instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted (GFile *file,
GtkWindow *parent_window,
gboolean interactive,
NautilusOpCallback done_callback,
gpointer done_callback_data)
{
GTask *task;
MarkTrustedJob *job;
job = op_job_new (MarkTrustedJob, parent_window);
job->file = g_object_ref (file);
job->interactive = interactive;
job->done_callback = done_callback;
job->done_callback_data = done_callback_data;
task = g_task_new (NULL, NULL, mark_trusted_task_done, job);
g_task_set_task_data (task, job, NULL);
g_task_run_in_thread (task, mark_trusted_task_thread_func);
g_object_unref (task);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted (GFile *file,
nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_executable (GFile *file,
GtkWindow *parent_window,
gboolean interactive,
NautilusOpCallback done_callback,
gpointer done_callback_data)
{
GTask *task;
MarkTrustedJob *job;
job = op_job_new (MarkTrustedJob, parent_window);
job->file = g_object_ref (file);
job->interactive = interactive;
job->done_callback = done_callback;
job->done_callback_data = done_callback_data;
task = g_task_new (NULL, NULL, mark_desktop_file_executable_task_done, job);
g_task_set_task_data (task, job, NULL);
g_task_run_in_thread (task, mark_desktop_file_executable_task_thread_func);
g_object_unref (task);
}
| 167,751 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport int LocaleLowercase(const int c)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(tolower_l(c,c_locale));
#endif
return(tolower(c));
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-125 | MagickExport int LocaleLowercase(const int c)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(tolower_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(tolower((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
| 170,233 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ResetState() {
nav_handle1_.reset();
nav_handle2_.reset();
nav_handle3_.reset();
throttle1_.reset();
throttle2_.reset();
throttle3_.reset();
contents1_.reset();
contents2_.reset();
contents3_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | void ResetState() {
nav_handle1_.reset();
nav_handle2_.reset();
nav_handle3_.reset();
throttle1_.reset();
throttle2_.reset();
throttle3_.reset();
// ChromeTestHarnessWithLocalDB::TearDown() deletes the
contents1_.reset();
contents2_.reset();
contents3_.reset();
}
| 172,231 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TestCompletionCallback()
: callback_(base::Bind(&TestCompletionCallback::SetResult,
base::Unretained(this))) {}
Commit Message: Update helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest for OnceCallback
Helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest.cc don't fit to OnceCallback
migration, as they are copied and passed to others.
This CL updates them to pass new callbacks for each use to avoid the
copy of callbacks.
Bug: 714018
Change-Id: Ifb70901439ae92b6b049b84534283c39ebc40ee0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/527549
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478549}
CWE ID: | TestCompletionCallback()
| 171,975 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
if (index == browser_->active_index()) {
infobar_container_->ChangeTabContents(NULL);
UpdateDevToolsForContents(NULL);
}
contents_container_->DetachTab(contents);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void BrowserWindowGtk::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
void BrowserWindowGtk::TabDetachedAt(WebContents* contents, int index) {
if (index == browser_->active_index()) {
infobar_container_->ChangeTabContents(NULL);
UpdateDevToolsForContents(NULL);
}
contents_container_->DetachTab(contents);
}
| 171,513 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: vpx_codec_err_t Decoder::DecodeFrame(const uint8_t *cxdata, size_t size) {
vpx_codec_err_t res_dec;
InitOnce();
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
res_dec = vpx_codec_decode(&decoder_,
cxdata, static_cast<unsigned int>(size),
NULL, 0));
return res_dec;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | vpx_codec_err_t Decoder::DecodeFrame(const uint8_t *cxdata, size_t size) {
return DecodeFrame(cxdata, size, NULL);
}
vpx_codec_err_t Decoder::DecodeFrame(const uint8_t *cxdata, size_t size,
void *user_priv) {
vpx_codec_err_t res_dec;
InitOnce();
API_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
res_dec = vpx_codec_decode(&decoder_,
cxdata, static_cast<unsigned int>(size),
user_priv, 0));
return res_dec;
}
| 174,534 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int tcp_v6_send_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
struct flowi *fl,
struct request_sock *req,
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc,
bool attach_req)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct flowi6 *fl6 = &fl->u.ip6;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err = -ENOMEM;
/* First, grab a route. */
if (!dst && (dst = inet6_csk_route_req(sk, fl6, req,
IPPROTO_TCP)) == NULL)
goto done;
skb = tcp_make_synack(sk, dst, req, foc, attach_req);
if (skb) {
__tcp_v6_send_check(skb, &ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr,
&ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr);
fl6->daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
if (np->repflow && ireq->pktopts)
fl6->flowlabel = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(ireq->pktopts));
err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
done:
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int tcp_v6_send_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
struct flowi *fl,
struct request_sock *req,
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc,
bool attach_req)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct flowi6 *fl6 = &fl->u.ip6;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err = -ENOMEM;
/* First, grab a route. */
if (!dst && (dst = inet6_csk_route_req(sk, fl6, req,
IPPROTO_TCP)) == NULL)
goto done;
skb = tcp_make_synack(sk, dst, req, foc, attach_req);
if (skb) {
__tcp_v6_send_check(skb, &ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr,
&ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr);
fl6->daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
if (np->repflow && ireq->pktopts)
fl6->flowlabel = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(ireq->pktopts));
err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
np->tclass);
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
done:
return err;
}
| 167,341 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_write_destroy(png_structp png_ptr)
{
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
jmp_buf tmp_jmp; /* Save jump buffer */
#endif
png_error_ptr error_fn;
png_error_ptr warning_fn;
png_voidp error_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
png_free_ptr free_fn;
#endif
png_debug(1, "in png_write_destroy");
/* Free any memory zlib uses */
deflateEnd(&png_ptr->zstream);
/* Free our memory. png_free checks NULL for us. */
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->zbuf);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->row_buf);
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->prev_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->sub_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->up_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->avg_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->paeth_row);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_TIME_RFC1123_SUPPORTED
