instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
bool is_in_page,
bool was_restored,
NavigationHandleImpl* handle) {
DCHECK(!rfh->GetParent());
NavigationEntryImpl* entry;
if (params.intended_as_new_entry) {
entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
} else if (params.nav_entry_id) {
entry = GetEntryWithUniqueID(params.nav_entry_id);
if (is_in_page) {
NavigationEntryImpl* last_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (entry->GetURL().GetOrigin() == last_entry->GetURL().GetOrigin() &&
last_entry->GetSSL().initialized && !entry->GetSSL().initialized &&
was_restored) {
entry->GetSSL() = last_entry->GetSSL();
}
} else {
entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
} else {
entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (!is_in_page)
entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
DCHECK(entry);
entry->set_page_type(params.url_is_unreachable ? PAGE_TYPE_ERROR
: PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
entry->SetURL(params.url);
entry->SetReferrer(params.referrer);
if (entry->update_virtual_url_with_url())
UpdateVirtualURLToURL(entry, params.url);
DCHECK(entry->site_instance() == nullptr ||
!entry->GetRedirectChain().empty() ||
entry->site_instance() == rfh->GetSiteInstance());
entry->AddOrUpdateFrameEntry(
rfh->frame_tree_node(), params.item_sequence_number,
params.document_sequence_number, rfh->GetSiteInstance(), nullptr,
params.url, params.referrer, params.redirects, params.page_state,
params.method, params.post_id);
if (ui::PageTransitionIsRedirect(params.transition) && !is_in_page)
entry->GetFavicon() = FaviconStatus();
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
last_committed_entry_index_ = GetIndexOfEntry(entry);
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
bool is_in_page,
bool was_restored,
NavigationHandleImpl* handle) {
DCHECK(!rfh->GetParent());
NavigationEntryImpl* entry;
if (params.intended_as_new_entry) {
entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
MaybeDumpCopiedNonSameOriginEntry("Existing page navigation", params,
is_in_page, entry);
} else if (params.nav_entry_id) {
entry = GetEntryWithUniqueID(params.nav_entry_id);
if (is_in_page) {
NavigationEntryImpl* last_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (entry->GetURL().GetOrigin() == last_entry->GetURL().GetOrigin() &&
last_entry->GetSSL().initialized && !entry->GetSSL().initialized &&
was_restored) {
entry->GetSSL() = last_entry->GetSSL();
}
} else {
entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
} else {
entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (!is_in_page)
entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
DCHECK(entry);
entry->set_page_type(params.url_is_unreachable ? PAGE_TYPE_ERROR
: PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
entry->SetURL(params.url);
entry->SetReferrer(params.referrer);
if (entry->update_virtual_url_with_url())
UpdateVirtualURLToURL(entry, params.url);
DCHECK(entry->site_instance() == nullptr ||
!entry->GetRedirectChain().empty() ||
entry->site_instance() == rfh->GetSiteInstance());
entry->AddOrUpdateFrameEntry(
rfh->frame_tree_node(), params.item_sequence_number,
params.document_sequence_number, rfh->GetSiteInstance(), nullptr,
params.url, params.referrer, params.redirects, params.page_state,
params.method, params.post_id);
if (ui::PageTransitionIsRedirect(params.transition) && !is_in_page)
entry->GetFavicon() = FaviconStatus();
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
last_committed_entry_index_ = GetIndexOfEntry(entry);
}
| 172,410 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: method_invocation_get_uid (GDBusMethodInvocation *context)
{
const gchar *sender;
PolkitSubject *busname;
PolkitSubject *process;
uid_t uid;
sender = g_dbus_method_invocation_get_sender (context);
busname = polkit_system_bus_name_new (sender);
process = polkit_system_bus_name_get_process_sync (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (busname), NULL, NULL);
uid = polkit_unix_process_get_uid (POLKIT_UNIX_PROCESS (process));
g_object_unref (busname);
g_object_unref (process);
return uid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | method_invocation_get_uid (GDBusMethodInvocation *context)
| 165,010 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ServerWrapper::OnHttpRequest(int connection_id,
const net::HttpServerRequestInfo& info) {
server_->SetSendBufferSize(connection_id, kSendBufferSizeForDevTools);
if (base::StartsWith(info.path, "/json", base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DevToolsHttpHandler::OnJsonRequest,
handler_, connection_id, info));
return;
}
if (info.path.empty() || info.path == "/") {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DevToolsHttpHandler::OnDiscoveryPageRequest, handler_,
connection_id));
return;
}
if (!base::StartsWith(info.path, "/devtools/",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
server_->Send404(connection_id, kDevtoolsHttpHandlerTrafficAnnotation);
return;
}
std::string filename = PathWithoutParams(info.path.substr(10));
std::string mime_type = GetMimeType(filename);
if (!debug_frontend_dir_.empty()) {
base::FilePath path = debug_frontend_dir_.AppendASCII(filename);
std::string data;
base::ReadFileToString(path, &data);
server_->Send200(connection_id, data, mime_type,
kDevtoolsHttpHandlerTrafficAnnotation);
return;
}
if (bundles_resources_) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DevToolsHttpHandler::OnFrontendResourceRequest,
handler_, connection_id, filename));
return;
}
server_->Send404(connection_id, kDevtoolsHttpHandlerTrafficAnnotation);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: check Host header for being IP or localhost when connecting over RDP.
Bug: 813540
Change-Id: I9338aa2475c15090b8a60729be25502eb866efb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/952522
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#541547}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ServerWrapper::OnHttpRequest(int connection_id,
const net::HttpServerRequestInfo& info) {
if (!RequestIsSafeToServe(info)) {
Send500(connection_id,
"Host header is specified and is not an IP address or localhost.");
return;
}
server_->SetSendBufferSize(connection_id, kSendBufferSizeForDevTools);
if (base::StartsWith(info.path, "/json", base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DevToolsHttpHandler::OnJsonRequest,
handler_, connection_id, info));
return;
}
if (info.path.empty() || info.path == "/") {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DevToolsHttpHandler::OnDiscoveryPageRequest, handler_,
connection_id));
return;
}
if (!base::StartsWith(info.path, "/devtools/",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
server_->Send404(connection_id, kDevtoolsHttpHandlerTrafficAnnotation);
return;
}
std::string filename = PathWithoutParams(info.path.substr(10));
std::string mime_type = GetMimeType(filename);
if (!debug_frontend_dir_.empty()) {
base::FilePath path = debug_frontend_dir_.AppendASCII(filename);
std::string data;
base::ReadFileToString(path, &data);
server_->Send200(connection_id, data, mime_type,
kDevtoolsHttpHandlerTrafficAnnotation);
return;
}
if (bundles_resources_) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DevToolsHttpHandler::OnFrontendResourceRequest,
handler_, connection_id, filename));
return;
}
server_->Send404(connection_id, kDevtoolsHttpHandlerTrafficAnnotation);
}
| 172,732 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PageGroupLoadDeferrer::PageGroupLoadDeferrer(Page* page, bool deferSelf)
{
const HashSet<Page*>& pages = page->group().pages();
HashSet<Page*>::const_iterator end = pages.end();
for (HashSet<Page*>::const_iterator it = pages.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
Page* otherPage = *it;
if ((deferSelf || otherPage != page)) {
if (!otherPage->defersLoading()) {
m_deferredFrames.append(otherPage->mainFrame());
for (Frame* frame = otherPage->mainFrame(); frame; frame = frame->tree()->traverseNext())
frame->document()->suspendScheduledTasks(ActiveDOMObject::WillDeferLoading);
}
}
}
size_t count = m_deferredFrames.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i)
if (Page* page = m_deferredFrames[i]->page())
page->setDefersLoading(true);
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | PageGroupLoadDeferrer::PageGroupLoadDeferrer(Page* page, bool deferSelf)
{
const HashSet<Page*>& pages = page->group().pages();
HashSet<Page*>::const_iterator end = pages.end();
for (HashSet<Page*>::const_iterator it = pages.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
Page* otherPage = *it;
if ((deferSelf || otherPage != page)) {
if (!otherPage->defersLoading()) {
m_deferredFrames.append(otherPage->mainFrame());
// Ensure that we notify the client if the initial empty document is accessed before showing anything
// modal, to prevent spoofs while the modal window or sheet is visible.
otherPage->mainFrame()->loader()->notifyIfInitialDocumentAccessed();
for (Frame* frame = otherPage->mainFrame(); frame; frame = frame->tree()->traverseNext())
frame->document()->suspendScheduledTasks(ActiveDOMObject::WillDeferLoading);
}
}
}
size_t count = m_deferredFrames.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i)
if (Page* page = m_deferredFrames[i]->page())
page->setDefersLoading(true);
}
| 171,190 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: zend_object_iterator *spl_filesystem_dir_get_iterator(zend_class_entry *ce, zval *object, int by_ref TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator;
spl_filesystem_object *dir_object;
if (by_ref) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "An iterator cannot be used with foreach by reference");
}
dir_object = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
iterator = spl_filesystem_object_to_iterator(dir_object);
/* initialize iterator if it wasn't gotten before */
if (iterator->intern.data == NULL) {
iterator->intern.data = object;
iterator->intern.funcs = &spl_filesystem_dir_it_funcs;
/* ->current must be initialized; rewind doesn't set it and valid
* doesn't check whether it's set */
iterator->current = object;
}
zval_add_ref(&object);
return (zend_object_iterator*)iterator;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | zend_object_iterator *spl_filesystem_dir_get_iterator(zend_class_entry *ce, zval *object, int by_ref TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator;
spl_filesystem_object *dir_object;
if (by_ref) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "An iterator cannot be used with foreach by reference");
}
dir_object = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
iterator = spl_filesystem_object_to_iterator(dir_object);
/* initialize iterator if it wasn't gotten before */
if (iterator->intern.data == NULL) {
iterator->intern.data = object;
iterator->intern.funcs = &spl_filesystem_dir_it_funcs;
/* ->current must be initialized; rewind doesn't set it and valid
* doesn't check whether it's set */
iterator->current = object;
}
zval_add_ref(&object);
return (zend_object_iterator*)iterator;
}
| 167,069 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void qrio_cpuwd_flag(bool flag)
{
u8 reason1;
void __iomem *qrio_base = (void *)CONFIG_SYS_QRIO_BASE;
reason1 = in_8(qrio_base + REASON1_OFF);
if (flag)
reason1 |= REASON1_CPUWD;
else
reason1 &= ~REASON1_CPUWD;
out_8(qrio_base + REASON1_OFF, reason1);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | void qrio_cpuwd_flag(bool flag)
{
u8 reason1;
void __iomem *qrio_base = (void *)CONFIG_SYS_QRIO_BASE;
reason1 = in_8(qrio_base + REASON1_OFF);
if (flag)
reason1 |= REASON1_CPUWD;
else
reason1 &= ~REASON1_CPUWD;
out_8(qrio_base + REASON1_OFF, reason1);
}
| 169,624 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void BooleanOrNullAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "booleanOrNullAttribute");
bool cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLBoolean>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
bool is_null = IsUndefinedOrNull(v8_value);
impl->setBooleanOrNullAttribute(cpp_value, is_null);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | static void BooleanOrNullAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "booleanOrNullAttribute");
bool is_null = IsUndefinedOrNull(v8_value);
bool cpp_value = is_null ? bool() : NativeValueTraits<IDLBoolean>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setBooleanOrNullAttribute(cpp_value, is_null);
}
| 172,304 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: enum nss_status _nss_mymachines_getgrnam_r(
const char *name,
struct group *gr,
char *buffer, size_t buflen,
int *errnop) {
_cleanup_bus_error_free_ sd_bus_error error = SD_BUS_ERROR_NULL;
_cleanup_bus_message_unref_ sd_bus_message* reply = NULL;
_cleanup_bus_flush_close_unref_ sd_bus *bus = NULL;
const char *p, *e, *machine;
uint32_t mapped;
uid_t gid;
size_t l;
int r;
assert(name);
assert(gr);
p = startswith(name, "vg-");
if (!p)
goto not_found;
e = strrchr(p, '-');
if (!e || e == p)
goto not_found;
r = parse_gid(e + 1, &gid);
if (r < 0)
goto not_found;
machine = strndupa(p, e - p);
if (!machine_name_is_valid(machine))
goto not_found;
r = sd_bus_open_system(&bus);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_call_method(bus,
"org.freedesktop.machine1",
"/org/freedesktop/machine1",
"org.freedesktop.machine1.Manager",
"MapFromMachineGroup",
&error,
&reply,
"su",
machine, (uint32_t) gid);
if (r < 0) {
if (sd_bus_error_has_name(&error, BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_GROUP_MAPPING))
goto not_found;
goto fail;
}
r = sd_bus_message_read(reply, "u", &mapped);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
l = sizeof(char*) + strlen(name) + 1;
if (buflen < l) {
*errnop = ENOMEM;
return NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN;
}
memzero(buffer, sizeof(char*));
strcpy(buffer + sizeof(char*), name);
gr->gr_name = buffer + sizeof(char*);
gr->gr_gid = gid;
gr->gr_passwd = (char*) "*"; /* locked */
gr->gr_mem = (char**) buffer;
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
not_found:
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_NOTFOUND;
fail:
*errnop = -r;
return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
}
Commit Message: nss-mymachines: do not allow overlong machine names
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/2002
CWE ID: CWE-119 | enum nss_status _nss_mymachines_getgrnam_r(
const char *name,
struct group *gr,
char *buffer, size_t buflen,
int *errnop) {
_cleanup_bus_error_free_ sd_bus_error error = SD_BUS_ERROR_NULL;
_cleanup_bus_message_unref_ sd_bus_message* reply = NULL;
_cleanup_bus_flush_close_unref_ sd_bus *bus = NULL;
const char *p, *e, *machine;
uint32_t mapped;
uid_t gid;
size_t l;
int r;
assert(name);
assert(gr);
p = startswith(name, "vg-");
if (!p)
goto not_found;
e = strrchr(p, '-');
if (!e || e == p)
goto not_found;
if (e - p > HOST_NAME_MAX - 1) /* -1 for the last dash */
goto not_found;
r = parse_gid(e + 1, &gid);
if (r < 0)
goto not_found;
machine = strndupa(p, e - p);
if (!machine_name_is_valid(machine))
goto not_found;
r = sd_bus_open_system(&bus);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_call_method(bus,
"org.freedesktop.machine1",
"/org/freedesktop/machine1",
"org.freedesktop.machine1.Manager",
"MapFromMachineGroup",
&error,
&reply,
"su",
machine, (uint32_t) gid);
if (r < 0) {
if (sd_bus_error_has_name(&error, BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_GROUP_MAPPING))
goto not_found;
goto fail;
}
r = sd_bus_message_read(reply, "u", &mapped);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
l = sizeof(char*) + strlen(name) + 1;
if (buflen < l) {
*errnop = ENOMEM;
return NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN;
}
memzero(buffer, sizeof(char*));
strcpy(buffer + sizeof(char*), name);
gr->gr_name = buffer + sizeof(char*);
gr->gr_gid = gid;
gr->gr_passwd = (char*) "*"; /* locked */
gr->gr_mem = (char**) buffer;
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
not_found:
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_NOTFOUND;
fail:
*errnop = -r;
return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
}
| 168,869 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::freeBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CLOG_BUFFER(freeBuffer, "%s:%u %#x", portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer);
removeActiveBuffer(portIndex, buffer);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer);
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_FreeBuffer(mHandle, portIndex, header);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(freeBuffer, err, "%s:%u %#x", portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer);
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
invalidateBufferID(buffer);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::freeBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CLOG_BUFFER(freeBuffer, "%s:%u %#x", portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer);
removeActiveBuffer(portIndex, buffer);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, portIndex);
if (header == NULL) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_FreeBuffer(mHandle, portIndex, header);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(freeBuffer, err, "%s:%u %#x", portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer);
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
invalidateBufferID(buffer);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
| 173,529 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: psh_glyph_find_strong_points( PSH_Glyph glyph,
FT_Int dimension )
{
/* a point is `strong' if it is located on a stem edge and */
/* has an `in' or `out' tangent parallel to the hint's direction */
PSH_Hint_Table table = &glyph->hint_tables[dimension];
PS_Mask mask = table->hint_masks->masks;
FT_UInt num_masks = table->hint_masks->num_masks;
FT_UInt first = 0;
FT_Int major_dir = dimension == 0 ? PSH_DIR_VERTICAL
: PSH_DIR_HORIZONTAL;
PSH_Dimension dim = &glyph->globals->dimension[dimension];
FT_Fixed scale = dim->scale_mult;
FT_Int threshold;
threshold = (FT_Int)FT_DivFix( PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD, scale );
if ( threshold > PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM )
threshold = PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM;
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
if ( num_masks > 1 && glyph->num_points > 0 )
{
first = mask->end_point;
mask++;
for ( ; num_masks > 1; num_masks--, mask++ )
{
next = mask->end_point;
FT_Int count;
next = mask->end_point;
count = next - first;
if ( count > 0 )
{
threshold, major_dir );
}
first = next;
}
}
/* process primary hints for all points */
if ( num_masks == 1 )
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
psh_hint_table_activate_mask( table, table->hint_masks->masks );
psh_hint_table_find_strong_points( table, point, count,
threshold, major_dir );
}
/* now, certain points may have been attached to a hint and */
/* not marked as strong; update their flags then */
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, point++ )
if ( point->hint && !psh_point_is_strong( point ) )
psh_point_set_strong( point );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | psh_glyph_find_strong_points( PSH_Glyph glyph,
FT_Int dimension )
{
/* a point is `strong' if it is located on a stem edge and */
/* has an `in' or `out' tangent parallel to the hint's direction */
PSH_Hint_Table table = &glyph->hint_tables[dimension];
PS_Mask mask = table->hint_masks->masks;
FT_UInt num_masks = table->hint_masks->num_masks;
FT_UInt first = 0;
FT_Int major_dir = dimension == 0 ? PSH_DIR_VERTICAL
: PSH_DIR_HORIZONTAL;
PSH_Dimension dim = &glyph->globals->dimension[dimension];
FT_Fixed scale = dim->scale_mult;
FT_Int threshold;
threshold = (FT_Int)FT_DivFix( PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD, scale );
if ( threshold > PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM )
threshold = PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM;
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
if ( num_masks > 1 && glyph->num_points > 0 )
{
/* the `endchar' op can reduce the number of points */
first = mask->end_point > glyph->num_points
? glyph->num_points
: mask->end_point;
mask++;
for ( ; num_masks > 1; num_masks--, mask++ )
{
next = mask->end_point;
FT_Int count;
next = mask->end_point > glyph->num_points
? glyph->num_points
: mask->end_point;
count = next - first;
if ( count > 0 )
{
threshold, major_dir );
}
first = next;
}
}
/* process primary hints for all points */
if ( num_masks == 1 )
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
psh_hint_table_activate_mask( table, table->hint_masks->masks );
psh_hint_table_find_strong_points( table, point, count,
threshold, major_dir );
}
/* now, certain points may have been attached to a hint and */
/* not marked as strong; update their flags then */
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, point++ )
if ( point->hint && !psh_point_is_strong( point ) )
psh_point_set_strong( point );
}
}
| 165,007 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ext4_orphan_del(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode)
{
struct list_head *prev;
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
__u32 ino_next;
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
int err = 0;
/* ext4_handle_valid() assumes a valid handle_t pointer */
if (handle && !ext4_handle_valid(handle))
return 0;
mutex_lock(&EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_orphan_lock);
if (list_empty(&ei->i_orphan))
goto out;
ino_next = NEXT_ORPHAN(inode);
prev = ei->i_orphan.prev;
sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
jbd_debug(4, "remove inode %lu from orphan list\n", inode->i_ino);
list_del_init(&ei->i_orphan);
/* If we're on an error path, we may not have a valid
* transaction handle with which to update the orphan list on
* disk, but we still need to remove the inode from the linked
* list in memory. */
if (sbi->s_journal && !handle)
goto out;
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc);
if (err)
goto out_err;
if (prev == &sbi->s_orphan) {
jbd_debug(4, "superblock will point to %u\n", ino_next);
BUFFER_TRACE(sbi->s_sbh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, sbi->s_sbh);
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
sbi->s_es->s_last_orphan = cpu_to_le32(ino_next);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, inode->i_sb);
} else {
struct ext4_iloc iloc2;
struct inode *i_prev =
&list_entry(prev, struct ext4_inode_info, i_orphan)->vfs_inode;
jbd_debug(4, "orphan inode %lu will point to %u\n",
i_prev->i_ino, ino_next);
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, i_prev, &iloc2);
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
NEXT_ORPHAN(i_prev) = ino_next;
err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, i_prev, &iloc2);
}
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) = 0;
err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc);
out_err:
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err);
out:
mutex_unlock(&EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_orphan_lock);
return err;
out_brelse:
brelse(iloc.bh);
goto out_err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: make orphan functions be no-op in no-journal mode
Instead of checking whether the handle is valid, we check if journal
is enabled. This avoids taking the s_orphan_lock mutex in all cases
when there is no journal in use, including the error paths where
ext4_orphan_del() is called with a handle set to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Anatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int ext4_orphan_del(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode)
{
struct list_head *prev;
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
__u32 ino_next;
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
int err = 0;
if (!EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal)
return 0;
mutex_lock(&EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_orphan_lock);
if (list_empty(&ei->i_orphan))
goto out;
ino_next = NEXT_ORPHAN(inode);
prev = ei->i_orphan.prev;
sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
jbd_debug(4, "remove inode %lu from orphan list\n", inode->i_ino);
list_del_init(&ei->i_orphan);
/* If we're on an error path, we may not have a valid
* transaction handle with which to update the orphan list on
* disk, but we still need to remove the inode from the linked
* list in memory. */
if (!handle)
goto out;
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc);
if (err)
goto out_err;
if (prev == &sbi->s_orphan) {
jbd_debug(4, "superblock will point to %u\n", ino_next);
BUFFER_TRACE(sbi->s_sbh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, sbi->s_sbh);
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
sbi->s_es->s_last_orphan = cpu_to_le32(ino_next);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, inode->i_sb);
} else {
struct ext4_iloc iloc2;
struct inode *i_prev =
&list_entry(prev, struct ext4_inode_info, i_orphan)->vfs_inode;
jbd_debug(4, "orphan inode %lu will point to %u\n",
i_prev->i_ino, ino_next);
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, i_prev, &iloc2);
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
NEXT_ORPHAN(i_prev) = ino_next;
err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, i_prev, &iloc2);
}
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) = 0;
err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc);
out_err:
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err);
out:
mutex_unlock(&EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_orphan_lock);
return err;
out_brelse:
brelse(iloc.bh);
goto out_err;
}
| 166,582 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_create(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
ih264d_create_op_t *ps_create_op;
WORD32 ret;
ps_create_op = (ih264d_create_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
ret = ih264d_allocate_static_bufs(&dec_hdl, pv_api_ip, pv_api_op);
/* If allocation of some buffer fails, then free buffers allocated till then */
if((IV_FAIL == ret) && (NULL != dec_hdl))
{
ih264d_free_static_bufs(dec_hdl);
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
return IV_FAIL;
}
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Handle dec_hdl memory allocation failure gracefully
If memory allocation for dec_hdl fails, return gracefully
with an error code. All other allocation failures are
handled correctly.
