instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int send_reply_chunks(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
struct rpcrdma_write_array *rp_ary,
struct rpcrdma_msg *rdma_resp,
struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct svc_rdma_req_map *vec)
{
u32 xfer_len = rqstp->rq_res.len;
int write_len;
u32 xdr_off;
int chunk_no;
int chunk_off;
int nchunks;
struct rpcrdma_segment *ch;
struct rpcrdma_write_array *res_ary;
int ret;
/* XXX: need to fix when reply lists occur with read-list and or
* write-list */
res_ary = (struct rpcrdma_write_array *)
&rdma_resp->rm_body.rm_chunks[2];
/* xdr offset starts at RPC message */
nchunks = be32_to_cpu(rp_ary->wc_nchunks);
for (xdr_off = 0, chunk_no = 0;
xfer_len && chunk_no < nchunks;
chunk_no++) {
u64 rs_offset;
ch = &rp_ary->wc_array[chunk_no].wc_target;
write_len = min(xfer_len, be32_to_cpu(ch->rs_length));
/* Prepare the reply chunk given the length actually
* written */
xdr_decode_hyper((__be32 *)&ch->rs_offset, &rs_offset);
svc_rdma_xdr_encode_array_chunk(res_ary, chunk_no,
ch->rs_handle, ch->rs_offset,
write_len);
chunk_off = 0;
while (write_len) {
ret = send_write(xprt, rqstp,
be32_to_cpu(ch->rs_handle),
rs_offset + chunk_off,
xdr_off,
write_len,
vec);
if (ret <= 0)
goto out_err;
chunk_off += ret;
xdr_off += ret;
xfer_len -= ret;
write_len -= ret;
}
}
/* Update the req with the number of chunks actually used */
svc_rdma_xdr_encode_reply_array(res_ary, chunk_no);
return rqstp->rq_res.len;
out_err:
pr_err("svcrdma: failed to send reply chunks, rc=%d\n", ret);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | static int send_reply_chunks(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
/* The svc_rqst and all resources it owns are released as soon as
* svc_rdma_sendto returns. Transfer pages under I/O to the ctxt
* so they are released by the Send completion handler.
*/
static void svc_rdma_save_io_pages(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int i, pages = rqstp->rq_next_page - rqstp->rq_respages;
ctxt->count += pages;
for (i = 0; i < pages; i++) {
ctxt->pages[i + 1] = rqstp->rq_respages[i];
rqstp->rq_respages[i] = NULL;
}
rqstp->rq_next_page = rqstp->rq_respages + 1;
}
/**
* svc_rdma_post_send_wr - Set up and post one Send Work Request
* @rdma: controlling transport
* @ctxt: op_ctxt for transmitting the Send WR
* @num_sge: number of SGEs to send
* @inv_rkey: R_key argument to Send With Invalidate, or zero
*
* Returns:
* %0 if the Send* was posted successfully,
* %-ENOTCONN if the connection was lost or dropped,
* %-EINVAL if there was a problem with the Send we built,
* %-ENOMEM if ib_post_send failed.
*/
int svc_rdma_post_send_wr(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma,
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt, int num_sge,
u32 inv_rkey)
{
struct ib_send_wr *send_wr = &ctxt->send_wr;
dprintk("svcrdma: posting Send WR with %u sge(s)\n", num_sge);
send_wr->next = NULL;
ctxt->cqe.done = svc_rdma_wc_send;
send_wr->wr_cqe = &ctxt->cqe;
send_wr->sg_list = ctxt->sge;
send_wr->num_sge = num_sge;
send_wr->send_flags = IB_SEND_SIGNALED;
if (inv_rkey) {
send_wr->opcode = IB_WR_SEND_WITH_INV;
send_wr->ex.invalidate_rkey = inv_rkey;
} else {
send_wr->opcode = IB_WR_SEND;
}
return svc_rdma_send(rdma, send_wr);
}
| 168,168 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char *lxclock_name(const char *p, const char *n)
{
int ret;
int len;
char *dest;
char *rundir;
/* lockfile will be:
* "/run" + "/lock/lxc/$lxcpath/$lxcname + '\0' if root
* or
* $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR + "/lock/lxc/$lxcpath/$lxcname + '\0' if non-root
*/
/* length of "/lock/lxc/" + $lxcpath + "/" + "." + $lxcname + '\0' */
len = strlen("/lock/lxc/") + strlen(n) + strlen(p) + 3;
rundir = get_rundir();
if (!rundir)
return NULL;
len += strlen(rundir);
if ((dest = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
ret = snprintf(dest, len, "%s/lock/lxc/%s", rundir, p);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) {
free(dest);
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
ret = mkdir_p(dest, 0755);
if (ret < 0) {
/* fall back to "/tmp/" + $(id -u) + "/lxc" + $lxcpath + "/" + "." + $lxcname + '\0'
* * maximum length of $(id -u) is 10 calculated by (log (2 ** (sizeof(uid_t) * 8) - 1) / log 10 + 1)
* * lxcpath always starts with '/'
*/
int l2 = 22 + strlen(n) + strlen(p);
if (l2 > len) {
char *d;
d = realloc(dest, l2);
if (!d) {
free(dest);
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
len = l2;
dest = d;
}
ret = snprintf(dest, len, "/tmp/%d/lxc%s", geteuid(), p);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) {
free(dest);
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
ret = mkdir_p(dest, 0755);
if (ret < 0) {
free(dest);
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
ret = snprintf(dest, len, "/tmp/%d/lxc%s/.%s", geteuid(), p, n);
} else
ret = snprintf(dest, len, "%s/lock/lxc/%s/.%s", rundir, p, n);
free(rundir);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) {
free(dest);
return NULL;
}
return dest;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1331: lxclock: use /run/lxc/lock rather than /run/lock/lxc
This prevents an unprivileged user to use LXC to create arbitrary file
on the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | static char *lxclock_name(const char *p, const char *n)
{
int ret;
int len;
char *dest;
char *rundir;
/* lockfile will be:
* "/run" + "/lxc/lock/$lxcpath/$lxcname + '\0' if root
* or
* $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR + "/lxc/lock/$lxcpath/$lxcname + '\0' if non-root
*/
/* length of "/lxc/lock/" + $lxcpath + "/" + "." + $lxcname + '\0' */
len = strlen("/lxc/lock/") + strlen(n) + strlen(p) + 3;
rundir = get_rundir();
if (!rundir)
return NULL;
len += strlen(rundir);
if ((dest = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
ret = snprintf(dest, len, "%s/lxc/lock/%s", rundir, p);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) {
free(dest);
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
ret = mkdir_p(dest, 0755);
if (ret < 0) {
free(dest);
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
ret = snprintf(dest, len, "%s/lxc/lock/%s/.%s", rundir, p, n);
free(rundir);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) {
free(dest);
return NULL;
}
return dest;
}
| 166,725 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool HarfBuzzShaper::shape(GlyphBuffer* glyphBuffer)
{
if (!createHarfBuzzRuns())
return false;
m_totalWidth = 0;
if (!shapeHarfBuzzRuns())
return false;
if (glyphBuffer && !fillGlyphBuffer(glyphBuffer))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
R=leviw@chromium.org
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | bool HarfBuzzShaper::shape(GlyphBuffer* glyphBuffer)
{
if (!createHarfBuzzRuns())
return false;
if (!shapeHarfBuzzRuns())
return false;
if (glyphBuffer && !fillGlyphBuffer(glyphBuffer))
return false;
return true;
}
| 172,005 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SchedulerObject::_continue(std::string key, std::string &/*reason*/, std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster < 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Remove: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
scheduler.enqueueActOnJobMyself(id,JA_CONTINUE_JOBS,true);
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | SchedulerObject::_continue(std::string key, std::string &/*reason*/, std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster <= 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Remove: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
scheduler.enqueueActOnJobMyself(id,JA_CONTINUE_JOBS,true);
return true;
}
| 164,831 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Cues::PreloadCuePoint(long& cue_points_size, long long pos) const {
assert(m_count == 0);
if (m_preload_count >= cue_points_size) {
const long n = (cue_points_size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2 * cue_points_size;
CuePoint** const qq = new CuePoint* [n];
CuePoint** q = qq; // beginning of target
CuePoint** p = m_cue_points; // beginning of source
CuePoint** const pp = p + m_preload_count; // end of source
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_cue_points;
m_cue_points = qq;
cue_points_size = n;
}
CuePoint* const pCP = new CuePoint(m_preload_count, pos);
m_cue_points[m_preload_count++] = pCP;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void Cues::PreloadCuePoint(long& cue_points_size, long long pos) const {
bool Cues::PreloadCuePoint(long& cue_points_size, long long pos) const {
if (m_count != 0)
return false;
if (m_preload_count >= cue_points_size) {
const long n = (cue_points_size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2 * cue_points_size;
CuePoint** const qq = new (std::nothrow) CuePoint*[n];
if (qq == NULL)
return false;
CuePoint** q = qq; // beginning of target
CuePoint** p = m_cue_points; // beginning of source
CuePoint** const pp = p + m_preload_count; // end of source
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_cue_points;
m_cue_points = qq;
cue_points_size = n;
}
CuePoint* const pCP = new (std::nothrow) CuePoint(m_preload_count, pos);
if (pCP == NULL)
return false;
m_cue_points[m_preload_count++] = pCP;
return true;
}
| 173,861 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void dump_boot(DOS_FS * fs, struct boot_sector *b, unsigned lss)
{
unsigned short sectors;
printf("Boot sector contents:\n");
if (!atari_format) {
char id[9];
strncpy(id, (const char *)b->system_id, 8);
id[8] = 0;
printf("System ID \"%s\"\n", id);
} else {
/* On Atari, a 24 bit serial number is stored at offset 8 of the boot
* sector */
printf("Serial number 0x%x\n",
b->system_id[5] | (b->system_id[6] << 8) | (b->
system_id[7] << 16));
}
printf("Media byte 0x%02x (%s)\n", b->media, get_media_descr(b->media));
printf("%10d bytes per logical sector\n", GET_UNALIGNED_W(b->sector_size));
printf("%10d bytes per cluster\n", fs->cluster_size);
printf("%10d reserved sector%s\n", le16toh(b->reserved),
le16toh(b->reserved) == 1 ? "" : "s");
printf("First FAT starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->fat_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->fat_start / lss);
printf("%10d FATs, %d bit entries\n", b->fats, fs->fat_bits);
printf("%10d bytes per FAT (= %u sectors)\n", fs->fat_size,
fs->fat_size / lss);
if (!fs->root_cluster) {
printf("Root directory starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->root_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->root_start / lss);
printf("%10d root directory entries\n", fs->root_entries);
} else {
printf("Root directory start at cluster %lu (arbitrary size)\n",
(unsigned long)fs->root_cluster);
}
printf("Data area starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->data_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->data_start / lss);
printf("%10lu data clusters (%llu bytes)\n",
(unsigned long)fs->data_clusters,
(unsigned long long)fs->data_clusters * fs->cluster_size);
printf("%u sectors/track, %u heads\n", le16toh(b->secs_track),
le16toh(b->heads));
printf("%10u hidden sectors\n", atari_format ?
/* On Atari, the hidden field is only 16 bit wide and unused */
(((unsigned char *)&b->hidden)[0] |
((unsigned char *)&b->hidden)[1] << 8) : le32toh(b->hidden));
sectors = GET_UNALIGNED_W(b->sectors);
printf("%10u sectors total\n", sectors ? sectors : le32toh(b->total_sect));
}
Commit Message: read_boot(): Handle excessive FAT size specifications
The variable used for storing the FAT size (in bytes) was an unsigned
int. Since the size in sectors read from the BPB was not sufficiently
checked, this could end up being zero after multiplying it with the
sector size while some offsets still stayed excessive. Ultimately it
would cause segfaults when accessing FAT entries for which no memory
was allocated.
Make it more robust by changing the types used to store FAT size to
off_t and abort if there is no room for data clusters. Additionally
check that FAT size is not specified as zero.
Fixes #25 and fixes #26.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <aeb@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void dump_boot(DOS_FS * fs, struct boot_sector *b, unsigned lss)
{
unsigned short sectors;
printf("Boot sector contents:\n");
if (!atari_format) {
char id[9];
strncpy(id, (const char *)b->system_id, 8);
id[8] = 0;
printf("System ID \"%s\"\n", id);
} else {
/* On Atari, a 24 bit serial number is stored at offset 8 of the boot
* sector */
printf("Serial number 0x%x\n",
b->system_id[5] | (b->system_id[6] << 8) | (b->
system_id[7] << 16));
}
printf("Media byte 0x%02x (%s)\n", b->media, get_media_descr(b->media));
printf("%10d bytes per logical sector\n", GET_UNALIGNED_W(b->sector_size));
printf("%10d bytes per cluster\n", fs->cluster_size);
printf("%10d reserved sector%s\n", le16toh(b->reserved),
le16toh(b->reserved) == 1 ? "" : "s");
printf("First FAT starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->fat_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->fat_start / lss);
printf("%10d FATs, %d bit entries\n", b->fats, fs->fat_bits);
printf("%10lld bytes per FAT (= %llu sectors)\n", (long long)fs->fat_size,
(long long)fs->fat_size / lss);
if (!fs->root_cluster) {
printf("Root directory starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->root_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->root_start / lss);
printf("%10d root directory entries\n", fs->root_entries);
} else {
printf("Root directory start at cluster %lu (arbitrary size)\n",
(unsigned long)fs->root_cluster);
}
printf("Data area starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->data_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->data_start / lss);
printf("%10lu data clusters (%llu bytes)\n",
(unsigned long)fs->data_clusters,
(unsigned long long)fs->data_clusters * fs->cluster_size);
printf("%u sectors/track, %u heads\n", le16toh(b->secs_track),
le16toh(b->heads));
printf("%10u hidden sectors\n", atari_format ?
/* On Atari, the hidden field is only 16 bit wide and unused */
(((unsigned char *)&b->hidden)[0] |
((unsigned char *)&b->hidden)[1] << 8) : le32toh(b->hidden));
sectors = GET_UNALIGNED_W(b->sectors);
printf("%10u sectors total\n", sectors ? sectors : le32toh(b->total_sect));
}
| 167,231 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: tBTA_AV_EVT bta_av_proc_meta_cmd(tAVRC_RESPONSE* p_rc_rsp,
tBTA_AV_RC_MSG* p_msg, uint8_t* p_ctype) {
tBTA_AV_EVT evt = BTA_AV_META_MSG_EVT;
uint8_t u8, pdu, *p;
uint16_t u16;
tAVRC_MSG_VENDOR* p_vendor = &p_msg->msg.vendor;
pdu = *(p_vendor->p_vendor_data);
p_rc_rsp->pdu = pdu;
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_REJ;
/* Check to ansure a valid minimum meta data length */
if ((AVRC_MIN_META_CMD_LEN + p_vendor->vendor_len) > AVRC_META_CMD_BUF_SIZE) {
/* reject it */
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Invalid meta-command length: %d", __func__,
p_vendor->vendor_len);
return 0;
}
/* Metadata messages only use PANEL sub-unit type */
if (p_vendor->hdr.subunit_type != AVRC_SUB_PANEL) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: SUBUNIT must be PANEL", __func__);
/* reject it */
evt = 0;
p_vendor->hdr.ctype = AVRC_RSP_NOT_IMPL;
p_vendor->vendor_len = 0;
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
} else if (!AVRC_IsValidAvcType(pdu, p_vendor->hdr.ctype)) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Invalid pdu/ctype: 0x%x, %d", __func__, pdu,
p_vendor->hdr.ctype);
/* reject invalid message without reporting to app */
evt = 0;
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_CMD;
} else {
switch (pdu) {
case AVRC_PDU_GET_CAPABILITIES:
/* process GetCapabilities command without reporting the event to app */
evt = 0;
u8 = *(p_vendor->p_vendor_data + 4);
p = p_vendor->p_vendor_data + 2;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.capability_id = u8;
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(u16, p);
if ((u16 != 1) || (p_vendor->vendor_len != 5)) {
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_INTERNAL_ERR;
} else {
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_NO_ERROR;
if (u8 == AVRC_CAP_COMPANY_ID) {
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_IMPL_STBL;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.count = p_bta_av_cfg->num_co_ids;
memcpy(p_rc_rsp->get_caps.param.company_id,
p_bta_av_cfg->p_meta_co_ids,
(p_bta_av_cfg->num_co_ids << 2));
} else if (u8 == AVRC_CAP_EVENTS_SUPPORTED) {
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_IMPL_STBL;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.count = p_bta_av_cfg->num_evt_ids;
memcpy(p_rc_rsp->get_caps.param.event_id,
p_bta_av_cfg->p_meta_evt_ids, p_bta_av_cfg->num_evt_ids);
} else {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Invalid capability ID: 0x%x", __func__, u8);
/* reject - unknown capability ID */
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
}
}
break;
case AVRC_PDU_REGISTER_NOTIFICATION:
/* make sure the event_id is implemented */
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = bta_av_chk_notif_evt_id(p_vendor);
if (p_rc_rsp->rsp.status != BTA_AV_STS_NO_RSP) evt = 0;
break;
}
}
return evt;
}
Commit Message: Check packet length in bta_av_proc_meta_cmd
Bug: 111893951
Test: manual - connect A2DP
Change-Id: Ibbf347863dfd29ea3385312e9dde1082bc90d2f3
(cherry picked from commit ed51887f921263219bcd2fbf6650ead5ec8d334e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | tBTA_AV_EVT bta_av_proc_meta_cmd(tAVRC_RESPONSE* p_rc_rsp,
tBTA_AV_RC_MSG* p_msg, uint8_t* p_ctype) {
tBTA_AV_EVT evt = BTA_AV_META_MSG_EVT;
uint8_t u8, pdu, *p;
uint16_t u16;
tAVRC_MSG_VENDOR* p_vendor = &p_msg->msg.vendor;
pdu = *(p_vendor->p_vendor_data);
p_rc_rsp->pdu = pdu;
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_REJ;
/* Check to ansure a valid minimum meta data length */
if ((AVRC_MIN_META_CMD_LEN + p_vendor->vendor_len) > AVRC_META_CMD_BUF_SIZE) {
/* reject it */
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Invalid meta-command length: %d", __func__,
p_vendor->vendor_len);
return 0;
}
/* Metadata messages only use PANEL sub-unit type */
if (p_vendor->hdr.subunit_type != AVRC_SUB_PANEL) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: SUBUNIT must be PANEL", __func__);
/* reject it */
evt = 0;
p_vendor->hdr.ctype = AVRC_RSP_NOT_IMPL;
p_vendor->vendor_len = 0;
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
} else if (!AVRC_IsValidAvcType(pdu, p_vendor->hdr.ctype)) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Invalid pdu/ctype: 0x%x, %d", __func__, pdu,
p_vendor->hdr.ctype);
/* reject invalid message without reporting to app */
evt = 0;
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_CMD;
} else {
switch (pdu) {
case AVRC_PDU_GET_CAPABILITIES:
/* process GetCapabilities command without reporting the event to app */
evt = 0;
if (p_vendor->vendor_len != 5) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111893951");
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_INTERNAL_ERR;
break;
}
u8 = *(p_vendor->p_vendor_data + 4);
p = p_vendor->p_vendor_data + 2;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.capability_id = u8;
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(u16, p);
if (u16 != 1) {
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_INTERNAL_ERR;
} else {
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_NO_ERROR;
if (u8 == AVRC_CAP_COMPANY_ID) {
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_IMPL_STBL;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.count = p_bta_av_cfg->num_co_ids;
memcpy(p_rc_rsp->get_caps.param.company_id,
p_bta_av_cfg->p_meta_co_ids,
(p_bta_av_cfg->num_co_ids << 2));
} else if (u8 == AVRC_CAP_EVENTS_SUPPORTED) {
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_IMPL_STBL;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.count = p_bta_av_cfg->num_evt_ids;
memcpy(p_rc_rsp->get_caps.param.event_id,
p_bta_av_cfg->p_meta_evt_ids, p_bta_av_cfg->num_evt_ids);
} else {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Invalid capability ID: 0x%x", __func__, u8);
/* reject - unknown capability ID */
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
}
}
break;
case AVRC_PDU_REGISTER_NOTIFICATION:
/* make sure the event_id is implemented */
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = bta_av_chk_notif_evt_id(p_vendor);
if (p_rc_rsp->rsp.status != BTA_AV_STS_NO_RSP) evt = 0;
break;
}
}
return evt;
}
| 174,078 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int vp8_lossy_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, AVFrame *p,
int *got_frame, uint8_t *data_start,
unsigned int data_size)
{
WebPContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
AVPacket pkt;
int ret;
if (!s->initialized) {
ff_vp8_decode_init(avctx);
s->initialized = 1;
if (s->has_alpha)
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P;
}
s->lossless = 0;
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "unsupported chunk size\n");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
av_init_packet(&pkt);
pkt.data = data_start;
pkt.size = data_size;
ret = ff_vp8_decode_frame(avctx, p, got_frame, &pkt);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
update_canvas_size(avctx, avctx->width, avctx->height);
if (s->has_alpha) {
ret = vp8_lossy_decode_alpha(avctx, p, s->alpha_data,
s->alpha_data_size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int vp8_lossy_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, AVFrame *p,
int *got_frame, uint8_t *data_start,
unsigned int data_size)
{
WebPContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
AVPacket pkt;
int ret;
if (!s->initialized) {
ff_vp8_decode_init(avctx);
s->initialized = 1;
}
avctx->pix_fmt = s->has_alpha ? AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P : AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P;
s->lossless = 0;
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "unsupported chunk size\n");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
av_init_packet(&pkt);
pkt.data = data_start;
pkt.size = data_size;
ret = ff_vp8_decode_frame(avctx, p, got_frame, &pkt);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
update_canvas_size(avctx, avctx->width, avctx->height);
if (s->has_alpha) {
ret = vp8_lossy_decode_alpha(avctx, p, s->alpha_data,
s->alpha_data_size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return ret;
}
| 168,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static double abserr(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* Absolute error permitted in linear values - affected by the bit depth of
* the calculations.
