt_str_strdup(line);
}
else if (ctx->hdrs[i]->index != index - 1)
pop_data->clear_cache = true;
ctx->hdrs[i]->refno = index;
ctx->hdrs[i]->index = index - 1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-824
Summary: An issue was discovered in Mutt before 1.10.1 and NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. pop.c mishandles a zero-length UID.
Commit Message: Ensure UID in fetch_uidl
|
Low
| 169,136
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlParseDocTypeDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name = NULL;
xmlChar *ExternalID = NULL;
xmlChar *URI = NULL;
/*
* We know that '<!DOCTYPE' has been detected.
*/
SKIP(9);
SKIP_BLANKS;
/*
* Parse the DOCTYPE name.
*/
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseDocTypeDecl : no DOCTYPE name !\n");
}
ctxt->intSubName = name;
SKIP_BLANKS;
/*
* Check for SystemID and ExternalID
*/
URI = xmlParseExternalID(ctxt, &ExternalID, 1);
if ((URI != NULL) || (ExternalID != NULL)) {
ctxt->hasExternalSubset = 1;
}
ctxt->extSubURI = URI;
ctxt->extSubSystem = ExternalID;
SKIP_BLANKS;
/*
* Create and update the internal subset.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->internalSubset != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->internalSubset(ctxt->userData, name, ExternalID, URI);
/*
* Is there any internal subset declarations ?
* they are handled separately in xmlParseInternalSubset()
*/
if (RAW == '[')
return;
/*
* We should be at the end of the DOCTYPE declaration.
*/
if (RAW != '>') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCTYPE_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
}
NEXT;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,281
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int crypto_shash_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_hash rhash;
struct shash_alg *salg = __crypto_shash_alg(alg);
snprintf(rhash.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "shash");
rhash.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
rhash.digestsize = salg->digestsize;
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_HASH,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_hash), &rhash))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The crypto_report_one function in crypto/crypto_user.c in the report API in the crypto user configuration API in the Linux kernel through 3.8.2 uses an incorrect length value during a copy operation, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 166,072
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void EntrySync::remove(ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
RefPtr<VoidSyncCallbackHelper> helper = VoidSyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->remove(this, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,423
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *ndev,
struct cfg80211_ap_settings *settings)
{
s32 ie_offset;
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy);
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
const struct brcmf_tlv *ssid_ie;
const struct brcmf_tlv *country_ie;
struct brcmf_ssid_le ssid_le;
s32 err = -EPERM;
const struct brcmf_tlv *rsn_ie;
const struct brcmf_vs_tlv *wpa_ie;
struct brcmf_join_params join_params;
enum nl80211_iftype dev_role;
struct brcmf_fil_bss_enable_le bss_enable;
u16 chanspec = chandef_to_chanspec(&cfg->d11inf, &settings->chandef);
bool mbss;
int is_11d;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "ctrlchn=%d, center=%d, bw=%d, beacon_interval=%d, dtim_period=%d,\n",
settings->chandef.chan->hw_value,
settings->chandef.center_freq1, settings->chandef.width,
settings->beacon_interval, settings->dtim_period);
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "ssid=%s(%zu), auth_type=%d, inactivity_timeout=%d\n",
settings->ssid, settings->ssid_len, settings->auth_type,
settings->inactivity_timeout);
dev_role = ifp->vif->wdev.iftype;
mbss = ifp->vif->mbss;
/* store current 11d setting */
brcmf_fil_cmd_int_get(ifp, BRCMF_C_GET_REGULATORY, &ifp->vif->is_11d);
country_ie = brcmf_parse_tlvs((u8 *)settings->beacon.tail,
settings->beacon.tail_len,
