instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool NaClProcessHost::StartNaClExecution() {
NaClBrowser* nacl_browser = NaClBrowser::GetInstance();
nacl::NaClStartParams params;
params.validation_cache_enabled = nacl_browser->ValidationCacheIsEnabled();
params.validation_cache_key = nacl_browser->GetValidationCacheKey();
params.version = chrome::VersionInfo().CreateVersionString();
params.enable_exception_handling = enable_exception_handling_;
params.enable_debug_stub =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableNaClDebug);
params.enable_ipc_proxy = enable_ipc_proxy_;
base::PlatformFile irt_file = nacl_browser->IrtFile();
CHECK_NE(irt_file, base::kInvalidPlatformFileValue);
const ChildProcessData& data = process_->GetData();
for (size_t i = 0; i < internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.size(); i++) {
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle,
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr[i], true,
¶ms.handles)) {
return false;
}
}
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle, irt_file, false, ¶ms.handles))
return false;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::SharedMemory memory_buffer;
base::SharedMemoryCreateOptions options;
options.size = 1;
options.executable = true;
if (!memory_buffer.Create(options)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to allocate memory buffer";
return false;
}
nacl::FileDescriptor memory_fd;
memory_fd.fd = dup(memory_buffer.handle().fd);
if (memory_fd.fd < 0) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to dup() a file descriptor";
return false;
}
memory_fd.auto_close = true;
params.handles.push_back(memory_fd);
#endif
process_->Send(new NaClProcessMsg_Start(params));
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.clear();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool NaClProcessHost::StartNaClExecution() {
NaClBrowser* nacl_browser = NaClBrowser::GetInstance();
nacl::NaClStartParams params;
params.validation_cache_enabled = nacl_browser->ValidationCacheIsEnabled();
params.validation_cache_key = nacl_browser->GetValidationCacheKey();
params.version = chrome::VersionInfo().CreateVersionString();
params.enable_exception_handling = enable_exception_handling_;
params.enable_debug_stub =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableNaClDebug);
base::PlatformFile irt_file = nacl_browser->IrtFile();
CHECK_NE(irt_file, base::kInvalidPlatformFileValue);
const ChildProcessData& data = process_->GetData();
for (size_t i = 0; i < internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.size(); i++) {
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle,
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr[i], true,
¶ms.handles)) {
return false;
}
}
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle, irt_file, false, ¶ms.handles))
return false;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::SharedMemory memory_buffer;
base::SharedMemoryCreateOptions options;
options.size = 1;
options.executable = true;
if (!memory_buffer.Create(options)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to allocate memory buffer";
return false;
}
nacl::FileDescriptor memory_fd;
memory_fd.fd = dup(memory_buffer.handle().fd);
if (memory_fd.fd < 0) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to dup() a file descriptor";
return false;
}
memory_fd.auto_close = true;
params.handles.push_back(memory_fd);
#endif
process_->Send(new NaClProcessMsg_Start(params));
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.clear();
return true;
}
| 170,729 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char *escape_pathname(const char *inp)
{
const unsigned char *s;
char *escaped, *d;
if (!inp) {
return NULL;
}
escaped = malloc (4 * strlen(inp) + 1);
if (!escaped) {
perror("malloc");
return NULL;
}
for (d = escaped, s = (const unsigned char *)inp; *s; s++) {
if (needs_escape (*s)) {
snprintf (d, 5, "\\x%02x", *s);
d += strlen (d);
} else {
*d++ = *s;
}
}
*d++ = '\0';
return escaped;
}
Commit Message: misc oom and possible memory leak fix
CWE ID: | static char *escape_pathname(const char *inp)
{
const unsigned char *s;
char *escaped, *d;
if (!inp) {
return NULL;
}
escaped = malloc (4 * strlen(inp) + 1);
if (!escaped) {
perror("malloc");
return NULL;
}
for (d = escaped, s = (const unsigned char *)inp; *s; s++) {
if (needs_escape (*s)) {
snprintf (d, 5, "\\x%02x", *s);
d += strlen (d);
} else {
*d++ = *s;
}
}
*d++ = '\0';
return escaped;
}
| 169,757 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void LocalFileSystem::fileSystemNotAvailable(
PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> context,
PassRefPtr<CallbackWrapper> callbacks)
{
context->postTask(createCrossThreadTask(&reportFailure, callbacks->release(), FileError::ABORT_ERR));
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void LocalFileSystem::fileSystemNotAvailable(
PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> context,
CallbackWrapper* callbacks)
{
context->postTask(createCrossThreadTask(&reportFailure, callbacks->release(), FileError::ABORT_ERR));
}
| 171,428 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool Track::VetEntry(const BlockEntry* pBlockEntry) const
{
assert(pBlockEntry);
const Block* const pBlock = pBlockEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
assert(pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number);
if (!pBlock || pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != m_info.number)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool Track::VetEntry(const BlockEntry* pBlockEntry) const
bool Track::VetEntry(const BlockEntry* pBlockEntry) const {
assert(pBlockEntry);
const Block* const pBlock = pBlockEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
assert(pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number);
if (!pBlock || pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != m_info.number)
return false;
// This function is used during a seek to determine whether the
// frame is a valid seek target. This default function simply
// returns true, which means all frames are valid seek targets.
// It gets overridden by the VideoTrack class, because only video
// keyframes can be used as seek target.
return true;
}
| 174,451 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void fe_netjoin_init(void)
{
settings_add_bool("misc", "hide_netsplit_quits", TRUE);
settings_add_int("misc", "netjoin_max_nicks", 10);
join_tag = -1;
printing_joins = FALSE;
read_settings();
signal_add("setup changed", (SIGNAL_FUNC) read_settings);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'netjoin-timeout' into 'master'
fe-netjoin: remove irc servers on "server disconnected" signal
Closes #7
See merge request !10
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void fe_netjoin_init(void)
{
settings_add_bool("misc", "hide_netsplit_quits", TRUE);
settings_add_int("misc", "netjoin_max_nicks", 10);
join_tag = -1;
printing_joins = FALSE;
read_settings();
signal_add("setup changed", (SIGNAL_FUNC) read_settings);
signal_add("server disconnected", (SIGNAL_FUNC) sig_server_disconnected);
}
| 168,291 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static uint64_t pci_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned int size)
{
AcpiPciHpState *s = opaque;
uint32_t val = 0;
int bsel = s->hotplug_select;
if (bsel < 0 || bsel > ACPI_PCIHP_MAX_HOTPLUG_BUS) {
return 0;
}
switch (addr) {
case PCI_UP_BASE:
val = s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].up;
if (!s->legacy_piix) {
s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].up = 0;
}
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_up_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_DOWN_BASE:
val = s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].down;
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_down_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_EJ_BASE:
/* No feature defined yet */
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_features_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_RMV_BASE:
val = s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].hotplug_enable;
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_rmv_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_SEL_BASE:
val = s->hotplug_select;
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_sel_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
default:
break;
}
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static uint64_t pci_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned int size)
{
AcpiPciHpState *s = opaque;
uint32_t val = 0;
int bsel = s->hotplug_select;
if (bsel < 0 || bsel >= ACPI_PCIHP_MAX_HOTPLUG_BUS) {
return 0;
}
switch (addr) {
case PCI_UP_BASE:
val = s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].up;
if (!s->legacy_piix) {
s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].up = 0;
}
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_up_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_DOWN_BASE:
val = s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].down;
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_down_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_EJ_BASE:
/* No feature defined yet */
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_features_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_RMV_BASE:
val = s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].hotplug_enable;
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_rmv_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_SEL_BASE:
val = s->hotplug_select;
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_sel_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
default:
break;
}
return val;
}
| 165,019 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OmniboxPopupViewGtk::~OmniboxPopupViewGtk() {
model_.reset();
g_object_unref(layout_);
gtk_widget_destroy(window_);
for (ImageMap::iterator it = images_.begin(); it != images_.end(); ++it)
delete it->second;
}
Commit Message: GTK: Stop listening to gtk signals in the omnibox before destroying the model.
BUG=123530
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10103012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132498 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | OmniboxPopupViewGtk::~OmniboxPopupViewGtk() {
// Stop listening to our signals before we destroy the model. I suspect that
// we can race window destruction, otherwise.
signal_registrar_.reset();
model_.reset();
g_object_unref(layout_);
gtk_widget_destroy(window_);
for (ImageMap::iterator it = images_.begin(); it != images_.end(); ++it)
delete it->second;
}
| 171,049 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), NULL, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
if (!tls_index.initialized())
tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"(^[\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|[a-z][\u0585\u0581]+$|)"
R"([a-z][\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|)"
R"(^[og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|[\p{scx=armn}][og]+$|)"
R"([\p{scx=armn}][og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=cans}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=cans}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339])",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
Commit Message: Block Tifinagh + Latin mix
BUG=chromium:722639
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDNToU*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2894313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#474199}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), NULL, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
if (!tls_index.initialized())
tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
// - Disalow mixing of Latin and Tifinagh.
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"(^[\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|[a-z][\u0585\u0581]+$|)"
R"([a-z][\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|)"
R"(^[og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|[\p{scx=armn}][og]+$|)"
R"([\p{scx=armn}][og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=cans}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=cans}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=tfng}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=tfng}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339])",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
| 172,363 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::StartUpdate(AppCacheHost* host,
const GURL& new_master_resource) {
DCHECK(group_->update_job() == this);
DCHECK(!group_->is_obsolete());
bool is_new_pending_master_entry = false;
if (!new_master_resource.is_empty()) {
DCHECK(new_master_resource == host->pending_master_entry_url());
DCHECK(!new_master_resource.has_ref());
DCHECK(new_master_resource.GetOrigin() == manifest_url_.GetOrigin());
if (IsTerminating()) {
group_->QueueUpdate(host, new_master_resource);
return;
}
std::pair<PendingMasters::iterator, bool> ret =
pending_master_entries_.insert(
PendingMasters::value_type(new_master_resource, PendingHosts()));
is_new_pending_master_entry = ret.second;
ret.first->second.push_back(host);
host->AddObserver(this);
}
AppCacheGroup::UpdateAppCacheStatus update_status = group_->update_status();
if (update_status == AppCacheGroup::CHECKING ||
update_status == AppCacheGroup::DOWNLOADING) {
if (host) {
NotifySingleHost(host, APPCACHE_CHECKING_EVENT);
if (update_status == AppCacheGroup::DOWNLOADING)
NotifySingleHost(host, APPCACHE_DOWNLOADING_EVENT);
if (!new_master_resource.is_empty()) {
AddMasterEntryToFetchList(host, new_master_resource,
is_new_pending_master_entry);
}
}
return;
}
MadeProgress();
group_->SetUpdateAppCacheStatus(AppCacheGroup::CHECKING);
if (group_->HasCache()) {
base::TimeDelta kFullUpdateInterval = base::TimeDelta::FromHours(24);
update_type_ = UPGRADE_ATTEMPT;
base::TimeDelta time_since_last_check =
base::Time::Now() - group_->last_full_update_check_time();
doing_full_update_check_ = time_since_last_check > kFullUpdateInterval;
NotifyAllAssociatedHosts(APPCACHE_CHECKING_EVENT);
} else {
update_type_ = CACHE_ATTEMPT;
doing_full_update_check_ = true;
DCHECK(host);
NotifySingleHost(host, APPCACHE_CHECKING_EVENT);
}
if (!new_master_resource.is_empty()) {
AddMasterEntryToFetchList(host, new_master_resource,
is_new_pending_master_entry);
}
BrowserThread::PostAfterStartupTask(
FROM_HERE, base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get(),
base::Bind(&AppCacheUpdateJob::FetchManifest, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
true));
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID: | void AppCacheUpdateJob::StartUpdate(AppCacheHost* host,
const GURL& new_master_resource) {
DCHECK(group_->update_job() == this);
DCHECK(!group_->is_obsolete());
bool is_new_pending_master_entry = false;
if (!new_master_resource.is_empty()) {
DCHECK(new_master_resource == host->pending_master_entry_url());
DCHECK(!new_master_resource.has_ref());
DCHECK(new_master_resource.GetOrigin() == manifest_url_.GetOrigin());
if (ContainsKey(failed_master_entries_, new_master_resource))
return;
if (IsTerminating()) {
group_->QueueUpdate(host, new_master_resource);
return;
}
std::pair<PendingMasters::iterator, bool> ret =
pending_master_entries_.insert(
PendingMasters::value_type(new_master_resource, PendingHosts()));
is_new_pending_master_entry = ret.second;
ret.first->second.push_back(host);
host->AddObserver(this);
}
AppCacheGroup::UpdateAppCacheStatus update_status = group_->update_status();
if (update_status == AppCacheGroup::CHECKING ||
update_status == AppCacheGroup::DOWNLOADING) {
if (host) {
NotifySingleHost(host, APPCACHE_CHECKING_EVENT);
if (update_status == AppCacheGroup::DOWNLOADING)
NotifySingleHost(host, APPCACHE_DOWNLOADING_EVENT);
if (!new_master_resource.is_empty()) {
AddMasterEntryToFetchList(host, new_master_resource,
is_new_pending_master_entry);
}
}
return;
}
MadeProgress();
group_->SetUpdateAppCacheStatus(AppCacheGroup::CHECKING);
if (group_->HasCache()) {
base::TimeDelta kFullUpdateInterval = base::TimeDelta::FromHours(24);
update_type_ = UPGRADE_ATTEMPT;
base::TimeDelta time_since_last_check =
base::Time::Now() - group_->last_full_update_check_time();
doing_full_update_check_ = time_since_last_check > kFullUpdateInterval;
NotifyAllAssociatedHosts(APPCACHE_CHECKING_EVENT);
} else {
update_type_ = CACHE_ATTEMPT;
doing_full_update_check_ = true;
DCHECK(host);
NotifySingleHost(host, APPCACHE_CHECKING_EVENT);
}
if (!new_master_resource.is_empty()) {
AddMasterEntryToFetchList(host, new_master_resource,
is_new_pending_master_entry);
}
BrowserThread::PostAfterStartupTask(
FROM_HERE, base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get(),
base::Bind(&AppCacheUpdateJob::FetchManifest, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
true));
}
| 171,733 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: set_umask(const char *optarg)
{
long umask_long;
mode_t umask_val;
char *endptr;
umask_long = strtoll(optarg, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr || umask_long < 0 || umask_long & ~0777L) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid --umask option %s", optarg);
return;
}
umask_val = umask_long & 0777;
umask(umask_val);
umask_cmdline = true;
return umask_val;
}
Commit Message: Fix compile warning introduced in commit c6247a9
Commit c6247a9 - "Add command line and configuration option to set umask"
introduced a compile warning, although the code would have worked OK.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | set_umask(const char *optarg)
{
long umask_long;
mode_t umask_val;
char *endptr;
umask_long = strtoll(optarg, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr || umask_long < 0 || umask_long & ~0777L) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid --umask option %s", optarg);
return 0;
}
umask_val = umask_long & 0777;
umask(umask_val);
umask_cmdline = true;
return umask_val;
}
| 170,158 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ConnectIBusSignals() {
if (!ibus_) {
return;
}
g_signal_connect_after(ibus_,
"connected",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusConnectedCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_,
"disconnected",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusDisconnectedCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_,
"global-engine-changed",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusGlobalEngineChangedCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_,
"name-owner-changed",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusNameOwnerChangedCallback),
this);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void ConnectIBusSignals() {
if (!ibus_) {
return;
}
g_signal_connect_after(ibus_,
"connected",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusConnectedThunk),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_,
"disconnected",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusDisconnectedThunk),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_,
"global-engine-changed",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusGlobalEngineChangedThunk),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_,
"name-owner-changed",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusNameOwnerChangedThunk),
this);
}
| 170,529 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RenderThread::~RenderThread() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderProcessObserver, observers_, OnRenderProcessShutdown());
if (web_database_observer_impl_.get())
web_database_observer_impl_->WaitForAllDatabasesToClose();
RemoveFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_input_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
RemoveFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
db_message_filter_ = NULL;
if (file_thread_.get())
file_thread_->Stop();
if (webkit_client_.get())
WebKit::shutdown();
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
PluginChannelBase::CleanupChannels();
if (RenderProcessImpl::InProcessPlugins())
CoUninitialize();
#endif
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | RenderThread::~RenderThread() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderProcessObserver, observers_, OnRenderProcessShutdown());
if (web_database_observer_impl_.get())
web_database_observer_impl_->WaitForAllDatabasesToClose();
RemoveFilter(devtools_agent_message_filter_.get());
devtools_agent_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_input_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
RemoveFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
db_message_filter_ = NULL;
if (file_thread_.get())
file_thread_->Stop();
if (webkit_client_.get())
WebKit::shutdown();
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
PluginChannelBase::CleanupChannels();
if (RenderProcessImpl::InProcessPlugins())
CoUninitialize();
#endif
}
| 170,327 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
int retval;
/* clear any previous set[ug]id data from a previous binary */
bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();
bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) &&
!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_uid) &&
kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_gid)) {
/* Set-uid? */
if (mode & S_ISUID) {
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->cred->euid = inode->i_uid;
}
/* Set-gid? */
/*
* If setgid is set but no group execute bit then this
* is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid
* executable.
*/
if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->cred->egid = inode->i_gid;
}
}
/* fill in binprm security blob */
retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
bprm->cred_prepared = 1;
memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
return kernel_read(bprm->file, 0, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
}
Commit Message: fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables
This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a
setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid
root.