*/
if (pm->assume_16_bit_calculations ||
(pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
return pm->maxabs16;
else
return pm->maxabs8;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | static double abserr(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
static double abserr(const png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* Absolute error permitted in linear values - affected by the bit depth of
* the calculations.
*/
if (pm->assume_16_bit_calculations ||
(pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
return pm->maxabs16;
else
return pm->maxabs8;
}
| 173,603 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(linkinfo)
{
char *link;
size_t link_len;
zend_stat_t sb;
int ret;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p", &link, &link_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ret = VCWD_STAT(link, &sb);
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
RETURN_LONG(Z_L(-1));
}
RETURN_LONG((zend_long) sb.st_dev);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #76459 windows linkinfo lacks openbasedir check
CWE ID: CWE-200 | PHP_FUNCTION(linkinfo)
{
char *link;
char *dirname;
size_t link_len;
zend_stat_t sb;
int ret;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p", &link, &link_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
dirname = estrndup(link, link_len);
php_dirname(dirname, link_len);
if (php_check_open_basedir(dirname)) {
efree(dirname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ret = VCWD_STAT(link, &sb);
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
efree(dirname);
RETURN_LONG(Z_L(-1));
}
efree(dirname);
RETURN_LONG((zend_long) sb.st_dev);
}
| 169,107 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ip_optprint(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register u_int option_len;
const char *sep = "";
for (; length > 0; cp += option_len, length -= option_len) {
u_int option_code;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", sep));
sep = ",";
ND_TCHECK(*cp);
option_code = *cp;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",
tok2str(ip_option_values,"unknown %u",option_code)));
if (option_code == IPOPT_NOP ||
option_code == IPOPT_EOL)
option_len = 1;
else {
ND_TCHECK(cp[1]);
option_len = cp[1];
if (option_len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", option_len));
return;
}
}
if (option_len > length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", option_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*cp, option_len);
switch (option_code) {
case IPOPT_EOL:
return;
case IPOPT_TS:
ip_printts(ndo, cp, option_len);
break;
case IPOPT_RR: /* fall through */
case IPOPT_SSRR:
case IPOPT_LSRR:
if (ip_printroute(ndo, cp, option_len) == -1)
goto trunc;
break;
case IPOPT_RA:
if (option_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", option_len));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK(cp[3]);
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&cp[2]) != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " value %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&cp[2])));
break;
case IPOPT_NOP: /* nothing to print - fall through */
case IPOPT_SECURITY:
default:
break;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13037/IP: Add bounds checks when printing time stamp options.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ip_optprint(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register u_int option_len;
const char *sep = "";
for (; length > 0; cp += option_len, length -= option_len) {
u_int option_code;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", sep));
sep = ",";
ND_TCHECK(*cp);
option_code = *cp;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",
tok2str(ip_option_values,"unknown %u",option_code)));
if (option_code == IPOPT_NOP ||
option_code == IPOPT_EOL)
option_len = 1;
else {
ND_TCHECK(cp[1]);
option_len = cp[1];
if (option_len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", option_len));
return;
}
}
if (option_len > length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", option_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*cp, option_len);
switch (option_code) {
case IPOPT_EOL:
return;
case IPOPT_TS:
if (ip_printts(ndo, cp, option_len) == -1)
goto trunc;
break;
case IPOPT_RR: /* fall through */
case IPOPT_SSRR:
case IPOPT_LSRR:
if (ip_printroute(ndo, cp, option_len) == -1)
goto trunc;
break;
case IPOPT_RA:
if (option_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", option_len));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK(cp[3]);
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&cp[2]) != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " value %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&cp[2])));
break;
case IPOPT_NOP: /* nothing to print - fall through */
case IPOPT_SECURITY:
default:
break;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
| 167,845 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MediaStreamDispatcherHost::DoOpenDevice(
int32_t page_request_id,
const std::string& device_id,
blink::MediaStreamType type,
OpenDeviceCallback callback,
MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin salt_and_origin) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (!MediaStreamManager::IsOriginAllowed(render_process_id_,
salt_and_origin.origin)) {
std::move(callback).Run(false /* success */, std::string(),
blink::MediaStreamDevice());
return;
}
media_stream_manager_->OpenDevice(
render_process_id_, render_frame_id_, page_request_id, requester_id_,
device_id, type, std::move(salt_and_origin), std::move(callback),
base::BindRepeating(&MediaStreamDispatcherHost::OnDeviceStopped,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: [MediaStream] Pass request ID parameters in the right order for OpenDevice()
Prior to this CL, requester_id and page_request_id parameters were
passed in incorrect order from MediaStreamDispatcherHost to
MediaStreamManager for the OpenDevice() operation, which could lead to
errors.
Bug: 948564
Change-Id: Iadcf3fe26adaac50564102138ce212269cf32d62
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1569113
Reviewed-by: Marina Ciocea <marinaciocea@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651255}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void MediaStreamDispatcherHost::DoOpenDevice(
int32_t page_request_id,
const std::string& device_id,
blink::MediaStreamType type,
OpenDeviceCallback callback,
MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin salt_and_origin) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (!MediaStreamManager::IsOriginAllowed(render_process_id_,
salt_and_origin.origin)) {
std::move(callback).Run(false /* success */, std::string(),
blink::MediaStreamDevice());
return;
}
media_stream_manager_->OpenDevice(
render_process_id_, render_frame_id_, requester_id_, page_request_id,
device_id, type, std::move(salt_and_origin), std::move(callback),
base::BindRepeating(&MediaStreamDispatcherHost::OnDeviceStopped,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
| 173,015 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ImageLoader::ImageLoader(Element* element)
: m_element(element),
m_derefElementTimer(this, &ImageLoader::timerFired),
m_hasPendingLoadEvent(false),
m_hasPendingErrorEvent(false),
m_imageComplete(true),
m_loadingImageDocument(false),
m_elementIsProtected(false),
m_suppressErrorEvents(false) {
RESOURCE_LOADING_DVLOG(1) << "new ImageLoader " << this;
}
Commit Message: Move ImageLoader timer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
Move ImageLoader timer m_derefElementTimer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
This associates it with the frame's Networking timer task queue.
BUG=624694
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2642103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#444927}
CWE ID: | ImageLoader::ImageLoader(Element* element)
: m_element(element),
m_derefElementTimer(TaskRunnerHelper::get(TaskType::Networking,
element->document().frame()),
this,
&ImageLoader::timerFired),
m_hasPendingLoadEvent(false),
m_hasPendingErrorEvent(false),
m_imageComplete(true),
m_loadingImageDocument(false),
m_elementIsProtected(false),
m_suppressErrorEvents(false) {
RESOURCE_LOADING_DVLOG(1) << "new ImageLoader " << this;
}
| 171,974 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ext4_xattr_cache_find(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_xattr_header *header,
struct mb_cache_entry **pce)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(header->h_hash);
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
struct mb_cache *ext4_mb_cache = EXT4_GET_MB_CACHE(inode);
if (!header->h_hash)
return NULL; /* never share */
ea_idebug(inode, "looking for cached blocks [%x]", (int)hash);
again:
ce = mb_cache_entry_find_first(ext4_mb_cache, inode->i_sb->s_bdev,
hash);
while (ce) {
struct buffer_head *bh;
if (IS_ERR(ce)) {
if (PTR_ERR(ce) == -EAGAIN)
goto again;
break;
}
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, ce->e_block);
if (!bh) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "block %lu read error",
(unsigned long) ce->e_block);
} else if (le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount) >=
EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX) {
ea_idebug(inode, "block %lu refcount %d>=%d",
(unsigned long) ce->e_block,
le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount),
EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX);
} else if (ext4_xattr_cmp(header, BHDR(bh)) == 0) {
*pce = ce;
return bh;
}
brelse(bh);
ce = mb_cache_entry_find_next(ce, inode->i_sb->s_bdev, hash);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | ext4_xattr_cache_find(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_xattr_header *header,
struct mb2_cache_entry **pce)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(header->h_hash);
struct mb2_cache_entry *ce;
struct mb2_cache *ext4_mb_cache = EXT4_GET_MB_CACHE(inode);
if (!header->h_hash)
return NULL; /* never share */
ea_idebug(inode, "looking for cached blocks [%x]", (int)hash);
ce = mb2_cache_entry_find_first(ext4_mb_cache, hash);
while (ce) {
struct buffer_head *bh;
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, ce->e_block);
if (!bh) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "block %lu read error",
(unsigned long) ce->e_block);
} else if (le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount) >=
EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX) {
ea_idebug(inode, "block %lu refcount %d>=%d",
(unsigned long) ce->e_block,
le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount),
EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX);
} else if (ext4_xattr_cmp(header, BHDR(bh)) == 0) {
*pce = ce;
return bh;
}
brelse(bh);
ce = mb2_cache_entry_find_next(ext4_mb_cache, ce);
}
return NULL;
}
| 169,991 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const Block* Track::EOSBlock::GetBlock() const
{
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const Block* Track::EOSBlock::GetBlock() const
| 174,284 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xfs_acl_from_disk(struct xfs_acl *aclp)
{
struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e;
struct posix_acl *acl;
struct xfs_acl_entry *ace;
int count, i;
count = be32_to_cpu(aclp->acl_cnt);
acl = posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
acl_e = &acl->a_entries[i];
ace = &aclp->acl_entry[i];
/*
* The tag is 32 bits on disk and 16 bits in core.
*
* Because every access to it goes through the core
* format first this is not a problem.
*/
acl_e->e_tag = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_tag);
acl_e->e_perm = be16_to_cpu(ace->ae_perm);
switch (acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
case ACL_GROUP:
acl_e->e_id = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_id);
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
acl_e->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
return acl;
fail:
posix_acl_release(acl);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
Commit Message: xfs: validate acl count
This prevents in-memory corruption and possible panics if the on-disk
ACL is badly corrupted.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | xfs_acl_from_disk(struct xfs_acl *aclp)
{
struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e;
struct posix_acl *acl;
struct xfs_acl_entry *ace;
int count, i;
count = be32_to_cpu(aclp->acl_cnt);
if (count > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES)
return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
acl = posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
acl_e = &acl->a_entries[i];
ace = &aclp->acl_entry[i];
/*
* The tag is 32 bits on disk and 16 bits in core.
*
* Because every access to it goes through the core
* format first this is not a problem.
*/
acl_e->e_tag = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_tag);
acl_e->e_perm = be16_to_cpu(ace->ae_perm);
switch (acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
case ACL_GROUP:
acl_e->e_id = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_id);
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
acl_e->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
return acl;
fail:
posix_acl_release(acl);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
| 165,656 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int NsGetParameter(preproc_effect_t *effect,
void *pParam,
uint32_t *pValueSize,
void *pValue)
{
int status = 0;
return status;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int NsGetParameter(preproc_effect_t *effect,
int NsGetParameter(preproc_effect_t *effect __unused,
void *pParam __unused,
uint32_t *pValueSize __unused,
void *pValue __unused)
{
int status = 0;
return status;
}
| 173,351 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool OutOfProcessInstance::Init(uint32_t argc,
const char* argn[],
const char* argv[]) {
pp::Var document_url_var = pp::URLUtil_Dev::Get()->GetDocumentURL(this);
std::string document_url = document_url_var.is_string() ?
document_url_var.AsString() : std::string();
std::string extension_url = std::string(kChromeExtension);
bool in_extension =
!document_url.compare(0, extension_url.size(), extension_url);
if (in_extension) {
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < argc; ++i) {
if (strcmp(argn[i], "full-frame") == 0) {
full_ = true;
break;
}
}
}
if (full_)
SetPluginToHandleFindRequests();
pp::VarDictionary translated_strings;
translated_strings.Set(kType, kJSSetTranslatedStringsType);
translated_strings.Set(kJSGetPasswordString,
GetLocalizedString(PP_RESOURCESTRING_PDFGETPASSWORD));
translated_strings.Set(kJSLoadingString,
GetLocalizedString(PP_RESOURCESTRING_PDFLOADING));
translated_strings.Set(kJSLoadFailedString,
GetLocalizedString(PP_RESOURCESTRING_PDFLOAD_FAILED));
PostMessage(translated_strings);
text_input_.reset(new pp::TextInput_Dev(this));
const char* stream_url = nullptr;
const char* original_url = nullptr;
const char* headers = nullptr;
bool is_material = false;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < argc; ++i) {
if (strcmp(argn[i], "src") == 0)
original_url = argv[i];
else if (strcmp(argn[i], "stream-url") == 0)
stream_url = argv[i];
else if (strcmp(argn[i], "headers") == 0)
headers = argv[i];
else if (strcmp(argn[i], "is-material") == 0)
is_material = true;
else if (strcmp(argn[i], "top-toolbar-height") == 0)
base::StringToInt(argv[i], &top_toolbar_height_);
}
if (is_material)
background_color_ = kBackgroundColorMaterial;
else
background_color_ = kBackgroundColor;
if (!original_url)
return false;
if (!stream_url)
stream_url = original_url;
if (IsPrintPreviewUrl(original_url))
return true;
LoadUrl(stream_url);
url_ = original_url;
return engine_->New(original_url, headers);
}
Commit Message: Prevent leaking PDF data cross-origin
BUG=520422
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1311973002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#345267}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool OutOfProcessInstance::Init(uint32_t argc,
const char* argn[],
const char* argv[]) {
// the plugin to be loaded in the extension and print preview to avoid
// exposing sensitive APIs directly to external websites.
pp::Var document_url_var = pp::URLUtil_Dev::Get()->GetDocumentURL(this);
if (!document_url_var.is_string())
return false;
std::string document_url = document_url_var.AsString();
std::string extension_url = std::string(kChromeExtension);
std::string print_preview_url = std::string(kChromePrint);
if (!base::StringPiece(document_url).starts_with(kChromeExtension) &&
!base::StringPiece(document_url).starts_with(kChromePrint)) {
return false;
}
// Check if the plugin is full frame. This is passed in from JS.
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < argc; ++i) {
if (strcmp(argn[i], "full-frame") == 0) {
full_ = true;
break;
}
}
if (full_)
SetPluginToHandleFindRequests();
pp::VarDictionary translated_strings;
translated_strings.Set(kType, kJSSetTranslatedStringsType);
translated_strings.Set(kJSGetPasswordString,
GetLocalizedString(PP_RESOURCESTRING_PDFGETPASSWORD));
translated_strings.Set(kJSLoadingString,
GetLocalizedString(PP_RESOURCESTRING_PDFLOADING));
translated_strings.Set(kJSLoadFailedString,
GetLocalizedString(PP_RESOURCESTRING_PDFLOAD_FAILED));
PostMessage(translated_strings);
text_input_.reset(new pp::TextInput_Dev(this));
const char* stream_url = nullptr;
const char* original_url = nullptr;
const char* headers = nullptr;
bool is_material = false;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < argc; ++i) {
if (strcmp(argn[i], "src") == 0)
original_url = argv[i];
else if (strcmp(argn[i], "stream-url") == 0)
stream_url = argv[i];
else if (strcmp(argn[i], "headers") == 0)
headers = argv[i];
else if (strcmp(argn[i], "is-material") == 0)
is_material = true;
else if (strcmp(argn[i], "top-toolbar-height") == 0)
base::StringToInt(argv[i], &top_toolbar_height_);
}
if (is_material)
background_color_ = kBackgroundColorMaterial;
else
background_color_ = kBackgroundColor;
if (!original_url)
return false;
if (!stream_url)
stream_url = original_url;
if (IsPrintPreviewUrl(original_url))
return true;
LoadUrl(stream_url);
url_ = original_url;
return engine_->New(original_url, headers);
}
| 172,042 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int32_t PepperFlashRendererHost::OnNavigate(
ppapi::host::HostMessageContext* host_context,
const ppapi::URLRequestInfoData& data,
const std::string& target,
bool from_user_action) {
content::PepperPluginInstance* plugin_instance =
host_->GetPluginInstance(pp_instance());
if (!plugin_instance)
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
ppapi::proxy::HostDispatcher* host_dispatcher =
ppapi::proxy::HostDispatcher::GetForInstance(pp_instance());
host_dispatcher->set_allow_plugin_reentrancy();
base::WeakPtr<PepperFlashRendererHost> weak_ptr = weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
navigate_replies_.push_back(host_context->MakeReplyMessageContext());
plugin_instance->Navigate(data, target.c_str(), from_user_action);
if (weak_ptr.get()) {
SendReply(navigate_replies_.back(), IPC::Message());
navigate_replies_.pop_back();
}
return PP_OK_COMPLETIONPENDING;
}
Commit Message: PPB_Flash.Navigate(): Disallow certain HTTP request headers.
With this CL, PPB_Flash.Navigate() fails the operation with
PP_ERROR_NOACCESS if the request headers contain non-simple headers.
BUG=332023
TEST=None
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/136393004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@249114 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | int32_t PepperFlashRendererHost::OnNavigate(
ppapi::host::HostMessageContext* host_context,
const ppapi::URLRequestInfoData& data,
const std::string& target,
bool from_user_action) {
content::PepperPluginInstance* plugin_instance =
host_->GetPluginInstance(pp_instance());
if (!plugin_instance)
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
std::map<std::string, FlashNavigateUsage>& rejected_headers =
g_rejected_headers.Get();
if (rejected_headers.empty()) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kRejectedHttpRequestHeaders); ++i)
rejected_headers[kRejectedHttpRequestHeaders[i]] =
static_cast<FlashNavigateUsage>(i);
}
net::HttpUtil::HeadersIterator header_iter(data.headers.begin(),
data.headers.end(),
"\n\r");
bool rejected = false;
while (header_iter.GetNext()) {
std::string lower_case_header_name = StringToLowerASCII(header_iter.name());
if (!IsSimpleHeader(lower_case_header_name, header_iter.values())) {
rejected = true;
std::map<std::string, FlashNavigateUsage>::const_iterator iter =
rejected_headers.find(lower_case_header_name);
FlashNavigateUsage usage = iter != rejected_headers.end() ?
iter->second : REJECT_OTHER_HEADERS;
RecordFlashNavigateUsage(usage);
}
}
RecordFlashNavigateUsage(TOTAL_NAVIGATE_REQUESTS);
if (rejected) {
RecordFlashNavigateUsage(TOTAL_REJECTED_NAVIGATE_REQUESTS);
return PP_ERROR_NOACCESS;
}
ppapi::proxy::HostDispatcher* host_dispatcher =
ppapi::proxy::HostDispatcher::GetForInstance(pp_instance());
host_dispatcher->set_allow_plugin_reentrancy();
base::WeakPtr<PepperFlashRendererHost> weak_ptr = weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
navigate_replies_.push_back(host_context->MakeReplyMessageContext());
plugin_instance->Navigate(data, target.c_str(), from_user_action);
if (weak_ptr.get()) {
SendReply(navigate_replies_.back(), IPC::Message());
navigate_replies_.pop_back();
}
return PP_OK_COMPLETIONPENDING;
}
| 171,709 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void reflectStringAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> v8Value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
Element* impl = V8Element::toImpl(holder);
V8StringResource<> cppValue = v8Value;
if (!cppValue.prepare())
return;
impl->setAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectstringattributeAttr, cppValue);
}
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static void reflectStringAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> v8Value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestInterfaceNode* impl = V8TestInterfaceNode::toImpl(holder);
V8StringResource<> cppValue = v8Value;
if (!cppValue.prepare())
return;
impl->setAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectstringattributeAttr, cppValue);
}
| 171,598 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::IsEmulatedQueryTarget(GLenum target) const {
switch (target) {
case GL_COMMANDS_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_READBACK_SHADOW_COPIES_UPDATED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_COMMANDS_ISSUED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_LATENCY_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
case GL_ASYNC_PIXEL_PACK_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_GET_ERROR_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | bool GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::IsEmulatedQueryTarget(GLenum target) const {
switch (target) {
case GL_COMMANDS_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_READBACK_SHADOW_COPIES_UPDATED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_COMMANDS_ISSUED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_LATENCY_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
case GL_ASYNC_PIXEL_PACK_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_GET_ERROR_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
case GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
| 172,530 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: horAcc8(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
unsigned char* cp = (unsigned char*) cp0;
assert((cc%stride)==0);
if (cc > stride) {
/*
* Pipeline the most common cases.