WLAN_EID_COUNTRY);
is_11d = country_ie ? 1 : 0;
memset(&ssid_le, 0, sizeof(ssid_le));
if (settings->ssid == NULL || settings->ssid_len == 0) {
ie_offset = DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN + DOT11_BCN_PRB_FIXED_LEN;
ssid_ie = brcmf_parse_tlvs(
(u8 *)&settings->beacon.head[ie_offset],
settings->beacon.head_len - ie_offset,
WLAN_EID_SSID);
if (!ssid_ie)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(ssid_le.SSID, ssid_ie->data, ssid_ie->len);
ssid_le.SSID_len = cpu_to_le32(ssid_ie->len);
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "SSID is (%s) in Head\n", ssid_le.SSID);
} else {
memcpy(ssid_le.SSID, settings->ssid, settings->ssid_len);
ssid_le.SSID_len = cpu_to_le32((u32)settings->ssid_len);
}
if (!mbss) {
brcmf_set_mpc(ifp, 0);
brcmf_configure_arp_nd_offload(ifp, false);
}
/* find the RSN_IE */
rsn_ie = brcmf_parse_tlvs((u8 *)settings->beacon.tail,
settings->beacon.tail_len, WLAN_EID_RSN);
/* find the WPA_IE */
wpa_ie = brcmf_find_wpaie((u8 *)settings->beacon.tail,
settings->beacon.tail_len);
if ((wpa_ie != NULL || rsn_ie != NULL)) {
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "WPA(2) IE is found\n");
if (wpa_ie != NULL) {
/* WPA IE */
err = brcmf_configure_wpaie(ifp, wpa_ie, false);
if (err < 0)
goto exit;
} else {
struct brcmf_vs_tlv *tmp_ie;
tmp_ie = (struct brcmf_vs_tlv *)rsn_ie;
/* RSN IE */
err = brcmf_configure_wpaie(ifp, tmp_ie, true);
if (err < 0)
goto exit;
}
} else {
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "No WPA(2) IEs found\n");
brcmf_configure_opensecurity(ifp);
}
brcmf_config_ap_mgmt_ie(ifp->vif, &settings->beacon);
/* Parameters shared by all radio interfaces */
if (!mbss) {
if (is_11d != ifp->vif->is_11d) {
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_REGULATORY,
is_11d);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("Regulatory Set Error, %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
}
if (settings->beacon_interval) {
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_BCNPRD,
settings->beacon_interval);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("Beacon Interval Set Error, %d\n",
err);
goto exit;
}
}
if (settings->dtim_period) {
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_DTIMPRD,
settings->dtim_period);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("DTIM Interval Set Error, %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
}
if ((dev_role == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) &&
((ifp->ifidx == 0) ||
!brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_RSDB))) {
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_DOWN, 1);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("BRCMF_C_DOWN error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "apsta", 0);
}
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_INFRA, 1);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("SET INFRA error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
} else if (WARN_ON(is_11d != ifp->vif->is_11d)) {
/* Multiple-BSS should use same 11d configuration */
err = -EINVAL;
goto exit;
}
/* Interface specific setup */
if (dev_role == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) {
if ((brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_MBSS)) && (!mbss))
brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "mbss", 1);
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_AP, 1);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("setting AP mode failed %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
if (!mbss) {
/* Firmware 10.x requires setting channel after enabling
* AP and before bringing interface up.
*/
err = brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "chanspec", chanspec);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("Set Channel failed: chspec=%d, %d\n",
chanspec, err);
goto exit;
}
}
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_UP, 1);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("BRCMF_C_UP error (%d)\n", err);
goto exit;
}
/* On DOWN the firmware removes the WEP keys, reconfigure
* them if they were set.