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->time_buffer);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->prev_filters);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->filter_weights);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->inv_filter_weights);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->filter_costs);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->inv_filter_costs);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
/* Reset structure */
png_memcpy(tmp_jmp, png_ptr->jmpbuf, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
error_fn = png_ptr->error_fn;
warning_fn = png_ptr->warning_fn;
error_ptr = png_ptr->error_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
free_fn = png_ptr->free_fn;
#endif
png_memset(png_ptr, 0, png_sizeof(png_struct));
png_ptr->error_fn = error_fn;
png_ptr->warning_fn = warning_fn;
png_ptr->error_ptr = error_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->free_fn = free_fn;
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
png_memcpy(png_ptr->jmpbuf, tmp_jmp, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | png_write_destroy(png_structp png_ptr)
{
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
jmp_buf tmp_jmp; /* Save jump buffer */
#endif
png_error_ptr error_fn;
png_error_ptr warning_fn;
png_voidp error_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
png_free_ptr free_fn;
#endif
png_debug(1, "in png_write_destroy");
/* Free any memory zlib uses */
deflateEnd(&png_ptr->zstream);
/* Free our memory. png_free checks NULL for us. */
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->zbuf);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->row_buf);
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->prev_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->sub_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->up_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->avg_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->paeth_row);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_TIME_RFC1123_SUPPORTED
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->time_buffer);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
/* Reset structure */
png_memcpy(tmp_jmp, png_ptr->jmpbuf, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
error_fn = png_ptr->error_fn;
warning_fn = png_ptr->warning_fn;
error_ptr = png_ptr->error_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
free_fn = png_ptr->free_fn;
#endif
png_memset(png_ptr, 0, png_sizeof(png_struct));
png_ptr->error_fn = error_fn;
png_ptr->warning_fn = warning_fn;
png_ptr->error_ptr = error_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->free_fn = free_fn;
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
png_memcpy(png_ptr->jmpbuf, tmp_jmp, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
}
| 172,189 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: flx_set_palette_vector (FlxColorSpaceConverter * flxpal, guint start, guint num,
guchar * newpal, gint scale)
{
guint grab;
g_return_if_fail (flxpal != NULL);
g_return_if_fail (start < 0x100);
grab = ((start + num) > 0x100 ? 0x100 - start : num);
if (scale) {
gint i = 0;
start *= 3;
while (grab) {
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
grab--;
}
} else {
memcpy (&flxpal->palvec[start * 3], newpal, grab * 3);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | flx_set_palette_vector (FlxColorSpaceConverter * flxpal, guint start, guint num,
guchar * newpal, gint scale)
{
guint grab;
g_return_if_fail (flxpal != NULL);
g_return_if_fail (start < 0x100);
grab = ((start + num) > 0x100 ? 0x100 - start : num);
if (scale) {
gint i = 0;
start *= 3;
while (grab) {
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
grab--;
}
} else {
memcpy (&flxpal->palvec[start * 3], newpal, grab * 3);
}
}
| 165,245 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static zend_bool add_post_var(zval *arr, post_var_data_t *var, zend_bool eof)
{
char *ksep, *vsep, *val;
size_t klen, vlen;
size_t new_vlen;
if (var->ptr >= var->end) {
return 0;
}
vsep = memchr(var->ptr, '&', var->end - var->ptr);
if (!vsep) {
if (!eof) {
return 0;
} else {
vsep = var->end;
}
}
ksep = memchr(var->ptr, '=', vsep - var->ptr);
if (ksep) {
*ksep = '\0';
/* "foo=bar&" or "foo=&" */
klen = ksep - var->ptr;
vlen = vsep - ++ksep;
} else {
ksep = "";
/* "foo&" */
klen = vsep - var->ptr;
vlen = 0;
}
php_url_decode(var->ptr, klen);
val = estrndup(ksep, vlen);
if (vlen) {
vlen = php_url_decode(val, vlen);
}
if (sapi_module.input_filter(PARSE_POST, var->ptr, &val, vlen, &new_vlen)) {
php_register_variable_safe(var->ptr, val, new_vlen, arr);
}
efree(val);
var->ptr = vsep + (vsep != var->end);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73807
CWE ID: CWE-400 | static zend_bool add_post_var(zval *arr, post_var_data_t *var, zend_bool eof)
{
char *start, *ksep, *vsep, *val;
size_t klen, vlen;
size_t new_vlen;
if (var->ptr >= var->end) {
return 0;
}
start = var->ptr + var->already_scanned;
vsep = memchr(start, '&', var->end - start);
if (!vsep) {
if (!eof) {
var->already_scanned = var->end - var->ptr;
return 0;
} else {
vsep = var->end;
}
}
ksep = memchr(var->ptr, '=', vsep - var->ptr);
if (ksep) {
*ksep = '\0';
/* "foo=bar&" or "foo=&" */
klen = ksep - var->ptr;
vlen = vsep - ++ksep;
} else {
ksep = "";
/* "foo&" */
klen = vsep - var->ptr;
vlen = 0;
}
php_url_decode(var->ptr, klen);
val = estrndup(ksep, vlen);
if (vlen) {
vlen = php_url_decode(val, vlen);
}
if (sapi_module.input_filter(PARSE_POST, var->ptr, &val, vlen, &new_vlen)) {
php_register_variable_safe(var->ptr, val, new_vlen, arr);
}
efree(val);
var->ptr = vsep + (vsep != var->end);
var->already_scanned = 0;
return 1;
}
| 170,041 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void dump_completed_IO(struct inode * inode)
{
#ifdef EXT4_DEBUG
struct list_head *cur, *before, *after;
ext4_io_end_t *io, *io0, *io1;
if (list_empty(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_list)){
ext4_debug("inode %lu completed_io list is empty\n", inode->i_ino);
return;
}
ext4_debug("Dump inode %lu completed_io list \n", inode->i_ino);
list_for_each_entry(io, &EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_list, list){
cur = &io->list;
before = cur->prev;
io0 = container_of(before, ext4_io_end_t, list);
after = cur->next;
io1 = container_of(after, ext4_io_end_t, list);
ext4_debug("io 0x%p from inode %lu,prev 0x%p,next 0x%p\n",
io, inode->i_ino, io0, io1);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | static void dump_completed_IO(struct inode * inode)
{
#ifdef EXT4_DEBUG
struct list_head *cur, *before, *after;
ext4_io_end_t *io, *io0, *io1;
unsigned long flags;
if (list_empty(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_list)){
ext4_debug("inode %lu completed_io list is empty\n", inode->i_ino);
return;
}
ext4_debug("Dump inode %lu completed_io list \n", inode->i_ino);
spin_lock_irqsave(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(io, &EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_list, list){
cur = &io->list;
before = cur->prev;
io0 = container_of(before, ext4_io_end_t, list);
after = cur->next;
io1 = container_of(after, ext4_io_end_t, list);
ext4_debug("io 0x%p from inode %lu,prev 0x%p,next 0x%p\n",
io, inode->i_ino, io0, io1);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_lock, flags);
#endif
}
| 167,539 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static rsRetVal createSocket(instanceConf_t* info, void** sock) {
int rv;
sublist* sub;
*sock = zsocket_new(s_context, info->type);
if (!sock) {
errmsg.LogError(0,
RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS,
"zsocket_new failed: %s, for type %d",
zmq_strerror(errno),info->type);
/* DK: invalid params seems right here */
return RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
}
DBGPRINTF("imzmq3: socket of type %d created successfully\n", info->type)
/* Set options *before* the connect/bind. */
if (info->identity) zsocket_set_identity(*sock, info->identity);
if (info->sndBuf > -1) zsocket_set_sndbuf(*sock, info->sndBuf);
if (info->rcvBuf > -1) zsocket_set_rcvbuf(*sock, info->rcvBuf);
if (info->linger > -1) zsocket_set_linger(*sock, info->linger);
if (info->backlog > -1) zsocket_set_backlog(*sock, info->backlog);
if (info->sndTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_sndtimeo(*sock, info->sndTimeout);
if (info->rcvTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_rcvtimeo(*sock, info->rcvTimeout);
if (info->maxMsgSize > -1) zsocket_set_maxmsgsize(*sock, info->maxMsgSize);
if (info->rate > -1) zsocket_set_rate(*sock, info->rate);
if (info->recoveryIVL > -1) zsocket_set_recovery_ivl(*sock, info->recoveryIVL);
if (info->multicastHops > -1) zsocket_set_multicast_hops(*sock, info->multicastHops);
if (info->reconnectIVL > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl(*sock, info->reconnectIVL);
if (info->reconnectIVLMax > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl_max(*sock, info->reconnectIVLMax);
if (info->ipv4Only > -1) zsocket_set_ipv4only(*sock, info->ipv4Only);
if (info->affinity > -1) zsocket_set_affinity(*sock, info->affinity);
if (info->sndHWM > -1 ) zsocket_set_sndhwm(*sock, info->sndHWM);
if (info->rcvHWM > -1 ) zsocket_set_rcvhwm(*sock, info->rcvHWM);
/* Set subscriptions.*/
if (info->type == ZMQ_SUB) {
for(sub = info->subscriptions; sub!=NULL; sub=sub->next) {
zsocket_set_subscribe(*sock, sub->subscribe);
}
}
/* Do the bind/connect... */
if (info->action==ACTION_CONNECT) {
rv = zsocket_connect(*sock, info->description);
if (rv == -1) {
errmsg.LogError(0,
RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS,
"zmq_connect using %s failed: %s",
info->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
return RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
}
DBGPRINTF("imzmq3: connect for %s successful\n",info->description);
} else {
rv = zsocket_bind(*sock, info->description);
if (rv == -1) {
errmsg.LogError(0,
RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS,
"zmq_bind using %s failed: %s",
info->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
return RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
}
DBGPRINTF("imzmq3: bind for %s successful\n",info->description);
}
return RS_RET_OK;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1565 from Whissi/fix-format-security-issue-in-zmq-modules
Fix format security issue in zmq3 modules
CWE ID: CWE-134 | static rsRetVal createSocket(instanceConf_t* info, void** sock) {
int rv;
sublist* sub;
*sock = zsocket_new(s_context, info->type);
if (!sock) {
errmsg.LogError(0,
RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS,
"zsocket_new failed: %s, for type %d",
zmq_strerror(errno),info->type);
/* DK: invalid params seems right here */
return RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
}
DBGPRINTF("imzmq3: socket of type %d created successfully\n", info->type)
/* Set options *before* the connect/bind. */
if (info->identity) zsocket_set_identity(*sock, info->identity);
if (info->sndBuf > -1) zsocket_set_sndbuf(*sock, info->sndBuf);
if (info->rcvBuf > -1) zsocket_set_rcvbuf(*sock, info->rcvBuf);
if (info->linger > -1) zsocket_set_linger(*sock, info->linger);
if (info->backlog > -1) zsocket_set_backlog(*sock, info->backlog);
if (info->sndTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_sndtimeo(*sock, info->sndTimeout);
if (info->rcvTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_rcvtimeo(*sock, info->rcvTimeout);
if (info->maxMsgSize > -1) zsocket_set_maxmsgsize(*sock, info->maxMsgSize);
if (info->rate > -1) zsocket_set_rate(*sock, info->rate);
if (info->recoveryIVL > -1) zsocket_set_recovery_ivl(*sock, info->recoveryIVL);
if (info->multicastHops > -1) zsocket_set_multicast_hops(*sock, info->multicastHops);
if (info->reconnectIVL > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl(*sock, info->reconnectIVL);
if (info->reconnectIVLMax > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl_max(*sock, info->reconnectIVLMax);
if (info->ipv4Only > -1) zsocket_set_ipv4only(*sock, info->ipv4Only);
if (info->affinity > -1) zsocket_set_affinity(*sock, info->affinity);
if (info->sndHWM > -1 ) zsocket_set_sndhwm(*sock, info->sndHWM);
if (info->rcvHWM > -1 ) zsocket_set_rcvhwm(*sock, info->rcvHWM);
/* Set subscriptions.*/
if (info->type == ZMQ_SUB) {
for(sub = info->subscriptions; sub!=NULL; sub=sub->next) {
zsocket_set_subscribe(*sock, sub->subscribe);
}
}
/* Do the bind/connect... */
if (info->action==ACTION_CONNECT) {
rv = zsocket_connect(*sock, "%s", info->description);
if (rv == -1) {
errmsg.LogError(0,
RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS,
"zmq_connect using %s failed: %s",
info->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
return RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
}
DBGPRINTF("imzmq3: connect for %s successful\n",info->description);
} else {
rv = zsocket_bind(*sock, "%s", info->description);
if (rv == -1) {
errmsg.LogError(0,
RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS,
"zmq_bind using %s failed: %s",
info->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
return RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
}
DBGPRINTF("imzmq3: bind for %s successful\n",info->description);
}
return RS_RET_OK;
}
| 167,983 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_GetArrayItem( cJSON *array, int item )
{
cJSON *c = array->child;
while ( c && item > 0 ) {
--item;
c = c->next;
}
return c;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cJSON *cJSON_GetArrayItem( cJSON *array, int item )
| 167,286 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline const unsigned char *ReadResourceShort(const unsigned char *p,
unsigned short *quantum)
{
*quantum=(unsigned short) (*p++ << 8);
*quantum|=(unsigned short) (*p++ << 0);
return(p);
}static inline void WriteResourceLong(unsigned char *p,
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static inline const unsigned char *ReadResourceShort(const unsigned char *p,
unsigned short *quantum)
{
*quantum=(unsigned short) (*p++) << 8;
*quantum|=(unsigned short) (*p++);
return(p);
| 169,948 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::command(uint32_t cmdCode,
uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData,
uint32_t *replySize,
void *pReplyData)
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
ALOGVV("command(), cmdCode: %d, mEffectInterface: %p", cmdCode, mEffectInterface);
if (mState == DESTROYED || mEffectInterface == NULL) {
return NO_INIT;
}
if (mStatus != NO_ERROR) {
return mStatus;
}
if (cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM &&
(*replySize < sizeof(effect_param_t) ||
((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->psize > *replySize - sizeof(effect_param_t))) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29251553");
return -EINVAL;
}
status_t status = (*mEffectInterface)->command(mEffectInterface,
cmdCode,
cmdSize,
pCmdData,
replySize,
pReplyData);
if (cmdCode != EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM && status == NO_ERROR) {
uint32_t size = (replySize == NULL) ? 0 : *replySize;
for (size_t i = 1; i < mHandles.size(); i++) {
EffectHandle *h = mHandles[i];
if (h != NULL && !h->destroyed_l()) {
h->commandExecuted(cmdCode, cmdSize, pCmdData, size, pReplyData);
}
}
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::command(uint32_t cmdCode,
uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData,