*/
if (stride == 3) {
unsigned int cr = cp[0];
unsigned int cg = cp[1];
unsigned int cb = cp[2];
cc -= 3;
cp += 3;
while (cc>0) {
cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
cc -= 3;
cp += 3;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
unsigned int cr = cp[0];
unsigned int cg = cp[1];
unsigned int cb = cp[2];
unsigned int ca = cp[3];
cc -= 4;
cp += 4;
while (cc>0) {
cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
cp[3] = (unsigned char) ((ca += cp[3]) & 0xff);
cc -= 4;
cp += 4;
}
} else {
cc -= stride;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] =
(unsigned char) ((cp[stride] + *cp) & 0xff); cp++)
cc -= stride;
} while (cc>0);
}
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | horAcc8(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
unsigned char* cp = (unsigned char*) cp0;
if((cc%stride)!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "horAcc8",
"%s", "(cc%stride)!=0");
return 0;
}
if (cc > stride) {
/*
* Pipeline the most common cases.
*/
if (stride == 3) {
unsigned int cr = cp[0];
unsigned int cg = cp[1];
unsigned int cb = cp[2];
cc -= 3;
cp += 3;
while (cc>0) {
cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
cc -= 3;
cp += 3;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
unsigned int cr = cp[0];
unsigned int cg = cp[1];
unsigned int cb = cp[2];
unsigned int ca = cp[3];
cc -= 4;
cp += 4;
while (cc>0) {
cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
cp[3] = (unsigned char) ((ca += cp[3]) & 0xff);
cc -= 4;
cp += 4;
}
} else {
cc -= stride;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] =
(unsigned char) ((cp[stride] + *cp) & 0xff); cp++)
cc -= stride;
} while (cc>0);
}
}
return 1;
}
| 166,884 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mobility_opt_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const unsigned len)
{
unsigned i, optlen;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += optlen) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i]);
if (bp[i] == IP6MOPT_PAD1)
optlen = 1;
else {
if (i + 1 < len) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + 1]);
optlen = bp[i + 1] + 2;
}
else
goto trunc;
}
if (i + optlen > len)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + optlen]);
switch (bp[i]) {
case IP6MOPT_PAD1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(pad1)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_PADN:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_REFRESH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_REFRESH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: %u)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]) << 2));
break;
case IP6MOPT_ALTCOA:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_ALTCOA_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(altcoa: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(alt-CoA: %s)", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[i+2])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_NONCEID:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_NONCEID_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: ho=0x%04x co=0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+4])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_AUTH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_AUTH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth)"));
break;
default:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(sopt_type %u: trunc)", bp[i]));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(type-0x%02x: len=%u)", bp[i], bp[i + 1]));
break;
}
}
return 0;
trunc:
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13024/IPv6 mobility: Add a bounds check before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't cause 'tcpdump: pcap_loop: truncated dump file'
CWE ID: CWE-125 | mobility_opt_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const unsigned len)
{
unsigned i, optlen;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += optlen) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i]);
if (bp[i] == IP6MOPT_PAD1)
optlen = 1;
else {
if (i + 1 < len) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + 1]);
optlen = bp[i + 1] + 2;
}
else
goto trunc;
}
if (i + optlen > len)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + optlen]);
switch (bp[i]) {
case IP6MOPT_PAD1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(pad1)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_PADN:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_REFRESH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_REFRESH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: %u)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]) << 2));
break;
case IP6MOPT_ALTCOA:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_ALTCOA_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(altcoa: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(alt-CoA: %s)", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[i+2])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_NONCEID:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_NONCEID_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: ho=0x%04x co=0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+4])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_AUTH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_AUTH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth)"));
break;
default:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(sopt_type %u: trunc)", bp[i]));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(type-0x%02x: len=%u)", bp[i], bp[i + 1]));
break;
}
}
return 0;
trunc:
return 1;
}
| 167,867 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateNativeHandleInMeta(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<NativeHandle>& nativeHandle, OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, portIndex);
if (header == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = (BufferMeta *)(header->pAppPrivate);
sp<ABuffer> data = bufferMeta->getBuffer(
header, false /* backup */, false /* limit */);
bufferMeta->setNativeHandle(nativeHandle);
if (mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeNativeHandleSource
&& data->capacity() >= sizeof(VideoNativeHandleMetadata)) {
VideoNativeHandleMetadata &metadata = *(VideoNativeHandleMetadata *)(data->data());
metadata.eType = mMetadataType[portIndex];
metadata.pHandle =
nativeHandle == NULL ? NULL : const_cast<native_handle*>(nativeHandle->handle());
} else {
CLOG_ERROR(updateNativeHandleInMeta, BAD_VALUE, "%s:%u, %#x bad type (%d) or size (%zu)",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer, mMetadataType[portIndex], data->capacity());
return BAD_VALUE;
}
CLOG_BUFFER(updateNativeHandleInMeta, "%s:%u, %#x := %p",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer,
nativeHandle == NULL ? NULL : nativeHandle->handle());
return OK;
}
Commit Message: IOMX: do not convert ANWB to gralloc source in emptyBuffer
Bug: 29422020
Bug: 31412859
Change-Id: If48e3e0b6f1af99a459fdc3f6f03744bbf0dc375
(cherry picked from commit 534bb6132a6a664f90b42b3ef81298b42efb3dc2)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateNativeHandleInMeta(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<NativeHandle>& nativeHandle, OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, portIndex);
if (header == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = (BufferMeta *)(header->pAppPrivate);
// update backup buffer
sp<ABuffer> data = bufferMeta->getBuffer(
header, false /* backup */, false /* limit */);
bufferMeta->setNativeHandle(nativeHandle);
if (mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeNativeHandleSource
&& data->capacity() >= sizeof(VideoNativeHandleMetadata)) {
VideoNativeHandleMetadata &metadata = *(VideoNativeHandleMetadata *)(data->data());
metadata.eType = mMetadataType[portIndex];
metadata.pHandle =
nativeHandle == NULL ? NULL : const_cast<native_handle*>(nativeHandle->handle());
} else {
CLOG_ERROR(updateNativeHandleInMeta, BAD_VALUE, "%s:%u, %#x bad type (%d) or size (%zu)",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer, mMetadataType[portIndex], data->capacity());
return BAD_VALUE;
}
CLOG_BUFFER(updateNativeHandleInMeta, "%s:%u, %#x := %p",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer,
nativeHandle == NULL ? NULL : nativeHandle->handle());
return OK;
}
| 174,146 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool radeon_atom_get_tv_timings(struct radeon_device *rdev, int index,
struct drm_display_mode *mode)
{
struct radeon_mode_info *mode_info = &rdev->mode_info;
ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO *tv_info;
ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO_V1_2 *tv_info_v1_2;
ATOM_DTD_FORMAT *dtd_timings;
int data_index = GetIndexIntoMasterTable(DATA, AnalogTV_Info);
u8 frev, crev;
u16 data_offset, misc;
if (!atom_parse_data_header(mode_info->atom_context, data_index, NULL,
&frev, &crev, &data_offset))
return false;
switch (crev) {
case 1:
tv_info = (ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO *)(mode_info->atom_context->bios + data_offset);
if (index > MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING)
return false;
mode->crtc_htotal = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_Total);
mode->crtc_hdisplay = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_Disp);
mode->crtc_hsync_start = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncStart);
mode->crtc_hsync_end = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncStart) +
le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncWidth);
mode->crtc_vtotal = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_Total);
mode->crtc_vdisplay = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_Disp);
mode->crtc_vsync_start = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncStart);
mode->crtc_vsync_end = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncStart) +
le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncWidth);
mode->flags = 0;
misc = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].susModeMiscInfo.usAccess);
if (misc & ATOM_VSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NVSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_HSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_COMPOSITESYNC)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_CSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_INTERLACE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE;
if (misc & ATOM_DOUBLE_CLOCK_MODE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_DBLSCAN;
mode->clock = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usPixelClock) * 10;
if (index == 1) {
/* PAL timings appear to have wrong values for totals */
mode->crtc_htotal -= 1;
mode->crtc_vtotal -= 1;
}
break;
case 2:
tv_info_v1_2 = (ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO_V1_2 *)(mode_info->atom_context->bios + data_offset);
if (index > MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2)
return false;
dtd_timings = &tv_info_v1_2->aModeTimings[index];
mode->crtc_htotal = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHBlanking_Time);
mode->crtc_hdisplay = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive);
mode->crtc_hsync_start = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHSyncOffset);
mode->crtc_hsync_end = mode->crtc_hsync_start +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHSyncWidth);
mode->crtc_vtotal = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVBlanking_Time);
mode->crtc_vdisplay = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive);
mode->crtc_vsync_start = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVSyncOffset);
mode->crtc_vsync_end = mode->crtc_vsync_start +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVSyncWidth);
mode->flags = 0;
misc = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->susModeMiscInfo.usAccess);
if (misc & ATOM_VSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NVSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_HSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_COMPOSITESYNC)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_CSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_INTERLACE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE;
if (misc & ATOM_DOUBLE_CLOCK_MODE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_DBLSCAN;
mode->clock = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usPixClk) * 10;
break;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_atombios.c: range check issues
This change makes the array larger, "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2" is 3
and the original size "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING" is 2.
Also there were checks that were off by one.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexdeucher@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool radeon_atom_get_tv_timings(struct radeon_device *rdev, int index,
struct drm_display_mode *mode)
{
struct radeon_mode_info *mode_info = &rdev->mode_info;
ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO *tv_info;
ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO_V1_2 *tv_info_v1_2;
ATOM_DTD_FORMAT *dtd_timings;
int data_index = GetIndexIntoMasterTable(DATA, AnalogTV_Info);
u8 frev, crev;
u16 data_offset, misc;
if (!atom_parse_data_header(mode_info->atom_context, data_index, NULL,
&frev, &crev, &data_offset))
return false;
switch (crev) {
case 1:
tv_info = (ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO *)(mode_info->atom_context->bios + data_offset);
if (index >= MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING)
return false;
mode->crtc_htotal = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_Total);
mode->crtc_hdisplay = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_Disp);
mode->crtc_hsync_start = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncStart);
mode->crtc_hsync_end = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncStart) +
le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncWidth);
mode->crtc_vtotal = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_Total);
mode->crtc_vdisplay = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_Disp);
mode->crtc_vsync_start = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncStart);
mode->crtc_vsync_end = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncStart) +
le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncWidth);
mode->flags = 0;
misc = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].susModeMiscInfo.usAccess);
if (misc & ATOM_VSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NVSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_HSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_COMPOSITESYNC)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_CSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_INTERLACE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE;
if (misc & ATOM_DOUBLE_CLOCK_MODE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_DBLSCAN;
mode->clock = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usPixelClock) * 10;
if (index == 1) {
/* PAL timings appear to have wrong values for totals */
mode->crtc_htotal -= 1;
mode->crtc_vtotal -= 1;
}
break;
case 2:
tv_info_v1_2 = (ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO_V1_2 *)(mode_info->atom_context->bios + data_offset);
if (index >= MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2)
return false;
dtd_timings = &tv_info_v1_2->aModeTimings[index];
mode->crtc_htotal = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHBlanking_Time);
mode->crtc_hdisplay = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive);
mode->crtc_hsync_start = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHSyncOffset);
mode->crtc_hsync_end = mode->crtc_hsync_start +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHSyncWidth);
mode->crtc_vtotal = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVBlanking_Time);
mode->crtc_vdisplay = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive);
mode->crtc_vsync_start = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVSyncOffset);
mode->crtc_vsync_end = mode->crtc_vsync_start +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVSyncWidth);
mode->flags = 0;
misc = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->susModeMiscInfo.usAccess);
if (misc & ATOM_VSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NVSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_HSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_COMPOSITESYNC)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_CSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_INTERLACE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE;
if (misc & ATOM_DOUBLE_CLOCK_MODE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_DBLSCAN;
mode->clock = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usPixClk) * 10;
break;
}
return true;
}
| 169,873 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct nfs4_opendata *nfs4_open_recoverdata_alloc(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *opendata;
opendata = nfs4_opendata_alloc(&ctx->path, state->owner, 0, NULL);
if (opendata == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
opendata->state = state;
atomic_inc(&state->count);
return opendata;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | static struct nfs4_opendata *nfs4_open_recoverdata_alloc(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *opendata;
opendata = nfs4_opendata_alloc(&ctx->path, state->owner, 0, 0, NULL);
if (opendata == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
opendata->state = state;
atomic_inc(&state->count);
return opendata;
}
| 165,697 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void red_channel_pipes_add_empty_msg(RedChannel *channel, int msg_type)
{
RingItem *link;
RING_FOREACH(link, &channel->clients) {
red_channel_client_pipe_add_empty_msg(
SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link),
msg_type);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void red_channel_pipes_add_empty_msg(RedChannel *channel, int msg_type)
{
RingItem *link, *next;
RING_FOREACH_SAFE(link, next, &channel->clients) {
red_channel_client_pipe_add_empty_msg(
SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link),
msg_type);
}
}
| 164,663 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob)
{
u_char buf[1024];
size_t len;
struct stat st;
int r;
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
for (;;) {
if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) {
if (errno == EPIPE)
break;
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0)
goto out;
if (sshbuf_len(blob) > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
st.st_size != (off_t)sshbuf_len(blob)) {
r = SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED;
goto out;
}
r = 0;
out:
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
if (r != 0)
sshbuf_reset(blob);
return r;
}
Commit Message: use sshbuf_allocate() to pre-allocate the buffer used for loading
keys. This avoids implicit realloc inside the buffer code, which
might theoretically leave fragments of the key on the heap. This
doesn't appear to happen in practice for normal sized keys, but
was observed for novelty oversize ones.
Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok markus@
CWE ID: CWE-320 | sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob)
{
u_char buf[1024];
size_t len;
struct stat st;
int r, dontmax = 0;
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
/*
* Pre-allocate the buffer used for the key contents and clamp its
* maximum size. This ensures that key contents are never leaked via
* implicit realloc() in the sshbuf code.
*/
if ((st.st_mode & S_IFREG) == 0 || st.st_size <= 0) {
st.st_size = 64*1024; /* 64k should be enough for anyone :) */
dontmax = 1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(blob, st.st_size)) != 0 ||
(dontmax && (r = sshbuf_set_max_size(blob, st.st_size)) != 0))
return r;
for (;;) {
if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) {
if (errno == EPIPE)
break;
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0)
goto out;
if (sshbuf_len(blob) > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
st.st_size != (off_t)sshbuf_len(blob)) {
r = SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED;
goto out;
}
r = 0;
out:
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
if (r != 0)
sshbuf_reset(blob);
return r;
}
| 168,660 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeOSSetImeConfig(InputMethodStatusConnection* connection,
const char* section,
const char* config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
DCHECK(section);
DCHECK(config_name);
g_return_val_if_fail(connection, FALSE);
return connection->SetImeConfig(section, config_name, value);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool ChromeOSSetImeConfig(InputMethodStatusConnection* connection,
| 170,526 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval *key, *data, **old_data;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(key);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&key, p, max, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_LONG && Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(data);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&data, p, max, var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
zval_dtor(data);
FREE_ZVAL(data);
return 0;
}
if (!objprops) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(key)) {
case IS_LONG:
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_index_update(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
case IS_STRING:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_symtable_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
}
} else {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(key);
zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data,
sizeof data, NULL);
}
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | static inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval *key, *data, **old_data;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(key);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&key, p, max, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_LONG && Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(data);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&data, p, max, var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
zval_dtor(data);
FREE_ZVAL(data);
return 0;
}
if (!objprops) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(key)) {
case IS_LONG:
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_index_update(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
case IS_STRING:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_symtable_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
}
} else {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(key);
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data,
sizeof data, NULL);
}
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
| 164,893 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ChromeURLRequestContext::ChromeURLRequestContext(
ContextType type,
chrome_browser_net::LoadTimeStats* load_time_stats)
: load_time_stats_(load_time_stats) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
if (load_time_stats_)
load_time_stats_->RegisterURLRequestContext(this, type);
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | ChromeURLRequestContext::ChromeURLRequestContext(
ContextType type,
chrome_browser_net::LoadTimeStats* load_time_stats)
: weak_factory_(this),
load_time_stats_(load_time_stats) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
if (load_time_stats_)
load_time_stats_->RegisterURLRequestContext(this, type);
}
| 171,250 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void processInputBuffer(client *c) {
server.current_client = c;
/* Keep processing while there is something in the input buffer */
while(sdslen(c->querybuf)) {
/* Return if clients are paused. */
if (!(c->flags & CLIENT_SLAVE) && clientsArePaused()) break;
/* Immediately abort if the client is in the middle of something. */
if (c->flags & CLIENT_BLOCKED) break;
/* CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_REPLY closes the connection once the reply is
* written to the client. Make sure to not let the reply grow after
* this flag has been set (i.e. don't process more commands). */
if (c->flags & CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_REPLY) break;
/* Determine request type when unknown. */
if (!c->reqtype) {
if (c->querybuf[0] == '*') {
c->reqtype = PROTO_REQ_MULTIBULK;
} else {
c->reqtype = PROTO_REQ_INLINE;
}
}
if (c->reqtype == PROTO_REQ_INLINE) {
if (processInlineBuffer(c) != C_OK) break;
} else if (c->reqtype == PROTO_REQ_MULTIBULK) {
if (processMultibulkBuffer(c) != C_OK) break;
} else {
serverPanic("Unknown request type");
}
/* Multibulk processing could see a <= 0 length. */
if (c->argc == 0) {
resetClient(c);
} else {
/* Only reset the client when the command was executed. */
if (processCommand(c) == C_OK)
resetClient(c);
/* freeMemoryIfNeeded may flush slave output buffers. This may result
* into a slave, that may be the active client, to be freed. */
if (server.current_client == NULL) break;
}
}
server.current_client = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void processInputBuffer(client *c) {
server.current_client = c;
/* Keep processing while there is something in the input buffer */
while(sdslen(c->querybuf)) {
/* Return if clients are paused. */
if (!(c->flags & CLIENT_SLAVE) && clientsArePaused()) break;
/* Immediately abort if the client is in the middle of something. */
if (c->flags & CLIENT_BLOCKED) break;
/* CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_REPLY closes the connection once the reply is
* written to the client. Make sure to not let the reply grow after
* this flag has been set (i.e. don't process more commands).
