instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Cluster::Cluster(
Segment* pSegment,
long idx,
long long element_start
/* long long element_size */ ) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_index(idx),
m_pos(element_start),
m_element_size(-1 /* element_size */ ),
m_timecode(-1),
m_entries(NULL),
m_entries_size(0),
m_entries_count(-1) //means "has not been parsed yet"
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Cluster::Cluster(
| 174,249 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const char * util_acl_to_str(const sc_acl_entry_t *e)
{
static char line[80], buf[20];
unsigned int acl;
if (e == NULL)
return "N/A";
line[0] = 0;
while (e != NULL) {
acl = e->method;
switch (acl) {
case SC_AC_UNKNOWN:
return "N/A";
case SC_AC_NEVER:
return "NEVR";
case SC_AC_NONE:
return "NONE";
case SC_AC_CHV:
strcpy(buf, "CHV");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "%d", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_TERM:
strcpy(buf, "TERM");
break;
case SC_AC_PRO:
strcpy(buf, "PROT");
break;
case SC_AC_AUT:
strcpy(buf, "AUTH");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 4, "%d", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_SEN:
strcpy(buf, "Sec.Env. ");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "#%d", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_SCB:
strcpy(buf, "Sec.ControlByte ");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "Ox%X", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_IDA:
strcpy(buf, "PKCS#15 AuthID ");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "#%d", e->key_ref);
break;
default:
strcpy(buf, "????");
break;
}
strcat(line, buf);
strcat(line, " ");
e = e->next;
}
line[strlen(line)-1] = 0; /* get rid of trailing space */
return line;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | const char * util_acl_to_str(const sc_acl_entry_t *e)
{
static char line[80], buf[20];
unsigned int acl;
if (e == NULL)
return "N/A";
line[0] = 0;
while (e != NULL) {
acl = e->method;
switch (acl) {
case SC_AC_UNKNOWN:
return "N/A";
case SC_AC_NEVER:
return "NEVR";
case SC_AC_NONE:
return "NONE";
case SC_AC_CHV:
strcpy(buf, "CHV");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "%d", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_TERM:
strcpy(buf, "TERM");
break;
case SC_AC_PRO:
strcpy(buf, "PROT");
break;
case SC_AC_AUT:
strcpy(buf, "AUTH");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 4, "%d", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_SEN:
strcpy(buf, "Sec.Env. ");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "#%d", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_SCB:
strcpy(buf, "Sec.ControlByte ");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "Ox%X", e->key_ref);
break;
case SC_AC_IDA:
strcpy(buf, "PKCS#15 AuthID ");
if (e->key_ref != SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE)
sprintf(buf + 3, "#%d", e->key_ref);
break;
default:
strcpy(buf, "????");
break;
}
strncat(line, buf, sizeof line);
strncat(line, " ", sizeof line);
e = e->next;
}
line[(sizeof line)-1] = '\0'; /* make sure it's NUL terminated */
line[strlen(line)-1] = 0; /* get rid of trailing space */
return line;
}
| 169,083 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: construct_command_line(struct manager_ctx *manager, struct server *server)
{
static char cmd[BUF_SIZE];
char *method = manager->method;
int i;
build_config(working_dir, server);
if (server->method) method = server->method;
memset(cmd, 0, BUF_SIZE);
snprintf(cmd, BUF_SIZE,
"%s -m %s --manager-address %s -f %s/.shadowsocks_%s.pid -c %s/.shadowsocks_%s.conf",
executable, method, manager->manager_address,
working_dir, server->port, working_dir, server->port);
if (manager->acl != NULL) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --acl %s", manager->acl);
}
if (manager->timeout != NULL) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -t %s", manager->timeout);
}
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
if (manager->nofile) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -n %d", manager->nofile);
}
#endif
if (manager->user != NULL) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -a %s", manager->user);
}
if (manager->verbose) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -v");
}
if (server->mode == NULL && manager->mode == UDP_ONLY) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -U");
}
if (server->mode == NULL && manager->mode == TCP_AND_UDP) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -u");
}
if (server->fast_open[0] == 0 && manager->fast_open) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --fast-open");
}
if (manager->ipv6first) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -6");
}
if (manager->mtu) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --mtu %d", manager->mtu);
}
if (server->plugin == NULL && manager->plugin) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --plugin \"%s\"", manager->plugin);
}
if (server->plugin_opts == NULL && manager->plugin_opts) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --plugin-opts \"%s\"", manager->plugin_opts);
}
for (i = 0; i < manager->nameserver_num; i++) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -d %s", manager->nameservers[i]);
}
for (i = 0; i < manager->host_num; i++) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -s %s", manager->hosts[i]);
}
{
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --reuse-port");
}
if (verbose) {
LOGI("cmd: %s", cmd);
}
return cmd;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1734
CWE ID: CWE-78 | construct_command_line(struct manager_ctx *manager, struct server *server)
{
static char cmd[BUF_SIZE];
int i;
int port;
port = atoi(server->port);
build_config(working_dir, manager, server);
memset(cmd, 0, BUF_SIZE);
snprintf(cmd, BUF_SIZE,
"%s --manager-address %s -f %s/.shadowsocks_%d.pid -c %s/.shadowsocks_%d.conf",
executable, manager->manager_address, working_dir, port, working_dir, port);
if (manager->acl != NULL) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --acl %s", manager->acl);
}
if (manager->timeout != NULL) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -t %s", manager->timeout);
}
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
if (manager->nofile) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -n %d", manager->nofile);
}
#endif
if (manager->user != NULL) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -a %s", manager->user);
}
if (manager->verbose) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -v");
}
if (server->mode == NULL && manager->mode == UDP_ONLY) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -U");
}
if (server->mode == NULL && manager->mode == TCP_AND_UDP) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -u");
}
if (server->fast_open[0] == 0 && manager->fast_open) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --fast-open");
}
if (manager->ipv6first) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -6");
}
if (manager->mtu) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --mtu %d", manager->mtu);
}
if (server->plugin == NULL && manager->plugin) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --plugin \"%s\"", manager->plugin);
}
if (server->plugin_opts == NULL && manager->plugin_opts) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --plugin-opts \"%s\"", manager->plugin_opts);
}
for (i = 0; i < manager->nameserver_num; i++) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -d %s", manager->nameservers[i]);
}
for (i = 0; i < manager->host_num; i++) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -s %s", manager->hosts[i]);
}
{
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --reuse-port");
}
if (verbose) {
LOGI("cmd: %s", cmd);
}
return cmd;
}
| 167,714 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BackendIO::ExecuteBackendOperation() {
switch (operation_) {
case OP_INIT:
result_ = backend_->SyncInit();
break;
case OP_OPEN: {
scoped_refptr<EntryImpl> entry;
result_ = backend_->SyncOpenEntry(key_, &entry);
*entry_ptr_ = LeakEntryImpl(std::move(entry));
break;
}
case OP_CREATE: {
scoped_refptr<EntryImpl> entry;
result_ = backend_->SyncCreateEntry(key_, &entry);
*entry_ptr_ = LeakEntryImpl(std::move(entry));
break;
}
case OP_DOOM:
result_ = backend_->SyncDoomEntry(key_);
break;
case OP_DOOM_ALL:
result_ = backend_->SyncDoomAllEntries();
break;
case OP_DOOM_BETWEEN:
result_ = backend_->SyncDoomEntriesBetween(initial_time_, end_time_);
break;
case OP_DOOM_SINCE:
result_ = backend_->SyncDoomEntriesSince(initial_time_);
break;
case OP_SIZE_ALL:
result_ = backend_->SyncCalculateSizeOfAllEntries();
break;
case OP_OPEN_NEXT: {
scoped_refptr<EntryImpl> entry;
result_ = backend_->SyncOpenNextEntry(iterator_, &entry);
*entry_ptr_ = LeakEntryImpl(std::move(entry));
break;
}
case OP_END_ENUMERATION:
backend_->SyncEndEnumeration(std::move(scoped_iterator_));
result_ = net::OK;
break;
case OP_ON_EXTERNAL_CACHE_HIT:
backend_->SyncOnExternalCacheHit(key_);
result_ = net::OK;
break;
case OP_CLOSE_ENTRY:
entry_->Release();
result_ = net::OK;
break;
case OP_DOOM_ENTRY:
entry_->DoomImpl();
result_ = net::OK;
break;
case OP_FLUSH_QUEUE:
result_ = net::OK;
break;
case OP_RUN_TASK:
task_.Run();
result_ = net::OK;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid Operation";
result_ = net::ERR_UNEXPECTED;
}
DCHECK_NE(net::ERR_IO_PENDING, result_);
NotifyController();
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void BackendIO::ExecuteBackendOperation() {
switch (operation_) {
case OP_INIT:
result_ = backend_->SyncInit();
break;
case OP_OPEN: {
scoped_refptr<EntryImpl> entry;
result_ = backend_->SyncOpenEntry(key_, &entry);
*entry_ptr_ = LeakEntryImpl(std::move(entry));
break;
}
case OP_CREATE: {
scoped_refptr<EntryImpl> entry;
result_ = backend_->SyncCreateEntry(key_, &entry);
*entry_ptr_ = LeakEntryImpl(std::move(entry));
break;
}
case OP_DOOM:
result_ = backend_->SyncDoomEntry(key_);
break;
case OP_DOOM_ALL:
result_ = backend_->SyncDoomAllEntries();
break;
case OP_DOOM_BETWEEN:
result_ = backend_->SyncDoomEntriesBetween(initial_time_, end_time_);
break;
case OP_DOOM_SINCE:
result_ = backend_->SyncDoomEntriesSince(initial_time_);
break;
case OP_SIZE_ALL:
result_ = backend_->SyncCalculateSizeOfAllEntries();
break;
case OP_OPEN_NEXT: {
scoped_refptr<EntryImpl> entry;
result_ = backend_->SyncOpenNextEntry(iterator_, &entry);
*entry_ptr_ = LeakEntryImpl(std::move(entry));
break;
}
case OP_END_ENUMERATION:
backend_->SyncEndEnumeration(std::move(scoped_iterator_));
result_ = net::OK;
break;
case OP_ON_EXTERNAL_CACHE_HIT:
backend_->SyncOnExternalCacheHit(key_);
result_ = net::OK;
break;
case OP_CLOSE_ENTRY:
entry_->Release();
result_ = net::OK;
break;
case OP_DOOM_ENTRY:
entry_->DoomImpl();
result_ = net::OK;
break;
case OP_FLUSH_QUEUE:
result_ = net::OK;
break;
case OP_RUN_TASK:
task_.Run();
result_ = net::OK;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid Operation";
result_ = net::ERR_UNEXPECTED;
}
DCHECK_NE(net::ERR_IO_PENDING, result_);
NotifyController();
backend_->OnSyncBackendOpComplete();
}
| 172,699 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static uint32_t fdctrl_read_data(FDCtrl *fdctrl)
{
FDrive *cur_drv;
uint32_t retval = 0;
int pos;
cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
fdctrl->dsr &= ~FD_DSR_PWRDOWN;
if (!(fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_RQM) || !(fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_DIO)) {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("error: controller not ready for reading\n");
return 0;
}
pos = fdctrl->data_pos;
if (fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_NONDMA) {
pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN;
if (pos == 0) {
if (fdctrl->data_pos != 0)
if (!fdctrl_seek_to_next_sect(fdctrl, cur_drv)) {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("error seeking to next sector %d\n",
fd_sector(cur_drv));
return 0;
}
if (blk_read(cur_drv->blk, fd_sector(cur_drv), fdctrl->fifo, 1)
< 0) {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("error getting sector %d\n",
fd_sector(cur_drv));
/* Sure, image size is too small... */
memset(fdctrl->fifo, 0, FD_SECTOR_LEN);
}
}
}
retval = fdctrl->fifo[pos];
if (++fdctrl->data_pos == fdctrl->data_len) {
fdctrl->data_pos = 0;
/* Switch from transfer mode to status mode
* then from status mode to command mode
*/
if (fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_NONDMA) {
fdctrl_stop_transfer(fdctrl, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00);
} else {
fdctrl_reset_fifo(fdctrl);
fdctrl_reset_irq(fdctrl);
}
}
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("data register: 0x%02x\n", retval);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static uint32_t fdctrl_read_data(FDCtrl *fdctrl)
{
FDrive *cur_drv;
uint32_t retval = 0;
uint32_t pos;
cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
fdctrl->dsr &= ~FD_DSR_PWRDOWN;
if (!(fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_RQM) || !(fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_DIO)) {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("error: controller not ready for reading\n");
return 0;
}
pos = fdctrl->data_pos;
pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN;
if (fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_NONDMA) {
if (pos == 0) {
if (fdctrl->data_pos != 0)
if (!fdctrl_seek_to_next_sect(fdctrl, cur_drv)) {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("error seeking to next sector %d\n",
fd_sector(cur_drv));
return 0;
}
if (blk_read(cur_drv->blk, fd_sector(cur_drv), fdctrl->fifo, 1)
< 0) {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("error getting sector %d\n",
fd_sector(cur_drv));
/* Sure, image size is too small... */
memset(fdctrl->fifo, 0, FD_SECTOR_LEN);
}
}
}
retval = fdctrl->fifo[pos];
if (++fdctrl->data_pos == fdctrl->data_len) {
fdctrl->data_pos = 0;
/* Switch from transfer mode to status mode
* then from status mode to command mode
*/
if (fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_NONDMA) {
fdctrl_stop_transfer(fdctrl, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00);
} else {
fdctrl_reset_fifo(fdctrl);
fdctrl_reset_irq(fdctrl);
}
}
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("data register: 0x%02x\n", retval);
return retval;
}
| 164,707 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void xmlrpc_char_encode(char *outbuffer, const char *s1)
{
long unsigned int i;
unsigned char c;
char buf2[15];
mowgli_string_t *s = mowgli_string_create();
*buf2 = '\0';
*outbuffer = '\0';
if ((!(s1) || (*(s1) == '\0')))
{
return;
}
for (i = 0; s1[i] != '\0'; i++)
{
c = s1[i];
if (c > 127)
{
snprintf(buf2, sizeof buf2, "&#%d;", c);
s->append(s, buf2, strlen(buf2));
}
else if (c == '&')
{
s->append(s, "&", 5);
}
else if (c == '<')
{
s->append(s, "<", 4);
}
else if (c == '>')
{
s->append(s, ">", 4);
}
else if (c == '"')
{
s->append(s, """, 6);
}
else
{
s->append_char(s, c);
}
}
memcpy(outbuffer, s->str, XMLRPC_BUFSIZE);
}
Commit Message: Do not copy more bytes than were allocated
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void xmlrpc_char_encode(char *outbuffer, const char *s1)
{
long unsigned int i;
unsigned char c;
char buf2[15];
mowgli_string_t *s = mowgli_string_create();
*buf2 = '\0';
*outbuffer = '\0';
if ((!(s1) || (*(s1) == '\0')))
{
return;
}
for (i = 0; s1[i] != '\0'; i++)
{
c = s1[i];
if (c > 127)
{
snprintf(buf2, sizeof buf2, "&#%d;", c);
s->append(s, buf2, strlen(buf2));
}
else if (c == '&')
{
s->append(s, "&", 5);
}
else if (c == '<')
{
s->append(s, "<", 4);
}
else if (c == '>')
{
s->append(s, ">", 4);
}
else if (c == '"')
{
s->append(s, """, 6);
}
else
{
s->append_char(s, c);
}
}
s->append_char(s, 0);
strncpy(outbuffer, s->str, XMLRPC_BUFSIZE);
}
| 167,260 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: exit_ext2_xattr(void)
{
mb_cache_destroy(ext2_xattr_cache);
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | exit_ext2_xattr(void)
void ext2_xattr_destroy_cache(struct mb2_cache *cache)
{
if (cache)
mb2_cache_destroy(cache);
}
| 169,976 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlDocPtr soap_xmlParseFile(const char *filename TSRMLS_DC)
{
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = NULL;
xmlDocPtr ret;
zend_bool old_allow_url_fopen;
/*
xmlInitParser();
*/
old_allow_url_fopen = PG(allow_url_fopen);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = 1;
ctxt = xmlCreateFileParserCtxt(filename);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
if (ctxt) {
ctxt->keepBlanks = 0;
ctxt->options -= XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD;
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = soap_ignorableWhitespace;
ctxt->sax->comment = soap_Comment;
ctxt->sax->warning = NULL;
ctxt->sax->error = NULL;
/*ctxt->sax->fatalError = NULL;*/
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if (ctxt->wellFormed) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
if (ret->URL == NULL && ctxt->directory != NULL) {
ret->URL = xmlCharStrdup(ctxt->directory);
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
} else {
ret = NULL;
}
/*
xmlCleanupParser();
*/
if (ret) {
cleanup_xml_node((xmlNodePtr)ret);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | xmlDocPtr soap_xmlParseFile(const char *filename TSRMLS_DC)
{
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = NULL;
xmlDocPtr ret;
zend_bool old_allow_url_fopen;
/*
xmlInitParser();
*/
old_allow_url_fopen = PG(allow_url_fopen);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = 1;
ctxt = xmlCreateFileParserCtxt(filename);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
if (ctxt) {
ctxt->keepBlanks = 0;
ctxt->options &= ~XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD;
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = soap_ignorableWhitespace;
ctxt->sax->comment = soap_Comment;
ctxt->sax->warning = NULL;
ctxt->sax->error = NULL;
/*ctxt->sax->fatalError = NULL;*/
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if (ctxt->wellFormed) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
if (ret->URL == NULL && ctxt->directory != NULL) {
ret->URL = xmlCharStrdup(ctxt->directory);
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
} else {
ret = NULL;
}
/*
xmlCleanupParser();
*/
if (ret) {
cleanup_xml_node((xmlNodePtr)ret);
}
return ret;
}
| 164,725 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static jboolean enableNative(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) {
ALOGV("%s:",__FUNCTION__);
jboolean result = JNI_FALSE;
if (!sBluetoothInterface) return result;
int ret = sBluetoothInterface->enable();
result = (ret == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS || ret == BT_STATUS_DONE) ? JNI_TRUE : JNI_FALSE;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static jboolean enableNative(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) {
static jboolean enableNative(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj, jboolean isGuest) {
ALOGV("%s:",__FUNCTION__);
jboolean result = JNI_FALSE;
if (!sBluetoothInterface) return result;
int ret = sBluetoothInterface->enable(isGuest == JNI_TRUE ? 1 : 0);
result = (ret == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS || ret == BT_STATUS_DONE) ? JNI_TRUE : JNI_FALSE;
return result;
}
| 174,161 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer",
"GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped");
ScopedSendOnIOThread delayed_send(
host_id_,
new AcceleratedSurfaceMsg_BufferPresented(params.route_id, false, 0));
RenderWidgetHostViewPort* view = GetRenderWidgetHostViewFromSurfaceID(
params.surface_id);
if (!view)
return;
delayed_send.Cancel();
static const base::TimeDelta swap_delay = GetSwapDelay();
if (swap_delay.ToInternalValue())
base::PlatformThread::Sleep(swap_delay);
view->AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(params, host_id_);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer",
"GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped");
ScopedSendOnIOThread delayed_send(
host_id_,
new AcceleratedSurfaceMsg_BufferPresented(params.route_id,
params.surface_handle,
0));
RenderWidgetHostViewPort* view = GetRenderWidgetHostViewFromSurfaceID(
params.surface_id);
if (!view)
return;
delayed_send.Cancel();
static const base::TimeDelta swap_delay = GetSwapDelay();
if (swap_delay.ToInternalValue())
base::PlatformThread::Sleep(swap_delay);
view->AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(params, host_id_);
}
| 171,357 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fputcsv)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char delimiter = intern->u.file.delimiter, enclosure = intern->u.file.enclosure, escape = intern->u.file.escape;
char *delim = NULL, *enclo = NULL, *esc = NULL;
int d_len = 0, e_len = 0, esc_len = 0, ret;
zval *fields = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "a|sss", &fields, &delim, &d_len, &enclo, &e_len, &esc, &esc_len) == SUCCESS) {
switch(ZEND_NUM_ARGS())
{
case 4:
if (esc_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "escape must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
escape = esc[0];
/* no break */
case 3:
if (e_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "enclosure must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
enclosure = enclo[0];
/* no break */
case 2:
if (d_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "delimiter must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
delimiter = delim[0];
/* no break */
case 1:
case 0:
break;
}
ret = php_fputcsv(intern->u.file.stream, fields, delimiter, enclosure, escape TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_LONG(ret);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fputcsv)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char delimiter = intern->u.file.delimiter, enclosure = intern->u.file.enclosure, escape = intern->u.file.escape;
char *delim = NULL, *enclo = NULL, *esc = NULL;
int d_len = 0, e_len = 0, esc_len = 0, ret;
zval *fields = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "a|sss", &fields, &delim, &d_len, &enclo, &e_len, &esc, &esc_len) == SUCCESS) {
switch(ZEND_NUM_ARGS())
{
case 4:
if (esc_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "escape must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
escape = esc[0];
/* no break */
case 3:
if (e_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "enclosure must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
enclosure = enclo[0];
/* no break */
case 2:
if (d_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "delimiter must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
delimiter = delim[0];
/* no break */
case 1:
case 0:
break;
}
ret = php_fputcsv(intern->u.file.stream, fields, delimiter, enclosure, escape TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_LONG(ret);
}
}
| 167,062 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Track::Create(
Segment* pSegment,
const Info& info,
long long element_start,
long long element_size,
Track*& pResult)
{
if (pResult)
return -1;
Track* const pTrack = new (std::nothrow) Track(pSegment,
element_start,
element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; //generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status) // error
{
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; //success
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Track::Create(
Track::Info::Info()
: uid(0),
defaultDuration(0),
codecDelay(0),
seekPreRoll(0),
nameAsUTF8(NULL),
language(NULL),
codecId(NULL),
codecNameAsUTF8(NULL),
codecPrivate(NULL),
codecPrivateSize(0),
lacing(false) {}
Track::Info::~Info() { Clear(); }
void Track::Info::Clear() {
delete[] nameAsUTF8;
nameAsUTF8 = NULL;
delete[] language;
language = NULL;
delete[] codecId;
codecId = NULL;
delete[] codecPrivate;
codecPrivate = NULL;
codecPrivateSize = 0;
delete[] codecNameAsUTF8;
codecNameAsUTF8 = NULL;
}
| 174,255 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: freeimage(Image *image)
{
freebuffer(image);
png_image_free(&image->image);
if (image->input_file != NULL)
{
fclose(image->input_file);
image->input_file = NULL;
}
if (image->input_memory != NULL)
{
free(image->input_memory);
image->input_memory = NULL;
image->input_memory_size = 0;
}
if (image->tmpfile_name[0] != 0 && (image->opts & KEEP_TMPFILES) == 0)
{
remove(image->tmpfile_name);
image->tmpfile_name[0] = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | freeimage(Image *image)
{
freebuffer(image);
png_image_free(&image->image);
if (image->input_file != NULL)
{
fclose(image->input_file);
image->input_file = NULL;
}
if (image->input_memory != NULL)
{
free(image->input_memory);
image->input_memory = NULL;
image->input_memory_size = 0;
}
if (image->tmpfile_name[0] != 0 && (image->opts & KEEP_TMPFILES) == 0)
{
(void)remove(image->tmpfile_name);
image->tmpfile_name[0] = 0;
}
}
| 173,594 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SyncManager::SyncInternal::UpdateEnabledTypes() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
ModelSafeRoutingInfo routes;
registrar_->GetModelSafeRoutingInfo(&routes);
const ModelTypeSet enabled_types = GetRoutingInfoTypes(routes);
sync_notifier_->UpdateEnabledTypes(enabled_types);
if (enable_sync_tabs_for_other_clients_)
MaybeSetSyncTabsInNigoriNode(enabled_types);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void SyncManager::SyncInternal::UpdateEnabledTypes() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
ModelSafeRoutingInfo routes;
registrar_->GetModelSafeRoutingInfo(&routes);
const ModelTypeSet enabled_types = GetRoutingInfoTypes(routes);
sync_notifier_->UpdateEnabledTypes(enabled_types);
| 170,798 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int tipc_nl_compat_link_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX + 1];
struct tipc_link_info link_info;
int err;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK])
return -EINVAL;
err = nla_parse_nested(link, TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX, attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK],
NULL);
if (err)
return err;
link_info.dest = nla_get_flag(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_DEST]);
link_info.up = htonl(nla_get_flag(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_UP]));
strcpy(link_info.str, nla_data(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME]));
return tipc_add_tlv(msg->rep, TIPC_TLV_LINK_INFO,
&link_info, sizeof(link_info));
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix an infoleak in tipc_nl_compat_link_dump
link_info.str is a char array of size 60. Memory after the NULL
byte is not initialized. Sending the whole object out can cause
a leak.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int tipc_nl_compat_link_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX + 1];
struct tipc_link_info link_info;
int err;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK])
return -EINVAL;
err = nla_parse_nested(link, TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX, attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK],
NULL);
if (err)
return err;
link_info.dest = nla_get_flag(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_DEST]);
link_info.up = htonl(nla_get_flag(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_UP]));
nla_strlcpy(link_info.str, nla_data(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME]),
TIPC_MAX_LINK_NAME);
return tipc_add_tlv(msg->rep, TIPC_TLV_LINK_INFO,
&link_info, sizeof(link_info));
}
| 167,162 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int dnxhd_find_frame_end(DNXHDParserContext *dctx,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
ParseContext *pc = &dctx->pc;
uint64_t state = pc->state64;
int pic_found = pc->frame_start_found;
int i = 0;
if (!pic_found) {
for (i = 0; i < buf_size; i++) {
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (ff_dnxhd_check_header_prefix(state & 0xffffffffff00LL) != 0) {
i++;
pic_found = 1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (pic_found && !dctx->remaining) {
if (!buf_size) /* EOF considered as end of frame */
return 0;
for (; i < buf_size; i++) {
dctx->cur_byte++;
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (dctx->cur_byte == 24) {
dctx->h = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 26) {
dctx->w = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 42) {
int cid = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
if (cid <= 0)
continue;
dctx->remaining = avpriv_dnxhd_get_frame_size(cid);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0) {
dctx->remaining = dnxhd_get_hr_frame_size(cid, dctx->w, dctx->h);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0)
return dctx->remaining;
}
if (buf_size - i + 47 >= dctx->remaining) {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
} else {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
}
}
}
} else if (pic_found) {
if (dctx->remaining > buf_size) {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
} else {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
}
}
pc->frame_start_found = pic_found;
pc->state64 = state;
return END_NOT_FOUND;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dnxhd_parser: Do not return invalid value from dnxhd_find_frame_end() on error
Fixes: Null pointer dereference
Fixes: CVE-2017-9608
Found-by: Yihan Lian
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 611b35627488a8d0763e75c25ee0875c5b7987dd)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int dnxhd_find_frame_end(DNXHDParserContext *dctx,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
ParseContext *pc = &dctx->pc;
uint64_t state = pc->state64;
int pic_found = pc->frame_start_found;
int i = 0;
if (!pic_found) {
for (i = 0; i < buf_size; i++) {
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (ff_dnxhd_check_header_prefix(state & 0xffffffffff00LL) != 0) {
i++;
pic_found = 1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (pic_found && !dctx->remaining) {
if (!buf_size) /* EOF considered as end of frame */
return 0;
for (; i < buf_size; i++) {
dctx->cur_byte++;
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (dctx->cur_byte == 24) {
dctx->h = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 26) {
dctx->w = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 42) {
int cid = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
int remaining;
if (cid <= 0)
continue;
remaining = avpriv_dnxhd_get_frame_size(cid);
if (remaining <= 0) {
remaining = dnxhd_get_hr_frame_size(cid, dctx->w, dctx->h);
if (remaining <= 0)
continue;
}
dctx->remaining = remaining;
if (buf_size - i + 47 >= dctx->remaining) {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
} else {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
}
}
}
} else if (pic_found) {
if (dctx->remaining > buf_size) {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
} else {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
}
}
pc->frame_start_found = pic_found;
pc->state64 = state;
return END_NOT_FOUND;
}
| 170,046 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int snmp_helper(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct snmp_ctx *ctx = (struct snmp_ctx *)context;
__be32 *pdata = (__be32 *)data;
if (*pdata == ctx->from) {
pr_debug("%s: %pI4 to %pI4\n", __func__,
(void *)&ctx->from, (void *)&ctx->to);
if (*ctx->check)
fast_csum(ctx, (unsigned char *)data - ctx->begin);
*pdata = ctx->to;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_nat_snmp_basic: add missing length checks in ASN.1 cbs
The generic ASN.1 decoder infrastructure doesn't guarantee that callbacks
will get as much data as they expect; callbacks have to check the `datalen`
parameter before looking at `data`. Make sure that snmp_version() and
snmp_helper() don't read/write beyond the end of the packet data.
(Also move the assignment to `pdata` down below the check to make it clear
that it isn't necessarily a pointer we can use before the `datalen` check.)
Fixes: cc2d58634e0f ("netfilter: nf_nat_snmp_basic: use asn1 decoder library")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-129 | int snmp_helper(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct snmp_ctx *ctx = (struct snmp_ctx *)context;
__be32 *pdata;
if (datalen != 4)
return -EINVAL;
pdata = (__be32 *)data;
if (*pdata == ctx->from) {
pr_debug("%s: %pI4 to %pI4\n", __func__,
(void *)&ctx->from, (void *)&ctx->to);
if (*ctx->check)
fast_csum(ctx, (unsigned char *)data - ctx->begin);
*pdata = ctx->to;
}
return 1;
}
| 169,723 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PluginModule::InitAsProxiedNaCl(
scoped_ptr<PluginDelegate::OutOfProcessProxy> out_of_process_proxy,
PP_Instance instance) {
nacl_ipc_proxy_ = true;
InitAsProxied(out_of_process_proxy.release());
out_of_process_proxy_->AddInstance(instance);
PluginInstance* plugin_instance = host_globals->GetInstance(instance);
if (!plugin_instance)
return;
plugin_instance->ResetAsProxied();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void PluginModule::InitAsProxiedNaCl(
PluginDelegate::OutOfProcessProxy* out_of_process_proxy,
PP_Instance instance) {
InitAsProxied(out_of_process_proxy);
out_of_process_proxy_->AddInstance(instance);
PluginInstance* plugin_instance = host_globals->GetInstance(instance);
if (!plugin_instance)
return;
plugin_instance->ResetAsProxied();
}
| 170,745 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method() const {
return current_input_method_;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method() const {
virtual input_method::InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method() const {
return current_input_method_;
}
| 170,513 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::get_config(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE configIndex,
OMX_INOUT OMX_PTR configData)
{
(void)hComp;
if (configData == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: param is null");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: can't be in invalid state");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
switch ((int)configIndex) {
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE* pParam = reinterpret_cast<OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE*>(configData);
memcpy(pParam, &m_sConfigBitrate, sizeof(m_sConfigBitrate));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoFramerate:
{
OMX_CONFIG_FRAMERATETYPE* pParam = reinterpret_cast<OMX_CONFIG_FRAMERATETYPE*>(configData);
memcpy(pParam, &m_sConfigFramerate, sizeof(m_sConfigFramerate));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigCommonRotate:
{
OMX_CONFIG_ROTATIONTYPE* pParam = reinterpret_cast<OMX_CONFIG_ROTATIONTYPE*>(configData);
memcpy(pParam, &m_sConfigFrameRotation, sizeof(m_sConfigFrameRotation));
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraperiod:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_config:QOMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraperiod");
QOMX_VIDEO_INTRAPERIODTYPE* pParam = reinterpret_cast<QOMX_VIDEO_INTRAPERIODTYPE*>(configData);
memcpy(pParam, &m_sIntraperiod, sizeof(m_sIntraperiod));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoAVCIntraPeriod:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_AVCINTRAPERIOD *pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_AVCINTRAPERIOD*>(configData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_config: OMX_IndexConfigVideoAVCIntraPeriod");
memcpy(pParam, &m_sConfigAVCIDRPeriod, sizeof(m_sConfigAVCIDRPeriod));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigCommonDeinterlace:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_DEINTERLACE *pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_DEINTERLACE*>(configData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_config: OMX_IndexConfigCommonDeinterlace");
memcpy(pParam, &m_sConfigDeinterlace, sizeof(m_sConfigDeinterlace));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoVp8ReferenceFrame:
{
OMX_VIDEO_VP8REFERENCEFRAMETYPE* pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_VIDEO_VP8REFERENCEFRAMETYPE*>(configData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_config: OMX_IndexConfigVideoVp8ReferenceFrame");
memcpy(pParam, &m_sConfigVp8ReferenceFrame, sizeof(m_sConfigVp8ReferenceFrame));
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexConfigPerfLevel:
{
OMX_U32 perflevel;
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL*>(configData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_config: OMX_QcomIndexConfigPerfLevel");
if (!dev_get_performance_level(&perflevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid entry returned from get_performance_level %d",
pParam->ePerfLevel);
} else {
pParam->ePerfLevel = (QOMX_VIDEO_PERF_LEVEL)perflevel;
}
break;
}
default:
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: unsupported index %d", (int) configIndex);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vidc: validate omx param/config data
Check the sanity of config/param strcuture objects
passed to get/set _ config()/parameter() methods.
Bug: 27533317
Security Vulnerability in MediaServer
omx_vdec::get_config() Can lead to arbitrary write
Change-Id: I6c3243afe12055ab94f1a1ecf758c10e88231809
Conflicts:
mm-core/inc/OMX_QCOMExtns.h
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_base.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_encoder.cpp
CWE ID: CWE-20 | OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::get_config(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE configIndex,
OMX_INOUT OMX_PTR configData)
{
(void)hComp;
if (configData == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: param is null");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: can't be in invalid state");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
switch ((int)configIndex) {
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(configData, OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE* pParam = reinterpret_cast<OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE*>(configData);
memcpy(pParam, &m_sConfigBitrate, sizeof(m_sConfigBitrate));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoFramerate:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(configData, OMX_CONFIG_FRAMERATETYPE);
OMX_CONFIG_FRAMERATETYPE* pParam = reinterpret_cast<OMX_CONFIG_FRAMERATETYPE*>(configData);
memcpy(pParam, &m_sConfigFramerate, sizeof(m_sConfigFramerate));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigCommonRotate:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(configData, OMX_CONFIG_ROTATIONTYPE);
OMX_CONFIG_ROTATIONTYPE* pParam = reinterpret_cast<OMX_CONFIG_ROTATIONTYPE*>(configData);
memcpy(pParam, &m_sConfigFrameRotation, sizeof(m_sConfigFrameRotation));
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraperiod:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_config:QOMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraperiod");
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(configData, QOMX_VIDEO_INTRAPERIODTYPE);
QOMX_VIDEO_INTRAPERIODTYPE* pParam = reinterpret_cast<QOMX_VIDEO_INTRAPERIODTYPE*>(configData);
memcpy(pParam, &m_sIntraperiod, sizeof(m_sIntraperiod));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoAVCIntraPeriod:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(configData, OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_AVCINTRAPERIOD);
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_AVCINTRAPERIOD *pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_AVCINTRAPERIOD*>(configData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_config: OMX_IndexConfigVideoAVCIntraPeriod");
memcpy(pParam, &m_sConfigAVCIDRPeriod, sizeof(m_sConfigAVCIDRPeriod));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigCommonDeinterlace:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(configData, OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_DEINTERLACE);
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_DEINTERLACE *pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_DEINTERLACE*>(configData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_config: OMX_IndexConfigCommonDeinterlace");
memcpy(pParam, &m_sConfigDeinterlace, sizeof(m_sConfigDeinterlace));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoVp8ReferenceFrame:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(configData, OMX_VIDEO_VP8REFERENCEFRAMETYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_VP8REFERENCEFRAMETYPE* pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_VIDEO_VP8REFERENCEFRAMETYPE*>(configData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_config: OMX_IndexConfigVideoVp8ReferenceFrame");
memcpy(pParam, &m_sConfigVp8ReferenceFrame, sizeof(m_sConfigVp8ReferenceFrame));
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexConfigPerfLevel:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(configData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL);
OMX_U32 perflevel;
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL*>(configData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_config: OMX_QcomIndexConfigPerfLevel");
if (!dev_get_performance_level(&perflevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid entry returned from get_performance_level %d",
pParam->ePerfLevel);
} else {
pParam->ePerfLevel = (QOMX_VIDEO_PERF_LEVEL)perflevel;
}
break;
}
default:
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: unsupported index %d", (int) configIndex);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
| 173,793 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PersistentHistogramAllocator::GetCreateHistogramResultHistogram() {
constexpr subtle::AtomicWord kHistogramUnderConstruction = 1;
static subtle::AtomicWord atomic_histogram_pointer = 0;
subtle::AtomicWord histogram_value =
subtle::Acquire_Load(&atomic_histogram_pointer);
if (histogram_value == kHistogramUnderConstruction)
return nullptr;
if (histogram_value)
return reinterpret_cast<HistogramBase*>(histogram_value);
if (subtle::NoBarrier_CompareAndSwap(&atomic_histogram_pointer, 0,
kHistogramUnderConstruction) != 0) {
return nullptr;
}
if (GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Creating the results-histogram inside persistent"
<< " memory can cause future allocations to crash if"
<< " that memory is ever released (for testing).";
}
HistogramBase* histogram_pointer = LinearHistogram::FactoryGet(
kResultHistogram, 1, CREATE_HISTOGRAM_MAX, CREATE_HISTOGRAM_MAX + 1,
HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
subtle::Release_Store(
&atomic_histogram_pointer,
reinterpret_cast<subtle::AtomicWord>(histogram_pointer));
return histogram_pointer;
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | PersistentHistogramAllocator::GetCreateHistogramResultHistogram() {
| 172,133 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void sycc422_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
int *d0, *d1, *d2, *r, *g, *b;
const int *y, *cb, *cr;
unsigned int maxw, maxh, max;
int offset, upb;
unsigned int i, j;
upb = (int)img->comps[0].prec;
offset = 1<<(upb - 1); upb = (1<<upb)-1;
maxw = (unsigned int)img->comps[0].w; maxh = (unsigned int)img->comps[0].h;
max = maxw * maxh;
y = img->comps[0].data;
cb = img->comps[1].data;
cr = img->comps[2].data;
d0 = r = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
d1 = g = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
d2 = b = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
if(r == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) goto fails;
for(i=0U; i < maxh; ++i)
{
for(j=0U; j < (maxw & ~(unsigned int)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if (j < maxw) {
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b; ++cb; ++cr;
}
}
free(img->comps[0].data); img->comps[0].data = d0;
free(img->comps[1].data); img->comps[1].data = d1;
free(img->comps[2].data); img->comps[2].data = d2;
#if defined(USE_JPWL) || defined(USE_MJ2)
img->comps[1].w = maxw; img->comps[1].h = maxh;
img->comps[2].w = maxw; img->comps[2].h = maxh;
#else
img->comps[1].w = (OPJ_UINT32)maxw; img->comps[1].h = (OPJ_UINT32)maxh;
img->comps[2].w = (OPJ_UINT32)maxw; img->comps[2].h = (OPJ_UINT32)maxh;
#endif
img->comps[1].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[2].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[1].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
img->comps[2].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
return;
fails:
if(r) free(r);
if(g) free(g);
if(b) free(b);
}/* sycc422_to_rgb() */
Commit Message: Fix Out-Of-Bounds Read in sycc42x_to_rgb function (#745)
42x Images with an odd x0/y0 lead to subsampled component starting at the
2nd column/line.