Bug: 68300072
Test: ran poc before/after
Change-Id: I118ae71f4aded658441f1932bd4ede3536f5028b
(cherry picked from commit 7720b3fe3de04523da3a9ecec2b42a3748529bbd)
CWE ID: CWE-770 | WORD32 ih264d_create(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
ih264d_create_ip_t *ps_create_ip;
ih264d_create_op_t *ps_create_op;
WORD32 ret;
ps_create_ip = (ih264d_create_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_create_op = (ih264d_create_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
dec_hdl = NULL;
ret = ih264d_allocate_static_bufs(&dec_hdl, pv_api_ip, pv_api_op);
/* If allocation of some buffer fails, then free buffers allocated till then */
if(IV_FAIL == ret)
{
if(dec_hdl)
{
if(dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle)
{
ih264d_free_static_bufs(dec_hdl);
}
else
{
void (*pf_aligned_free)(void *pv_mem_ctxt, void *pv_buf);
void *pv_mem_ctxt;
pf_aligned_free = ps_create_ip->s_ivd_create_ip_t.pf_aligned_free;
pv_mem_ctxt = ps_create_ip->s_ivd_create_ip_t.pv_mem_ctxt;
pf_aligned_free(pv_mem_ctxt, dec_hdl);
}
}
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
return IV_FAIL;
}
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
| 174,112 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FolderHeaderView::Update() {
if (!folder_item_)
return;
folder_name_view_->SetVisible(folder_name_visible_);
if (folder_name_visible_)
folder_name_view_->SetText(base::UTF8ToUTF16(folder_item_->name()));
Layout();
}
Commit Message: Enforce the maximum length of the folder name in UI.
BUG=355797
R=xiyuan@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/203863005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260156 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void FolderHeaderView::Update() {
if (!folder_item_)
return;
folder_name_view_->SetVisible(folder_name_visible_);
if (folder_name_visible_) {
folder_name_view_->SetText(base::UTF8ToUTF16(folder_item_->name()));
folder_name_view_->Update();
}
Layout();
}
| 171,202 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: acc_ctx_cont(OM_uint32 *minstat,
gss_buffer_t buf,
gss_ctx_id_t *ctx,
gss_buffer_t *responseToken,
gss_buffer_t *mechListMIC,
OM_uint32 *negState,
send_token_flag *return_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret, tmpmin;
gss_OID supportedMech;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc;
unsigned int len;
unsigned char *ptr, *bufstart;
sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*ctx;
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
*negState = REJECT;
*minstat = 0;
supportedMech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
*return_token = ERROR_TOKEN_SEND;
*responseToken = *mechListMIC = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
ptr = bufstart = buf->value;
#define REMAIN (buf->length - (ptr - bufstart))
if (REMAIN > INT_MAX)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
/*
* Attempt to work with old Sun SPNEGO.
*/
if (*ptr == HEADER_ID) {
ret = g_verify_token_header(gss_mech_spnego,
&len, &ptr, 0, REMAIN);
if (ret) {
*minstat = ret;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
}
if (*ptr != (CONTEXT | 0x01)) {
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
ret = get_negTokenResp(minstat, ptr, REMAIN,
negState, &supportedMech,
responseToken, mechListMIC);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
if (*responseToken == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER &&
*mechListMIC == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
if (supportedMech != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
sc->firstpass = 0;
*negState = ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE;
*return_token = CONT_TOKEN_SEND;
cleanup:
if (supportedMech != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
generic_gss_release_oid(&tmpmin, &supportedMech);
}
return ret;
#undef REMAIN
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | acc_ctx_cont(OM_uint32 *minstat,
gss_buffer_t buf,
gss_ctx_id_t *ctx,
gss_buffer_t *responseToken,
gss_buffer_t *mechListMIC,
OM_uint32 *negState,
send_token_flag *return_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret, tmpmin;
gss_OID supportedMech;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc;
unsigned int len;
unsigned char *ptr, *bufstart;
sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*ctx;
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
*negState = REJECT;
*minstat = 0;
supportedMech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
*return_token = ERROR_TOKEN_SEND;
*responseToken = *mechListMIC = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
ptr = bufstart = buf->value;
#define REMAIN (buf->length - (ptr - bufstart))
if (REMAIN == 0 || REMAIN > INT_MAX)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
/*
* Attempt to work with old Sun SPNEGO.
*/
if (*ptr == HEADER_ID) {
ret = g_verify_token_header(gss_mech_spnego,
&len, &ptr, 0, REMAIN);
if (ret) {
*minstat = ret;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
}
if (*ptr != (CONTEXT | 0x01)) {
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
ret = get_negTokenResp(minstat, ptr, REMAIN,
negState, &supportedMech,
responseToken, mechListMIC);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
if (*responseToken == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER &&
*mechListMIC == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
if (supportedMech != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
sc->firstpass = 0;
*negState = ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE;
*return_token = CONT_TOKEN_SEND;
cleanup:
if (supportedMech != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
generic_gss_release_oid(&tmpmin, &supportedMech);
}
return ret;
#undef REMAIN
}
| 166,310 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::InitializeURLRequest(
net::URLRequest* request,
const Referrer& referrer,
bool is_download,
int render_process_host_id,
int render_view_routing_id,
int render_frame_routing_id,
PreviewsState previews_state,
ResourceContext* context) {
DCHECK(io_thread_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(!request->is_pending());
Referrer::SetReferrerForRequest(request, referrer);
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = CreateRequestInfo(
render_process_host_id, render_view_routing_id, render_frame_routing_id,
previews_state, is_download, context);
info->AssociateWithRequest(request);
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::InitializeURLRequest(
net::URLRequest* request,
const Referrer& referrer,
bool is_download,
int render_process_host_id,
int render_view_routing_id,
int render_frame_routing_id,
int frame_tree_node_id,
PreviewsState previews_state,
ResourceContext* context) {
DCHECK(io_thread_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(!request->is_pending());
Referrer::SetReferrerForRequest(request, referrer);
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = CreateRequestInfo(
render_process_host_id, render_view_routing_id, render_frame_routing_id,
frame_tree_node_id, previews_state, is_download, context);
info->AssociateWithRequest(request);
}
| 173,027 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PromoResourceService::PromoResourceService(Profile* profile)
: WebResourceService(profile->GetPrefs(),
GetPromoResourceURL(),
true, // append locale to URL
prefs::kNtpPromoResourceCacheUpdate,
kStartResourceFetchDelay,
GetCacheUpdateDelay()),
profile_(profile),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(
weak_ptr_factory_(this)),
web_resource_update_scheduled_(false) {
ScheduleNotificationOnInit();
}
Commit Message: Refresh promo notifications as they're fetched
The "guard" existed for notification scheduling was preventing
"turn-off a promo" and "update a promo" scenarios.
Yet I do not believe it was adding any actual safety: if things
on a server backend go wrong, the clients will be affected one
way or the other, and it is better to have an option to shut
the malformed promo down "as quickly as possible" (~in 12-24 hours).
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10696204
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | PromoResourceService::PromoResourceService(Profile* profile)
: WebResourceService(profile->GetPrefs(),
GetPromoResourceURL(),
true, // append locale to URL
prefs::kNtpPromoResourceCacheUpdate,
kStartResourceFetchDelay,
GetCacheUpdateDelay()),
profile_(profile),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(
weak_ptr_factory_(this)) {
ScheduleNotificationOnInit();
}
| 170,782 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ChooserContextBase::GetGrantedObjects(const GURL& requesting_origin,
const GURL& embedding_origin) {
DCHECK_EQ(requesting_origin, requesting_origin.GetOrigin());
DCHECK_EQ(embedding_origin, embedding_origin.GetOrigin());
if (!CanRequestObjectPermission(requesting_origin, embedding_origin))
return {};
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<Object>> results;
auto* info = new content_settings::SettingInfo();
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> setting =
GetWebsiteSetting(requesting_origin, embedding_origin, info);
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> objects;
if (!setting->Remove(kObjectListKey, &objects))
return results;
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> object_list =
base::ListValue::From(std::move(objects));
if (!object_list)
return results;
for (auto& object : *object_list) {
base::DictionaryValue* object_dict;
if (object.GetAsDictionary(&object_dict) && IsValidObject(*object_dict)) {
results.push_back(std::make_unique<Object>(
requesting_origin, embedding_origin, object_dict, info->source,
host_content_settings_map_->is_incognito()));
}
}
return results;
}
Commit Message: Fix memory leak in ChooserContextBase::GetGrantedObjects.
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: Ia163d503a4207859cd41c847c9d5f67e77580fbc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1456080
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Marek Haranczyk <mharanczyk@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629919}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | ChooserContextBase::GetGrantedObjects(const GURL& requesting_origin,
const GURL& embedding_origin) {
DCHECK_EQ(requesting_origin, requesting_origin.GetOrigin());
DCHECK_EQ(embedding_origin, embedding_origin.GetOrigin());
if (!CanRequestObjectPermission(requesting_origin, embedding_origin))
return {};
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<Object>> results;
content_settings::SettingInfo info;
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> setting =
GetWebsiteSetting(requesting_origin, embedding_origin, &info);
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> objects;
if (!setting->Remove(kObjectListKey, &objects))
return results;
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> object_list =
base::ListValue::From(std::move(objects));
if (!object_list)
return results;
for (auto& object : *object_list) {
base::DictionaryValue* object_dict;
if (object.GetAsDictionary(&object_dict) && IsValidObject(*object_dict)) {
results.push_back(std::make_unique<Object>(
requesting_origin, embedding_origin, object_dict, info.source,
host_content_settings_map_->is_incognito()));
}
}
return results;
}
| 172,055 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
int prediction_resistance,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
{
int reseed_required = 0;
if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) {
rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
return 0;
}
if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
return 0;
}
}
if (outlen > drbg->max_request) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG);
return 0;
}
if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
return 0;
}
if (drbg->fork_count != rand_fork_count) {
drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
reseed_required = 1;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
int prediction_resistance,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
{
int fork_id;
int reseed_required = 0;
if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) {
rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
return 0;
}
if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
return 0;
}
}
if (outlen > drbg->max_request) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG);
return 0;
}
if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
return 0;
}
fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
if (drbg->fork_id != fork_id) {
drbg->fork_id = fork_id;
reseed_required = 1;
}
}
| 165,143 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: JBIG2Bitmap::JBIG2Bitmap(Guint segNumA, int wA, int hA):
JBIG2Segment(segNumA)
{
w = wA;
h = hA;
line = (wA + 7) >> 3;
if (w <= 0 || h <= 0 || line <= 0 || h >= (INT_MAX - 1) / line) {
error(-1, "invalid width/height");
data = NULL;
return;
}
data = (Guchar *)gmalloc(h * line + 1);
data[h * line] = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | JBIG2Bitmap::JBIG2Bitmap(Guint segNumA, int wA, int hA):
JBIG2Segment(segNumA)
{
w = wA;
h = hA;
line = (wA + 7) >> 3;
if (w <= 0 || h <= 0 || line <= 0 || h >= (INT_MAX - 1) / line) {
error(-1, "invalid width/height");
data = NULL;
return;
}
data = (Guchar *)gmallocn(h, line + 1);
data[h * line] = 0;
}
| 164,612 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void UpdateUI(const char* current_global_engine_id) {
DCHECK(current_global_engine_id);
const IBusEngineInfo* engine_info = NULL;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kIBusEngines); ++i) {
if (kIBusEngines[i].name == std::string(current_global_engine_id)) {
engine_info = &kIBusEngines[i];
break;
}
}
if (!engine_info) {
LOG(ERROR) << current_global_engine_id
<< " is not found in the input method white-list.";
return;
}
InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method =
CreateInputMethodDescriptor(engine_info->name,
engine_info->longname,
engine_info->layout,
engine_info->language);
DLOG(INFO) << "Updating the UI. ID:" << current_input_method.id
<< ", keyboard_layout:" << current_input_method.keyboard_layout;
current_input_method_changed_(language_library_, current_input_method);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void UpdateUI(const char* current_global_engine_id) {
DCHECK(current_global_engine_id);
const IBusEngineInfo* engine_info = NULL;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kIBusEngines); ++i) {
if (kIBusEngines[i].name == std::string(current_global_engine_id)) {
engine_info = &kIBusEngines[i];
break;
}
}
if (!engine_info) {
LOG(ERROR) << current_global_engine_id
<< " is not found in the input method white-list.";
return;
}
InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method =
CreateInputMethodDescriptor(engine_info->name,
engine_info->longname,
engine_info->layout,
engine_info->language);
VLOG(1) << "Updating the UI. ID:" << current_input_method.id
<< ", keyboard_layout:" << current_input_method.keyboard_layout;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
OnCurrentInputMethodChanged(current_input_method));
}
| 170,552 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int net_get(int s, void *arg, int *len)
{
struct net_hdr nh;
int plen;
if (net_read_exact(s, &nh, sizeof(nh)) == -1)
{
return -1;
}
plen = ntohl(nh.nh_len);
if (!(plen <= *len))
printf("PLEN %d type %d len %d\n",
plen, nh.nh_type, *len);
assert(plen <= *len); /* XXX */
*len = plen;
if ((*len) && (net_read_exact(s, arg, *len) == -1))
{
return -1;
}
return nh.nh_type;
}
Commit Message: OSdep: Fixed segmentation fault that happens with a malicious server sending a negative length (Closes #16 on GitHub).
git-svn-id: http://svn.aircrack-ng.org/trunk@2419 28c6078b-6c39-48e3-add9-af49d547ecab
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int net_get(int s, void *arg, int *len)
{
struct net_hdr nh;
int plen;
if (net_read_exact(s, &nh, sizeof(nh)) == -1)
{
return -1;
}
plen = ntohl(nh.nh_len);
if (!(plen <= *len))
printf("PLEN %d type %d len %d\n",
plen, nh.nh_type, *len);
assert(plen <= *len && plen > 0); /* XXX */
*len = plen;
if ((*len) && (net_read_exact(s, arg, *len) == -1))
{
return -1;
}
return nh.nh_type;
}
| 168,912 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BlobURLRegistry::registerURL(SecurityOrigin* origin, const KURL& publicURL, URLRegistrable* blob)
{
ASSERT(&blob->registry() == this);
ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(origin, publicURL, static_cast<Blob*>(blob)->url());
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void BlobURLRegistry::registerURL(SecurityOrigin* origin, const KURL& publicURL, URLRegistrable* blob)
{
ASSERT(&blob->registry() == this);
BlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(origin, publicURL, static_cast<Blob*>(blob)->url());
}
| 170,677 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: yydestruct (const char *yymsg, int yytype, YYSTYPE *yyvaluep, void *yyscanner, HEX_LEX_ENVIRONMENT *lex_env)
{
YYUSE (yyvaluep);
YYUSE (yyscanner);
YYUSE (lex_env);
if (!yymsg)
yymsg = "Deleting";
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT (yymsg, yytype, yyvaluep, yylocationp);
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
switch (yytype)
{
case 16: /* tokens */
#line 94 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1023 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 17: /* token_sequence */
#line 95 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1029 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 18: /* token_or_range */
#line 96 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1035 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 19: /* token */
#line 97 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1041 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 21: /* range */
#line 100 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1047 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 22: /* alternatives */
#line 99 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1053 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 23: /* byte */
#line 98 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1059 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
default:
break;
}
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #674 for hex strings.