uint32_t *replySize,
void *pReplyData)
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
ALOGVV("command(), cmdCode: %d, mEffectInterface: %p", cmdCode, mEffectInterface);
if (mState == DESTROYED || mEffectInterface == NULL) {
return NO_INIT;
}
if (mStatus != NO_ERROR) {
return mStatus;
}
if (cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM &&
(*replySize < sizeof(effect_param_t) ||
((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->psize > *replySize - sizeof(effect_param_t))) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29251553");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM
|| cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM_DEFERRED) && // DEFERRED not generally used
(sizeof(effect_param_t) > cmdSize
|| ((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->psize > cmdSize
- sizeof(effect_param_t)
|| ((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->vsize > cmdSize
- sizeof(effect_param_t)
- ((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->psize
|| roundUpDelta(((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->psize, (uint32_t)sizeof(int)) >
cmdSize
- sizeof(effect_param_t)
- ((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->psize
- ((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->vsize)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "30204301");
return -EINVAL;
}
status_t status = (*mEffectInterface)->command(mEffectInterface,
cmdCode,
cmdSize,
pCmdData,
replySize,
pReplyData);
if (cmdCode != EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM && status == NO_ERROR) {
uint32_t size = (replySize == NULL) ? 0 : *replySize;
for (size_t i = 1; i < mHandles.size(); i++) {
EffectHandle *h = mHandles[i];
if (h != NULL && !h->destroyed_l()) {
h->commandExecuted(cmdCode, cmdSize, pCmdData, size, pReplyData);
}
}
}
return status;
}
| 173,387 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateSecureBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, size_t size, OMX::buffer_id *buffer,
void **buffer_data, sp<NativeHandle> *native_handle) {
if (buffer == NULL || buffer_data == NULL || native_handle == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(size, portIndex);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, size);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBuffer, err, BUFFER_FMT(portIndex, "%zu@", size));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle) {
*buffer_data = NULL;
*native_handle = NativeHandle::create(
(native_handle_t *)header->pBuffer, false /* ownsHandle */);
} else {
*buffer_data = header->pBuffer;
*native_handle = NULL;
}
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateSecureBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p:%p", size, *buffer_data,
*native_handle == NULL ? NULL : (*native_handle)->handle()));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: OMXNodeInstance: sanity check portIndex.
Bug: 31385713
Change-Id: Ib91d00eb5cc8c51c84d37f5d36d6b7ca594d201f
(cherry picked from commit f80a1f5075a7c6e1982d37c68bfed7c9a611bb20)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateSecureBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, size_t size, OMX::buffer_id *buffer,
void **buffer_data, sp<NativeHandle> *native_handle) {
if (buffer == NULL || buffer_data == NULL || native_handle == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (portIndex >= NELEM(mSecureBufferType)) {
ALOGE("b/31385713, portIndex(%u)", portIndex);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "31385713");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(size, portIndex);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, size);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBuffer, err, BUFFER_FMT(portIndex, "%zu@", size));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle) {
*buffer_data = NULL;
*native_handle = NativeHandle::create(
(native_handle_t *)header->pBuffer, false /* ownsHandle */);
} else {
*buffer_data = header->pBuffer;
*native_handle = NULL;
}
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateSecureBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p:%p", size, *buffer_data,
*native_handle == NULL ? NULL : (*native_handle)->handle()));
return OK;
}
| 173,384 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static gboolean irssi_ssl_verify(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
{
if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) != X509_V_OK) {
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int n;
char *str;
g_warning("Could not verify SSL servers certificate:");
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), 0, 0)) == NULL)
g_warning(" Could not get subject-name from peer certificate");
else {
g_warning(" Subject : %s", str);
free(str);
}
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), 0, 0)) == NULL)
g_warning(" Could not get issuer-name from peer certificate");
else {
g_warning(" Issuer : %s", str);
free(str);
}
if (! X509_digest(cert, EVP_md5(), md, &n))
g_warning(" Could not get fingerprint from peer certificate");
else {
char hex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
char fp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*3];
if (n < sizeof(fp)) {
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
fp[i*3+0] = hex[(md[i] >> 4) & 0xF];
fp[i*3+1] = hex[(md[i] >> 0) & 0xF];
fp[i*3+2] = i == n - 1 ? '\0' : ':';
}
g_warning(" MD5 Fingerprint : %s", fp);
}
}
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static gboolean irssi_ssl_verify(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
/* Checks if the given string has internal NUL characters. */
static gboolean has_internal_nul(const char* str, int len) {
/* Remove trailing nul characters. They would give false alarms */
while (len > 0 && str[len-1] == 0)
len--;
return strlen(str) != len;
}
/* tls_dns_name - Extract valid DNS name from subjectAltName value */
static const char *tls_dns_name(const GENERAL_NAME * gn)
{
const char *dnsname;
/* We expect the OpenSSL library to construct GEN_DNS extension objects as
ASN1_IA5STRING values. Check we got the right union member. */
if (ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
g_warning("Invalid ASN1 value type in subjectAltName");
return NULL;
}
/* Safe to treat as an ASCII string possibly holding a DNS name */
dnsname = (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5);
if (has_internal_nul(dnsname, ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5))) {
g_warning("Internal NUL in subjectAltName");
return NULL;
}
return dnsname;
}
/* tls_text_name - extract certificate property value by name */
static char *tls_text_name(X509_NAME *name, int nid)
{
int pos;
X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
ASN1_STRING *entry_str;
int utf8_length;
unsigned char *utf8_value;
char *result;
if (name == 0 || (pos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, -1)) < 0) {
return NULL;
}
entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, pos);
g_return_val_if_fail(entry != NULL, NULL);
entry_str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry);
g_return_val_if_fail(entry_str != NULL, NULL);
/* Convert everything into UTF-8. It's up to OpenSSL to do something
reasonable when converting ASCII formats that contain non-ASCII
content. */
if ((utf8_length = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8_value, entry_str)) < 0) {
g_warning("Error decoding ASN.1 type=%d", ASN1_STRING_type(entry_str));
return NULL;
}
if (has_internal_nul((char *)utf8_value, utf8_length)) {
g_warning("NUL character in hostname in certificate");
OPENSSL_free(utf8_value);
return NULL;
}