That is offset = comp->dx * comp->x0 - image->x0 = 1
Fix #726
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void sycc422_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
int *d0, *d1, *d2, *r, *g, *b;
const int *y, *cb, *cr;
size_t maxw, maxh, max, offx, loopmaxw;
int offset, upb;
size_t i;
upb = (int)img->comps[0].prec;
offset = 1<<(upb - 1); upb = (1<<upb)-1;
maxw = (size_t)img->comps[0].w; maxh = (size_t)img->comps[0].h;
max = maxw * maxh;
y = img->comps[0].data;
cb = img->comps[1].data;
cr = img->comps[2].data;
d0 = r = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d1 = g = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d2 = b = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
if(r == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) goto fails;
/* if img->x0 is odd, then first column shall use Cb/Cr = 0 */
offx = img->x0 & 1U;
loopmaxw = maxw - offx;
for(i=0U; i < maxh; ++i)
{
size_t j;
if (offx > 0U) {
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, 0, 0, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
}
for(j=0U; j < (loopmaxw & ~(size_t)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if (j < loopmaxw) {
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b; ++cb; ++cr;
}
}
free(img->comps[0].data); img->comps[0].data = d0;
free(img->comps[1].data); img->comps[1].data = d1;
free(img->comps[2].data); img->comps[2].data = d2;
img->comps[1].w = img->comps[2].w = img->comps[0].w;
img->comps[1].h = img->comps[2].h = img->comps[0].h;
img->comps[1].dx = img->comps[2].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[1].dy = img->comps[2].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
img->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
return;
fails:
free(r);
free(g);
free(b);
}/* sycc422_to_rgb() */
| 168,840 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: uint8_t* input() const {
return input_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize + BorderLeft();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | uint8_t* input() const {
uint8_t *input() const {
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
if (UUT_->use_highbd_ == 0) {
return input_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize + BorderLeft();
} else {
return CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(input16_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize +
BorderLeft());
}
#else
return input_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize + BorderLeft();
#endif
}
| 174,510 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::SetTickClockForTesting(
std::unique_ptr<base::TickClock> tick_clock) {
tick_clock_ = std::move(tick_clock);
DCHECK(!outstanding_recomputation_timer_->IsRunning());
outstanding_recomputation_timer_ = base::MakeUnique<base::Timer>(
false /* retain_user_task */, false /* is_repeating */,
tick_clock_.get());
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | void NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::SetTickClockForTesting(
std::unique_ptr<base::TickClock> tick_clock) {
tick_clock_ = std::move(tick_clock);
DCHECK(!outstanding_recomputation_timer_->IsRunning());
outstanding_recomputation_timer_ = std::make_unique<base::Timer>(
false /* retain_user_task */, false /* is_repeating */,
tick_clock_.get());
}
| 173,267 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int process_cmd_sock(int h)
{
sock_cmd_t cmd = {-1, 0, 0, 0, 0};
int fd = ts[h].cmd_fdr;
if(recv(fd, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), MSG_WAITALL) != sizeof(cmd))
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("recv cmd errno:%d", errno);
return FALSE;
}
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("cmd.id:%d", cmd.id);
switch(cmd.id)
{
case CMD_ADD_FD:
add_poll(h, cmd.fd, cmd.type, cmd.flags, cmd.user_id);
break;
case CMD_REMOVE_FD:
for (int i = 1; i < MAX_POLL; ++i)
{
poll_slot_t *poll_slot = &ts[h].ps[i];
if (poll_slot->pfd.fd == cmd.fd)
{
remove_poll(h, poll_slot, poll_slot->flags);
break;
}
}
close(cmd.fd);
break;
case CMD_WAKEUP:
break;
case CMD_USER_PRIVATE:
asrt(ts[h].cmd_callback);
if(ts[h].cmd_callback)
ts[h].cmd_callback(fd, cmd.type, cmd.flags, cmd.user_id);
break;
case CMD_EXIT:
return FALSE;
default:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("unknown cmd: %d", cmd.id);
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static int process_cmd_sock(int h)
{
sock_cmd_t cmd = {-1, 0, 0, 0, 0};
int fd = ts[h].cmd_fdr;
if(TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(recv(fd, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), MSG_WAITALL)) != sizeof(cmd))
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("recv cmd errno:%d", errno);
return FALSE;
}
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("cmd.id:%d", cmd.id);
switch(cmd.id)
{
case CMD_ADD_FD:
add_poll(h, cmd.fd, cmd.type, cmd.flags, cmd.user_id);
break;
case CMD_REMOVE_FD:
for (int i = 1; i < MAX_POLL; ++i)
{
poll_slot_t *poll_slot = &ts[h].ps[i];
if (poll_slot->pfd.fd == cmd.fd)
{
remove_poll(h, poll_slot, poll_slot->flags);
break;
}
}
close(cmd.fd);
break;
case CMD_WAKEUP:
break;
case CMD_USER_PRIVATE:
asrt(ts[h].cmd_callback);
if(ts[h].cmd_callback)
ts[h].cmd_callback(fd, cmd.type, cmd.flags, cmd.user_id);
break;
case CMD_EXIT:
return FALSE;
default:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("unknown cmd: %d", cmd.id);
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
| 173,465 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params,
int gpu_host_id) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
params.route_id, gpu_host_id, true, 0);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params,
int gpu_host_id) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
params.route_id, gpu_host_id, params.surface_handle, 0);
}
| 171,390 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport void *AcquireAlignedMemory(const size_t count,const size_t quantum)
{
#define AlignedExtent(size,alignment) \
(((size)+((alignment)-1)) & ~((alignment)-1))
size_t
alignment,
extent,
size;
void
*memory;
if (CheckMemoryOverflow(count,quantum) != MagickFalse)
return((void *) NULL);
memory=NULL;
alignment=CACHE_LINE_SIZE;
size=count*quantum;
extent=AlignedExtent(size,alignment);
if ((size == 0) || (alignment < sizeof(void *)) || (extent < size))
return((void *) NULL);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_POSIX_MEMALIGN)
if (posix_memalign(&memory,alignment,extent) != 0)
memory=NULL;
#elif defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE__ALIGNED_MALLOC)
memory=_aligned_malloc(extent,alignment);
#else
{
void
*p;
extent=(size+alignment-1)+sizeof(void *);
if (extent > size)
{
p=malloc(extent);
if (p != NULL)
{
memory=(void *) AlignedExtent((size_t) p+sizeof(void *),alignment);
*((void **) memory-1)=p;
}
}
}
#endif
return(memory);
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119 | MagickExport void *AcquireAlignedMemory(const size_t count,const size_t quantum)
{
#define AlignedExtent(size,alignment) \
(((size)+((alignment)-1)) & ~((alignment)-1))
size_t
alignment,
extent,
size;
void
*memory;
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(count,quantum) != MagickFalse)
return((void *) NULL);
memory=NULL;
alignment=CACHE_LINE_SIZE;
size=count*quantum;
extent=AlignedExtent(size,alignment);
if ((size == 0) || (alignment < sizeof(void *)) || (extent < size))
return((void *) NULL);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_POSIX_MEMALIGN)
if (posix_memalign(&memory,alignment,extent) != 0)
memory=NULL;
#elif defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE__ALIGNED_MALLOC)
memory=_aligned_malloc(extent,alignment);
#else
{
void
*p;
extent=(size+alignment-1)+sizeof(void *);
if (extent > size)
{
p=malloc(extent);
if (p != NULL)
{
memory=(void *) AlignedExtent((size_t) p+sizeof(void *),alignment);
*((void **) memory-1)=p;
}
}
}
#endif
return(memory);
}
| 168,542 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, set_cpu_used_);
}
if (cfg_.ts_number_layers > 1) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP9E_SET_SVC, 1);
}
vpx_svc_layer_id_t layer_id = {0, 0};
layer_id.spatial_layer_id = 0;
frame_flags_ = SetFrameFlags(video->frame(), cfg_.ts_number_layers);
layer_id.temporal_layer_id = SetLayerId(video->frame(),
cfg_.ts_number_layers);
if (video->frame() > 0) {
encoder->Control(VP9E_SET_SVC_LAYER_ID, &layer_id);
}
}
const vpx_rational_t tb = video->timebase();
timebase_ = static_cast<double>(tb.num) / tb.den;
duration_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 0)
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, set_cpu_used_);
if (denoiser_offon_test_) {
ASSERT_GT(denoiser_offon_period_, 0)
<< "denoiser_offon_period_ is not positive.";
if ((video->frame() + 1) % denoiser_offon_period_ == 0) {
// Flip denoiser_on_ periodically
denoiser_on_ ^= 1;
}
}
encoder->Control(VP9E_SET_NOISE_SENSITIVITY, denoiser_on_);
if (cfg_.ts_number_layers > 1) {
if (video->frame() == 0) {
encoder->Control(VP9E_SET_SVC, 1);
}
vpx_svc_layer_id_t layer_id;
layer_id.spatial_layer_id = 0;
frame_flags_ = SetFrameFlags(video->frame(), cfg_.ts_number_layers);
layer_id.temporal_layer_id = SetLayerId(video->frame(),
cfg_.ts_number_layers);
encoder->Control(VP9E_SET_SVC_LAYER_ID, &layer_id);
}
const vpx_rational_t tb = video->timebase();
timebase_ = static_cast<double>(tb.num) / tb.den;
duration_ = 0;
}
| 174,516 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BlockEntry::BlockEntry(Cluster* p, long idx) :
m_pCluster(p),
m_index(idx)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | BlockEntry::BlockEntry(Cluster* p, long idx) :
BlockEntry::~BlockEntry() {}
bool BlockEntry::EOS() const { return (GetKind() == kBlockEOS); }
const Cluster* BlockEntry::GetCluster() const { return m_pCluster; }
long BlockEntry::GetIndex() const { return m_index; }
SimpleBlock::SimpleBlock(Cluster* pCluster, long idx, long long start,
long long size)
: BlockEntry(pCluster, idx), m_block(start, size, 0) {}
long SimpleBlock::Parse() { return m_block.Parse(m_pCluster); }
BlockEntry::Kind SimpleBlock::GetKind() const { return kBlockSimple; }
const Block* SimpleBlock::GetBlock() const { return &m_block; }
BlockGroup::BlockGroup(Cluster* pCluster, long idx, long long block_start,
long long block_size, long long prev, long long next,
long long duration, long long discard_padding)
: BlockEntry(pCluster, idx),
m_block(block_start, block_size, discard_padding),
m_prev(prev),
m_next(next),
m_duration(duration) {}
long BlockGroup::Parse() {
const long status = m_block.Parse(m_pCluster);
if (status)
return status;
m_block.SetKey((m_prev > 0) && (m_next <= 0));
return 0;
}
| 174,241 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void read_sequence_header(decoder_info_t *decoder_info, stream_t *stream) {
decoder_info->width = get_flc(16, stream);
decoder_info->height = get_flc(16, stream);
decoder_info->log2_sb_size = get_flc(3, stream);
decoder_info->pb_split = get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->tb_split_enable = get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->max_num_ref = get_flc(2, stream) + 1;
decoder_info->interp_ref = get_flc(2, stream);
decoder_info->max_delta_qp = get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->deblocking = get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->clpf = get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->use_block_contexts = get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->bipred = get_flc(2, stream);
decoder_info->qmtx = get_flc(1, stream);
if (decoder_info->qmtx) {
decoder_info->qmtx_offset = get_flc(6, stream) - 32;
}
decoder_info->subsample = get_flc(2, stream);
decoder_info->subsample = // 0: 400 1: 420 2: 422 3: 444
(decoder_info->subsample & 1) * 20 + (decoder_info->subsample & 2) * 22 +
((decoder_info->subsample & 3) == 3) * 2 + 400;
decoder_info->num_reorder_pics = get_flc(4, stream);
if (decoder_info->subsample != 400) {
decoder_info->cfl_intra = get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->cfl_inter = get_flc(1, stream);
}
decoder_info->bitdepth = get_flc(1, stream) ? 10 : 8;
if (decoder_info->bitdepth == 10)
decoder_info->bitdepth += 2 * get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->input_bitdepth = get_flc(1, stream) ? 10 : 8;
if (decoder_info->input_bitdepth == 10)
decoder_info->input_bitdepth += 2 * get_flc(1, stream);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible stack overflows in decoder for illegal bit streams
Fixes CVE-2018-0429
A vulnerability in the Thor decoder (available at:
https://github.com/cisco/thor) could allow an authenticated, local
attacker to cause segmentation faults and stack overflows when using a
non-conformant Thor bitstream as input.
The vulnerability is due to lack of input validation when parsing the
bitstream. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a
stack overflow and potentially inject and execute arbitrary code.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void read_sequence_header(decoder_info_t *decoder_info, stream_t *stream) {
decoder_info->width = get_flc(16, stream);
decoder_info->height = get_flc(16, stream);
decoder_info->log2_sb_size = get_flc(3, stream);
decoder_info->log2_sb_size = clip(decoder_info->log2_sb_size, log2i(MIN_BLOCK_SIZE), log2i(MAX_SB_SIZE));
decoder_info->pb_split = get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->tb_split_enable = get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->max_num_ref = get_flc(2, stream) + 1;
decoder_info->interp_ref = get_flc(2, stream);
decoder_info->max_delta_qp = get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->deblocking = get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->clpf = get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->use_block_contexts = get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->bipred = get_flc(2, stream);
decoder_info->qmtx = get_flc(1, stream);
if (decoder_info->qmtx) {
decoder_info->qmtx_offset = get_flc(6, stream) - 32;
}
decoder_info->subsample = get_flc(2, stream);
decoder_info->subsample = // 0: 400 1: 420 2: 422 3: 444
(decoder_info->subsample & 1) * 20 + (decoder_info->subsample & 2) * 22 +
((decoder_info->subsample & 3) == 3) * 2 + 400;
decoder_info->num_reorder_pics = get_flc(4, stream);
if (decoder_info->subsample != 400) {
decoder_info->cfl_intra = get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->cfl_inter = get_flc(1, stream);
}
decoder_info->bitdepth = get_flc(1, stream) ? 10 : 8;
if (decoder_info->bitdepth == 10)
decoder_info->bitdepth += 2 * get_flc(1, stream);
decoder_info->input_bitdepth = get_flc(1, stream) ? 10 : 8;
if (decoder_info->input_bitdepth == 10)
decoder_info->input_bitdepth += 2 * get_flc(1, stream);
}
| 169,367 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishRequest::EstablishRequest()
: event(false, false),
gpu_process_handle(base::kNullProcessHandle) {
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishRequest::EstablishRequest()
: event(false, false) {
}
| 170,918 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > kMaxPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex == kInputPortIndex) {
formatParams->eCompressionFormat = mCodingType;
formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused;
formatParams->xFramerate = 0;
} else {
CHECK_EQ(formatParams->nPortIndex, 1u);
formatParams->eCompressionFormat = OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused;
formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar;
formatParams->xFramerate = 0;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *profileLevel =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *) params;
if (profileLevel->nPortIndex != kInputPortIndex) {
ALOGE("Invalid port index: %" PRIu32, profileLevel->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
if (profileLevel->nProfileIndex >= mNumProfileLevels) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
profileLevel->eProfile = mProfileLevels[profileLevel->nProfileIndex].mProfile;
profileLevel->eLevel = mProfileLevels[profileLevel->nProfileIndex].mLevel;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(formatParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > kMaxPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex == kInputPortIndex) {
formatParams->eCompressionFormat = mCodingType;
formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused;
formatParams->xFramerate = 0;
} else {
CHECK_EQ(formatParams->nPortIndex, 1u);
formatParams->eCompressionFormat = OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused;
formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar;
formatParams->xFramerate = 0;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *profileLevel =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *) params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(profileLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (profileLevel->nPortIndex != kInputPortIndex) {
ALOGE("Invalid port index: %" PRIu32, profileLevel->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
if (profileLevel->nProfileIndex >= mNumProfileLevels) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
profileLevel->eProfile = mProfileLevels[profileLevel->nProfileIndex].mProfile;
profileLevel->eLevel = mProfileLevels[profileLevel->nProfileIndex].mLevel;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,225 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::OnCurrentSrcChanged(
const KURL& current_src) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
Locker<MediaElementAudioSourceHandler> locker(*this);
passes_current_src_cors_access_check_ =
PassesCurrentSrcCORSAccessCheck(current_src);
maybe_print_cors_message_ = !passes_current_src_cors_access_check_;
current_src_string_ = current_src.GetString();
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::OnCurrentSrcChanged(
bool MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin() {
// If we're cross-origin and allowed access vie CORS, we're not tainted.
if (MediaElement()->GetWebMediaPlayer()->DidPassCORSAccessCheck()) {
return false;
}
// Handles the case where the url is a redirect to another site that we're not
// allowed to access.