*/
brcmf_cfg80211_reconfigure_wep(ifp);
memset(&join_params, 0, sizeof(join_params));
/* join parameters starts with ssid */
memcpy(&join_params.ssid_le, &ssid_le, sizeof(ssid_le));
/* create softap */
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_data_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_SSID,
&join_params, sizeof(join_params));
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("SET SSID error (%d)\n", err);
goto exit;
}
if (settings->hidden_ssid) {
err = brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "closednet", 1);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("closednet error (%d)\n", err);
goto exit;
}
}
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "AP mode configuration complete\n");
} else if (dev_role == NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_GO) {
err = brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "chanspec", chanspec);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("Set Channel failed: chspec=%d, %d\n",
chanspec, err);
goto exit;
}
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_data_set(ifp, "ssid", &ssid_le,
sizeof(ssid_le));
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("setting ssid failed %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
bss_enable.bsscfgidx = cpu_to_le32(ifp->bsscfgidx);
bss_enable.enable = cpu_to_le32(1);
err = brcmf_fil_iovar_data_set(ifp, "bss", &bss_enable,
sizeof(bss_enable));
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("bss_enable config failed %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "GO mode configuration complete\n");
} else {
WARN_ON(1);
}
set_bit(BRCMF_VIF_STATUS_AP_CREATED, &ifp->vif->sme_state);
brcmf_net_setcarrier(ifp, true);
exit:
if ((err) && (!mbss)) {
brcmf_set_mpc(ifp, 1);
brcmf_configure_arp_nd_offload(ifp, true);
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap function in drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c in the Linux kernel before 4.7.5 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long SSID Information Element in a command to a Netlink socket.
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
|
Low
| 166,908
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int decode_map(codebook *s, oggpack_buffer *b, ogg_int32_t *v, int point){
ogg_uint32_t entry = decode_packed_entry_number(s,b);
int i;
if(oggpack_eop(b))return(-1);
/* 1 used by test file 0 */
/* according to decode type */
switch(s->dec_type){
case 1:{
/* packed vector of values */
int mask=(1<<s->q_bits)-1;
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++){
v[i]=entry&mask;
entry>>=s->q_bits;
}
break;
}
case 2:{
/* packed vector of column offsets */
int mask=(1<<s->q_pack)-1;
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++){
if(s->q_bits<=8)
v[i]=((unsigned char *)(s->q_val))[entry&mask];
else
v[i]=((ogg_uint16_t *)(s->q_val))[entry&mask];
entry>>=s->q_pack;
}
break;
}
case 3:{
/* offset into array */
void *ptr=((char *)s->q_val)+entry*s->q_pack;
if(s->q_bits<=8){
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]=((unsigned char *)ptr)[i];
}else{
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]=((ogg_uint16_t *)ptr)[i];
}
break;
}
default:
return -1;
}
/* we have the unpacked multiplicands; compute final vals */
{
int shiftM = point-s->q_delp;
ogg_int32_t add = point-s->q_minp;
int mul = s->q_del;
if(add>0)
add= s->q_min >> add;
else
add= s->q_min << -add;
if (shiftM<0)
{
mul <<= -shiftM;
shiftM = 0;
}
add <<= shiftM;
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]= ((add + v[i] * mul) >> shiftM);
if(s->q_seq)
for(i=1;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]+=v[i-1];
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (n/a). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-62800140.
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
|
Low
| 173,983
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int java_switch_op(RAnal *anal, RAnalOp *op, ut64 addr, const ut8 *data, int len) {
ut8 op_byte = data[0];
ut64 offset = addr - java_get_method_start ();
ut8 pos = (offset+1)%4 ? 1 + 4 - (offset+1)%4 : 1;
if (op_byte == 0xaa) {
if (pos + 8 > len) {
return op->size;
}
int min_val = (ut32)(UINT (data, pos + 4)),
max_val = (ut32)(UINT (data, pos + 8));
ut32 default_loc = (ut32) (UINT (data, pos)), cur_case = 0;
op->switch_op = r_anal_switch_op_new (addr, min_val, default_loc);
RAnalCaseOp *caseop = NULL;
pos += 12;
if (max_val > min_val && ((max_val - min_val)<(UT16_MAX/4))) {
for (cur_case = 0; cur_case <= max_val - min_val; pos += 4, cur_case++) {
if (pos + 4 >= len) {
break;
}
int offset = (int)(ut32)(R_BIN_JAVA_UINT (data, pos));
caseop = r_anal_switch_op_add_case (op->switch_op,
addr + pos, cur_case + min_val, addr + offset);
if (caseop) {
caseop->bb_ref_to = addr+offset;
caseop->bb_ref_from = addr; // TODO figure this one out
}
}
} else {
eprintf ("Invalid switch boundaries at 0x%"PFMT64x"\n", addr);
}
}
op->size = pos;
return op->size;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: There is a heap out of bounds read in radare2 2.6.0 in java_switch_op() in libr/anal/p/anal_java.c via a crafted Java binary file.