This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int retval;
bprm_fill_uid(bprm);
/* fill in binprm security blob */
retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
bprm->cred_prepared = 1;
memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
return kernel_read(bprm->file, 0, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
}
| 166,625 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PluginChannel::~PluginChannel() {
if (renderer_handle_)
base::CloseProcessHandle(renderer_handle_);
MessageLoop::current()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&PluginReleaseCallback),
base::TimeDelta::FromMinutes(kPluginReleaseTimeMinutes));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | PluginChannel::~PluginChannel() {
MessageLoop::current()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&PluginReleaseCallback),
base::TimeDelta::FromMinutes(kPluginReleaseTimeMinutes));
}
| 170,951 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DWORD WtsSessionProcessDelegate::GetExitCode() {
if (!core_)
return CONTROL_C_EXIT;
return core_->GetExitCode();
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | DWORD WtsSessionProcessDelegate::GetExitCode() {
DWORD WtsSessionProcessDelegate::GetProcessId() const {
if (core_)
return 0;
return core_->GetProcessId();
}
bool WtsSessionProcessDelegate::IsPermanentError(int failure_count) const {
if (core_)
return false;
return core_->IsPermanentError(failure_count);
}
| 171,557 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
++vcpu->stat.insn_emulation_fail;
trace_kvm_emulate_insn_failed(vcpu);
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return EMULATE_FAIL;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static int handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r = EMULATE_DONE;
++vcpu->stat.insn_emulation_fail;
trace_kvm_emulate_insn_failed(vcpu);
if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
r = EMULATE_FAIL;
}
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return r;
}
| 166,558 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::OnPolicyStateChanged(
policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::PolicySubsystemState state,
policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::ErrorDetails error_details) {
if (is_showing_) {
switch (state) {
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::UNENROLLED:
return;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::BAD_GAIA_TOKEN:
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::LOCAL_ERROR:
actor_->ShowFatalEnrollmentError();
break;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::UNMANAGED:
actor_->ShowAccountError();
break;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR:
actor_->ShowNetworkEnrollmentError();
break;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::TOKEN_FETCHED:
WriteInstallAttributesData();
return;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::SUCCESS:
registrar_.reset();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentOK,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
actor_->ShowConfirmationScreen();
return;
}
if (state == policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::UNMANAGED) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentNotSupported,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
} else {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentPolicyFailed,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
}
LOG(WARNING) << "Policy subsystem error during enrollment: " << state
<< " details: " << error_details;
}
registrar_.reset();
g_browser_process->browser_policy_connector()->DeviceStopAutoRetry();
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::OnPolicyStateChanged(
policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::PolicySubsystemState state,
policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::ErrorDetails error_details) {
if (is_showing_) {
switch (state) {
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::UNENROLLED:
return;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::BAD_GAIA_TOKEN:
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::LOCAL_ERROR:
actor_->ShowFatalEnrollmentError();
break;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::UNMANAGED:
actor_->ShowAccountError();
break;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR:
actor_->ShowNetworkEnrollmentError();
break;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::TOKEN_FETCHED:
WriteInstallAttributesData();
return;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::SUCCESS:
registrar_.reset();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentOK,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
actor_->ShowConfirmationScreen();
return;
}
if (state == policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::UNMANAGED) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentNotSupported,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
} else {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentPolicyFailed,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
}
LOG(WARNING) << "Policy subsystem error during enrollment: " << state
<< " details: " << error_details;
}
registrar_.reset();
g_browser_process->browser_policy_connector()->ResetDevicePolicy();
}
| 170,277 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static authz_status lua_authz_check(request_rec *r, const char *require_line,
const void *parsed_require_line)
{
apr_pool_t *pool;
ap_lua_vm_spec *spec;
lua_State *L;
ap_lua_server_cfg *server_cfg = ap_get_module_config(r->server->module_config,
&lua_module);
const ap_lua_dir_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(r->per_dir_config,
&lua_module);
const lua_authz_provider_spec *prov_spec = parsed_require_line;
int result;
int nargs = 0;
spec = create_vm_spec(&pool, r, cfg, server_cfg, prov_spec->file_name,
NULL, 0, prov_spec->function_name, "authz provider");
L = ap_lua_get_lua_state(pool, spec, r);
if (L == NULL) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02314)
"Unable to compile VM for authz provider %s", prov_spec->name);
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
lua_getglobal(L, prov_spec->function_name);
if (!lua_isfunction(L, -1)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT, 0, r, APLOGNO(02319)
"Unable to find entry function '%s' in %s (not a valid function)",
prov_spec->function_name, prov_spec->file_name);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
ap_lua_run_lua_request(L, r);
if (prov_spec->args) {
int i;
if (!lua_checkstack(L, prov_spec->args->nelts)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02315)
"Error: authz provider %s: too many arguments", prov_spec->name);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
for (i = 0; i < prov_spec->args->nelts; i++) {
const char *arg = APR_ARRAY_IDX(prov_spec->args, i, const char *);
lua_pushstring(L, arg);
}
nargs = prov_spec->args->nelts;
}
if (lua_pcall(L, 1 + nargs, 1, 0)) {
const char *err = lua_tostring(L, -1);
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02316)
"Error executing authz provider %s: %s", prov_spec->name, err);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
if (!lua_isnumber(L, -1)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02317)
"Error: authz provider %s did not return integer", prov_spec->name);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
result = lua_tointeger(L, -1);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
switch (result) {
case AUTHZ_DENIED:
case AUTHZ_GRANTED:
case AUTHZ_NEUTRAL:
case AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR:
case AUTHZ_DENIED_NO_USER:
return result;
default:
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02318)
"Error: authz provider %s: invalid return value %d",
prov_spec->name, result);
}
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static authz_status lua_authz_check(request_rec *r, const char *require_line,
const void *parsed_require_line)
{
apr_pool_t *pool;
ap_lua_vm_spec *spec;
lua_State *L;
ap_lua_server_cfg *server_cfg = ap_get_module_config(r->server->module_config,
&lua_module);
const ap_lua_dir_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(r->per_dir_config,
&lua_module);
const lua_authz_provider_func *prov_func = parsed_require_line;
const lua_authz_provider_spec *prov_spec = prov_func->spec;
int result;
int nargs = 0;
spec = create_vm_spec(&pool, r, cfg, server_cfg, prov_spec->file_name,
NULL, 0, prov_spec->function_name, "authz provider");
L = ap_lua_get_lua_state(pool, spec, r);
if (L == NULL) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02314)
"Unable to compile VM for authz provider %s", prov_spec->name);
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
lua_getglobal(L, prov_spec->function_name);
if (!lua_isfunction(L, -1)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT, 0, r, APLOGNO(02319)
"Unable to find entry function '%s' in %s (not a valid function)",
prov_spec->function_name, prov_spec->file_name);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
ap_lua_run_lua_request(L, r);
if (prov_func->args) {
int i;
if (!lua_checkstack(L, prov_func->args->nelts)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02315)
"Error: authz provider %s: too many arguments", prov_spec->name);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
for (i = 0; i < prov_func->args->nelts; i++) {
const char *arg = APR_ARRAY_IDX(prov_func->args, i, const char *);
lua_pushstring(L, arg);
}
nargs = prov_func->args->nelts;
}
if (lua_pcall(L, 1 + nargs, 1, 0)) {
const char *err = lua_tostring(L, -1);
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02316)
"Error executing authz provider %s: %s", prov_spec->name, err);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
if (!lua_isnumber(L, -1)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02317)
"Error: authz provider %s did not return integer", prov_spec->name);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
result = lua_tointeger(L, -1);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
switch (result) {
case AUTHZ_DENIED:
case AUTHZ_GRANTED:
case AUTHZ_NEUTRAL:
case AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR:
case AUTHZ_DENIED_NO_USER:
return result;
default:
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02318)
"Error: authz provider %s: invalid return value %d",
prov_spec->name, result);
}
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
| 166,250 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int SoundPool::load(const char* path, int priority __unused)
{
ALOGV("load: path=%s, priority=%d", path, priority);
Mutex::Autolock lock(&mLock);
sp<Sample> sample = new Sample(++mNextSampleID, path);
mSamples.add(sample->sampleID(), sample);
doLoad(sample);
return sample->sampleID();
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int SoundPool::load(const char* path, int priority __unused)
{
ALOGV("load: path=%s, priority=%d", path, priority);
int sampleID;
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(&mLock);
sampleID = ++mNextSampleID;
sp<Sample> sample = new Sample(sampleID, path);
mSamples.add(sampleID, sample);
sample->startLoad();
}
// mDecodeThread->loadSample() must be called outside of mLock.
// mDecodeThread->loadSample() may block on mDecodeThread message queue space;
// the message queue emptying may block on SoundPool::findSample().
//
// It theoretically possible that sample loads might decode out-of-order.
mDecodeThread->loadSample(sampleID);
return sampleID;
}
| 173,961 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Track::GetType() const
{
return m_info.type;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Track::GetType() const
| 174,375 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::EnsureMailbox(MailboxSyncMode mode,
GLenum filter) {
if (!texture_holder_->IsMailboxTextureHolder()) {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::EnsureMailbox");
if (!original_skia_image_) {
RetainOriginalSkImage();
}
texture_holder_ = std::make_unique<MailboxTextureHolder>(
std::move(texture_holder_), filter);
}
texture_holder_->Sync(mode);
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::EnsureMailbox(MailboxSyncMode mode,
GLenum filter) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (!texture_holder_->IsMailboxTextureHolder()) {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::EnsureMailbox");
if (!original_skia_image_) {
RetainOriginalSkImage();
}
texture_holder_ = std::make_unique<MailboxTextureHolder>(
std::move(texture_holder_), filter);
}
texture_holder_->Sync(mode);
}
| 172,595 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::didBlurFromControl()
{
RefPtr<HTMLInputElement> protector(element());
element()->setFocus(false);
}
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::didBlurFromControl()
{
if (containsFocusedShadowElement())
return;
RefPtr<HTMLInputElement> protector(element());
element()->setFocus(false);
}
| 171,211 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BackendImpl::BackendImpl(
const base::FilePath& path,
scoped_refptr<BackendCleanupTracker> cleanup_tracker,
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& cache_thread,
net::NetLog* net_log)
: cleanup_tracker_(std::move(cleanup_tracker)),
background_queue_(this, FallbackToInternalIfNull(cache_thread)),
path_(path),
block_files_(path),
mask_(0),
max_size_(0),
up_ticks_(0),
cache_type_(net::DISK_CACHE),
uma_report_(0),
user_flags_(0),
init_(false),
restarted_(false),
unit_test_(false),
read_only_(false),
disabled_(false),
new_eviction_(false),
first_timer_(true),
user_load_(false),
net_log_(net_log),
done_(base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::MANUAL,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::NOT_SIGNALED),
ptr_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | BackendImpl::BackendImpl(
const base::FilePath& path,
scoped_refptr<BackendCleanupTracker> cleanup_tracker,
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& cache_thread,
net::NetLog* net_log)
: cleanup_tracker_(std::move(cleanup_tracker)),
background_queue_(this, FallbackToInternalIfNull(cache_thread)),
path_(path),
block_files_(path),
mask_(0),
max_size_(0),
up_ticks_(0),
cache_type_(net::DISK_CACHE),
uma_report_(0),
user_flags_(0),
init_(false),
restarted_(false),
unit_test_(false),
read_only_(false),
disabled_(false),
new_eviction_(false),
first_timer_(true),
user_load_(false),
consider_evicting_at_op_end_(false),
net_log_(net_log),
done_(base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::MANUAL,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::NOT_SIGNALED),
ptr_factory_(this) {}
| 172,696 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static RFlagsAtOffset* r_flag_get_nearest_list(RFlag *f, ut64 off, int dir) {
RFlagsAtOffset *flags = NULL;
RFlagsAtOffset key;
key.off = off;
if (dir >= 0) {
flags = r_skiplist_get_geq (f->by_off, &key);
} else {
flags = r_skiplist_get_leq (f->by_off, &key);
}
if (dir == 0 && flags && flags->off != off) {
return NULL;
}
return flags;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static RFlagsAtOffset* r_flag_get_nearest_list(RFlag *f, ut64 off, int dir) {
static RFlagsAtOffset* r_flag_get_nearest_list(RFlag *f, ut64 off, int dir) {
RFlagsAtOffset *flags = NULL;
RFlagsAtOffset key;
key.off = off;
if (dir >= 0) {
flags = r_skiplist_get_geq (f->by_off, &key);
} else {
flags = r_skiplist_get_leq (f->by_off, &key);
}
if (dir == 0 && flags && flags->off != off) {
return NULL;
}
return flags;
}
| 167,723 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct svc_serv *nfs_callback_create_svc(int minorversion)
{
struct nfs_callback_data *cb_info = &nfs_callback_info[minorversion];
struct svc_serv *serv;
struct svc_serv_ops *sv_ops;
/*
* Check whether we're already up and running.
*/
if (cb_info->serv) {
/*
* Note: increase service usage, because later in case of error
* svc_destroy() will be called.
*/
svc_get(cb_info->serv);
return cb_info->serv;
}
switch (minorversion) {
case 0:
sv_ops = nfs4_cb_sv_ops[0];
break;
default:
sv_ops = nfs4_cb_sv_ops[1];
}
if (sv_ops == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
/*
* Sanity check: if there's no task,
* we should be the first user ...
*/
if (cb_info->users)
printk(KERN_WARNING "nfs_callback_create_svc: no kthread, %d users??\n",
cb_info->users);
serv = svc_create(&nfs4_callback_program, NFS4_CALLBACK_BUFSIZE, sv_ops);
if (!serv) {
printk(KERN_ERR "nfs_callback_create_svc: create service failed\n");
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
cb_info->serv = serv;
/* As there is only one thread we need to over-ride the
* default maximum of 80 connections
*/
serv->sv_maxconn = 1024;
dprintk("nfs_callback_create_svc: service created\n");
return serv;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | static struct svc_serv *nfs_callback_create_svc(int minorversion)
{
struct nfs_callback_data *cb_info = &nfs_callback_info[minorversion];
struct svc_serv *serv;
struct svc_serv_ops *sv_ops;
/*
* Check whether we're already up and running.
*/
if (cb_info->serv) {
/*
* Note: increase service usage, because later in case of error
* svc_destroy() will be called.
*/
svc_get(cb_info->serv);
return cb_info->serv;
}
switch (minorversion) {
case 0:
sv_ops = nfs4_cb_sv_ops[0];
break;
default:
sv_ops = nfs4_cb_sv_ops[1];
}
if (sv_ops == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
/*
* Sanity check: if there's no task,
* we should be the first user ...
*/
if (cb_info->users)
printk(KERN_WARNING "nfs_callback_create_svc: no kthread, %d users??\n",
cb_info->users);
serv = svc_create_pooled(&nfs4_callback_program, NFS4_CALLBACK_BUFSIZE, sv_ops);
if (!serv) {
printk(KERN_ERR "nfs_callback_create_svc: create service failed\n");
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
cb_info->serv = serv;
/* As there is only one thread we need to over-ride the
* default maximum of 80 connections
*/
serv->sv_maxconn = 1024;
dprintk("nfs_callback_create_svc: service created\n");
return serv;
}
| 168,139 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ide_dma_cb(void *opaque, int ret)
{
IDEState *s = opaque;
int n;
int64_t sector_num;
bool stay_active = false;
if (ret == -ECANCELED) {
return;
}
if (ret < 0) {
int op = IDE_RETRY_DMA;
if (s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_READ)
op |= IDE_RETRY_READ;
else if (s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_TRIM)
op |= IDE_RETRY_TRIM;
if (ide_handle_rw_error(s, -ret, op)) {
return;
}
}
n = s->io_buffer_size >> 9;
if (n > s->nsector) {
/* The PRDs were longer than needed for this request. Shorten them so
* we don't get a negative remainder. The Active bit must remain set
* after the request completes. */
n = s->nsector;
stay_active = true;
}
sector_num = ide_get_sector(s);
if (n > 0) {
assert(s->io_buffer_size == s->sg.size);
dma_buf_commit(s, s->io_buffer_size);
sector_num += n;
ide_set_sector(s, sector_num);
s->nsector -= n;
}
/* end of transfer ? */
if (s->nsector == 0) {
s->status = READY_STAT | SEEK_STAT;
ide_set_irq(s->bus);
goto eot;
}
/* launch next transfer */
n = s->nsector;
s->io_buffer_index = 0;
s->io_buffer_size = n * 512;
if (s->bus->dma->ops->prepare_buf(s->bus->dma, ide_cmd_is_read(s)) == 0) {
/* The PRDs were too short. Reset the Active bit, but don't raise an
* interrupt. */
s->status = READY_STAT | SEEK_STAT;
goto eot;
}
printf("ide_dma_cb: sector_num=%" PRId64 " n=%d, cmd_cmd=%d\n",
sector_num, n, s->dma_cmd);
#endif
if ((s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_READ || s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_WRITE) &&
!ide_sect_range_ok(s, sector_num, n)) {
ide_dma_error(s);
return;
}
switch (s->dma_cmd) {
case IDE_DMA_READ:
s->bus->dma->aiocb = dma_blk_read(s->blk, &s->sg, sector_num,
ide_dma_cb, s);
break;
case IDE_DMA_WRITE:
s->bus->dma->aiocb = dma_blk_write(s->blk, &s->sg, sector_num,
ide_dma_cb, s);
break;
case IDE_DMA_TRIM:
s->bus->dma->aiocb = dma_blk_io(s->blk, &s->sg, sector_num,
ide_issue_trim, ide_dma_cb, s,
DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE);
break;
}
return;
eot:
if (s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_READ || s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_WRITE) {
block_acct_done(blk_get_stats(s->blk), &s->acct);
}
ide_set_inactive(s, stay_active);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void ide_dma_cb(void *opaque, int ret)
{
IDEState *s = opaque;
int n;
int64_t sector_num;
bool stay_active = false;
if (ret == -ECANCELED) {
return;
}
if (ret < 0) {
int op = IDE_RETRY_DMA;
if (s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_READ)
op |= IDE_RETRY_READ;
else if (s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_TRIM)
op |= IDE_RETRY_TRIM;
if (ide_handle_rw_error(s, -ret, op)) {
return;
}
}
n = s->io_buffer_size >> 9;
if (n > s->nsector) {
/* The PRDs were longer than needed for this request. Shorten them so
* we don't get a negative remainder. The Active bit must remain set
* after the request completes. */
n = s->nsector;
stay_active = true;
}
sector_num = ide_get_sector(s);
if (n > 0) {
assert(s->io_buffer_size == s->sg.size);
dma_buf_commit(s, s->io_buffer_size);
sector_num += n;
ide_set_sector(s, sector_num);
s->nsector -= n;
}
/* end of transfer ? */
if (s->nsector == 0) {
s->status = READY_STAT | SEEK_STAT;
ide_set_irq(s->bus);
goto eot;
}
/* launch next transfer */
n = s->nsector;
s->io_buffer_index = 0;
s->io_buffer_size = n * 512;
if (s->bus->dma->ops->prepare_buf(s->bus->dma, ide_cmd_is_read(s)) < 512) {
/* The PRDs were too short. Reset the Active bit, but don't raise an
* interrupt. */
s->status = READY_STAT | SEEK_STAT;
dma_buf_commit(s, 0);
goto eot;
}
printf("ide_dma_cb: sector_num=%" PRId64 " n=%d, cmd_cmd=%d\n",
sector_num, n, s->dma_cmd);
#endif
if ((s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_READ || s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_WRITE) &&
!ide_sect_range_ok(s, sector_num, n)) {
ide_dma_error(s);
return;
}
switch (s->dma_cmd) {
case IDE_DMA_READ:
s->bus->dma->aiocb = dma_blk_read(s->blk, &s->sg, sector_num,
ide_dma_cb, s);
break;
case IDE_DMA_WRITE:
s->bus->dma->aiocb = dma_blk_write(s->blk, &s->sg, sector_num,
ide_dma_cb, s);
break;
case IDE_DMA_TRIM:
s->bus->dma->aiocb = dma_blk_io(s->blk, &s->sg, sector_num,
ide_issue_trim, ide_dma_cb, s,
DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE);
break;
}
return;
eot:
if (s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_READ || s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_WRITE) {
block_acct_done(blk_get_stats(s->blk), &s->acct);
}
ide_set_inactive(s, stay_active);
}
| 164,839 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: uint32 ResourceTracker::GetLiveObjectsForInstance(
PP_Instance instance) const {
InstanceMap::const_iterator found = instance_map_.find(instance);
if (found == instance_map_.end())
return 0;
return static_cast<uint32>(found->second->resources.size() +
found->second->object_vars.size());
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | uint32 ResourceTracker::GetLiveObjectsForInstance(
PP_Instance instance) const {
InstanceMap::const_iterator found = instance_map_.find(instance);
if (found == instance_map_.end())
return 0;
return static_cast<uint32>(found->second->ref_resources.size() +
found->second->object_vars.size());
}
| 170,418 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static M_bool M_fs_check_overwrite_allowed(const char *p1, const char *p2, M_uint32 mode)
{
M_fs_info_t *info = NULL;
char *pold = NULL;
char *pnew = NULL;
M_fs_type_t type;
M_bool ret = M_TRUE;
if (mode & M_FS_FILE_MODE_OVERWRITE)
return M_TRUE;
/* If we're not overwriting we need to verify existance.