if (!MediaElement()->HasSingleSecurityOrigin()) {
return true;
}
| 173,145 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Document::DispatchUnloadEvents() {
PluginScriptForbiddenScope forbid_plugin_destructor_scripting;
if (parser_)
parser_->StopParsing();
if (load_event_progress_ == kLoadEventNotRun)
return;
if (load_event_progress_ <= kUnloadEventInProgress) {
Element* current_focused_element = FocusedElement();
if (auto* input = ToHTMLInputElementOrNull(current_focused_element))
input->EndEditing();
if (load_event_progress_ < kPageHideInProgress) {
load_event_progress_ = kPageHideInProgress;
if (LocalDOMWindow* window = domWindow()) {
const TimeTicks pagehide_event_start = CurrentTimeTicks();
window->DispatchEvent(
PageTransitionEvent::Create(EventTypeNames::pagehide, false), this);
const TimeTicks pagehide_event_end = CurrentTimeTicks();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(
CustomCountHistogram, pagehide_histogram,
("DocumentEventTiming.PageHideDuration", 0, 10000000, 50));
pagehide_histogram.Count(
(pagehide_event_end - pagehide_event_start).InMicroseconds());
}
if (!frame_)
return;
mojom::PageVisibilityState visibility_state = GetPageVisibilityState();
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadVisibilityChangeInProgress;
if (visibility_state != mojom::PageVisibilityState::kHidden) {
const TimeTicks pagevisibility_hidden_event_start = CurrentTimeTicks();
DispatchEvent(Event::CreateBubble(EventTypeNames::visibilitychange));
const TimeTicks pagevisibility_hidden_event_end = CurrentTimeTicks();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(CustomCountHistogram, pagevisibility_histogram,
("DocumentEventTiming.PageVibilityHiddenDuration",
0, 10000000, 50));
pagevisibility_histogram.Count((pagevisibility_hidden_event_end -
pagevisibility_hidden_event_start)
.InMicroseconds());
DispatchEvent(
Event::CreateBubble(EventTypeNames::webkitvisibilitychange));
}
if (!frame_)
return;
frame_->Loader().SaveScrollAnchor();
DocumentLoader* document_loader =
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader();
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadEventInProgress;
Event* unload_event(Event::Create(EventTypeNames::unload));
if (document_loader &&
document_loader->GetTiming().UnloadEventStart().is_null() &&
document_loader->GetTiming().UnloadEventEnd().is_null()) {
DocumentLoadTiming& timing = document_loader->GetTiming();
DCHECK(!timing.NavigationStart().is_null());
const TimeTicks unload_event_start = CurrentTimeTicks();
timing.MarkUnloadEventStart(unload_event_start);
frame_->DomWindow()->DispatchEvent(unload_event, this);
const TimeTicks unload_event_end = CurrentTimeTicks();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(
CustomCountHistogram, unload_histogram,
("DocumentEventTiming.UnloadDuration", 0, 10000000, 50));
unload_histogram.Count(
(unload_event_end - unload_event_start).InMicroseconds());
timing.MarkUnloadEventEnd(unload_event_end);
} else {
frame_->DomWindow()->DispatchEvent(unload_event, frame_->GetDocument());
}
}
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadEventHandled;
}
if (!frame_)
return;
bool keep_event_listeners =
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader() &&
frame_->ShouldReuseDefaultView(
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader()->Url());
if (!keep_event_listeners)
RemoveAllEventListenersRecursively();
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | void Document::DispatchUnloadEvents() {
PluginScriptForbiddenScope forbid_plugin_destructor_scripting;
if (parser_)
parser_->StopParsing();
if (load_event_progress_ == kLoadEventNotRun)
return;
if (load_event_progress_ <= kUnloadEventInProgress) {
Element* current_focused_element = FocusedElement();
if (auto* input = ToHTMLInputElementOrNull(current_focused_element))
input->EndEditing();
if (load_event_progress_ < kPageHideInProgress) {
load_event_progress_ = kPageHideInProgress;
if (LocalDOMWindow* window = domWindow()) {
const TimeTicks pagehide_event_start = CurrentTimeTicks();
window->DispatchEvent(
PageTransitionEvent::Create(EventTypeNames::pagehide, false), this);
const TimeTicks pagehide_event_end = CurrentTimeTicks();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(
CustomCountHistogram, pagehide_histogram,
("DocumentEventTiming.PageHideDuration", 0, 10000000, 50));
pagehide_histogram.Count(
(pagehide_event_end - pagehide_event_start).InMicroseconds());
}
if (!frame_)
return;
mojom::PageVisibilityState visibility_state = GetPageVisibilityState();
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadVisibilityChangeInProgress;
if (visibility_state != mojom::PageVisibilityState::kHidden) {
const TimeTicks pagevisibility_hidden_event_start = CurrentTimeTicks();
DispatchEvent(Event::CreateBubble(EventTypeNames::visibilitychange));
const TimeTicks pagevisibility_hidden_event_end = CurrentTimeTicks();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(CustomCountHistogram, pagevisibility_histogram,
("DocumentEventTiming.PageVibilityHiddenDuration",
0, 10000000, 50));
pagevisibility_histogram.Count((pagevisibility_hidden_event_end -
pagevisibility_hidden_event_start)
.InMicroseconds());
DispatchEvent(
Event::CreateBubble(EventTypeNames::webkitvisibilitychange));
}
if (!frame_)
return;
frame_->Loader().SaveScrollAnchor();
DocumentLoader* document_loader =
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader();
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadEventInProgress;
Event* unload_event(Event::Create(EventTypeNames::unload));
if (document_loader &&
document_loader->GetTiming().UnloadEventStart().is_null() &&
document_loader->GetTiming().UnloadEventEnd().is_null()) {
DocumentLoadTiming& timing = document_loader->GetTiming();
DCHECK(!timing.NavigationStart().is_null());
const TimeTicks unload_event_start = CurrentTimeTicks();
timing.MarkUnloadEventStart(unload_event_start);
frame_->DomWindow()->DispatchEvent(unload_event, this);
const TimeTicks unload_event_end = CurrentTimeTicks();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(
CustomCountHistogram, unload_histogram,
("DocumentEventTiming.UnloadDuration", 0, 10000000, 50));
unload_histogram.Count(
(unload_event_end - unload_event_start).InMicroseconds());
timing.MarkUnloadEventEnd(unload_event_end);
} else {
frame_->DomWindow()->DispatchEvent(unload_event, frame_->GetDocument());
}
}
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadEventHandled;
}
if (!frame_)
return;
bool keep_event_listeners =
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader() &&
frame_->ShouldReuseDefaultView(
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader()->Url(),
frame_->Loader()
.GetProvisionalDocumentLoader()
->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
if (!keep_event_listeners)
RemoveAllEventListenersRecursively();
}
| 173,195 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_16_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_expand_16(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_expand_16_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_expand_16_set(const image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_expand_16(pp);
/* NOTE: prior to 1.7 libpng does SET_EXPAND as well, so tRNS is expanded. */
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10700
if (that->this.has_tRNS)
that->this.is_transparent = 1;
# endif
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
| 173,628 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int read_private_key(RSA *rsa)
{
int r;
sc_path_t path;
sc_file_t *file;
const sc_acl_entry_t *e;
u8 buf[2048], *p = buf;
size_t bufsize, keysize;
r = select_app_df();
if (r)
return 1;
sc_format_path("I0012", &path);
r = sc_select_file(card, &path, &file);
if (r) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to select private key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
e = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_READ);
if (e == NULL || e->method == SC_AC_NEVER)
return 10;
bufsize = file->size;
sc_file_free(file);
r = sc_read_binary(card, 0, buf, bufsize, 0);
if (r < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to read private key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
bufsize = r;
do {
if (bufsize < 4)
return 3;
keysize = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
if (keysize == 0)
break;
if (keysize < 3)
return 3;
if (p[2] == opt_key_num)
break;
p += keysize;
bufsize -= keysize;
} while (1);
if (keysize == 0) {
printf("Key number %d not found.\n", opt_key_num);
return 2;
}
return parse_private_key(p, keysize, rsa);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | static int read_private_key(RSA *rsa)
{
int r;
sc_path_t path;
sc_file_t *file;
const sc_acl_entry_t *e;
u8 buf[2048], *p = buf;
size_t bufsize, keysize;
r = select_app_df();
if (r)
return 1;
sc_format_path("I0012", &path);
r = sc_select_file(card, &path, &file);
if (r) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to select private key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
e = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_READ);
if (e == NULL || e->method == SC_AC_NEVER)
return 10;
bufsize = MIN(file->size, sizeof buf);
sc_file_free(file);
r = sc_read_binary(card, 0, buf, bufsize, 0);
if (r < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to read private key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
bufsize = r;
do {
if (bufsize < 4)
return 3;
keysize = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
if (keysize == 0)
break;
if (keysize < 3)
return 3;
if (p[2] == opt_key_num)
break;
p += keysize;
bufsize -= keysize;
} while (1);
if (keysize == 0) {
printf("Key number %d not found.\n", opt_key_num);
return 2;
}
return parse_private_key(p, keysize, rsa);
}
| 169,080 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[] ) {
int i, fails_count=0;
CU_pSuite cryptoUtilsTestSuite, parserTestSuite;
CU_pSuite *suites[] = {
&cryptoUtilsTestSuite,
&parserTestSuite,
NULL
};
if (argc>1) {
if (argv[1][0] == '-') {
if (strcmp(argv[1], "-verbose") == 0) {
verbose = 1;
} else {
printf ("Usage:\n %s [-verbose] to enable extensive logging\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
} else {
printf ("Usage:\n %s [-verbose] to enable extensive logging\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_LIBXML2
xmlInitParser();
#endif
/* initialize the CUnit test registry */
if (CUE_SUCCESS != CU_initialize_registry()) {
return CU_get_error();
}
/* Add the cryptoUtils suite to the registry */
cryptoUtilsTestSuite = CU_add_suite("Bzrtp Crypto Utils", NULL, NULL);
CU_add_test(cryptoUtilsTestSuite, "zrtpKDF", test_zrtpKDF);
CU_add_test(cryptoUtilsTestSuite, "CRC32", test_CRC32);
CU_add_test(cryptoUtilsTestSuite, "algo agreement", test_algoAgreement);
CU_add_test(cryptoUtilsTestSuite, "context algo setter and getter", test_algoSetterGetter);
CU_add_test(cryptoUtilsTestSuite, "adding mandatory crypto algorithms if needed", test_addMandatoryCryptoTypesIfNeeded);
/* Add the parser suite to the registry */
parserTestSuite = CU_add_suite("Bzrtp ZRTP Packet Parser", NULL, NULL);
CU_add_test(parserTestSuite, "Parse", test_parser);
CU_add_test(parserTestSuite, "Parse Exchange", test_parserComplete);
CU_add_test(parserTestSuite, "State machine", test_stateMachine);
/* Run all suites */
for(i=0; suites[i]; i++){
CU_basic_run_suite(*suites[i]);
fails_count += CU_get_number_of_tests_failed();
}
/* cleanup the CUnit registry */
CU_cleanup_registry();
#ifdef HAVE_LIBXML2
/* cleanup libxml2 */
xmlCleanupParser();
#endif
return (fails_count == 0 ? 0 : 1);
}
Commit Message: Add ZRTP Commit packet hvi check on DHPart2 packet reception
CWE ID: CWE-254 | int main(int argc, char *argv[] ) {
int i, fails_count=0;
CU_pSuite cryptoUtilsTestSuite, parserTestSuite;
CU_pSuite *suites[] = {
&cryptoUtilsTestSuite,
&parserTestSuite,
NULL
};
if (argc>1) {
if (argv[1][0] == '-') {
if (strcmp(argv[1], "-verbose") == 0) {
verbose = 1;
} else {
printf ("Usage:\n %s [-verbose] to enable extensive logging\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
} else {
printf ("Usage:\n %s [-verbose] to enable extensive logging\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_LIBXML2
xmlInitParser();
#endif
/* initialize the CUnit test registry */
if (CUE_SUCCESS != CU_initialize_registry()) {
return CU_get_error();
}
/* Add the cryptoUtils suite to the registry */
cryptoUtilsTestSuite = CU_add_suite("Bzrtp Crypto Utils", NULL, NULL);
CU_add_test(cryptoUtilsTestSuite, "zrtpKDF", test_zrtpKDF);
CU_add_test(cryptoUtilsTestSuite, "CRC32", test_CRC32);
CU_add_test(cryptoUtilsTestSuite, "algo agreement", test_algoAgreement);
CU_add_test(cryptoUtilsTestSuite, "context algo setter and getter", test_algoSetterGetter);
CU_add_test(cryptoUtilsTestSuite, "adding mandatory crypto algorithms if needed", test_addMandatoryCryptoTypesIfNeeded);
/* Add the parser suite to the registry */
parserTestSuite = CU_add_suite("Bzrtp ZRTP Packet Parser", NULL, NULL);
CU_add_test(parserTestSuite, "Parse", test_parser);
CU_add_test(parserTestSuite, "Parse hvi check fail", test_parser_hvi);
CU_add_test(parserTestSuite, "Parse Exchange", test_parserComplete);
CU_add_test(parserTestSuite, "State machine", test_stateMachine);
/* Run all suites */
for(i=0; suites[i]; i++){
CU_basic_run_suite(*suites[i]);
fails_count += CU_get_number_of_tests_failed();
}
/* cleanup the CUnit registry */
CU_cleanup_registry();
#ifdef HAVE_LIBXML2
/* cleanup libxml2 */
xmlCleanupParser();
#endif
return (fails_count == 0 ? 0 : 1);
}
| 168,830 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int board_early_init_r(void)
{
int ret = 0;
/* Flush d-cache and invalidate i-cache of any FLASH data */
flush_dcache();
invalidate_icache();
set_liodns();
setup_qbman_portals();
ret = trigger_fpga_config();
if (ret)
printf("error triggering PCIe FPGA config\n");
/* enable the Unit LED (red) & Boot LED (on) */
qrio_set_leds();
/* enable Application Buffer */
qrio_enable_app_buffer();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | int board_early_init_r(void)
{
int ret = 0;
/* Flush d-cache and invalidate i-cache of any FLASH data */
flush_dcache();
invalidate_icache();
set_liodns();
setup_qbman_portals();
ret = trigger_fpga_config();
if (ret)
printf("error triggering PCIe FPGA config\n");
/* enable the Unit LED (red) & Boot LED (on) */
qrio_set_leds();
/* enable Application Buffer */
qrio_enable_app_buffer();
return 0;
}
| 169,628 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ExprAppendMultiKeysymList(ExprDef *expr, ExprDef *append)
{
unsigned nSyms = darray_size(expr->keysym_list.syms);
unsigned numEntries = darray_size(append->keysym_list.syms);
darray_append(expr->keysym_list.symsMapIndex, nSyms);
darray_append(expr->keysym_list.symsNumEntries, numEntries);
darray_concat(expr->keysym_list.syms, append->keysym_list.syms);
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) &append);
return expr;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: fix pointer value for FreeStmt
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | ExprAppendMultiKeysymList(ExprDef *expr, ExprDef *append)
{
unsigned nSyms = darray_size(expr->keysym_list.syms);
unsigned numEntries = darray_size(append->keysym_list.syms);
darray_append(expr->keysym_list.symsMapIndex, nSyms);
darray_append(expr->keysym_list.symsNumEntries, numEntries);
darray_concat(expr->keysym_list.syms, append->keysym_list.syms);
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) append);
return expr;
}
| 169,093 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void TearDown() {
content::GetContentClient()->set_browser(old_browser_client_);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | virtual void TearDown() {
content::GetContentClient()->set_browser(old_browser_client_);
content::SetContentClient(old_client_);
}
| 171,012 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RunCoeffCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 1000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_ref_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_block, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() - rnd.Rand8();
fwd_txfm_ref(input_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_block, output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void RunCoeffCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 1000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, int16_t, input_block[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, output_ref_block[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, output_block[kNumCoeffs]);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
// Initialize a test block with input range [-mask_, mask_].
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_block[j] = (rnd.Rand16() & mask_) - (rnd.Rand16() & mask_);
fwd_txfm_ref(input_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_block, output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
}
}
| 174,520 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceFinished(
base::WeakPtr<RenderWidgetHostViewAura> render_widget_host_view,
const base::Callback<void(bool)>& callback,
bool result) {
callback.Run(result);
if (!render_widget_host_view.get())
return;
--render_widget_host_view->pending_thumbnail_tasks_;
render_widget_host_view->AdjustSurfaceProtection();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceFinished(
base::WeakPtr<RenderWidgetHostViewAura> render_widget_host_view,
const base::Callback<void(bool)>& callback,
bool result) {
callback.Run(result);
if (!render_widget_host_view.get())
return;
--render_widget_host_view->pending_thumbnail_tasks_;
}
| 171,378 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::SetPrintPreviewDataForIndex(
int index,
const base::RefCountedBytes* data) {
print_preview_data_service()->SetDataEntry(preview_ui_addr_str_, index, data);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void PrintPreviewUI::SetPrintPreviewDataForIndex(
int index,
const base::RefCountedBytes* data) {
print_preview_data_service()->SetDataEntry(id_, index, data);
}
| 170,843 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long Segment::CreateInstance(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
Segment*& pSegment)
{
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
pSegment = NULL;
long long total, available;
const long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (available < 0)
return -1;
if ((total >= 0) && (available > total))
return -1;
for (;;)
{
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result) //error, or too few available bytes
return result;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > available)
return pos + len;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) //error
return id;
pos += len; //consume ID
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result) //error, or too few available bytes
return result;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > available)
return pos + len;
long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return size;
pos += len; //consume length of size of element
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (id == 0x08538067) //Segment ID
{
if (size == unknown_size)
size = -1;
else if (total < 0)
size = -1;
else if ((pos + size) > total)
size = -1;
pSegment = new (std::nothrow) Segment(
pReader,
idpos,
pos,
size);
if (pSegment == 0)
return -1; //generic error
return 0; //success
}
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + size) > total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + size) > available)
return pos + size;
pos += size; //consume payload
}
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long Segment::CreateInstance(
if (result < 0) // error
return result;
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
return (pos + 1);
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > available)
return pos + len;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return id;
if (id == 0x0F43B675) // Cluster ID
break;
pos += len; // consume ID
if ((pos + 1) > available)
return (pos + 1);
// Read Size
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return result;
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
return (pos + 1);
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > available)
return pos + len;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return size;
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
const long long element_size = size + pos - element_start;
// Pos now points to start of payload
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
// We read EBML elements either in total or nothing at all.