Commit Message: Fix #10296 - Heap out of bounds read in java_switch_op()
|
Medium
| 169,198
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pdf_repair_xref(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc)
{
int c;
pdf_lexbuf *buf = &doc->lexbuf.base;
int num_roots = 0;
int max_roots = 0;
fz_var(encrypt);
fz_var(id);
fz_var(roots);
fz_var(num_roots);
fz_var(max_roots);
fz_var(info);
fz_var(list);
fz_var(obj);
if (doc->repair_attempted)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "Repair failed already - not trying again");
doc->repair_attempted = 1;
doc->dirty = 1;
/* Can't support incremental update after repair */
doc->freeze_updates = 1;
fz_seek(ctx, doc->file, 0, 0);
fz_try(ctx)
{
pdf_xref_entry *entry;
listlen = 0;
listcap = 1024;
list = fz_malloc_array(ctx, listcap, sizeof(struct entry));
/* look for '%PDF' version marker within first kilobyte of file */
n = fz_read(ctx, doc->file, (unsigned char *)buf->scratch, fz_mini(buf->size, 1024));
fz_seek(ctx, doc->file, 0, 0);
if (n >= 4)
{
for (j = 0; j < n - 4; j++)
{
if (memcmp(&buf->scratch[j], "%PDF", 4) == 0)
{
fz_seek(ctx, doc->file, j + 8, 0); /* skip "%PDF-X.Y" */
break;
}
}
}
/* skip comment line after version marker since some generators
* forget to terminate the comment with a newline */
c = fz_read_byte(ctx, doc->file);
while (c >= 0 && (c == ' ' || c == '%'))
c = fz_read_byte(ctx, doc->file);
fz_unread_byte(ctx, doc->file);
while (1)
{
tmpofs = fz_tell(ctx, doc->file);
if (tmpofs < 0)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "cannot tell in file");
fz_try(ctx)
{
tok = pdf_lex_no_string(ctx, doc->file, buf);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow_if(ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER);
fz_warn(ctx, "ignoring the rest of the file");
break;
}
/* If we have the next token already, then we'll jump
* back here, rather than going through the top of
* the loop. */
have_next_token:
if (tok == PDF_TOK_INT)
{
if (buf->i < 0)
{
num = 0;
gen = 0;
continue;
}
numofs = genofs;
num = gen;
genofs = tmpofs;
gen = buf->i;
}
else if (tok == PDF_TOK_OBJ)
{
pdf_obj *root = NULL;
fz_try(ctx)
{
stm_len = 0;
stm_ofs = 0;
tok = pdf_repair_obj(ctx, doc, buf, &stm_ofs, &stm_len, &encrypt, &id, NULL, &tmpofs, &root);
if (root)
add_root(ctx, root, &roots, &num_roots, &max_roots);
}
fz_always(ctx)
{
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, root);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow_if(ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER);
/* If we haven't seen a root yet, there is nothing
* we can do, but give up. Otherwise, we'll make
* do. */
if (!roots)
fz_rethrow(ctx);
fz_warn(ctx, "cannot parse object (%d %d R) - ignoring rest of file", num, gen);
break;
}
if (num <= 0 || num > MAX_OBJECT_NUMBER)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "ignoring object with invalid object number (%d %d R)", num, gen);
goto have_next_token;
}
gen = fz_clampi(gen, 0, 65535);
if (listlen + 1 == listcap)
{
listcap = (listcap * 3) / 2;
list = fz_resize_array(ctx, list, listcap, sizeof(struct entry));
}
list[listlen].num = num;
list[listlen].gen = gen;
list[listlen].ofs = numofs;
list[listlen].stm_ofs = stm_ofs;
list[listlen].stm_len = stm_len;
listlen ++;
if (num > maxnum)
maxnum = num;
goto have_next_token;
}
/* If we find a dictionary it is probably the trailer,
* but could be a stream (or bogus) dictionary caused
* by a corrupt file. */
else if (tok == PDF_TOK_OPEN_DICT)
{
fz_try(ctx)
{
dict = pdf_parse_dict(ctx, doc, doc->file, buf);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow_if(ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER);
/* If this was the real trailer dict
* it was broken, in which case we are
* in trouble. Keep going though in