*
* The same applies for clients we want to terminate ASAP. */
if (c->flags & (CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_REPLY|CLIENT_CLOSE_ASAP)) break;
/* Determine request type when unknown. */
if (!c->reqtype) {
if (c->querybuf[0] == '*') {
c->reqtype = PROTO_REQ_MULTIBULK;
} else {
c->reqtype = PROTO_REQ_INLINE;
}
}
if (c->reqtype == PROTO_REQ_INLINE) {
if (processInlineBuffer(c) != C_OK) break;
} else if (c->reqtype == PROTO_REQ_MULTIBULK) {
if (processMultibulkBuffer(c) != C_OK) break;
} else {
serverPanic("Unknown request type");
}
/* Multibulk processing could see a <= 0 length. */
if (c->argc == 0) {
resetClient(c);
} else {
/* Only reset the client when the command was executed. */
if (processCommand(c) == C_OK)
resetClient(c);
/* freeMemoryIfNeeded may flush slave output buffers. This may result
* into a slave, that may be the active client, to be freed. */
if (server.current_client == NULL) break;
}
}
server.current_client = NULL;
}
| 168,453 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gs_pattern2_set_color(const gs_client_color * pcc, gs_gstate * pgs)
{
gs_pattern2_instance_t * pinst = (gs_pattern2_instance_t *)pcc->pattern;
gs_color_space * pcs = pinst->templat.Shading->params.ColorSpace;
int code;
uchar k, num_comps;
pinst->saved->overprint_mode = pgs->overprint_mode;
pinst->saved->overprint = pgs->overprint;
num_comps = pgs->device->color_info.num_components;
for (k = 0; k < num_comps; k++) {
pgs->color_component_map.color_map[k] =
pinst->saved->color_component_map.color_map[k];
}
code = pcs->type->set_overprint(pcs, pgs);
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | gs_pattern2_set_color(const gs_client_color * pcc, gs_gstate * pgs)
{
gs_pattern2_instance_t * pinst = (gs_pattern2_instance_t *)pcc->pattern;
gs_color_space * pcs = pinst->templat.Shading->params.ColorSpace;
int code;
uchar k, num_comps;
pinst->saved->overprint_mode = pgs->overprint_mode;
pinst->saved->overprint = pgs->overprint;
num_comps = pgs->device->color_info.num_components;
for (k = 0; k < num_comps; k++) {
pgs->color_component_map.color_map[k] =
pinst->saved->color_component_map.color_map[k];
}
code = pcs->type->set_overprint(pcs, pgs);
return code;
}
| 164,647 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: extern "C" int EffectCreate(const effect_uuid_t *uuid,
int32_t sessionId,
int32_t ioId,
effect_handle_t *pHandle){
int ret;
int i;
int length = sizeof(gDescriptors) / sizeof(const effect_descriptor_t *);
const effect_descriptor_t *desc;
ALOGV("\t\nEffectCreate start");
if (pHandle == NULL || uuid == NULL){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : EffectCreate() called with NULL pointer");
return -EINVAL;
}
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
desc = gDescriptors[i];
if (memcmp(uuid, &desc->uuid, sizeof(effect_uuid_t))
== 0) {
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - UUID matched Reverb type %d, UUID = %x", i, desc->uuid.timeLow);
break;
}
}
if (i == length) {
return -ENOENT;
}
ReverbContext *pContext = new ReverbContext;
pContext->itfe = &gReverbInterface;
pContext->hInstance = NULL;
pContext->auxiliary = false;
if ((desc->flags & EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_AUXILIARY){
pContext->auxiliary = true;
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - AUX");
}else{
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - INS");
}
pContext->preset = false;
if (memcmp(&desc->type, SL_IID_PRESETREVERB, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0) {
pContext->preset = true;
pContext->curPreset = REVERB_PRESET_LAST + 1;
pContext->nextPreset = REVERB_DEFAULT_PRESET;
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - PRESET");
}else{
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - ENVIRONMENTAL");
}
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - Calling Reverb_init");
ret = Reverb_init(pContext);
if (ret < 0){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : EffectCreate() init failed");
delete pContext;
return ret;
}
*pHandle = (effect_handle_t)pContext;
#ifdef LVM_PCM
pContext->PcmInPtr = NULL;
pContext->PcmOutPtr = NULL;
pContext->PcmInPtr = fopen("/data/tmp/reverb_pcm_in.pcm", "w");
pContext->PcmOutPtr = fopen("/data/tmp/reverb_pcm_out.pcm", "w");
if((pContext->PcmInPtr == NULL)||
(pContext->PcmOutPtr == NULL)){
return -EINVAL;
}
#endif
pContext->InFrames32 = (LVM_INT32 *)malloc(LVREV_MAX_FRAME_SIZE * sizeof(LVM_INT32) * 2);
pContext->OutFrames32 = (LVM_INT32 *)malloc(LVREV_MAX_FRAME_SIZE * sizeof(LVM_INT32) * 2);
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate %p, size %zu", pContext, sizeof(ReverbContext));
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate end\n");
return 0;
} /* end EffectCreate */
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | extern "C" int EffectCreate(const effect_uuid_t *uuid,
int32_t sessionId __unused,
int32_t ioId __unused,
effect_handle_t *pHandle){
int ret;
int i;
int length = sizeof(gDescriptors) / sizeof(const effect_descriptor_t *);
const effect_descriptor_t *desc;
ALOGV("\t\nEffectCreate start");
if (pHandle == NULL || uuid == NULL){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : EffectCreate() called with NULL pointer");
return -EINVAL;
}
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
desc = gDescriptors[i];
if (memcmp(uuid, &desc->uuid, sizeof(effect_uuid_t))
== 0) {
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - UUID matched Reverb type %d, UUID = %x", i, desc->uuid.timeLow);
break;
}
}
if (i == length) {
return -ENOENT;
}
ReverbContext *pContext = new ReverbContext;
pContext->itfe = &gReverbInterface;
pContext->hInstance = NULL;
pContext->auxiliary = false;
if ((desc->flags & EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_AUXILIARY){
pContext->auxiliary = true;
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - AUX");
}else{
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - INS");
}
pContext->preset = false;
if (memcmp(&desc->type, SL_IID_PRESETREVERB, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0) {
pContext->preset = true;
pContext->curPreset = REVERB_PRESET_LAST + 1;
pContext->nextPreset = REVERB_DEFAULT_PRESET;
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - PRESET");
}else{
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - ENVIRONMENTAL");
}
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - Calling Reverb_init");
ret = Reverb_init(pContext);
if (ret < 0){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : EffectCreate() init failed");
delete pContext;
return ret;
}
*pHandle = (effect_handle_t)pContext;
#ifdef LVM_PCM
pContext->PcmInPtr = NULL;
pContext->PcmOutPtr = NULL;
pContext->PcmInPtr = fopen("/data/tmp/reverb_pcm_in.pcm", "w");
pContext->PcmOutPtr = fopen("/data/tmp/reverb_pcm_out.pcm", "w");
if((pContext->PcmInPtr == NULL)||
(pContext->PcmOutPtr == NULL)){
return -EINVAL;
}
#endif
pContext->InFrames32 = (LVM_INT32 *)malloc(LVREV_MAX_FRAME_SIZE * sizeof(LVM_INT32) * 2);
pContext->OutFrames32 = (LVM_INT32 *)malloc(LVREV_MAX_FRAME_SIZE * sizeof(LVM_INT32) * 2);
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate %p, size %zu", pContext, sizeof(ReverbContext));
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate end\n");
return 0;
} /* end EffectCreate */
| 173,349 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_pic_ext_data(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
UWORD32 u4_start_code;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while ( (u4_start_code == EXTENSION_START_CODE ||
u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE) &&
(IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE == e_error)
{
if(u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE)
{
impeg2d_dec_user_data(ps_dec);
}
else
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
switch(u4_start_code)
{
case QUANT_MATRIX_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_quant_matrix_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case COPYRIGHT_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_copyright_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case PIC_DISPLAY_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_pic_disp_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case CAMERA_PARAM_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_cam_param_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case ITU_T_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_itu_t_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case PIC_SPATIAL_SCALABLE_EXT_ID:
case PIC_TEMPORAL_SCALABLE_EXT_ID:
e_error = IMPEG2D_SCALABLITY_NOT_SUP;
break;
default:
/* In case its a reserved extension code */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
break;
}
}
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
}
return e_error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254 | IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_pic_ext_data(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
UWORD32 u4_start_code;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while ( (u4_start_code == EXTENSION_START_CODE ||
u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE) &&
(IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE == e_error &&
(ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset))
{
if(u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE)
{
impeg2d_dec_user_data(ps_dec);
}
else
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
switch(u4_start_code)
{
case QUANT_MATRIX_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_quant_matrix_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case COPYRIGHT_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_copyright_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case PIC_DISPLAY_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_pic_disp_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case CAMERA_PARAM_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_cam_param_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case ITU_T_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_itu_t_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case PIC_SPATIAL_SCALABLE_EXT_ID:
case PIC_TEMPORAL_SCALABLE_EXT_ID:
e_error = IMPEG2D_SCALABLITY_NOT_SUP;
break;
default:
/* In case its a reserved extension code */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
break;
}
}
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
}
return e_error;
}
| 173,944 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
debug3("%s", __func__);
(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
buffer_clear(m);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
}
Commit Message: set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free
Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised.
Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-264 | mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt;
debug3("%s", __func__);
(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL;
buffer_clear(m);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
return r;
}
| 166,584 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int handle_vmptrst(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
u32 vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
gva_t vmcs_gva;
struct x86_exception e;
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
return 1;
if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qualification,
vmx_instruction_info, true, &vmcs_gva))
return 1;
/* ok to use *_system, as hardware has verified cpl=0 */
if (kvm_write_guest_virt_system(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, vmcs_gva,
(void *)&to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.current_vmptr,
sizeof(u64), &e)) {
kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e);
return 1;
}
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | static int handle_vmptrst(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
u32 vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
gva_t vmcs_gva;
struct x86_exception e;
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
return 1;
if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qualification,
vmx_instruction_info, true, &vmcs_gva))
return 1;
/* *_system ok, nested_vmx_check_permission has verified cpl=0 */
if (kvm_write_guest_virt_system(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, vmcs_gva,
(void *)&to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.current_vmptr,
sizeof(u64), &e)) {
kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e);
return 1;
}
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
| 169,174 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int re_yyget_column (yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
if (! YY_CURRENT_BUFFER)
return 0;
return yycolumn;
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int re_yyget_column (yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
if (! YY_CURRENT_BUFFER)
return 0;
return yycolumn;
}
| 168,483 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int UDPSocketWin::InternalConnect(const IPEndPoint& address) {
DCHECK(!is_connected());
DCHECK(!remote_address_.get());
int addr_family = address.GetSockAddrFamily();
int rv = CreateSocket(addr_family);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
if (bind_type_ == DatagramSocket::RANDOM_BIND) {
size_t addr_size =
addr_family == AF_INET ? kIPv4AddressSize : kIPv6AddressSize;
IPAddressNumber addr_any(addr_size);
rv = RandomBind(addr_any);
}
if (rv < 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Net.UdpSocketRandomBindErrorCode", rv);
Close();
return rv;
}
SockaddrStorage storage;
if (!address.ToSockAddr(storage.addr, &storage.addr_len))
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
rv = connect(socket_, storage.addr, storage.addr_len);
if (rv < 0) {
int result = MapSystemError(WSAGetLastError());
Close();
return result;
}
remote_address_.reset(new IPEndPoint(address));
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | int UDPSocketWin::InternalConnect(const IPEndPoint& address) {
DCHECK(!is_connected());
DCHECK(!remote_address_.get());
int addr_family = address.GetSockAddrFamily();
int rv = CreateSocket(addr_family);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
if (bind_type_ == DatagramSocket::RANDOM_BIND) {
size_t addr_size =
addr_family == AF_INET ? kIPv4AddressSize : kIPv6AddressSize;
IPAddressNumber addr_any(addr_size);
rv = RandomBind(addr_any);
}
if (rv < 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Net.UdpSocketRandomBindErrorCode", -rv);
Close();
return rv;
}
SockaddrStorage storage;
if (!address.ToSockAddr(storage.addr, &storage.addr_len))
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
rv = connect(socket_, storage.addr, storage.addr_len);
if (rv < 0) {
int result = MapSystemError(WSAGetLastError());
Close();
return result;
}
remote_address_.reset(new IPEndPoint(address));
return rv;
}
| 171,318 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IsTraceEventArgsWhitelisted(const char* category_group_name,
const char* event_name) {
base::CStringTokenizer category_group_tokens(
category_group_name, category_group_name + strlen(category_group_name),
",");
while (category_group_tokens.GetNext()) {
const std::string& category_group_token = category_group_tokens.token();
for (int i = 0; kEventArgsWhitelist[i][0] != NULL; ++i) {
DCHECK(kEventArgsWhitelist[i][1]);
if (base::MatchPattern(category_group_token.c_str(),
kEventArgsWhitelist[i][0]) &&
base::MatchPattern(event_name, kEventArgsWhitelist[i][1])) {
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool IsTraceEventArgsWhitelisted(const char* category_group_name,
bool IsTraceArgumentNameWhitelisted(const char* const* granular_filter,
const char* arg_name) {
for (int i = 0; granular_filter[i] != nullptr; ++i) {
if (base::MatchPattern(arg_name, granular_filter[i]))
return true;
}
return false;
}
bool IsTraceEventArgsWhitelisted(
const char* category_group_name,
const char* event_name,
base::trace_event::ArgumentNameFilterPredicate* arg_name_filter) {
DCHECK(arg_name_filter);
base::CStringTokenizer category_group_tokens(
category_group_name, category_group_name + strlen(category_group_name),
",");
while (category_group_tokens.GetNext()) {
const std::string& category_group_token = category_group_tokens.token();
for (int i = 0; kEventArgsWhitelist[i].category_name != nullptr; ++i) {
const WhitelistEntry& whitelist_entry = kEventArgsWhitelist[i];
DCHECK(whitelist_entry.event_name);
if (base::MatchPattern(category_group_token.c_str(),
whitelist_entry.category_name) &&
base::MatchPattern(event_name, whitelist_entry.event_name)) {
if (whitelist_entry.arg_name_filter) {
*arg_name_filter = base::Bind(&IsTraceArgumentNameWhitelisted,
whitelist_entry.arg_name_filter);
}
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
| 171,680 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfsd_cross_mnt(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct dentry **dpp,
struct svc_export **expp)
{
struct svc_export *exp = *expp, *exp2 = NULL;
struct dentry *dentry = *dpp;
struct path path = {.mnt = mntget(exp->ex_path.mnt),
.dentry = dget(dentry)};
int err = 0;
err = follow_down(&path);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
exp2 = rqst_exp_get_by_name(rqstp, &path);
if (IS_ERR(exp2)) {
err = PTR_ERR(exp2);
/*
* We normally allow NFS clients to continue
* "underneath" a mountpoint that is not exported.
* The exception is V4ROOT, where no traversal is ever
* allowed without an explicit export of the new
* directory.
*/
if (err == -ENOENT && !(exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_V4ROOT))
err = 0;
path_put(&path);
goto out;
}
if (nfsd_v4client(rqstp) ||
(exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_CROSSMOUNT) || EX_NOHIDE(exp2)) {
/* successfully crossed mount point */
/*
* This is subtle: path.dentry is *not* on path.mnt
* at this point. The only reason we are safe is that
* original mnt is pinned down by exp, so we should
* put path *before* putting exp
*/
*dpp = path.dentry;
path.dentry = dentry;
*expp = exp2;
exp2 = exp;
}
path_put(&path);
exp_put(exp2);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | nfsd_cross_mnt(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct dentry **dpp,
struct svc_export **expp)
{
struct svc_export *exp = *expp, *exp2 = NULL;
struct dentry *dentry = *dpp;
struct path path = {.mnt = mntget(exp->ex_path.mnt),
.dentry = dget(dentry)};
int err = 0;
err = follow_down(&path);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
if (path.mnt == exp->ex_path.mnt && path.dentry == dentry &&
nfsd_mountpoint(dentry, exp) == 2) {
/* This is only a mountpoint in some other namespace */
path_put(&path);
goto out;
}
exp2 = rqst_exp_get_by_name(rqstp, &path);
if (IS_ERR(exp2)) {
err = PTR_ERR(exp2);
/*
* We normally allow NFS clients to continue
* "underneath" a mountpoint that is not exported.
* The exception is V4ROOT, where no traversal is ever
* allowed without an explicit export of the new
* directory.
*/
if (err == -ENOENT && !(exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_V4ROOT))
err = 0;
path_put(&path);
goto out;
}
if (nfsd_v4client(rqstp) ||
(exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_CROSSMOUNT) || EX_NOHIDE(exp2)) {
/* successfully crossed mount point */
/*
* This is subtle: path.dentry is *not* on path.mnt
* at this point. The only reason we are safe is that
* original mnt is pinned down by exp, so we should
* put path *before* putting exp
*/
*dpp = path.dentry;
path.dentry = dentry;
*expp = exp2;
exp2 = exp;
}
path_put(&path);
exp_put(exp2);
out:
return err;
}
| 168,153 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int udf_symlink_filler(struct file *file, struct page *page)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
unsigned char *symlink;
int err;
unsigned char *p = kmap(page);
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo;
uint32_t pos;
/* We don't support symlinks longer than one block */
if (inode->i_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize) {
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
goto out_unmap;
}
iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
pos = udf_block_map(inode, 0);
down_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB) {
symlink = iinfo->i_ext.i_data + iinfo->i_lenEAttr;
} else {
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, pos);
if (!bh) {
err = -EIO;
goto out_unlock_inode;
}
symlink = bh->b_data;
}
udf_pc_to_char(inode->i_sb, symlink, inode->i_size, p);
brelse(bh);
up_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
SetPageUptodate(page);
kunmap(page);
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
out_unlock_inode:
up_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
SetPageError(page);
out_unmap:
kunmap(page);
unlock_page(page);
return err;
}
Commit Message: udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | static int udf_symlink_filler(struct file *file, struct page *page)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
unsigned char *symlink;
int err;
unsigned char *p = kmap(page);
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo;
uint32_t pos;
/* We don't support symlinks longer than one block */
if (inode->i_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize) {
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
goto out_unmap;
}
iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
pos = udf_block_map(inode, 0);
down_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB) {
symlink = iinfo->i_ext.i_data + iinfo->i_lenEAttr;
} else {
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, pos);
if (!bh) {
err = -EIO;
goto out_unlock_inode;
}
symlink = bh->b_data;
}
err = udf_pc_to_char(inode->i_sb, symlink, inode->i_size, p, PAGE_SIZE);
brelse(bh);
if (err)
goto out_unlock_inode;
up_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
SetPageUptodate(page);
kunmap(page);
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
out_unlock_inode:
up_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
SetPageError(page);
out_unmap:
kunmap(page);
unlock_page(page);
return err;
}
| 166,758 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PushMessagingServiceImpl::PushMessagingServiceImpl(Profile* profile)
: profile_(profile),
push_subscription_count_(0),
pending_push_subscription_count_(0),
notification_manager_(profile),
push_messaging_service_observer_(PushMessagingServiceObserver::Create()),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(profile);
HostContentSettingsMapFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)->AddObserver(this);
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_APP_TERMINATING,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
}
Commit Message: Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | PushMessagingServiceImpl::PushMessagingServiceImpl(Profile* profile)
: profile_(profile),
push_subscription_count_(0),
pending_push_subscription_count_(0),
notification_manager_(profile),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(profile);
HostContentSettingsMapFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)->AddObserver(this);
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_APP_TERMINATING,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
}
| 172,942 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ScriptValue WebGLRenderingContextBase::getProgramParameter(
ScriptState* script_state,
WebGLProgram* program,
GLenum pname) {
if (!ValidateWebGLProgramOrShader("getProgramParamter", program)) {
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
GLint value = 0;
switch (pname) {
case GL_DELETE_STATUS:
return WebGLAny(script_state, program->MarkedForDeletion());
case GL_VALIDATE_STATUS:
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<bool>(value));
case GL_LINK_STATUS:
return WebGLAny(script_state, program->LinkStatus(this));
case GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR:
if (!ExtensionEnabled(kKHRParallelShaderCompileName)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
return WebGLAny(script_state, program->CompletionStatus(this));
case GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORM_BLOCKS:
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_VARYINGS:
if (!IsWebGL2OrHigher()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
FALLTHROUGH;
case GL_ATTACHED_SHADERS:
case GL_ACTIVE_ATTRIBUTES:
case GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORMS:
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, value);
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER_MODE:
if (!IsWebGL2OrHigher()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<unsigned>(value));
case GL_ACTIVE_ATOMIC_COUNTER_BUFFERS:
if (context_type_ == Platform::kWebGL2ComputeContextType) {
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<unsigned>(value));
}
FALLTHROUGH;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | ScriptValue WebGLRenderingContextBase::getProgramParameter(
ScriptState* script_state,
WebGLProgram* program,
GLenum pname) {
if (!ValidateWebGLProgramOrShader("getProgramParamter", program)) {
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
GLint value = 0;
switch (pname) {
case GL_DELETE_STATUS:
return WebGLAny(script_state, program->MarkedForDeletion());
case GL_VALIDATE_STATUS:
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<bool>(value));
case GL_LINK_STATUS:
return WebGLAny(script_state, program->LinkStatus(this));
case GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR:
if (!ExtensionEnabled(kKHRParallelShaderCompileName)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
bool completed;
if (checkProgramCompletionQueryAvailable(program, &completed)) {
return WebGLAny(script_state, completed);
}
return WebGLAny(script_state, program->CompletionStatus(this));
case GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORM_BLOCKS:
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_VARYINGS:
if (!IsWebGL2OrHigher()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
FALLTHROUGH;
case GL_ATTACHED_SHADERS:
case GL_ACTIVE_ATTRIBUTES:
case GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORMS:
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, value);
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER_MODE:
if (!IsWebGL2OrHigher()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<unsigned>(value));
case GL_ACTIVE_ATOMIC_COUNTER_BUFFERS:
if (context_type_ == Platform::kWebGL2ComputeContextType) {
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<unsigned>(value));
}
FALLTHROUGH;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
}
| 172,536 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SubprocessMetricsProviderTest()
: thread_bundle_(content::TestBrowserThreadBundle::DEFAULT) {
base::PersistentHistogramAllocator::GetCreateHistogramResultHistogram();
provider_.MergeHistogramDeltas();
test_recorder_ = base::StatisticsRecorder::CreateTemporaryForTesting();
base::GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithLocalMemory(TEST_MEMORY_SIZE,
0, "");
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | SubprocessMetricsProviderTest()
: thread_bundle_(content::TestBrowserThreadBundle::DEFAULT) {
provider_.MergeHistogramDeltas();
test_recorder_ = base::StatisticsRecorder::CreateTemporaryForTesting();
base::GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithLocalMemory(TEST_MEMORY_SIZE,
0, "");
}
| 172,140 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
/* The general expand case depends on what the colour type is: */
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
else if (that->bit_depth < 8) /* grayscale */
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 8;
if (that->have_tRNS)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this);
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_expand_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_expand_mod(const image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
const transform_display *display)
{
/* The general expand case depends on what the colour type is: */
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
else if (that->bit_depth < 8) /* grayscale */
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 8;
if (that->have_tRNS)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this, 0/*!for background*/);
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
| 173,633 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AXObject::isMultiline() const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!node)
return false;
if (isHTMLTextAreaElement(*node))
return true;
if (hasEditableStyle(*node))
return true;
if (!isNativeTextControl() && !isNonNativeTextControl())
return false;
return equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_multilineAttr), "true");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool AXObject::isMultiline() const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!node)
return false;
if (isHTMLTextAreaElement(*node))
return true;
if (hasEditableStyle(*node))
return true;
if (!isNativeTextControl() && !isNonNativeTextControl())
return false;
return equalIgnoringASCIICase(getAttribute(aria_multilineAttr), "true");
}
| 171,928 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: VideoTrack::VideoTrack(
Segment* pSegment,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
Track(pSegment, element_start, element_size)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | VideoTrack::VideoTrack(
| 174,453 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XSharedMemoryId AttachSharedMemory(Display* display, int shared_memory_key) {
DCHECK(QuerySharedMemorySupport(display));
XShmSegmentInfo shminfo;
memset(&shminfo, 0, sizeof(shminfo));
shminfo.shmid = shared_memory_key;
if (!XShmAttach(display, &shminfo))
NOTREACHED();
return shminfo.shmseg;
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | XSharedMemoryId AttachSharedMemory(Display* display, int shared_memory_key) {
DCHECK(QuerySharedMemorySupport(display));
XShmSegmentInfo shminfo;
memset(&shminfo, 0, sizeof(shminfo));
shminfo.shmid = shared_memory_key;
if (!XShmAttach(display, &shminfo)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "X failed to attach to shared memory segment "
<< shminfo.shmid;
NOTREACHED();
} else {
VLOG(1) << "X attached to shared memory segment " << shminfo.shmid;
}
return shminfo.shmseg;
}
| 171,593 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void local_socket_close(asocket* s) {
adb_mutex_lock(&socket_list_lock);
local_socket_close_locked(s);
adb_mutex_unlock(&socket_list_lock);
}
Commit Message: adb: switch the socket list mutex to a recursive_mutex.