if ((pos + size) > available)
return pos + size;
if (id == 0x0549A966) { // Segment Info ID
if (m_pInfo)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_pInfo = new (std::nothrow)
SegmentInfo(this, pos, size, element_start, element_size);
if (m_pInfo == NULL)
return -1;
const long status = m_pInfo->Parse();
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x0654AE6B) { // Tracks ID
if (m_pTracks)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_pTracks = new (std::nothrow)
Tracks(this, pos, size, element_start, element_size);
if (m_pTracks == NULL)
return -1;
const long status = m_pTracks->Parse();
| 174,259 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int touch(const char *path) {
return touch_file(path, false, USEC_INFINITY, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID, 0);
}
Commit Message: util-lib: use MODE_INVALID as invalid value for mode_t everywhere
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int touch(const char *path) {
return touch_file(path, false, USEC_INFINITY, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID, MODE_INVALID);
}
| 170,104 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void build_l4proto_dccp(const struct nf_conntrack *ct, struct nethdr *n)
{
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_ORIG_PORT, n, NTA_PORT,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_port));
if (!nfct_attr_is_set(ct, ATTR_DCCP_STATE))
return;
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_DCCP_STATE, n, NTA_DCCP_STATE);
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_DCCP_ROLE, n, NTA_DCCP_ROLE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | static void build_l4proto_dccp(const struct nf_conntrack *ct, struct nethdr *n)
{
/* DCCP is optional, make sure nf_conntrack_dccp is loaded */
if (!nfct_attr_is_set(ct, ATTR_DCCP_STATE))
return;
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_ORIG_PORT, n, NTA_PORT,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_port));
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_DCCP_STATE, n, NTA_DCCP_STATE);
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_DCCP_ROLE, n, NTA_DCCP_ROLE);
}
| 164,629 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int kwajd_read_headers(struct mspack_system *sys,
struct mspack_file *fh,
struct mskwajd_header *hdr)
{
unsigned char buf[16];
int i;
/* read in the header */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], kwajh_SIZEOF) != kwajh_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* check for "KWAJ" signature */
if (((unsigned int) EndGetI32(&buf[kwajh_Signature1]) != 0x4A41574B) ||
((unsigned int) EndGetI32(&buf[kwajh_Signature2]) != 0xD127F088))
{
return MSPACK_ERR_SIGNATURE;
}
/* basic header fields */
hdr->comp_type = EndGetI16(&buf[kwajh_CompMethod]);
hdr->data_offset = EndGetI16(&buf[kwajh_DataOffset]);
hdr->headers = EndGetI16(&buf[kwajh_Flags]);
hdr->length = 0;
hdr->filename = NULL;
hdr->extra = NULL;
hdr->extra_length = 0;
/* optional headers */
/* 4 bytes: length of unpacked file */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASLENGTH) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 4) != 4) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
hdr->length = EndGetI32(&buf[0]);
}
/* 2 bytes: unknown purpose */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASUNKNOWN1) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 2) != 2) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* 2 bytes: length of section, then [length] bytes: unknown purpose */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASUNKNOWN2) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 2) != 2) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
i = EndGetI16(&buf[0]);
if (sys->seek(fh, (off_t)i, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_CUR)) return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* filename and extension */
if (hdr->headers & (MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILENAME | MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILEEXT)) {
off_t pos = sys->tell(fh);
char *fn = (char *) sys->alloc(sys, (size_t) 13);
/* allocate memory for maximum length filename */
if (! fn) return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
hdr->filename = fn;
/* copy filename if present */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILENAME) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 9) != 9) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
for (i = 0; i < 9; i++, fn++) if (!(*fn = buf[i])) break;
pos += (i < 9) ? i+1 : 9;
if (sys->seek(fh, pos, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START))
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* copy extension if present */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILEEXT) {
*fn++ = '.';
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 4) != 4) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, fn++) if (!(*fn = buf[i])) break;
pos += (i < 4) ? i+1 : 4;
if (sys->seek(fh, pos, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START))
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
*fn = '\0';
}
/* 2 bytes: extra text length then [length] bytes of extra text data */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASEXTRATEXT) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 2) != 2) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
i = EndGetI16(&buf[0]);
hdr->extra = (char *) sys->alloc(sys, (size_t)i+1);
if (! hdr->extra) return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
if (sys->read(fh, hdr->extra, i) != i) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
hdr->extra[i] = '\0';
hdr->extra_length = i;
}
return MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
Commit Message: kwaj_read_headers(): fix handling of non-terminated strings
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static int kwajd_read_headers(struct mspack_system *sys,
struct mspack_file *fh,
struct mskwajd_header *hdr)
{
unsigned char buf[16];
int i;
/* read in the header */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], kwajh_SIZEOF) != kwajh_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* check for "KWAJ" signature */
if (((unsigned int) EndGetI32(&buf[kwajh_Signature1]) != 0x4A41574B) ||
((unsigned int) EndGetI32(&buf[kwajh_Signature2]) != 0xD127F088))
{
return MSPACK_ERR_SIGNATURE;
}
/* basic header fields */
hdr->comp_type = EndGetI16(&buf[kwajh_CompMethod]);
hdr->data_offset = EndGetI16(&buf[kwajh_DataOffset]);
hdr->headers = EndGetI16(&buf[kwajh_Flags]);
hdr->length = 0;
hdr->filename = NULL;
hdr->extra = NULL;
hdr->extra_length = 0;
/* optional headers */
/* 4 bytes: length of unpacked file */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASLENGTH) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 4) != 4) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
hdr->length = EndGetI32(&buf[0]);
}
/* 2 bytes: unknown purpose */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASUNKNOWN1) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 2) != 2) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* 2 bytes: length of section, then [length] bytes: unknown purpose */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASUNKNOWN2) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 2) != 2) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
i = EndGetI16(&buf[0]);
if (sys->seek(fh, (off_t)i, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_CUR)) return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* filename and extension */
if (hdr->headers & (MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILENAME | MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILEEXT)) {
int len;
/* allocate memory for maximum length filename */
char *fn = (char *) sys->alloc(sys, (size_t) 13);
if (!(hdr->filename = fn)) return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
/* copy filename if present */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILENAME) {
/* read and copy up to 9 bytes of a null terminated string */
if ((len = sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 9)) < 2) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) if (!(*fn++ = buf[i])) break;
/* if string was 9 bytes with no null terminator, reject it */
if (i == 9 && buf[8] != '\0') return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
/* seek to byte after string ended in file */
if (sys->seek(fh, (off_t)(i + 1 - len), MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_CUR))
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
fn--; /* remove the null terminator */
}
/* copy extension if present */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILEEXT) {
*fn++ = '.';
/* read and copy up to 4 bytes of a null terminated string */
if ((len = sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 4)) < 2) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) if (!(*fn++ = buf[i])) break;
/* if string was 4 bytes with no null terminator, reject it */
if (i == 4 && buf[3] != '\0') return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
/* seek to byte after string ended in file */
if (sys->seek(fh, (off_t)(i + 1 - len), MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_CUR))
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
fn--; /* remove the null terminator */
}
*fn = '\0';
}
/* 2 bytes: extra text length then [length] bytes of extra text data */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASEXTRATEXT) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 2) != 2) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
i = EndGetI16(&buf[0]);
hdr->extra = (char *) sys->alloc(sys, (size_t)i+1);
if (! hdr->extra) return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
if (sys->read(fh, hdr->extra, i) != i) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
hdr->extra[i] = '\0';
hdr->extra_length = i;
}
return MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
| 169,111 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SetupConnectedStreams() {
CallbackRunLoop run_loop(runner());
ASSERT_TRUE(client_peer_->quic_transport()->IsEncryptionEstablished());
ASSERT_TRUE(server_peer_->quic_transport()->IsEncryptionEstablished());
client_peer_->CreateStreamWithDelegate();
ASSERT_TRUE(client_peer_->stream());
ASSERT_TRUE(client_peer_->stream_delegate());
base::RepeatingCallback<void()> callback = run_loop.CreateCallback();
QuicPeerForTest* server_peer_ptr = server_peer_.get();
MockP2PQuicStreamDelegate* stream_delegate =
new MockP2PQuicStreamDelegate();
P2PQuicStream* server_stream;
EXPECT_CALL(*server_peer_->quic_transport_delegate(), OnStream(_))
.WillOnce(Invoke([&callback, &server_stream,
&stream_delegate](P2PQuicStream* stream) {
stream->SetDelegate(stream_delegate);
server_stream = stream;
callback.Run();
}));
client_peer_->stream()->WriteOrBufferData(kTriggerRemoteStreamPhrase,
/*fin=*/false, nullptr);
run_loop.RunUntilCallbacksFired();
server_peer_ptr->SetStreamAndDelegate(
static_cast<P2PQuicStreamImpl*>(server_stream),
std::unique_ptr<MockP2PQuicStreamDelegate>(stream_delegate));
ASSERT_TRUE(client_peer_->stream());
ASSERT_TRUE(client_peer_->stream_delegate());
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void SetupConnectedStreams() {
CallbackRunLoop run_loop(runner());
ASSERT_TRUE(client_peer_->quic_transport()->IsEncryptionEstablished());
ASSERT_TRUE(server_peer_->quic_transport()->IsEncryptionEstablished());
client_peer_->CreateStreamWithDelegate();
ASSERT_TRUE(client_peer_->stream());
ASSERT_TRUE(client_peer_->stream_delegate());
base::RepeatingCallback<void()> callback = run_loop.CreateCallback();
QuicPeerForTest* server_peer_ptr = server_peer_.get();
MockP2PQuicStreamDelegate* stream_delegate =
new MockP2PQuicStreamDelegate();
P2PQuicStream* server_stream;
EXPECT_CALL(*server_peer_->quic_transport_delegate(), OnStream(_))
.WillOnce(Invoke([&callback, &server_stream,
&stream_delegate](P2PQuicStream* stream) {
stream->SetDelegate(stream_delegate);
server_stream = stream;
callback.Run();
}));
client_peer_->stream()->WriteData(
std::vector<uint8_t>(kTriggerRemoteStreamPhrase.begin(),
kTriggerRemoteStreamPhrase.end()),
/*fin=*/false);
run_loop.RunUntilCallbacksFired();
server_peer_ptr->SetStreamAndDelegate(
static_cast<P2PQuicStreamImpl*>(server_stream),
std::unique_ptr<MockP2PQuicStreamDelegate>(stream_delegate));
ASSERT_TRUE(client_peer_->stream());
ASSERT_TRUE(client_peer_->stream_delegate());
}
| 172,268 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t SoundTriggerHwService::Module::startRecognition(sound_model_handle_t handle,
const sp<IMemory>& dataMemory)
{
ALOGV("startRecognition() model handle %d", handle);
if (!captureHotwordAllowed()) {
return PERMISSION_DENIED;
}
if (dataMemory != 0 && dataMemory->pointer() == NULL) {
ALOGE("startRecognition() dataMemory is non-0 but has NULL pointer()");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
AutoMutex lock(mLock);
if (mServiceState == SOUND_TRIGGER_STATE_DISABLED) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
sp<Model> model = getModel(handle);
if (model == 0) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if ((dataMemory == 0) ||
(dataMemory->size() < sizeof(struct sound_trigger_recognition_config))) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (model->mState == Model::STATE_ACTIVE) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
struct sound_trigger_recognition_config *config =
(struct sound_trigger_recognition_config *)dataMemory->pointer();
config->capture_handle = model->mCaptureIOHandle;
config->capture_device = model->mCaptureDevice;
status_t status = mHwDevice->start_recognition(mHwDevice, handle, config,
SoundTriggerHwService::recognitionCallback,
this);
if (status == NO_ERROR) {
model->mState = Model::STATE_ACTIVE;
model->mConfig = *config;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: soundtrigger: add size check on sound model and recogntion data
Bug: 30148546
Change-Id: I082f535a853c96571887eeea37c6d41ecee7d8c0
(cherry picked from commit bb00d8f139ff51336ab3c810d35685003949bcf8)
(cherry picked from commit ef0c91518446e65533ca8bab6726a845f27c73fd)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | status_t SoundTriggerHwService::Module::startRecognition(sound_model_handle_t handle,
const sp<IMemory>& dataMemory)
{
ALOGV("startRecognition() model handle %d", handle);
if (!captureHotwordAllowed()) {
return PERMISSION_DENIED;
}
if (dataMemory == 0 || dataMemory->pointer() == NULL) {
ALOGE("startRecognition() dataMemory is 0 or has NULL pointer()");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
struct sound_trigger_recognition_config *config =
(struct sound_trigger_recognition_config *)dataMemory->pointer();
if (config->data_offset < sizeof(struct sound_trigger_recognition_config) ||
config->data_size > (UINT_MAX - config->data_offset) ||
dataMemory->size() < config->data_offset ||
config->data_size > (dataMemory->size() - config->data_offset)) {
ALOGE("startRecognition() data_size is too big");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
AutoMutex lock(mLock);
if (mServiceState == SOUND_TRIGGER_STATE_DISABLED) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
sp<Model> model = getModel(handle);
if (model == 0) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (model->mState == Model::STATE_ACTIVE) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
config->capture_handle = model->mCaptureIOHandle;
config->capture_device = model->mCaptureDevice;
status_t status = mHwDevice->start_recognition(mHwDevice, handle, config,
SoundTriggerHwService::recognitionCallback,
this);
if (status == NO_ERROR) {
model->mState = Model::STATE_ACTIVE;
model->mConfig = *config;
}
return status;
}
| 173,400 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: UserInitiatedInfo CreateUserInitiatedInfo(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle,
PageLoadTracker* committed_load) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsRendererInitiated())
return UserInitiatedInfo::BrowserInitiated();
return UserInitiatedInfo::RenderInitiated(
navigation_handle->HasUserGesture());
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | UserInitiatedInfo CreateUserInitiatedInfo(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle,
PageLoadTracker* committed_load) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsRendererInitiated())
return UserInitiatedInfo::BrowserInitiated();
return UserInitiatedInfo::RenderInitiated(
navigation_handle->HasUserGesture(),
!navigation_handle->NavigationInputStart().is_null());
}
| 172,495 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: base::string16 TranslateInfoBarDelegate::GetLanguageDisplayableName(
const std::string& language_code) {
return l10n_util::GetDisplayNameForLocale(
language_code, g_browser_process->GetApplicationLocale(), true);
}
Commit Message: Remove dependency of TranslateInfobarDelegate on profile
This CL uses TranslateTabHelper instead of Profile and also cleans up
some unused code and irrelevant dependencies.
BUG=371845
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/286973003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@270758 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | base::string16 TranslateInfoBarDelegate::GetLanguageDisplayableName(
| 171,173 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static NavigationPolicy NavigationPolicyForRequest(
const FrameLoadRequest& request) {
NavigationPolicy policy = kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab;
Event* event = request.TriggeringEvent();
if (!event)
return policy;
if (request.Form() && event->UnderlyingEvent())
event = event->UnderlyingEvent();
if (event->IsMouseEvent()) {
MouseEvent* mouse_event = ToMouseEvent(event);
NavigationPolicyFromMouseEvent(
mouse_event->button(), mouse_event->ctrlKey(), mouse_event->shiftKey(),
mouse_event->altKey(), mouse_event->metaKey(), &policy);
} else if (event->IsKeyboardEvent()) {
KeyboardEvent* key_event = ToKeyboardEvent(event);
NavigationPolicyFromMouseEvent(0, key_event->ctrlKey(),
key_event->shiftKey(), key_event->altKey(),
key_event->metaKey(), &policy);
} else if (event->IsGestureEvent()) {
GestureEvent* gesture_event = ToGestureEvent(event);
NavigationPolicyFromMouseEvent(
0, gesture_event->ctrlKey(), gesture_event->shiftKey(),
gesture_event->altKey(), gesture_event->metaKey(), &policy);
}
return policy;
}
Commit Message: Only allow downloading in response to real keyboard modifiers
BUG=848531
Change-Id: I97554c8d312243b55647f1376945aee32dbd95bf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1082216
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564051}
CWE ID: | static NavigationPolicy NavigationPolicyForRequest(
static NavigationPolicy NavigationPolicyForEvent(Event* event) {
NavigationPolicy policy = kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab;
if (event->IsMouseEvent()) {
MouseEvent* mouse_event = ToMouseEvent(event);
NavigationPolicyFromMouseEvent(
mouse_event->button(), mouse_event->ctrlKey(), mouse_event->shiftKey(),
mouse_event->altKey(), mouse_event->metaKey(), &policy);
} else if (event->IsKeyboardEvent()) {
KeyboardEvent* key_event = ToKeyboardEvent(event);
NavigationPolicyFromMouseEvent(0, key_event->ctrlKey(),
key_event->shiftKey(), key_event->altKey(),
key_event->metaKey(), &policy);
} else if (event->IsGestureEvent()) {
GestureEvent* gesture_event = ToGestureEvent(event);
NavigationPolicyFromMouseEvent(
0, gesture_event->ctrlKey(), gesture_event->shiftKey(),
gesture_event->altKey(), gesture_event->metaKey(), &policy);
}
return policy;
}
| 173,191 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: crm_recv_remote_msg(void *session, gboolean encrypted)
{
char *reply = NULL;
xmlNode *xml = NULL;
if (encrypted) {
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
reply = cib_recv_tls(session);
#else
CRM_ASSERT(encrypted == FALSE);
#endif
} else {
reply = cib_recv_plaintext(GPOINTER_TO_INT(session));
}
if (reply == NULL || strlen(reply) == 0) {
crm_trace("Empty reply");
} else {
xml = string2xml(reply);
if (xml == NULL) {
crm_err("Couldn't parse: '%.120s'", reply);
}
}
free(reply);
return xml;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | crm_recv_remote_msg(void *session, gboolean encrypted)
crm_parse_remote_buffer(char **msg_buf)
{
char *buf = NULL;
char *start = NULL;
char *end = NULL;
xmlNode *xml = NULL;
if (*msg_buf == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
/* take ownership of the buffer */
buf = *msg_buf;
*msg_buf = NULL;
/* MSGS are separated by a '\r\n\r\n'. Split a message off the buffer and return it. */
start = buf;
end = strstr(start, REMOTE_MSG_TERMINATOR);
while (!xml && end) {
/* grab the message */
end[0] = '\0';
end += strlen(REMOTE_MSG_TERMINATOR);
xml = string2xml(start);
if (xml == NULL) {
crm_err("Couldn't parse: '%.120s'", start);
}
start = end;
end = strstr(start, REMOTE_MSG_TERMINATOR);
}
if (xml && start) {
/* we have msgs left over, save it until next time */
*msg_buf = strdup(start);
free(buf);
} else if (!xml) {
/* no msg present */
*msg_buf = buf;
}
return xml;
}
/*!
* \internal
* \brief Determine if a remote session has data to read
*
* \retval 0, timeout occured.
* \retval positive, data is ready to be read
* \retval negative, session has ended
*/
int
crm_recv_remote_ready(void *session, gboolean encrypted, int timeout /* ms */)
{
struct pollfd fds = { 0, };
int sock = 0;
void *sock_ptr = NULL;
int rc = 0;
time_t start;
if (encrypted) {
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
gnutls_session *tls_session = session;
sock_ptr = gnutls_transport_get_ptr(*tls_session);
#else
CRM_ASSERT(encrypted == FALSE);
#endif
} else {
sock_ptr = session;
}
sock = GPOINTER_TO_INT(sock_ptr);
if (sock <= 0) {
return -ENOTCONN;
}
start = time(NULL);
errno = 0;
do {
fds.fd = sock;
fds.events = POLLIN;
/* If we got an EINTR while polling, and we have a
* specific timeout we are trying to honor, attempt
* to adjust the timeout to the closest second. */
if (errno == EINTR && (timeout > 0)) {
timeout = timeout - ((time(NULL) - start) * 1000);
if (timeout < 1000) {
timeout = 1000;
}
}
rc = poll(&fds, 1, timeout);
} while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR);
return rc;
}
char *
crm_recv_remote_raw(void *session, gboolean encrypted, size_t max_recv, size_t *recv_len, int *disconnected)
{
char *reply = NULL;
if (recv_len) {
*recv_len = 0;
}
if (disconnected) {
*disconnected = 0;
}
if (encrypted) {
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
reply = crm_recv_tls(session, max_recv, recv_len, disconnected);
#else
CRM_ASSERT(encrypted == FALSE);
#endif
} else {
reply = crm_recv_plaintext(GPOINTER_TO_INT(session), max_recv, recv_len, disconnected);
}
if (reply == NULL || strlen(reply) == 0) {
crm_trace("Empty reply");
}
return reply;
}
/*!
* \internal
* \brief Read data off the socket until at least one full message is present or timeout occures.
* \retval TRUE message read
* \retval FALSE full message not read
*/
gboolean
crm_recv_remote_msg(void *session, char **recv_buf, gboolean encrypted, int total_timeout /*ms */, int *disconnected)
{
int ret;
size_t request_len = 0;
time_t start = time(NULL);
char *raw_request = NULL;
int remaining_timeout = 0;
if (total_timeout == 0) {
total_timeout = 10000;
} else if (total_timeout < 0) {
total_timeout = 60000;
}
*disconnected = 0;
remaining_timeout = total_timeout;
while ((remaining_timeout > 0) && !(*disconnected)) {
/* read some more off the tls buffer if we still have time left. */
crm_trace("waiting to receive remote msg, starting timeout %d, remaining_timeout %d", total_timeout, remaining_timeout);
ret = crm_recv_remote_ready(session, encrypted, remaining_timeout);
raw_request = NULL;
if (ret == 0) {
crm_err("poll timed out (%d ms) while waiting to receive msg", remaining_timeout);
return FALSE;
} else if (ret < 0) {
if (errno != EINTR) {
crm_debug("poll returned error while waiting for msg, rc: %d, errno: %d", ret, errno);
*disconnected = 1;
return FALSE;
}
crm_debug("poll EINTR encountered during poll, retrying");
} else {
raw_request = crm_recv_remote_raw(session, encrypted, 0, &request_len, disconnected);
}
remaining_timeout = remaining_timeout - ((time(NULL) - start) * 1000);
if (!raw_request) {
crm_debug("Empty msg received after poll");
continue;
}
if (*recv_buf) {
int old_len = strlen(*recv_buf);
crm_trace("Expanding recv buffer from %d to %d", old_len, old_len+request_len);
*recv_buf = realloc(*recv_buf, old_len + request_len + 1);
memcpy(*recv_buf + old_len, raw_request, request_len);
*(*recv_buf+old_len+request_len) = '\0';
free(raw_request);
} else {
*recv_buf = raw_request;
}
if (strstr(*recv_buf, REMOTE_MSG_TERMINATOR)) {
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
| 166,163 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long AudioTrack::GetBitDepth() const
{
return m_bitDepth;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long AudioTrack::GetBitDepth() const
| 174,283 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Buffer m;
int success;
debug3("%s", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, authctxt->user);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
success = buffer_get_int(&m);
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__);
buffer_free(&m);
return (NULL);
}
buffer_free(&m);
return (authctxt);
}
Commit Message: Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.
Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-20 | mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Buffer m;
int success;
debug3("%s", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
success = buffer_get_int(&m);
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__);
buffer_free(&m);
return (NULL);
}
buffer_free(&m);
return (authctxt);
}
| 166,586 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: explicit ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout(
const base::Callback<void(const SkBitmap&)>& image_decoded_callback)
: image_decoded_callback_(image_decoded_callback),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | explicit ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout(
| 171,953 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ext4_xattr_release_block(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
struct mb_cache_entry *ce = NULL;
int error = 0;
struct mb_cache *ext4_mb_cache = EXT4_GET_MB_CACHE(inode);
ce = mb_cache_entry_get(ext4_mb_cache, bh->b_bdev, bh->b_blocknr);
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access");
error = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh);
if (error)
goto out;
lock_buffer(bh);
if (BHDR(bh)->h_refcount == cpu_to_le32(1)) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "refcount now=0; freeing");
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_free(ce);
get_bh(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, bh, 0, 1,
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_METADATA |
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_FORGET);
} else {
le32_add_cpu(&BHDR(bh)->h_refcount, -1);
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
/*
* Beware of this ugliness: Releasing of xattr block references
* from different inodes can race and so we have to protect
* from a race where someone else frees the block (and releases
* its journal_head) before we are done dirtying the buffer. In
* nojournal mode this race is harmless and we actually cannot
* call ext4_handle_dirty_xattr_block() with locked buffer as
* that function can call sync_dirty_buffer() so for that case
* we handle the dirtying after unlocking the buffer.
*/
if (ext4_handle_valid(handle))
error = ext4_handle_dirty_xattr_block(handle, inode,
bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
if (!ext4_handle_valid(handle))
error = ext4_handle_dirty_xattr_block(handle, inode,
bh);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
dquot_free_block(inode, EXT4_C2B(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb), 1));
ea_bdebug(bh, "refcount now=%d; releasing",
le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount));
}
out:
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, error);
return;
}
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | ext4_xattr_release_block(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
int error = 0;
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access");
error = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh);
if (error)
goto out;
lock_buffer(bh);
if (BHDR(bh)->h_refcount == cpu_to_le32(1)) {
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_hash);
ea_bdebug(bh, "refcount now=0; freeing");
/*
* This must happen under buffer lock for
* ext4_xattr_block_set() to reliably detect freed block
*/
mb2_cache_entry_delete_block(EXT4_GET_MB_CACHE(inode), hash,
bh->b_blocknr);
get_bh(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, bh, 0, 1,
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_METADATA |
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_FORGET);
} else {
le32_add_cpu(&BHDR(bh)->h_refcount, -1);
/*
* Beware of this ugliness: Releasing of xattr block references
* from different inodes can race and so we have to protect
* from a race where someone else frees the block (and releases
* its journal_head) before we are done dirtying the buffer. In
* nojournal mode this race is harmless and we actually cannot
* call ext4_handle_dirty_xattr_block() with locked buffer as
* that function can call sync_dirty_buffer() so for that case
* we handle the dirtying after unlocking the buffer.