result = g_strdup((char *) utf8_value);
OPENSSL_free(utf8_value);
return result;
}
/** check if a hostname in the certificate matches the hostname we used for the connection */
static gboolean match_hostname(const char *cert_hostname, const char *hostname)
{
const char *hostname_left;
if (!strcasecmp(cert_hostname, hostname)) { /* exact match */
return TRUE;
} else if (cert_hostname[0] == '*' && cert_hostname[1] == '.' && cert_hostname[2] != 0) { /* wildcard match */
/* The initial '*' matches exactly one hostname component */
hostname_left = strchr(hostname, '.');
if (hostname_left != NULL && ! strcasecmp(hostname_left + 1, cert_hostname + 2)) {
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
/* based on verify_extract_name from tls_client.c in postfix */
static gboolean irssi_ssl_verify_hostname(X509 *cert, const char *hostname)
{
int gen_index, gen_count;
gboolean matched = FALSE, has_dns_name = FALSE;
const char *cert_dns_name;
char *cert_subject_cn;
const GENERAL_NAME *gn;
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) * gens;
/* Verify the dNSName(s) in the peer certificate against the hostname. */
gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, 0, 0);
if (gens) {
gen_count = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens);
for (gen_index = 0; gen_index < gen_count && !matched; ++gen_index) {
gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, gen_index);
if (gn->type != GEN_DNS)
continue;
/* Even if we have an invalid DNS name, we still ultimately
ignore the CommonName, because subjectAltName:DNS is
present (though malformed). */
has_dns_name = TRUE;
cert_dns_name = tls_dns_name(gn);
if (cert_dns_name && *cert_dns_name) {
matched = match_hostname(cert_dns_name, hostname);
}
}
/* Free stack *and* member GENERAL_NAME objects */
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free);
}
if (has_dns_name) {
if (! matched) {
/* The CommonName in the issuer DN is obsolete when SubjectAltName is available. */
g_warning("None of the Subject Alt Names in the certificate match hostname '%s'", hostname);
}
return matched;
} else { /* No subjectAltNames, look at CommonName */
cert_subject_cn = tls_text_name(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NID_commonName);
if (cert_subject_cn && *cert_subject_cn) {
matched = match_hostname(cert_subject_cn, hostname);
if (! matched) {
g_warning("SSL certificate common name '%s' doesn't match host name '%s'", cert_subject_cn, hostname);
}
} else {
g_warning("No subjectAltNames and no valid common name in certificate");
}
free(cert_subject_cn);
}
return matched;
}
static gboolean irssi_ssl_verify(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx, const char* hostname, X509 *cert)
{
if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) != X509_V_OK) {
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int n;
char *str;
g_warning("Could not verify SSL servers certificate:");
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), 0, 0)) == NULL)
g_warning(" Could not get subject-name from peer certificate");
else {
g_warning(" Subject : %s", str);
free(str);
}
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), 0, 0)) == NULL)
g_warning(" Could not get issuer-name from peer certificate");
else {
g_warning(" Issuer : %s", str);
free(str);
}
if (! X509_digest(cert, EVP_md5(), md, &n))
g_warning(" Could not get fingerprint from peer certificate");
else {
char hex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
char fp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*3];
if (n < sizeof(fp)) {
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
fp[i*3+0] = hex[(md[i] >> 4) & 0xF];
fp[i*3+1] = hex[(md[i] >> 0) & 0xF];
fp[i*3+2] = i == n - 1 ? '\0' : ':';
}
g_warning(" MD5 Fingerprint : %s", fp);
}
}
return FALSE;
} else if (! irssi_ssl_verify_hostname(cert, hostname)){
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
| 165,518 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static plist_t parse_string_node(const char **bnode, uint64_t size)
{
plist_data_t data = plist_new_plist_data();
data->type = PLIST_STRING;
data->strval = (char *) malloc(sizeof(char) * (size + 1));
memcpy(data->strval, *bnode, size);
data->strval[size] = '\0';
data->length = strlen(data->strval);
return node_create(NULL, data);
}
Commit Message: bplist: Make sure to bail out if malloc() fails in parse_string_node()
Credit to Wang Junjie <zhunkibatu@gmail.com> (#93)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static plist_t parse_string_node(const char **bnode, uint64_t size)
{
plist_data_t data = plist_new_plist_data();
data->type = PLIST_STRING;
data->strval = (char *) malloc(sizeof(char) * (size + 1));
if (!data->strval) {
plist_free_data(data);
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: Could not allocate %" PRIu64 " bytes\n", __func__, sizeof(char) * (size + 1));
return NULL;
}
memcpy(data->strval, *bnode, size);
data->strval[size] = '\0';
data->length = strlen(data->strval);
return node_create(NULL, data);
}
| 168,335 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: CStarter::removeDeferredJobs() {
bool ret = true;
if ( this->deferral_tid == -1 ) {
return ( ret );
}
m_deferred_job_update = true;
if ( daemonCore->Cancel_Timer( this->deferral_tid ) >= 0 ) {
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, "Cancelled time deferred execution for "
"Job %d.%d\n",
this->jic->jobCluster(),
this->jic->jobProc() );
this->deferral_tid = -1;
} else {
MyString error = "Failed to cancel deferred execution timer for Job ";
error += this->jic->jobCluster();
error += ".";
error += this->jic->jobProc();
EXCEPT( error.Value() );
ret = false;
}
return ( ret );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | CStarter::removeDeferredJobs() {
bool ret = true;
if ( this->deferral_tid == -1 ) {
return ( ret );
}
m_deferred_job_update = true;
if ( daemonCore->Cancel_Timer( this->deferral_tid ) >= 0 ) {
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, "Cancelled time deferred execution for "
"Job %d.%d\n",
this->jic->jobCluster(),
this->jic->jobProc() );
this->deferral_tid = -1;
} else {
MyString error = "Failed to cancel deferred execution timer for Job ";
error += this->jic->jobCluster();
error += ".";
error += this->jic->jobProc();
EXCEPT( "%s", error.Value() );
ret = false;
}
return ( ret );
}
| 165,379 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int nfs_can_extend_write(struct file *file, struct page *page, struct inode *inode)
{
if (file->f_flags & O_DSYNC)
return 0;
if (NFS_PROTO(inode)->have_delegation(inode, FMODE_WRITE))
return 1;
if (nfs_write_pageuptodate(page, inode) && (inode->i_flock == NULL ||
(inode->i_flock->fl_start == 0 &&
inode->i_flock->fl_end == OFFSET_MAX &&
inode->i_flock->fl_type != F_RDLCK)))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int nfs_can_extend_write(struct file *file, struct page *page, struct inode *inode)
{
if (file->f_flags & O_DSYNC)
return 0;
if (!nfs_write_pageuptodate(page, inode))
return 0;
if (NFS_PROTO(inode)->have_delegation(inode, FMODE_WRITE))
return 1;
if (inode->i_flock == NULL || (inode->i_flock->fl_start == 0 &&
inode->i_flock->fl_end == OFFSET_MAX &&
inode->i_flock->fl_type != F_RDLCK))
return 1;
return 0;
}
| 166,424 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void re_yyensure_buffer_stack (yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
yy_size_t num_to_alloc;
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
if (!yyg->yy_buffer_stack) {
/* First allocation is just for 2 elements, since we don't know if this
* scanner will even need a stack. We use 2 instead of 1 to avoid an
* immediate realloc on the next call.