sockets.cpp was branching on whether a socket close function was
local_socket_close in order to avoid a potential deadlock if the socket
list lock was held while closing a peer socket.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I5e56f17fa54275284787f0f1dc150d1960256ab3
(cherry picked from commit 9b587dec6d0a57c8fe1083c1c543fbeb163d65fa)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void local_socket_close(asocket* s) {
| 174,153 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: stringprep (char *in,
size_t maxlen,
Stringprep_profile_flags flags,
const Stringprep_profile * profile)
{
int rc;
char *utf8 = NULL;
uint32_t *ucs4 = NULL;
size_t ucs4len, maxucs4len, adducs4len = 50;
do
{
uint32_t *newp;
free (ucs4);
ucs4 = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (in, -1, &ucs4len);
maxucs4len = ucs4len + adducs4len;
newp = realloc (ucs4, maxucs4len * sizeof (uint32_t));
if (!newp)
return STRINGPREP_MALLOC_ERROR;
}
ucs4 = newp;
rc = stringprep_4i (ucs4, &ucs4len, maxucs4len, flags, profile);
adducs4len += 50;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | stringprep (char *in,
size_t maxlen,
Stringprep_profile_flags flags,
const Stringprep_profile * profile)
{
int rc;
char *utf8 = NULL;
uint32_t *ucs4 = NULL;
size_t ucs4len, maxucs4len, adducs4len = 50;
do
{
uint32_t *newp;
free (ucs4);
ucs4 = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (in, -1, &ucs4len);
if (ucs4 == NULL)
return STRINGPREP_ICONV_ERROR;
maxucs4len = ucs4len + adducs4len;
newp = realloc (ucs4, maxucs4len * sizeof (uint32_t));
if (!newp)
return STRINGPREP_MALLOC_ERROR;
}
ucs4 = newp;
rc = stringprep_4i (ucs4, &ucs4len, maxucs4len, flags, profile);
adducs4len += 50;
}
| 164,762 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int flakey_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct flakey_c *fc = ti->private;
return __blkdev_driver_ioctl(fc->dev->bdev, fc->dev->mode, cmd, arg);
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int flakey_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct flakey_c *fc = ti->private;
struct dm_dev *dev = fc->dev;
int r = 0;
/*
* Only pass ioctls through if the device sizes match exactly.
*/
if (fc->start ||
ti->len != i_size_read(dev->bdev->bd_inode) >> SECTOR_SHIFT)
r = scsi_verify_blk_ioctl(NULL, cmd);
return r ? : __blkdev_driver_ioctl(dev->bdev, dev->mode, cmd, arg);
}
| 165,722 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const AXObject* AXObject::disabledAncestor() const {
const AtomicString& disabled = getAttribute(aria_disabledAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(disabled, "true"))
return this;
if (equalIgnoringCase(disabled, "false"))
return 0;
if (AXObject* parent = parentObject())
return parent->disabledAncestor();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | const AXObject* AXObject::disabledAncestor() const {
const AtomicString& disabled = getAttribute(aria_disabledAttr);
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(disabled, "true"))
return this;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(disabled, "false"))
return 0;
if (AXObject* parent = parentObject())
return parent->disabledAncestor();
return 0;
}
| 171,925 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ssh_packet_get_compress_state(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
struct sshbuf *b;
int r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (state->compression_in_started) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, &state->compression_in_stream,
sizeof(state->compression_in_stream))) != 0)
goto out;
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
if (state->compression_out_started) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, &state->compression_out_stream,
sizeof(state->compression_out_stream))) != 0)
goto out;
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b);
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ssh_packet_get_compress_state(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh)
| 168,652 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ContextualSearchFieldTrial::ContextualSearchFieldTrial()
: is_resolver_url_prefix_cached_(false),
is_surrounding_size_cached_(false),
surrounding_size_(0),
is_icing_surrounding_size_cached_(false),
icing_surrounding_size_(0),
is_send_base_page_url_disabled_cached_(false),
is_send_base_page_url_disabled_(false),
is_decode_mentions_disabled_cached_(false),
is_decode_mentions_disabled_(false),
is_now_on_tap_bar_integration_enabled_cached_(false),
is_now_on_tap_bar_integration_enabled_(false) {}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | ContextualSearchFieldTrial::ContextualSearchFieldTrial()
: is_resolver_url_prefix_cached_(false),
is_surrounding_size_cached_(false),
surrounding_size_(0),
is_icing_surrounding_size_cached_(false),
icing_surrounding_size_(0),
is_send_base_page_url_disabled_cached_(false),
is_send_base_page_url_disabled_(false),
is_decode_mentions_disabled_cached_(false),
is_decode_mentions_disabled_(false),
| 171,643 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool SeekHead::ParseEntry(IMkvReader* pReader, long long start, long long size_,
Entry* pEntry) {
if (size_ <= 0)
return false;
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size_;
long len;
const long long seekIdId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdId != 0x13AB) // SeekID ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume SeekID id
const long long seekIdSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume size of field
if ((pos + seekIdSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len); // payload
if (pEntry->id <= 0)
return false;
if (len != seekIdSize)
return false;
pos += seekIdSize; // consume SeekID payload
const long long seekPosId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosId != 0x13AC) // SeekPos ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long seekPosSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume size
if ((pos + seekPosSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, seekPosSize);
if (pEntry->pos < 0)
return false;
pos += seekPosSize; // consume payload
if (pos != stop)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool SeekHead::ParseEntry(IMkvReader* pReader, long long start, long long size_,
Entry* pEntry) {
if (size_ <= 0)
return false;
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size_;
long len;
const long long seekIdId = ReadID(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdId < 0)
return false;
if (seekIdId != 0x13AB) // SeekID ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume SeekID id
const long long seekIdSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume size of field
if ((pos + seekIdSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len); // payload
if (pEntry->id <= 0)
return false;
if (len != seekIdSize)
return false;
pos += seekIdSize; // consume SeekID payload
const long long seekPosId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosId != 0x13AC) // SeekPos ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long seekPosSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume size
if ((pos + seekPosSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, seekPosSize);
if (pEntry->pos < 0)
return false;
pos += seekPosSize; // consume payload
if (pos != stop)
return false;
return true;
}
| 173,855 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GetPreviewDataForIndex(int index,
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes>* data) {
if (index != printing::COMPLETE_PREVIEW_DOCUMENT_INDEX &&
index < printing::FIRST_PAGE_INDEX) {
return;
}
PreviewPageDataMap::iterator it = page_data_map_.find(index);
if (it != page_data_map_.end())
*data = it->second.get();
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void GetPreviewDataForIndex(int index,
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes>* data) {
if (IsInvalidIndex(index))
return;
PreviewPageDataMap::iterator it = page_data_map_.find(index);
if (it != page_data_map_.end())
*data = it->second.get();
}
| 170,822 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pam_sm_close_session (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags UNUSED,
int argc, const char **argv)
{
void *cookiefile;
int i, debug = 0;
const char* user;
struct passwd *tpwd = NULL;
uid_t unlinkuid, fsuid;
if (pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL) != PAM_SUCCESS)
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "error determining target user's name");
else {
tpwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, user);
if (!tpwd)
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "error determining target user's UID");
else
unlinkuid = tpwd->pw_uid;
}
/* Parse arguments. We don't understand many, so no sense in breaking
* this into a separate function. */
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if (strcmp(argv[i], "debug") == 0) {
debug = 1;
continue;
}
if (strncmp(argv[i], "xauthpath=", 10) == 0) {
continue;
}
if (strncmp(argv[i], "systemuser=", 11) == 0) {
continue;
}
if (strncmp(argv[i], "targetuser=", 11) == 0) {
continue;
}
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "unrecognized option `%s'",
argv[i]);
}
/* Try to retrieve the name of a file we created when the session was
* opened. */
if (pam_get_data(pamh, DATANAME, (const void**) &cookiefile) == PAM_SUCCESS) {
/* We'll only try to remove the file once. */
if (strlen((char*)cookiefile) > 0) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "removing `%s'",
(char*)cookiefile);
}
/* NFS with root_squash requires non-root user */
if (tpwd)
fsuid = setfsuid(unlinkuid);
unlink((char*)cookiefile);
if (tpwd)
setfsuid(fsuid);
*((char*)cookiefile) = '\0';
}
}
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | pam_sm_close_session (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags UNUSED,
int argc, const char **argv)
{
int i, debug = 0;
const char *user;
const void *data;
const char *cookiefile;
struct passwd *tpwd;
uid_t fsuid;
/* Try to retrieve the name of a file we created when
* the session was opened. */
if (pam_get_data(pamh, DATANAME, &data) != PAM_SUCCESS)
return PAM_SUCCESS;
cookiefile = data;
/* Parse arguments. We don't understand many, so
* no sense in breaking this into a separate function. */
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if (strcmp(argv[i], "debug") == 0) {
debug = 1;
continue;
}
if (strncmp(argv[i], "xauthpath=", 10) == 0)
continue;
if (strncmp(argv[i], "systemuser=", 11) == 0)
continue;
if (strncmp(argv[i], "targetuser=", 11) == 0)
continue;
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "unrecognized option `%s'",
argv[i]);
}
if (pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"error determining target user's name");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
if (!(tpwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, user))) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"error determining target user's UID");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
if (debug)
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "removing `%s'", cookiefile);
fsuid = setfsuid(tpwd->pw_uid);
unlink(cookiefile);
setfsuid(fsuid);
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
| 164,789 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GfxImageColorMap::getRGBLine(Guchar *in, unsigned int *out, int length) {
int i, j;
Guchar *inp, *tmp_line;
switch (colorSpace->getMode()) {
case csIndexed:
case csSeparation:
tmp_line = (Guchar *) gmalloc (length * nComps2);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nComps2; j++) {
tmp_line[i * nComps2 + j] = byte_lookup[in[i] * nComps2 + j];
}
}
colorSpace2->getRGBLine(tmp_line, out, length);
gfree (tmp_line);
break;
default:
inp = in;
for (j = 0; j < length; j++)
for (i = 0; i < nComps; i++) {
*inp = byte_lookup[*inp * nComps + i];
inp++;
}
colorSpace->getRGBLine(in, out, length);
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void GfxImageColorMap::getRGBLine(Guchar *in, unsigned int *out, int length) {
int i, j;
Guchar *inp, *tmp_line;
switch (colorSpace->getMode()) {
case csIndexed:
case csSeparation:
tmp_line = (Guchar *) gmallocn (length, nComps2);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nComps2; j++) {
tmp_line[i * nComps2 + j] = byte_lookup[in[i] * nComps2 + j];
}
}
colorSpace2->getRGBLine(tmp_line, out, length);
gfree (tmp_line);
break;
default:
inp = in;
for (j = 0; j < length; j++)
for (i = 0; i < nComps; i++) {
*inp = byte_lookup[*inp * nComps + i];
inp++;
}
colorSpace->getRGBLine(in, out, length);
break;
}
}
| 164,611 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: raptor_libxml_resolveEntity(void* user_data,
const xmlChar *publicId, const xmlChar *systemId) {
raptor_sax2* sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)user_data;
return libxml2_resolveEntity(sax2->xc, publicId, systemId);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | raptor_libxml_resolveEntity(void* user_data,
const xmlChar *publicId, const xmlChar *systemId)
{
raptor_sax2* sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)user_data;
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = sax2->xc;
const unsigned char *uri_string = NULL;
xmlParserInputPtr entity_input;
int load_entity = 0;
if(ctxt->input)
uri_string = RAPTOR_GOOD_CAST(const unsigned char *, ctxt->input->filename);
if(!uri_string)
uri_string = RAPTOR_GOOD_CAST(const unsigned char *, ctxt->directory);
load_entity = RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(sax2, RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES);
if(load_entity)
load_entity = raptor_sax2_check_load_uri_string(sax2, uri_string);
if(load_entity) {
entity_input = xmlLoadExternalEntity(RAPTOR_GOOD_CAST(const char*, uri_string),
RAPTOR_GOOD_CAST(const char*, publicId),
ctxt);
} else {
RAPTOR_DEBUG4("Not loading entity URI %s by policy for publicId '%s' systemId '%s'\n", uri_string, publicId, systemId);
}
return entity_input;
}
| 165,659 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SubpelVarianceTest<SubpelVarianceFunctionType>::RefTest() {
for (int x = 0; x < 16; ++x) {
for (int y = 0; y < 16; ++y) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
src_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1; j++) {
ref_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
unsigned int var1;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var1 = subpel_variance_(ref_, width_ + 1, x, y,
src_, width_, &sse1));
const unsigned int var2 = subpel_variance_ref(ref_, src_, log2width_,
log2height_, x, y, &sse2);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
EXPECT_EQ(var1, var2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void SubpelVarianceTest<SubpelVarianceFunctionType>::RefTest() {
for (int x = 0; x < 8; ++x) {
for (int y = 0; y < 8; ++y) {
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
src_[j] = rnd_.Rand8();
}
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1; j++) {
ref_[j] = rnd_.Rand8();
}
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src_)[j] = rnd_.Rand16() & mask_;
}
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1; j++) {
CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref_)[j] = rnd_.Rand16() & mask_;
}
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
unsigned int var1;
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var1 = subpel_variance_(ref_, width_ + 1, x, y,
src_, width_, &sse1));
const unsigned int var2 = subpel_variance_ref(ref_, src_,
log2width_, log2height_,
x, y, &sse2,
use_high_bit_depth_,
bit_depth_);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
EXPECT_EQ(var1, var2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
}
}
}
| 174,587 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void smp_proc_enc_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->ltk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void smp_proc_enc_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111937065");
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
return;
}
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->ltk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
| 174,074 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DOMWindow::focus(LocalDOMWindow* incumbent_window) {
if (!GetFrame())
return;
Page* page = GetFrame()->GetPage();
if (!page)
return;
DCHECK(incumbent_window);
ExecutionContext* incumbent_execution_context =
incumbent_window->GetExecutionContext();
bool allow_focus = incumbent_execution_context->IsWindowInteractionAllowed();
if (allow_focus) {
incumbent_execution_context->ConsumeWindowInteraction();
} else {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
allow_focus =
opener() && (opener() != this) &&
(ToDocument(incumbent_execution_context)->domWindow() == opener());
}
if (GetFrame()->IsMainFrame() && allow_focus)
page->GetChromeClient().Focus();
page->GetFocusController().FocusDocumentView(GetFrame(),
true /* notifyEmbedder */);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | void DOMWindow::focus(LocalDOMWindow* incumbent_window) {
if (!GetFrame())
return;
Page* page = GetFrame()->GetPage();
if (!page)
return;
DCHECK(incumbent_window);
ExecutionContext* incumbent_execution_context =
incumbent_window->GetExecutionContext();
bool allow_focus = incumbent_execution_context->IsWindowInteractionAllowed();
if (allow_focus) {
incumbent_execution_context->ConsumeWindowInteraction();
} else {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
allow_focus =
opener() && (opener() != this) &&
(ToDocument(incumbent_execution_context)->domWindow() == opener());
}
if (GetFrame()->IsMainFrame() && allow_focus)
page->GetChromeClient().Focus(incumbent_window->GetFrame());
page->GetFocusController().FocusDocumentView(GetFrame(),
true /* notifyEmbedder */);
}
| 172,722 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: alloc_limit_failure (char *fn_name, size_t size)
{
fprintf (stderr,
"%s: Maximum allocation size exceeded "
"(maxsize = %lu; size = %lu).\n",
fn_name,
(unsigned long)alloc_limit,
(unsigned long)size);
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows and harden memory allocator.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | alloc_limit_failure (char *fn_name, size_t size)
{
fprintf (stderr,
"%s: Maximum allocation size exceeded "
"(maxsize = %lu; size = %lu).\n",
fn_name,
(unsigned long)alloc_limit,
(unsigned long)size);
}
| 168,355 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewDataService::GetDataEntry(
const std::string& preview_ui_addr_str,
int index,
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes>* data_bytes) {
*data_bytes = NULL;
PreviewDataStoreMap::iterator it = data_store_map_.find(preview_ui_addr_str);
if (it != data_store_map_.end())
it->second->GetPreviewDataForIndex(index, data_bytes);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void PrintPreviewDataService::GetDataEntry(
int32 preview_ui_id,
int index,
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes>* data_bytes) {
*data_bytes = NULL;
PreviewDataStoreMap::const_iterator it = data_store_map_.find(preview_ui_id);
if (it != data_store_map_.end())
it->second->GetPreviewDataForIndex(index, data_bytes);
}
| 170,821 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: smb_flush_file(struct smb_request *sr, struct smb_ofile *ofile)
{
sr->user_cr = smb_ofile_getcred(ofile);
if ((ofile->f_node->flags & NODE_FLAGS_WRITE_THROUGH) == 0)
(void) smb_fsop_commit(sr, sr->user_cr, ofile->f_node);
}
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <matt.barden@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <evan.layton@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | smb_flush_file(struct smb_request *sr, struct smb_ofile *ofile)
| 168,827 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RunRoundTripErrorCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
int max_error = 0;
int total_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 100000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_input_block, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_temp_block, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, 64);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block, test_temp_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
if (test_temp_block[j] > 0) {
test_temp_block[j] += 2;
test_temp_block[j] /= 4;
test_temp_block[j] *= 4;
} else {
test_temp_block[j] -= 2;
test_temp_block[j] /= 4;
test_temp_block[j] *= 4;
}
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
const int diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const int error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
}
}
EXPECT_GE(1, max_error)
<< "Error: 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has an individual"
<< " roundtrip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE(count_test_block/5, total_error)
<< "Error: 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has average roundtrip "
<< "error > 1/5 per block";
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void RunRoundTripErrorCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
int max_error = 0;
int total_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 100000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, int16_t, test_input_block[64]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, test_temp_block[64]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint8_t, dst[64]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint8_t, src[64]);
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint16_t, dst16[64]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint16_t, src16[64]);
#endif
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
// Initialize a test block with input range [-mask_, mask_].