* case this was just a bogus dict. */
continue;
}
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_Encrypt);
if (obj)
{
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, encrypt);
encrypt = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, obj);
}
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_ID);
if (obj && (!id || !encrypt || pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_Encrypt)))
{
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, id);
id = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, obj);
}
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_Root);
if (obj)
add_root(ctx, obj, &roots, &num_roots, &max_roots);
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_Info);
if (obj)
{
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, info);
info = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, obj);
}
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, dict);
obj = NULL;
}
else if (tok == PDF_TOK_EOF)
break;
else
{
if (tok == PDF_TOK_ERROR)
fz_read_byte(ctx, doc->file);
num = 0;
gen = 0;
}
}
if (listlen == 0)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "no objects found");
/* make xref reasonable */
/*
Dummy access to entry to assure sufficient space in the xref table
and avoid repeated reallocs in the loop
*/
/* Ensure that the first xref table is a 'solid' one from
* 0 to maxnum. */
pdf_ensure_solid_xref(ctx, doc, maxnum);
for (i = 1; i < maxnum; i++)
{
entry = pdf_get_populating_xref_entry(ctx, doc, i);
if (entry->obj != NULL)
continue;
entry->type = 'f';
entry->ofs = 0;
entry->gen = 0;
entry->num = 0;
entry->stm_ofs = 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
{
entry = pdf_get_populating_xref_entry(ctx, doc, list[i].num);
entry->type = 'n';
entry->ofs = list[i].ofs;
entry->gen = list[i].gen;
entry->num = list[i].num;
entry->stm_ofs = list[i].stm_ofs;
/* correct stream length for unencrypted documents */
if (!encrypt && list[i].stm_len >= 0)
{
dict = pdf_load_object(ctx, doc, list[i].num);
length = pdf_new_int(ctx, doc, list[i].stm_len);
pdf_dict_put(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_Length, length);
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, length);
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, dict);
}
}
entry = pdf_get_populating_xref_entry(ctx, doc, 0);
entry->type = 'f';
entry->ofs = 0;
entry->gen = 65535;
entry->num = 0;
entry->stm_ofs = 0;
next = 0;
/* correct stream length for unencrypted documents */
if (!encrypt && list[i].stm_len >= 0)
{
dict = pdf_load_object(ctx, doc, list[i].num);
length = pdf_new_int(ctx, doc, list[i].stm_len);
pdf_dict_put(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_Length, length);
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, length);
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, dict);
}
}
obj = pdf_new_dict(ctx, doc, 5);
/* During repair there is only a single xref section */
pdf_set_populating_xref_trailer(ctx, doc, obj);
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, obj);
obj = NULL;
obj = pdf_new_int(ctx, doc, maxnum + 1);
pdf_dict_put(ctx, pdf_trailer(ctx, doc), PDF_NAME_Size, obj);
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, obj);
obj = NULL;
if (roots)
{
int i;
for (i = num_roots-1; i > 0; i--)
{
if (pdf_is_dict(ctx, roots[i]))
break;
}
if (i >= 0)
{
pdf_dict_put(ctx, pdf_trailer(ctx, doc), PDF_NAME_Root, roots[i]);
}
}
if (info)
{
pdf_dict_put(ctx, pdf_trailer(ctx, doc), PDF_NAME_Info, info);
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, info);
info = NULL;
}
if (encrypt)
{
if (pdf_is_indirect(ctx, encrypt))
{
/* create new reference with non-NULL xref pointer */
obj = pdf_new_indirect(ctx, doc, pdf_to_num(ctx, encrypt), pdf_to_gen(ctx, encrypt));