*
* For files we need to check if the file name exists in the
* directory it's being copied to.
*
* For directories we need to check if the directory name
* exists in the directory it's being copied to.
*/
if (M_fs_info(&info, p1, M_FS_PATH_INFO_FLAGS_BASIC) != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS)
return M_FALSE;
type = M_fs_info_get_type(info);
M_fs_info_destroy(info);
if (type != M_FS_TYPE_DIR) {
/* File exists at path. */
if (M_fs_perms_can_access(p2, M_FS_PERMS_MODE_NONE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
ret = M_FALSE;
goto done;
}
}
/* Is dir */
pold = M_fs_path_basename(p1, M_FS_SYSTEM_AUTO);
pnew = M_fs_path_join(p2, pnew, M_FS_SYSTEM_AUTO);
if (M_fs_perms_can_access(pnew, M_FS_PERMS_MODE_NONE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
ret = M_FALSE;
goto done;
}
done:
M_free(pnew);
M_free(pold);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732 | static M_bool M_fs_check_overwrite_allowed(const char *p1, const char *p2, M_uint32 mode)
{
M_fs_info_t *info = NULL;
char *pold = NULL;
char *pnew = NULL;
M_fs_type_t type;
M_bool ret = M_TRUE;
if (mode & M_FS_FILE_MODE_OVERWRITE)
return M_TRUE;
/* If we're not overwriting we need to verify existance.
*
* For files we need to check if the file name exists in the
* directory it's being copied to.
*
* For directories we need to check if the directory name
* exists in the directory it's being copied to.
*/
if (M_fs_info(&info, p1, M_FS_PATH_INFO_FLAGS_BASIC) != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS)
return M_FALSE;
type = M_fs_info_get_type(info);
M_fs_info_destroy(info);
if (type != M_FS_TYPE_DIR) {
/* File exists at path. */
if (M_fs_perms_can_access(p2, M_FS_PERMS_MODE_NONE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
ret = M_FALSE;
goto done;
}
}
/* Is dir */
pold = M_fs_path_basename(p1, M_FS_SYSTEM_AUTO);
pnew = M_fs_path_join(p2, pnew, M_FS_SYSTEM_AUTO);
if (M_fs_perms_can_access(pnew, M_FS_PERMS_MODE_NONE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
ret = M_FALSE;
goto done;
}
done:
M_free(pnew);
M_free(pold);
return ret;
}
| 169,140 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void si_conn_send(struct connection *conn)
{
struct stream_interface *si = conn->owner;
struct channel *chn = si->ob;
int ret;
if (chn->pipe && conn->xprt->snd_pipe) {
ret = conn->xprt->snd_pipe(conn, chn->pipe);
if (ret > 0)
chn->flags |= CF_WRITE_PARTIAL;
if (!chn->pipe->data) {
put_pipe(chn->pipe);
chn->pipe = NULL;
}
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR)
return;
}
/* At this point, the pipe is empty, but we may still have data pending
* in the normal buffer.
*/
if (!chn->buf->o)
return;
/* when we're here, we already know that there is no spliced
* data left, and that there are sendable buffered data.
*/
if (!(conn->flags & (CO_FL_ERROR | CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH | CO_FL_DATA_WR_SH | CO_FL_WAIT_DATA | CO_FL_HANDSHAKE))) {
/* check if we want to inform the kernel that we're interested in
* sending more data after this call. We want this if :
* - we're about to close after this last send and want to merge
* the ongoing FIN with the last segment.
* - we know we can't send everything at once and must get back
* here because of unaligned data
* - there is still a finite amount of data to forward
* The test is arranged so that the most common case does only 2
* tests.
*/
unsigned int send_flag = 0;
if ((!(chn->flags & (CF_NEVER_WAIT|CF_SEND_DONTWAIT)) &&
((chn->to_forward && chn->to_forward != CHN_INFINITE_FORWARD) ||
(chn->flags & CF_EXPECT_MORE))) ||
((chn->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW)) == CF_SHUTW_NOW))
send_flag |= CO_SFL_MSG_MORE;
if (chn->flags & CF_STREAMER)
send_flag |= CO_SFL_STREAMER;
ret = conn->xprt->snd_buf(conn, chn->buf, send_flag);
if (ret > 0) {
chn->flags |= CF_WRITE_PARTIAL;
if (!chn->buf->o) {
/* Always clear both flags once everything has been sent, they're one-shot */
chn->flags &= ~(CF_EXPECT_MORE | CF_SEND_DONTWAIT);
}
/* if some data remain in the buffer, it's only because the
* system buffers are full, we will try next time.
*/
}
}
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static void si_conn_send(struct connection *conn)
{
struct stream_interface *si = conn->owner;
struct channel *chn = si->ob;
int ret;
if (chn->pipe && conn->xprt->snd_pipe) {
ret = conn->xprt->snd_pipe(conn, chn->pipe);
if (ret > 0)
chn->flags |= CF_WRITE_PARTIAL | CF_WROTE_DATA;
if (!chn->pipe->data) {
put_pipe(chn->pipe);
chn->pipe = NULL;
}
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR)
return;
}
/* At this point, the pipe is empty, but we may still have data pending
* in the normal buffer.
*/
if (!chn->buf->o)
return;
/* when we're here, we already know that there is no spliced
* data left, and that there are sendable buffered data.
*/
if (!(conn->flags & (CO_FL_ERROR | CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH | CO_FL_DATA_WR_SH | CO_FL_WAIT_DATA | CO_FL_HANDSHAKE))) {
/* check if we want to inform the kernel that we're interested in
* sending more data after this call. We want this if :
* - we're about to close after this last send and want to merge
* the ongoing FIN with the last segment.
* - we know we can't send everything at once and must get back
* here because of unaligned data
* - there is still a finite amount of data to forward
* The test is arranged so that the most common case does only 2
* tests.
*/
unsigned int send_flag = 0;
if ((!(chn->flags & (CF_NEVER_WAIT|CF_SEND_DONTWAIT)) &&
((chn->to_forward && chn->to_forward != CHN_INFINITE_FORWARD) ||
(chn->flags & CF_EXPECT_MORE))) ||
((chn->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW)) == CF_SHUTW_NOW))
send_flag |= CO_SFL_MSG_MORE;
if (chn->flags & CF_STREAMER)
send_flag |= CO_SFL_STREAMER;
ret = conn->xprt->snd_buf(conn, chn->buf, send_flag);
if (ret > 0) {
chn->flags |= CF_WRITE_PARTIAL | CF_WROTE_DATA;
if (!chn->buf->o) {
/* Always clear both flags once everything has been sent, they're one-shot */
chn->flags &= ~(CF_EXPECT_MORE | CF_SEND_DONTWAIT);
}
/* if some data remain in the buffer, it's only because the
* system buffers are full, we will try next time.
*/
}
}
return;
}
| 164,991 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool NuMediaExtractor::getTotalBitrate(int64_t *bitrate) const {
if (mTotalBitrate >= 0) {
*bitrate = mTotalBitrate;
return true;
}
off64_t size;
if (mDurationUs >= 0 && mDataSource->getSize(&size) == OK) {
*bitrate = size * 8000000ll / mDurationUs; // in bits/sec
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | bool NuMediaExtractor::getTotalBitrate(int64_t *bitrate) const {
if (mTotalBitrate >= 0) {
*bitrate = mTotalBitrate;
return true;
}
off64_t size;
if (mDurationUs > 0 && mDataSource->getSize(&size) == OK) {
*bitrate = size * 8000000ll / mDurationUs; // in bits/sec
return true;
}
return false;
}
| 174,003 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void UnloadController::TabDetachedImpl(TabContents* contents) {
if (is_attempting_to_close_browser_)
ClearUnloadState(contents->web_contents(), false);
registrar_.Remove(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_WEB_CONTENTS_DISCONNECTED,
content::Source<content::WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void UnloadController::TabDetachedImpl(TabContents* contents) {
void UnloadController::TabDetachedImpl(content::WebContents* contents) {
if (is_attempting_to_close_browser_)
ClearUnloadState(contents, false);
registrar_.Remove(this,
content::NOTIFICATION_WEB_CONTENTS_DISCONNECTED,
content::Source<content::WebContents>(contents));
}
| 171,520 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: tar_directory_for_file (GsfInfileTar *dir, const char *name, gboolean last)
{
const char *s = name;
while (1) {
const char *s0 = s;
char *dirname;
/* Find a directory component, if any. */
while (1) {
if (*s == 0) {
if (last && s != s0)
break;
else
return dir;
}
/* This is deliberately slash-only. */
if (*s == '/')
break;
s++;
}
dirname = g_strndup (s0, s - s0);
while (*s == '/')
s++;
if (strcmp (dirname, ".") != 0) {
GsfInput *subdir =
gsf_infile_child_by_name (GSF_INFILE (dir),
dirname);
if (subdir) {
/* Undo the ref. */
g_object_unref (subdir);
dir = GSF_INFILE_TAR (subdir);
} else
dir = tar_create_dir (dir, dirname);
}
g_free (dirname);
}
}
Commit Message: tar: fix crash on broken tar file.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | tar_directory_for_file (GsfInfileTar *dir, const char *name, gboolean last)
{
const char *s = name;
while (1) {
const char *s0 = s;
char *dirname;
/* Find a directory component, if any. */
while (1) {
if (*s == 0) {
if (last && s != s0)
break;
else
return dir;
}
/* This is deliberately slash-only. */
if (*s == '/')
break;
s++;
}
dirname = g_strndup (s0, s - s0);
while (*s == '/')
s++;
if (strcmp (dirname, ".") != 0) {
GsfInput *subdir =
gsf_infile_child_by_name (GSF_INFILE (dir),
dirname);
if (subdir) {
dir = GSF_IS_INFILE_TAR (subdir)
? GSF_INFILE_TAR (subdir)
: dir;
/* Undo the ref. */
g_object_unref (subdir);
} else
dir = tar_create_dir (dir, dirname);
}
g_free (dirname);
}
}
| 166,843 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct lib_t* MACH0_(get_libs)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
struct lib_t *libs;
int i;
if (!bin->nlibs)
return NULL;
if (!(libs = calloc ((bin->nlibs + 1), sizeof(struct lib_t))))
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < bin->nlibs; i++) {
strncpy (libs[i].name, bin->libs[i], R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH);
libs[i].name[R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH-1] = '\0';
libs[i].last = 0;
}
libs[i].last = 1;
return libs;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416 | struct lib_t* MACH0_(get_libs)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
struct lib_t *libs;
int i;
if (!bin->nlibs) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(libs = calloc ((bin->nlibs + 1), sizeof(struct lib_t)))) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->nlibs; i++) {
strncpy (libs[i].name, bin->libs[i], R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH);
libs[i].name[R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH-1] = '\0';
libs[i].last = 0;
}
libs[i].last = 1;
return libs;
}
| 168,234 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ReportPreconnectAccuracy(
const PreconnectStats& stats,
const std::map<GURL, OriginRequestSummary>& requests) {
if (stats.requests_stats.empty())
return;
int preresolve_hits_count = 0;
int preresolve_misses_count = 0;
int preconnect_hits_count = 0;
int preconnect_misses_count = 0;
for (const auto& request_stats : stats.requests_stats) {
bool hit = requests.find(request_stats.origin) != requests.end();
bool preconnect = request_stats.was_preconnected;
preresolve_hits_count += hit;
preresolve_misses_count += !hit;
preconnect_hits_count += preconnect && hit;
preconnect_misses_count += preconnect && !hit;
}
int total_preresolves = preresolve_hits_count + preresolve_misses_count;
int total_preconnects = preconnect_hits_count + preconnect_misses_count;
DCHECK_EQ(static_cast<int>(stats.requests_stats.size()),
preresolve_hits_count + preresolve_misses_count);
DCHECK_GT(total_preresolves, 0);
size_t preresolve_hits_percentage =
(100 * preresolve_hits_count) / total_preresolves;
if (total_preconnects > 0) {
size_t preconnect_hits_percentage =
(100 * preconnect_hits_count) / total_preconnects;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
internal::kLoadingPredictorPreconnectHitsPercentage,
preconnect_hits_percentage);
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(internal::kLoadingPredictorPreresolveHitsPercentage,
preresolve_hits_percentage);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_100(internal::kLoadingPredictorPreresolveCount,
total_preresolves);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_100(internal::kLoadingPredictorPreconnectCount,
total_preconnects);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void ReportPreconnectAccuracy(
const PreconnectStats& stats,
const std::map<url::Origin, OriginRequestSummary>& requests) {
if (stats.requests_stats.empty())
return;
int preresolve_hits_count = 0;
int preresolve_misses_count = 0;
int preconnect_hits_count = 0;
int preconnect_misses_count = 0;
for (const auto& request_stats : stats.requests_stats) {
bool hit = requests.find(request_stats.origin) != requests.end();
bool preconnect = request_stats.was_preconnected;
preresolve_hits_count += hit;
preresolve_misses_count += !hit;
preconnect_hits_count += preconnect && hit;
preconnect_misses_count += preconnect && !hit;
}
int total_preresolves = preresolve_hits_count + preresolve_misses_count;
int total_preconnects = preconnect_hits_count + preconnect_misses_count;
DCHECK_EQ(static_cast<int>(stats.requests_stats.size()),
preresolve_hits_count + preresolve_misses_count);
DCHECK_GT(total_preresolves, 0);
size_t preresolve_hits_percentage =
(100 * preresolve_hits_count) / total_preresolves;
if (total_preconnects > 0) {
size_t preconnect_hits_percentage =
(100 * preconnect_hits_count) / total_preconnects;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
internal::kLoadingPredictorPreconnectHitsPercentage,
preconnect_hits_percentage);
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(internal::kLoadingPredictorPreresolveHitsPercentage,
preresolve_hits_percentage);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_100(internal::kLoadingPredictorPreresolveCount,
total_preresolves);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_100(internal::kLoadingPredictorPreconnectCount,
total_preconnects);
}
| 172,372 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
struct mg_context *ctx;
base::AtExitManager exit;
base::WaitableEvent shutdown_event(false, false);
CommandLine::Init(argc, argv);
CommandLine* cmd_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
#endif
srand((unsigned int)time(NULL));
chrome::RegisterPathProvider();
TestTimeouts::Initialize();
InitChromeDriverLogging(*cmd_line);
std::string port = "9515";
std::string root;
std::string url_base;
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch("port"))
port = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII("port");
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch("root"))
root = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII("root");
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch("url-base"))
url_base = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII("url-base");
webdriver::SessionManager* manager = webdriver::SessionManager::GetInstance();
manager->set_port(port);
manager->set_url_base(url_base);
ctx = mg_start();
if (!SetMongooseOptions(ctx, port, root)) {
mg_stop(ctx);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
return WSAEADDRINUSE;
#else
return EADDRINUSE;
#endif
}
webdriver::Dispatcher dispatcher(ctx, url_base);
webdriver::InitCallbacks(ctx, &dispatcher, &shutdown_event, root.empty());
std::cout << "Started ChromeDriver" << std::endl
<< "port=" << port << std::endl;
if (root.length()) {
VLOG(1) << "Serving files from the current working directory";
}
shutdown_event.Wait();
mg_stop(ctx);
return (EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
struct mg_context *ctx;
base::AtExitManager exit;
base::WaitableEvent shutdown_event(false, false);
CommandLine::Init(argc, argv);
CommandLine* cmd_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
#endif
srand((unsigned int)time(NULL));
chrome::RegisterPathProvider();
TestTimeouts::Initialize();
std::string port = "9515";
std::string root;
std::string url_base;
bool verbose = false;
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch("port"))
port = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII("port");
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch("root"))
root = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII("root");
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch("url-base"))
url_base = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII("url-base");
// Whether or not to do verbose logging.
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch("verbose"))
verbose = true;
webdriver::InitWebDriverLogging(
verbose ? logging::LOG_INFO : logging::LOG_WARNING);
webdriver::SessionManager* manager = webdriver::SessionManager::GetInstance();
manager->set_port(port);
manager->set_url_base(url_base);
ctx = mg_start();
if (!SetMongooseOptions(ctx, port, root)) {
mg_stop(ctx);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
return WSAEADDRINUSE;
#else
return EADDRINUSE;
#endif
}
webdriver::Dispatcher dispatcher(ctx, url_base);
webdriver::InitCallbacks(ctx, &dispatcher, &shutdown_event, root.empty());
std::cout << "Started ChromeDriver" << std::endl
<< "port=" << port << std::endl;
if (root.length()) {
VLOG(1) << "Serving files from the current working directory";
}
shutdown_event.Wait();
mg_stop(ctx);
return (EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
| 170,462 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ShellSurface::CreateShellSurfaceWidget(ui::WindowShowState show_state) {
DCHECK(enabled());
DCHECK(!widget_);
views::Widget::InitParams params;
params.type = views::Widget::InitParams::TYPE_WINDOW;
params.ownership = views::Widget::InitParams::NATIVE_WIDGET_OWNS_WIDGET;
params.delegate = this;
params.shadow_type = views::Widget::InitParams::SHADOW_TYPE_NONE;
params.opacity = views::Widget::InitParams::TRANSLUCENT_WINDOW;
params.show_state = show_state;
params.parent =
ash::Shell::GetContainer(ash::Shell::GetPrimaryRootWindow(), container_);
params.bounds = initial_bounds_;
bool activatable = activatable_ && !surface_->GetHitTestBounds().IsEmpty();
params.activatable = activatable ? views::Widget::InitParams::ACTIVATABLE_YES
: views::Widget::InitParams::ACTIVATABLE_NO;
widget_ = new ShellSurfaceWidget(this);
widget_->Init(params);
widget_->set_movement_disabled(!initial_bounds_.IsEmpty());
aura::Window* window = widget_->GetNativeWindow();
window->SetName("ExoShellSurface");
window->AddChild(surface_->window());
window->SetEventTargeter(base::WrapUnique(new CustomWindowTargeter));
SetApplicationId(window, &application_id_);
SetMainSurface(window, surface_);
window->AddObserver(this);
ash::wm::GetWindowState(window)->AddObserver(this);
if (parent_)
wm::AddTransientChild(parent_, window);
ash::wm::GetWindowState(window)->set_window_position_managed(
ash::wm::ToWindowShowState(ash::wm::WINDOW_STATE_TYPE_AUTO_POSITIONED) ==
show_state &&
initial_bounds_.IsEmpty());
views::FocusManager* focus_manager = widget_->GetFocusManager();
for (const auto& entry : kCloseWindowAccelerators) {
focus_manager->RegisterAccelerator(
ui::Accelerator(entry.keycode, entry.modifiers),
ui::AcceleratorManager::kNormalPriority, this);
}
pending_show_widget_ = true;
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void ShellSurface::CreateShellSurfaceWidget(ui::WindowShowState show_state) {
DCHECK(enabled());
DCHECK(!widget_);
views::Widget::InitParams params;
params.type = views::Widget::InitParams::TYPE_WINDOW;
params.ownership = views::Widget::InitParams::NATIVE_WIDGET_OWNS_WIDGET;
params.delegate = this;
params.shadow_type = views::Widget::InitParams::SHADOW_TYPE_NONE;
params.opacity = views::Widget::InitParams::TRANSLUCENT_WINDOW;
params.show_state = show_state;
params.parent =
ash::Shell::GetContainer(ash::Shell::GetPrimaryRootWindow(), container_);
params.bounds = initial_bounds_;
bool activatable = activatable_;
// ShellSurfaces in system modal container are only activatable if input
// region is non-empty. See OnCommitSurface() for more details.
if (container_ == ash::kShellWindowId_SystemModalContainer)
activatable &= !surface_->GetHitTestBounds().IsEmpty();
params.activatable = activatable ? views::Widget::InitParams::ACTIVATABLE_YES
: views::Widget::InitParams::ACTIVATABLE_NO;
widget_ = new ShellSurfaceWidget(this);
widget_->Init(params);
widget_->set_movement_disabled(!initial_bounds_.IsEmpty());
aura::Window* window = widget_->GetNativeWindow();
window->SetName("ExoShellSurface");
window->AddChild(surface_->window());
window->SetEventTargeter(base::WrapUnique(new CustomWindowTargeter));
SetApplicationId(window, &application_id_);
SetMainSurface(window, surface_);
window->AddObserver(this);
ash::wm::GetWindowState(window)->AddObserver(this);
if (parent_)
wm::AddTransientChild(parent_, window);
ash::wm::GetWindowState(window)->set_window_position_managed(
ash::wm::ToWindowShowState(ash::wm::WINDOW_STATE_TYPE_AUTO_POSITIONED) ==
show_state &&
initial_bounds_.IsEmpty());
views::FocusManager* focus_manager = widget_->GetFocusManager();
for (const auto& entry : kCloseWindowAccelerators) {
focus_manager->RegisterAccelerator(
ui::Accelerator(entry.keycode, entry.modifiers),
ui::AcceleratorManager::kNormalPriority, this);
}
pending_show_widget_ = true;
}
| 171,638 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct vm_area_struct *prev;
int error;
address &= PAGE_MASK;
error = security_mmap_addr(address);
if (error)
return error;
/* Enforce stack_guard_gap */
prev = vma->vm_prev;
/* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
if (prev && !(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) &&
(prev->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
if (address - prev->vm_end < stack_guard_gap)
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated. */
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* vma->vm_start/vm_end cannot change under us because the caller
* is required to hold the mmap_sem in read mode. We need the
* anon_vma lock to serialize against concurrent expand_stacks.