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
if (bit_depth_ == VPX_BITS_8) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
src16[j] = rnd.Rand16() & mask_;
dst16[j] = rnd.Rand16() & mask_;
test_input_block[j] = src16[j] - dst16[j];
#endif
}
}
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block, test_temp_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
if (test_temp_block[j] > 0) {
test_temp_block[j] += 2;
test_temp_block[j] /= 4;
test_temp_block[j] *= 4;
} else {
test_temp_block[j] -= 2;
test_temp_block[j] /= 4;
test_temp_block[j] *= 4;
}
}
if (bit_depth_ == VPX_BITS_8) {
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(dst16), pitch_));
#endif
}
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
const int diff =
bit_depth_ == VPX_BITS_8 ? dst[j] - src[j] : dst16[j] - src16[j];
#else
const int diff = dst[j] - src[j];
#endif
const int error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
}
}
EXPECT_GE(1 << 2 * (bit_depth_ - 8), max_error)
<< "Error: 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has an individual"
<< " roundtrip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE((count_test_block << 2 * (bit_depth_ - 8))/5, total_error)
<< "Error: 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has average roundtrip "
<< "error > 1/5 per block";
}
| 174,560 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_create_iv)
{
char *iv;
long source = RANDOM;
long size;
int n = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|l", &size, &source) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (size <= 0 || size >= INT_MAX) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot create an IV with a size of less than 1 or greater than %d", INT_MAX);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
iv = ecalloc(size + 1, 1);
if (source == RANDOM || source == URANDOM) {
#if PHP_WIN32
/* random/urandom equivalent on Windows */
BYTE *iv_b = (BYTE *) iv;
if (php_win32_get_random_bytes(iv_b, (size_t) size) == FAILURE){
efree(iv);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not gather sufficient random data");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
n = size;
#else
int *fd = &MCG(fd[source]);
size_t read_bytes = 0;
if (*fd < 0) {
*fd = open(source == RANDOM ? "/dev/random" : "/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
if (*fd < 0) {
efree(iv);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot open source device");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
while (read_bytes < size) {
n = read(*fd, iv + read_bytes, size - read_bytes);
if (n < 0) {
break;
}
read_bytes += n;
}
n = read_bytes;
if (n < size) {
efree(iv);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not gather sufficient random data");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#endif
} else {
n = size;
while (size) {
iv[--size] = (char) (255.0 * php_rand(TSRMLS_C) / RAND_MAX);
}
}
RETURN_STRINGL(iv, n, 0);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_create_iv)
{
char *iv;
long source = RANDOM;
long size;
int n = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|l", &size, &source) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (size <= 0 || size >= INT_MAX) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot create an IV with a size of less than 1 or greater than %d", INT_MAX);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
iv = ecalloc(size + 1, 1);
if (source == RANDOM || source == URANDOM) {
#if PHP_WIN32
/* random/urandom equivalent on Windows */
BYTE *iv_b = (BYTE *) iv;
if (php_win32_get_random_bytes(iv_b, (size_t) size) == FAILURE){
efree(iv);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not gather sufficient random data");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
n = size;
#else
int *fd = &MCG(fd[source]);
size_t read_bytes = 0;
if (*fd < 0) {
*fd = open(source == RANDOM ? "/dev/random" : "/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
if (*fd < 0) {
efree(iv);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot open source device");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
while (read_bytes < size) {
n = read(*fd, iv + read_bytes, size - read_bytes);
if (n < 0) {
break;
}
read_bytes += n;
}
n = read_bytes;
if (n < size) {
efree(iv);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not gather sufficient random data");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#endif
} else {
n = size;
while (size) {
iv[--size] = (char) (255.0 * php_rand(TSRMLS_C) / RAND_MAX);
}
}
RETURN_STRINGL(iv, n, 0);
}
| 167,111 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ScrollAnchor::ExamineResult ScrollAnchor::Examine(
const LayoutObject* candidate) const {
if (candidate == ScrollerLayoutBox(scroller_))
return ExamineResult(kContinue);
if (candidate->StyleRef().OverflowAnchor() == EOverflowAnchor::kNone)
return ExamineResult(kSkip);
if (candidate->IsLayoutInline())
return ExamineResult(kContinue);
if (candidate->IsAnonymous())
return ExamineResult(kContinue);
if (!candidate->IsText() && !candidate->IsBox())
return ExamineResult(kSkip);
if (!CandidateMayMoveWithScroller(candidate, scroller_))
return ExamineResult(kSkip);
LayoutRect candidate_rect = RelativeBounds(candidate, scroller_);
LayoutRect visible_rect =
ScrollerLayoutBox(scroller_)->OverflowClipRect(LayoutPoint());
bool occupies_space =
candidate_rect.Width() > 0 && candidate_rect.Height() > 0;
if (occupies_space && visible_rect.Intersects(candidate_rect)) {
return ExamineResult(
visible_rect.Contains(candidate_rect) ? kReturn : kConstrain,
CornerToAnchor(scroller_));
} else {
return ExamineResult(kSkip);
}
}
Commit Message: Consider scroll-padding when determining scroll anchor node
Scroll anchoring should not anchor to a node that is behind scroll
padding.
Bug: 1010002
Change-Id: Icbd89fb85ea2c97a6de635930a9896f6a87b8f07
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1887745
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nick Burris <nburris@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#711020}
CWE ID: | ScrollAnchor::ExamineResult ScrollAnchor::Examine(
const LayoutObject* candidate) const {
if (candidate == ScrollerLayoutBox(scroller_))
return ExamineResult(kContinue);
if (candidate->StyleRef().OverflowAnchor() == EOverflowAnchor::kNone)
return ExamineResult(kSkip);
if (candidate->IsLayoutInline())
return ExamineResult(kContinue);
if (candidate->IsAnonymous())
return ExamineResult(kContinue);
if (!candidate->IsText() && !candidate->IsBox())
return ExamineResult(kSkip);
if (!CandidateMayMoveWithScroller(candidate, scroller_))
return ExamineResult(kSkip);
LayoutRect candidate_rect = RelativeBounds(candidate, scroller_);
LayoutRect visible_rect =
ScrollerLayoutBox(scroller_)->OverflowClipRect(LayoutPoint());
const ComputedStyle* style = ScrollerLayoutBox(scroller_)->Style();
LayoutRectOutsets scroll_padding(
MinimumValueForLength(style->ScrollPaddingTop(), visible_rect.Height()),
MinimumValueForLength(style->ScrollPaddingRight(), visible_rect.Width()),
MinimumValueForLength(style->ScrollPaddingBottom(),
visible_rect.Height()),
MinimumValueForLength(style->ScrollPaddingLeft(), visible_rect.Width()));
visible_rect.Contract(scroll_padding);
bool occupies_space =
candidate_rect.Width() > 0 && candidate_rect.Height() > 0;
if (occupies_space && visible_rect.Intersects(candidate_rect)) {
return ExamineResult(
visible_rect.Contains(candidate_rect) ? kReturn : kConstrain,
CornerToAnchor(scroller_));
} else {
return ExamineResult(kSkip);
}
}
| 172,383 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SProcXResQueryResourceBytes (ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
int c;
xXResResourceIdSpec *specs = (void*) ((char*) stuff + sizeof(*stuff));
int c;
xXResResourceIdSpec *specs = (void*) ((char*) stuff + sizeof(*stuff));
swapl(&stuff->numSpecs);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq,
stuff->numSpecs * sizeof(specs[0]));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | SProcXResQueryResourceBytes (ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
int c;
xXResResourceIdSpec *specs = (void*) ((char*) stuff + sizeof(*stuff));
int c;
xXResResourceIdSpec *specs = (void*) ((char*) stuff + sizeof(*stuff));
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
swapl(&stuff->numSpecs);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq,
stuff->numSpecs * sizeof(specs[0]));
}
| 165,435 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MemBackendImpl::EvictIfNeeded() {
if (current_size_ <= max_size_)
return;
int target_size = std::max(0, max_size_ - kDefaultEvictionSize);
base::LinkNode<MemEntryImpl>* entry = lru_list_.head();
while (current_size_ > target_size && entry != lru_list_.end()) {
MemEntryImpl* to_doom = entry->value();
do {
entry = entry->next();
} while (entry != lru_list_.end() && entry->value()->parent() == to_doom);
if (!to_doom->InUse())
to_doom->Doom();
}
}
Commit Message: [MemCache] Fix bug while iterating LRU list in range doom
This is exact same thing as https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/987919
but on explicit mass-erase rather than eviction.
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for the report and testcase.
Bug: 831963
Change-Id: I96a46700c1f058f7feebe038bcf983dc40eb7102
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1014023
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Karlin <jkarlin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#551205}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void MemBackendImpl::EvictIfNeeded() {
if (current_size_ <= max_size_)
return;
int target_size = std::max(0, max_size_ - kDefaultEvictionSize);
base::LinkNode<MemEntryImpl>* entry = lru_list_.head();
while (current_size_ > target_size && entry != lru_list_.end()) {
MemEntryImpl* to_doom = entry->value();
entry = NextSkippingChildren(lru_list_, entry);
if (!to_doom->InUse())
to_doom->Doom();
}
}
| 173,258 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WT_InterpolateMono (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_I32 *pMixBuffer;
const EAS_I8 *pLoopEnd;
const EAS_I8 *pCurrentPhaseInt;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
EAS_I32 gain;
EAS_I32 gainIncrement;
EAS_I32 currentPhaseFrac;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 tmp2;
EAS_I8 *pLoopStart;
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
pMixBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pMixBuffer;
/* calculate gain increment */
gainIncrement = (pWTIntFrame->gainTarget - pWTIntFrame->prevGain) << (16 - SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
if (gainIncrement < 0)
gainIncrement++;
gain = pWTIntFrame->prevGain << 16;
pCurrentPhaseInt = pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum;
currentPhaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->phaseIncrement;
pLoopStart = pWTVoice->pLoopStart;
pLoopEnd = pWTVoice->pLoopEnd + 1;
InterpolationLoop:
tmp0 = (EAS_I32)(pCurrentPhaseInt - pLoopEnd);
if (tmp0 >= 0)
pCurrentPhaseInt = pLoopStart + tmp0;
tmp0 = *pCurrentPhaseInt;
tmp1 = *(pCurrentPhaseInt + 1);
tmp2 = phaseInc + currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp1 - tmp0;
tmp1 = tmp1 * currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp0 + (tmp1 >> NUM_EG1_FRAC_BITS);
pCurrentPhaseInt += (tmp2 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
currentPhaseFrac = tmp2 & PHASE_FRAC_MASK;
gain += gainIncrement;
tmp2 = (gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
tmp0 = *pMixBuffer;
tmp2 = tmp1 * tmp2;
tmp2 = (tmp2 >> 9);
tmp0 = tmp2 + tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp0;
numSamples--;
if (numSamples > 0)
goto InterpolationLoop;
pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum = pCurrentPhaseInt;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = currentPhaseFrac;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide>*/
pWTVoice->gain = (EAS_I16)(gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void WT_InterpolateMono (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_I32 *pMixBuffer;
const EAS_I8 *pLoopEnd;
const EAS_I8 *pCurrentPhaseInt;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
EAS_I32 gain;
EAS_I32 gainIncrement;
EAS_I32 currentPhaseFrac;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 tmp2;
EAS_I8 *pLoopStart;
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pMixBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pMixBuffer;
/* calculate gain increment */
gainIncrement = (pWTIntFrame->gainTarget - pWTIntFrame->prevGain) << (16 - SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
if (gainIncrement < 0)
gainIncrement++;
gain = pWTIntFrame->prevGain << 16;
pCurrentPhaseInt = pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum;
currentPhaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->phaseIncrement;
pLoopStart = pWTVoice->pLoopStart;
pLoopEnd = pWTVoice->pLoopEnd + 1;
InterpolationLoop:
tmp0 = (EAS_I32)(pCurrentPhaseInt - pLoopEnd);
if (tmp0 >= 0)
pCurrentPhaseInt = pLoopStart + tmp0;
tmp0 = *pCurrentPhaseInt;
tmp1 = *(pCurrentPhaseInt + 1);
tmp2 = phaseInc + currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp1 - tmp0;
tmp1 = tmp1 * currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp0 + (tmp1 >> NUM_EG1_FRAC_BITS);
pCurrentPhaseInt += (tmp2 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
currentPhaseFrac = tmp2 & PHASE_FRAC_MASK;
gain += gainIncrement;
tmp2 = (gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
tmp0 = *pMixBuffer;
tmp2 = tmp1 * tmp2;
tmp2 = (tmp2 >> 9);
tmp0 = tmp2 + tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp0;
numSamples--;
if (numSamples > 0)
goto InterpolationLoop;
pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum = pCurrentPhaseInt;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = currentPhaseFrac;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide>*/
pWTVoice->gain = (EAS_I16)(gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
}
| 173,918 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: auth_read_binary(struct sc_card *card, unsigned int offset,
unsigned char *buf, size_t count, unsigned long flags)
{
int rv;
struct sc_pkcs15_bignum bn[2];
unsigned char *out = NULL;
bn[0].data = NULL;
bn[1].data = NULL;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
sc_log(card->ctx,
"offset %i; size %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u; flags 0x%lX",
offset, count, flags);
sc_log(card->ctx,"last selected : magic %X; ef %X",
auth_current_ef->magic, auth_current_ef->ef_structure);
if (offset & ~0x7FFF)
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS, "Invalid file offset");
if (auth_current_ef->magic==SC_FILE_MAGIC &&
auth_current_ef->ef_structure == SC_CARDCTL_OBERTHUR_KEY_RSA_PUBLIC) {
int jj;
unsigned char resp[256];
size_t resp_len, out_len;
struct sc_pkcs15_pubkey_rsa key;
resp_len = sizeof(resp);
rv = auth_read_component(card, SC_CARDCTL_OBERTHUR_KEY_RSA_PUBLIC,
2, resp, resp_len);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "read component failed");
for (jj=0; jj<rv && *(resp+jj)==0; jj++)
;
bn[0].data = calloc(1, rv - jj);
if (!bn[0].data) {
rv = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto err;
}
bn[0].len = rv - jj;
memcpy(bn[0].data, resp + jj, rv - jj);
rv = auth_read_component(card, SC_CARDCTL_OBERTHUR_KEY_RSA_PUBLIC,
1, resp, resp_len);
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(card->ctx, rv, "Cannot read RSA public key component");
bn[1].data = calloc(1, rv);
if (!bn[1].data) {
rv = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto err;
}
bn[1].len = rv;
memcpy(bn[1].data, resp, rv);
key.exponent = bn[0];
key.modulus = bn[1];
if (sc_pkcs15_encode_pubkey_rsa(card->ctx, &key, &out, &out_len)) {
rv = SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(card->ctx, rv, "cannot encode RSA public key");
}
else {
rv = out_len - offset > count ? count : out_len - offset;
memcpy(buf, out + offset, rv);
sc_log_hex(card->ctx, "write_publickey", buf, rv);
}
}
else {
rv = iso_ops->read_binary(card, offset, buf, count, 0);
}
err:
free(bn[0].data);
free(bn[1].data);
free(out);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | auth_read_binary(struct sc_card *card, unsigned int offset,
unsigned char *buf, size_t count, unsigned long flags)
{
int rv;
struct sc_pkcs15_bignum bn[2];
unsigned char *out = NULL;
bn[0].data = NULL;
bn[1].data = NULL;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
if (!auth_current_ef)
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS, "Invalid auth_current_ef");
sc_log(card->ctx,
"offset %i; size %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u; flags 0x%lX",
offset, count, flags);
sc_log(card->ctx,"last selected : magic %X; ef %X",
auth_current_ef->magic, auth_current_ef->ef_structure);
if (offset & ~0x7FFF)
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS, "Invalid file offset");
if (auth_current_ef->magic==SC_FILE_MAGIC &&
auth_current_ef->ef_structure == SC_CARDCTL_OBERTHUR_KEY_RSA_PUBLIC) {
int jj;
unsigned char resp[256];
size_t resp_len, out_len;
struct sc_pkcs15_pubkey_rsa key;
resp_len = sizeof(resp);
rv = auth_read_component(card, SC_CARDCTL_OBERTHUR_KEY_RSA_PUBLIC,
2, resp, resp_len);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "read component failed");
for (jj=0; jj<rv && *(resp+jj)==0; jj++)
;
bn[0].data = calloc(1, rv - jj);
if (!bn[0].data) {
rv = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto err;
}
bn[0].len = rv - jj;
memcpy(bn[0].data, resp + jj, rv - jj);
rv = auth_read_component(card, SC_CARDCTL_OBERTHUR_KEY_RSA_PUBLIC,
1, resp, resp_len);
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(card->ctx, rv, "Cannot read RSA public key component");
bn[1].data = calloc(1, rv);
if (!bn[1].data) {
rv = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto err;
}
bn[1].len = rv;
memcpy(bn[1].data, resp, rv);
key.exponent = bn[0];
key.modulus = bn[1];
if (sc_pkcs15_encode_pubkey_rsa(card->ctx, &key, &out, &out_len)) {
rv = SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(card->ctx, rv, "cannot encode RSA public key");
}
else {
rv = out_len - offset > count ? count : out_len - offset;
memcpy(buf, out + offset, rv);
sc_log_hex(card->ctx, "write_publickey", buf, rv);
}
}
else {
rv = iso_ops->read_binary(card, offset, buf, count, 0);
}
err:
free(bn[0].data);
free(bn[1].data);
free(out);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, rv);
}
| 169,058 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintViewManager::RenderFrameDeleted(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
if (render_frame_host == print_preview_rfh_)
print_preview_state_ = NOT_PREVIEWING;
PrintViewManagerBase::RenderFrameDeleted(render_frame_host);
}
Commit Message: Properly clean up in PrintViewManager::RenderFrameCreated().