*/
if (ext4_handle_valid(handle))
error = ext4_handle_dirty_xattr_block(handle, inode,
bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
if (!ext4_handle_valid(handle))
error = ext4_handle_dirty_xattr_block(handle, inode,
bh);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
dquot_free_block(inode, EXT4_C2B(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb), 1));
ea_bdebug(bh, "refcount now=%d; releasing",
le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount));
}
out:
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, error);
return;
}
| 169,996 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool Block::IsInvisible() const
{
return bool(int(m_flags & 0x08) != 0);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool Block::IsInvisible() const
const Block::Frame& Block::GetFrame(int idx) const {
assert(idx >= 0);
assert(idx < m_frame_count);
const Frame& f = m_frames[idx];
assert(f.pos > 0);
assert(f.len > 0);
return f;
}
| 174,391 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const CuePoint* Cues::GetFirst() const
{
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return NULL;
if (m_count == 0)
return NULL;
#if 0
LoadCuePoint(); //init cues
const size_t count = m_count + m_preload_count;
if (count == 0) //weird
return NULL;
#endif
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
CuePoint* const pCP = pp[0];
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
return pCP;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const CuePoint* Cues::GetFirst() const
if (m_count == 0)
return NULL;
#if 0
LoadCuePoint(); //init cues
const size_t count = m_count + m_preload_count;
if (count == 0) //weird
return NULL;
#endif
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
CuePoint* const pCP = pp[0];
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
return pCP;
}
| 174,321 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void voutf(struct GlobalConfig *config,
const char *prefix,
const char *fmt,
va_list ap)
{
size_t width = (79 - strlen(prefix));
if(!config->mute) {
size_t len;
char *ptr;
char *print_buffer;
print_buffer = curlx_mvaprintf(fmt, ap);
if(!print_buffer)
return;
len = strlen(print_buffer);
ptr = print_buffer;
while(len > 0) {
fputs(prefix, config->errors);
if(len > width) {
size_t cut = width-1;
while(!ISSPACE(ptr[cut]) && cut) {
cut--;
}
if(0 == cut)
/* not a single cutting position was found, just cut it at the
max text width then! */
cut = width-1;
(void)fwrite(ptr, cut + 1, 1, config->errors);
fputs("\n", config->errors);
ptr += cut + 1; /* skip the space too */
len -= cut;
}
else {
fputs(ptr, config->errors);
len = 0;
}
}
curl_free(print_buffer);
}
}
Commit Message: voutf: fix bad arethmetic when outputting warnings to stderr
CVE-2018-16842
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16842.html
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void voutf(struct GlobalConfig *config,
const char *prefix,
const char *fmt,
va_list ap)
{
size_t width = (79 - strlen(prefix));
if(!config->mute) {
size_t len;
char *ptr;
char *print_buffer;
print_buffer = curlx_mvaprintf(fmt, ap);
if(!print_buffer)
return;
len = strlen(print_buffer);
ptr = print_buffer;
while(len > 0) {
fputs(prefix, config->errors);
if(len > width) {
size_t cut = width-1;
while(!ISSPACE(ptr[cut]) && cut) {
cut--;
}
if(0 == cut)
/* not a single cutting position was found, just cut it at the
max text width then! */
cut = width-1;
(void)fwrite(ptr, cut + 1, 1, config->errors);
fputs("\n", config->errors);
ptr += cut + 1; /* skip the space too */
len -= cut + 1;
}
else {
fputs(ptr, config->errors);
len = 0;
}
}
curl_free(print_buffer);
}
}
| 169,029 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: init_validate_info(validate_info *vi, gamma_display *dp, png_const_structp pp,
int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int outmax = (1U<<out_depth)-1;
vi->pp = pp;
vi->dp = dp;
if (dp->sbit > 0 && dp->sbit < in_depth)
{
vi->sbit = dp->sbit;
vi->isbit_shift = in_depth - dp->sbit;
}
else
{
vi->sbit = (png_byte)in_depth;
vi->isbit_shift = 0;
}
vi->sbit_max = (1U << vi->sbit)-1;
/* This mimics the libpng threshold test, '0' is used to prevent gamma
* correction in the validation test.
*/
vi->screen_gamma = dp->screen_gamma;
if (fabs(vi->screen_gamma-1) < PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
vi->screen_gamma = vi->screen_inverse = 0;
else
vi->screen_inverse = 1/vi->screen_gamma;
vi->use_input_precision = dp->use_input_precision;
vi->outmax = outmax;
vi->maxabs = abserr(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
vi->maxpc = pcerr(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
vi->maxcalc = calcerr(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
vi->maxout = outerr(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
vi->outquant = output_quantization_factor(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
vi->maxout_total = vi->maxout + vi->outquant * .5;
vi->outlog = outlog(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
if ((dp->this.colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) != 0 ||
(dp->this.colour_type == 3 && dp->this.is_transparent))
{
vi->do_background = dp->do_background;
if (vi->do_background != 0)
{
PNG_CONST double bg_inverse = 1/dp->background_gamma;
double r, g, b;
/* Caller must at least put the gray value into the red channel */
r = dp->background_color.red; r /= outmax;
g = dp->background_color.green; g /= outmax;
b = dp->background_color.blue; b /= outmax;
# if 0
/* libpng doesn't do this optimization, if we do pngvalid will fail.
*/
if (fabs(bg_inverse-1) >= PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
# endif
{
r = pow(r, bg_inverse);
g = pow(g, bg_inverse);
b = pow(b, bg_inverse);
}
vi->background_red = r;
vi->background_green = g;
vi->background_blue = b;
}
}
else
vi->do_background = 0;
if (vi->do_background == 0)
vi->background_red = vi->background_green = vi->background_blue = 0;
vi->gamma_correction = 1/(dp->file_gamma*dp->screen_gamma);
if (fabs(vi->gamma_correction-1) < PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
vi->gamma_correction = 0;
vi->file_inverse = 1/dp->file_gamma;
if (fabs(vi->file_inverse-1) < PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
vi->file_inverse = 0;
vi->scale16 = dp->scale16;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | init_validate_info(validate_info *vi, gamma_display *dp, png_const_structp pp,
int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
const unsigned int outmax = (1U<<out_depth)-1;
vi->pp = pp;
vi->dp = dp;
if (dp->sbit > 0 && dp->sbit < in_depth)
{
vi->sbit = dp->sbit;
vi->isbit_shift = in_depth - dp->sbit;
}
else
{
vi->sbit = (png_byte)in_depth;
vi->isbit_shift = 0;
}
vi->sbit_max = (1U << vi->sbit)-1;
/* This mimics the libpng threshold test, '0' is used to prevent gamma
* correction in the validation test.
*/
vi->screen_gamma = dp->screen_gamma;
if (fabs(vi->screen_gamma-1) < PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
vi->screen_gamma = vi->screen_inverse = 0;
else
vi->screen_inverse = 1/vi->screen_gamma;
vi->use_input_precision = dp->use_input_precision;
vi->outmax = outmax;
vi->maxabs = abserr(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
vi->maxpc = pcerr(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
vi->maxcalc = calcerr(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
vi->maxout = outerr(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
vi->outquant = output_quantization_factor(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
vi->maxout_total = vi->maxout + vi->outquant * .5;
vi->outlog = outlog(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
if ((dp->this.colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) != 0 ||
(dp->this.colour_type == 3 && dp->this.is_transparent) ||
((dp->this.colour_type == 0 || dp->this.colour_type == 2) &&
dp->this.has_tRNS))
{
vi->do_background = dp->do_background;
if (vi->do_background != 0)
{
const double bg_inverse = 1/dp->background_gamma;
double r, g, b;
/* Caller must at least put the gray value into the red channel */
r = dp->background_color.red; r /= outmax;
g = dp->background_color.green; g /= outmax;
b = dp->background_color.blue; b /= outmax;
# if 0
/* libpng doesn't do this optimization, if we do pngvalid will fail.
*/
if (fabs(bg_inverse-1) >= PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
# endif
{
r = pow(r, bg_inverse);
g = pow(g, bg_inverse);
b = pow(b, bg_inverse);
}
vi->background_red = r;
vi->background_green = g;
vi->background_blue = b;
}
}
else /* Do not expect any background processing */
vi->do_background = 0;
if (vi->do_background == 0)
vi->background_red = vi->background_green = vi->background_blue = 0;
vi->gamma_correction = 1/(dp->file_gamma*dp->screen_gamma);
if (fabs(vi->gamma_correction-1) < PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
vi->gamma_correction = 0;
vi->file_inverse = 1/dp->file_gamma;
if (fabs(vi->file_inverse-1) < PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
vi->file_inverse = 0;
vi->scale16 = dp->scale16;
}
| 173,658 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jpc_siz_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->caps) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->width) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->height) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->xoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->yoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilewidth) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileheight) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilexoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileyoff) ||
jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->numcomps)) {
return -1;
}
if (!siz->width || !siz->height || !siz->tilewidth ||
!siz->tileheight || !siz->numcomps) {
return -1;
}
if (!(siz->comps = jas_alloc2(siz->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_sizcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].hsamp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].vsamp)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
siz->comps[i].sgnd = (tmp >> 7) & 1;
siz->comps[i].prec = (tmp & 0x7f) + 1;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Added range check on XRsiz and YRsiz fields of SIZ marker segment.
CWE ID: CWE-369 | static int jpc_siz_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->caps) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->width) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->height) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->xoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->yoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilewidth) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileheight) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilexoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileyoff) ||
jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->numcomps)) {
return -1;
}
if (!siz->width || !siz->height || !siz->tilewidth ||
!siz->tileheight || !siz->numcomps) {
return -1;
}
if (!(siz->comps = jas_alloc2(siz->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_sizcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].hsamp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].vsamp)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].hsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].hsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid XRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].hsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].vsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].vsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid YRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].vsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
siz->comps[i].sgnd = (tmp >> 7) & 1;
siz->comps[i].prec = (tmp & 0x7f) + 1;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,760 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static const char *check_secret(int module, const char *user, const char *group,
const char *challenge, const char *pass)
{
char line[1024];
char pass2[MAX_DIGEST_LEN*2];
const char *fname = lp_secrets_file(module);
STRUCT_STAT st;
int fd, ok = 1;
int user_len = strlen(user);
int group_len = group ? strlen(group) : 0;
char *err;
if (!fname || !*fname || (fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
return "no secrets file";
if (do_fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "fstat(%s)", fname);
ok = 0;
} else if (lp_strict_modes(module)) {
rprintf(FLOG, "secrets file must not be other-accessible (see strict modes option)\n");
ok = 0;
} else if (MY_UID() == 0 && st.st_uid != 0) {
rprintf(FLOG, "secrets file must be owned by root when running as root (see strict modes)\n");
ok = 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static const char *check_secret(int module, const char *user, const char *group,
const char *challenge, const char *pass)
{
char line[1024];
char pass2[MAX_DIGEST_LEN*2];
const char *fname = lp_secrets_file(module);
STRUCT_STAT st;
int ok = 1;
int user_len = strlen(user);
int group_len = group ? strlen(group) : 0;
char *err;
FILE *fh;
if (!fname || !*fname || (fh = fopen(fname, "r")) == NULL)
return "no secrets file";
if (do_fstat(fileno(fh), &st) == -1) {
rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "fstat(%s)", fname);
ok = 0;
} else if (lp_strict_modes(module)) {
rprintf(FLOG, "secrets file must not be other-accessible (see strict modes option)\n");
ok = 0;
} else if (MY_UID() == 0 && st.st_uid != 0) {
rprintf(FLOG, "secrets file must be owned by root when running as root (see strict modes)\n");
ok = 0;
}
}
| 165,208 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cmsSEQ* CMSEXPORT cmsAllocProfileSequenceDescription(cmsContext ContextID, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
cmsSEQ* Seq;
cmsUInt32Number i;
if (n == 0) return NULL;
if (n > 255) return NULL;
Seq = (cmsSEQ*) _cmsMallocZero(ContextID, sizeof(cmsSEQ));
if (Seq == NULL) return NULL;
Seq -> ContextID = ContextID;
Seq -> seq = (cmsPSEQDESC*) _cmsCalloc(ContextID, n, sizeof(cmsPSEQDESC));
Seq -> n = n;
for (i=0; i < n; i++) {
Seq -> seq[i].Manufacturer = NULL;
Seq -> seq[i].Model = NULL;
Seq -> seq[i].Description = NULL;
}
return Seq;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | cmsSEQ* CMSEXPORT cmsAllocProfileSequenceDescription(cmsContext ContextID, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
cmsSEQ* Seq;
cmsUInt32Number i;
if (n == 0) return NULL;
if (n > 255) return NULL;
Seq = (cmsSEQ*) _cmsMallocZero(ContextID, sizeof(cmsSEQ));
if (Seq == NULL) return NULL;
Seq -> ContextID = ContextID;
Seq -> seq = (cmsPSEQDESC*) _cmsCalloc(ContextID, n, sizeof(cmsPSEQDESC));
Seq -> n = n;
if (Seq -> seq == NULL) {
_cmsFree(ContextID, Seq);
return NULL;
}
for (i=0; i < n; i++) {
Seq -> seq[i].Manufacturer = NULL;
Seq -> seq[i].Model = NULL;
Seq -> seq[i].Description = NULL;
}
return Seq;
}
| 166,542 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭԏ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщฟ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടร] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зӡ] > 3"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Map U+04CF to lowercase L as well.
U+04CF (ӏ) has the confusability skeleton of 'i' (lowercase
I), but it can be confused for 'l' (lowercase L) or '1' (digit) if rendered
in some fonts.
If a host name contains it, calculate the confusability skeleton
twice, once with the default mapping to 'i' (lowercase I) and the 2nd
time with an alternative mapping to 'l'. Mapping them to 'l' (lowercase L)
also gets it treated as similar to digit 1 because the confusability
skeleton of digit 1 is 'l'.
Bug: 817247
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I7442b950c9457eea285e17f01d1f43c9acc5d79c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/974165
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#551263}
CWE ID: | IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭԏ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщฟ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടร] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зӡ] > 3"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
| 173,222 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t HevcParameterSets::addNalUnit(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
uint8_t nalUnitType = (data[0] >> 1) & 0x3f;
status_t err = OK;
switch (nalUnitType) {
case 32: // VPS
err = parseVps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 33: // SPS
err = parseSps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 34: // PPS
err = parsePps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 39: // Prefix SEI
case 40: // Suffix SEI
break;
default:
ALOGE("Unrecognized NAL unit type.");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
sp<ABuffer> buffer = ABuffer::CreateAsCopy(data, size);
buffer->setInt32Data(nalUnitType);
mNalUnits.push(buffer);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Validate lengths in HEVC metadata parsing
Add code to validate the size parameter passed to
HecvParameterSets::addNalUnit(). Previously vulnerable
to decrementing an unsigned past 0, yielding a huge result value.