*/
anon_vma_lock_write(vma->anon_vma);
/* Somebody else might have raced and expanded it already */
if (address < vma->vm_start) {
unsigned long size, grow;
size = vma->vm_end - address;
grow = (vma->vm_start - address) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
error = -ENOMEM;
if (grow <= vma->vm_pgoff) {
error = acct_stack_growth(vma, size, grow);
if (!error) {
/*
* vma_gap_update() doesn't support concurrent
* updates, but we only hold a shared mmap_sem
* lock here, so we need to protect against
* concurrent vma expansions.
* anon_vma_lock_write() doesn't help here, as
* we don't guarantee that all growable vmas
* in a mm share the same root anon vma.
* So, we reuse mm->page_table_lock to guard
* against concurrent vma expansions.
*/
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
mm->locked_vm += grow;
vm_stat_account(mm, vma->vm_flags, grow);
anon_vma_interval_tree_pre_update_vma(vma);
vma->vm_start = address;
vma->vm_pgoff -= grow;
anon_vma_interval_tree_post_update_vma(vma);
vma_gap_update(vma);
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
perf_event_mmap(vma);
}
}
}
anon_vma_unlock_write(vma->anon_vma);
khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(vma, vma->vm_flags);
validate_mm(mm);
return error;
}
Commit Message: mm: enforce min addr even if capable() in expand_downwards()
security_mmap_addr() does a capability check with current_cred(), but
we can reach this code from contexts like a VFS write handler where
current_cred() must not be used.
This can be abused on systems without SMAP to make NULL pointer
dereferences exploitable again.
Fixes: 8869477a49c3 ("security: protect from stack expansion into low vm addresses")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct vm_area_struct *prev;
int error = 0;
address &= PAGE_MASK;
if (address < mmap_min_addr)
return -EPERM;
/* Enforce stack_guard_gap */
prev = vma->vm_prev;
/* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
if (prev && !(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) &&
(prev->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
if (address - prev->vm_end < stack_guard_gap)
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated. */
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* vma->vm_start/vm_end cannot change under us because the caller
* is required to hold the mmap_sem in read mode. We need the
* anon_vma lock to serialize against concurrent expand_stacks.
*/
anon_vma_lock_write(vma->anon_vma);
/* Somebody else might have raced and expanded it already */
if (address < vma->vm_start) {
unsigned long size, grow;
size = vma->vm_end - address;
grow = (vma->vm_start - address) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
error = -ENOMEM;
if (grow <= vma->vm_pgoff) {
error = acct_stack_growth(vma, size, grow);
if (!error) {
/*
* vma_gap_update() doesn't support concurrent
* updates, but we only hold a shared mmap_sem
* lock here, so we need to protect against
* concurrent vma expansions.
* anon_vma_lock_write() doesn't help here, as
* we don't guarantee that all growable vmas
* in a mm share the same root anon vma.
* So, we reuse mm->page_table_lock to guard
* against concurrent vma expansions.
*/
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
mm->locked_vm += grow;
vm_stat_account(mm, vma->vm_flags, grow);
anon_vma_interval_tree_pre_update_vma(vma);
vma->vm_start = address;
vma->vm_pgoff -= grow;
anon_vma_interval_tree_post_update_vma(vma);
vma_gap_update(vma);
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
perf_event_mmap(vma);
}
}
}
anon_vma_unlock_write(vma->anon_vma);
khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(vma, vma->vm_flags);
validate_mm(mm);
return error;
}
| 169,722 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WT_NoiseGenerator (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 nInterpolatedSample;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* get last two samples generated */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp0 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->phaseAccum) >> 18;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
/* generate a buffer of noise */
while (numSamples--) {
nInterpolatedSample = MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp0, (PHASE_ONE - pWTVoice->phaseFrac));
nInterpolatedSample += MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp1, pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_PCM) nInterpolatedSample;
/* update PRNG */
pWTVoice->phaseFrac += (EAS_U32) phaseInc;
if (GET_PHASE_INT_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac)) {
tmp0 = tmp1;
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = pWTVoice->loopEnd;
pWTVoice->loopEnd = (5 * pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1);
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = GET_PHASE_FRAC_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void WT_NoiseGenerator (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 nInterpolatedSample;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* get last two samples generated */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp0 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->phaseAccum) >> 18;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
/* generate a buffer of noise */
while (numSamples--) {
nInterpolatedSample = MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp0, (PHASE_ONE - pWTVoice->phaseFrac));
nInterpolatedSample += MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp1, pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_PCM) nInterpolatedSample;
/* update PRNG */
pWTVoice->phaseFrac += (EAS_U32) phaseInc;
if (GET_PHASE_INT_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac)) {
tmp0 = tmp1;
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = pWTVoice->loopEnd;
pWTVoice->loopEnd = (5 * pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1);
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = GET_PHASE_FRAC_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
}
}
}
| 173,920 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppListController::Init(Profile* initial_profile) {
if (win8::IsSingleWindowMetroMode())
return;
PrefService* prefs = g_browser_process->local_state();
if (prefs->HasPrefPath(prefs::kRestartWithAppList) &&
prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kRestartWithAppList)) {
prefs->SetBoolean(prefs::kRestartWithAppList, false);
AppListController::GetInstance()->
ShowAppListDuringModeSwitch(initial_profile);
}
AppListController::GetInstance();
ScheduleWarmup();
MigrateAppLauncherEnabledPref();
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAppList))
EnableAppList();
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAppList))
DisableAppList();
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void AppListController::Init(Profile* initial_profile) {
if (win8::IsSingleWindowMetroMode())
return;
PrefService* prefs = g_browser_process->local_state();
if (prefs->HasPrefPath(prefs::kRestartWithAppList) &&
prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kRestartWithAppList)) {
prefs->SetBoolean(prefs::kRestartWithAppList, false);
AppListController::GetInstance()->
ShowAppListDuringModeSwitch(initial_profile);
}
// Migrate from legacy app launcher if we are on a non-canary and non-chromium
// build.
#if defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
if (!InstallUtil::IsChromeSxSProcess() &&
!chrome_launcher_support::GetAnyAppHostPath().empty()) {
chrome_launcher_support::InstallationState state =
chrome_launcher_support::GetAppLauncherInstallationState();
if (state == chrome_launcher_support::NOT_INSTALLED) {
// If app_host.exe is found but can't be located in the registry,
// skip the migration as this is likely a developer build.
return;
} else if (state == chrome_launcher_support::INSTALLED_AT_SYSTEM_LEVEL) {
chrome_launcher_support::UninstallLegacyAppLauncher(
chrome_launcher_support::SYSTEM_LEVEL_INSTALLATION);
} else if (state == chrome_launcher_support::INSTALLED_AT_USER_LEVEL) {
chrome_launcher_support::UninstallLegacyAppLauncher(
chrome_launcher_support::USER_LEVEL_INSTALLATION);
}
EnableAppList();
}
#endif
AppListController::GetInstance();
ScheduleWarmup();
MigrateAppLauncherEnabledPref();
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAppList))
EnableAppList();
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAppList))
DisableAppList();
}
| 171,337 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int hashtable_set(hashtable_t *hashtable,
const char *key, size_t serial,
json_t *value)
{
pair_t *pair;
bucket_t *bucket;
size_t hash, index;
/* rehash if the load ratio exceeds 1 */
if(hashtable->size >= num_buckets(hashtable))
if(hashtable_do_rehash(hashtable))
return -1;
hash = hash_str(key);
index = hash % num_buckets(hashtable);
bucket = &hashtable->buckets[index];
pair = hashtable_find_pair(hashtable, bucket, key, hash);
if(pair)
{
json_decref(pair->value);
pair->value = value;
}
else
{
/* offsetof(...) returns the size of pair_t without the last,
flexible member. This way, the correct amount is
allocated. */
pair = jsonp_malloc(offsetof(pair_t, key) + strlen(key) + 1);
if(!pair)
return -1;
pair->hash = hash;
pair->serial = serial;
strcpy(pair->key, key);
pair->value = value;
list_init(&pair->list);
insert_to_bucket(hashtable, bucket, &pair->list);
hashtable->size++;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | int hashtable_set(hashtable_t *hashtable,
const char *key, size_t serial,
json_t *value)
{
pair_t *pair;
bucket_t *bucket;
size_t hash, index;
/* rehash if the load ratio exceeds 1 */
if(hashtable->size >= hashsize(hashtable->order))
if(hashtable_do_rehash(hashtable))
return -1;
hash = hash_str(key);
index = hash & hashmask(hashtable->order);
bucket = &hashtable->buckets[index];
pair = hashtable_find_pair(hashtable, bucket, key, hash);
if(pair)
{
json_decref(pair->value);
pair->value = value;
}
else
{
/* offsetof(...) returns the size of pair_t without the last,
flexible member. This way, the correct amount is
allocated. */
pair = jsonp_malloc(offsetof(pair_t, key) + strlen(key) + 1);
if(!pair)
return -1;
pair->hash = hash;
pair->serial = serial;
strcpy(pair->key, key);
pair->value = value;
list_init(&pair->list);
insert_to_bucket(hashtable, bucket, &pair->list);
hashtable->size++;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,533 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: unsigned char *base64decode(const char *buf, size_t *size)
{
if (!buf || !size) return NULL;
size_t len = (*size > 0) ? *size : strlen(buf);
if (len <= 0) return NULL;
unsigned char *outbuf = (unsigned char*)malloc((len/4)*3+3);
const char *ptr = buf;
int p = 0;
size_t l = 0;
do {
ptr += strspn(ptr, "\r\n\t ");
if (*ptr == '\0' || ptr >= buf+len) {
break;
}
l = strcspn(ptr, "\r\n\t ");
if (l > 3 && ptr+l <= buf+len) {
p+=base64decode_block(outbuf+p, ptr, l);
ptr += l;
} else {
break;
}
} while (1);
outbuf[p] = 0;
*size = p;
return outbuf;
}
Commit Message: base64: Rework base64decode to handle split encoded data correctly
CWE ID: CWE-125 | unsigned char *base64decode(const char *buf, size_t *size)
{
if (!buf || !size) return NULL;
size_t len = (*size > 0) ? *size : strlen(buf);
if (len <= 0) return NULL;
unsigned char *outbuf = (unsigned char*)malloc((len/4)*3+3);
const char *ptr = buf;
int p = 0;
int wv, w1, w2, w3, w4;
int tmpval[4];
int tmpcnt = 0;
do {
while (ptr < buf+len && (*ptr == ' ' || *ptr == '\t' || *ptr == '\n' || *ptr == '\r')) {
ptr++;
}
if (*ptr == '\0' || ptr >= buf+len) {
break;
}
if ((wv = base64_table[(int)(unsigned char)*ptr++]) == -1) {
continue;
}
tmpval[tmpcnt++] = wv;
if (tmpcnt == 4) {
tmpcnt = 0;
w1 = tmpval[0];
w2 = tmpval[1];
w3 = tmpval[2];
w4 = tmpval[3];
if (w2 >= 0) {
outbuf[p++] = (unsigned char)(((w1 << 2) + (w2 >> 4)) & 0xFF);
}
if (w3 >= 0) {
outbuf[p++] = (unsigned char)(((w2 << 4) + (w3 >> 2)) & 0xFF);
}
if (w4 >= 0) {
outbuf[p++] = (unsigned char)(((w3 << 6) + w4) & 0xFF);
}
}
} while (1);
outbuf[p] = 0;
*size = p;
return outbuf;
}
| 168,416 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForPrintPreview(
const base::DictionaryValue& job_settings) {
if (prep_frame_view_)
return;
if (!render_view()->GetWebView())
return;
blink::WebFrame* main_frame = render_view()->GetWebView()->mainFrame();
if (!main_frame)
return;
blink::WebDocument document = main_frame->document();
blink::WebElement pdf_element = document.getElementById("pdf-viewer");
if (pdf_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
blink::WebLocalFrame* plugin_frame = pdf_element.document().frame();
blink::WebElement plugin_element = pdf_element;
if (pdf_element.hasHTMLTagName("iframe")) {
plugin_frame = blink::WebLocalFrame::fromFrameOwnerElement(pdf_element);
plugin_element = delegate_->GetPdfElement(plugin_frame);
if (plugin_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
}
base::AutoReset<bool> set_printing_flag(&print_for_preview_, true);
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(plugin_frame, plugin_element, job_settings)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "UpdatePrintSettings failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
return;
}
PrintMsg_Print_Params& print_params = print_pages_params_->params;
print_params.printable_area = gfx::Rect(print_params.page_size);
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(plugin_frame, plugin_element)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForPrintPreview(
const base::DictionaryValue& job_settings) {
CHECK_LE(ipc_nesting_level_, 1);
if (prep_frame_view_)
return;
if (!render_view()->GetWebView())
return;
blink::WebFrame* main_frame = render_view()->GetWebView()->mainFrame();
if (!main_frame)
return;
blink::WebDocument document = main_frame->document();
blink::WebElement pdf_element = document.getElementById("pdf-viewer");
if (pdf_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
blink::WebLocalFrame* plugin_frame = pdf_element.document().frame();
blink::WebElement plugin_element = pdf_element;
if (pdf_element.hasHTMLTagName("iframe")) {
plugin_frame = blink::WebLocalFrame::fromFrameOwnerElement(pdf_element);
plugin_element = delegate_->GetPdfElement(plugin_frame);
if (plugin_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
}
base::AutoReset<bool> set_printing_flag(&print_for_preview_, true);
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(plugin_frame, plugin_element, job_settings)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "UpdatePrintSettings failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
return;
}
PrintMsg_Print_Params& print_params = print_pages_params_->params;
print_params.printable_area = gfx::Rect(print_params.page_size);
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(plugin_frame, plugin_element)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
}
| 171,873 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const SystemProfileProto& MetricsLog::RecordEnvironment(
DelegatingProvider* delegating_provider) {
DCHECK(!has_environment_);
has_environment_ = true;
SystemProfileProto* system_profile = uma_proto()->mutable_system_profile();
WriteMetricsEnableDefault(client_->GetMetricsReportingDefaultState(),
system_profile);
std::string brand_code;
if (client_->GetBrand(&brand_code))
system_profile->set_brand_code(brand_code);
SystemProfileProto::Hardware::CPU* cpu =
system_profile->mutable_hardware()->mutable_cpu();
base::CPU cpu_info;
cpu->set_vendor_name(cpu_info.vendor_name());
cpu->set_signature(cpu_info.signature());
cpu->set_num_cores(base::SysInfo::NumberOfProcessors());
delegating_provider->ProvideSystemProfileMetrics(system_profile);
return *system_profile;
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | const SystemProfileProto& MetricsLog::RecordEnvironment(
DelegatingProvider* delegating_provider) {
DCHECK(!has_environment_);
has_environment_ = true;
SystemProfileProto* system_profile = uma_proto()->mutable_system_profile();
WriteMetricsEnableDefault(client_->GetMetricsReportingDefaultState(),
system_profile);
std::string brand_code;
if (client_->GetBrand(&brand_code))
system_profile->set_brand_code(brand_code);
delegating_provider->ProvideSystemProfileMetrics(system_profile);
return *system_profile;
}
| 172,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: huff_get_next_word(Jbig2HuffmanState *hs, int offset)
{
uint32_t word = 0;
Jbig2WordStream *ws = hs->ws;
if ((ws->get_next_word(ws, offset, &word)) && ((hs->offset_limit == 0) || (offset < hs->offset_limit)))
hs->offset_limit = offset;
return word;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | huff_get_next_word(Jbig2HuffmanState *hs, int offset)
huff_get_next_word(Jbig2HuffmanState *hs, uint32_t offset)
{
uint32_t word = 0;
Jbig2WordStream *ws = hs->ws;
if ((ws->get_next_word(ws, offset, &word)) && ((hs->offset_limit == 0) || (offset < hs->offset_limit)))
hs->offset_limit = offset;
return word;
}
| 165,488 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void red_channel_pipes_add_type(RedChannel *channel, int pipe_item_type)
{
RingItem *link;
RING_FOREACH(link, &channel->clients) {
red_channel_client_pipe_add_type(
SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link),
pipe_item_type);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void red_channel_pipes_add_type(RedChannel *channel, int pipe_item_type)
{
RingItem *link, *next;
RING_FOREACH_SAFE(link, next, &channel->clients) {
red_channel_client_pipe_add_type(
SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link),
pipe_item_type);
}
}