BUG=694382,698622
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2742853003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#457363}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void PrintViewManager::RenderFrameDeleted(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
if (render_frame_host == print_preview_rfh_)
PrintPreviewDone();
PrintViewManagerBase::RenderFrameDeleted(render_frame_host);
}
| 172,405 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Document::open(Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "Imported document doesn't support open().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support open().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use open().");
return;
}
if (entered_document) {
if (!GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPortAndSuborigin(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call open() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
SetSecurityOrigin(entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin());
if (this != entered_document) {
KURL new_url = entered_document->Url();
new_url.SetFragmentIdentifier(String());
SetURL(new_url);
}
cookie_url_ = entered_document->CookieURL();
}
open();
}
Commit Message: Inherit referrer and policy when creating a nested browsing context
BUG=763194
R=estark@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ide3950269adf26ba221f573dfa088e95291ab676
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/732652
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark <estark@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511211}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void Document::open(Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "Imported document doesn't support open().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support open().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use open().");
return;
}
if (entered_document) {
if (!GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPortAndSuborigin(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call open() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
SetSecurityOrigin(entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin());
if (this != entered_document) {
KURL new_url = entered_document->Url();
new_url.SetFragmentIdentifier(String());
SetURL(new_url);
SetReferrerPolicy(entered_document->GetReferrerPolicy());
}
cookie_url_ = entered_document->CookieURL();
}
open();
}
| 172,691 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int cJSON_GetArraySize( cJSON *array )
{
cJSON *c = array->child;
int i = 0;
while ( c ) {
++i;
c = c->next;
}
return i;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int cJSON_GetArraySize( cJSON *array )
| 167,287 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cib_remote_signon(cib_t * cib, const char *name, enum cib_conn_type type)
{
int rc = pcmk_ok;
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
if (private->passwd == NULL) {
struct termios settings;
int rc;
rc = tcgetattr(0, &settings);
settings.c_lflag &= ~ECHO;
rc = tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &settings);
fprintf(stderr, "Password: ");
private->passwd = calloc(1, 1024);
rc = scanf("%s", private->passwd);
fprintf(stdout, "\n");
/* fprintf(stderr, "entered: '%s'\n", buffer); */
if (rc < 1) {
private->passwd = NULL;
}
settings.c_lflag |= ECHO;
rc = tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &settings);
}
if (private->server == NULL || private->user == NULL) {
rc = -EINVAL;
}
if (rc == pcmk_ok) {
rc = cib_tls_signon(cib, &(private->command));
}
if (rc == pcmk_ok) {
rc = cib_tls_signon(cib, &(private->callback));
}
if (rc == pcmk_ok) {
xmlNode *hello =
cib_create_op(0, private->callback.token, CRM_OP_REGISTER, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
crm_xml_add(hello, F_CIB_CLIENTNAME, name);
crm_send_remote_msg(private->command.session, hello, private->command.encrypted);
free_xml(hello);
}
if (rc == pcmk_ok) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Opened connection to %s:%d\n", name, private->server, private->port);
cib->state = cib_connected_command;
cib->type = cib_command;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Connection to %s:%d failed: %s\n",
name, private->server, private->port, pcmk_strerror(rc));
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | cib_remote_signon(cib_t * cib, const char *name, enum cib_conn_type type)
{
int rc = pcmk_ok;
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
if (private->passwd == NULL) {
struct termios settings;
int rc;
rc = tcgetattr(0, &settings);
settings.c_lflag &= ~ECHO;
rc = tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &settings);
fprintf(stderr, "Password: ");
private->passwd = calloc(1, 1024);
rc = scanf("%s", private->passwd);
fprintf(stdout, "\n");
/* fprintf(stderr, "entered: '%s'\n", buffer); */
if (rc < 1) {
private->passwd = NULL;
}
settings.c_lflag |= ECHO;
rc = tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &settings);
}
if (private->server == NULL || private->user == NULL) {
rc = -EINVAL;
}
if (rc == pcmk_ok) {
rc = cib_tls_signon(cib, &(private->command), FALSE);
}
if (rc == pcmk_ok) {
rc = cib_tls_signon(cib, &(private->callback), TRUE);
}
if (rc == pcmk_ok) {
xmlNode *hello =
cib_create_op(0, private->callback.token, CRM_OP_REGISTER, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
crm_xml_add(hello, F_CIB_CLIENTNAME, name);
crm_send_remote_msg(private->command.session, hello, private->command.encrypted);
free_xml(hello);
}
if (rc == pcmk_ok) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Opened connection to %s:%d\n", name, private->server, private->port);
cib->state = cib_connected_command;
cib->type = cib_command;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Connection to %s:%d failed: %s\n",
name, private->server, private->port, pcmk_strerror(rc));
}
return rc;
}
| 166,153 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev2_sub_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
struct isakmp *base,
u_char np, const struct isakmp_gen *ext, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase, uint32_t doi, uint32_t proto, int depth)
{
const u_char *cp;
int i;
struct isakmp_gen e;
cp = (const u_char *)ext;
while (np) {
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_TCHECK2(*ext, ntohs(e.len));
depth++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n"));
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
cp = ikev2_sub0_print(ndo, base, np,
ext, ep, phase, doi, proto, depth);
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
depth--;
if (cp == NULL) {
/* Zero-length subitem */
return NULL;
}
np = e.np;
ext = (const struct isakmp_gen *)cp;
}
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(np)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev2_sub_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
struct isakmp *base,
u_char np, const struct isakmp_gen *ext, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase, uint32_t doi, uint32_t proto, int depth)
{
const u_char *cp;
int i;
struct isakmp_gen e;
cp = (const u_char *)ext;
while (np) {
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_TCHECK2(*ext, ntohs(e.len));
depth++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n"));
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
cp = ikev2_sub0_print(ndo, base, np,
ext, ep, phase, doi, proto, depth);
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
depth--;
if (cp == NULL) {
/* Zero-length subitem */
return NULL;
}
np = e.np;
ext = (const struct isakmp_gen *)cp;
}
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(np)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,802 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: header_put_le_short (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 2)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
} ;
} /* header_put_le_short */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | header_put_le_short (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = x ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 8) ;
} /* header_put_le_short */
| 170,058 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: P2PQuicTransportImpl::P2PQuicTransportImpl(
P2PQuicTransportConfig p2p_transport_config,
std::unique_ptr<net::QuicChromiumConnectionHelper> helper,
std::unique_ptr<quic::QuicConnection> connection,
const quic::QuicConfig& quic_config,
quic::QuicClock* clock)
: quic::QuicSession(connection.get(),
nullptr /* visitor */,
quic_config,
quic::CurrentSupportedVersions()),
helper_(std::move(helper)),
connection_(std::move(connection)),
perspective_(p2p_transport_config.is_server
? quic::Perspective::IS_SERVER
: quic::Perspective::IS_CLIENT),
packet_transport_(p2p_transport_config.packet_transport),
delegate_(p2p_transport_config.delegate),
clock_(clock) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(delegate_);
DCHECK(clock_);
DCHECK(packet_transport_);
DCHECK_GT(p2p_transport_config.certificates.size(), 0u);
if (p2p_transport_config.can_respond_to_crypto_handshake) {
InitializeCryptoStream();
}
certificate_ = p2p_transport_config.certificates[0];
packet_transport_->SetReceiveDelegate(this);
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | P2PQuicTransportImpl::P2PQuicTransportImpl(
P2PQuicTransportConfig p2p_transport_config,
std::unique_ptr<net::QuicChromiumConnectionHelper> helper,
std::unique_ptr<quic::QuicConnection> connection,
const quic::QuicConfig& quic_config,
quic::QuicClock* clock)
: quic::QuicSession(connection.get(),
nullptr /* visitor */,
quic_config,
quic::CurrentSupportedVersions()),
helper_(std::move(helper)),
connection_(std::move(connection)),
perspective_(p2p_transport_config.is_server
? quic::Perspective::IS_SERVER
: quic::Perspective::IS_CLIENT),
packet_transport_(p2p_transport_config.packet_transport),
delegate_(p2p_transport_config.delegate),
clock_(clock),
stream_write_buffer_size_(p2p_transport_config.stream_write_buffer_size) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(delegate_);
DCHECK(clock_);
DCHECK(packet_transport_);
DCHECK_GT(stream_write_buffer_size_, 0u);
DCHECK_GT(p2p_transport_config.certificates.size(), 0u);
if (p2p_transport_config.can_respond_to_crypto_handshake) {
InitializeCryptoStream();
}
certificate_ = p2p_transport_config.certificates[0];
packet_transport_->SetReceiveDelegate(this);
}
| 172,266 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fread)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
long length = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &length) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (length <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Length parameter must be greater than 0");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value) = emalloc(length + 1);
Z_STRLEN_P(return_value) = php_stream_read(intern->u.file.stream, Z_STRVAL_P(return_value), length);
/* needed because recv/read/gzread doesnt put a null at the end*/
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value)[Z_STRLEN_P(return_value)] = 0;
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_STRING;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fread)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
long length = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &length) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (length <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Length parameter must be greater than 0");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (length > INT_MAX) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Length parameter must be no more than %d", INT_MAX);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value) = emalloc(length + 1);
Z_STRLEN_P(return_value) = php_stream_read(intern->u.file.stream, Z_STRVAL_P(return_value), length);
/* needed because recv/read/gzread doesnt put a null at the end*/
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value)[Z_STRLEN_P(return_value)] = 0;
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_STRING;
}
| 167,067 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char* engrave_tombstone(pid_t pid, pid_t tid, int signal, int original_si_code,
uintptr_t abort_msg_address, bool dump_sibling_threads,
bool* detach_failed, int* total_sleep_time_usec) {
log_t log;
log.current_tid = tid;
log.crashed_tid = tid;
if ((mkdir(TOMBSTONE_DIR, 0755) == -1) && (errno != EEXIST)) {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "failed to create %s: %s\n", TOMBSTONE_DIR, strerror(errno));
}
if (chown(TOMBSTONE_DIR, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM) == -1) {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "failed to change ownership of %s: %s\n", TOMBSTONE_DIR, strerror(errno));
}
int fd = -1;
char* path = NULL;
if (selinux_android_restorecon(TOMBSTONE_DIR, 0) == 0) {
path = find_and_open_tombstone(&fd);
} else {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "Failed to restore security context, not writing tombstone.\n");
}
if (fd < 0) {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "Skipping tombstone write, nothing to do.\n");
*detach_failed = false;
return NULL;
}
log.tfd = fd;
int amfd = activity_manager_connect();
log.amfd = amfd;
*detach_failed = dump_crash(&log, pid, tid, signal, original_si_code, abort_msg_address,
dump_sibling_threads, total_sleep_time_usec);
ALOGI("\nTombstone written to: %s\n", path);
close(amfd);
close(fd);
return path;
}
Commit Message: Don't create tombstone directory.
Partial backport of cf79748.
Bug: http://b/26403620
Change-Id: Ib877ab6cfab6aef079830c5a50ba81141ead35ee
CWE ID: CWE-264 | char* engrave_tombstone(pid_t pid, pid_t tid, int signal, int original_si_code,
uintptr_t abort_msg_address, bool dump_sibling_threads,
bool* detach_failed, int* total_sleep_time_usec) {
log_t log;
log.current_tid = tid;
log.crashed_tid = tid;
int fd = -1;
char* path = find_and_open_tombstone(&fd);
if (fd < 0) {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "Skipping tombstone write, nothing to do.\n");
*detach_failed = false;
return NULL;
}
log.tfd = fd;
int amfd = activity_manager_connect();
log.amfd = amfd;
*detach_failed = dump_crash(&log, pid, tid, signal, original_si_code, abort_msg_address,
dump_sibling_threads, total_sleep_time_usec);
ALOGI("\nTombstone written to: %s\n", path);
close(amfd);
close(fd);
return path;
}
| 173,890 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_all_variants)
{
const char* loc_name = NULL;
int loc_name_len = 0;
int result = 0;
char* token = NULL;
char* variant = NULL;
char* saved_ptr = NULL;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&loc_name, &loc_name_len ) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_parse: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_name_len == 0) {
loc_name = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
array_init( return_value );
/* If the locale is grandfathered, stop, no variants */
if( findOffset( LOC_GRANDFATHERED , loc_name ) >= 0 ){
/* ("Grandfathered Tag. No variants."); */
}
else {
/* Call ICU variant */
variant = get_icu_value_internal( loc_name , LOC_VARIANT_TAG , &result ,0);
if( result > 0 && variant){
/* Tokenize on the "_" or "-" */
token = php_strtok_r( variant , DELIMITER , &saved_ptr);
add_next_index_stringl( return_value, token , strlen(token) ,TRUE );
/* tokenize on the "_" or "-" and stop at singleton if any */
while( (token = php_strtok_r(NULL , DELIMITER, &saved_ptr)) && (strlen(token)>1) ){
add_next_index_stringl( return_value, token , strlen(token) ,TRUE );
}
}
if( variant ){
efree( variant );
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_all_variants)
{
const char* loc_name = NULL;
int loc_name_len = 0;
int result = 0;
char* token = NULL;
char* variant = NULL;
char* saved_ptr = NULL;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&loc_name, &loc_name_len ) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_parse: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_name_len == 0) {
loc_name = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
array_init( return_value );
/* If the locale is grandfathered, stop, no variants */
if( findOffset( LOC_GRANDFATHERED , loc_name ) >= 0 ){
/* ("Grandfathered Tag. No variants."); */
}
else {
/* Call ICU variant */
variant = get_icu_value_internal( loc_name , LOC_VARIANT_TAG , &result ,0);
if( result > 0 && variant){
/* Tokenize on the "_" or "-" */
token = php_strtok_r( variant , DELIMITER , &saved_ptr);
add_next_index_stringl( return_value, token , strlen(token) ,TRUE );
/* tokenize on the "_" or "-" and stop at singleton if any */
while( (token = php_strtok_r(NULL , DELIMITER, &saved_ptr)) && (strlen(token)>1) ){
add_next_index_stringl( return_value, token , strlen(token) ,TRUE );
}
}
if( variant ){
efree( variant );
}
}
}
| 167,192 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ohci_bus_start(OHCIState *ohci)
{
ohci->eof_timer = timer_new_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL,
ohci_frame_boundary,
ohci);
if (ohci->eof_timer == NULL) {
trace_usb_ohci_bus_eof_timer_failed(ohci->name);
ohci_die(ohci);
return 0;
}
trace_usb_ohci_start(ohci->name);
/* Delay the first SOF event by one frame time as
if (ohci->eof_timer == NULL) {
trace_usb_ohci_bus_eof_timer_failed(ohci->name);
ohci_die(ohci);
return 0;
}
trace_usb_ohci_start(ohci->name);
/* Delay the first SOF event by one frame time as
static void ohci_bus_stop(OHCIState *ohci)
{
trace_usb_ohci_stop(ohci->name);
if (ohci->eof_timer) {
timer_del(ohci->eof_timer);
timer_free(ohci->eof_timer);
}
ohci->eof_timer = NULL;
}
/* Sets a flag in a port status register but only set it if the port is
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | static int ohci_bus_start(OHCIState *ohci)
{
trace_usb_ohci_start(ohci->name);
/* Delay the first SOF event by one frame time as
if (ohci->eof_timer == NULL) {
trace_usb_ohci_bus_eof_timer_failed(ohci->name);
ohci_die(ohci);
return 0;
}
trace_usb_ohci_start(ohci->name);
/* Delay the first SOF event by one frame time as
static void ohci_bus_stop(OHCIState *ohci)
{
trace_usb_ohci_stop(ohci->name);
timer_del(ohci->eof_timer);
}
/* Sets a flag in a port status register but only set it if the port is
}
| 165,188 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: AriaCurrentState AXNodeObject::ariaCurrentState() const {
const AtomicString& attributeValue =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kCurrent);
if (attributeValue.isNull())
return AriaCurrentStateUndefined;
if (attributeValue.isEmpty() || equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "false"))
return AriaCurrentStateFalse;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "true"))
return AriaCurrentStateTrue;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "page"))
return AriaCurrentStatePage;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "step"))
return AriaCurrentStateStep;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "location"))
return AriaCurrentStateLocation;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "date"))
return AriaCurrentStateDate;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "time"))
return AriaCurrentStateTime;
if (!attributeValue.isEmpty())
return AriaCurrentStateTrue;
return AXObject::ariaCurrentState();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | AriaCurrentState AXNodeObject::ariaCurrentState() const {
const AtomicString& attributeValue =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kCurrent);
if (attributeValue.isNull())
return AriaCurrentStateUndefined;
if (attributeValue.isEmpty() ||
equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "false"))
return AriaCurrentStateFalse;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "true"))
return AriaCurrentStateTrue;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "page"))
return AriaCurrentStatePage;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "step"))
return AriaCurrentStateStep;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "location"))
return AriaCurrentStateLocation;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "date"))
return AriaCurrentStateDate;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "time"))
return AriaCurrentStateTime;
if (!attributeValue.isEmpty())
return AriaCurrentStateTrue;
return AXObject::ariaCurrentState();
}
| 171,908 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::CreateBlockGroup(long long start_offset, long long size,
long long discard_padding) {
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count >= 0);
assert(m_entries_count < m_entries_size);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = start_offset;
const long long stop = start_offset + size;
long long prev = 1; // nonce
long long next = 0; // nonce
long long duration = -1; // really, this is unsigned
long long bpos = -1;
long long bsize = -1;
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume size
if (id == 0x21) { // Block ID
if (bpos < 0) { // Block ID
bpos = pos;
bsize = size;
}
} else if (id == 0x1B) { // Duration ID
assert(size <= 8);
duration = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
assert(duration >= 0); // TODO
} else if (id == 0x7B) { // ReferenceBlock
assert(size <= 8);
const long size_ = static_cast<long>(size);
long long time;
long status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, size_, time);
assert(status == 0);
if (status != 0)
return -1;
if (time <= 0) // see note above
prev = time;
else // weird
next = time;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
assert(bpos >= 0);
assert(bsize >= 0);
const long idx = m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** const ppEntry = m_entries + idx;
BlockEntry*& pEntry = *ppEntry;
pEntry = new (std::nothrow)
BlockGroup(this, idx, bpos, bsize, prev, next, duration, discard_padding);
if (pEntry == NULL)
return -1; // generic error
BlockGroup* const p = static_cast<BlockGroup*>(pEntry);
const long status = p->Parse();
if (status == 0) { // success
++m_entries_count;
return 0;
}
delete pEntry;
pEntry = 0;
return status;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long Cluster::CreateBlockGroup(long long start_offset, long long size,
long long discard_padding) {
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count >= 0);
assert(m_entries_count < m_entries_size);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = start_offset;
const long long stop = start_offset + size;
long long prev = 1; // nonce
long long next = 0; // nonce
long long duration = -1; // really, this is unsigned
long long bpos = -1;
long long bsize = -1;
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadID(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0 || (pos + len) > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume size
if (id == 0x21) { // Block ID
if (bpos < 0) { // Block ID
bpos = pos;
bsize = size;
}
} else if (id == 0x1B) { // Duration ID
if (size > 8)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
duration = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (duration < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x7B) { // ReferenceBlock
if (size > 8 || size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long size_ = static_cast<long>(size);
long long time;
long status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, size_, time);
assert(status == 0);
if (status != 0)
return -1;
if (time <= 0) // see note above
prev = time;
else // weird
next = time;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (bpos < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
assert(bsize >= 0);
const long idx = m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** const ppEntry = m_entries + idx;
BlockEntry*& pEntry = *ppEntry;
pEntry = new (std::nothrow)
BlockGroup(this, idx, bpos, bsize, prev, next, duration, discard_padding);
if (pEntry == NULL)
return -1; // generic error
BlockGroup* const p = static_cast<BlockGroup*>(pEntry);
const long status = p->Parse();
if (status == 0) { // success
++m_entries_count;
return 0;
}
delete pEntry;
pEntry = 0;
return status;
}
| 173,806 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int usb_cypress_load_firmware(struct usb_device *udev, const struct firmware *fw, int type)
{
struct hexline *hx;
u8 reset;
int ret,pos=0;
hx = kmalloc(sizeof(*hx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hx)
return -ENOMEM;
/* stop the CPU */
reset = 1;
if ((ret = usb_cypress_writemem(udev,cypress[type].cpu_cs_register,&reset,1)) != 1)
err("could not stop the USB controller CPU.");
while ((ret = dvb_usb_get_hexline(fw, hx, &pos)) > 0) {
deb_fw("writing to address 0x%04x (buffer: 0x%02x %02x)\n", hx->addr, hx->len, hx->chk);
ret = usb_cypress_writemem(udev, hx->addr, hx->data, hx->len);
if (ret != hx->len) {
err("error while transferring firmware (transferred size: %d, block size: %d)",
ret, hx->len);
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
if (ret < 0) {
err("firmware download failed at %d with %d",pos,ret);
kfree(hx);
return ret;
}
if (ret == 0) {
/* restart the CPU */
reset = 0;
if (ret || usb_cypress_writemem(udev,cypress[type].cpu_cs_register,&reset,1) != 1) {
err("could not restart the USB controller CPU.");
ret = -EINVAL;
}
} else
ret = -EIO;
kfree(hx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: [media] dvb-usb-firmware: don't do DMA on stack
The buffer allocation for the firmware data was changed in
commit 43fab9793c1f ("[media] dvb-usb: don't use stack for firmware load")
but the same applies for the reset value.