CWE ID: CWE-674 | yydestruct (const char *yymsg, int yytype, YYSTYPE *yyvaluep, void *yyscanner, HEX_LEX_ENVIRONMENT *lex_env)
{
YYUSE (yyvaluep);
YYUSE (yyscanner);
YYUSE (lex_env);
if (!yymsg)
yymsg = "Deleting";
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT (yymsg, yytype, yyvaluep, yylocationp);
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
switch (yytype)
{
case 16: /* tokens */
#line 101 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1030 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 17: /* token_sequence */
#line 102 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1036 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 18: /* token_or_range */
#line 103 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1042 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 19: /* token */
#line 104 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1048 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 21: /* range */
#line 107 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1054 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 22: /* alternatives */
#line 106 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1060 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 23: /* byte */
#line 105 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1066 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
default:
break;
}
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
}
| 168,100 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(curl_escape)
{
char *str = NULL, *res = NULL;
size_t str_len = 0;
zval *zid;
php_curl *ch;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "rs", &zid, &str, &str_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((ch = (php_curl*)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(zid), le_curl_name, le_curl)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if ((res = curl_easy_escape(ch->cp, str, str_len))) {
RETVAL_STRING(res);
curl_free(res);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72674 - check both curl_escape and curl_unescape
CWE ID: CWE-119 | PHP_FUNCTION(curl_escape)
{
char *str = NULL, *res = NULL;
size_t str_len = 0;
zval *zid;
php_curl *ch;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "rs", &zid, &str, &str_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((ch = (php_curl*)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(zid), le_curl_name, le_curl)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (ZEND_SIZE_T_INT_OVFL(str_len)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if ((res = curl_easy_escape(ch->cp, str, str_len))) {
RETVAL_STRING(res);
curl_free(res);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
| 166,946 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void impeg2d_dec_hdr(void *pv_dec,impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t *ps_ip,
impeg2d_video_decode_op_t *ps_op)
{
UWORD32 u4_bits_read;
dec_state_t *ps_dec;
ps_dec = (dec_state_t *)pv_dec;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
impeg2d_bit_stream_init(&(ps_dec->s_bit_stream),ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.pv_stream_buffer,
ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes);
{
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
e_error = impeg2d_process_video_header(ps_dec);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = e_error;
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_num_bits_read(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream);
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = u4_bits_read>> 3;
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed > ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
}
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code == 0)
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = e_error;
impeg2d_next_code(ps_dec, SEQUENCE_HEADER_CODE);
return;
}
}
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_vertical_size;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = IV_SUCCESS;
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_num_bits_read(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream);
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = u4_bits_read>> 3;
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed > ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
}
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
/* MOD */
ps_dec->u2_header_done = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix in handling header decode errors
If header decode was unsuccessful, do not try decoding a frame
Also, initialize pic_wd, pic_ht for reinitialization when
decoder is created with smaller dimensions
Bug: 28886651
Bug: 35219737
Change-Id: I8c06d9052910e47fce2e6fe25ad318d4c83d2c50
(cherry picked from commit 2b9fa9ace2dbedfbac026fc9b6ab6cdac7f68c27)
(cherry picked from commit c2395cd7cc0c286a66de674032dd2ed26500aef4)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void impeg2d_dec_hdr(void *pv_dec,impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t *ps_ip,
impeg2d_video_decode_op_t *ps_op)
{
UWORD32 u4_bits_read;
dec_state_t *ps_dec;
ps_dec = (dec_state_t *)pv_dec;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
impeg2d_bit_stream_init(&(ps_dec->s_bit_stream),ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.pv_stream_buffer,
ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes);
{
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
e_error = impeg2d_process_video_header(ps_dec);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = e_error;
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_num_bits_read(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream);
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = u4_bits_read>> 3;
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed > ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
}
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code == 0)
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = e_error;
if (IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS == e_error)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec->u2_header_done = 0;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_height;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_width;
}
impeg2d_next_code(ps_dec, SEQUENCE_HEADER_CODE);
return;
}
}
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_vertical_size;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = IV_SUCCESS;
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_num_bits_read(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream);
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = u4_bits_read>> 3;
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed > ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
}
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
/* MOD */
ps_dec->u2_header_done = 1;
}
}
| 174,034 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: create_surface_from_thumbnail_data (guchar *data,
gint width,
gint height,
gint rowstride)
{
guchar *cairo_pixels;
cairo_surface_t *surface;
static cairo_user_data_key_t key;
int j;
cairo_pixels = (guchar *)g_malloc (4 * width * height);
surface = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data ((unsigned char *)cairo_pixels,
CAIRO_FORMAT_RGB24,
width, height, 4 * width);
cairo_surface_set_user_data (surface, &key,
cairo_pixels, (cairo_destroy_func_t)g_free);
for (j = height; j; j--) {
guchar *p = data;
guchar *q = cairo_pixels;
guchar *end = p + 3 * width;
while (p < end) {
#if G_BYTE_ORDER == G_LITTLE_ENDIAN
q[0] = p[2];
q[1] = p[1];
q[2] = p[0];
#else
q[1] = p[0];
q[2] = p[1];
q[3] = p[2];
#endif
p += 3;
q += 4;
}
data += rowstride;
cairo_pixels += 4 * width;
}
return surface;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | create_surface_from_thumbnail_data (guchar *data,
gint width,
gint height,
gint rowstride)
{
guchar *cairo_pixels;
gint cairo_stride;
cairo_surface_t *surface;
int j;
surface = cairo_image_surface_create (CAIRO_FORMAT_RGB24, width, height);
if (cairo_surface_status (surface))
return NULL;
cairo_pixels = cairo_image_surface_get_data (surface);
cairo_stride = cairo_image_surface_get_stride (surface);
for (j = height; j; j--) {
guchar *p = data;
guchar *q = cairo_pixels;
guchar *end = p + 3 * width;
while (p < end) {
#if G_BYTE_ORDER == G_LITTLE_ENDIAN
q[0] = p[2];
q[1] = p[1];
q[2] = p[0];
#else
q[1] = p[0];
q[2] = p[1];
q[3] = p[2];
#endif
p += 3;
q += 4;
}
data += rowstride;
cairo_pixels += cairo_stride;
}
return surface;
}
| 164,601 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Chapters::Atom::ShallowCopy(Atom& rhs) const
{
rhs.m_string_uid = m_string_uid;
rhs.m_uid = m_uid;
rhs.m_start_timecode = m_start_timecode;
rhs.m_stop_timecode = m_stop_timecode;
rhs.m_displays = m_displays;
rhs.m_displays_size = m_displays_size;
rhs.m_displays_count = m_displays_count;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Chapters::Atom::ShallowCopy(Atom& rhs) const
| 174,442 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ExtensionTtsPlatformImplChromeOs::Speak(
const std::string& utterance,
const std::string& locale,
const std::string& gender,
double rate,
double pitch,
double volume) {
chromeos::CrosLibrary* cros_library = chromeos::CrosLibrary::Get();
if (!cros_library->EnsureLoaded()) {
set_error(kCrosLibraryNotLoadedError);
return false;
}
std::string options;
if (!locale.empty()) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyLocale,
locale,
&options);
}
if (!gender.empty()) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyGender,
gender,
&options);
}
if (rate >= 0.0) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyRate,
DoubleToString(rate * 5),
&options);
}
if (pitch >= 0.0) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyPitch,
DoubleToString(pitch * 2),
&options);
}
if (volume >= 0.0) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyVolume,
DoubleToString(volume * 5),
&options);
}
if (!options.empty()) {
cros_library->GetSpeechSynthesisLibrary()->SetSpeakProperties(
options.c_str());
}
return cros_library->GetSpeechSynthesisLibrary()->Speak(utterance.c_str());
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool ExtensionTtsPlatformImplChromeOs::Speak(
int utterance_id,
const std::string& utterance,
const std::string& lang,
const UtteranceContinuousParameters& params) {
chromeos::CrosLibrary* cros_library = chromeos::CrosLibrary::Get();
if (!cros_library->EnsureLoaded()) {
set_error(kCrosLibraryNotLoadedError);
return false;
}
utterance_id_ = utterance_id;
utterance_length_ = utterance.size();
std::string options;
if (!lang.empty()) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyLocale,
lang,
&options);
}
if (params.rate >= 0.0) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyRate,
DoubleToString(1.5 + params.rate * 2.5),
&options);
}
if (params.pitch >= 0.0) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyPitch,
DoubleToString(params.pitch),
&options);
}
if (params.volume >= 0.0) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyVolume,
DoubleToString(params.volume * 5),
&options);
}
if (!options.empty()) {
cros_library->GetSpeechSynthesisLibrary()->SetSpeakProperties(
options.c_str());
}
bool result =
cros_library->GetSpeechSynthesisLibrary()->Speak(utterance.c_str());
if (result) {
ExtensionTtsController* controller = ExtensionTtsController::GetInstance();
controller->OnTtsEvent(utterance_id_, TTS_EVENT_START, 0, std::string());
PollUntilSpeechFinishes(utterance_id_);
}
return result;
}
| 170,399 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void scsi_write_complete(void * opaque, int ret)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = (SCSIDiskReq *)opaque;
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
uint32_t len;
uint32_t n;
if (r->req.aiocb != NULL) {
r->req.aiocb = NULL;
bdrv_acct_done(s->bs, &r->acct);
}
if (ret) {
if (scsi_handle_rw_error(r, -ret, SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_WRITE)) {
return;
}
}
n = r->iov.iov_len / 512;
r->sector += n;
r->sector_count -= n;
if (r->sector_count == 0) {
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
} else {
len = r->sector_count * 512;
if (len > SCSI_DMA_BUF_SIZE) {
len = SCSI_DMA_BUF_SIZE;
}
r->iov.iov_len = len;
DPRINTF("Write complete tag=0x%x more=%d\n", r->req.tag, len);
scsi_req_data(&r->req, len);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: commonize iovec creation between reads and writes
Also, consistently use qiov.size instead of iov.iov_len.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void scsi_write_complete(void * opaque, int ret)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = (SCSIDiskReq *)opaque;
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
uint32_t n;
if (r->req.aiocb != NULL) {
r->req.aiocb = NULL;
bdrv_acct_done(s->bs, &r->acct);
}
if (ret) {
if (scsi_handle_rw_error(r, -ret, SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_WRITE)) {
return;
}
}
n = r->qiov.size / 512;
r->sector += n;
r->sector_count -= n;
if (r->sector_count == 0) {
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
} else {
scsi_init_iovec(r);
DPRINTF("Write complete tag=0x%x more=%d\n", r->req.tag, r->qiov.size);
scsi_req_data(&r->req, r->qiov.size);
}
}
| 169,922 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int MemBackendImpl::DoomEntriesBetween(Time initial_time,
Time end_time,
const CompletionCallback& callback) {
if (end_time.is_null())
end_time = Time::Max();
DCHECK_GE(end_time, initial_time);
base::LinkNode<MemEntryImpl>* node = lru_list_.head();
while (node != lru_list_.end() && node->value()->GetLastUsed() < initial_time)
node = node->next();
while (node != lru_list_.end() && node->value()->GetLastUsed() < end_time) {
MemEntryImpl* to_doom = node->value();
node = node->next();
to_doom->Doom();
}
return net::OK;
}
Commit Message: [MemCache] Fix bug while iterating LRU list in range doom
This is exact same thing as https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/987919
but on explicit mass-erase rather than eviction.
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for the report and testcase.
Bug: 831963
Change-Id: I96a46700c1f058f7feebe038bcf983dc40eb7102
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1014023
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Karlin <jkarlin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#551205}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | int MemBackendImpl::DoomEntriesBetween(Time initial_time,
Time end_time,
const CompletionCallback& callback) {
if (end_time.is_null())
end_time = Time::Max();
DCHECK_GE(end_time, initial_time);
base::LinkNode<MemEntryImpl>* node = lru_list_.head();
while (node != lru_list_.end() && node->value()->GetLastUsed() < initial_time)
node = node->next();
while (node != lru_list_.end() && node->value()->GetLastUsed() < end_time) {
MemEntryImpl* to_doom = node->value();
node = NextSkippingChildren(lru_list_, node);
to_doom->Doom();
}
return net::OK;
}
| 173,257 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TabGroupData::TabGroupData() {
static int next_placeholder_title_number = 1;
title_ = base::ASCIIToUTF16(
"Group " + base::NumberToString(next_placeholder_title_number));
++next_placeholder_title_number;
static SkRandom rand;
stroke_color_ = rand.nextU() | 0xff000000;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | TabGroupData::TabGroupData() {
static int next_placeholder_title_number = 1;
title_ = base::ASCIIToUTF16(
"Group " + base::NumberToString(next_placeholder_title_number));
++next_placeholder_title_number;
static SkRandom rand;
color_ = rand.nextU() | 0xff000000;
}
| 172,517 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: R_API RConfigNode* r_config_set(RConfig *cfg, const char *name, const char *value) {
RConfigNode *node = NULL;
char *ov = NULL;
ut64 oi;
if (!cfg || STRNULL (name)) {
return NULL;
}
node = r_config_node_get (cfg, name);
if (node) {
if (node->flags & CN_RO) {
eprintf ("(error: '%s' config key is read only)\n", name);
return node;
}
oi = node->i_value;
if (node->value) {
ov = strdup (node->value);
if (!ov) {
goto beach;
}
} else {
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup ("");
}
if (node->flags & CN_BOOL) {
bool b = is_true (value);
node->i_value = (ut64) b? 1: 0;
char *value = strdup (r_str_bool (b));
if (value) {
free (node->value);
node->value = value;
}
} else {
if (!value) {
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup ("");
node->i_value = 0;
} else {
if (node->value == value) {
goto beach;
}
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup (value);
if (IS_DIGIT (*value)) {
if (strchr (value, '/')) {
node->i_value = r_num_get (cfg->num, value);
} else {
node->i_value = r_num_math (cfg->num, value);
}
} else {
node->i_value = 0;
}
node->flags |= CN_INT;
}
}
} else { // Create a new RConfigNode
oi = UT64_MAX;
if (!cfg->lock) {
node = r_config_node_new (name, value);
if (node) {
if (value && is_bool (value)) {
node->flags |= CN_BOOL;
node->i_value = is_true (value)? 1: 0;
}
if (cfg->ht) {
ht_insert (cfg->ht, node->name, node);
r_list_append (cfg->nodes, node);
cfg->n_nodes++;
}
} else {
eprintf ("r_config_set: unable to create a new RConfigNode\n");
}
} else {
eprintf ("r_config_set: variable '%s' not found\n", name);
}
}
if (node && node->setter) {
int ret = node->setter (cfg->user, node);
if (ret == false) {
if (oi != UT64_MAX) {
node->i_value = oi;
}
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup (ov? ov: "");
}
}
beach:
free (ov);
return node;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex
CWE ID: CWE-416 | R_API RConfigNode* r_config_set(RConfig *cfg, const char *name, const char *value) {
RConfigNode *node = NULL;
char *ov = NULL;
ut64 oi;
if (!cfg || STRNULL (name)) {
return NULL;
}
node = r_config_node_get (cfg, name);
if (node) {
if (node->flags & CN_RO) {
eprintf ("(error: '%s' config key is read only)\n", name);
return node;
}
oi = node->i_value;
if (node->value) {
ov = strdup (node->value);
if (!ov) {
goto beach;
}
} else {
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup ("");
}
if (node->flags & CN_BOOL) {
bool b = is_true (value);
node->i_value = (ut64) b? 1: 0;
char *value = strdup (r_str_bool (b));
if (value) {
free (node->value);
node->value = value;
}
} else {
if (!value) {
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup ("");
node->i_value = 0;
} else {
if (node->value == value) {
goto beach;
}
char *tmp = node->value;
node->value = strdup (value);
free (tmp);
if (IS_DIGIT (*value)) {
if (strchr (value, '/')) {
node->i_value = r_num_get (cfg->num, value);
} else {
node->i_value = r_num_math (cfg->num, value);
}
} else {
node->i_value = 0;
}
node->flags |= CN_INT;
}
}
} else { // Create a new RConfigNode
oi = UT64_MAX;
if (!cfg->lock) {
node = r_config_node_new (name, value);
if (node) {
if (value && is_bool (value)) {
node->flags |= CN_BOOL;
node->i_value = is_true (value)? 1: 0;
}
if (cfg->ht) {
ht_insert (cfg->ht, node->name, node);
r_list_append (cfg->nodes, node);
cfg->n_nodes++;
}
} else {
eprintf ("r_config_set: unable to create a new RConfigNode\n");
}
} else {
eprintf ("r_config_set: variable '%s' not found\n", name);
}
}
if (node && node->setter) {
int ret = node->setter (cfg->user, node);
if (ret == false) {
if (oi != UT64_MAX) {
node->i_value = oi;
}
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup (ov? ov: "");
}
}
beach:
free (ov);
return node;
}
| 168,095 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CtcpHandler::handlePing(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m) {
Q_UNUSED(target)
if(ctcptype == CtcpQuery) {
if(_ignoreListManager->ctcpMatch(prefix, network()->networkName(), "PING"))
return;
reply(nickFromMask(prefix), "PING", param);
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP PING request from %1").arg(prefix));
} else {
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP TIME request by %1").arg(prefix));
}
else {
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP TIME answer from %1: %2")
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void CtcpHandler::handlePing(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m) {
void CtcpHandler::handlePing(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m, QString &reply) {
Q_UNUSED(target)
if(ctcptype == CtcpQuery) {
reply = param;
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP PING request from %1").arg(prefix));
} else {
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP TIME request by %1").arg(prefix));
}
else {
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP TIME answer from %1: %2")
}
}
| 164,878 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport size_t GetQuantumExtent(const Image *image,
const QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const QuantumType quantum_type)
{
size_t
packet_size;
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
packet_size=1;
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case IndexAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case RGBQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case BGRQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case RGBAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case RGBOQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case BGRAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKAQuantum: packet_size=5; break;
default: break;
}
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
return((size_t) (packet_size*image->columns*((quantum_info->depth+7)/8)));
return((size_t) ((packet_size*image->columns*quantum_info->depth+7)/8));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/105
CWE ID: CWE-369 | MagickExport size_t GetQuantumExtent(const Image *image,
const QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const QuantumType quantum_type)
{
size_t
extent,
packet_size;
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
packet_size=1;
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case IndexAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case RGBQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case BGRQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case RGBAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case RGBOQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case BGRAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKAQuantum: packet_size=5; break;
default: break;
}
extent=MagickMax(image->columns,image->rows);
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
return((size_t) (packet_size*extent*((quantum_info->depth+7)/8)));
return((size_t) ((packet_size*extent*quantum_info->depth+7)/8));
}
| 168,798 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WtsConsoleSessionProcessDriver::OnChannelConnected() {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void WtsConsoleSessionProcessDriver::OnChannelConnected() {
void WtsConsoleSessionProcessDriver::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
}
| 171,554 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void __local_bh_enable(unsigned int cnt)
{
lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
if (softirq_count() == (cnt & SOFTIRQ_MASK))
trace_softirqs_on(_RET_IP_);
preempt_count_sub(cnt);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static void __local_bh_enable(unsigned int cnt)
{
lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
if (preempt_count() == cnt)
trace_preempt_on(CALLER_ADDR0, get_lock_parent_ip());
if (softirq_count() == (cnt & SOFTIRQ_MASK))
trace_softirqs_on(_RET_IP_);
__preempt_count_sub(cnt);
}
| 169,184 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void calc_coeff(double mu[4], const int index[4], int prefilter, double r2, double mul)
{
double mul2 = mul * mul, mul3 = mul2 * mul;
double kernel[] = {
(5204 + 2520 * mul + 1092 * mul2 + 3280 * mul3) / 12096,
(2943 - 210 * mul - 273 * mul2 - 2460 * mul3) / 12096,
( 486 - 924 * mul - 546 * mul2 + 984 * mul3) / 12096,
( 17 - 126 * mul + 273 * mul2 - 164 * mul3) / 12096,
};
double mat_freq[13];
memcpy(mat_freq, kernel, sizeof(kernel));
memset(mat_freq + 4, 0, sizeof(mat_freq) - sizeof(kernel));
int n = 6;
coeff_filter(mat_freq, n, kernel);
for (int k = 0; k < 2 * prefilter; ++k)
coeff_blur121(mat_freq, ++n);
double vec_freq[13];
n = index[3] + prefilter + 3;
calc_gauss(vec_freq, n, r2);
memset(vec_freq + n + 1, 0, sizeof(vec_freq) - (n + 1) * sizeof(vec_freq[0]));
n -= 3;
coeff_filter(vec_freq, n, kernel);
for (int k = 0; k < prefilter; ++k)
coeff_blur121(vec_freq, --n);
double mat[4][4];
calc_matrix(mat, mat_freq, index);
double vec[4];
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
vec[i] = mat_freq[0] - mat_freq[index[i]] - vec_freq[0] + vec_freq[index[i]];
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
double res = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < 4; ++j)
res += mat[i][j] * vec[j];
mu[i] = FFMAX(0, res);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix blur coefficient calculation buffer overflow
Found by fuzzer test case id:000082,sig:11,src:002579,op:havoc,rep:8.
Correctness should be checked, but this fixes the overflow for good.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void calc_coeff(double mu[4], const int index[4], int prefilter, double r2, double mul)
{
double mul2 = mul * mul, mul3 = mul2 * mul;
double kernel[] = {
(5204 + 2520 * mul + 1092 * mul2 + 3280 * mul3) / 12096,
(2943 - 210 * mul - 273 * mul2 - 2460 * mul3) / 12096,
( 486 - 924 * mul - 546 * mul2 + 984 * mul3) / 12096,
( 17 - 126 * mul + 273 * mul2 - 164 * mul3) / 12096,
};
double mat_freq[14];
memcpy(mat_freq, kernel, sizeof(kernel));
memset(mat_freq + 4, 0, sizeof(mat_freq) - sizeof(kernel));
int n = 6;
coeff_filter(mat_freq, n, kernel);
for (int k = 0; k < 2 * prefilter; ++k)
coeff_blur121(mat_freq, ++n);
double vec_freq[13];
n = index[3] + prefilter + 3;
calc_gauss(vec_freq, n, r2);
memset(vec_freq + n + 1, 0, sizeof(vec_freq) - (n + 1) * sizeof(vec_freq[0]));
n -= 3;
coeff_filter(vec_freq, n, kernel);
for (int k = 0; k < prefilter; ++k)
coeff_blur121(vec_freq, --n);
double mat[4][4];
calc_matrix(mat, mat_freq, index);
double vec[4];
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
vec[i] = mat_freq[0] - mat_freq[index[i]] - vec_freq[0] + vec_freq[index[i]];
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
double res = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < 4; ++j)
res += mat[i][j] * vec[j];
mu[i] = FFMAX(0, res);
}
}
| 168,775 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_open)
{
char *cipher, *cipher_dir;
char *mode, *mode_dir;
int cipher_len, cipher_dir_len;
int mode_len, mode_dir_len;
MCRYPT td;
php_mcrypt *pm;
if (zend_parse_parameters (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ssss",
&cipher, &cipher_len, &cipher_dir, &cipher_dir_len,
&mode, &mode_len, &mode_dir, &mode_dir_len)) {
return;
}
td = mcrypt_module_open (
cipher,
cipher_dir_len > 0 ? cipher_dir : MCG(algorithms_dir),
mode,
mode_dir_len > 0 ? mode_dir : MCG(modes_dir)
);
if (td == MCRYPT_FAILED) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not open encryption module");
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
pm = emalloc(sizeof(php_mcrypt));
pm->td = td;
pm->init = 0;
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, pm, le_mcrypt);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_open)
{
char *cipher, *cipher_dir;
char *mode, *mode_dir;
int cipher_len, cipher_dir_len;
int mode_len, mode_dir_len;
MCRYPT td;
php_mcrypt *pm;
if (zend_parse_parameters (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ssss",
&cipher, &cipher_len, &cipher_dir, &cipher_dir_len,
&mode, &mode_len, &mode_dir, &mode_dir_len)) {
return;
}
td = mcrypt_module_open (
cipher,
cipher_dir_len > 0 ? cipher_dir : MCG(algorithms_dir),
mode,
mode_dir_len > 0 ? mode_dir : MCG(modes_dir)
);
if (td == MCRYPT_FAILED) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not open encryption module");
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
pm = emalloc(sizeof(php_mcrypt));
pm->td = td;
pm->init = 0;
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, pm, le_mcrypt);
}
}
| 167,089 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void RemoveICCProfileFromResourceBlock(StringInfo *bim_profile)
{
register const unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*datum;
unsigned int
count,
long_sans;
unsigned short
id,
short_sans;
length=GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile);
if (length < 16)
return;
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile);
for (p=datum; (p >= datum) && (p < (datum+length-16)); )
{
register unsigned char
*q;
q=(unsigned char *) p;
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) p,"8BIM",4) != 0)
break;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&long_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&id);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&count);
if (id == 0x0000040f)
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,q+PSDQuantum(count)+12,length-
(PSDQuantum(count)+12)-(q-datum));
SetStringInfoLength(bim_profile,length-(PSDQuantum(count)+12));
break;
}
p+=count;
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
p++;
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/148
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static void RemoveICCProfileFromResourceBlock(StringInfo *bim_profile)
{
register const unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*datum;
unsigned int
count,
long_sans;
unsigned short
id,
short_sans;
length=GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile);
if (length < 16)
return;
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile);
for (p=datum; (p >= datum) && (p < (datum+length-16)); )
{
register unsigned char
*q;
q=(unsigned char *) p;
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) p,"8BIM",4) != 0)
break;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&long_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&id);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&count);
if (id == 0x0000040f)
{
if ((q+PSDQuantum(count)+12) < (datum+length-16))
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,q+PSDQuantum(count)+12,length-
(PSDQuantum(count)+12)-(q-datum));
SetStringInfoLength(bim_profile,length-(PSDQuantum(count)+12));
}
break;
}
p+=count;
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
p++;
}
}
| 168,789 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const char* Track::GetCodecId() const
{
return m_info.codecId;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const char* Track::GetCodecId() const
| 174,293 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_MODERATELY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"),
status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE(
"[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb\\u30fc]"), status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
}
Commit Message: Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_MODERATELY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"),
status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE(
"[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb\\u30fc]"), status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
// These Cyrillic letters look like Latin. A domain label entirely made of
// these letters is blocked as a simpliified whole-script-spoofable.