*/
num_to_alloc = 1; // After all that talk, this was set to 1 anyways...
yyg->yy_buffer_stack = (struct yy_buffer_state**)re_yyalloc
(num_to_alloc * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*)
, yyscanner);
if ( ! yyg->yy_buffer_stack )
YY_FATAL_ERROR( "out of dynamic memory in re_yyensure_buffer_stack()" );
memset(yyg->yy_buffer_stack, 0, num_to_alloc * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*));
yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max = num_to_alloc;
yyg->yy_buffer_stack_top = 0;
return;
}
if (yyg->yy_buffer_stack_top >= (yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max) - 1){
/* Increase the buffer to prepare for a possible push. */
yy_size_t grow_size = 8 /* arbitrary grow size */;
num_to_alloc = yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max + grow_size;
yyg->yy_buffer_stack = (struct yy_buffer_state**)re_yyrealloc
(yyg->yy_buffer_stack,
num_to_alloc * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*)
, yyscanner);
if ( ! yyg->yy_buffer_stack )
YY_FATAL_ERROR( "out of dynamic memory in re_yyensure_buffer_stack()" );
/* zero only the new slots.*/
memset(yyg->yy_buffer_stack + yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max, 0, grow_size * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*));
yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max = num_to_alloc;
}
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static void re_yyensure_buffer_stack (yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
yy_size_t num_to_alloc;
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
if (!yyg->yy_buffer_stack) {
/* First allocation is just for 2 elements, since we don't know if this
* scanner will even need a stack. We use 2 instead of 1 to avoid an
* immediate realloc on the next call.
*/
num_to_alloc = 1; // After all that talk, this was set to 1 anyways...
yyg->yy_buffer_stack = (struct yy_buffer_state**)re_yyalloc
(num_to_alloc * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*)
, yyscanner);
if ( ! yyg->yy_buffer_stack )
YY_FATAL_ERROR( "out of dynamic memory in re_yyensure_buffer_stack()" );
memset(yyg->yy_buffer_stack, 0, num_to_alloc * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*));
yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max = num_to_alloc;
yyg->yy_buffer_stack_top = 0;
return;
}
if (yyg->yy_buffer_stack_top >= (yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max) - 1){
/* Increase the buffer to prepare for a possible push. */
yy_size_t grow_size = 8 /* arbitrary grow size */;
num_to_alloc = yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max + grow_size;
yyg->yy_buffer_stack = (struct yy_buffer_state**)re_yyrealloc
(yyg->yy_buffer_stack,
num_to_alloc * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*)
, yyscanner);
if ( ! yyg->yy_buffer_stack )
YY_FATAL_ERROR( "out of dynamic memory in re_yyensure_buffer_stack()" );
/* zero only the new slots.*/
memset(yyg->yy_buffer_stack + yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max, 0, grow_size * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*));
yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max = num_to_alloc;
}
}
| 168,482 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SVGDocumentExtensions::startAnimations()
{
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> > timeContainers;
timeContainers.appendRange(m_timeContainers.begin(), m_timeContainers.end());
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator end = timeContainers.end();
for (WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator itr = timeContainers.begin(); itr != end; ++itr)
(*itr)->timeContainer()->begin();
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void SVGDocumentExtensions::startAnimations()
{
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> > timeContainers;
timeContainers.appendRange(m_timeContainers.begin(), m_timeContainers.end());
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator end = timeContainers.end();
for (WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator itr = timeContainers.begin(); itr != end; ++itr) {
SMILTimeContainer* timeContainer = (*itr)->timeContainer();
if (!timeContainer->isStarted())
timeContainer->begin();
}
}
| 171,649 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session,
TargetRegistry* registry) {
if (!ShouldAllowSession(session))
return false;
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(
GetId(),
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->devtools_frame_token()
: base::UnguessableToken(),
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(
session->client()->MayDiscoverTargets()
? protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kRegular
: protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kAutoAttachOnly,
GetId(), registry)));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(emulation_handler)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (!frame_tree_node_ || !frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(
new protocol::TracingHandler(frame_tree_node_, GetIOContext())));
}
if (sessions().empty()) {
bool use_video_capture_api = true;
#ifdef OS_ANDROID
if (!CompositorImpl::IsInitialized())
use_video_capture_api = false;
#endif
if (!use_video_capture_api)
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session,
TargetRegistry* registry) {
if (!ShouldAllowSession(session))
return false;
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(
GetId(),
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->devtools_frame_token()
: base::UnguessableToken(),
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(
session->client()->MayDiscoverTargets()
? protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kRegular
: protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kAutoAttachOnly,
GetId(), registry)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(
emulation_handler, session->client()->MayAffectLocalFiles())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (!frame_tree_node_ || !frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(
new protocol::TracingHandler(frame_tree_node_, GetIOContext())));
}
if (sessions().empty()) {
bool use_video_capture_api = true;
#ifdef OS_ANDROID
if (!CompositorImpl::IsInitialized())
use_video_capture_api = false;
#endif
if (!use_video_capture_api)
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
return true;
}
| 172,609 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::NoneSupported(const String& message) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "NoneSupported(" << (void*)this << ", message='" << message
<< "')";
StopPeriodicTimers();
load_state_ = kWaitingForSource;
current_source_node_ = nullptr;
error_ = MediaError::Create(MediaError::kMediaErrSrcNotSupported, message);
ForgetResourceSpecificTracks();
SetNetworkState(kNetworkNoSource);
UpdateDisplayState();
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::error);
ScheduleRejectPlayPromises(kNotSupportedError);