| 164,664 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AddInputMethodNames(const GList* engines, InputMethodDescriptors* out) {
DCHECK(out);
for (; engines; engines = g_list_next(engines)) {
IBusEngineDesc* engine_desc = IBUS_ENGINE_DESC(engines->data);
const gchar* name = ibus_engine_desc_get_name(engine_desc);
const gchar* longname = ibus_engine_desc_get_longname(engine_desc);
const gchar* layout = ibus_engine_desc_get_layout(engine_desc);
const gchar* language = ibus_engine_desc_get_language(engine_desc);
if (InputMethodIdIsWhitelisted(name)) {
out->push_back(CreateInputMethodDescriptor(name,
longname,
layout,
language));
DLOG(INFO) << name << " (preloaded)";
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void AddInputMethodNames(const GList* engines, InputMethodDescriptors* out) {
DCHECK(out);
for (; engines; engines = g_list_next(engines)) {
IBusEngineDesc* engine_desc = IBUS_ENGINE_DESC(engines->data);
const gchar* name = ibus_engine_desc_get_name(engine_desc);
const gchar* longname = ibus_engine_desc_get_longname(engine_desc);
const gchar* layout = ibus_engine_desc_get_layout(engine_desc);
const gchar* language = ibus_engine_desc_get_language(engine_desc);
if (InputMethodIdIsWhitelisted(name)) {
out->push_back(CreateInputMethodDescriptor(name,
longname,
layout,
language));
VLOG(1) << name << " (preloaded)";
}
}
}
| 170,517 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void sum_init(int csum_type, int seed)
{
char s[4];
if (csum_type < 0)
csum_type = parse_csum_name(NULL, 0);
cursum_type = csum_type;
switch (csum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5:
md5_begin(&md);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
mdfour_begin(&md);
sumresidue = 0;
break;
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
break;
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
mdfour_begin(&md);
sumresidue = 0;
SIVAL(s, 0, seed);
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-354 | void sum_init(int csum_type, int seed)
{
char s[4];
if (csum_type < 0)
csum_type = parse_csum_name(NULL, 0);
cursum_type = csum_type;
switch (csum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5:
md5_begin(&md);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
mdfour_begin(&md);
sumresidue = 0;
break;
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
break;
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC:
mdfour_begin(&md);
sumresidue = 0;
SIVAL(s, 0, seed);
break;
}
}
| 164,646 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintTabBackground(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
bool active,
int fill_id,
int y_inset,
const SkPath* clip) const {
DCHECK(!y_inset || fill_id);
const SkColor active_color =
tab_->controller()->GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_ACTIVE);
const SkColor inactive_color =
tab_->GetThemeProvider()->GetDisplayProperty(
ThemeProperties::SHOULD_FILL_BACKGROUND_TAB_COLOR)
? tab_->controller()->GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_INACTIVE)
: SK_ColorTRANSPARENT;
const SkColor stroke_color =
tab_->controller()->GetToolbarTopSeparatorColor();
const bool paint_hover_effect = !active && IsHoverActive();
const float stroke_thickness = GetStrokeThickness(active);
PaintTabBackgroundFill(canvas, active, paint_hover_effect, active_color,
inactive_color, fill_id, y_inset);
if (stroke_thickness > 0) {
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(clip ? canvas : nullptr);
if (clip)
canvas->sk_canvas()->clipPath(*clip, SkClipOp::kDifference, true);
PaintBackgroundStroke(canvas, active, stroke_color);
}
PaintSeparators(canvas);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void GM2TabStyle::PaintTabBackground(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
TabState active_state,
int fill_id,
int y_inset,
const SkPath* clip) const {
DCHECK(!y_inset || fill_id);
const SkColor stroke_color =
tab_->controller()->GetToolbarTopSeparatorColor();
const bool paint_hover_effect =
active_state == TAB_INACTIVE && IsHoverActive();
const float stroke_thickness = GetStrokeThickness(active_state == TAB_ACTIVE);
PaintTabBackgroundFill(canvas, active_state, paint_hover_effect, fill_id,
y_inset);
if (stroke_thickness > 0) {
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(clip ? canvas : nullptr);
if (clip)
canvas->sk_canvas()->clipPath(*clip, SkClipOp::kDifference, true);
PaintBackgroundStroke(canvas, active_state, stroke_color);
}
PaintSeparators(canvas);
}
| 172,525 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChangeCurrentInputMethod(const InputMethodDescriptor& new_input_method) {
if (current_input_method_.id != new_input_method.id) {
previous_input_method_ = current_input_method_;
current_input_method_ = new_input_method;
if (!input_method::SetCurrentKeyboardLayoutByName(
current_input_method_.keyboard_layout)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to change keyboard layout to "
<< current_input_method_.keyboard_layout;
}
ObserverListBase<Observer>::Iterator it(observers_);
Observer* first_observer = it.GetNext();
if (first_observer) {
first_observer->PreferenceUpdateNeeded(this,
previous_input_method_,
current_input_method_);
}
}
const size_t num_active_input_methods = GetNumActiveInputMethods();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
InputMethodChanged(this,
current_input_method_,
num_active_input_methods));
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void ChangeCurrentInputMethod(const InputMethodDescriptor& new_input_method) {
void ChangeCurrentInputMethod(const input_method::InputMethodDescriptor&
new_input_method) {
if (current_input_method_.id != new_input_method.id) {
previous_input_method_ = current_input_method_;
current_input_method_ = new_input_method;
if (!input_method::SetCurrentKeyboardLayoutByName(
current_input_method_.keyboard_layout)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to change keyboard layout to "
<< current_input_method_.keyboard_layout;
}
ObserverListBase<InputMethodLibrary::Observer>::Iterator it(observers_);
InputMethodLibrary::Observer* first_observer = it.GetNext();
if (first_observer) {
first_observer->PreferenceUpdateNeeded(this,
previous_input_method_,
current_input_method_);
}
}
const size_t num_active_input_methods = GetNumActiveInputMethods();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(InputMethodLibrary::Observer, observers_,
InputMethodChanged(this,
current_input_method_,
num_active_input_methods));
}
| 170,478 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int mp_get_count(struct sb_uart_state *state, struct serial_icounter_struct *icnt)
{
struct serial_icounter_struct icount;
struct sb_uart_icount cnow;
struct sb_uart_port *port = state->port;
spin_lock_irq(&port->lock);
memcpy(&cnow, &port->icount, sizeof(struct sb_uart_icount));
spin_unlock_irq(&port->lock);
icount.cts = cnow.cts;
icount.dsr = cnow.dsr;
icount.rng = cnow.rng;
icount.dcd = cnow.dcd;
icount.rx = cnow.rx;
icount.tx = cnow.tx;
icount.frame = cnow.frame;
icount.overrun = cnow.overrun;
icount.parity = cnow.parity;
icount.brk = cnow.brk;
icount.buf_overrun = cnow.buf_overrun;
return copy_to_user(icnt, &icount, sizeof(icount)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int mp_get_count(struct sb_uart_state *state, struct serial_icounter_struct *icnt)
{
struct serial_icounter_struct icount = {};
struct sb_uart_icount cnow;
struct sb_uart_port *port = state->port;
spin_lock_irq(&port->lock);
memcpy(&cnow, &port->icount, sizeof(struct sb_uart_icount));
spin_unlock_irq(&port->lock);
icount.cts = cnow.cts;
icount.dsr = cnow.dsr;
icount.rng = cnow.rng;
icount.dcd = cnow.dcd;
icount.rx = cnow.rx;
icount.tx = cnow.tx;
icount.frame = cnow.frame;
icount.overrun = cnow.overrun;
icount.parity = cnow.parity;
icount.brk = cnow.brk;
icount.buf_overrun = cnow.buf_overrun;
return copy_to_user(icnt, &icount, sizeof(icount)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
| 165,961 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RunMemCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 1000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, input_extreme_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_ref_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_block, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
input_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() - rnd.Rand8();
input_extreme_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() % 2 ? 255 : -255;
}
if (i == 0)
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_extreme_block[j] = 255;
if (i == 1)
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_extreme_block[j] = -255;
fwd_txfm_ref(input_extreme_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_extreme_block,
output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
EXPECT_GE(4 * DCT_MAX_VALUE, abs(output_block[j]))
<< "Error: 16x16 FDCT has coefficient larger than 4*DCT_MAX_VALUE";
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void RunMemCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 1000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, int16_t, input_extreme_block[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, output_ref_block[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, output_block[kNumCoeffs]);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
// Initialize a test block with input range [-mask_, mask_].
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
input_extreme_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() % 2 ? mask_ : -mask_;
}
if (i == 0) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_extreme_block[j] = mask_;
} else if (i == 1) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_extreme_block[j] = -mask_;
}
fwd_txfm_ref(input_extreme_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_extreme_block,
output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
EXPECT_GE(4 * DCT_MAX_VALUE << (bit_depth_ - 8), abs(output_block[j]))
<< "Error: 16x16 FDCT has coefficient larger than 4*DCT_MAX_VALUE";
}
}
}
| 174,526 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfsd4_encode_layoutget(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
struct nfsd4_layoutget *lgp)
{
struct xdr_stream *xdr = &resp->xdr;
const struct nfsd4_layout_ops *ops =
nfsd4_layout_ops[lgp->lg_layout_type];
__be32 *p;
dprintk("%s: err %d\n", __func__, nfserr);
if (nfserr)
goto out;
nfserr = nfserr_resource;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 36 + sizeof(stateid_opaque_t));
if (!p)
goto out;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1); /* we always set return-on-close */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lgp->lg_sid.si_generation);
p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, &lgp->lg_sid.si_opaque,
sizeof(stateid_opaque_t));
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1); /* we always return a single layout */
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, lgp->lg_seg.offset);
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, lgp->lg_seg.length);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lgp->lg_seg.iomode);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lgp->lg_layout_type);
nfserr = ops->encode_layoutget(xdr, lgp);
out:
kfree(lgp->lg_content);
return nfserr;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | nfsd4_encode_layoutget(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
struct nfsd4_layoutget *lgp)
{
struct xdr_stream *xdr = &resp->xdr;
const struct nfsd4_layout_ops *ops;
__be32 *p;
dprintk("%s: err %d\n", __func__, nfserr);
if (nfserr)
goto out;
nfserr = nfserr_resource;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 36 + sizeof(stateid_opaque_t));
if (!p)
goto out;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1); /* we always set return-on-close */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lgp->lg_sid.si_generation);
p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, &lgp->lg_sid.si_opaque,
sizeof(stateid_opaque_t));
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1); /* we always return a single layout */
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, lgp->lg_seg.offset);
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, lgp->lg_seg.length);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lgp->lg_seg.iomode);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lgp->lg_layout_type);
ops = nfsd4_layout_ops[lgp->lg_layout_type];
nfserr = ops->encode_layoutget(xdr, lgp);
out:
kfree(lgp->lg_content);
return nfserr;
}
| 168,149 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: s_aes_process(stream_state * ss, stream_cursor_read * pr,
stream_cursor_write * pw, bool last)
{
stream_aes_state *const state = (stream_aes_state *) ss;
const unsigned char *limit;
const long in_size = pr->limit - pr->ptr;
const long out_size = pw->limit - pw->ptr;
unsigned char temp[16];
int status = 0;
/* figure out if we're going to run out of space */
if (in_size > out_size) {
limit = pr->ptr + out_size;
status = 1; /* need more output space */
} else {
limit = pr->limit;
status = last ? EOFC : 0; /* need more input */
}
/* set up state and context */
if (state->ctx == NULL) {
/* allocate the aes context. this is a public struct but it
contains internal pointers, so we need to store it separately
in immovable memory like any opaque structure. */
state->ctx = (aes_context *)gs_alloc_bytes_immovable(state->memory,
sizeof(aes_context), "aes context structure");
if (state->ctx == NULL) {
gs_throw(gs_error_VMerror, "could not allocate aes context");
return ERRC;
}
if (state->keylength < 1 || state->keylength > SAES_MAX_KEYLENGTH) {
gs_throw1(gs_error_rangecheck, "invalid aes key length (%d bytes)",
state->keylength);
}
aes_setkey_dec(state->ctx, state->key, state->keylength * 8);
}
if (!state->initialized) {
/* read the initialization vector from the first 16 bytes */
if (in_size < 16) return 0; /* get more data */
memcpy(state->iv, pr->ptr + 1, 16);
state->initialized = 1;
pr->ptr += 16;
}
/* decrypt available blocks */
while (pr->ptr + 16 <= limit) {
aes_crypt_cbc(state->ctx, AES_DECRYPT, 16, state->iv,
pr->ptr + 1, temp);
pr->ptr += 16;
if (last && pr->ptr == pr->limit) {
/* we're on the last block; unpad if necessary */
int pad;
if (state->use_padding) {
/* we are using RFC 1423-style padding, so the last byte of the
plaintext gives the number of bytes to discard */
pad = temp[15];
if (pad < 1 || pad > 16) {
/* Bug 692343 - don't error here, just warn. Take padding to be
* zero. This may give us a stream that's too long - preferable
* to the alternatives. */
gs_warn1("invalid aes padding byte (0x%02x)",
(unsigned char)pad);
pad = 0;
}
} else {
/* not using padding */
pad = 0;
}
memcpy(pw->ptr + 1, temp, 16 - pad);
pw->ptr += 16 - pad;
return EOFC;
}
memcpy(pw->ptr + 1, temp, 16);
pw->ptr += 16;
}
/* if we got to the end of the file without triggering the padding
check, the input must not have been a multiple of 16 bytes long.
complain. */
if (status == EOFC) {
gs_throw(gs_error_rangecheck, "aes stream isn't a multiple of 16 bytes");
return 0;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | s_aes_process(stream_state * ss, stream_cursor_read * pr,
stream_cursor_write * pw, bool last)
{
stream_aes_state *const state = (stream_aes_state *) ss;
const unsigned char *limit;
const long in_size = pr->limit - pr->ptr;
const long out_size = pw->limit - pw->ptr;
unsigned char temp[16];
int status = 0;
/* figure out if we're going to run out of space */
if (in_size > out_size) {
limit = pr->ptr + out_size;
status = 1; /* need more output space */
} else {
limit = pr->limit;
status = last ? EOFC : 0; /* need more input */
}
/* set up state and context */
if (state->ctx == NULL) {
/* allocate the aes context. this is a public struct but it
contains internal pointers, so we need to store it separately
in immovable memory like any opaque structure. */
state->ctx = (aes_context *)gs_alloc_bytes_immovable(state->memory,
sizeof(aes_context), "aes context structure");
if (state->ctx == NULL) {
gs_throw(gs_error_VMerror, "could not allocate aes context");
return ERRC;
}
memset(state->ctx, 0x00, sizeof(aes_context));
if (state->keylength < 1 || state->keylength > SAES_MAX_KEYLENGTH) {
gs_throw1(gs_error_rangecheck, "invalid aes key length (%d bytes)",
state->keylength);
}
aes_setkey_dec(state->ctx, state->key, state->keylength * 8);
}
if (!state->initialized) {
/* read the initialization vector from the first 16 bytes */
if (in_size < 16) return 0; /* get more data */
memcpy(state->iv, pr->ptr + 1, 16);
state->initialized = 1;
pr->ptr += 16;
}
/* decrypt available blocks */
while (pr->ptr + 16 <= limit) {
aes_crypt_cbc(state->ctx, AES_DECRYPT, 16, state->iv,
pr->ptr + 1, temp);
pr->ptr += 16;
if (last && pr->ptr == pr->limit) {
/* we're on the last block; unpad if necessary */
int pad;
if (state->use_padding) {
/* we are using RFC 1423-style padding, so the last byte of the
plaintext gives the number of bytes to discard */
pad = temp[15];
if (pad < 1 || pad > 16) {
/* Bug 692343 - don't error here, just warn. Take padding to be
* zero. This may give us a stream that's too long - preferable
* to the alternatives. */
gs_warn1("invalid aes padding byte (0x%02x)",
(unsigned char)pad);
pad = 0;
}
} else {
/* not using padding */
pad = 0;
}
memcpy(pw->ptr + 1, temp, 16 - pad);
pw->ptr += 16 - pad;
return EOFC;
}
memcpy(pw->ptr + 1, temp, 16);
pw->ptr += 16;
}
/* if we got to the end of the file without triggering the padding
check, the input must not have been a multiple of 16 bytes long.