Bug: 35467107
Test: ran POC, no crash, emitted new "bad length" log entry
Change-Id: Ia169b9edc1e0f7c5302e3c68aa90a54e8863d79e
(cherry picked from commit e0dcf097cc029d056926029a29419e1650cbdf1b)
CWE ID: CWE-476 | status_t HevcParameterSets::addNalUnit(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
if (size < 1) {
ALOGE("empty NAL b/35467107");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t nalUnitType = (data[0] >> 1) & 0x3f;
status_t err = OK;
switch (nalUnitType) {
case 32: // VPS
if (size < 2) {
ALOGE("invalid NAL/VPS size b/35467107");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
err = parseVps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 33: // SPS
if (size < 2) {
ALOGE("invalid NAL/SPS size b/35467107");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
err = parseSps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 34: // PPS
if (size < 2) {
ALOGE("invalid NAL/PPS size b/35467107");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
err = parsePps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 39: // Prefix SEI
case 40: // Suffix SEI
break;
default:
ALOGE("Unrecognized NAL unit type.");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
sp<ABuffer> buffer = ABuffer::CreateAsCopy(data, size);
buffer->setInt32Data(nalUnitType);
mNalUnits.push(buffer);
return OK;
}
| 174,001 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: safecat_current_encoding(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos,
PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm)
{
pos = safecat_color_encoding(buffer, bufsize, pos, pm->current_encoding,
pm->current_gamma);
if (pm->encoding_ignored)
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "[overridden]");
return pos;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | safecat_current_encoding(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos,
const png_modifier *pm)
{
pos = safecat_color_encoding(buffer, bufsize, pos, pm->current_encoding,
pm->current_gamma);
if (pm->encoding_ignored)
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "[overridden]");
return pos;
}
| 173,691 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool GestureProviderAura::OnTouchEvent(const TouchEvent& event) {
last_touch_event_flags_ = event.flags();
bool pointer_id_is_active = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < pointer_state_.GetPointerCount(); ++i) {
if (event.touch_id() != pointer_state_.GetPointerId(i))
continue;
pointer_id_is_active = true;
break;
}
if (event.type() == ET_TOUCH_PRESSED && pointer_id_is_active) {
return false;
} else if (event.type() != ET_TOUCH_PRESSED && !pointer_id_is_active) {
return false;
}
pointer_state_.OnTouch(event);
bool result = filtered_gesture_provider_.OnTouchEvent(pointer_state_);
pointer_state_.CleanupRemovedTouchPoints(event);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | bool GestureProviderAura::OnTouchEvent(const TouchEvent& event) {
bool pointer_id_is_active = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < pointer_state_.GetPointerCount(); ++i) {
if (event.touch_id() != pointer_state_.GetPointerId(i))
continue;
pointer_id_is_active = true;
break;
}
if (event.type() == ET_TOUCH_PRESSED && pointer_id_is_active) {
return false;
} else if (event.type() != ET_TOUCH_PRESSED && !pointer_id_is_active) {
return false;
}
last_touch_event_flags_ = event.flags();
last_touch_event_latency_info_ = *event.latency();
pointer_state_.OnTouch(event);
bool result = filtered_gesture_provider_.OnTouchEvent(pointer_state_);
pointer_state_.CleanupRemovedTouchPoints(event);
return result;
}
| 171,205 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <infile> <outfile>\n", exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void usage_exit() {
void usage_exit(void) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <infile> <outfile>\n", exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
| 174,475 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void update_rate_histogram(struct rate_hist *hist,
const vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t *cfg,
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
int i;
int64_t then = 0;
int64_t avg_bitrate = 0;
int64_t sum_sz = 0;
const int64_t now = pkt->data.frame.pts * 1000 *
(uint64_t)cfg->g_timebase.num /
(uint64_t)cfg->g_timebase.den;
int idx = hist->frames++ % hist->samples;
hist->pts[idx] = now;
hist->sz[idx] = (int)pkt->data.frame.sz;
if (now < cfg->rc_buf_initial_sz)
return;
then = now;
/* Sum the size over the past rc_buf_sz ms */
for (i = hist->frames; i > 0 && hist->frames - i < hist->samples; i--) {
const int i_idx = (i - 1) % hist->samples;
then = hist->pts[i_idx];
if (now - then > cfg->rc_buf_sz)
break;
sum_sz += hist->sz[i_idx];
}
if (now == then)
return;
avg_bitrate = sum_sz * 8 * 1000 / (now - then);
idx = (int)(avg_bitrate * (RATE_BINS / 2) / (cfg->rc_target_bitrate * 1000));
if (idx < 0)
idx = 0;
if (idx > RATE_BINS - 1)
idx = RATE_BINS - 1;
if (hist->bucket[idx].low > avg_bitrate)
hist->bucket[idx].low = (int)avg_bitrate;
if (hist->bucket[idx].high < avg_bitrate)
hist->bucket[idx].high = (int)avg_bitrate;
hist->bucket[idx].count++;
hist->total++;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void update_rate_histogram(struct rate_hist *hist,
const vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t *cfg,
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
int i;
int64_t then = 0;
int64_t avg_bitrate = 0;
int64_t sum_sz = 0;
const int64_t now = pkt->data.frame.pts * 1000 *
(uint64_t)cfg->g_timebase.num /
(uint64_t)cfg->g_timebase.den;
int idx = hist->frames++ % hist->samples;
hist->pts[idx] = now;
hist->sz[idx] = (int)pkt->data.frame.sz;
if (now < cfg->rc_buf_initial_sz)
return;
if (!cfg->rc_target_bitrate)
return;
then = now;
/* Sum the size over the past rc_buf_sz ms */
for (i = hist->frames; i > 0 && hist->frames - i < hist->samples; i--) {
const int i_idx = (i - 1) % hist->samples;
then = hist->pts[i_idx];
if (now - then > cfg->rc_buf_sz)
break;
sum_sz += hist->sz[i_idx];
}
if (now == then)
return;
avg_bitrate = sum_sz * 8 * 1000 / (now - then);
idx = (int)(avg_bitrate * (RATE_BINS / 2) / (cfg->rc_target_bitrate * 1000));
if (idx < 0)
idx = 0;
if (idx > RATE_BINS - 1)
idx = RATE_BINS - 1;
if (hist->bucket[idx].low > avg_bitrate)
hist->bucket[idx].low = (int)avg_bitrate;
if (hist->bucket[idx].high < avg_bitrate)
hist->bucket[idx].high = (int)avg_bitrate;
hist->bucket[idx].count++;
hist->total++;
}
| 174,500 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void WritePixel(struct ngiflib_img * i, struct ngiflib_decode_context * context, u8 v) {
struct ngiflib_gif * p = i->parent;
if(v!=i->gce.transparent_color || !i->gce.transparent_flag) {
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
if(p->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED) {
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
*context->frbuff_p.p8 = v;
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
} else
*context->frbuff_p.p32 =
GifIndexToTrueColor(i->palette, v);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
}
if(--(context->Xtogo) <= 0) {
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
if(p->line_cb) p->line_cb(p, context->line_p, context->curY);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
context->Xtogo = i->width;
switch(context->pass) {
case 0:
context->curY++;
break;
case 1: /* 1st pass : every eighth row starting from 0 */
context->curY += 8;
if(context->curY >= p->height) {
context->pass++;
context->curY = i->posY + 4;
}
break;
case 2: /* 2nd pass : every eighth row starting from 4 */
context->curY += 8;
if(context->curY >= p->height) {
context->pass++;
context->curY = i->posY + 2;
}
break;
case 3: /* 3rd pass : every fourth row starting from 2 */
context->curY += 4;
if(context->curY >= p->height) {
context->pass++;
context->curY = i->posY + 1;
}
break;
case 4: /* 4th pass : every odd row */
context->curY += 2;
break;
}
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
if(p->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED) {
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
context->line_p.p8 = p->frbuff.p8 + (u32)context->curY*p->width;
context->frbuff_p.p8 = context->line_p.p8 + i->posX;
#else
context->frbuff_p.p8 = p->frbuff.p8 + (u32)context->curY*p->width + i->posX;
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
} else {
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
context->line_p.p32 = p->frbuff.p32 + (u32)context->curY*p->width;
context->frbuff_p.p32 = context->line_p.p32 + i->posX;
#else
context->frbuff_p.p32 = p->frbuff.p32 + (u32)context->curY*p->width + i->posX;
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
} else {
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
if(p->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED) {
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
context->frbuff_p.p8++;
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
} else {
context->frbuff_p.p32++;
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
}
}
Commit Message: fix deinterlacing for small pictures
fixes #12
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void WritePixel(struct ngiflib_img * i, struct ngiflib_decode_context * context, u8 v) {
struct ngiflib_gif * p = i->parent;
if(v!=i->gce.transparent_color || !i->gce.transparent_flag) {
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
if(p->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED) {
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
*context->frbuff_p.p8 = v;
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
} else
*context->frbuff_p.p32 =
GifIndexToTrueColor(i->palette, v);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
}
if(--(context->Xtogo) <= 0) {
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
if(p->line_cb) p->line_cb(p, context->line_p, context->curY);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
context->Xtogo = i->width;
switch(context->pass) {
case 0:
context->curY++;
break;
case 1: /* 1st pass : every eighth row starting from 0 */
context->curY += 8;
break;
case 2: /* 2nd pass : every eighth row starting from 4 */
context->curY += 8;
break;
case 3: /* 3rd pass : every fourth row starting from 2 */
context->curY += 4;
break;
case 4: /* 4th pass : every odd row */
context->curY += 2;
break;
}
while(context->pass > 0 && context->pass < 4 &&
context->curY >= p->height) {
switch(++context->pass) {
case 2: /* 2nd pass : every eighth row starting from 4 */
context->curY = i->posY + 4;
break;
case 3: /* 3rd pass : every fourth row starting from 2 */
context->curY = i->posY + 2;
break;
case 4: /* 4th pass : every odd row */
context->curY = i->posY + 1;
break;
}
}
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
if(p->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED) {
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
context->line_p.p8 = p->frbuff.p8 + (u32)context->curY*p->width;
context->frbuff_p.p8 = context->line_p.p8 + i->posX;
#else
context->frbuff_p.p8 = p->frbuff.p8 + (u32)context->curY*p->width + i->posX;
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
} else {
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
context->line_p.p32 = p->frbuff.p32 + (u32)context->curY*p->width;
context->frbuff_p.p32 = context->line_p.p32 + i->posX;
#else
context->frbuff_p.p32 = p->frbuff.p32 + (u32)context->curY*p->width + i->posX;
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
} else {
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
if(p->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED) {
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
context->frbuff_p.p8++;
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
} else {
context->frbuff_p.p32++;
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
}
}
| 169,511 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: l2tp_proto_ver_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const uint16_t *dat)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u.%u", (EXTRACT_16BITS(dat) >> 8),
(EXTRACT_16BITS(dat) & 0xff)));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | l2tp_proto_ver_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const uint16_t *dat)
l2tp_proto_ver_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const uint16_t *dat, u_int length)
{
if (length < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u.%u", (EXTRACT_16BITS(dat) >> 8),
(EXTRACT_16BITS(dat) & 0xff)));
}
| 167,898 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftG711::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex == 0) {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = mIsMLaw ? OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeMULaw
: OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeALaw;
} else {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
}
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSamplingRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftG711::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex == 0) {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = mIsMLaw ? OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeMULaw
: OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeALaw;
} else {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
}
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSamplingRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,205 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RGBA32 AXNodeObject::colorValue() const {
if (!isHTMLInputElement(getNode()) || !isColorWell())
return AXObject::colorValue();
HTMLInputElement* input = toHTMLInputElement(getNode());
const AtomicString& type = input->getAttribute(typeAttr);
if (!equalIgnoringCase(type, "color"))
return AXObject::colorValue();
Color color;
bool success = color.setFromString(input->value());
DCHECK(success);
return color.rgb();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | RGBA32 AXNodeObject::colorValue() const {
if (!isHTMLInputElement(getNode()) || !isColorWell())
return AXObject::colorValue();
HTMLInputElement* input = toHTMLInputElement(getNode());
const AtomicString& type = input->getAttribute(typeAttr);
if (!equalIgnoringASCIICase(type, "color"))
return AXObject::colorValue();
Color color;
bool success = color.setFromString(input->value());
DCHECK(success);
return color.rgb();
}
| 171,910 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void scsi_read_complete(void * opaque, int ret)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = (SCSIDiskReq *)opaque;
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
int n;
if (r->req.aiocb != NULL) {
r->req.aiocb = NULL;
bdrv_acct_done(s->bs, &r->acct);
}
if (ret) {
if (scsi_handle_rw_error(r, -ret, SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_READ)) {
return;
}
}
DPRINTF("Data ready tag=0x%x len=%zd\n", r->req.tag, r->iov.iov_len);
n = r->iov.iov_len / 512;
r->sector += n;
r->sector_count -= n;
scsi_req_data(&r->req, r->iov.iov_len);
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: commonize iovec creation between reads and writes
Also, consistently use qiov.size instead of iov.iov_len.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void scsi_read_complete(void * opaque, int ret)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = (SCSIDiskReq *)opaque;
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
int n;
if (r->req.aiocb != NULL) {
r->req.aiocb = NULL;
bdrv_acct_done(s->bs, &r->acct);
}
if (ret) {
if (scsi_handle_rw_error(r, -ret, SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_READ)) {
return;
}
}
DPRINTF("Data ready tag=0x%x len=%zd\n", r->req.tag, r->qiov.size);
n = r->qiov.size / 512;
r->sector += n;
r->sector_count -= n;
scsi_req_data(&r->req, r->qiov.size);
}
| 169,920 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltCopyNamespaceList(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNsPtr cur) {
xmlNsPtr ret = NULL, tmp;
xmlNsPtr p = NULL,q;
if (cur == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
return(NULL);
/*
* One can add namespaces only on element nodes
*/
if ((node != NULL) && (node->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
node = NULL;
while (cur != NULL) {
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
break;
/*
* Avoid duplicating namespace declarations in the tree if
* a matching declaration is in scope.
*/
if (node != NULL) {
if ((node->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(node->ns->prefix, cur->prefix)) &&
(xmlStrEqual(node->ns->href, cur->href))) {
cur = cur->next;
continue;
}
tmp = xmlSearchNs(node->doc, node, cur->prefix);
if ((tmp != NULL) && (xmlStrEqual(tmp->href, cur->href))) {
cur = cur->next;
continue;
}
}
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
/*
* Namespace exclusion and ns-aliasing is performed at
* compilation-time in the refactored code.
*/
q = xmlNewNs(node, cur->href, cur->prefix);
if (p == NULL) {
ret = p = q;
} else {
p->next = q;
p = q;
}
#else
/*
* TODO: Remove this if the refactored code gets enabled.
*/
if (!xmlStrEqual(cur->href, XSLT_NAMESPACE)) {
const xmlChar *URI;
/* TODO apply cascading */
URI = (const xmlChar *) xmlHashLookup(ctxt->style->nsAliases,
cur->href);
if (URI == UNDEFINED_DEFAULT_NS)
continue;
if (URI != NULL) {
q = xmlNewNs(node, URI, cur->prefix);
} else {
q = xmlNewNs(node, cur->href, cur->prefix);
}
if (p == NULL) {
ret = p = q;
} else {
p->next = q;
p = q;
}
}
#endif
cur = cur->next;
}
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xsltCopyNamespaceList(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNsPtr cur) {
xmlNsPtr ret = NULL, tmp;
xmlNsPtr p = NULL,q;
if (cur == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
return(NULL);
/*
* One can add namespaces only on element nodes
*/
if ((node != NULL) && (node->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
node = NULL;
while (cur != NULL) {
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
break;
/*
* Avoid duplicating namespace declarations in the tree if
* a matching declaration is in scope.
*/
if (node != NULL) {
if ((node->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(node->ns->prefix, cur->prefix)) &&
(xmlStrEqual(node->ns->href, cur->href))) {
cur = cur->next;
continue;
}
tmp = xmlSearchNs(node->doc, node, cur->prefix);
if ((tmp != NULL) && (xmlStrEqual(tmp->href, cur->href))) {
cur = cur->next;
continue;
}
}
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
/*
* Namespace exclusion and ns-aliasing is performed at
* compilation-time in the refactored code.
*/
q = xmlNewNs(node, cur->href, cur->prefix);
if (p == NULL) {
ret = p = q;
} else {
p->next = q;
p = q;
}
#else
/*
* TODO: Remove this if the refactored code gets enabled.
*/
if (!xmlStrEqual(cur->href, XSLT_NAMESPACE)) {
const xmlChar *URI;
/* TODO apply cascading */
URI = (const xmlChar *) xmlHashLookup(ctxt->style->nsAliases,
cur->href);
if (URI == UNDEFINED_DEFAULT_NS) {
cur = cur->next;
continue;
}
if (URI != NULL) {
q = xmlNewNs(node, URI, cur->prefix);
} else {
q = xmlNewNs(node, cur->href, cur->prefix);
}
if (p == NULL) {
ret = p = q;
} else {
p->next = q;
p = q;
}
}
#endif
cur = cur->next;
}
return(ret);
}
| 173,305 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
{
int ret;
sigset_t sigsaved;
/* Make sure they initialize the vcpu with KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT */
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.target < 0))
return -ENOEXEC;
ret = kvm_vcpu_first_run_init(vcpu);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (run->exit_reason == KVM_EXIT_MMIO) {
ret = kvm_handle_mmio_return(vcpu, vcpu->run);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (vcpu->sigset_active)
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &vcpu->sigset, &sigsaved);
ret = 1;
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
while (ret > 0) {
/*
* Check conditions before entering the guest
*/
cond_resched();
update_vttbr(vcpu->kvm);
if (vcpu->arch.pause)
vcpu_pause(vcpu);
kvm_vgic_flush_hwstate(vcpu);
kvm_timer_flush_hwstate(vcpu);
local_irq_disable();
/*
* Re-check atomic conditions
*/
if (signal_pending(current)) {
ret = -EINTR;
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
}
if (ret <= 0 || need_new_vmid_gen(vcpu->kvm)) {
local_irq_enable();
kvm_timer_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
kvm_vgic_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
continue;
}
/**************************************************************
* Enter the guest
*/
trace_kvm_entry(*vcpu_pc(vcpu));
kvm_guest_enter();
vcpu->mode = IN_GUEST_MODE;
ret = kvm_call_hyp(__kvm_vcpu_run, vcpu);
vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
vcpu->arch.last_pcpu = smp_processor_id();
kvm_guest_exit();
trace_kvm_exit(*vcpu_pc(vcpu));
/*
* We may have taken a host interrupt in HYP mode (ie
* while executing the guest). This interrupt is still
* pending, as we haven't serviced it yet!
*
* We're now back in SVC mode, with interrupts
* disabled. Enabling the interrupts now will have
* the effect of taking the interrupt again, in SVC
* mode this time.
*/
local_irq_enable();
/*
* Back from guest
*************************************************************/
kvm_timer_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
kvm_vgic_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
ret = handle_exit(vcpu, run, ret);
}
if (vcpu->sigset_active)
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigsaved, NULL);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
{
int ret;
sigset_t sigsaved;
if (unlikely(!kvm_vcpu_initialized(vcpu)))
return -ENOEXEC;
ret = kvm_vcpu_first_run_init(vcpu);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (run->exit_reason == KVM_EXIT_MMIO) {
ret = kvm_handle_mmio_return(vcpu, vcpu->run);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (vcpu->sigset_active)
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &vcpu->sigset, &sigsaved);
ret = 1;
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
while (ret > 0) {
/*
* Check conditions before entering the guest
*/
cond_resched();
update_vttbr(vcpu->kvm);
if (vcpu->arch.pause)
vcpu_pause(vcpu);
kvm_vgic_flush_hwstate(vcpu);
kvm_timer_flush_hwstate(vcpu);
local_irq_disable();
/*
* Re-check atomic conditions
*/
if (signal_pending(current)) {
ret = -EINTR;
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
}
if (ret <= 0 || need_new_vmid_gen(vcpu->kvm)) {
local_irq_enable();
kvm_timer_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
kvm_vgic_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
continue;
}
/**************************************************************
* Enter the guest
*/
trace_kvm_entry(*vcpu_pc(vcpu));
kvm_guest_enter();
vcpu->mode = IN_GUEST_MODE;
ret = kvm_call_hyp(__kvm_vcpu_run, vcpu);
vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
vcpu->arch.last_pcpu = smp_processor_id();
kvm_guest_exit();
trace_kvm_exit(*vcpu_pc(vcpu));
/*
* We may have taken a host interrupt in HYP mode (ie
* while executing the guest). This interrupt is still
* pending, as we haven't serviced it yet!
*
* We're now back in SVC mode, with interrupts
* disabled. Enabling the interrupts now will have
* the effect of taking the interrupt again, in SVC
* mode this time.
*/
local_irq_enable();
/*
* Back from guest
*************************************************************/
kvm_timer_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
kvm_vgic_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
ret = handle_exit(vcpu, run, ret);
}
if (vcpu->sigset_active)
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigsaved, NULL);
return ret;
}
| 165,953 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: kg_seal_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
int toktype)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *)context_handle;
if (!ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (conf_req_flag && kg_integ_only_iov(iov, iov_count)) {
/* may be more sensible to return an error here */
conf_req_flag = FALSE;
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto) {
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1_iov(context, ctx, conf_req_flag,
conf_state, iov, iov_count, toktype);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3_iov(context, ctx, conf_req_flag,
conf_state, iov, iov_count, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
break;
}
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | kg_seal_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
int toktype)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *)context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (conf_req_flag && kg_integ_only_iov(iov, iov_count)) {
/* may be more sensible to return an error here */
conf_req_flag = FALSE;
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto) {
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1_iov(context, ctx, conf_req_flag,
conf_state, iov, iov_count, toktype);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3_iov(context, ctx, conf_req_flag,
conf_state, iov, iov_count, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
break;
}
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
| 166,818 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ContentEncoding::GetEncryptionByIndex(unsigned long idx) const {
const ptrdiff_t count = encryption_entries_end_ - encryption_entries_;
assert(count >= 0);
if (idx >= static_cast<unsigned long>(count))
return NULL;
return encryption_entries_[idx];
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ContentEncoding::GetEncryptionByIndex(unsigned long idx) const {
const ContentEncoding::ContentEncryption* ContentEncoding::GetEncryptionByIndex(
unsigned long idx) const {
const ptrdiff_t count = encryption_entries_end_ - encryption_entries_;
assert(count >= 0);
if (idx >= static_cast<unsigned long>(count))
return NULL;
return encryption_entries_[idx];
}
| 174,313 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct inet_peer *inet_getpeer(struct inetpeer_addr *daddr, int create)
{
struct inet_peer __rcu **stack[PEER_MAXDEPTH], ***stackptr;
struct inet_peer_base *base = family_to_base(daddr->family);
struct inet_peer *p;
unsigned int sequence;
int invalidated, gccnt = 0;
/* Attempt a lockless lookup first.
* Because of a concurrent writer, we might not find an existing entry.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
sequence = read_seqbegin(&base->lock);
p = lookup_rcu(daddr, base);
invalidated = read_seqretry(&base->lock, sequence);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (p)
return p;
/* If no writer did a change during our lookup, we can return early. */
if (!create && !invalidated)
return NULL;
/* retry an exact lookup, taking the lock before.
* At least, nodes should be hot in our cache.
*/
write_seqlock_bh(&base->lock);
relookup:
p = lookup(daddr, stack, base);
if (p != peer_avl_empty) {
atomic_inc(&p->refcnt);
write_sequnlock_bh(&base->lock);
return p;
}
if (!gccnt) {
gccnt = inet_peer_gc(base, stack, stackptr);
if (gccnt && create)
goto relookup;
}
p = create ? kmem_cache_alloc(peer_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC) : NULL;
if (p) {
p->daddr = *daddr;
atomic_set(&p->refcnt, 1);
atomic_set(&p->rid, 0);
atomic_set(&p->ip_id_count, secure_ip_id(daddr->addr.a4));
p->tcp_ts_stamp = 0;
p->metrics[RTAX_LOCK-1] = INETPEER_METRICS_NEW;
p->rate_tokens = 0;
p->rate_last = 0;
p->pmtu_expires = 0;
p->pmtu_orig = 0;
memset(&p->redirect_learned, 0, sizeof(p->redirect_learned));
/* Link the node. */
link_to_pool(p, base);
base->total++;
}
write_sequnlock_bh(&base->lock);
return p;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | struct inet_peer *inet_getpeer(struct inetpeer_addr *daddr, int create)
struct inet_peer *inet_getpeer(const struct inetpeer_addr *daddr, int create)
{
struct inet_peer __rcu **stack[PEER_MAXDEPTH], ***stackptr;
struct inet_peer_base *base = family_to_base(daddr->family);
struct inet_peer *p;
unsigned int sequence;
int invalidated, gccnt = 0;
/* Attempt a lockless lookup first.