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, encrypt);
encrypt = obj;
obj = NULL;
}
pdf_dict_put(ctx, pdf_trailer(ctx, doc), PDF_NAME_Encrypt, encrypt);
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, encrypt);
encrypt = NULL;
}
if (id)
{
if (pdf_is_indirect(ctx, id))
{
/* create new reference with non-NULL xref pointer */
obj = pdf_new_indirect(ctx, doc, pdf_to_num(ctx, id), pdf_to_gen(ctx, id));
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, id);
id = obj;
obj = NULL;
}
pdf_dict_put(ctx, pdf_trailer(ctx, doc), PDF_NAME_ID, id);
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, id);
id = NULL;
}
fz_free(ctx, list);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The pdf_to_num function in pdf-object.c in MuPDF before 1.10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,261
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: err_t verify_signed_hash(const struct RSA_public_key *k
, u_char *s, unsigned int s_max_octets
, u_char **psig
, size_t hash_len
, const u_char *sig_val, size_t sig_len)
{
unsigned int padlen;
/* actual exponentiation; see PKCS#1 v2.0 5.1 */
{
chunk_t temp_s;
MP_INT c;
n_to_mpz(&c, sig_val, sig_len);
oswcrypto.mod_exp(&c, &c, &k->e, &k->n);
temp_s = mpz_to_n(&c, sig_len); /* back to octets */
if(s_max_octets < sig_len) {
return "2""exponentiation failed; too many octets";
}
memcpy(s, temp_s.ptr, sig_len);
pfree(temp_s.ptr);
mpz_clear(&c);
}
/* check signature contents */
/* verify padding (not including any DER digest info! */
padlen = sig_len - 3 - hash_len;
/* now check padding */
DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
DBG_dump("verify_sh decrypted SIG1:", s, sig_len));
DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("pad_len calculated: %d hash_len: %d", padlen, (int)hash_len));
/* skip padding */
if(s[0] != 0x00
|| s[1] != 0x01
|| s[padlen+2] != 0x00) {
return "3""SIG padding does not check out";
}
s += padlen + 3;
(*psig) = s;
/* return SUCCESS */
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-347
Summary: In verify_signed_hash() in lib/liboswkeys/signatures.c in Openswan before 2.6.50.1, the RSA implementation does not verify the value of padding string during PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification. Consequently, a remote attacker can forge signatures when small public exponents are being used. IKEv2 signature verification is affected when RAW RSA keys are used.
Commit Message: wo#7449 . verify padding contents for IKEv2 RSA sig check
Special thanks to Sze Yiu Chau of Purdue University (schau@purdue.edu)
who reported the issue.
|
Low
| 169,097
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WallpaperManager::OnWallpaperDecoded(
const AccountId& account_id,
const wallpaper::WallpaperInfo& info,
bool update_wallpaper,
MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder on_finish,
std::unique_ptr<user_manager::UserImage> user_image) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("ui", "LoadAndDecodeWallpaper", this);
if (user_image->image().isNull()) {
wallpaper::WallpaperInfo default_info(
"", wallpaper::WALLPAPER_LAYOUT_CENTER_CROPPED, wallpaper::DEFAULT,
base::Time::Now().LocalMidnight());
SetUserWallpaperInfo(account_id, default_info, true);
if (update_wallpaper)
DoSetDefaultWallpaper(account_id, std::move(on_finish));
return;
}
wallpaper_cache_[account_id].second = user_image->image();
if (update_wallpaper)
SetWallpaper(user_image->image(), info);
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The XSSAuditor::canonicalize function in core/html/parser/XSSAuditor.cpp in the XSS auditor in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly choose a truncation point, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via an unspecified linear-time attack.