complain. */
if (status == EOFC) {
gs_throw(gs_error_rangecheck, "aes stream isn't a multiple of 16 bytes");
return 0;
}
return status;
}
| 164,703 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static double ipow( double n, int exp )
{
double r;
if ( exp < 0 )
return 1.0 / ipow( n, -exp );
r = 1;
while ( exp > 0 ) {
if ( exp & 1 )
r *= n;
exp >>= 1;
n *= n;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static double ipow( double n, int exp )
/* Parse the input text to generate a number, and populate the result into item. */
static const char *parse_number(cJSON *item,const char *num)
{
double n=0,sign=1,scale=0;int subscale=0,signsubscale=1;
if (*num=='-') sign=-1,num++; /* Has sign? */
if (*num=='0') num++; /* is zero */
if (*num>='1' && *num<='9') do n=(n*10.0)+(*num++ -'0'); while (*num>='0' && *num<='9'); /* Number? */
if (*num=='.' && num[1]>='0' && num[1]<='9') {num++; do n=(n*10.0)+(*num++ -'0'),scale--; while (*num>='0' && *num<='9');} /* Fractional part? */
if (*num=='e' || *num=='E') /* Exponent? */
{ num++;if (*num=='+') num++; else if (*num=='-') signsubscale=-1,num++; /* With sign? */
while (*num>='0' && *num<='9') subscale=(subscale*10)+(*num++ - '0'); /* Number? */
}
| 167,300 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void svc_rdma_send_error(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt, struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
int status)
{
struct ib_send_wr err_wr;
struct page *p;
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
enum rpcrdma_errcode err;
__be32 *va;
int length;
int ret;
ret = svc_rdma_repost_recv(xprt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret)
return;
p = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
return;
va = page_address(p);
/* XDR encode an error reply */
err = ERR_CHUNK;
if (status == -EPROTONOSUPPORT)
err = ERR_VERS;
length = svc_rdma_xdr_encode_error(xprt, rmsgp, err, va);
ctxt = svc_rdma_get_context(xprt);
ctxt->direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
ctxt->count = 1;
ctxt->pages[0] = p;
/* Prepare SGE for local address */
ctxt->sge[0].lkey = xprt->sc_pd->local_dma_lkey;
ctxt->sge[0].length = length;
ctxt->sge[0].addr = ib_dma_map_page(xprt->sc_cm_id->device,
p, 0, length, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (ib_dma_mapping_error(xprt->sc_cm_id->device, ctxt->sge[0].addr)) {
dprintk("svcrdma: Error mapping buffer for protocol error\n");
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
return;
}
svc_rdma_count_mappings(xprt, ctxt);
/* Prepare SEND WR */
memset(&err_wr, 0, sizeof(err_wr));
ctxt->cqe.done = svc_rdma_wc_send;
err_wr.wr_cqe = &ctxt->cqe;
err_wr.sg_list = ctxt->sge;
err_wr.num_sge = 1;
err_wr.opcode = IB_WR_SEND;
err_wr.send_flags = IB_SEND_SIGNALED;
/* Post It */
ret = svc_rdma_send(xprt, &err_wr);
if (ret) {
dprintk("svcrdma: Error %d posting send for protocol error\n",
ret);
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | void svc_rdma_send_error(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt, struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
| 168,174 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ut64 MACH0_(get_baddr)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
int i;
if (bin->hdr.filetype != MH_EXECUTE && bin->hdr.filetype != MH_DYLINKER)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsegs; ++i)
if (bin->segs[i].fileoff == 0 && bin->segs[i].filesize != 0)
return bin->segs[i].vmaddr;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416 | ut64 MACH0_(get_baddr)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
int i;
if (bin->hdr.filetype != MH_EXECUTE && bin->hdr.filetype != MH_DYLINKER) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsegs; ++i) {
if (bin->segs[i].fileoff == 0 && bin->segs[i].filesize != 0) {
return bin->segs[i].vmaddr;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 168,232 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dhcpv6_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *cp, u_int length, int indent)
{
u_int i, t;
const u_char *tlv, *value;
uint16_t type, optlen;
i = 0;
while (i < length) {
tlv = cp + i;
type = EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv);
optlen = EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv + 2);
value = tlv + 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n"));
for (t = indent; t > 0; t--)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(dh6opt_str, "Unknown", type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo," (%u)", optlen + 4 ));
switch (type) {
case DH6OPT_DNS_SERVERS:
case DH6OPT_SNTP_SERVERS: {
if (optlen % 16 != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", istr));
return -1;
}
for (t = 0; t < optlen; t += 16)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, value + t)));
}
break;
case DH6OPT_DOMAIN_LIST: {
const u_char *tp = value;
while (tp < value + optlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if ((tp = ns_nprint(ndo, tp, value + optlen)) == NULL)
return -1;
}
}
break;
}
i += 4 + optlen;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13042/HNCP: add DHCPv6-Data bounds checks
hncp_print_rec() validates each HNCP TLV to be within the declared as
well as the on-the-wire packet space. However, dhcpv6_print() in the same
file didn't do the same for the DHCPv6 options within the HNCP
DHCPv6-Data TLV value, which could cause an out-of-bounds read when
decoding an invalid packet. Add missing checks to dhcpv6_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | dhcpv6_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *cp, u_int length, int indent)
{
u_int i, t;
const u_char *tlv, *value;
uint16_t type, optlen;
i = 0;
while (i < length) {
if (i + 4 > length)
return -1;
tlv = cp + i;
type = EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv);
optlen = EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv + 2);
value = tlv + 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n"));
for (t = indent; t > 0; t--)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(dh6opt_str, "Unknown", type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo," (%u)", optlen + 4 ));
if (i + 4 + optlen > length)
return -1;
switch (type) {
case DH6OPT_DNS_SERVERS:
case DH6OPT_SNTP_SERVERS: {
if (optlen % 16 != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", istr));
return -1;
}
for (t = 0; t < optlen; t += 16)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, value + t)));
}
break;
case DH6OPT_DOMAIN_LIST: {
const u_char *tp = value;
while (tp < value + optlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if ((tp = ns_nprint(ndo, tp, value + optlen)) == NULL)
return -1;
}
}
break;
}
i += 4 + optlen;
}
return 0;
}
| 167,833 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlDocPtr soap_xmlParseMemory(const void *buf, size_t buf_size)
{
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = NULL;
xmlDocPtr ret;
/*
xmlInitParser();
*/
*/
ctxt = xmlCreateMemoryParserCtxt(buf, buf_size);
if (ctxt) {
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = soap_ignorableWhitespace;
ctxt->sax->comment = soap_Comment;
ctxt->sax->warning = NULL;
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20703
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_HUGE;
#endif
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if (ctxt->wellFormed) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
if (ret->URL == NULL && ctxt->directory != NULL) {
ret->URL = xmlCharStrdup(ctxt->directory);
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
} else {
ret = NULL;
}
/*
xmlCleanupParser();
*/
/*
if (ret) {
cleanup_xml_node((xmlNodePtr)ret);
}
*/
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | xmlDocPtr soap_xmlParseMemory(const void *buf, size_t buf_size)
{
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = NULL;
xmlDocPtr ret;
/*
xmlInitParser();
*/
*/
ctxt = xmlCreateMemoryParserCtxt(buf, buf_size);
if (ctxt) {
ctxt->options -= XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD;
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = soap_ignorableWhitespace;
ctxt->sax->comment = soap_Comment;
ctxt->sax->warning = NULL;
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20703
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_HUGE;
#endif
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if (ctxt->wellFormed) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
if (ret->URL == NULL && ctxt->directory != NULL) {
ret->URL = xmlCharStrdup(ctxt->directory);
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
} else {
ret = NULL;
}
/*
xmlCleanupParser();
*/
/*
if (ret) {
cleanup_xml_node((xmlNodePtr)ret);
}
*/
return ret;
}
| 164,728 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlParseNameAndCompare(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar const *other) {
register const xmlChar *cmp = other;
register const xmlChar *in;
const xmlChar *ret;
GROW;
in = ctxt->input->cur;
while (*in != 0 && *in == *cmp) {
++in;
++cmp;
ctxt->input->col++;
}
if (*cmp == 0 && (*in == '>' || IS_BLANK_CH (*in))) {
/* success */
ctxt->input->cur = in;
return (const xmlChar*) 1;
}
/* failure (or end of input buffer), check with full function */
ret = xmlParseName (ctxt);
/* strings coming from the dictionnary direct compare possible */
if (ret == other) {
return (const xmlChar*) 1;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlParseNameAndCompare(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar const *other) {
register const xmlChar *cmp = other;
register const xmlChar *in;
const xmlChar *ret;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
in = ctxt->input->cur;
while (*in != 0 && *in == *cmp) {
++in;
++cmp;
ctxt->input->col++;
}
if (*cmp == 0 && (*in == '>' || IS_BLANK_CH (*in))) {
/* success */
ctxt->input->cur = in;
return (const xmlChar*) 1;
}
/* failure (or end of input buffer), check with full function */
ret = xmlParseName (ctxt);
/* strings coming from the dictionnary direct compare possible */
if (ret == other) {
return (const xmlChar*) 1;
}
return ret;
}
| 171,296 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int BlobURLRequestJob::ComputeBytesToRead() const {
int64 current_item_remaining_bytes =
item_length_list_[current_item_index_] - current_item_offset_;
int64 remaining_bytes = std::min(current_item_remaining_bytes,
remaining_bytes_);
return static_cast<int>(std::min(
static_cast<int64>(read_buf_->BytesRemaining()),
remaining_bytes));
}
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | int BlobURLRequestJob::ComputeBytesToRead() const {
int64 current_item_length = item_length_list_[current_item_index_];
int64 item_remaining = current_item_length - current_item_offset_;
int64 buf_remaining = read_buf_->BytesRemaining();
int64 max_remaining = std::numeric_limits<int>::max();
int64 min = std::min(std::min(std::min(item_remaining,
buf_remaining),
remaining_bytes_),
max_remaining);
return static_cast<int>(min);
}
| 171,397 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void Predict(MB_PREDICTION_MODE mode) {
mbptr_->mode_info_context->mbmi.mode = mode;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(pred_fn_(mbptr_,
data_ptr_[0] - kStride,
data_ptr_[0] - 1, kStride,
data_ptr_[0], kStride));
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void Predict(MB_PREDICTION_MODE mode) {
mbptr_->mode_info_context->mbmi.mode = mode;
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(pred_fn_(mbptr_,
data_ptr_[0] - kStride,
data_ptr_[0] - 1, kStride,
data_ptr_[0], kStride));
}
| 174,566 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SpdyWriteQueue::Clear() {
CHECK(!removing_writes_);
removing_writes_ = true;
for (int i = MINIMUM_PRIORITY; i <= MAXIMUM_PRIORITY; ++i) {
for (std::deque<PendingWrite>::iterator it = queue_[i].begin();
it != queue_[i].end(); ++it) {
delete it->frame_producer;
}
queue_[i].clear();
}
removing_writes_ = false;
}
Commit Message: These can post callbacks which re-enter into SpdyWriteQueue.
BUG=369539
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/265933007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268730 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void SpdyWriteQueue::Clear() {
CHECK(!removing_writes_);
removing_writes_ = true;
std::vector<SpdyBufferProducer*> erased_buffer_producers;
for (int i = MINIMUM_PRIORITY; i <= MAXIMUM_PRIORITY; ++i) {
for (std::deque<PendingWrite>::iterator it = queue_[i].begin();
it != queue_[i].end(); ++it) {
erased_buffer_producers.push_back(it->frame_producer);
}
queue_[i].clear();
}
removing_writes_ = false;
STLDeleteElements(&erased_buffer_producers); // Invokes callbacks.
}
| 171,673 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ResourceHostMsg_Request CreateXHRRequestWithOrigin(const char* origin) {
ResourceHostMsg_Request request;
request.method = "GET";
request.url = GURL("http://bar.com/simple_page.html");
request.first_party_for_cookies = GURL(origin);
request.referrer_policy = blink::WebReferrerPolicyDefault;
request.headers = base::StringPrintf("Origin: %s\r\n", origin);
request.load_flags = 0;
request.origin_pid = 0;
request.resource_type = RESOURCE_TYPE_XHR;
request.request_context = 0;
request.appcache_host_id = kAppCacheNoHostId;
request.download_to_file = false;
request.should_reset_appcache = false;
request.is_main_frame = true;
request.parent_is_main_frame = false;
request.parent_render_frame_id = -1;
request.transition_type = ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK;
request.allow_download = true;
return request;
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | ResourceHostMsg_Request CreateXHRRequestWithOrigin(const char* origin) {
ResourceHostMsg_Request CreateXHRRequest(const char* url) {
ResourceHostMsg_Request request;
request.method = "GET";
request.url = GURL(url);
request.referrer_policy = blink::WebReferrerPolicyDefault;
request.load_flags = 0;
request.origin_pid = 0;
request.resource_type = RESOURCE_TYPE_XHR;
request.request_context = 0;
request.appcache_host_id = kAppCacheNoHostId;
request.download_to_file = false;
request.should_reset_appcache = false;
request.is_main_frame = true;
request.parent_is_main_frame = false;
request.parent_render_frame_id = -1;
request.transition_type = ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK;
request.allow_download = true;
return request;
}
| 172,272 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::AuthorizeService(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
const std::string& uuid,
const ConfirmationCallback& callback) {
callback.Run(CANCELLED);
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::AuthorizeService(
| 171,216 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: CreateDataReductionProxyChromeIOData(
Profile* profile,
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& io_task_runner,
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& ui_task_runner) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(profile);
DCHECK(profile->GetPrefs());
data_reduction_proxy::DataReductionProxySettings*
data_reduction_proxy_settings =
DataReductionProxyChromeSettingsFactory::GetForBrowserContext(
profile);
bool enabled = data_reduction_proxy_settings &&
data_reduction_proxy_settings->IsDataSaverEnabledByUser();
std::unique_ptr<data_reduction_proxy::DataReductionProxyIOData>
data_reduction_proxy_io_data(
new data_reduction_proxy::DataReductionProxyIOData(
DataReductionProxyChromeSettings::GetClient(),
profile->GetPrefs(), content::GetNetworkConnectionTracker(),
io_task_runner, ui_task_runner, enabled, GetUserAgent(),
version_info::GetChannelString(chrome::GetChannel())));
data_reduction_proxy_io_data->set_lofi_decider(
std::make_unique<data_reduction_proxy::ContentLoFiDecider>());
data_reduction_proxy_io_data->set_resource_type_provider(
std::make_unique<data_reduction_proxy::ContentResourceTypeProvider>());
data_reduction_proxy_io_data->set_lofi_ui_service(
std::make_unique<data_reduction_proxy::ContentLoFiUIService>(
ui_task_runner, base::Bind(&OnLoFiResponseReceivedOnUI)));
return data_reduction_proxy_io_data;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | CreateDataReductionProxyChromeIOData(
Profile* profile,
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& io_task_runner,
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& ui_task_runner) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(profile);
DCHECK(profile->GetPrefs());
bool enabled = data_reduction_proxy::DataReductionProxySettings::
IsDataSaverEnabledByUser(profile->GetPrefs());
std::unique_ptr<data_reduction_proxy::DataReductionProxyIOData>
data_reduction_proxy_io_data(
new data_reduction_proxy::DataReductionProxyIOData(
DataReductionProxyChromeSettings::GetClient(),
profile->GetPrefs(), content::GetNetworkConnectionTracker(),
io_task_runner, ui_task_runner, enabled, GetUserAgent(),
version_info::GetChannelString(chrome::GetChannel())));
data_reduction_proxy_io_data->set_lofi_decider(
std::make_unique<data_reduction_proxy::ContentLoFiDecider>());
data_reduction_proxy_io_data->set_resource_type_provider(
std::make_unique<data_reduction_proxy::ContentResourceTypeProvider>());
data_reduction_proxy_io_data->set_lofi_ui_service(
std::make_unique<data_reduction_proxy::ContentLoFiUIService>(
ui_task_runner, base::Bind(&OnLoFiResponseReceivedOnUI)));
return data_reduction_proxy_io_data;
}
| 172,549 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::isModal() const {
if (roleValue() != DialogRole && roleValue() != AlertDialogRole)
return false;
if (hasAttribute(aria_modalAttr)) {
const AtomicString& modal = getAttribute(aria_modalAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(modal, "true"))
return true;
if (equalIgnoringCase(modal, "false"))
return false;
}
if (getNode() && isHTMLDialogElement(*getNode()))
return toElement(getNode())->isInTopLayer();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool AXNodeObject::isModal() const {
if (roleValue() != DialogRole && roleValue() != AlertDialogRole)
return false;
if (hasAttribute(aria_modalAttr)) {
const AtomicString& modal = getAttribute(aria_modalAttr);
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(modal, "true"))
return true;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(modal, "false"))
return false;
}
if (getNode() && isHTMLDialogElement(*getNode()))
return toElement(getNode())->isInTopLayer();
return false;
}
| 171,916 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexdh_init){
int rc;
(void)type;
(void)user;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET,"Received SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
if(session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_INIT){
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE,"Invalid state for SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
goto error;
}
switch(session->next_crypto->kex_type){
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP1_SHA1:
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA1:
rc=ssh_server_kexdh_init(session, packet);
break;
#ifdef HAVE_ECDH
case SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256:
rc = ssh_server_ecdh_init(session, packet);
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CURVE25519
case SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_LIBSSH_ORG:
rc = ssh_server_curve25519_init(session, packet);
break;
#endif
default:
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"Wrong kex type in ssh_packet_kexdh_init");
rc = SSH_ERROR;
}
if (rc == SSH_ERROR)
session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
error:
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexdh_init){
int rc = SSH_ERROR;
(void)type;
(void)user;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET,"Received SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
if(session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_INIT){
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE,"Invalid state for SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
goto error;
}
switch(session->next_crypto->kex_type){
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP1_SHA1:
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA1:
rc=ssh_server_kexdh_init(session, packet);
break;
#ifdef HAVE_ECDH
case SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256:
rc = ssh_server_ecdh_init(session, packet);
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CURVE25519
case SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_LIBSSH_ORG:
rc = ssh_server_curve25519_init(session, packet);
break;
#endif
default:
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"Wrong kex type in ssh_packet_kexdh_init");
rc = SSH_ERROR;
}
error:
if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
}
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
| 165,325 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RenderWidgetHostViewAura(RenderWidgetHost* host)
: host_(RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(host)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(window_(new aura::Window(this))),
in_shutdown_(false),
is_fullscreen_(false),
popup_parent_host_view_(NULL),
popup_child_host_view_(NULL),
is_loading_(false),
text_input_type_(ui::TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_NONE),
can_compose_inline_(true),
has_composition_text_(false),
device_scale_factor_(1.0f),
current_surface_(0),
current_surface_is_protected_(true),
current_surface_in_use_by_compositor_(true),
protection_state_id_(0),
surface_route_id_(0),
paint_canvas_(NULL),
synthetic_move_sent_(false),
accelerated_compositing_state_changed_(false),
can_lock_compositor_(YES) {
host_->SetView(this);
window_observer_.reset(new WindowObserver(this));
window_->AddObserver(window_observer_.get());
aura::client::SetTooltipText(window_, &tooltip_);
aura::client::SetActivationDelegate(window_, this);
gfx::Screen::GetScreenFor(window_)->AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RenderWidgetHostViewAura(RenderWidgetHost* host)
: host_(RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(host)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(window_(new aura::Window(this))),
in_shutdown_(false),
is_fullscreen_(false),
popup_parent_host_view_(NULL),
popup_child_host_view_(NULL),
is_loading_(false),
text_input_type_(ui::TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_NONE),
can_compose_inline_(true),
has_composition_text_(false),
device_scale_factor_(1.0f),
current_surface_(0),
paint_canvas_(NULL),
synthetic_move_sent_(false),
accelerated_compositing_state_changed_(false),
can_lock_compositor_(YES) {
host_->SetView(this);
window_observer_.reset(new WindowObserver(this));
window_->AddObserver(window_observer_.get());
aura::client::SetTooltipText(window_, &tooltip_);
aura::client::SetActivationDelegate(window_, this);
gfx::Screen::GetScreenFor(window_)->AddObserver(this);
}
| 171,383 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ext2_xattr_delete_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
down_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
if (!EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
if (!bh) {
ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_delete_inode",
"inode %ld: block %d read error", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
goto cleanup;
}
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d", atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)));
if (HDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
HDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_delete_inode",
"inode %ld: bad block %d", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
goto cleanup;
}
ce = mb_cache_entry_get(ext2_xattr_cache, bh->b_bdev, bh->b_blocknr);
lock_buffer(bh);
if (HDR(bh)->h_refcount == cpu_to_le32(1)) {
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_free(ce);
ext2_free_blocks(inode, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl, 1);
get_bh(bh);
bforget(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
} else {
le32_add_cpu(&HDR(bh)->h_refcount, -1);
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
ea_bdebug(bh, "refcount now=%d",
le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount));
unlock_buffer(bh);
mark_buffer_dirty(bh);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
sync_dirty_buffer(bh);
dquot_free_block_nodirty(inode, 1);
}
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl = 0;
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
up_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | ext2_xattr_delete_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
down_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
if (!EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
if (!bh) {
ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_delete_inode",
"inode %ld: block %d read error", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
goto cleanup;
}
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d", atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)));
if (HDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
HDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_delete_inode",
"inode %ld: bad block %d", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
goto cleanup;
}
lock_buffer(bh);
if (HDR(bh)->h_refcount == cpu_to_le32(1)) {
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_hash);
/*
* This must happen under buffer lock for ext2_xattr_set2() to
* reliably detect freed block
*/
mb2_cache_entry_delete_block(EXT2_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_mb_cache,
hash, bh->b_blocknr);
ext2_free_blocks(inode, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl, 1);
get_bh(bh);
bforget(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
} else {
le32_add_cpu(&HDR(bh)->h_refcount, -1);
ea_bdebug(bh, "refcount now=%d",
le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount));
unlock_buffer(bh);
mark_buffer_dirty(bh);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
sync_dirty_buffer(bh);
dquot_free_block_nodirty(inode, 1);
}
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl = 0;
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
up_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
}
| 169,979 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void OnDidAddMessageToConsole(int32_t,
const base::string16& message,
int32_t,
const base::string16&) {
callback_.Run(message);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void OnDidAddMessageToConsole(int32_t,
| 172,490 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CreatePersistentHistogramAllocator() {
GlobalHistogramAllocator::GetCreateHistogramResultHistogram();
GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithLocalMemory(
kAllocatorMemorySize, 0, "HistogramAllocatorTest");
allocator_ = GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get()->memory_allocator();
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void CreatePersistentHistogramAllocator() {
GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithLocalMemory(
kAllocatorMemorySize, 0, "HistogramAllocatorTest");
allocator_ = GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get()->memory_allocator();
}
| 172,130 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int l2tp_ip6_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int *uaddr_len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *lsa = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *)uaddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct l2tp_ip6_sock *lsk = l2tp_ip6_sk(sk);
lsa->l2tp_family = AF_INET6;
lsa->l2tp_flowinfo = 0;
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = 0;
if (peer) {
if (!lsk->peer_conn_id)
return -ENOTCONN;
lsa->l2tp_conn_id = lsk->peer_conn_id;
lsa->l2tp_addr = np->daddr;
if (np->sndflow)
lsa->l2tp_flowinfo = np->flow_label;
} else {
if (ipv6_addr_any(&np->rcv_saddr))
lsa->l2tp_addr = np->saddr;
else
lsa->l2tp_addr = np->rcv_saddr;
lsa->l2tp_conn_id = lsk->conn_id;
}
if (ipv6_addr_type(&lsa->l2tp_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
*uaddr_len = sizeof(*lsa);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: l2tp: fix info leak via getsockname()
The L2TP code for IPv6 fails to initialize the l2tp_unused member of
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 and that for leaks two bytes kernel stack via
the getsockname() syscall. Initialize l2tp_unused with 0 to avoid the
info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int l2tp_ip6_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int *uaddr_len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *lsa = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *)uaddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct l2tp_ip6_sock *lsk = l2tp_ip6_sk(sk);
lsa->l2tp_family = AF_INET6;
lsa->l2tp_flowinfo = 0;
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = 0;
lsa->l2tp_unused = 0;
if (peer) {
if (!lsk->peer_conn_id)
return -ENOTCONN;
lsa->l2tp_conn_id = lsk->peer_conn_id;
lsa->l2tp_addr = np->daddr;
if (np->sndflow)
lsa->l2tp_flowinfo = np->flow_label;
} else {
if (ipv6_addr_any(&np->rcv_saddr))
lsa->l2tp_addr = np->saddr;
else
lsa->l2tp_addr = np->rcv_saddr;
lsa->l2tp_conn_id = lsk->conn_id;
}
if (ipv6_addr_type(&lsa->l2tp_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
*uaddr_len = sizeof(*lsa);
return 0;
}
| 166,183 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const char* Chapters::Display::GetCountry() const
{
return m_country;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const char* Chapters::Display::GetCountry() const
| 174,300 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidPrintPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPrintPage_Params& params) {
if (printer_.get())
printer_->PrintPage(params);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidPrintPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPrintPage_Params& params) {
printer_->PrintPage(params);
}
| 170,850 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PepperRendererConnection::OnMsgDidCreateInProcessInstance(
PP_Instance instance,
const PepperRendererInstanceData& instance_data) {
PepperRendererInstanceData data = instance_data;
data.render_process_id = render_process_id_;
in_process_host_->AddInstance(instance, data);
}
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void PepperRendererConnection::OnMsgDidCreateInProcessInstance(
PP_Instance instance,
const PepperRendererInstanceData& instance_data) {
PepperRendererInstanceData data = instance_data;
// It's important that we supply the render process ID ourselves since the
// message may be coming from a compromised renderer.