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(icu::UnicodeString("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
}
| 172,389 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FormAssociatedElement::formRemovedFromTree(const Node* formRoot)
{
ASSERT(m_form);
if (toHTMLElement(this)->highestAncestor() != formRoot)
setForm(0);
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash when a form control is in a past naems map of a demoted form element.
Note that we wanted to add the protector in FormAssociatedElement::setForm(),
but we couldn't do it because it is called from the constructor.
BUG=326854
TEST=automated.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/105693013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@163680 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-287 | void FormAssociatedElement::formRemovedFromTree(const Node* formRoot)
{
ASSERT(m_form);
if (toHTMLElement(this)->highestAncestor() == formRoot)
return;
RefPtr<HTMLElement> protector(toHTMLElement(this));
setForm(0);
}
| 171,718 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct arpt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
return -EINVAL;
err = xt_check_entry_offsets(e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct arpt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
return -EINVAL;
err = xt_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems, e->target_offset,
e->next_offset);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
| 167,216 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_SampleName(ModPlugFile* file, unsigned int qual, char* buff)
{
const char* str;
unsigned int retval;
size_t tmpretval;
if(!file) return 0;
str = openmpt_module_get_sample_name(file->mod,qual-1);
if(!str){
if(buff){
*buff = '\0';
}
return 0;
}
tmpretval = strlen(str);
if(tmpretval>=INT_MAX){
tmpretval = INT_MAX-1;
}
retval = (int)tmpretval;
if(buff){
memcpy(buff,str,retval+1);
buff[retval] = '\0';
}
openmpt_free_string(str);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: [Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buffer size beforehand. libopenmpt can return strings longer than 32 bytes here beacuse the internal limit of 32 bytes applies to strings encoded in arbitrary character encodings but the API returns them converted to UTF-8, which can be longer. (reported by Antonio Morales Maldonado of Semmle Security Research Team)
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@12127 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-120 | LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_SampleName(ModPlugFile* file, unsigned int qual, char* buff)
{
const char* str;
char buf[32];
if(!file) return 0;
str = openmpt_module_get_sample_name(file->mod,qual-1);
memset(buf,0,32);
if(str){
strncpy(buf,str,31);
openmpt_free_string(str);
}
if(buff){
strncpy(buff,buf,32);
}
return (unsigned int)strlen(buf);
}
| 169,501 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static sk_sp<SkImage> flipSkImageVertically(SkImage* input,
AlphaDisposition alphaOp) {
size_t width = static_cast<size_t>(input->width());
size_t height = static_cast<size_t>(input->height());
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::MakeN32(input->width(), input->height(),
(alphaOp == PremultiplyAlpha)
? kPremul_SkAlphaType
: kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
size_t imageRowBytes = width * info.bytesPerPixel();
RefPtr<Uint8Array> imagePixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!imagePixels)
return nullptr;
for (size_t i = 0; i < height / 2; i++) {
size_t topFirstElement = i * imageRowBytes;
size_t topLastElement = (i + 1) * imageRowBytes;
size_t bottomFirstElement = (height - 1 - i) * imageRowBytes;
std::swap_ranges(imagePixels->data() + topFirstElement,
imagePixels->data() + topLastElement,
imagePixels->data() + bottomFirstElement);
}
return newSkImageFromRaster(info, std::move(imagePixels), imageRowBytes);
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static sk_sp<SkImage> flipSkImageVertically(SkImage* input,
AlphaDisposition alphaOp) {
unsigned width = static_cast<unsigned>(input->width());
unsigned height = static_cast<unsigned>(input->height());
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::MakeN32(input->width(), input->height(),
(alphaOp == PremultiplyAlpha)
? kPremul_SkAlphaType
: kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
unsigned imageRowBytes = width * info.bytesPerPixel();
RefPtr<Uint8Array> imagePixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!imagePixels)
return nullptr;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < height / 2; i++) {
unsigned topFirstElement = i * imageRowBytes;
unsigned topLastElement = (i + 1) * imageRowBytes;
unsigned bottomFirstElement = (height - 1 - i) * imageRowBytes;
std::swap_ranges(imagePixels->data() + topFirstElement,
imagePixels->data() + topLastElement,
imagePixels->data() + bottomFirstElement);
}
return newSkImageFromRaster(info, std::move(imagePixels), imageRowBytes);
}
| 172,502 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AudioOutputDevice::Stop() {
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(audio_thread_lock_);
audio_thread_->Stop(MessageLoop::current());
audio_thread_.reset();
}
message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&AudioOutputDevice::ShutDownOnIOThread, this));
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void AudioOutputDevice::Stop() {
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(audio_thread_lock_);
audio_thread_.Stop(MessageLoop::current());
}
message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&AudioOutputDevice::ShutDownOnIOThread, this));
}
| 170,707 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void php_imagepolygon(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int filled)
{
zval *IM, *POINTS;
long NPOINTS, COL;
zval **var = NULL;
gdImagePtr im;
gdPointPtr points;
int npoints, col, nelem, i;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rall", &IM, &POINTS, &NPOINTS, &COL) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
npoints = NPOINTS;
col = COL;
nelem = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(POINTS));
if (nelem < 6) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must have at least 3 points in your array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (npoints <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must give a positive number of points");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (nelem < npoints * 2) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Trying to use %d points in array with only %d points", npoints, nelem/2);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
points = (gdPointPtr) safe_emalloc(npoints, sizeof(gdPoint), 0);
for (i = 0; i < npoints; i++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(POINTS), (i * 2), (void **) &var) == SUCCESS) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL((var));
convert_to_long(*var);
points[i].x = Z_LVAL_PP(var);
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(POINTS), (i * 2) + 1, (void **) &var) == SUCCESS) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL(var);
convert_to_long(*var);
points[i].y = Z_LVAL_PP(var);
}
}
if (filled) {
gdImageFilledPolygon(im, points, npoints, col);
} else {
gdImagePolygon(im, points, npoints, col);
}
efree(points);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #66356 (Heap Overflow Vulnerability in imagecrop())
And also fixed the bug: arguments are altered after some calls
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static void php_imagepolygon(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int filled)
{
zval *IM, *POINTS;
long NPOINTS, COL;
zval **var = NULL;
gdImagePtr im;
gdPointPtr points;
int npoints, col, nelem, i;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rall", &IM, &POINTS, &NPOINTS, &COL) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
npoints = NPOINTS;
col = COL;
nelem = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(POINTS));
if (nelem < 6) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must have at least 3 points in your array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (npoints <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must give a positive number of points");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (nelem < npoints * 2) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Trying to use %d points in array with only %d points", npoints, nelem/2);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
points = (gdPointPtr) safe_emalloc(npoints, sizeof(gdPoint), 0);
for (i = 0; i < npoints; i++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(POINTS), (i * 2), (void **) &var) == SUCCESS) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(var) != IS_LONG) {
zval lval;
lval = **var;
zval_copy_ctor(&lval);
convert_to_long(&lval);
points[i].x = Z_LVAL(lval);
} else {
points[i].x = Z_LVAL_PP(var);
}
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(POINTS), (i * 2) + 1, (void **) &var) == SUCCESS) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(var) != IS_LONG) {
zval lval;
lval = **var;
zval_copy_ctor(&lval);
convert_to_long(&lval);
points[i].y = Z_LVAL(lval);
} else {
points[i].y = Z_LVAL_PP(var);
}
}
}
if (filled) {
gdImageFilledPolygon(im, points, npoints, col);
} else {
gdImagePolygon(im, points, npoints, col);
}
efree(points);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
| 166,431 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool Get(const std::string& addr, int* out_value) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
PrintPreviewRequestIdMap::const_iterator it = map_.find(addr);
if (it == map_.end())
return false;
*out_value = it->second;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | bool Get(const std::string& addr, int* out_value) {
// Gets the value for |preview_id|.
// Returns true and sets |out_value| on success.
bool Get(int32 preview_id, int* out_value) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
PrintPreviewRequestIdMap::const_iterator it = map_.find(preview_id);
if (it == map_.end())
return false;
*out_value = it->second;
return true;
}
| 170,831 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PP_Flash_Menu* ReadMenu(int depth,
const IPC::Message* m,
PickleIterator* iter) {
if (depth > kMaxMenuDepth)
return NULL;
++depth;
PP_Flash_Menu* menu = new PP_Flash_Menu;
menu->items = NULL;
if (!m->ReadUInt32(iter, &menu->count)) {
FreeMenu(menu);
return NULL;
}
if (menu->count == 0)
return menu;
menu->items = new PP_Flash_MenuItem[menu->count];
memset(menu->items, 0, sizeof(PP_Flash_MenuItem) * menu->count);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < menu->count; ++i) {
if (!ReadMenuItem(depth, m, iter, menu->items + i)) {
FreeMenu(menu);
return NULL;
}
}
return menu;
}
Commit Message: IPC: defend against excessive number of submenu entries in PPAPI message.
BUG=168710
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11794037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@175576 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | PP_Flash_Menu* ReadMenu(int depth,
const IPC::Message* m,
PickleIterator* iter) {
if (depth > kMaxMenuDepth)
return NULL;
++depth;
PP_Flash_Menu* menu = new PP_Flash_Menu;
menu->items = NULL;
if (!m->ReadUInt32(iter, &menu->count)) {
FreeMenu(menu);
return NULL;
}
if (menu->count == 0)
return menu;
if (menu->count > kMaxMenuEntries) {
FreeMenu(menu);
return NULL;
}
menu->items = new PP_Flash_MenuItem[menu->count];
memset(menu->items, 0, sizeof(PP_Flash_MenuItem) * menu->count);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < menu->count; ++i) {
if (!ReadMenuItem(depth, m, iter, menu->items + i)) {
FreeMenu(menu);
return NULL;
}
}
return menu;
}
| 171,401 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void IBusBusNameOwnerChangedCallback(
IBusBus* bus,
const gchar* name, const gchar* old_name, const gchar* new_name,
gpointer user_data) {
DCHECK(name);
DCHECK(old_name);
DCHECK(new_name);
DLOG(INFO) << "Name owner is changed: name=" << name
<< ", old_name=" << old_name << ", new_name=" << new_name;
if (name != std::string("org.freedesktop.IBus.Config")) {
return;
}
const std::string empty_string;
if (old_name != empty_string || new_name == empty_string) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Unexpected name owner change: name=" << name
<< ", old_name=" << old_name << ", new_name=" << new_name;
return;
}
LOG(INFO) << "IBus config daemon is started. Recovering ibus_config_";
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->MaybeRestoreConnections();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void IBusBusNameOwnerChangedCallback(
void IBusBusNameOwnerChanged(IBusBus* bus,
const gchar* name,
const gchar* old_name,
const gchar* new_name) {
DCHECK(name);
DCHECK(old_name);
DCHECK(new_name);
VLOG(1) << "Name owner is changed: name=" << name
<< ", old_name=" << old_name << ", new_name=" << new_name;
if (name != std::string("org.freedesktop.IBus.Config")) {
return;
}
const std::string empty_string;
if (old_name != empty_string || new_name == empty_string) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Unexpected name owner change: name=" << name
<< ", old_name=" << old_name << ", new_name=" << new_name;
// |OnConnectionChange| with false here to allow Chrome to
return;
}
VLOG(1) << "IBus config daemon is started. Recovering ibus_config_";
// successfully created, |OnConnectionChange| will be called to
MaybeRestoreConnections();
}
| 170,539 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChooserController::OnBluetoothChooserEvent(
BluetoothChooser::Event event,
const std::string& device_address) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(chooser_.get());
switch (event) {
case BluetoothChooser::Event::RESCAN:
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
device_ids_.clear();
PopulateConnectedDevices();
DCHECK(chooser_);
StartDeviceDiscovery();
return;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::DENIED_PERMISSION:
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::
CHOOSER_NOT_SHOWN_USER_DENIED_PERMISSION_TO_SCAN);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::CANCELLED:
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SHOW_OVERVIEW_HELP:
DVLOG(1) << "Overview Help link pressed.";
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SHOW_ADAPTER_OFF_HELP:
DVLOG(1) << "Adapter Off Help link pressed.";
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SHOW_NEED_LOCATION_HELP:
DVLOG(1) << "Need Location Help link pressed.";
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SELECTED:
RecordNumOfDevices(options_->accept_all_devices, device_ids_.size());
PostSuccessCallback(device_address);
break;
}
chooser_.reset();
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void BluetoothDeviceChooserController::OnBluetoothChooserEvent(
BluetoothChooser::Event event,
const std::string& device_address) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(chooser_.get());
switch (event) {
case BluetoothChooser::Event::RESCAN:
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
device_ids_.clear();
PopulateConnectedDevices();
DCHECK(chooser_);
StartDeviceDiscovery();
return;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::DENIED_PERMISSION:
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(
WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_NOT_SHOWN_USER_DENIED_PERMISSION_TO_SCAN);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::CANCELLED:
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SHOW_OVERVIEW_HELP:
DVLOG(1) << "Overview Help link pressed.";
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SHOW_ADAPTER_OFF_HELP:
DVLOG(1) << "Adapter Off Help link pressed.";
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SHOW_NEED_LOCATION_HELP:
DVLOG(1) << "Need Location Help link pressed.";
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SELECTED:
RecordNumOfDevices(options_->accept_all_devices, device_ids_.size());
PostSuccessCallback(device_address);
break;
}
chooser_.reset();
}
| 172,444 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char *M_fs_path_join_parts(const M_list_str_t *path, M_fs_system_t sys_type)
{
M_list_str_t *parts;
const char *part;
char *out;
size_t len;
size_t i;
size_t count;
if (path == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
len = M_list_str_len(path);
if (len == 0) {
return NULL;
}
sys_type = M_fs_path_get_system_type(sys_type);
/* Remove any empty parts (except for the first part which denotes an abs path on Unix
* or a UNC path on Windows). */
parts = M_list_str_duplicate(path);
for (i=len-1; i>0; i--) {
part = M_list_str_at(parts, i);
if (part == NULL || *part == '\0') {
M_list_str_remove_at(parts, i);
}
}
len = M_list_str_len(parts);
/* Join puts the sep between items. If there are no items then the sep
* won't be written. */
part = M_list_str_at(parts, 0);
if (len == 1 && (part == NULL || *part == '\0')) {
M_list_str_destroy(parts);
if (sys_type == M_FS_SYSTEM_WINDOWS) {
return M_strdup("\\\\");
}
return M_strdup("/");
}
/* Handle windows abs path because they need two separators. */
if (sys_type == M_FS_SYSTEM_WINDOWS && len > 0) {
part = M_list_str_at(parts, 0);
/* If we have 1 item we need to add two empties so we get the second separator. */
count = (len == 1) ? 2 : 1;
/* If we're dealing with a unc path add the second sep so we get two separators for the UNC base. */
if (part != NULL && *part == '\0') {
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
M_list_str_insert_at(parts, "", 0);
}
} else if (M_fs_path_isabs(part, sys_type) && len == 1) {
/* We need to add an empty so we get a separator after the drive. */
M_list_str_insert_at(parts, "", 1);
}
}
out = M_list_str_join(parts, (unsigned char)M_fs_path_get_system_sep(sys_type));
M_list_str_destroy(parts);
return out;
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732 | char *M_fs_path_join_parts(const M_list_str_t *path, M_fs_system_t sys_type)
{
M_list_str_t *parts;
const char *part;
char *out;
size_t len;
size_t i;
size_t count;
if (path == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
len = M_list_str_len(path);
if (len == 0) {
return NULL;
}
sys_type = M_fs_path_get_system_type(sys_type);
/* Remove any empty parts (except for the first part which denotes an abs path on Unix
* or a UNC path on Windows). */
parts = M_list_str_duplicate(path);
for (i=len-1; i>0; i--) {
part = M_list_str_at(parts, i);
if (part == NULL || *part == '\0') {
M_list_str_remove_at(parts, i);
}
}
len = M_list_str_len(parts);
/* Join puts the sep between items. If there are no items then the sep
* won't be written. */
part = M_list_str_at(parts, 0);
if (len == 1 && (part == NULL || *part == '\0')) {
M_list_str_destroy(parts);
if (sys_type == M_FS_SYSTEM_WINDOWS) {
return M_strdup("\\\\");
}
return M_strdup("/");
}
/* Handle windows abs path because they need two separators. */
if (sys_type == M_FS_SYSTEM_WINDOWS && len > 0) {
part = M_list_str_at(parts, 0);
/* If we have 1 item we need to add two empties so we get the second separator. */
count = (len == 1) ? 2 : 1;
/* If we're dealing with a unc path add the second sep so we get two separators for the UNC base. */
if (part != NULL && *part == '\0') {
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
M_list_str_insert_at(parts, "", 0);
}
} else if (M_fs_path_isabs(part, sys_type) && len == 1) {
/* We need to add an empty so we get a separator after the drive. */
M_list_str_insert_at(parts, "", 1);
}
}
out = M_list_str_join(parts, (unsigned char)M_fs_path_get_system_sep(sys_type));
M_list_str_destroy(parts);
return out;
}
| 169,146 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ext2_xattr_list(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct ext2_xattr_entry *entry;
char *end;
size_t rest = buffer_size;
int error;
ea_idebug(inode, "buffer=%p, buffer_size=%ld",
buffer, (long)buffer_size);
down_read(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
error = 0;
if (!EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
ea_idebug(inode, "reading block %d", EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
if (!bh)
goto cleanup;
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d, refcount=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)), le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount));
end = bh->b_data + bh->b_size;
if (HDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
HDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
bad_block: ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_list",
"inode %ld: bad block %d", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
/* check the on-disk data structure */
entry = FIRST_ENTRY(bh);
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry)) {
struct ext2_xattr_entry *next = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(entry);
if ((char *)next >= end)
goto bad_block;
entry = next;
}
if (ext2_xattr_cache_insert(bh))
ea_idebug(inode, "cache insert failed");
/* list the attribute names */
for (entry = FIRST_ENTRY(bh); !IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry);
entry = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(entry)) {
const struct xattr_handler *handler =
ext2_xattr_handler(entry->e_name_index);
if (handler && (!handler->list || handler->list(dentry))) {
const char *prefix = handler->prefix ?: handler->name;
size_t prefix_len = strlen(prefix);
size_t size = prefix_len + entry->e_name_len + 1;
if (buffer) {
if (size > rest) {
error = -ERANGE;
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy(buffer, prefix, prefix_len);
buffer += prefix_len;
memcpy(buffer, entry->e_name, entry->e_name_len);
buffer += entry->e_name_len;
*buffer++ = 0;
}
rest -= size;
}
}
error = buffer_size - rest; /* total size */
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
up_read(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | ext2_xattr_list(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct ext2_xattr_entry *entry;
char *end;
size_t rest = buffer_size;
int error;
struct mb2_cache *ext2_mb_cache = EXT2_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_mb_cache;
ea_idebug(inode, "buffer=%p, buffer_size=%ld",
buffer, (long)buffer_size);
down_read(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
error = 0;
if (!EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
ea_idebug(inode, "reading block %d", EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
if (!bh)
goto cleanup;
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d, refcount=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)), le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount));
end = bh->b_data + bh->b_size;
if (HDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
HDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
bad_block: ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_list",
"inode %ld: bad block %d", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
/* check the on-disk data structure */
entry = FIRST_ENTRY(bh);
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry)) {
struct ext2_xattr_entry *next = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(entry);
if ((char *)next >= end)
goto bad_block;
entry = next;
}
if (ext2_xattr_cache_insert(ext2_mb_cache, bh))
ea_idebug(inode, "cache insert failed");
/* list the attribute names */
for (entry = FIRST_ENTRY(bh); !IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry);
entry = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(entry)) {
const struct xattr_handler *handler =
ext2_xattr_handler(entry->e_name_index);
if (handler && (!handler->list || handler->list(dentry))) {
const char *prefix = handler->prefix ?: handler->name;
size_t prefix_len = strlen(prefix);
size_t size = prefix_len + entry->e_name_len + 1;
if (buffer) {
if (size > rest) {
error = -ERANGE;
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy(buffer, prefix, prefix_len);
buffer += prefix_len;
memcpy(buffer, entry->e_name, entry->e_name_len);
buffer += entry->e_name_len;
*buffer++ = 0;
}
rest -= size;
}
}
error = buffer_size - rest; /* total size */
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
up_read(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
return error;
}
| 169,981 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(const KURL& url, PassOwnPtr<BlobData> blobData)
{
if (isMainThread())
blobRegistry().registerBlobURL(url, blobData);
else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url, blobData));
callOnMainThread(®isterBlobURLTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(const KURL& url, PassOwnPtr<BlobData> blobData)
void BlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(const KURL& url, PassOwnPtr<BlobData> blobData)
{
if (isMainThread()) {
if (WebBlobRegistry* registry = blobRegistry()) {
WebBlobData webBlobData(blobData);
registry->registerBlobURL(url, webBlobData);
}
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url, blobData));
callOnMainThread(®isterBlobURLTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
| 170,684 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int dv_extract_audio(uint8_t* frame, uint8_t* ppcm[4],
const DVprofile *sys)
{
int size, chan, i, j, d, of, smpls, freq, quant, half_ch;
uint16_t lc, rc;
const uint8_t* as_pack;
uint8_t *pcm, ipcm;
as_pack = dv_extract_pack(frame, dv_audio_source);
if (!as_pack) /* No audio ? */
return 0;
smpls = as_pack[1] & 0x3f; /* samples in this frame - min. samples */
freq = (as_pack[4] >> 3) & 0x07; /* 0 - 48kHz, 1 - 44,1kHz, 2 - 32kHz */
quant = as_pack[4] & 0x07; /* 0 - 16bit linear, 1 - 12bit nonlinear */
if (quant > 1)
return -1; /* unsupported quantization */
size = (sys->audio_min_samples[freq] + smpls) * 4; /* 2ch, 2bytes */
half_ch = sys->difseg_size / 2;
/* We work with 720p frames split in half, thus even frames have
* channels 0,1 and odd 2,3. */
ipcm = (sys->height == 720 && !(frame[1] & 0x0C)) ? 2 : 0;
pcm = ppcm[ipcm++];
/* for each DIF channel */
for (chan = 0; chan < sys->n_difchan; chan++) {
/* for each DIF segment */
for (i = 0; i < sys->difseg_size; i++) {
frame += 6 * 80; /* skip DIF segment header */
break;
}
/* for each AV sequence */