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
|
Low
| 171,968
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xsltValueOf(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp)
{
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemValueOfPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemValueOfPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
xmlXPathObjectPtr res = NULL;
xmlChar *value = NULL;
xmlDocPtr oldXPContextDoc;
xmlNsPtr *oldXPNamespaces;
xmlNodePtr oldXPContextNode;
int oldXPProximityPosition, oldXPContextSize, oldXPNsNr;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (node == NULL) || (inst == NULL))
return;
if ((comp == NULL) || (comp->select == NULL) || (comp->comp == NULL)) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltValueOf(): "
"The XSLT 'value-of' instruction was not compiled.\n");
return;
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_VALUE_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltValueOf: select %s\n", comp->select));
#endif
xpctxt = ctxt->xpathCtxt;
oldXPContextDoc = xpctxt->doc;
oldXPContextNode = xpctxt->node;
oldXPProximityPosition = xpctxt->proximityPosition;
oldXPContextSize = xpctxt->contextSize;
oldXPNsNr = xpctxt->nsNr;
oldXPNamespaces = xpctxt->namespaces;
xpctxt->node = node;
if (comp != NULL) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
if (comp->inScopeNs != NULL) {
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->inScopeNs->list;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->inScopeNs->xpathNumber;
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
#else
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->nsList;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->nsNr;
#endif
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
res = xmlXPathCompiledEval(comp->comp, xpctxt);
xpctxt->doc = oldXPContextDoc;
xpctxt->node = oldXPContextNode;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->nsNr = oldXPNsNr;
xpctxt->namespaces = oldXPNamespaces;
/*
* Cast the XPath object to string.
*/
if (res != NULL) {
value = xmlXPathCastToString(res);
if (value == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltValueOf(): "
"failed to cast an XPath object to string.\n");
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
goto error;
}
if (value[0] != 0) {
xsltCopyTextString(ctxt, ctxt->insert, value, comp->noescape);
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"XPath evaluation returned no result.\n");
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
goto error;
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
if (value) {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_VALUE_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltValueOf: result '%s'\n", value));
}
#endif
error:
if (value != NULL)
xmlFree(value);
if (res != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(res);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 173,331
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool DoCanonicalizePathComponent(const CHAR* source,
const Component& component,
char separator,
CanonOutput* output,
Component* new_component) {
bool success = true;
if (component.is_valid()) {
if (separator)
output->push_back(separator);
new_component->begin = output->length();
int end = component.end();
for (int i = component.begin; i < end; i++) {
UCHAR uch = static_cast<UCHAR>(source[i]);
if (uch < 0x20 || uch >= 0x80)
success &= AppendUTF8EscapedChar(source, &i, end, output);
else
output->push_back(static_cast<char>(uch));
}
new_component->len = output->length() - new_component->begin;
} else {
new_component->reset();
}
return success;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Excessive data validation in URL parser in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to input a URL to bypass website URL validation via a crafted URL.
Commit Message: [url] Make path URL parsing more lax
Parsing the path component of a non-special URL like javascript or data
should not fail for invalid URL characters like \uFFFF. See this bit
in the spec:
https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#cannot-be-a-base-url-path-state
Note: some failing WPTs are added which are because url parsing
replaces invalid characters (e.g. \uFFFF) with the replacement char
\uFFFD, when that isn't in the spec.
Bug: 925614
Change-Id: I450495bfdfa68dc70334ebed16a3ecc0d5737e88
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1551917
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Harrison <csharrison@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#648155}
|
Medium
| 173,011
|
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