data.render_process_id = render_process_id_;
// 'instance' is possibly invalid. The host must be careful not to trust it.
in_process_host_->AddInstance(instance, data);
}
| 172,311 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Segment::PreloadCluster(Cluster* pCluster, ptrdiff_t idx)
{
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
assert(idx >= m_clusterCount);
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
long& size = m_clusterSize;
assert(size >= count);
if (count >= size)
{
const long n = (size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2*size;
Cluster** const qq = new Cluster*[n];
Cluster** q = qq;
Cluster** p = m_clusters;
Cluster** const pp = p + count;
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_clusters;
m_clusters = qq;
size = n;
}
assert(m_clusters);
Cluster** const p = m_clusters + idx;
Cluster** q = m_clusters + count;
assert(q >= p);
assert(q < (m_clusters + size));
while (q > p)
{
Cluster** const qq = q - 1;
assert((*qq)->m_index < 0);
*q = *qq;
q = qq;
}
m_clusters[idx] = pCluster;
++m_clusterPreloadCount;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Segment::PreloadCluster(Cluster* pCluster, ptrdiff_t idx)
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0) {
assert(m_clusters);
Cluster** const p = m_clusters + m_clusterCount;
assert(*p);
assert((*p)->m_index < 0);
Cluster** q = p + m_clusterPreloadCount;
assert(q < (m_clusters + size));
for (;;) {
Cluster** const qq = q - 1;
assert((*qq)->m_index < 0);
*q = *qq;
q = qq;
if (q == p)
break;
}
}
m_clusters[idx] = pCluster;
++m_clusterCount;
}
| 174,431 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AffiliationFetcher::ParseResponse(
AffiliationFetcherDelegate::Result* result) const {
std::string serialized_response;
if (!fetcher_->GetResponseAsString(&serialized_response)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
affiliation_pb::LookupAffiliationResponse response;
if (!response.ParseFromString(serialized_response))
return false;
result->reserve(requested_facet_uris_.size());
std::map<FacetURI, size_t> facet_uri_to_class_index;
for (int i = 0; i < response.affiliation_size(); ++i) {
const affiliation_pb::Affiliation& equivalence_class(
response.affiliation(i));
AffiliatedFacets affiliated_uris;
for (int j = 0; j < equivalence_class.facet_size(); ++j) {
const std::string& uri_spec(equivalence_class.facet(j));
FacetURI uri = FacetURI::FromPotentiallyInvalidSpec(uri_spec);
if (!uri.is_valid())
continue;
affiliated_uris.push_back(uri);
}
if (affiliated_uris.empty())
continue;
for (const FacetURI& uri : affiliated_uris) {
if (!facet_uri_to_class_index.count(uri))
facet_uri_to_class_index[uri] = result->size();
if (facet_uri_to_class_index[uri] !=
facet_uri_to_class_index[affiliated_uris[0]]) {
return false;
}
}
if (facet_uri_to_class_index[affiliated_uris[0]] == result->size())
result->push_back(affiliated_uris);
}
for (const FacetURI& uri : requested_facet_uris_) {
if (!facet_uri_to_class_index.count(uri))
result->push_back(AffiliatedFacets(1, uri));
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Update AffiliationFetcher to use new Affiliation API wire format.
The new format is not backward compatible with the old one, therefore this CL updates the client side protobuf definitions to be in line with the API definition. However, this CL does not yet make use of any additional fields introduced in the new wire format.
BUG=437865
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/996613002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#319860}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool AffiliationFetcher::ParseResponse(
AffiliationFetcherDelegate::Result* result) const {
std::string serialized_response;
if (!fetcher_->GetResponseAsString(&serialized_response)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
affiliation_pb::LookupAffiliationResponse response;
if (!response.ParseFromString(serialized_response))
return false;
result->reserve(requested_facet_uris_.size());
std::map<FacetURI, size_t> facet_uri_to_class_index;
for (int i = 0; i < response.affiliation_size(); ++i) {
const affiliation_pb::Affiliation& equivalence_class(
response.affiliation(i));
AffiliatedFacets affiliated_uris;
for (int j = 0; j < equivalence_class.facet_size(); ++j) {
const std::string& uri_spec(equivalence_class.facet(j).id());
FacetURI uri = FacetURI::FromPotentiallyInvalidSpec(uri_spec);
if (!uri.is_valid())
continue;
affiliated_uris.push_back(uri);
}
if (affiliated_uris.empty())
continue;
for (const FacetURI& uri : affiliated_uris) {
if (!facet_uri_to_class_index.count(uri))
facet_uri_to_class_index[uri] = result->size();
if (facet_uri_to_class_index[uri] !=
facet_uri_to_class_index[affiliated_uris[0]]) {
return false;
}
}
if (facet_uri_to_class_index[affiliated_uris[0]] == result->size())
result->push_back(affiliated_uris);
}
for (const FacetURI& uri : requested_facet_uris_) {
if (!facet_uri_to_class_index.count(uri))
result->push_back(AffiliatedFacets(1, uri));
}
return true;
}
| 171,143 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Blob::Blob(PassOwnPtr<BlobData> blobData, long long size)
: m_type(blobData->contentType())
, m_size(size)
{
ASSERT(blobData);
ScriptWrappable::init(this);
m_internalURL = BlobURL::createInternalURL();
ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(m_internalURL, blobData);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | Blob::Blob(PassOwnPtr<BlobData> blobData, long long size)
: m_type(blobData->contentType())
, m_size(size)
{
ASSERT(blobData);
ScriptWrappable::init(this);
m_internalURL = BlobURL::createInternalURL();
BlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(m_internalURL, blobData);
}
| 170,675 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int rock_continue(struct rock_state *rs)
{
int ret = 1;
int blocksize = 1 << rs->inode->i_blkbits;
const int min_de_size = offsetof(struct rock_ridge, u);
kfree(rs->buffer);
rs->buffer = NULL;
if ((unsigned)rs->cont_offset > blocksize - min_de_size ||
(unsigned)rs->cont_size > blocksize ||
(unsigned)(rs->cont_offset + rs->cont_size) > blocksize) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "rock: corrupted directory entry. "
"extent=%d, offset=%d, size=%d\n",
rs->cont_extent, rs->cont_offset, rs->cont_size);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if (rs->cont_extent) {
struct buffer_head *bh;
rs->buffer = kmalloc(rs->cont_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rs->buffer) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = -EIO;
bh = sb_bread(rs->inode->i_sb, rs->cont_extent);
if (bh) {
memcpy(rs->buffer, bh->b_data + rs->cont_offset,
rs->cont_size);
put_bh(bh);
rs->chr = rs->buffer;
rs->len = rs->cont_size;
rs->cont_extent = 0;
rs->cont_size = 0;
rs->cont_offset = 0;
return 0;
}
printk("Unable to read rock-ridge attributes\n");
}
out:
kfree(rs->buffer);
rs->buffer = NULL;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries
Rock Ridge extensions define so called Continuation Entries (CE) which
define where is further space with Rock Ridge data. Corrupted isofs
image can contain arbitrarily long chain of these, including a one
containing loop and thus causing kernel to end in an infinite loop when
traversing these entries.
Limit the traversal to 32 entries which should be more than enough space
to store all the Rock Ridge data.
Reported-by: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static int rock_continue(struct rock_state *rs)
{
int ret = 1;
int blocksize = 1 << rs->inode->i_blkbits;
const int min_de_size = offsetof(struct rock_ridge, u);
kfree(rs->buffer);
rs->buffer = NULL;
if ((unsigned)rs->cont_offset > blocksize - min_de_size ||
(unsigned)rs->cont_size > blocksize ||
(unsigned)(rs->cont_offset + rs->cont_size) > blocksize) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "rock: corrupted directory entry. "
"extent=%d, offset=%d, size=%d\n",
rs->cont_extent, rs->cont_offset, rs->cont_size);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if (rs->cont_extent) {
struct buffer_head *bh;
rs->buffer = kmalloc(rs->cont_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rs->buffer) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = -EIO;
if (++rs->cont_loops >= RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES)
goto out;
bh = sb_bread(rs->inode->i_sb, rs->cont_extent);
if (bh) {
memcpy(rs->buffer, bh->b_data + rs->cont_offset,
rs->cont_size);
put_bh(bh);
rs->chr = rs->buffer;
rs->len = rs->cont_size;
rs->cont_extent = 0;
rs->cont_size = 0;
rs->cont_offset = 0;
return 0;
}
printk("Unable to read rock-ridge attributes\n");
}
out:
kfree(rs->buffer);
rs->buffer = NULL;
return ret;
}
| 166,236 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::string GetUploadData(const std::string& brand) {
DCHECK(!brand.empty());
std::string data(kPostXml);
const std::string placeholder("__BRANDCODE_PLACEHOLDER__");
size_t placeholder_pos = data.find(placeholder);
DCHECK(placeholder_pos != std::string::npos);
data.replace(placeholder_pos, placeholder.size(), brand);
return data;
}
Commit Message: Use install_static::GetAppGuid instead of the hardcoded string in BrandcodeConfigFetcher.
Bug: 769756
Change-Id: Ifdcb0a5145ffad1d563562e2b2ea2390ff074cdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1213178
Reviewed-by: Dominic Battré <battre@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#590275}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | std::string GetUploadData(const std::string& brand) {
std::string app_id(kDefaultAppID);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
app_id = install_static::UTF16ToUTF8(install_static::GetAppGuid());
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(!brand.empty());
return base::StringPrintf(kPostXml, app_id.c_str(), brand.c_str());
}
| 172,278 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long mkvparser::UnserializeUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
if ((size <= 0) || (size > 8))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long long result = 0;
for (long long i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long long mkvparser::UnserializeUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long UnserializeUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long long size) {
if (!pReader || pos < 0 || (size <= 0) || (size > 8))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long long result = 0;
for (long long i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
| 173,868 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: build_config(char *prefix, struct server *server)
{
char *path = NULL;
int path_size = strlen(prefix) + strlen(server->port) + 20;
path = ss_malloc(path_size);
snprintf(path, path_size, "%s/.shadowsocks_%s.conf", prefix, server->port);
FILE *f = fopen(path, "w+");
if (f == NULL) {
if (verbose) {
LOGE("unable to open config file");
}
ss_free(path);
return;
}
fprintf(f, "{\n");
fprintf(f, "\"server_port\":%d,\n", atoi(server->port));
fprintf(f, "\"password\":\"%s\"", server->password);
if (server->fast_open[0]) fprintf(f, ",\n\"fast_open\": %s", server->fast_open);
if (server->mode) fprintf(f, ",\n\"mode\":\"%s\"", server->mode);
if (server->method) fprintf(f, ",\n\"method\":\"%s\"", server->method);
if (server->plugin) fprintf(f, ",\n\"plugin\":\"%s\"", server->plugin);
if (server->plugin_opts) fprintf(f, ",\n\"plugin_opts\":\"%s\"", server->plugin_opts);
fprintf(f, "\n}\n");
fclose(f);
ss_free(path);
}
Commit Message: Fix #1734
CWE ID: CWE-78 | build_config(char *prefix, struct server *server)
build_config(char *prefix, struct manager_ctx *manager, struct server *server)
{
char *path = NULL;
int path_size = strlen(prefix) + strlen(server->port) + 20;
path = ss_malloc(path_size);
snprintf(path, path_size, "%s/.shadowsocks_%s.conf", prefix, server->port);
FILE *f = fopen(path, "w+");
if (f == NULL) {
if (verbose) {
LOGE("unable to open config file");
}
ss_free(path);
return;
}
fprintf(f, "{\n");
fprintf(f, "\"server_port\":%d,\n", atoi(server->port));
fprintf(f, "\"password\":\"%s\"", server->password);
if (server->method)
fprintf(f, ",\n\"method\":\"%s\"", server->method);
else if (manager->method)
fprintf(f, ",\n\"method\":\"%s\"", manager->method);
if (server->fast_open[0])
fprintf(f, ",\n\"fast_open\": %s", server->fast_open);
if (server->mode)
fprintf(f, ",\n\"mode\":\"%s\"", server->mode);
if (server->plugin)
fprintf(f, ",\n\"plugin\":\"%s\"", server->plugin);
if (server->plugin_opts)
fprintf(f, ",\n\"plugin_opts\":\"%s\"", server->plugin_opts);
fprintf(f, "\n}\n");
fclose(f);
ss_free(path);
}
| 167,713 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: test_standard(png_modifier* PNG_CONST pm, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
int bdlo, int PNG_CONST bdhi)
{
for (; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo)
{
int interlace_type;
for (interlace_type = PNG_INTERLACE_NONE;
interlace_type < INTERLACE_LAST; ++interlace_type)
{
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
interlace_type, 0, 0, 0), 0/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
}
}
return 1; /* keep going */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | test_standard(png_modifier* PNG_CONST pm, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
test_standard(png_modifier* const pm, png_byte const colour_type,
int bdlo, int const bdhi)
{
for (; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo)
{
int interlace_type;
for (interlace_type = PNG_INTERLACE_NONE;
interlace_type < INTERLACE_LAST; ++interlace_type)
{
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
interlace_type, 0, 0, 0), do_read_interlace, pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
}
}
return 1; /* keep going */
}
| 173,710 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Editor::Transpose() {
if (!CanEdit())
//// TODO(yosin): We should move |Transpose()| into |ExecuteTranspose()| in
//// "EditorCommand.cpp"
return;
GetFrame().GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(GetFrame());
if (range.IsNull())
return;
const String& text = PlainText(range);
if (text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& transposed = text.Right(1) + text.Left(1);
if (DispatchBeforeInputInsertText(
EventTargetNodeForDocument(GetFrame().GetDocument()), transposed,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose,
new StaticRangeVector(1, StaticRange::Create(range))) !=
DispatchEventResult::kNotCanceled)
return;
if (frame_->GetDocument()->GetFrame() != frame_)
return;
GetFrame().GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& new_range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(GetFrame());
if (new_range.IsNull())
return;
const String& new_text = PlainText(new_range);
if (new_text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& new_transposed = new_text.Right(1) + new_text.Left(1);
const SelectionInDOMTree& new_selection =
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder().SetBaseAndExtent(new_range).Build();
if (CreateVisibleSelection(new_selection) !=
GetFrame().Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree())
GetFrame().Selection().SetSelection(new_selection);
ReplaceSelectionWithText(new_transposed, false, false,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | void Editor::Transpose() {
//// TODO(yosin): We should move |Transpose()| into |ExecuteTranspose()| in
//// "EditorCommand.cpp"
void Transpose(LocalFrame& frame) {
Editor& editor = frame.GetEditor();
if (!editor.CanEdit())
return;
Document* const document = frame.GetDocument();
document->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(frame);
if (range.IsNull())
return;
const String& text = PlainText(range);
if (text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& transposed = text.Right(1) + text.Left(1);
if (DispatchBeforeInputInsertText(
EventTargetNodeForDocument(document), transposed,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose,
new StaticRangeVector(1, StaticRange::Create(range))) !=
DispatchEventResult::kNotCanceled)
return;
// 'beforeinput' event handler may destroy document->
if (frame.GetDocument() != document)
return;
document->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& new_range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(frame);
if (new_range.IsNull())
return;
const String& new_text = PlainText(new_range);
if (new_text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& new_transposed = new_text.Right(1) + new_text.Left(1);
const SelectionInDOMTree& new_selection =
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder().SetBaseAndExtent(new_range).Build();
if (CreateVisibleSelection(new_selection) !=
frame.Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree())
frame.Selection().SetSelection(new_selection);
editor.ReplaceSelectionWithText(new_transposed, false, false,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose);
}
| 172,011 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::JobRecord::JobRecord(
scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> input_frame,
scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> output_frame,
int quality,
int32_t task_id,
BitstreamBuffer* exif_buffer)
: input_frame(input_frame),
output_frame(output_frame),
quality(quality),
task_id(task_id),
output_shm(base::SharedMemoryHandle(), 0, true), // dummy
exif_shm(nullptr) {
if (exif_buffer) {
exif_shm.reset(new UnalignedSharedMemory(exif_buffer->TakeRegion(),
exif_buffer->size(), false));
exif_offset = exif_buffer->offset();
}
}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::JobRecord::JobRecord(
scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> input_frame,
scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> output_frame,
int quality,
int32_t task_id,
BitstreamBuffer* exif_buffer)
: input_frame(input_frame),
output_frame(output_frame),
quality(quality),
task_id(task_id),
output_shm(base::subtle::PlatformSharedMemoryRegion(), 0, true), // dummy
exif_shm(nullptr) {
if (exif_buffer) {
exif_shm.reset(new UnalignedSharedMemory(exif_buffer->TakeRegion(),
exif_buffer->size(), false));
exif_offset = exif_buffer->offset();
}
}
| 172,318 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_16_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(colour_type)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
/* expand_16 does something unless the bit depth is already 16. */
return bit_depth < 16;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_expand_16_add(image_transform *this,
const image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(colour_type)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
/* expand_16 does something unless the bit depth is already 16. */
return bit_depth < 16;
}
| 173,626 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
char *provider = NULL, *pin;
int r, i, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
u_int seconds;
time_t death = 0;
u_char type;
struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
Identity *id;
Idtab *tab;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
switch (type) {
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
death = monotime() + seconds;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
confirm = 1;
break;
default:
error("process_add_smartcard_key: "
"Unknown constraint type %d", type);
goto send;
}
}
if (lifetime && !death)
death = monotime() + lifetime;
count = pkcs11_add_provider(provider, pin, &keys);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
k = keys[i];
version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
tab = idtab_lookup(version);
if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
id->key = k;
id->provider = xstrdup(provider);
id->comment = xstrdup(provider); /* XXX */
id->death = death;
id->confirm = confirm;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
tab->nentries++;
success = 1;
} else {
sshkey_free(k);
}
keys[i] = NULL;
}
send:
free(pin);
free(provider);
free(keys);
send_status(e, success);
}
Commit Message: add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load (via
ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@
CWE ID: CWE-426 | process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
char *provider = NULL, *pin, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
int r, i, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
u_int seconds;
time_t death = 0;
u_char type;
struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
Identity *id;
Idtab *tab;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
switch (type) {
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
death = monotime() + seconds;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
confirm = 1;
break;
default:
error("process_add_smartcard_key: "
"Unknown constraint type %d", type);
goto send;
}
}
if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
provider, strerror(errno));
goto send;
}
if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, pkcs11_whitelist, 0) != 1) {
verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
"provider not whitelisted", canonical_provider);
goto send;
}
debug("%s: add %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
if (lifetime && !death)
death = monotime() + lifetime;
count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
k = keys[i];
version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
tab = idtab_lookup(version);
if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
id->key = k;
id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider); /* XXX */
id->death = death;
id->confirm = confirm;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
tab->nentries++;
success = 1;
} else {
sshkey_free(k);
}
keys[i] = NULL;
}
send:
free(pin);
free(provider);
free(keys);
send_status(e, success);
}
| 168,664 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
long result = 0, unit;
int qhead;
int err = 0;
tu = file->private_data;
unit = tu->tread ? sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread) : sizeof(struct snd_timer_read);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
while ((long)count - result >= unit) {
while (!tu->qused) {
wait_queue_t wait;
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) != 0 || result > 0) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto _error;
}
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
init_waitqueue_entry(&wait, current);
add_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
schedule();
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
remove_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
if (tu->disconnected) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto _error;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto _error;
}
}
qhead = tu->qhead++;
tu->qhead %= tu->queue_size;
tu->qused--;
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
if (tu->tread) {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->tqueue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->queue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_read)))
err = -EFAULT;
}
mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
if (err < 0)
goto _error;
result += unit;
buffer += unit;
}
_error:
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
return result > 0 ? result : err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix race between read and ioctl
The read from ALSA timer device, the function snd_timer_user_tread(),
may access to an uninitialized struct snd_timer_user fields when the
read is concurrently performed while the ioctl like
snd_timer_user_tselect() is invoked. We have already fixed the races
among ioctls via a mutex, but we seem to have forgotten the race
between read vs ioctl.