* Because of a concurrent writer, we might not find an existing entry.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
sequence = read_seqbegin(&base->lock);
p = lookup_rcu(daddr, base);
invalidated = read_seqretry(&base->lock, sequence);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (p)
return p;
/* If no writer did a change during our lookup, we can return early. */
if (!create && !invalidated)
return NULL;
/* retry an exact lookup, taking the lock before.
* At least, nodes should be hot in our cache.
*/
write_seqlock_bh(&base->lock);
relookup:
p = lookup(daddr, stack, base);
if (p != peer_avl_empty) {
atomic_inc(&p->refcnt);
write_sequnlock_bh(&base->lock);
return p;
}
if (!gccnt) {
gccnt = inet_peer_gc(base, stack, stackptr);
if (gccnt && create)
goto relookup;
}
p = create ? kmem_cache_alloc(peer_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC) : NULL;
if (p) {
p->daddr = *daddr;
atomic_set(&p->refcnt, 1);
atomic_set(&p->rid, 0);
atomic_set(&p->ip_id_count,
(daddr->family == AF_INET) ?
secure_ip_id(daddr->addr.a4) :
secure_ipv6_id(daddr->addr.a6));
p->tcp_ts_stamp = 0;
p->metrics[RTAX_LOCK-1] = INETPEER_METRICS_NEW;
p->rate_tokens = 0;
p->rate_last = 0;
p->pmtu_expires = 0;
p->pmtu_orig = 0;
memset(&p->redirect_learned, 0, sizeof(p->redirect_learned));
/* Link the node. */
link_to_pool(p, base);
base->total++;
}
write_sequnlock_bh(&base->lock);
return p;
}
| 165,850 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
return image_transform_png_set_expand_add(this, that, colour_type,
bit_depth);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_add(image_transform *this,
const image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
#if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10700
return image_transform_png_set_expand_add(this, that, colour_type,
bit_depth);
#else
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
/* This should do nothing unless the color type is gray and the bit depth is
* less than 8:
*/
return colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY && bit_depth < 8;
#endif /* 1.7 or later */
}
| 173,630 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int hashbin_delete( hashbin_t* hashbin, FREE_FUNC free_func)
{
irda_queue_t* queue;
unsigned long flags = 0;
int i;
IRDA_ASSERT(hashbin != NULL, return -1;);
IRDA_ASSERT(hashbin->magic == HB_MAGIC, return -1;);
/* Synchronize */
if ( hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK ) {
spin_lock_irqsave_nested(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags,
hashbin_lock_depth++);
}
/*
* Free the entries in the hashbin, TODO: use hashbin_clear when
* it has been shown to work
*/
for (i = 0; i < HASHBIN_SIZE; i ++ ) {
queue = dequeue_first((irda_queue_t**) &hashbin->hb_queue[i]);
while (queue ) {
if (free_func)
(*free_func)(queue);
queue = dequeue_first(
(irda_queue_t**) &hashbin->hb_queue[i]);
}
}
/* Cleanup local data */
hashbin->hb_current = NULL;
hashbin->magic = ~HB_MAGIC;
/* Release lock */
if ( hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags);
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
hashbin_lock_depth--;
#endif
}
/*
* Free the hashbin structure
*/
kfree(hashbin);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix lockdep annotations in hashbin_delete().
A nested lock depth was added to the hasbin_delete() code but it
doesn't actually work some well and results in tons of lockdep splats.
Fix the code instead to properly drop the lock around the operation
and just keep peeking the head of the hashbin queue.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | int hashbin_delete( hashbin_t* hashbin, FREE_FUNC free_func)
{
irda_queue_t* queue;
unsigned long flags = 0;
int i;
IRDA_ASSERT(hashbin != NULL, return -1;);
IRDA_ASSERT(hashbin->magic == HB_MAGIC, return -1;);
/* Synchronize */
if (hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK)
spin_lock_irqsave(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags);
/*
* Free the entries in the hashbin, TODO: use hashbin_clear when
* it has been shown to work
*/
for (i = 0; i < HASHBIN_SIZE; i ++ ) {
while (1) {
queue = dequeue_first((irda_queue_t**) &hashbin->hb_queue[i]);
if (!queue)
break;
if (free_func) {
if (hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags);
free_func(queue);
if (hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK)
spin_lock_irqsave(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags);
}
}
}
/* Cleanup local data */
hashbin->hb_current = NULL;
hashbin->magic = ~HB_MAGIC;
/* Release lock */
if (hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags);
/*
* Free the hashbin structure
*/
kfree(hashbin);
return 0;
}
| 168,344 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void bdt_enable(void)
{
bdt_log("ENABLE BT");
if (bt_enabled) {
bdt_log("Bluetooth is already enabled");
return;
}
status = sBtInterface->enable();
check_return_status(status);
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void bdt_enable(void)
{
bdt_log("ENABLE BT");
if (bt_enabled) {
bdt_log("Bluetooth is already enabled");
return;
}
status = sBtInterface->enable(false);
check_return_status(status);
}
| 173,555 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ui::ModalType ExtensionInstallDialogView::GetModalType() const {
return ui::MODAL_TYPE_WINDOW;
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | ui::ModalType ExtensionInstallDialogView::GetModalType() const {
return prompt_->ShouldUseTabModalDialog() ? ui::MODAL_TYPE_CHILD
: ui::MODAL_TYPE_WINDOW;
}
| 172,206 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Document::open()
{
ASSERT(!importLoader());
if (m_frame) {
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = scriptableDocumentParser()) {
if (parser->isParsing()) {
if (parser->isExecutingScript())
return;
if (!parser->wasCreatedByScript() && parser->hasInsertionPoint())
return;
}
}
if (m_frame->loader().provisionalDocumentLoader())
m_frame->loader().stopAllLoaders();
}
removeAllEventListenersRecursively();
implicitOpen(ForceSynchronousParsing);
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = scriptableDocumentParser())
parser->setWasCreatedByScript(true);
if (m_frame)
m_frame->loader().didExplicitOpen();
if (m_loadEventProgress != LoadEventInProgress && m_loadEventProgress != UnloadEventInProgress)
m_loadEventProgress = LoadEventNotRun;
}
Commit Message: Don't change Document load progress in any page dismissal events.
This can confuse the logic for blocking modal dialogs.
BUG=536652
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1373113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351419}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void Document::open()
{
ASSERT(!importLoader());
if (m_frame) {
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = scriptableDocumentParser()) {
if (parser->isParsing()) {
if (parser->isExecutingScript())
return;
if (!parser->wasCreatedByScript() && parser->hasInsertionPoint())
return;
}
}
if (m_frame->loader().provisionalDocumentLoader())
m_frame->loader().stopAllLoaders();
}
removeAllEventListenersRecursively();
implicitOpen(ForceSynchronousParsing);
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = scriptableDocumentParser())
parser->setWasCreatedByScript(true);
if (m_frame)
m_frame->loader().didExplicitOpen();
if (m_loadEventProgress != LoadEventInProgress && pageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() == NoDismissal)
m_loadEventProgress = LoadEventNotRun;
}
| 171,783 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void *gdImageJpegPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size, int quality)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx (2048, NULL);
gdImageJpegCtx (im, out, quality);
rv = gdDPExtractData (out, size);
out->gd_free (out);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | void *gdImageJpegPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size, int quality)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx (2048, NULL);
if (!_gdImageJpegCtx(im, out, quality)) {
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
} else {
rv = NULL;
}
out->gd_free (out);
return rv;
}
| 169,736 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuChannelHost::Connect(
const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle,
base::ProcessHandle client_process_for_gpu) {
DCHECK(factory_->IsMainThread());
scoped_refptr<base::MessageLoopProxy> io_loop = factory_->GetIOLoopProxy();
channel_.reset(new IPC::SyncChannel(
channel_handle, IPC::Channel::MODE_CLIENT, NULL,
io_loop, true,
factory_->GetShutDownEvent()));
sync_filter_ = new IPC::SyncMessageFilter(
factory_->GetShutDownEvent());
channel_->AddFilter(sync_filter_.get());
channel_filter_ = new MessageFilter(this);
channel_->AddFilter(channel_filter_.get());
state_ = kConnected;
Send(new GpuChannelMsg_Initialize(client_process_for_gpu));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuChannelHost::Connect(
const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle) {
DCHECK(factory_->IsMainThread());
scoped_refptr<base::MessageLoopProxy> io_loop = factory_->GetIOLoopProxy();
channel_.reset(new IPC::SyncChannel(
channel_handle, IPC::Channel::MODE_CLIENT, NULL,
io_loop, true,
factory_->GetShutDownEvent()));
sync_filter_ = new IPC::SyncMessageFilter(
factory_->GetShutDownEvent());
channel_->AddFilter(sync_filter_.get());
channel_filter_ = new MessageFilter(this);
channel_->AddFilter(channel_filter_.get());
state_ = kConnected;
}
| 170,928 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
reasons = *preasons;
crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
if (crl_score < best_score)
continue;
/* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
if (crl_score == best_score) {
int day, sec;
if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl),
X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
continue;
/*
* ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
* and |sec|.
*/
if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
continue;
}
best_crl = crl;
best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
best_score = crl_score;
best_reasons = reasons;
}
if (best_crl) {
if (*pcrl)
X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
*pcrl = best_crl;
*pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
*pscore = best_score;
*preasons = best_reasons;
CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
if (*pdcrl) {
X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
*pdcrl = NULL;
}
get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
}
if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
reasons = *preasons;
crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
continue;
/* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
int day, sec;
if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl),
X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
continue;
/*
* ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
* and |sec|.
*/
if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
continue;
}
best_crl = crl;
best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
best_score = crl_score;
best_reasons = reasons;
}
if (best_crl) {
if (*pcrl)
X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
*pcrl = best_crl;
*pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
*pscore = best_score;
*preasons = best_reasons;
CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
if (*pdcrl) {
X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
*pdcrl = NULL;
}
get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
}
if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
return 1;
return 0;
}
| 164,940 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Erase(const std::string& addr) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
map_.erase(addr);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void Erase(const std::string& addr) {
// Erases the entry for |preview_id|.
void Erase(int32 preview_id) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
map_.erase(preview_id);
}
| 170,830 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void spl_filesystem_dir_it_move_forward(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object((spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter);
object->u.dir.index++;
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (object->file_name) {
efree(object->file_name);
object->file_name = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static void spl_filesystem_dir_it_move_forward(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object((spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter);
object->u.dir.index++;
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (object->file_name) {
efree(object->file_name);
object->file_name = NULL;
}
}
| 167,071 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: new_msg_register_event (u_int32_t seqnum, struct lsa_filter_type *filter)
{
u_char buf[OSPF_API_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
struct msg_register_event *emsg;
int len;
emsg = (struct msg_register_event *) buf;
len = sizeof (struct msg_register_event) +
filter->num_areas * sizeof (struct in_addr);
emsg->filter.typemask = htons (filter->typemask);
emsg->filter.origin = filter->origin;
emsg->filter.num_areas = filter->num_areas;
return msg_new (MSG_REGISTER_EVENT, emsg, seqnum, len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | new_msg_register_event (u_int32_t seqnum, struct lsa_filter_type *filter)
{
u_char buf[OSPF_API_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
struct msg_register_event *emsg;
int len;
emsg = (struct msg_register_event *) buf;
len = sizeof (struct msg_register_event) +
filter->num_areas * sizeof (struct in_addr);
emsg->filter.typemask = htons (filter->typemask);
emsg->filter.origin = filter->origin;
emsg->filter.num_areas = filter->num_areas;
if (len > sizeof (buf))
len = sizeof(buf);
/* API broken - missing memcpy to fill data */
return msg_new (MSG_REGISTER_EVENT, emsg, seqnum, len);
}
| 164,716 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: base::string16 IDNToUnicodeWithAdjustments(
base::StringPiece host, base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustments* adjustments) {
if (adjustments)
adjustments->clear();
base::string16 input16;
input16.reserve(host.length());
input16.insert(input16.end(), host.begin(), host.end());
base::string16 out16;
for (size_t component_start = 0, component_end;
component_start < input16.length();
component_start = component_end + 1) {
component_end = input16.find('.', component_start);
if (component_end == base::string16::npos)
component_end = input16.length(); // For getting the last component.
size_t component_length = component_end - component_start;
size_t new_component_start = out16.length();
bool converted_idn = false;
if (component_end > component_start) {
converted_idn =
IDNToUnicodeOneComponent(input16.data() + component_start,
component_length, &out16);
}
size_t new_component_length = out16.length() - new_component_start;
if (converted_idn && adjustments) {
adjustments->push_back(base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustment(
component_start, component_length, new_component_length));
}
if (component_end < input16.length())
out16.push_back('.');
}
return out16;
}
Commit Message: Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | base::string16 IDNToUnicodeWithAdjustments(
base::StringPiece host, base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustments* adjustments) {
if (adjustments)
adjustments->clear();
base::string16 input16;
input16.reserve(host.length());
input16.insert(input16.end(), host.begin(), host.end());
bool is_tld_ascii = true;
size_t last_dot = host.rfind('.');
if (last_dot != base::StringPiece::npos &&
host.substr(last_dot).starts_with(".xn--")) {
is_tld_ascii = false;
}
base::string16 out16;
for (size_t component_start = 0, component_end;
component_start < input16.length();
component_start = component_end + 1) {
component_end = input16.find('.', component_start);
if (component_end == base::string16::npos)
component_end = input16.length(); // For getting the last component.
size_t component_length = component_end - component_start;
size_t new_component_start = out16.length();
bool converted_idn = false;
if (component_end > component_start) {
converted_idn =
IDNToUnicodeOneComponent(input16.data() + component_start,
component_length, is_tld_ascii, &out16);
}
size_t new_component_length = out16.length() - new_component_start;
if (converted_idn && adjustments) {
adjustments->push_back(base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustment(
component_start, component_length, new_component_length));
}
if (component_end < input16.length())
out16.push_back('.');
}
return out16;
}
| 172,391 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FaviconWebUIHandler::HandleGetFaviconDominantColor(const ListValue* args) {
std::string path;
CHECK(args->GetString(0, &path));
DCHECK(StartsWithASCII(path, "chrome://favicon/", false)) << "path is "
<< path;
path = path.substr(arraysize("chrome://favicon/") - 1);
double id;
CHECK(args->GetDouble(1, &id));
FaviconService* favicon_service =
web_ui_->GetProfile()->GetFaviconService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (!favicon_service || path.empty())
return;
FaviconService::Handle handle = favicon_service->GetFaviconForURL(
GURL(path),
history::FAVICON,
&consumer_,
NewCallback(this, &FaviconWebUIHandler::OnFaviconDataAvailable));
consumer_.SetClientData(favicon_service, handle, static_cast<int>(id));
}
Commit Message: ntp4: show larger favicons in most visited page
extend favicon source to provide larger icons. For now, larger means at most 32x32. Also, the only icon we actually support at this resolution is the default (globe).
BUG=none
TEST=manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7300017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91517 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void FaviconWebUIHandler::HandleGetFaviconDominantColor(const ListValue* args) {
std::string path;
CHECK(args->GetString(0, &path));
DCHECK(StartsWithASCII(path, "chrome://favicon/size/32/", false)) <<
"path is " << path;
path = path.substr(arraysize("chrome://favicon/size/32/") - 1);
double id;
CHECK(args->GetDouble(1, &id));
FaviconService* favicon_service =
web_ui_->GetProfile()->GetFaviconService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (!favicon_service || path.empty())
return;
FaviconService::Handle handle = favicon_service->GetFaviconForURL(
GURL(path),
history::FAVICON,
&consumer_,
NewCallback(this, &FaviconWebUIHandler::OnFaviconDataAvailable));
consumer_.SetClientData(favicon_service, handle, static_cast<int>(id));
}
| 170,369 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfs3svc_decode_readlinkargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_readlinkargs *args)
{
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
args->buffer = page_address(*(rqstp->rq_next_page++));
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | nfs3svc_decode_readlinkargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_readlinkargs *args)
{
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
if (!xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p))
return 0;
args->buffer = page_address(*(rqstp->rq_next_page++));
return 1;
}
| 168,143 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *pdid_buf,
unsigned int pkid_len,
int *valid_kdcPkId)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = pdid_buf;
int status = 1;
X509 *kdc_cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
*valid_kdcPkId = 0;
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
goto cleanup;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
status = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(kdc_cert), is->serial);
if (!status)
*valid_kdcPkId = 1;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID: | pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *pdid_buf,
unsigned int pkid_len,
int *valid_kdcPkId)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = pdid_buf;
int status = 1;
X509 *kdc_cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
*valid_kdcPkId = 0;
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
status = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(kdc_cert), is->serial);
if (!status)
*valid_kdcPkId = 1;
}
retval = 0;
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
return retval;
}
| 166,133 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void copy_xauthority(void) {
char *src = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE ;
char *dest;
if (asprintf(&dest, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
if (is_link(dest)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s is a symbolic link\n", dest);
exit(1);
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .Xauthority in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
if (chown(dest, getuid(), getgid()) < 0)
errExit("chown");
if (chmod(dest, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) < 0)
errExit("chmod");
unlink(src);
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | static void copy_xauthority(void) {
char *src = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE ;
char *dest;
if (asprintf(&dest, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
if (is_link(dest)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s is a symbolic link\n", dest);
exit(1);
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); // regular user
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
unlink(src);
}
| 170,097 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void locationWithExceptionAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* proxyImp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationWithException());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHrefThrows(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void locationWithExceptionAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* proxyImp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<TestNode> imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationWithException());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHrefThrows(cppValue);
}
| 171,684 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: setup_server_realm(krb5_principal sprinc)
{
krb5_error_code kret;
kdc_realm_t *newrealm;
kret = 0;
if (kdc_numrealms > 1) {
if (!(newrealm = find_realm_data(sprinc->realm.data,
(krb5_ui_4) sprinc->realm.length)))
kret = ENOENT;
else
kdc_active_realm = newrealm;
}
else
kdc_active_realm = kdc_realmlist[0];
return(kret);
}
Commit Message: Multi-realm KDC null deref [CVE-2013-1418]
If a KDC serves multiple realms, certain requests can cause
setup_server_realm() to dereference a null pointer, crashing the KDC.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
A related but more minor vulnerability requires authentication to
exploit, and is only present if a third-party KDC database module can
dereference a null pointer under certain conditions.
(back ported from commit 5d2d9a1abe46a2c1a8614d4672d08d9d30a5f8bf)
ticket: 7757 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.7
status: resolved
CWE ID: | setup_server_realm(krb5_principal sprinc)
{
krb5_error_code kret;
kdc_realm_t *newrealm;
kret = 0;
if (sprinc == NULL)
return NULL;
if (kdc_numrealms > 1) {
if (!(newrealm = find_realm_data(sprinc->realm.data,
(krb5_ui_4) sprinc->realm.length)))
kret = ENOENT;
else
kdc_active_realm = newrealm;
}
else
kdc_active_realm = kdc_realmlist[0];
return(kret);
}
| 165,933 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateArray( void )
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item();
if ( item )
item->type = cJSON_Array;
return item;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cJSON *cJSON_CreateArray( void )
| 167,269 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int nfs_readlink_reply(unsigned char *pkt, unsigned len)
{
uint32_t *data;
char *path;
int rlen;
int ret;
ret = rpc_check_reply(pkt, 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
data = (uint32_t *)(pkt + sizeof(struct rpc_reply));
data++;
rlen = ntohl(net_read_uint32(data)); /* new path length */
data++;
path = (char *)data;
} else {
memcpy(nfs_path, path, rlen);
nfs_path[rlen] = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int nfs_readlink_reply(unsigned char *pkt, unsigned len)
{
uint32_t *data;
char *path;
unsigned int rlen;
int ret;
ret = rpc_check_reply(pkt, 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
data = (uint32_t *)(pkt + sizeof(struct rpc_reply));
data++;
rlen = ntohl(net_read_uint32(data)); /* new path length */
rlen = max_t(unsigned int, rlen,
len - sizeof(struct rpc_reply) - sizeof(uint32_t));
data++;
path = (char *)data;
} else {
memcpy(nfs_path, path, rlen);
nfs_path[rlen] = 0;
}
| 164,625 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.