CloseMediaSource();
SetShouldDelayLoadEvent(false);
if (GetLayoutObject())
GetLayoutObject()->UpdateFromElement();
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void HTMLMediaElement::NoneSupported(const String& message) {
void HTMLMediaElement::NoneSupported(const String& input_message) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "NoneSupported(" << (void*)this << ", message='"
<< input_message << "')";
StopPeriodicTimers();
load_state_ = kWaitingForSource;
current_source_node_ = nullptr;
String empty_string;
const String& message = MediaShouldBeOpaque() ? empty_string : input_message;
error_ = MediaError::Create(MediaError::kMediaErrSrcNotSupported, message);
ForgetResourceSpecificTracks();
SetNetworkState(kNetworkNoSource);
UpdateDisplayState();
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::error);
ScheduleRejectPlayPromises(kNotSupportedError);
CloseMediaSource();
SetShouldDelayLoadEvent(false);
if (GetLayoutObject())
GetLayoutObject()->UpdateFromElement();
}
| 173,163 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: set_interface_var(const char *iface,
const char *var, const char *name,
uint32_t val)
{
FILE *fp;
char spath[64+IFNAMSIZ]; /* XXX: magic constant */
if (snprintf(spath, sizeof(spath), var, iface) >= sizeof(spath))
return -1;
if (access(spath, F_OK) != 0)
return -1;
fp = fopen(spath, "w");
if (!fp) {
if (name)
flog(LOG_ERR, "failed to set %s (%u) for %s: %s",
name, val, iface, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
fprintf(fp, "%u", val);
fclose(fp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: set_interface_var() doesn't check interface name and blindly does
fopen(path "/" ifname, "w") on it. As "ifname" is an untrusted input, it
should be checked for ".." and/or "/" in it. Otherwise, an infected
unprivileged daemon may overwrite contents of file named "mtu",
"hoplimit", etc. in arbitrary location with arbitrary 32-bit value in
decimal representation ("%d"). If an attacker has a local account or
may create arbitrary symlinks with these names in any location (e.g.
/tmp), any file may be overwritten with a decimal value.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | set_interface_var(const char *iface,
const char *var, const char *name,
uint32_t val)
{
FILE *fp;
char spath[64+IFNAMSIZ]; /* XXX: magic constant */
if (snprintf(spath, sizeof(spath), var, iface) >= sizeof(spath))
return -1;
/* No path traversal */
if (strstr(name, "..") || strchr(name, '/'))
return -1;
if (access(spath, F_OK) != 0)
return -1;
fp = fopen(spath, "w");
if (!fp) {
if (name)
flog(LOG_ERR, "failed to set %s (%u) for %s: %s",
name, val, iface, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
fprintf(fp, "%u", val);
fclose(fp);
return 0;
}
| 166,550 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void parse_content_range(URLContext *h, const char *p)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
const char *slash;
if (!strncmp(p, "bytes ", 6)) {
p += 6;
s->off = strtoll(p, NULL, 10);
if ((slash = strchr(p, '/')) && strlen(slash) > 0)
s->filesize = strtoll(slash + 1, NULL, 10);
}
if (s->seekable == -1 && (!s->is_akamai || s->filesize != 2147483647))
h->is_streamed = 0; /* we _can_ in fact seek */
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void parse_content_range(URLContext *h, const char *p)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
const char *slash;
if (!strncmp(p, "bytes ", 6)) {
p += 6;
s->off = strtoull(p, NULL, 10);
if ((slash = strchr(p, '/')) && strlen(slash) > 0)
s->filesize = strtoull(slash + 1, NULL, 10);
}
if (s->seekable == -1 && (!s->is_akamai || s->filesize != 2147483647))
h->is_streamed = 0; /* we _can_ in fact seek */
}
| 168,503 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int key_len = 0, key_size = 0;
int str_len = 0, bin_len = 0, hex_len = 0;
xmlChar *key = NULL, *str = NULL, *padkey = NULL;
xmlChar *bin = NULL, *hex = NULL;
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt = NULL;
if (nargs != 2) {
xmlXPathSetArityError (ctxt);
return;
}
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
str = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
key = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
key_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (key);
if (key_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (key);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
padkey = xmlMallocAtomic (RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
if (padkey == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate padkey\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memset(padkey, 0, RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
key_size = xmlUTF8Strsize (key, key_len);
if ((key_size > RC4_KEY_LENGTH) || (key_size < 0)) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: key size too long or key broken\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memcpy (padkey, key, key_size);
/* encrypt it */
bin_len = str_len;
bin = xmlStrdup (str);
if (bin == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate string\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
PLATFORM_RC4_ENCRYPT (ctxt, padkey, str, str_len, bin, bin_len);
/* encode it */
hex_len = str_len * 2 + 1;
hex = xmlMallocAtomic (hex_len);
if (hex == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate result\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
exsltCryptoBin2Hex (bin, str_len, hex, hex_len);
xmlXPathReturnString (ctxt, hex);
done:
if (key != NULL)
xmlFree (key);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree (str);
if (padkey != NULL)
xmlFree (padkey);
if (bin != NULL)
xmlFree (bin);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int key_len = 0;
int str_len = 0, bin_len = 0, hex_len = 0;
xmlChar *key = NULL, *str = NULL, *padkey = NULL;
xmlChar *bin = NULL, *hex = NULL;
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt = NULL;
if (nargs != 2) {
xmlXPathSetArityError (ctxt);
return;
}
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
str = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
str_len = xmlStrlen (str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
key = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
key_len = xmlStrlen (key);
if (key_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (key);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
padkey = xmlMallocAtomic (RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
if (padkey == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate padkey\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memset(padkey, 0, RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
if ((key_len > RC4_KEY_LENGTH) || (key_len < 0)) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: key size too long or key broken\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memcpy (padkey, key, key_len);
/* encrypt it */
bin_len = str_len;
bin = xmlStrdup (str);