This patch simply applies (more exactly extends the already applied
range of) tu->ioctl_lock in snd_timer_user_tread() for closing the
race window.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
long result = 0, unit;
int qhead;
int err = 0;
tu = file->private_data;
unit = tu->tread ? sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread) : sizeof(struct snd_timer_read);
mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
while ((long)count - result >= unit) {
while (!tu->qused) {
wait_queue_t wait;
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) != 0 || result > 0) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto _error;
}
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
init_waitqueue_entry(&wait, current);
add_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
schedule();
mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
remove_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
if (tu->disconnected) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto _error;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto _error;
}
}
qhead = tu->qhead++;
tu->qhead %= tu->queue_size;
tu->qused--;
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
if (tu->tread) {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->tqueue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->queue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_read)))
err = -EFAULT;
}
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
if (err < 0)
goto _error;
result += unit;
buffer += unit;
}
_error:
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
return result > 0 ? result : err;
}
| 170,008 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: unix_client_connect(hsm_com_client_hdl_t *hdl)
{
int fd, len;
struct sockaddr_un unix_addr;
if ((fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
{
return HSM_COM_ERROR;
}
memset(&unix_addr,0,sizeof(unix_addr));
unix_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if(strlen(hdl->c_path) >= sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path))
{
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_PATH_ERR;
}
snprintf(unix_addr.sun_path, sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path), "%s", hdl->c_path);
len = SUN_LEN(&unix_addr);
unlink(unix_addr.sun_path);
if(bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&unix_addr, len) < 0)
{
unlink(hdl->c_path);
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_BIND_ERR;
}
if(chmod(unix_addr.sun_path, S_IRWXU) < 0)
{
unlink(hdl->c_path);
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_CHMOD_ERR;
}
memset(&unix_addr,0,sizeof(unix_addr));
unix_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strncpy(unix_addr.sun_path, hdl->s_path, sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path));
unix_addr.sun_path[sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path)-1] = 0;
len = SUN_LEN(&unix_addr);
if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &unix_addr, len) < 0)
{
unlink(hdl->c_path);
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_CONX_ERR;
}
hdl->client_fd = fd;
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_CT;
if(unix_sck_send_conn(hdl, 2) != HSM_COM_OK)
{
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_IN;
return HSM_COM_SEND_ERR;
}
return HSM_COM_OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362 | unix_client_connect(hsm_com_client_hdl_t *hdl)
{
int fd, len;
struct sockaddr_un unix_addr;
hsm_com_errno_t res = HSM_COM_OK;
if ((fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
{
return HSM_COM_ERROR;
}
memset(&unix_addr,0,sizeof(unix_addr));
unix_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if(strlen(hdl->c_path) >= sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path))
{
res = HSM_COM_PATH_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
snprintf(unix_addr.sun_path, sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path), "%s", hdl->c_path);
len = SUN_LEN(&unix_addr);
unlink(unix_addr.sun_path);
if(bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&unix_addr, len) < 0)
{
res = HSM_COM_BIND_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if(chmod(unix_addr.sun_path, S_IRWXU) < 0)
{
res = HSM_COM_CHMOD_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
memset(&unix_addr,0,sizeof(unix_addr));
unix_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strncpy(unix_addr.sun_path, hdl->s_path, sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path));
unix_addr.sun_path[sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path)-1] = 0;
len = SUN_LEN(&unix_addr);
if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &unix_addr, len) < 0)
{
res = HSM_COM_CONX_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
hdl->client_fd = fd;
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_CT;
if(unix_sck_send_conn(hdl, 2) != HSM_COM_OK)
{
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_IN;
res = HSM_COM_SEND_ERR;
}
return res;
cleanup:
close(fd);
return res;
}
| 170,128 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::NetworkThrottleManagerImpl()
: lifetime_median_estimate_(PercentileEstimator::kMedianPercentile,
kInitialMedianInMs),
outstanding_recomputation_timer_(
base::MakeUnique<base::Timer>(false /* retain_user_task */,
false /* is_repeating */)),
tick_clock_(new base::DefaultTickClock()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::NetworkThrottleManagerImpl()
: lifetime_median_estimate_(PercentileEstimator::kMedianPercentile,
kInitialMedianInMs),
outstanding_recomputation_timer_(
std::make_unique<base::Timer>(false /* retain_user_task */,
false /* is_repeating */)),
tick_clock_(new base::DefaultTickClock()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
| 173,266 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void locationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeSetterForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationWithPerWorldBindings());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void locationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeSetterForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<TestNode> imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationWithPerWorldBindings());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
| 171,690 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMXNodeInstance::OMXNodeInstance(
OMX *owner, const sp<IOMXObserver> &observer, const char *name)
: mOwner(owner),
mNodeID(0),
mHandle(NULL),
mObserver(observer),
mDying(false),
mBufferIDCount(0)
{
mName = ADebug::GetDebugName(name);
DEBUG = ADebug::GetDebugLevelFromProperty(name, "debug.stagefright.omx-debug");
ALOGV("debug level for %s is %d", name, DEBUG);
DEBUG_BUMP = DEBUG;
mNumPortBuffers[0] = 0;
mNumPortBuffers[1] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[0] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[1] = 0;
mMetadataType[0] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mMetadataType[1] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mSecureBufferType[0] = kSecureBufferTypeUnknown;
mSecureBufferType[1] = kSecureBufferTypeUnknown;
mIsSecure = AString(name).endsWith(".secure");
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | OMXNodeInstance::OMXNodeInstance(
OMX *owner, const sp<IOMXObserver> &observer, const char *name)
: mOwner(owner),
mNodeID(0),
mHandle(NULL),
mObserver(observer),
mDying(false),
mSailed(false),
mQueriedProhibitedExtensions(false),
mBufferIDCount(0)
{
mName = ADebug::GetDebugName(name);
DEBUG = ADebug::GetDebugLevelFromProperty(name, "debug.stagefright.omx-debug");
ALOGV("debug level for %s is %d", name, DEBUG);
DEBUG_BUMP = DEBUG;
mNumPortBuffers[0] = 0;
mNumPortBuffers[1] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[0] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[1] = 0;
mMetadataType[0] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mMetadataType[1] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mSecureBufferType[0] = kSecureBufferTypeUnknown;
mSecureBufferType[1] = kSecureBufferTypeUnknown;
mIsSecure = AString(name).endsWith(".secure");
}
| 174,129 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool SVGFEColorMatrixElement::setFilterEffectAttribute(FilterEffect* effect, const QualifiedName& attrName)
{
FEColorMatrix* colorMatrix = static_cast<FEColorMatrix*>(effect);
if (attrName == SVGNames::typeAttr)
return colorMatrix->setType(m_type->currentValue()->enumValue());
if (attrName == SVGNames::valuesAttr)
return colorMatrix->setValues(m_values->currentValue()->toFloatVector());
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Explicitly enforce values size in feColorMatrix.
R=senorblanco@chromium.org
BUG=468519
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1075413002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@193571 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | bool SVGFEColorMatrixElement::setFilterEffectAttribute(FilterEffect* effect, const QualifiedName& attrName)
{
FEColorMatrix* colorMatrix = static_cast<FEColorMatrix*>(effect);
if (attrName == SVGNames::typeAttr)
return colorMatrix->setType(m_type->currentValue()->enumValue());
if (attrName == SVGNames::valuesAttr) {
Vector<float> values = m_values->currentValue()->toFloatVector();
if (values.size() == 20)
return colorMatrix->setValues(m_values->currentValue()->toFloatVector());
return false;
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return false;
}
| 171,979 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static __net_init int setup_net(struct net *net, struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
/* Must be called with pernet_ops_rwsem held */
const struct pernet_operations *ops, *saved_ops;
int error = 0;
LIST_HEAD(net_exit_list);
refcount_set(&net->count, 1);
refcount_set(&net->passive, 1);
net->dev_base_seq = 1;
net->user_ns = user_ns;
idr_init(&net->netns_ids);
spin_lock_init(&net->nsid_lock);
mutex_init(&net->ipv4.ra_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(ops, &pernet_list, list) {
error = ops_init(ops, net);
if (error < 0)
goto out_undo;
}
down_write(&net_rwsem);
list_add_tail_rcu(&net->list, &net_namespace_list);
up_write(&net_rwsem);
out:
return error;
out_undo:
/* Walk through the list backwards calling the exit functions
* for the pernet modules whose init functions did not fail.
*/
list_add(&net->exit_list, &net_exit_list);
saved_ops = ops;
list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list)
ops_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
ops = saved_ops;
list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list)
ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
rcu_barrier();
goto out;
}
Commit Message: netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static __net_init int setup_net(struct net *net, struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
/* Must be called with pernet_ops_rwsem held */
const struct pernet_operations *ops, *saved_ops;
int error = 0;
LIST_HEAD(net_exit_list);
refcount_set(&net->count, 1);
refcount_set(&net->passive, 1);
get_random_bytes(&net->hash_mix, sizeof(u32));
net->dev_base_seq = 1;
net->user_ns = user_ns;
idr_init(&net->netns_ids);
spin_lock_init(&net->nsid_lock);
mutex_init(&net->ipv4.ra_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(ops, &pernet_list, list) {
error = ops_init(ops, net);
if (error < 0)
goto out_undo;
}
down_write(&net_rwsem);
list_add_tail_rcu(&net->list, &net_namespace_list);
up_write(&net_rwsem);
out:
return error;
out_undo:
/* Walk through the list backwards calling the exit functions
* for the pernet modules whose init functions did not fail.
*/
list_add(&net->exit_list, &net_exit_list);
saved_ops = ops;
list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list)
ops_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
ops = saved_ops;
list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list)
ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
rcu_barrier();
goto out;
}
| 169,715 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void FramePktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
if (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) {
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void FramePktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
| 174,502 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void copyStereo8(
short *dst,
const int *const *src,
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i] << 8;
*dst++ = src[1][i] << 8;
}
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void copyStereo8(
short *dst,
const int * src[FLACParser::kMaxChannels],
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i] << 8;
*dst++ = src[1][i] << 8;
}
}
| 174,023 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DownloadRequestLimiter::TabDownloadState::DidStartNavigation(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsInMainFrame())
return;
download_seen_ = false;
ui_status_ = DOWNLOAD_UI_DEFAULT;
if (navigation_handle->IsRendererInitiated() &&
(status_ == PROMPT_BEFORE_DOWNLOAD || status_ == DOWNLOADS_NOT_ALLOWED)) {
return;
}
if (status_ == DownloadRequestLimiter::ALLOW_ALL_DOWNLOADS ||
status_ == DownloadRequestLimiter::DOWNLOADS_NOT_ALLOWED) {
if (!initial_page_host_.empty() &&
navigation_handle->GetURL().host_piece() == initial_page_host_) {
return;
}
}
NotifyCallbacks(false);
host_->Remove(this, web_contents());
}
Commit Message: Don't reset TabDownloadState on history back/forward
Currently performing forward/backward on a tab will reset the TabDownloadState.
Which allows javascript code to do trigger multiple downloads.
This CL disables that behavior by not resetting the TabDownloadState on
forward/back.
It is still possible to reset the TabDownloadState through user gesture
or using browser initiated download.
BUG=848535
Change-Id: I7f9bf6e8fb759b4dcddf5ac0c214e8c6c9f48863
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1108959
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#574437}
CWE ID: | void DownloadRequestLimiter::TabDownloadState::DidStartNavigation(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsInMainFrame())
return;
download_seen_ = false;
ui_status_ = DOWNLOAD_UI_DEFAULT;
if (status_ == PROMPT_BEFORE_DOWNLOAD || status_ == DOWNLOADS_NOT_ALLOWED) {
std::string host = navigation_handle->GetURL().host();
// If the navigation is renderer-initiated (but not user-initiated), ensure
// that a prompting or blocking limiter state is not reset, so
// window.location.href or meta refresh can't be abused to avoid the
// limiter.
if (navigation_handle->IsRendererInitiated()) {
if (!host.empty())
restricted_hosts_.emplace(host);
return;
}
// If this is a forward/back navigation, also don't reset a prompting or
// blocking limiter state unless a new host is encounted. This prevents a
// page to use history forward/backward to trigger multiple downloads.
if (IsNavigationRestricted(navigation_handle))
return;
}
if (status_ == DownloadRequestLimiter::ALLOW_ALL_DOWNLOADS ||
status_ == DownloadRequestLimiter::DOWNLOADS_NOT_ALLOWED) {
if (!initial_page_host_.empty() &&
navigation_handle->GetURL().host_piece() == initial_page_host_) {
return;
}
}
NotifyCallbacks(false);
host_->Remove(this, web_contents());
}
| 173,189 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NetworkHandler::GetResponseBodyForInterception(
const String& interception_id,
std::unique_ptr<GetResponseBodyForInterceptionCallback> callback) {
DevToolsInterceptorController* interceptor =
DevToolsInterceptorController::FromBrowserContext(
process_->GetBrowserContext());
if (!interceptor) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
interceptor->GetResponseBody(interception_id, std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void NetworkHandler::GetResponseBodyForInterception(
const String& interception_id,
std::unique_ptr<GetResponseBodyForInterceptionCallback> callback) {
DevToolsInterceptorController* interceptor =
DevToolsInterceptorController::FromBrowserContext(browser_context_);
if (!interceptor) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
interceptor->GetResponseBody(interception_id, std::move(callback));
}
| 172,758 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Response StorageHandler::UntrackIndexedDBForOrigin(const std::string& origin) {
if (!process_)
return Response::InternalError();
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid())
return Response::InvalidParams(origin + " is not a valid URL");
GetIndexedDBObserver()->TaskRunner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&IndexedDBObserver::UntrackOriginOnIDBThread,
base::Unretained(GetIndexedDBObserver()),
url::Origin::Create(origin_url)));
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | Response StorageHandler::UntrackIndexedDBForOrigin(const std::string& origin) {
if (!storage_partition_)
return Response::InternalError();
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid())
return Response::InvalidParams(origin + " is not a valid URL");
GetIndexedDBObserver()->TaskRunner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&IndexedDBObserver::UntrackOriginOnIDBThread,
base::Unretained(GetIndexedDBObserver()),
url::Origin::Create(origin_url)));
return Response::OK();
}
| 172,779 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MockRenderProcess::MockRenderProcess()
: transport_dib_next_sequence_number_(0) {
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | MockRenderProcess::MockRenderProcess()
: transport_dib_next_sequence_number_(0),
enabled_bindings_(0) {
}
| 171,020 |
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