for (j = 0; j < 9; j++) {
for (d = 8; d < 80; d += 2) {
if (quant == 0) { /* 16bit quantization */
of = sys->audio_shuffle[i][j] + (d - 8) / 2 * sys->audio_stride;
if (of*2 >= size)
continue;
pcm[of*2] = frame[d+1]; // FIXME: maybe we have to admit
pcm[of*2+1] = frame[d]; // that DV is a big-endian PCM
if (pcm[of*2+1] == 0x80 && pcm[of*2] == 0x00)
pcm[of*2+1] = 0;
} else { /* 12bit quantization */
lc = ((uint16_t)frame[d] << 4) |
((uint16_t)frame[d+2] >> 4);
rc = ((uint16_t)frame[d+1] << 4) |
((uint16_t)frame[d+2] & 0x0f);
lc = (lc == 0x800 ? 0 : dv_audio_12to16(lc));
rc = (rc == 0x800 ? 0 : dv_audio_12to16(rc));
of = sys->audio_shuffle[i%half_ch][j] + (d - 8) / 3 * sys->audio_stride;
if (of*2 >= size)
continue;
pcm[of*2] = lc & 0xff; // FIXME: maybe we have to admit
pcm[of*2+1] = lc >> 8; // that DV is a big-endian PCM
of = sys->audio_shuffle[i%half_ch+half_ch][j] +
(d - 8) / 3 * sys->audio_stride;
pcm[of*2] = rc & 0xff; // FIXME: maybe we have to admit
pcm[of*2+1] = rc >> 8; // that DV is a big-endian PCM
++d;
}
}
frame += 16 * 80; /* 15 Video DIFs + 1 Audio DIF */
}
}
frame += 16 * 80; /* 15 Video DIFs + 1 Audio DIF */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int dv_extract_audio(uint8_t* frame, uint8_t* ppcm[4],
const DVprofile *sys)
{
int size, chan, i, j, d, of, smpls, freq, quant, half_ch;
uint16_t lc, rc;
const uint8_t* as_pack;
uint8_t *pcm, ipcm;
as_pack = dv_extract_pack(frame, dv_audio_source);
if (!as_pack) /* No audio ? */
return 0;
smpls = as_pack[1] & 0x3f; /* samples in this frame - min. samples */
freq = (as_pack[4] >> 3) & 0x07; /* 0 - 48kHz, 1 - 44,1kHz, 2 - 32kHz */
quant = as_pack[4] & 0x07; /* 0 - 16bit linear, 1 - 12bit nonlinear */
if (quant > 1)
return -1; /* unsupported quantization */
size = (sys->audio_min_samples[freq] + smpls) * 4; /* 2ch, 2bytes */
half_ch = sys->difseg_size / 2;
/* We work with 720p frames split in half, thus even frames have
* channels 0,1 and odd 2,3. */
ipcm = (sys->height == 720 && !(frame[1] & 0x0C)) ? 2 : 0;
/* for each DIF channel */
for (chan = 0; chan < sys->n_difchan; chan++) {
/* next stereo channel (50Mbps and 100Mbps only) */
pcm = ppcm[ipcm++];
if (!pcm)
break;
/* for each DIF segment */
for (i = 0; i < sys->difseg_size; i++) {
frame += 6 * 80; /* skip DIF segment header */
break;
}
/* for each AV sequence */
for (j = 0; j < 9; j++) {
for (d = 8; d < 80; d += 2) {
if (quant == 0) { /* 16bit quantization */
of = sys->audio_shuffle[i][j] + (d - 8) / 2 * sys->audio_stride;
if (of*2 >= size)
continue;
pcm[of*2] = frame[d+1]; // FIXME: maybe we have to admit
pcm[of*2+1] = frame[d]; // that DV is a big-endian PCM
if (pcm[of*2+1] == 0x80 && pcm[of*2] == 0x00)
pcm[of*2+1] = 0;
} else { /* 12bit quantization */
lc = ((uint16_t)frame[d] << 4) |
((uint16_t)frame[d+2] >> 4);
rc = ((uint16_t)frame[d+1] << 4) |
((uint16_t)frame[d+2] & 0x0f);
lc = (lc == 0x800 ? 0 : dv_audio_12to16(lc));
rc = (rc == 0x800 ? 0 : dv_audio_12to16(rc));
of = sys->audio_shuffle[i%half_ch][j] + (d - 8) / 3 * sys->audio_stride;
if (of*2 >= size)
continue;
pcm[of*2] = lc & 0xff; // FIXME: maybe we have to admit
pcm[of*2+1] = lc >> 8; // that DV is a big-endian PCM
of = sys->audio_shuffle[i%half_ch+half_ch][j] +
(d - 8) / 3 * sys->audio_stride;
pcm[of*2] = rc & 0xff; // FIXME: maybe we have to admit
pcm[of*2+1] = rc >> 8; // that DV is a big-endian PCM
++d;
}
}
frame += 16 * 80; /* 15 Video DIFs + 1 Audio DIF */
}
}
frame += 16 * 80; /* 15 Video DIFs + 1 Audio DIF */
}
| 165,242 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::hasContentEditableAttributeSet() const {
const AtomicString& contentEditableValue = getAttribute(contenteditableAttr);
if (contentEditableValue.isNull())
return false;
return contentEditableValue.isEmpty() ||
equalIgnoringCase(contentEditableValue, "true");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool AXNodeObject::hasContentEditableAttributeSet() const {
const AtomicString& contentEditableValue = getAttribute(contenteditableAttr);
if (contentEditableValue.isNull())
return false;
return contentEditableValue.isEmpty() ||
equalIgnoringASCIICase(contentEditableValue, "true");
}
| 171,913 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int cg_write(const char *path, const char *buf, size_t size, off_t offset,
struct fuse_file_info *fi)
{
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char *localbuf = NULL;
struct cgfs_files *k = NULL;
struct file_info *f = (struct file_info *)fi->fh;
bool r;
if (f->type != LXC_TYPE_CGFILE) {
fprintf(stderr, "Internal error: directory cache info used in cg_write\n");
return -EIO;
}
if (offset)
return 0;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
localbuf = alloca(size+1);
localbuf[size] = '\0';
memcpy(localbuf, buf, size);
if ((k = cgfs_get_key(f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file)) == NULL) {
size = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, O_WRONLY)) {
size = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(f->file, "tasks") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "/tasks") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "/cgroup.procs") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "cgroup.procs") == 0)
r = do_write_pids(fc->pid, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);
else
r = cgfs_set_value(f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);
if (!r)
size = -EINVAL;
out:
free_key(k);
return size;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int cg_write(const char *path, const char *buf, size_t size, off_t offset,
struct fuse_file_info *fi)
{
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char *localbuf = NULL;
struct cgfs_files *k = NULL;
struct file_info *f = (struct file_info *)fi->fh;
bool r;
if (f->type != LXC_TYPE_CGFILE) {
fprintf(stderr, "Internal error: directory cache info used in cg_write\n");
return -EIO;
}
if (offset)
return 0;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
localbuf = alloca(size+1);
localbuf[size] = '\0';
memcpy(localbuf, buf, size);
if ((k = cgfs_get_key(f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file)) == NULL) {
size = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, O_WRONLY)) {
size = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(f->file, "tasks") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "/tasks") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "/cgroup.procs") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "cgroup.procs") == 0)
r = do_write_pids(fc->pid, fc->uid, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);
else
r = cgfs_set_value(f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);
if (!r)
size = -EINVAL;
out:
free_key(k);
return size;
}
| 166,701 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool handle_client_startup(PgSocket *client, PktHdr *pkt)
{
const char *passwd;
const uint8_t *key;
bool ok;
SBuf *sbuf = &client->sbuf;
/* don't tolerate partial packets */
if (incomplete_pkt(pkt)) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "client sent partial pkt in startup phase");
return false;
}
if (client->wait_for_welcome) {
if (finish_client_login(client)) {
/* the packet was already parsed */
sbuf_prepare_skip(sbuf, pkt->len);
return true;
} else
return false;
}
switch (pkt->type) {
case PKT_SSLREQ:
slog_noise(client, "C: req SSL");
slog_noise(client, "P: nak");
/* reject SSL attempt */
if (!sbuf_answer(&client->sbuf, "N", 1)) {
disconnect_client(client, false, "failed to nak SSL");
return false;
}
break;
case PKT_STARTUP_V2:
disconnect_client(client, true, "Old V2 protocol not supported");
return false;
case PKT_STARTUP:
if (client->pool) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "client re-sent startup pkt");
return false;
}
if (!decide_startup_pool(client, pkt))
return false;
if (client->pool->db->admin) {
if (!admin_pre_login(client))
return false;
}
if (cf_auth_type <= AUTH_TRUST || client->own_user) {
if (!finish_client_login(client))
return false;
} else {
if (!send_client_authreq(client)) {
disconnect_client(client, false, "failed to send auth req");
return false;
}
}
break;
case 'p': /* PasswordMessage */
/* haven't requested it */
if (cf_auth_type <= AUTH_TRUST) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "unrequested passwd pkt");
return false;
}
ok = mbuf_get_string(&pkt->data, &passwd);
if (ok && check_client_passwd(client, passwd)) {
if (!finish_client_login(client))
return false;
} else {
disconnect_client(client, true, "Auth failed");
return false;
}
break;
case PKT_CANCEL:
if (mbuf_avail_for_read(&pkt->data) == BACKENDKEY_LEN
&& mbuf_get_bytes(&pkt->data, BACKENDKEY_LEN, &key))
{
memcpy(client->cancel_key, key, BACKENDKEY_LEN);
accept_cancel_request(client);
} else
disconnect_client(client, false, "bad cancel request");
return false;
default:
disconnect_client(client, false, "bad packet");
return false;
}
sbuf_prepare_skip(sbuf, pkt->len);
client->request_time = get_cached_time();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Check if auth_user is set.
Fixes a crash if password packet appears before startup packet (#42).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static bool handle_client_startup(PgSocket *client, PktHdr *pkt)
{
const char *passwd;
const uint8_t *key;
bool ok;
SBuf *sbuf = &client->sbuf;
/* don't tolerate partial packets */
if (incomplete_pkt(pkt)) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "client sent partial pkt in startup phase");
return false;
}
if (client->wait_for_welcome) {
if (finish_client_login(client)) {
/* the packet was already parsed */
sbuf_prepare_skip(sbuf, pkt->len);
return true;
} else
return false;
}
switch (pkt->type) {
case PKT_SSLREQ:
slog_noise(client, "C: req SSL");
slog_noise(client, "P: nak");
/* reject SSL attempt */
if (!sbuf_answer(&client->sbuf, "N", 1)) {
disconnect_client(client, false, "failed to nak SSL");
return false;
}
break;
case PKT_STARTUP_V2:
disconnect_client(client, true, "Old V2 protocol not supported");
return false;
case PKT_STARTUP:
if (client->pool) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "client re-sent startup pkt");
return false;
}
if (!decide_startup_pool(client, pkt))
return false;
if (client->pool->db->admin) {
if (!admin_pre_login(client))
return false;
}
if (cf_auth_type <= AUTH_TRUST || client->own_user) {
if (!finish_client_login(client))
return false;
} else {
if (!send_client_authreq(client)) {
disconnect_client(client, false, "failed to send auth req");
return false;
}
}
break;
case 'p': /* PasswordMessage */
/* too early */
if (!client->auth_user) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "client password pkt before startup packet");
return false;
}
/* haven't requested it */
if (cf_auth_type <= AUTH_TRUST) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "unrequested passwd pkt");
return false;
}
ok = mbuf_get_string(&pkt->data, &passwd);
if (ok && check_client_passwd(client, passwd)) {
if (!finish_client_login(client))
return false;
} else {
disconnect_client(client, true, "Auth failed");
return false;
}
break;
case PKT_CANCEL:
if (mbuf_avail_for_read(&pkt->data) == BACKENDKEY_LEN
&& mbuf_get_bytes(&pkt->data, BACKENDKEY_LEN, &key))
{
memcpy(client->cancel_key, key, BACKENDKEY_LEN);
accept_cancel_request(client);
} else
disconnect_client(client, false, "bad cancel request");
return false;
default:
disconnect_client(client, false, "bad packet");
return false;
}
sbuf_prepare_skip(sbuf, pkt->len);
client->request_time = get_cached_time();
return true;
}
| 168,883 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> V8Console::createConsole(InspectedContext* inspectedContext, bool hasMemoryAttribute)
{
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = inspectedContext->context();
v8::Context::Scope contextScope(context);
v8::Isolate* isolate = context->GetIsolate();
v8::MicrotasksScope microtasksScope(isolate, v8::MicrotasksScope::kDoNotRunMicrotasks);
v8::Local<v8::Object> console = v8::Object::New(isolate);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "debug", V8Console::debugCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "error", V8Console::errorCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "info", V8Console::infoCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "log", V8Console::logCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "warn", V8Console::warnCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "dir", V8Console::dirCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "dirxml", V8Console::dirxmlCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "table", V8Console::tableCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "trace", V8Console::traceCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "group", V8Console::groupCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "groupCollapsed", V8Console::groupCollapsedCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "groupEnd", V8Console::groupEndCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "clear", V8Console::clearCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "count", V8Console::countCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "assert", V8Console::assertCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "markTimeline", V8Console::markTimelineCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "profile", V8Console::profileCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "profileEnd", V8Console::profileEndCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "timeline", V8Console::timelineCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "timelineEnd", V8Console::timelineEndCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "time", V8Console::timeCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "timeEnd", V8Console::timeEndCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "timeStamp", V8Console::timeStampCallback);
bool success = console->SetPrototype(context, v8::Object::New(isolate)).FromMaybe(false);
DCHECK(success);
if (hasMemoryAttribute)
console->SetAccessorProperty(toV8StringInternalized(isolate, "memory"), V8_FUNCTION_NEW_REMOVE_PROTOTYPE(context, V8Console::memoryGetterCallback, console, 0).ToLocalChecked(), V8_FUNCTION_NEW_REMOVE_PROTOTYPE(context, V8Console::memorySetterCallback, v8::Local<v8::Value>(), 0).ToLocalChecked(), static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), v8::DEFAULT);
console->SetPrivate(context, inspectedContextPrivateKey(isolate), v8::External::New(isolate, inspectedContext));
return console;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | v8::Local<v8::Object> V8Console::createConsole(InspectedContext* inspectedContext, bool hasMemoryAttribute)
{
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = inspectedContext->context();
v8::Context::Scope contextScope(context);
v8::Isolate* isolate = context->GetIsolate();
v8::MicrotasksScope microtasksScope(isolate, v8::MicrotasksScope::kDoNotRunMicrotasks);
v8::Local<v8::Object> console = v8::Object::New(isolate);
bool success = console->SetPrototype(context, v8::Object::New(isolate)).FromMaybe(false);
DCHECK(success);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "debug", V8Console::debugCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "error", V8Console::errorCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "info", V8Console::infoCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "log", V8Console::logCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "warn", V8Console::warnCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "dir", V8Console::dirCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "dirxml", V8Console::dirxmlCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "table", V8Console::tableCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "trace", V8Console::traceCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "group", V8Console::groupCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "groupCollapsed", V8Console::groupCollapsedCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "groupEnd", V8Console::groupEndCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "clear", V8Console::clearCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "count", V8Console::countCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "assert", V8Console::assertCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "markTimeline", V8Console::markTimelineCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "profile", V8Console::profileCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "profileEnd", V8Console::profileEndCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "timeline", V8Console::timelineCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "timelineEnd", V8Console::timelineEndCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "time", V8Console::timeCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "timeEnd", V8Console::timeEndCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, console, "timeStamp", V8Console::timeStampCallback);
if (hasMemoryAttribute)
console->SetAccessorProperty(toV8StringInternalized(isolate, "memory"), V8_FUNCTION_NEW_REMOVE_PROTOTYPE(context, V8Console::memoryGetterCallback, console, 0).ToLocalChecked(), V8_FUNCTION_NEW_REMOVE_PROTOTYPE(context, V8Console::memorySetterCallback, v8::Local<v8::Value>(), 0).ToLocalChecked(), static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), v8::DEFAULT);
console->SetPrivate(context, inspectedContextPrivateKey(isolate), v8::External::New(isolate, inspectedContext));
return console;
}
| 172,063 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char* _single_string_alloc_and_copy( LPCWSTR in )
{
char *chr;
int len = 0;
if ( !in )
{
return in;
}
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
len ++;
}
chr = malloc( len + 1 );
len = 0;
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
chr[ len ] = 0xFF & in[ len ];
len ++;
}
chr[ len ++ ] = '\0';
return chr;
}
Commit Message: New Pre Source
CWE ID: CWE-119 | char* _single_string_alloc_and_copy( LPCWSTR in )
{
char *chr;
int len = 0;
if ( !in )
{
return NULL;
}
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
len ++;
}
chr = malloc( len + 1 );
len = 0;
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
chr[ len ] = 0xFF & in[ len ];
len ++;
}
chr[ len ++ ] = '\0';
return chr;
}
| 169,315 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ikev2_parent_outI1_continue(struct pluto_crypto_req_cont *pcrc,
struct pluto_crypto_req *r,
err_t ugh)
{
struct ke_continuation *ke = (struct ke_continuation *)pcrc;
struct msg_digest *md = ke->md;
struct state *const st = md->st;
stf_status e;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("ikev2 parent outI1: calculated ke+nonce, sending I1"));
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"%s: Request was disconnected from state",
__FUNCTION__);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
return;
}
/* XXX should check out ugh */
passert(ugh == NULL);
passert(cur_state == NULL);
passert(st != NULL);
passert(st->st_suspended_md == ke->md);
set_suspended(st, NULL); /* no longer connected or suspended */
set_cur_state(st);
st->st_calculating = FALSE;
e = ikev2_parent_outI1_tail(pcrc, r);
if (ke->md != NULL) {
complete_v2_state_transition(&ke->md, e);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
}
reset_cur_state();
reset_globals();
passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void ikev2_parent_outI1_continue(struct pluto_crypto_req_cont *pcrc,
struct pluto_crypto_req *r,
err_t ugh)
{
struct ke_continuation *ke = (struct ke_continuation *)pcrc;
struct msg_digest *md = ke->md;
struct state *const st = md->st;
stf_status e;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("ikev2 parent outI1: calculated ke+nonce, sending I1"));
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"%s: Request was disconnected from state",
__FUNCTION__);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
return;
}
/* XXX should check out ugh */
passert(ugh == NULL);
passert(cur_state == NULL);
passert(st != NULL);
passert(st->st_suspended_md == ke->md);
set_suspended(st, NULL); /* no longer connected or suspended */
set_cur_state(st);
st->st_calculating = FALSE;
e = ikev2_parent_outI1_tail(pcrc, r);
if (ke->md != NULL) {
complete_v2_state_transition(&ke->md, e);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
}
reset_cur_state();
reset_globals();
}
| 166,473 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void patch_instruction(VAPICROMState *s, X86CPU *cpu, target_ulong ip)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu);
CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env;
VAPICHandlers *handlers;
uint8_t opcode[2];
uint32_t imm32;
target_ulong current_pc = 0;
target_ulong current_cs_base = 0;
uint32_t current_flags = 0;
if (smp_cpus == 1) {
handlers = &s->rom_state.up;
} else {
handlers = &s->rom_state.mp;
}
if (!kvm_enabled()) {
cpu_get_tb_cpu_state(env, ¤t_pc, ¤t_cs_base,
¤t_flags);
}
pause_all_vcpus();
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip, opcode, sizeof(opcode), 0);
switch (opcode[0]) {
case 0x89: /* mov r32 to r/m32 */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x50 + modrm_reg(opcode[1])); /* push reg */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 1, handlers->set_tpr);
break;
case 0x8b: /* mov r/m32 to r32 */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x90);
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 1, handlers->get_tpr[modrm_reg(opcode[1])]);
break;
case 0xa1: /* mov abs to eax */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip, handlers->get_tpr[0]);
break;
case 0xa3: /* mov eax to abs */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip, handlers->set_tpr_eax);
break;
case 0xc7: /* mov imm32, r/m32 (c7/0) */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x68); /* push imm32 */
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip + 6, (void *)&imm32, sizeof(imm32), 0);
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip + 1, (void *)&imm32, sizeof(imm32), 1);
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 5, handlers->set_tpr);
break;
case 0xff: /* push r/m32 */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x50); /* push eax */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 1, handlers->get_tpr_stack);
break;
default:
abort();
}
resume_all_vcpus();
if (!kvm_enabled()) {
tb_gen_code(cs, current_pc, current_cs_base, current_flags, 1);
cpu_resume_from_signal(cs, NULL);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void patch_instruction(VAPICROMState *s, X86CPU *cpu, target_ulong ip)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu);
CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env;
VAPICHandlers *handlers;
uint8_t opcode[2];
uint32_t imm32 = 0;
target_ulong current_pc = 0;
target_ulong current_cs_base = 0;
uint32_t current_flags = 0;
if (smp_cpus == 1) {
handlers = &s->rom_state.up;
} else {
handlers = &s->rom_state.mp;
}
if (!kvm_enabled()) {
cpu_get_tb_cpu_state(env, ¤t_pc, ¤t_cs_base,
¤t_flags);
}
pause_all_vcpus();
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip, opcode, sizeof(opcode), 0);
switch (opcode[0]) {
case 0x89: /* mov r32 to r/m32 */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x50 + modrm_reg(opcode[1])); /* push reg */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 1, handlers->set_tpr);
break;
case 0x8b: /* mov r/m32 to r32 */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x90);
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 1, handlers->get_tpr[modrm_reg(opcode[1])]);
break;
case 0xa1: /* mov abs to eax */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip, handlers->get_tpr[0]);
break;
case 0xa3: /* mov eax to abs */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip, handlers->set_tpr_eax);
break;
case 0xc7: /* mov imm32, r/m32 (c7/0) */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x68); /* push imm32 */
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip + 6, (void *)&imm32, sizeof(imm32), 0);
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip + 1, (void *)&imm32, sizeof(imm32), 1);
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 5, handlers->set_tpr);
break;
case 0xff: /* push r/m32 */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x50); /* push eax */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 1, handlers->get_tpr_stack);
break;
default:
abort();
}
resume_all_vcpus();
if (!kvm_enabled()) {
tb_gen_code(cs, current_pc, current_cs_base, current_flags, 1);
cpu_resume_from_signal(cs, NULL);
}
}
| 165,076 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int nr_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int er;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
release_sock(sk);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL) {
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
er = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (er < 0) {
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
if (sax != NULL) {
sax->sax25_family = AF_NETROM;
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, 7, sax->sax25_call.ax25_call,
AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sax);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return copied;
}
Commit Message: netrom: fix info leak via msg_name in nr_recvmsg()
In case msg_name is set the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of
struct sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Also
the sax25_ndigis member does not get assigned, leaking four more
bytes.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int nr_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int er;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
release_sock(sk);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL) {
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
er = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (er < 0) {
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
if (sax != NULL) {
memset(sax, 0, sizeof(sax));
sax->sax25_family = AF_NETROM;
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, 7, sax->sax25_call.ax25_call,
AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sax);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return copied;