Fixes: 43fab9793c1f ("[media] dvb-usb: don't use stack for firmware load")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int usb_cypress_load_firmware(struct usb_device *udev, const struct firmware *fw, int type)
{
struct hexline *hx;
u8 *buf;
int ret, pos = 0;
u16 cpu_cs_register = cypress[type].cpu_cs_register;
buf = kmalloc(sizeof(*hx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
hx = (struct hexline *)buf;
/* stop the CPU */
buf[0] = 1;
if (usb_cypress_writemem(udev, cpu_cs_register, buf, 1) != 1)
err("could not stop the USB controller CPU.");
while ((ret = dvb_usb_get_hexline(fw, hx, &pos)) > 0) {
deb_fw("writing to address 0x%04x (buffer: 0x%02x %02x)\n", hx->addr, hx->len, hx->chk);
ret = usb_cypress_writemem(udev, hx->addr, hx->data, hx->len);
if (ret != hx->len) {
err("error while transferring firmware (transferred size: %d, block size: %d)",
ret, hx->len);
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
if (ret < 0) {
err("firmware download failed at %d with %d",pos,ret);
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
if (ret == 0) {
/* restart the CPU */
buf[0] = 0;
if (usb_cypress_writemem(udev, cpu_cs_register, buf, 1) != 1) {
err("could not restart the USB controller CPU.");
ret = -EINVAL;
}
} else
ret = -EIO;
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
| 168,230 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CompileFromResponseCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
ExceptionState exception_state(args.GetIsolate(),
ExceptionState::kExecutionContext,
"WebAssembly", "compile");
ExceptionToRejectPromiseScope reject_promise_scope(args, exception_state);
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(args);
if (!ExecutionContext::From(script_state)) {
V8SetReturnValue(args, ScriptPromise().V8Value());
return;
}
if (args.Length() < 1 || !args[0]->IsObject() ||
!V8Response::hasInstance(args[0], args.GetIsolate())) {
V8SetReturnValue(
args,
ScriptPromise::Reject(
script_state, V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(
script_state->GetIsolate(),
"An argument must be provided, which must be a"
"Response or Promise<Response> object"))
.V8Value());
return;
}
Response* response = V8Response::ToImpl(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(args[0]));
if (response->MimeType() != "application/wasm") {
V8SetReturnValue(
args,
ScriptPromise::Reject(
script_state,
V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(
script_state->GetIsolate(),
"Incorrect response MIME type. Expected 'application/wasm'."))
.V8Value());
return;
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> promise;
if (response->IsBodyLocked() || response->bodyUsed()) {
promise = ScriptPromise::Reject(script_state,
V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(
script_state->GetIsolate(),
"Cannot compile WebAssembly.Module "
"from an already read Response"))
.V8Value();
} else {
if (response->BodyBuffer()) {
FetchDataLoaderAsWasmModule* loader =
new FetchDataLoaderAsWasmModule(script_state);
promise = loader->GetPromise();
response->BodyBuffer()->StartLoading(loader, new WasmDataLoaderClient());
} else {
promise = ScriptPromise::Reject(script_state,
V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(
script_state->GetIsolate(),
"Response object has a null body."))
.V8Value();
}
}
V8SetReturnValue(args, promise);
}
Commit Message: [wasm] Use correct bindings APIs
Use ScriptState::ForCurrentRealm in static methods, instead of
ForRelevantRealm().
Bug: chromium:788453
Change-Id: I63bd25e3f5a4e8d7cbaff945da8df0d71aa65527
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/795096
Commit-Queue: Mircea Trofin <mtrofin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#520174}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void CompileFromResponseCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
ExceptionState exception_state(args.GetIsolate(),
ExceptionState::kExecutionContext,
"WebAssembly", "compile");
ExceptionToRejectPromiseScope reject_promise_scope(args, exception_state);
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForCurrentRealm(args);
if (!ExecutionContext::From(script_state)) {
V8SetReturnValue(args, ScriptPromise().V8Value());
return;
}
if (args.Length() < 1 || !args[0]->IsObject() ||
!V8Response::hasInstance(args[0], args.GetIsolate())) {
V8SetReturnValue(
args,
ScriptPromise::Reject(
script_state, V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(
script_state->GetIsolate(),
"An argument must be provided, which must be a "
"Response or Promise<Response> object"))
.V8Value());
return;
}
Response* response = V8Response::ToImpl(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(args[0]));
if (response->MimeType() != "application/wasm") {
V8SetReturnValue(
args,
ScriptPromise::Reject(
script_state,
V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(
script_state->GetIsolate(),
"Incorrect response MIME type. Expected 'application/wasm'."))
.V8Value());
return;
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> promise;
if (response->IsBodyLocked() || response->bodyUsed()) {
promise = ScriptPromise::Reject(script_state,
V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(
script_state->GetIsolate(),
"Cannot compile WebAssembly.Module "
"from an already read Response"))
.V8Value();
} else {
if (response->BodyBuffer()) {
FetchDataLoaderAsWasmModule* loader =
new FetchDataLoaderAsWasmModule(script_state);
promise = loader->GetPromise();
response->BodyBuffer()->StartLoading(loader, new WasmDataLoaderClient());
} else {
promise = ScriptPromise::Reject(script_state,
V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(
script_state->GetIsolate(),
"Response object has a null body."))
.V8Value();
}
}
V8SetReturnValue(args, promise);
}
| 172,938 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidPreviewPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage_Params& params) {
DCHECK(params.page_number >= printing::FIRST_PAGE_INDEX);
print_preview_pages_remaining_--;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidPreviewPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage_Params& params) {
DCHECK_GE(params.page_number, printing::FIRST_PAGE_INDEX);
print_preview_pages_remaining_--;
}
| 170,849 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: walk_string(fz_context *ctx, int uni, int remove, editable_str *str)
{
int rune;
if (str->utf8 == NULL)
return;
do
{
char *s = &str->utf8[str->pos];
size_t len;
int n = fz_chartorune(&rune, s);
if (rune == uni)
{
/* Match. Skip over that one. */
str->pos += n;
}
else if (uni == 32) {
/* We don't care if we're given whitespace
* and it doesn't match the string. Don't
* skip forward. Nothing to remove. */
break;
}
else if (rune == 32) {
/* The string has a whitespace, and we
* don't match it; that's forgivable as
* PDF often misses out spaces. Remove this
* if we are removing stuff. */
}
else
{
/* Mismatch. No point in tracking through any more. */
str->pos = -1;
break;
}
if (remove)
{
len = strlen(s+n);
memmove(s, s+n, len+1);
str->edited = 1;
}
}
while (rune != uni);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | walk_string(fz_context *ctx, int uni, int remove, editable_str *str)
{
int rune;
if (str->utf8 == NULL || str->pos == -1)
return;
do
{
char *s = &str->utf8[str->pos];
size_t len;
int n = fz_chartorune(&rune, s);
if (rune == uni)
{
/* Match. Skip over that one. */
str->pos += n;
}
else if (uni == 32) {
/* We don't care if we're given whitespace
* and it doesn't match the string. Don't
* skip forward. Nothing to remove. */
break;
}
else if (rune == 32) {
/* The string has a whitespace, and we
* don't match it; that's forgivable as
* PDF often misses out spaces. Remove this
* if we are removing stuff. */
}
else
{
/* Mismatch. No point in tracking through any more. */
str->pos = -1;
break;
}
if (remove)
{
len = strlen(s+n);
memmove(s, s+n, len+1);
str->edited = 1;
}
}
while (rune != uni);
}
| 164,660 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void QuicStreamHost::Finish() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(p2p_stream_);
p2p_stream_->Finish();
writeable_ = false;
if (!readable_ && !writeable_) {
Delete();
}
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void QuicStreamHost::Finish() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(p2p_stream_);
std::vector<uint8_t> data;
p2p_stream_->WriteData(data, true);
writeable_ = false;
if (!readable_ && !writeable_) {
Delete();
}
}
| 172,269 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionTtsSpeakFunction::SpeechFinished() {
error_ = utterance_->error();
bool success = error_.empty();
SendResponse(success);
Release(); // Balanced in RunImpl().
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ExtensionTtsSpeakFunction::SpeechFinished() {
| 170,390 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri = ri->d.ktri;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = ktri->pkey;
unsigned char *ek = NULL;
size_t eklen;
int ret = 0;
CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY);
return 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311 | static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri = ri->d.ktri;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = ktri->pkey;
unsigned char *ek = NULL;
size_t eklen;
int ret = 0;
size_t fixlen = 0;
CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY);
return 0;
return 0;
}
| 165,137 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DoCheckFakeData(uint8* audio_data, size_t length) {
Type* output = reinterpret_cast<Type*>(audio_data);
for (size_t i = 0; i < length; i++) {
EXPECT_TRUE(algorithm_.is_muted() || output[i] != 0);
}
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void DoCheckFakeData(uint8* audio_data, size_t length) {
if (algorithm_.is_muted())
ASSERT_EQ(sum, 0);
else
ASSERT_NE(sum, 0);
}
| 171,531 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: extract_header_length(uint16_t fc)
{
int len = 0;
switch ((fc >> 10) & 0x3) {
case 0x00:
if (fc & (1 << 6)) /* intra-PAN with none dest addr */
return -1;
break;
case 0x01:
return -1;
case 0x02:
len += 4;
break;
case 0x03:
len += 10;
break;
}
switch ((fc >> 14) & 0x3) {
case 0x00:
break;
case 0x01:
return -1;
case 0x02:
len += 4;
break;
case 0x03:
len += 10;
break;
}
if (fc & (1 << 6)) {
if (len < 2)
return -1;
len -= 2;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13000/IEEE 802.15.4: Add more bounds checks.
While we're at it, add a bunch of macros for the frame control field's
subfields, have the reserved frame types show the frame type value, use
the same code path for processing source and destination addresses
regardless of whether -v was specified (just leave out the addresses in
non-verbose mode), and return the header length in all cases.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | extract_header_length(uint16_t fc)
| 170,029 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlParseMisc(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
while (((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '?')) ||
(CMP4(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', '-', '-')) ||
IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
if ((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '?')) {
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
} else if (IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
NEXT;
} else
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
}
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlParseMisc(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
while ((ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF) &&
(((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '?')) ||
(CMP4(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', '-', '-')) ||
IS_BLANK_CH(CUR))) {
if ((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '?')) {
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
} else if (IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
NEXT;
} else
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
}
}
| 171,294 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: native_handle_t* native_handle_create(int numFds, int numInts)
{
native_handle_t* h = malloc(
sizeof(native_handle_t) + sizeof(int)*(numFds+numInts));
if (h) {
h->version = sizeof(native_handle_t);
h->numFds = numFds;
h->numInts = numInts;
}
return h;
}
Commit Message: Prevent integer overflow when allocating native_handle_t
User specified values of numInts and numFds can overflow
and cause malloc to allocate less than we expect, causing
heap corruption in subsequent operations on the allocation.
Bug: 19334482
Change-Id: I43c75f536ea4c08f14ca12ca6288660fd2d1ec55
CWE ID: CWE-189 | native_handle_t* native_handle_create(int numFds, int numInts)
{
if (numFds < 0 || numInts < 0 || numFds > kMaxNativeFds || numInts > kMaxNativeInts) {
return NULL;
}
size_t mallocSize = sizeof(native_handle_t) + (sizeof(int) * (numFds + numInts));
native_handle_t* h = malloc(mallocSize);
if (h) {
h->version = sizeof(native_handle_t);
h->numFds = numFds;
h->numInts = numInts;
}
return h;
}
| 174,123 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(snmp, __construct)
{
php_snmp_object *snmp_object;
zval *object = getThis();
char *a1, *a2;
int a1_len, a2_len;
long timeout = SNMP_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
long retries = SNMP_DEFAULT_RETRIES;
long version = SNMP_DEFAULT_VERSION;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
zend_error_handling error_handling;
snmp_object = (php_snmp_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, NULL, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "lss|ll", &version, &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &timeout, &retries) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
switch(version) {
case SNMP_VERSION_1:
case SNMP_VERSION_2c:
case SNMP_VERSION_3:
break;
default:
zend_throw_exception(zend_exception_get_default(TSRMLS_C), "Unknown SNMP protocol version", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
/* handle re-open of snmp session */
if (snmp_object->session) {
netsnmp_session_free(&(snmp_object->session));
}
if (netsnmp_session_init(&(snmp_object->session), version, a1, a2, timeout, retries TSRMLS_CC)) {
return;
}
snmp_object->max_oids = 0;
snmp_object->valueretrieval = SNMP_G(valueretrieval);
snmp_object->enum_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM);
snmp_object->oid_output_format = netsnmp_ds_get_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT);
snmp_object->quick_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_QUICK_PRINT);
snmp_object->oid_increasing_check = TRUE;
snmp_object->exceptions_enabled = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | PHP_METHOD(snmp, __construct)
{
php_snmp_object *snmp_object;
zval *object = getThis();
char *a1, *a2;
int a1_len, a2_len;
long timeout = SNMP_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
long retries = SNMP_DEFAULT_RETRIES;
long version = SNMP_DEFAULT_VERSION;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
zend_error_handling error_handling;
snmp_object = (php_snmp_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, NULL, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "lss|ll", &version, &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &timeout, &retries) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
switch(version) {
case SNMP_VERSION_1:
case SNMP_VERSION_2c:
case SNMP_VERSION_3:
break;
default:
zend_throw_exception(zend_exception_get_default(TSRMLS_C), "Unknown SNMP protocol version", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
/* handle re-open of snmp session */
if (snmp_object->session) {
netsnmp_session_free(&(snmp_object->session));
}
if (netsnmp_session_init(&(snmp_object->session), version, a1, a2, timeout, retries TSRMLS_CC)) {
return;
}
snmp_object->max_oids = 0;
snmp_object->valueretrieval = SNMP_G(valueretrieval);
snmp_object->enum_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM);
snmp_object->oid_output_format = netsnmp_ds_get_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT);
snmp_object->quick_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_QUICK_PRINT);
snmp_object->oid_increasing_check = TRUE;
snmp_object->exceptions_enabled = 0;
}
| 164,972 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int fsmVerify(const char *path, rpmfi fi)
{
int rc;
int saveerrno = errno;
struct stat dsb;
mode_t mode = rpmfiFMode(fi);
rc = fsmStat(path, 1, &dsb);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (S_ISREG(mode)) {
/* HP-UX (and other os'es) don't permit unlink on busy files. */
char *rmpath = rstrscat(NULL, path, "-RPMDELETE", NULL);
rc = fsmRename(path, rmpath);
/* XXX shouldn't we take unlink return code here? */
if (!rc)
(void) fsmUnlink(rmpath);
else
rc = RPMERR_UNLINK_FAILED;
free(rmpath);
return (rc ? rc : RPMERR_ENOENT); /* XXX HACK */
} else if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
if (S_ISDIR(dsb.st_mode)) return 0;
if (S_ISLNK(dsb.st_mode)) {
rc = fsmStat(path, 0, &dsb);
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) rc = 0;
if (rc) return rc;
errno = saveerrno;
if (S_ISDIR(dsb.st_mode)) return 0;
}
} else if (S_ISLNK(mode)) {
if (S_ISLNK(dsb.st_mode)) {
char buf[8 * BUFSIZ];
size_t len;
rc = fsmReadLink(path, buf, 8 * BUFSIZ, &len);
errno = saveerrno;
if (rc) return rc;
if (rstreq(rpmfiFLink(fi), buf)) return 0;
}
} else if (S_ISFIFO(mode)) {
if (S_ISFIFO(dsb.st_mode)) return 0;
} else if (S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) {
if ((S_ISCHR(dsb.st_mode) || S_ISBLK(dsb.st_mode)) &&
(dsb.st_rdev == rpmfiFRdev(fi))) return 0;
} else if (S_ISSOCK(mode)) {
if (S_ISSOCK(dsb.st_mode)) return 0;
}
/* XXX shouldn't do this with commit/undo. */
rc = fsmUnlink(path);
if (rc == 0) rc = RPMERR_ENOENT;
return (rc ? rc : RPMERR_ENOENT); /* XXX HACK */
}
Commit Message: Restrict following symlinks to directories by ownership (CVE-2017-7500)
Only follow directory symlinks owned by target directory owner or root.
This prevents privilege escalation from user-writable directories via
directory symlinks to privileged directories on package upgrade, while
still allowing admin to arrange disk usage with symlinks.
The rationale is that if you can create symlinks owned by user X you *are*
user X (or root), and if you also own directory Y you can do whatever with
it already, including change permissions. So when you create a symlink to
that directory, the link ownership acts as a simple stamp of authority that
you indeed want rpm to treat this symlink as it were the directory that
you own. Such a permission can only be given by you or root, which
is just the way we want it. Plus it's almost ridiculously simple as far
as rules go, compared to trying to calculate something from the
source vs destination directory permissions etc.
In the normal case, the user arranging diskspace with symlinks is indeed
root so nothing changes, the only real change here is to links created by
non-privileged users which should be few and far between in practise.
Unfortunately our test-suite runs as a regular user via fakechroot and
thus the testcase for this fails under the new rules. Adjust the testcase
to get the ownership straight and add a second case for the illegal
behavior, basically the same as the old one but with different expectations.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | static int fsmVerify(const char *path, rpmfi fi)
static int fsmVerify(const char *path, rpmfi fi, const struct stat *fsb)
{
int rc;
int saveerrno = errno;
struct stat dsb;
mode_t mode = rpmfiFMode(fi);
rc = fsmStat(path, 1, &dsb);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (S_ISREG(mode)) {
/* HP-UX (and other os'es) don't permit unlink on busy files. */
char *rmpath = rstrscat(NULL, path, "-RPMDELETE", NULL);
rc = fsmRename(path, rmpath);
/* XXX shouldn't we take unlink return code here? */
if (!rc)
(void) fsmUnlink(rmpath);
else
rc = RPMERR_UNLINK_FAILED;
free(rmpath);
return (rc ? rc : RPMERR_ENOENT); /* XXX HACK */
} else if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
if (S_ISDIR(dsb.st_mode)) return 0;
if (S_ISLNK(dsb.st_mode)) {
uid_t luid = dsb.st_uid;
rc = fsmStat(path, 0, &dsb);
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) rc = 0;
if (rc) return rc;
errno = saveerrno;
/* Only permit directory symlinks by target owner and root */
if (S_ISDIR(dsb.st_mode) && (luid == 0 || luid == fsb->st_uid))
return 0;
}
} else if (S_ISLNK(mode)) {
if (S_ISLNK(dsb.st_mode)) {
char buf[8 * BUFSIZ];
size_t len;
rc = fsmReadLink(path, buf, 8 * BUFSIZ, &len);
errno = saveerrno;
if (rc) return rc;
if (rstreq(rpmfiFLink(fi), buf)) return 0;
}
} else if (S_ISFIFO(mode)) {
if (S_ISFIFO(dsb.st_mode)) return 0;
} else if (S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) {
if ((S_ISCHR(dsb.st_mode) || S_ISBLK(dsb.st_mode)) &&
(dsb.st_rdev == rpmfiFRdev(fi))) return 0;
} else if (S_ISSOCK(mode)) {
if (S_ISSOCK(dsb.st_mode)) return 0;
}
/* XXX shouldn't do this with commit/undo. */
rc = fsmUnlink(path);
if (rc == 0) rc = RPMERR_ENOENT;
return (rc ? rc : RPMERR_ENOENT); /* XXX HACK */
}
| 170,176 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void copy_fields(const FieldMatchContext *fm, AVFrame *dst,
const AVFrame *src, int field)
{
int plane;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && src->data[plane]; plane++)
av_image_copy_plane(dst->data[plane] + field*dst->linesize[plane], dst->linesize[plane] << 1,
src->data[plane] + field*src->linesize[plane], src->linesize[plane] << 1,
get_width(fm, src, plane), get_height(fm, src, plane) / 2);
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void copy_fields(const FieldMatchContext *fm, AVFrame *dst,
const AVFrame *src, int field)
{
int plane;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && src->data[plane] && src->linesize[plane]; plane++)
av_image_copy_plane(dst->data[plane] + field*dst->linesize[plane], dst->linesize[plane] << 1,
src->data[plane] + field*src->linesize[plane], src->linesize[plane] << 1,
get_width(fm, src, plane), get_height(fm, src, plane) / 2);
}
| 165,999 |
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