}
| 166,035 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int res_unpack(vorbis_info_residue *info,
vorbis_info *vi,oggpack_buffer *opb){
int j,k;
codec_setup_info *ci=(codec_setup_info *)vi->codec_setup;
memset(info,0,sizeof(*info));
info->type=oggpack_read(opb,16);
if(info->type>2 || info->type<0)goto errout;
info->begin=oggpack_read(opb,24);
info->end=oggpack_read(opb,24);
info->grouping=oggpack_read(opb,24)+1;
info->partitions=(char)(oggpack_read(opb,6)+1);
info->groupbook=(unsigned char)oggpack_read(opb,8);
if(info->groupbook>=ci->books)goto errout;
info->stagemasks=_ogg_malloc(info->partitions*sizeof(*info->stagemasks));
info->stagebooks=_ogg_malloc(info->partitions*8*sizeof(*info->stagebooks));
for(j=0;j<info->partitions;j++){
int cascade=oggpack_read(opb,3);
if(oggpack_read(opb,1))
cascade|=(oggpack_read(opb,5)<<3);
info->stagemasks[j]=cascade;
}
for(j=0;j<info->partitions;j++){
for(k=0;k<8;k++){
if((info->stagemasks[j]>>k)&1){
unsigned char book=(unsigned char)oggpack_read(opb,8);
if(book>=ci->books)goto errout;
info->stagebooks[j*8+k]=book;
if(k+1>info->stages)info->stages=k+1;
}else
info->stagebooks[j*8+k]=0xff;
}
}
if(oggpack_eop(opb))goto errout;
return 0;
errout:
res_clear_info(info);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | int res_unpack(vorbis_info_residue *info,
vorbis_info *vi,oggpack_buffer *opb){
int j,k;
codec_setup_info *ci=(codec_setup_info *)vi->codec_setup;
memset(info,0,sizeof(*info));
info->type=oggpack_read(opb,16);
if(info->type>2 || info->type<0)goto errout;
info->begin=oggpack_read(opb,24);
info->end=oggpack_read(opb,24);
info->grouping=oggpack_read(opb,24)+1; // "partition size" in spec
info->partitions=(char)(oggpack_read(opb,6)+1); // "classification" in spec
info->groupbook=(unsigned char)oggpack_read(opb,8); // "classbook" in spec
if(info->groupbook>=ci->books)goto errout;
info->stagemasks=_ogg_malloc(info->partitions*sizeof(*info->stagemasks));
info->stagebooks=_ogg_malloc(info->partitions*8*sizeof(*info->stagebooks));
for(j=0;j<info->partitions;j++){
int cascade=oggpack_read(opb,3);
if(oggpack_read(opb,1))
cascade|=(oggpack_read(opb,5)<<3);
info->stagemasks[j]=cascade;
}
for(j=0;j<info->partitions;j++){
for(k=0;k<8;k++){
if((info->stagemasks[j]>>k)&1){
unsigned char book=(unsigned char)oggpack_read(opb,8);
if(book>=ci->books)goto errout;
info->stagebooks[j*8+k]=book;
if(k+1>info->stages)info->stages=k+1;
}else
info->stagebooks[j*8+k]=0xff;
}
}
if(oggpack_eop(opb))goto errout;
// According to the Vorbis spec (paragraph 8.6.2 "packet decode"), residue
// begin and end should be limited to the maximum possible vector size in
// case they exceed it. However doing that makes the decoder crash further
// down, so we return an error instead.
int limit = (info->type == 2 ? vi->channels : 1) * ci->blocksizes[1] / 2;
if (info->begin > info->end ||
info->end > limit) {
goto errout;
}
return 0;
errout:
res_clear_info(info);
return 1;
}
| 173,991 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Segment::AppendCluster(Cluster* pCluster)
{
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index >= 0);
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
long& size = m_clusterSize;
assert(size >= count);
const long idx = pCluster->m_index;
assert(idx == m_clusterCount);
if (count >= size)
{
const long n = (size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2*size;
Cluster** const qq = new Cluster*[n];
Cluster** q = qq;
Cluster** p = m_clusters;
Cluster** const pp = p + count;
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_clusters;
m_clusters = qq;
size = n;
}
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0)
{
assert(m_clusters);
Cluster** const p = m_clusters + m_clusterCount;
assert(*p);
assert((*p)->m_index < 0);
Cluster** q = p + m_clusterPreloadCount;
assert(q < (m_clusters + size));
for (;;)
{
Cluster** const qq = q - 1;
assert((*qq)->m_index < 0);
*q = *qq;
q = qq;
if (q == p)
break;
}
}
m_clusters[idx] = pCluster;
++m_clusterCount;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Segment::AppendCluster(Cluster* pCluster)
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
long& size = m_clusterSize;
assert(size >= count);
const long idx = pCluster->m_index;
assert(idx == m_clusterCount);
if (count >= size) {
const long n = (size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2 * size;
Cluster** const qq = new Cluster* [n];
Cluster** q = qq;
Cluster** p = m_clusters;
Cluster** const pp = p + count;
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_clusters;
m_clusters = qq;
size = n;
}
| 174,237 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static RList *r_bin_wasm_get_element_entries (RBinWasmObj *bin, RBinWasmSection *sec) {
RList *ret = NULL;
RBinWasmElementEntry *ptr = NULL;
if (!(ret = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free))) {
return NULL;
}
ut8* buf = bin->buf->buf + (ut32)sec->payload_data;
ut32 len = sec->payload_len;
ut32 count = sec->count;
ut32 i = 0, r = 0;
while (i < len && r < count) {
if (!(ptr = R_NEW0 (RBinWasmElementEntry))) {
return ret;
}
if (!(consume_u32 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->index, &i))) {
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
if (!(consume_init_expr (buf + i, buf + len, R_BIN_WASM_END_OF_CODE, NULL, &i))) {
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
if (!(consume_u32 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->num_elem, &i))) {
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
ut32 j = 0;
while (i < len && j < ptr->num_elem ) {
ut32 e;
if (!(consume_u32 (buf + i, buf + len, &e, &i))) {
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
}
r_list_append (ret, ptr);
r += 1;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in fuzzed wasm r2_hoobr_consume_init_expr
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static RList *r_bin_wasm_get_element_entries (RBinWasmObj *bin, RBinWasmSection *sec) {
RList *ret = NULL;
RBinWasmElementEntry *ptr = NULL;
if (!(ret = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free))) {
return NULL;
}
ut8* buf = bin->buf->buf + (ut32)sec->payload_data;
int buflen = bin->buf->length - (ut32)sec->payload_data;
ut32 len = sec->payload_len;
ut32 count = sec->count;
ut32 i = 0, r = 0;
while (i < len && len < buflen && r < count) {
if (!(ptr = R_NEW0 (RBinWasmElementEntry))) {
return ret;
}
if (!(consume_u32 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->index, &i))) {
goto beach;
}
if (!(consume_init_expr (buf + i, buf + len, R_BIN_WASM_END_OF_CODE, NULL, &i))) {
goto beach;
}
if (!(consume_u32 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->num_elem, &i))) {
goto beach;
}
ut32 j = 0;
while (i < len && j < ptr->num_elem) {
ut32 e;
if (!(consume_u32 (buf + i, buf + len, &e, &i))) {
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
}
r_list_append (ret, ptr);
r += 1;
}
return ret;
beach:
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
| 168,252 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::GetNext(
const BlockEntry* pCurr,
const BlockEntry*& pNext) const
{
assert(pCurr);
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_count > 0);
size_t idx = pCurr->GetIndex();
assert(idx < size_t(m_entries_count));
assert(m_entries[idx] == pCurr);
++idx;
if (idx >= size_t(m_entries_count))
{
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //error
{
pNext = NULL;
return status;
}
if (status > 0)
{
pNext = NULL;
return 0;
}
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_count > 0);
assert(idx < size_t(m_entries_count));
}
pNext = m_entries[idx];
assert(pNext);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Cluster::GetNext(
size_t idx = pCurr->GetIndex();
assert(idx < size_t(m_entries_count));
assert(m_entries[idx] == pCurr);
++idx;
if (idx >= size_t(m_entries_count)) {
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) { // error
pNext = NULL;
return status;
}
if (status > 0) {
pNext = NULL;
return 0;
}
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_count > 0);
assert(idx < size_t(m_entries_count));
}
pNext = m_entries[idx];
assert(pNext);
return 0;
}
| 174,345 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::enableNativeBuffers(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL graphic, OMX_BOOL enable) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CLOG_CONFIG(enableNativeBuffers, "%s:%u%s, %d", portString(portIndex), portIndex,
graphic ? ", graphic" : "", enable);
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
graphic ? "OMX.google.android.index.enableAndroidNativeBuffers"
: "OMX.google.android.index.allocateNativeHandle");
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.enable = enable;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable);
if (!graphic) {
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] =
enable ? kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle : kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
} else if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeUnknown) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
}
}
} else {
CLOG_ERROR_IF(enable, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
if (!graphic) {
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
if (property_get("media.mediadrmservice.enable", value, NULL)
&& (!strcmp("1", value) || !strcasecmp("true", value))) {
CLOG_CONFIG(enableNativeBuffers, "system property override: using native-handles");
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle;
} else if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeUnknown) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
}
err = OMX_ErrorNone;
}
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: OMXNodeInstance: sanity check portIndex.
Bug: 31385713
Change-Id: Ib91d00eb5cc8c51c84d37f5d36d6b7ca594d201f
(cherry picked from commit f80a1f5075a7c6e1982d37c68bfed7c9a611bb20)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::enableNativeBuffers(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL graphic, OMX_BOOL enable) {
if (portIndex >= NELEM(mSecureBufferType)) {
ALOGE("b/31385713, portIndex(%u)", portIndex);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "31385713");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CLOG_CONFIG(enableNativeBuffers, "%s:%u%s, %d", portString(portIndex), portIndex,
graphic ? ", graphic" : "", enable);
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
graphic ? "OMX.google.android.index.enableAndroidNativeBuffers"
: "OMX.google.android.index.allocateNativeHandle");
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.enable = enable;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable);
if (!graphic) {
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] =
enable ? kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle : kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
} else if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeUnknown) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
}
}
} else {
CLOG_ERROR_IF(enable, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
if (!graphic) {
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
if (property_get("media.mediadrmservice.enable", value, NULL)
&& (!strcmp("1", value) || !strcasecmp("true", value))) {
CLOG_CONFIG(enableNativeBuffers, "system property override: using native-handles");
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle;
} else if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeUnknown) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
}
err = OMX_ErrorNone;
}
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
| 173,385 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChunkedUploadDataStream::AppendData(
const char* data, int data_len, bool is_done) {
DCHECK(!all_data_appended_);
DCHECK(data_len > 0 || is_done);
if (data_len > 0) {
DCHECK(data);
upload_data_.push_back(
base::MakeUnique<std::vector<char>>(data, data + data_len));
}
all_data_appended_ = is_done;
if (!read_buffer_.get())
return;
int result = ReadChunk(read_buffer_.get(), read_buffer_len_);
DCHECK_GE(result, 0);
read_buffer_ = NULL;
read_buffer_len_ = 0;
OnReadCompleted(result);
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | void ChunkedUploadDataStream::AppendData(
const char* data, int data_len, bool is_done) {
DCHECK(!all_data_appended_);
DCHECK(data_len > 0 || is_done);
if (data_len > 0) {
DCHECK(data);
upload_data_.push_back(
std::make_unique<std::vector<char>>(data, data + data_len));
}
all_data_appended_ = is_done;
if (!read_buffer_.get())
return;
int result = ReadChunk(read_buffer_.get(), read_buffer_len_);
DCHECK_GE(result, 0);
read_buffer_ = NULL;
read_buffer_len_ = 0;
OnReadCompleted(result);
}
| 173,260 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int create_fixed_stream_quirk(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
struct usb_interface *iface,
struct usb_driver *driver,
const struct snd_usb_audio_quirk *quirk)
{
struct audioformat *fp;
struct usb_host_interface *alts;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *altsd;
int stream, err;
unsigned *rate_table = NULL;
fp = kmemdup(quirk->data, sizeof(*fp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fp) {
usb_audio_err(chip, "cannot memdup\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (fp->nr_rates > MAX_NR_RATES) {
kfree(fp);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (fp->nr_rates > 0) {
rate_table = kmemdup(fp->rate_table,
sizeof(int) * fp->nr_rates, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rate_table) {
kfree(fp);
return -ENOMEM;
}
fp->rate_table = rate_table;
}
stream = (fp->endpoint & USB_DIR_IN)
? SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE : SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK;
err = snd_usb_add_audio_stream(chip, stream, fp);
if (err < 0) {
kfree(fp);
kfree(rate_table);
return err;
}
if (fp->iface != get_iface_desc(&iface->altsetting[0])->bInterfaceNumber ||
fp->altset_idx >= iface->num_altsetting) {
kfree(fp);
kfree(rate_table);
return -EINVAL;
}
alts = &iface->altsetting[fp->altset_idx];
altsd = get_iface_desc(alts);
fp->protocol = altsd->bInterfaceProtocol;
if (fp->datainterval == 0)
fp->datainterval = snd_usb_parse_datainterval(chip, alts);
if (fp->maxpacksize == 0)
fp->maxpacksize = le16_to_cpu(get_endpoint(alts, 0)->wMaxPacketSize);
usb_set_interface(chip->dev, fp->iface, 0);
snd_usb_init_pitch(chip, fp->iface, alts, fp);
snd_usb_init_sample_rate(chip, fp->iface, alts, fp, fp->rate_max);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | static int create_fixed_stream_quirk(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
struct usb_interface *iface,
struct usb_driver *driver,
const struct snd_usb_audio_quirk *quirk)
{
struct audioformat *fp;
struct usb_host_interface *alts;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *altsd;
int stream, err;
unsigned *rate_table = NULL;
fp = kmemdup(quirk->data, sizeof(*fp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fp) {
usb_audio_err(chip, "cannot memdup\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (fp->nr_rates > MAX_NR_RATES) {
kfree(fp);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (fp->nr_rates > 0) {
rate_table = kmemdup(fp->rate_table,
sizeof(int) * fp->nr_rates, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rate_table) {
kfree(fp);
return -ENOMEM;
}
fp->rate_table = rate_table;
}
stream = (fp->endpoint & USB_DIR_IN)
? SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE : SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK;
err = snd_usb_add_audio_stream(chip, stream, fp);
if (err < 0) {
kfree(fp);
kfree(rate_table);
return err;
}
if (fp->iface != get_iface_desc(&iface->altsetting[0])->bInterfaceNumber ||
fp->altset_idx >= iface->num_altsetting) {
kfree(fp);
kfree(rate_table);
return -EINVAL;
}
alts = &iface->altsetting[fp->altset_idx];
altsd = get_iface_desc(alts);
if (altsd->bNumEndpoints < 1) {
kfree(fp);
kfree(rate_table);
return -EINVAL;
}
fp->protocol = altsd->bInterfaceProtocol;
if (fp->datainterval == 0)
fp->datainterval = snd_usb_parse_datainterval(chip, alts);
if (fp->maxpacksize == 0)
fp->maxpacksize = le16_to_cpu(get_endpoint(alts, 0)->wMaxPacketSize);
usb_set_interface(chip->dev, fp->iface, 0);
snd_usb_init_pitch(chip, fp->iface, alts, fp);
snd_usb_init_sample_rate(chip, fp->iface, alts, fp, fp->rate_max);
return 0;
}
| 167,434 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
{
struct map_struct *buf;
OFF_T i, len = st_p->st_size;
md_context m;
int32 remainder;
int fd;
memset(sum, 0, MAX_DIGEST_LEN);
fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd == -1)
return;
buf = map_file(fd, len, MAX_MAP_SIZE, CSUM_CHUNK);
switch (checksum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5:
md5_begin(&m);
for (i = 0; i + CSUM_CHUNK <= len; i += CSUM_CHUNK) {
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, CSUM_CHUNK),
CSUM_CHUNK);
}
remainder = (int32)(len - i);
if (remainder > 0)
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
md5_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
mdfour_begin(&m);
for (i = 0; i + CSUM_CHUNK <= len; i += CSUM_CHUNK) {
}
/* Prior to version 27 an incorrect MD4 checksum was computed
* by failing to call mdfour_tail() for block sizes that
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* even when there are no more bytes. */
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* even when there are no more bytes. */
remainder = (int32)(len - i);
if (remainder > 0 || checksum_type != CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
mdfour_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
rprintf(FERROR, "invalid checksum-choice for the --checksum option (%d)\n", checksum_type);
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
close(fd);
unmap_file(buf);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-354 | void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
{
struct map_struct *buf;
OFF_T i, len = st_p->st_size;
md_context m;
int32 remainder;
int fd;
memset(sum, 0, MAX_DIGEST_LEN);
fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd == -1)
return;
buf = map_file(fd, len, MAX_MAP_SIZE, CSUM_CHUNK);
switch (checksum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5:
md5_begin(&m);
for (i = 0; i + CSUM_CHUNK <= len; i += CSUM_CHUNK) {
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, CSUM_CHUNK),
CSUM_CHUNK);
}
remainder = (int32)(len - i);
if (remainder > 0)
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
md5_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC:
mdfour_begin(&m);
for (i = 0; i + CSUM_CHUNK <= len; i += CSUM_CHUNK) {
}
/* Prior to version 27 an incorrect MD4 checksum was computed
* by failing to call mdfour_tail() for block sizes that
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* even when there are no more bytes. */
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* even when there are no more bytes. */
remainder = (int32)(len - i);
if (remainder > 0 || checksum_type > CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
mdfour_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
rprintf(FERROR, "invalid checksum-choice for the --checksum option (%d)\n", checksum_type);
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
close(fd);
unmap_file(buf);
}
| 164,643 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped");
base::ScopedClosureRunner scoped_completion_runner(
base::Bind(&AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompleted,
host_id_, params.route_id, params.surface_id,
true, base::TimeTicks(), base::TimeDelta()));
gfx::PluginWindowHandle handle =
GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->GetSurfaceWindowHandle(params.surface_id);
if (!handle) {
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "SurfaceIDNotFound_RoutingToUI",
"surface_id", params.surface_id);
#if defined(USE_AURA)
scoped_completion_runner.Release();
RouteOnUIThread(GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(params));
#endif
return;
}
scoped_refptr<AcceleratedPresenter> presenter(
AcceleratedPresenter::GetForWindow(handle));
if (!presenter) {
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "EarlyOut_NativeWindowNotFound", "handle", handle);
return;
}
scoped_completion_runner.Release();
presenter->AsyncPresentAndAcknowledge(
params.size,
params.surface_handle,
base::Bind(&AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompleted,
host_id_,
params.route_id,
params.surface_id));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped");
base::ScopedClosureRunner scoped_completion_runner(
base::Bind(&AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompleted,
host_id_, params.route_id, params.surface_id, params.surface_handle,
true, base::TimeTicks(), base::TimeDelta()));
gfx::PluginWindowHandle handle =
GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->GetSurfaceWindowHandle(params.surface_id);
if (!handle) {
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "SurfaceIDNotFound_RoutingToUI",
"surface_id", params.surface_id);
#if defined(USE_AURA)
scoped_completion_runner.Release();
RouteOnUIThread(GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(params));
#endif
return;
}
scoped_refptr<AcceleratedPresenter> presenter(
AcceleratedPresenter::GetForWindow(handle));
if (!presenter) {
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "EarlyOut_NativeWindowNotFound", "handle", handle);
return;
}
scoped_completion_runner.Release();
presenter->AsyncPresentAndAcknowledge(
params.size,
params.surface_handle,
base::Bind(&AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompleted,
host_id_,
params.route_id,
params.surface_id,
params.surface_handle));
}
| 171,356 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::RefTest() {
for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
src_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
ref_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
unsigned int var1;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var1 = variance_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse1));
const unsigned int var2 = variance_ref(src_, ref_, log2width_,
log2height_, &sse2);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2);
EXPECT_EQ(var1, var2);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::RefTest() {
for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
src_[j] = rnd_.Rand8();
ref_[j] = rnd_.Rand8();
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src_)[j] = rnd_.Rand16() && mask_;
CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref_)[j] = rnd_.Rand16() && mask_;
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
unsigned int var1;
const int stride_coeff = 1;
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
var1 = variance_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse1));
const unsigned int var2 = variance_ref(src_, ref_, log2width_,
log2height_, stride_coeff,
stride_coeff, &sse2,
use_high_bit_depth_, bit_depth_);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2);
EXPECT_EQ(var1, var2);
}
}
template<typename VarianceFunctionType>
void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::RefStrideTest() {
for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
int ref_stride_coeff = i % 2;
int src_stride_coeff = (i >> 1) % 2;
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
int ref_ind = (j / width_) * ref_stride_coeff * width_ + j % width_;
int src_ind = (j / width_) * src_stride_coeff * width_ + j % width_;
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
src_[src_ind] = rnd_.Rand8();
ref_[ref_ind] = rnd_.Rand8();
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src_)[src_ind] = rnd_.Rand16() && mask_;
CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref_)[ref_ind] = rnd_.Rand16() && mask_;
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
unsigned int var1;
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
var1 = variance_(src_, width_ * src_stride_coeff,
ref_, width_ * ref_stride_coeff, &sse1));
const unsigned int var2 = variance_ref(src_, ref_, log2width_,
log2height_, src_stride_coeff,
ref_stride_coeff, &sse2,
use_high_bit_depth_, bit_depth_);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2);
EXPECT_EQ(var1, var2);
}
}
| 174,586 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int can_open_delegated(struct nfs_delegation *delegation, mode_t open_flags)
{
if ((delegation->type & open_flags) != open_flags)
return 0;
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATION_NEED_RECLAIM, &delegation->flags))
return 0;
nfs_mark_delegation_referenced(delegation);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | static int can_open_delegated(struct nfs_delegation *delegation, mode_t open_flags)
static int can_open_delegated(struct nfs_delegation *delegation, fmode_t fmode)
{
if ((delegation->type & fmode) != fmode)
return 0;
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATION_NEED_RECLAIM, &delegation->flags))
return 0;
nfs_mark_delegation_referenced(delegation);
return 1;
}
| 165,687 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void UpdateForDataChange(int days_since_last_update) {
MaintainContentLengthPrefsWindow(original_update_.Get(), kNumDaysInHistory);
MaintainContentLengthPrefsWindow(received_update_.Get(), kNumDaysInHistory);
if (days_since_last_update) {
MaintainContentLengthPrefsForDateChange(
original_update_.Get(), received_update_.Get(),
days_since_last_update);
}
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void UpdateForDataChange(int days_since_last_update) {
original_.UpdateForDataChange(days_since_last_update);
received_.UpdateForDataChange(days_since_last_update);
}
| 171,329 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void queue_delete(struct snd_seq_queue *q)
{
/* stop and release the timer */
snd_seq_timer_stop(q->timer);
snd_seq_timer_close(q);
/* wait until access free */
snd_use_lock_sync(&q->use_lock);
/* release resources... */
snd_seq_prioq_delete(&q->tickq);
snd_seq_prioq_delete(&q->timeq);
snd_seq_timer_delete(&q->timer);
kfree(q);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close
ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client. This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.
This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static void queue_delete(struct snd_seq_queue *q)
{
/* stop and release the timer */
mutex_lock(&q->timer_mutex);
snd_seq_timer_stop(q->timer);
snd_seq_timer_close(q);
mutex_unlock(&q->timer_mutex);
/* wait until access free */
snd_use_lock_sync(&q->use_lock);
/* release resources... */
snd_seq_prioq_delete(&q->tickq);
snd_seq_prioq_delete(&q->timeq);
snd_seq_timer_delete(&q->timer);
kfree(q);
}
| 167,409 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <infile> <outfile> <N-M|N/M>\n", exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void usage_exit() {
void usage_exit(void) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <infile> <outfile> <N-M|N/M>\n", exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
| 174,477 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int enable(void) {
LOG_INFO("%s", __func__);
if (!interface_ready())
return BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
stack_manager_get_interface()->start_up_stack_async();
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int enable(void) {
static int enable(bool start_restricted) {
LOG_INFO(LOG_TAG, "%s: start restricted = %d", __func__, start_restricted);
restricted_mode = start_restricted;
if (!interface_ready())
return BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
stack_manager_get_interface()->start_up_stack_async();
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
| 173,551 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CastCastView::ButtonPressed(views::Button* sender,
const ui::Event& event) {
DCHECK(sender == stop_button_);
StopCast();
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void CastCastView::ButtonPressed(views::Button* sender,
const ui::Event& event) {
DCHECK(sender == stop_button_);
cast_config_delegate_->StopCasting();
}
| 171,623 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int size_entry_mwt(struct ebt_entry *entry, const unsigned char *base,
unsigned int *total,
struct ebt_entries_buf_state *state)
{
unsigned int i, j, startoff, new_offset = 0;
/* stores match/watchers/targets & offset of next struct ebt_entry: */
unsigned int offsets[4];
unsigned int *offsets_update = NULL;
int ret;
char *buf_start;
if (*total < sizeof(struct ebt_entries))
return -EINVAL;
if (!entry->bitmask) {
*total -= sizeof(struct ebt_entries);
return ebt_buf_add(state, entry, sizeof(struct ebt_entries));
}
if (*total < sizeof(*entry) || entry->next_offset < sizeof(*entry))
return -EINVAL;
startoff = state->buf_user_offset;
/* pull in most part of ebt_entry, it does not need to be changed. */
ret = ebt_buf_add(state, entry,
offsetof(struct ebt_entry, watchers_offset));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
offsets[0] = sizeof(struct ebt_entry); /* matches come first */
memcpy(&offsets[1], &entry->watchers_offset,
sizeof(offsets) - sizeof(offsets[0]));
if (state->buf_kern_start) {
buf_start = state->buf_kern_start + state->buf_kern_offset;
offsets_update = (unsigned int *) buf_start;
}
ret = ebt_buf_add(state, &offsets[1],
sizeof(offsets) - sizeof(offsets[0]));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
buf_start = (char *) entry;
/* 0: matches offset, always follows ebt_entry.
* 1: watchers offset, from ebt_entry structure
* 2: target offset, from ebt_entry structure
* 3: next ebt_entry offset, from ebt_entry structure
*
* offsets are relative to beginning of struct ebt_entry (i.e., 0).
*/
for (i = 0, j = 1 ; j < 4 ; j++, i++) {
struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32;
unsigned int size;
char *buf = buf_start + offsets[i];
if (offsets[i] > offsets[j])
return -EINVAL;
match32 = (struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *) buf;
size = offsets[j] - offsets[i];
ret = ebt_size_mwt(match32, size, i, state, base);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
new_offset += ret;
if (offsets_update && new_offset) {
pr_debug("change offset %d to %d\n",
offsets_update[i], offsets[j] + new_offset);
offsets_update[i] = offsets[j] + new_offset;
}
}
if (state->buf_kern_start == NULL) {
unsigned int offset = buf_start - (char *) base;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(NFPROTO_BRIDGE, offset, new_offset);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
startoff = state->buf_user_offset - startoff;
if (WARN_ON(*total < startoff))
return -EINVAL;
*total -= startoff;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets
We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.
The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.
Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.
Reported-by: <syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static int size_entry_mwt(struct ebt_entry *entry, const unsigned char *base,
unsigned int *total,
struct ebt_entries_buf_state *state)
{
unsigned int i, j, startoff, new_offset = 0;
/* stores match/watchers/targets & offset of next struct ebt_entry: */
unsigned int offsets[4];
unsigned int *offsets_update = NULL;
int ret;
char *buf_start;
if (*total < sizeof(struct ebt_entries))
return -EINVAL;
if (!entry->bitmask) {
*total -= sizeof(struct ebt_entries);
return ebt_buf_add(state, entry, sizeof(struct ebt_entries));
}
if (*total < sizeof(*entry) || entry->next_offset < sizeof(*entry))
return -EINVAL;
startoff = state->buf_user_offset;
/* pull in most part of ebt_entry, it does not need to be changed. */
ret = ebt_buf_add(state, entry,
offsetof(struct ebt_entry, watchers_offset));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
offsets[0] = sizeof(struct ebt_entry); /* matches come first */
memcpy(&offsets[1], &entry->watchers_offset,
sizeof(offsets) - sizeof(offsets[0]));
if (state->buf_kern_start) {
buf_start = state->buf_kern_start + state->buf_kern_offset;
offsets_update = (unsigned int *) buf_start;
}
ret = ebt_buf_add(state, &offsets[1],
sizeof(offsets) - sizeof(offsets[0]));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
buf_start = (char *) entry;
/* 0: matches offset, always follows ebt_entry.
* 1: watchers offset, from ebt_entry structure
* 2: target offset, from ebt_entry structure
* 3: next ebt_entry offset, from ebt_entry structure
*
* offsets are relative to beginning of struct ebt_entry (i.e., 0).
*/
for (i = 0; i < 4 ; ++i) {
if (offsets[i] >= *total)
return -EINVAL;
if (i == 0)
continue;
if (offsets[i-1] > offsets[i])
return -EINVAL;
}
for (i = 0, j = 1 ; j < 4 ; j++, i++) {
struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32;
unsigned int size;
char *buf = buf_start + offsets[i];
if (offsets[i] > offsets[j])
return -EINVAL;
match32 = (struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *) buf;
size = offsets[j] - offsets[i];
ret = ebt_size_mwt(match32, size, i, state, base);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
new_offset += ret;
if (offsets_update && new_offset) {
pr_debug("change offset %d to %d\n",
offsets_update[i], offsets[j] + new_offset);
offsets_update[i] = offsets[j] + new_offset;
}
}
if (state->buf_kern_start == NULL) {
unsigned int offset = buf_start - (char *) base;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(NFPROTO_BRIDGE, offset, new_offset);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
startoff = state->buf_user_offset - startoff;
if (WARN_ON(*total < startoff))
return -EINVAL;
*total -= startoff;
return 0;
}
| 169,358 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
debug3("%s", __func__);
authctxt->user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
buffer_clear(m);
if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
buffer_put_int(m, 1);
} else {
buffer_put_int(m, 0);
}
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.
Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-20 | mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
debug3("%s", __func__);
sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
buffer_clear(m);
if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
buffer_put_int(m, 1);
} else {
buffer_put_int(m, 0);
}
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
return (0);
}
| 166,585 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long mkvparser::UnserializeString(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size_,
char*& str)
{
delete[] str;
str = NULL;
if (size_ >= LONG_MAX) //we need (size+1) chars
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long size = static_cast<long>(size_);
str = new (std::nothrow) char[size+1];
if (str == NULL)
return -1;
unsigned char* const buf = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(str);
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, size, buf);
if (status)
{
delete[] str;
str = NULL;
return status;
}
str[size] = '\0';
return 0; //success
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long mkvparser::UnserializeString(
if (status) {
delete[] str;
str = NULL;
return status;
}
str[size] = '\0';
return 0; // success
}
| 174,449 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: lookup_bytestring(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bs,
const unsigned int nlen)
{
struct enamemem *tp;
register u_int i, j, k;
if (nlen >= 6) {
k = (bs[0] << 8) | bs[1];
j = (bs[2] << 8) | bs[3];
i = (bs[4] << 8) | bs[5];
} else if (nlen >= 4) {
k = (bs[0] << 8) | bs[1];
j = (bs[2] << 8) | bs[3];
i = 0;
} else
i = j = k = 0;
tp = &bytestringtable[(i ^ j) & (HASHNAMESIZE-1)];
while (tp->e_nxt)
if (tp->e_addr0 == i &&
tp->e_addr1 == j &&
tp->e_addr2 == k &&
memcmp((const char *)bs, (const char *)(tp->e_bs), nlen) == 0)
return tp;
else
tp = tp->e_nxt;
tp->e_addr0 = i;
tp->e_addr1 = j;
tp->e_addr2 = k;
tp->e_bs = (u_char *) calloc(1, nlen + 1);
if (tp->e_bs == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "lookup_bytestring: calloc");
memcpy(tp->e_bs, bs, nlen);
tp->e_nxt = (struct enamemem *)calloc(1, sizeof(*tp));
if (tp->e_nxt == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "lookup_bytestring: calloc");
return tp;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | lookup_bytestring(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bs,
const unsigned int nlen)
{
struct bsnamemem *tp;
register u_int i, j, k;
if (nlen >= 6) {
k = (bs[0] << 8) | bs[1];
j = (bs[2] << 8) | bs[3];
i = (bs[4] << 8) | bs[5];
} else if (nlen >= 4) {
k = (bs[0] << 8) | bs[1];
j = (bs[2] << 8) | bs[3];
i = 0;
} else
i = j = k = 0;
tp = &bytestringtable[(i ^ j) & (HASHNAMESIZE-1)];
while (tp->bs_nxt)
if (nlen == tp->bs_nbytes &&
tp->bs_addr0 == i &&
tp->bs_addr1 == j &&
tp->bs_addr2 == k &&
memcmp((const char *)bs, (const char *)(tp->bs_bytes), nlen) == 0)
return tp;
else
tp = tp->bs_nxt;
tp->bs_addr0 = i;
tp->bs_addr1 = j;
tp->bs_addr2 = k;
tp->bs_bytes = (u_char *) calloc(1, nlen + 1);
if (tp->bs_bytes == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "lookup_bytestring: calloc");
memcpy(tp->bs_bytes, bs, nlen);
tp->bs_nbytes = nlen;
tp->bs_nxt = (struct bsnamemem *)calloc(1, sizeof(*tp));
if (tp->bs_nxt == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "lookup_bytestring: calloc");
return tp;
}
| 167,960 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int frame_cnt = 0;
FILE *outfile = NULL;
vpx_codec_ctx_t codec;
vpx_codec_err_t res;
VpxVideoReader *reader = NULL;
const VpxInterface *decoder = NULL;
const VpxVideoInfo *info = NULL;
exec_name = argv[0];
if (argc != 3)
die("Invalid number of arguments.");
reader = vpx_video_reader_open(argv[1]);
if (!reader)
die("Failed to open %s for reading.", argv[1]);
if (!(outfile = fopen(argv[2], "wb")))
die("Failed to open %s for writing", argv[2]);
info = vpx_video_reader_get_info(reader);
decoder = get_vpx_decoder_by_fourcc(info->codec_fourcc);
if (!decoder)
die("Unknown input codec.");
printf("Using %s\n", vpx_codec_iface_name(decoder->interface()));
res = vpx_codec_dec_init(&codec, decoder->interface(), NULL,
VPX_CODEC_USE_POSTPROC);
if (res == VPX_CODEC_INCAPABLE)
die_codec(&codec, "Postproc not supported by this decoder.");
if (res)
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to initialize decoder.");
while (vpx_video_reader_read_frame(reader)) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
size_t frame_size = 0;
const unsigned char *frame = vpx_video_reader_get_frame(reader,
&frame_size);
++frame_cnt;
if (frame_cnt % 30 == 1) {
vp8_postproc_cfg_t pp = {0, 0, 0};
if (vpx_codec_control(&codec, VP8_SET_POSTPROC, &pp))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to turn off postproc.");
} else if (frame_cnt % 30 == 16) {
vp8_postproc_cfg_t pp = {VP8_DEBLOCK | VP8_DEMACROBLOCK | VP8_MFQE,
4, 0};
if (vpx_codec_control(&codec, VP8_SET_POSTPROC, &pp))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to turn on postproc.");
};
if (vpx_codec_decode(&codec, frame, (unsigned int)frame_size, NULL, 15000))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to decode frame");
while ((img = vpx_codec_get_frame(&codec, &iter)) != NULL) {
vpx_img_write(img, outfile);
}
}
printf("Processed %d frames.\n", frame_cnt);
if (vpx_codec_destroy(&codec))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to destroy codec");
printf("Play: ffplay -f rawvideo -pix_fmt yuv420p -s %dx%d %s\n",
info->frame_width, info->frame_height, argv[2]);
vpx_video_reader_close(reader);
fclose(outfile);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int frame_cnt = 0;
FILE *outfile = NULL;
vpx_codec_ctx_t codec;
vpx_codec_err_t res;
VpxVideoReader *reader = NULL;
const VpxInterface *decoder = NULL;
const VpxVideoInfo *info = NULL;
exec_name = argv[0];
if (argc != 3)
die("Invalid number of arguments.");
reader = vpx_video_reader_open(argv[1]);
if (!reader)
die("Failed to open %s for reading.", argv[1]);
if (!(outfile = fopen(argv[2], "wb")))
die("Failed to open %s for writing", argv[2]);
info = vpx_video_reader_get_info(reader);
decoder = get_vpx_decoder_by_fourcc(info->codec_fourcc);
if (!decoder)
die("Unknown input codec.");
printf("Using %s\n", vpx_codec_iface_name(decoder->codec_interface()));
res = vpx_codec_dec_init(&codec, decoder->codec_interface(), NULL,
VPX_CODEC_USE_POSTPROC);
if (res == VPX_CODEC_INCAPABLE)
die_codec(&codec, "Postproc not supported by this decoder.");
if (res)
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to initialize decoder.");
while (vpx_video_reader_read_frame(reader)) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
size_t frame_size = 0;
const unsigned char *frame = vpx_video_reader_get_frame(reader,
&frame_size);
++frame_cnt;
if (frame_cnt % 30 == 1) {
vp8_postproc_cfg_t pp = {0, 0, 0};
if (vpx_codec_control(&codec, VP8_SET_POSTPROC, &pp))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to turn off postproc.");
} else if (frame_cnt % 30 == 16) {
vp8_postproc_cfg_t pp = {VP8_DEBLOCK | VP8_DEMACROBLOCK | VP8_MFQE,
4, 0};
if (vpx_codec_control(&codec, VP8_SET_POSTPROC, &pp))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to turn on postproc.");
};
if (vpx_codec_decode(&codec, frame, (unsigned int)frame_size, NULL, 15000))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to decode frame");
while ((img = vpx_codec_get_frame(&codec, &iter)) != NULL) {
vpx_img_write(img, outfile);
}
}
printf("Processed %d frames.\n", frame_cnt);
if (vpx_codec_destroy(&codec))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to destroy codec");
printf("Play: ffplay -f rawvideo -pix_fmt yuv420p -s %dx%d %s\n",
info->frame_width, info->frame_height, argv[2]);
vpx_video_reader_close(reader);
fclose(outfile);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
| 174,478 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WorkerFetchContext::DispatchWillSendRequest(
unsigned long identifier,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
probe::willSendRequest(global_scope_, identifier, nullptr, request,
redirect_response, initiator_info);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void WorkerFetchContext::DispatchWillSendRequest(
unsigned long identifier,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
Resource::Type resource_type,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
probe::willSendRequest(global_scope_, identifier, nullptr, request,
redirect_response, initiator_info, resource_type);
}
| 172,476 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CairoOutputDev::beginString(GfxState *state, GooString *s)
{
int len = s->getLength();
if (needFontUpdate)
updateFont(state);
if (!currentFont)
return;
glyphs = (cairo_glyph_t *) gmalloc (len * sizeof (cairo_glyph_t));
glyphCount = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void CairoOutputDev::beginString(GfxState *state, GooString *s)
{
int len = s->getLength();
if (needFontUpdate)
updateFont(state);
if (!currentFont)
return;
glyphs = (cairo_glyph_t *) gmallocn (len, sizeof (cairo_glyph_t));
glyphCount = 0;
}
| 164,604 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppControllerImpl::GetArcAndroidId(
mojom::AppController::GetArcAndroidIdCallback callback) {
arc::GetAndroidId(base::BindOnce(
[](mojom::AppController::GetArcAndroidIdCallback callback, bool success,
int64_t android_id) {
std::move(callback).Run(success, base::NumberToString(android_id));
},
std::move(callback)));
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void AppControllerImpl::GetArcAndroidId(
void AppControllerService::GetArcAndroidId(
mojom::AppController::GetArcAndroidIdCallback callback) {
arc::GetAndroidId(base::BindOnce(
[](mojom::AppController::GetArcAndroidIdCallback callback, bool success,
int64_t android_id) {
std::move(callback).Run(success, base::NumberToString(android_id));
},
std::move(callback)));
}
| 172,083 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DidNavigate(uint32_t next_source_id) {
current_content_source_id_ = next_source_id;
did_receive_first_frame_after_navigation_ = false;
if (enable_surface_synchronization_) {
visual_properties_ack_pending_ = false;
viz::LocalSurfaceId old_surface_id = view_->GetLocalSurfaceId();
if (view_)
view_->DidNavigate();
viz::LocalSurfaceId new_surface_id = view_->GetLocalSurfaceId();
if (old_surface_id == new_surface_id)
return;
} else {
if (last_received_content_source_id_ >= current_content_source_id_)
return;
}
if (!new_content_rendering_timeout_)
return;
new_content_rendering_timeout_->Start(new_content_rendering_delay_);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DidNavigate(uint32_t next_source_id) {
current_content_source_id_ = next_source_id;
did_receive_first_frame_after_navigation_ = false;
if (enable_surface_synchronization_) {
visual_properties_ack_pending_ = false;
if (view_)
view_->DidNavigate();
} else {
if (last_received_content_source_id_ >= current_content_source_id_)
return;
}
if (!new_content_rendering_timeout_)
return;
new_content_rendering_timeout_->Start(new_content_rendering_delay_);
}
| 172,654 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
unsigned int count;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (! kcontrol)
return err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n",
id.iface,
id.device,
id.subdevice,
id.name,
id.index);
err = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
count = kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Make sure that id->index does not overflow
The ALSA control code expects that the range of assigned indices to a control is
continuous and does not overflow. Currently there are no checks to enforce this.
If a control with a overflowing index range is created that control becomes
effectively inaccessible and unremovable since snd_ctl_find_id() will not be
able to find it. This patch adds a check that makes sure that controls with a
overflowing index range can not be created.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
unsigned int count;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (! kcontrol)
return err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
if (id.index > UINT_MAX - kcontrol->count)
goto error;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n",
id.iface,
id.device,
id.subdevice,
id.name,
id.index);
err = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
count = kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return err;
}
| 169,905 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long FS_FOpenFileRead(const char *filename, fileHandle_t *file, qboolean uniqueFILE)
{
searchpath_t *search;
long len;
if(!fs_searchpaths)
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization");
for(search = fs_searchpaths; search; search = search->next)
{
len = FS_FOpenFileReadDir(filename, search, file, uniqueFILE, qfalse);
if(file == NULL)
{
if(len > 0)
return len;
}
else
{
if(len >= 0 && *file)
return len;
}
}
#ifdef FS_MISSING
if(missingFiles)
fprintf(missingFiles, "%s\n", filename);
#endif
if(file)
{
*file = 0;
return -1;
}
else
{
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | long FS_FOpenFileRead(const char *filename, fileHandle_t *file, qboolean uniqueFILE)
{
searchpath_t *search;
long len;
qboolean isLocalConfig;
if(!fs_searchpaths)
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization");
isLocalConfig = !strcmp(filename, "autoexec.cfg") || !strcmp(filename, Q3CONFIG_CFG);
for(search = fs_searchpaths; search; search = search->next)
{
// autoexec.cfg and wolfconfig_mp.cfg can only be loaded outside of pk3 files.
if (isLocalConfig && search->pack)
continue;
len = FS_FOpenFileReadDir(filename, search, file, uniqueFILE, qfalse);
if(file == NULL)
{
if(len > 0)
return len;
}
else
{
if(len >= 0 && *file)
return len;
}
}
#ifdef FS_MISSING
if(missingFiles)
fprintf(missingFiles, "%s\n", filename);
#endif
if(file)
{
*file = 0;
return -1;
}
else
{
return 0;
}
}
| 170,083 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char **XListExtensions(
register Display *dpy,
int *nextensions) /* RETURN */
{
xListExtensionsReply rep;
char **list = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (ListExtensions, req);
if (! _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nExtensions) {
list = Xmalloc (rep.nExtensions * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((!list) || (!ch)) {
Xfree(list);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + (rlen + 1);
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nExtensions; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
list[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
if (ch <= chend) {
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else {
list[i] = NULL;
}
} else
list[i] = NULL;
}
}
} else
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-682 | char **XListExtensions(
register Display *dpy,
int *nextensions) /* RETURN */
{
xListExtensionsReply rep;
char **list = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (ListExtensions, req);
if (! _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nExtensions) {
list = Xmalloc (rep.nExtensions * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((!list) || (!ch)) {
Xfree(list);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + rlen;
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nExtensions; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
list[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
list[i] = NULL;
}
}
} else
| 164,749 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void * calloc(size_t n, size_t lb)
{
if (lb && n > SIZE_MAX / lb)
return NULL;
# if defined(GC_LINUX_THREADS) /* && !defined(USE_PROC_FOR_LIBRARIES) */
/* libpthread allocated some memory that is only pointed to by */
/* mmapped thread stacks. Make sure it's not collectable. */
{
static GC_bool lib_bounds_set = FALSE;
ptr_t caller = (ptr_t)__builtin_return_address(0);
/* This test does not need to ensure memory visibility, since */
/* the bounds will be set when/if we create another thread. */
if (!EXPECT(lib_bounds_set, TRUE)) {
GC_init_lib_bounds();
lib_bounds_set = TRUE;
}
if (((word)caller >= (word)GC_libpthread_start
&& (word)caller < (word)GC_libpthread_end)
|| ((word)caller >= (word)GC_libld_start
&& (word)caller < (word)GC_libld_end))
return GC_malloc_uncollectable(n*lb);
/* The two ranges are actually usually adjacent, so there may */
/* be a way to speed this up. */
}
# endif
return((void *)REDIRECT_MALLOC(n*lb));
}
Commit Message: Fix calloc-related code to prevent SIZE_MAX redefinition in sys headers
* malloc.c: Include limits.h for SIZE_MAX.
* malloc.c (SIZE_MAX, calloc): Define GC_SIZE_MAX instead of SIZE_MAX.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void * calloc(size_t n, size_t lb)
{
if (lb && n > GC_SIZE_MAX / lb)
return NULL;
# if defined(GC_LINUX_THREADS) /* && !defined(USE_PROC_FOR_LIBRARIES) */
/* libpthread allocated some memory that is only pointed to by */
/* mmapped thread stacks. Make sure it's not collectable. */
{
static GC_bool lib_bounds_set = FALSE;
ptr_t caller = (ptr_t)__builtin_return_address(0);
/* This test does not need to ensure memory visibility, since */
/* the bounds will be set when/if we create another thread. */
if (!EXPECT(lib_bounds_set, TRUE)) {
GC_init_lib_bounds();
lib_bounds_set = TRUE;
}
if (((word)caller >= (word)GC_libpthread_start
&& (word)caller < (word)GC_libpthread_end)
|| ((word)caller >= (word)GC_libld_start
&& (word)caller < (word)GC_libld_end))
return GC_malloc_uncollectable(n*lb);
/* The two ranges are actually usually adjacent, so there may */
/* be a way to speed this up. */
}
# endif
return((void *)REDIRECT_MALLOC(n*lb));
}
| 169,880 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DWORD SetProcessIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel integrity_level) {
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_VISTA)
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
const wchar_t* integrity_level_str = GetIntegrityLevelString(integrity_level);
if (!integrity_level_str) {
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
std::wstring ace_access = SDDL_NO_READ_UP;
ace_access += SDDL_NO_WRITE_UP;
DWORD error = SetObjectIntegrityLabel(::GetCurrentProcess(), SE_KERNEL_OBJECT,
ace_access.c_str(),
integrity_level_str);
if (ERROR_SUCCESS != error)
return error;
HANDLE token_handle;
if (!::OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ADJUST_DEFAULT,
&token_handle))
return ::GetLastError();
base::win::ScopedHandle token(token_handle);
return SetTokenIntegrityLevel(token.Get(), integrity_level);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | DWORD SetProcessIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel integrity_level) {
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_VISTA)
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
// We don't check for an invalid level here because we'll just let it
// fail on the SetTokenIntegrityLevel call later on.
if (integrity_level == INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST) {
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
HANDLE token_handle;
if (!::OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ADJUST_DEFAULT,
&token_handle))
return ::GetLastError();
base::win::ScopedHandle token(token_handle);
return SetTokenIntegrityLevel(token.Get(), integrity_level);
}
| 170,914 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void UpdatePolicyForEvent(const WebInputEvent* input_event,
NavigationPolicy* policy) {
if (!input_event)
return;
unsigned short button_number = 0;
if (input_event->GetType() == WebInputEvent::kMouseUp) {
const WebMouseEvent* mouse_event =
static_cast<const WebMouseEvent*>(input_event);
switch (mouse_event->button) {
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kLeft:
button_number = 0;
break;
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kMiddle:
button_number = 1;
break;
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kRight:
button_number = 2;
break;
default:
return;
}
} else if ((WebInputEvent::IsKeyboardEventType(input_event->GetType()) &&
static_cast<const WebKeyboardEvent*>(input_event)
->windows_key_code == VKEY_RETURN) ||
WebInputEvent::IsGestureEventType(input_event->GetType())) {
button_number = 0;
} else {
return;
}
bool ctrl = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kControlKey;
bool shift = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kShiftKey;
bool alt = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kAltKey;
bool meta = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kMetaKey;
NavigationPolicy user_policy = *policy;
NavigationPolicyFromMouseEvent(button_number, ctrl, shift, alt, meta,
&user_policy);
if (user_policy == kNavigationPolicyDownload &&
*policy != kNavigationPolicyIgnore)
return;
if (user_policy == kNavigationPolicyNewWindow &&
*policy == kNavigationPolicyNewPopup)
return;
*policy = user_policy;
}
Commit Message: Only allow downloading in response to real keyboard modifiers
BUG=848531
Change-Id: I97554c8d312243b55647f1376945aee32dbd95bf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1082216
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564051}
CWE ID: | void UpdatePolicyForEvent(const WebInputEvent* input_event,
NavigationPolicy* policy) {
if (!input_event)
return;
unsigned short button_number = 0;
if (input_event->GetType() == WebInputEvent::kMouseUp) {
const WebMouseEvent* mouse_event =
static_cast<const WebMouseEvent*>(input_event);
switch (mouse_event->button) {
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kLeft:
button_number = 0;
break;
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kMiddle:
button_number = 1;
break;
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kRight:
button_number = 2;
break;
default:
return;
}
} else if ((WebInputEvent::IsKeyboardEventType(input_event->GetType()) &&
static_cast<const WebKeyboardEvent*>(input_event)
->windows_key_code == VKEY_RETURN) ||
WebInputEvent::IsGestureEventType(input_event->GetType())) {
button_number = 0;
} else {
return;
}
bool ctrl = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kControlKey;
bool shift = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kShiftKey;
bool alt = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kAltKey;
bool meta = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kMetaKey;
NavigationPolicy user_policy = *policy;
NavigationPolicyFromMouseEvent(button_number, ctrl, shift, alt, meta,
&user_policy);
if (user_policy == kNavigationPolicyNewWindow &&
*policy == kNavigationPolicyNewPopup)
return;
*policy = user_policy;
}
| 173,194 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: header_put_le_8byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, sf_count_t x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 8)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
} ;
} /* header_put_le_8byte */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | header_put_le_8byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, sf_count_t x)
| 170,055 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionUninstaller::Run() {
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_service()->
GetInstalledExtension(app_id_);
if (!extension) {
CleanUp();
return;
}
controller_->OnShowChildDialog();
dialog_.reset(extensions::ExtensionUninstallDialog::Create(
profile_, controller_->GetAppListWindow(), this));
dialog_->ConfirmUninstall(extension,
extensions::UNINSTALL_REASON_USER_INITIATED);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | void ExtensionUninstaller::Run() {
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_)->GetInstalledExtension(
app_id_);
if (!extension) {
CleanUp();
return;
}
controller_->OnShowChildDialog();
dialog_.reset(extensions::ExtensionUninstallDialog::Create(
profile_, controller_->GetAppListWindow(), this));
dialog_->ConfirmUninstall(extension,
extensions::UNINSTALL_REASON_USER_INITIATED);
}
| 171,724 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual v8::Handle<v8::FunctionTemplate> GetNativeFunction(
v8::Handle<v8::String> name) {
if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetExtensionAPIDefinition"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetExtensionAPIDefinition);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetExtensionViews"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetExtensionViews,
v8::External::New(this));
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetNextRequestId"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetNextRequestId);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("OpenChannelToTab"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(OpenChannelToTab);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetNextContextMenuId"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetNextContextMenuId);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetCurrentPageActions"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetCurrentPageActions,
v8::External::New(this));
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("StartRequest"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(StartRequest,
v8::External::New(this));
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetRenderViewId"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetRenderViewId);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("SetIconCommon"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(SetIconCommon,
v8::External::New(this));
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("IsExtensionProcess"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(IsExtensionProcess,
v8::External::New(this));
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("IsIncognitoProcess"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(IsIncognitoProcess);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetUniqueSubEventName"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetUniqueSubEventName);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetLocalFileSystem"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetLocalFileSystem);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("DecodeJPEG"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(DecodeJPEG, v8::External::New(this));
}
return ExtensionBase::GetNativeFunction(name);
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | virtual v8::Handle<v8::FunctionTemplate> GetNativeFunction(
v8::Handle<v8::String> name) {
if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetExtensionAPIDefinition"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetExtensionAPIDefinition);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetExtensionViews"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetExtensionViews,
v8::External::New(this));
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetNextRequestId"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetNextRequestId);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("OpenChannelToTab"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(OpenChannelToTab);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetNextContextMenuId"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetNextContextMenuId);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetNextTtsEventId"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetNextTtsEventId);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetCurrentPageActions"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetCurrentPageActions,
v8::External::New(this));
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("StartRequest"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(StartRequest,
v8::External::New(this));
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetRenderViewId"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetRenderViewId);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("SetIconCommon"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(SetIconCommon,
v8::External::New(this));
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("IsExtensionProcess"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(IsExtensionProcess,
v8::External::New(this));
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("IsIncognitoProcess"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(IsIncognitoProcess);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetUniqueSubEventName"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetUniqueSubEventName);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("GetLocalFileSystem"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(GetLocalFileSystem);
} else if (name->Equals(v8::String::New("DecodeJPEG"))) {
return v8::FunctionTemplate::New(DecodeJPEG, v8::External::New(this));
}
return ExtensionBase::GetNativeFunction(name);
}
| 170,404 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Element* siblingWithAriaRole(String role, Node* node) {
Node* parent = node->parentNode();
if (!parent)
return 0;
for (Element* sibling = ElementTraversal::firstChild(*parent); sibling;
sibling = ElementTraversal::nextSibling(*sibling)) {
const AtomicString& siblingAriaRole =
AccessibleNode::getProperty(sibling, AOMStringProperty::kRole);
if (equalIgnoringCase(siblingAriaRole, role))
return sibling;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | static Element* siblingWithAriaRole(String role, Node* node) {
Node* parent = node->parentNode();
if (!parent)
return 0;
for (Element* sibling = ElementTraversal::firstChild(*parent); sibling;
sibling = ElementTraversal::nextSibling(*sibling)) {
const AtomicString& siblingAriaRole =
AccessibleNode::getProperty(sibling, AOMStringProperty::kRole);
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(siblingAriaRole, role))
return sibling;
}
return 0;
}
| 171,921 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CopyFromCompositingSurface(
const gfx::Rect& src_subrect,
const gfx::Size& dst_size,
const base::Callback<void(bool)>& callback,
skia::PlatformBitmap* output) {
base::ScopedClosureRunner scoped_callback_runner(base::Bind(callback, false));
std::map<uint64, scoped_refptr<ui::Texture> >::iterator it =
image_transport_clients_.find(current_surface_);
if (it == image_transport_clients_.end())
return;
ui::Texture* container = it->second;
DCHECK(container);
gfx::Size dst_size_in_pixel = ConvertSizeToPixel(this, dst_size);
if (!output->Allocate(
dst_size_in_pixel.width(), dst_size_in_pixel.height(), true))
return;
ImageTransportFactory* factory = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance();
GLHelper* gl_helper = factory->GetGLHelper();
if (!gl_helper)
return;
unsigned char* addr = static_cast<unsigned char*>(
output->GetBitmap().getPixels());
scoped_callback_runner.Release();
base::Callback<void(bool)> wrapper_callback = base::Bind(
&RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceFinished,
AsWeakPtr(),
callback);
++pending_thumbnail_tasks_;
gfx::Rect src_subrect_in_gl = src_subrect;
src_subrect_in_gl.set_y(GetViewBounds().height() - src_subrect.bottom());
gfx::Rect src_subrect_in_pixel = ConvertRectToPixel(this, src_subrect_in_gl);
gl_helper->CropScaleReadbackAndCleanTexture(container->PrepareTexture(),
container->size(),
src_subrect_in_pixel,
dst_size_in_pixel,
addr,
wrapper_callback);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CopyFromCompositingSurface(
const gfx::Rect& src_subrect,
const gfx::Size& dst_size,
const base::Callback<void(bool)>& callback,
skia::PlatformBitmap* output) {
base::ScopedClosureRunner scoped_callback_runner(base::Bind(callback, false));
std::map<uint64, scoped_refptr<ui::Texture> >::iterator it =
image_transport_clients_.find(current_surface_);
if (it == image_transport_clients_.end())
return;
ui::Texture* container = it->second;
DCHECK(container);
gfx::Size dst_size_in_pixel = ConvertSizeToPixel(this, dst_size);
if (!output->Allocate(
dst_size_in_pixel.width(), dst_size_in_pixel.height(), true))
return;
ImageTransportFactory* factory = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance();
GLHelper* gl_helper = factory->GetGLHelper();
if (!gl_helper)
return;
unsigned char* addr = static_cast<unsigned char*>(
output->GetBitmap().getPixels());
scoped_callback_runner.Release();
// own completion handlers (where we can try to free the frontbuffer).
base::Callback<void(bool)> wrapper_callback = base::Bind(
&RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceFinished,
AsWeakPtr(),
callback);
++pending_thumbnail_tasks_;
gfx::Rect src_subrect_in_gl = src_subrect;
src_subrect_in_gl.set_y(GetViewBounds().height() - src_subrect.bottom());
gfx::Rect src_subrect_in_pixel = ConvertRectToPixel(this, src_subrect_in_gl);
gl_helper->CropScaleReadbackAndCleanTexture(container->PrepareTexture(),
container->size(),
src_subrect_in_pixel,
dst_size_in_pixel,
addr,
wrapper_callback);
}
| 171,377 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SchedulerObject::hold(std::string key, std::string &reason, std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster < 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Hold: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
if (!holdJob(id.cluster,
id.proc,
reason.c_str(),
true, // Always perform this action within a transaction
true, // Always notify the shadow of the hold
false, // Do not email the user about this action
false, // Do not email admin about this action
false // This is not a system related (internal) hold
)) {
text = "Failed to hold job";
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | SchedulerObject::hold(std::string key, std::string &reason, std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster <= 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Hold: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
if (!holdJob(id.cluster,
id.proc,
reason.c_str(),
true, // Always perform this action within a transaction
true, // Always notify the shadow of the hold
false, // Do not email the user about this action
false, // Do not email admin about this action
false // This is not a system related (internal) hold
)) {
text = "Failed to hold job";
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 164,832 |
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