if (bin == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate string\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
PLATFORM_RC4_ENCRYPT (ctxt, padkey, str, str_len, bin, bin_len);
/* encode it */
hex_len = str_len * 2 + 1;
hex = xmlMallocAtomic (hex_len);
if (hex == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate result\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
exsltCryptoBin2Hex (bin, str_len, hex, hex_len);
xmlXPathReturnString (ctxt, hex);
done:
if (key != NULL)
xmlFree (key);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree (str);
if (padkey != NULL)
xmlFree (padkey);
if (bin != NULL)
xmlFree (bin);
}
| 173,288 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int hfsplus_set_posix_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl,
int type)
{
int err;
char *xattr_name;
size_t size = 0;
char *value = NULL;
hfs_dbg(ACL_MOD, "[%s]: ino %lu\n", __func__, inode->i_ino);
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
err = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
err = 0;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
if (unlikely(size > HFSPLUS_MAX_INLINE_DATA_SIZE))
return -ENOMEM;
value = (char *)hfsplus_alloc_attr_entry();
if (unlikely(!value))
return -ENOMEM;
err = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (unlikely(err < 0))
goto end_set_acl;
}
err = __hfsplus_setxattr(inode, xattr_name, value, size, 0);
end_set_acl:
hfsplus_destroy_attr_entry((hfsplus_attr_entry *)value);
if (!err)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return err;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | int hfsplus_set_posix_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl,
int type)
{
int err;
char *xattr_name;
size_t size = 0;
char *value = NULL;
hfs_dbg(ACL_MOD, "[%s]: ino %lu\n", __func__, inode->i_ino);
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
err = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
if (err)
return err;
}
err = 0;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
if (unlikely(size > HFSPLUS_MAX_INLINE_DATA_SIZE))
return -ENOMEM;
value = (char *)hfsplus_alloc_attr_entry();
if (unlikely(!value))
return -ENOMEM;
err = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (unlikely(err < 0))
goto end_set_acl;
}
err = __hfsplus_setxattr(inode, xattr_name, value, size, 0);
end_set_acl:
hfsplus_destroy_attr_entry((hfsplus_attr_entry *)value);
if (!err)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return err;
}
| 166,973 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int mem_check_range(struct rxe_mem *mem, u64 iova, size_t length)
{
switch (mem->type) {
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_DMA:
return 0;
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_MR:
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_FMR:
return ((iova < mem->iova) ||
((iova + length) > (mem->iova + mem->length))) ?
-EFAULT : 0;
default:
return -EFAULT;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/rxe: Fix mem_check_range integer overflow
Update the range check to avoid integer-overflow in edge case.
Resolves CVE 2016-8636.
Signed-off-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | int mem_check_range(struct rxe_mem *mem, u64 iova, size_t length)
{
switch (mem->type) {
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_DMA:
return 0;
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_MR:
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_FMR:
if (iova < mem->iova ||
length > mem->length ||
iova > mem->iova + mem->length - length)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
default:
return -EFAULT;
}
}
| 168,773 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: decode_rt_routing_info(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, char *buf, u_int buflen)
{
uint8_t route_target[8];
u_int plen;
ND_TCHECK(pptr[0]);
plen = pptr[0]; /* get prefix length */
if (0 == plen) {
snprintf(buf, buflen, "default route target");
return 1;
}
if (32 > plen)
return -1;
plen-=32; /* adjust prefix length */
if (64 < plen)
return -1;
memset(&route_target, 0, sizeof(route_target));
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[1], (plen + 7) / 8);
memcpy(&route_target, &pptr[1], (plen + 7) / 8);
if (plen % 8) {
((u_char *)&route_target)[(plen + 7) / 8 - 1] &=
((0xff00 >> (plen % 8)) & 0xff);
}
snprintf(buf, buflen, "origin AS: %s, route target %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(pptr+1)),
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, (u_char *)&route_target));
return 5 + (plen + 7) / 8;
trunc:
return -2;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13053/BGP: fix VPN route target bounds checks
decode_rt_routing_info() didn't check bounds before fetching 4 octets of
the origin AS field and could over-read the input buffer, put it right.
It also fetched the varying number of octets of the route target field
from 4 octets lower than the correct offset, put it right.
It also used the same temporary buffer explicitly through as_printf()
and implicitly through bgp_vpn_rd_print() so the end result of snprintf()
was not what was originally intended.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | decode_rt_routing_info(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, char *buf, u_int buflen)
{
uint8_t route_target[8];
u_int plen;
char asbuf[sizeof(astostr)]; /* bgp_vpn_rd_print() overwrites astostr */
/* NLRI "prefix length" from RFC 2858 Section 4. */
ND_TCHECK(pptr[0]);
plen = pptr[0]; /* get prefix length */
/* NLRI "prefix" (ibid), valid lengths are { 0, 32, 33, ..., 96 } bits.
* RFC 4684 Section 4 defines the layout of "origin AS" and "route
* target" fields inside the "prefix" depending on its length.
*/
if (0 == plen) {
/* Without "origin AS", without "route target". */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "default route target");
return 1;
}
if (32 > plen)
return -1;
/* With at least "origin AS", possibly with "route target". */
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(pptr + 1);
as_printf(ndo, asbuf, sizeof(asbuf), EXTRACT_32BITS(pptr + 1));
plen-=32; /* adjust prefix length */
if (64 < plen)
return -1;
/* From now on (plen + 7) / 8 evaluates to { 0, 1, 2, ..., 8 }
* and gives the number of octets in the variable-length "route
* target" field inside this NLRI "prefix". Look for it.
*/
memset(&route_target, 0, sizeof(route_target));
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[5], (plen + 7) / 8);
memcpy(&route_target, &pptr[5], (plen + 7) / 8);
/* Which specification says to do this? */
if (plen % 8) {
((u_char *)&route_target)[(plen + 7) / 8 - 1] &=
((0xff00 >> (plen % 8)) & 0xff);
}
snprintf(buf, buflen, "origin AS: %s, route target %s",
asbuf,
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, (u_char *)&route_target));
return 5 + (plen + 7) / 8;
trunc:
return -2;
}
| 167,820 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TaskService::TaskService()
: next_instance_id_(0), bound_instance_id_(kInvalidInstanceId) {}
Commit Message: Change ReadWriteLock to Lock+ConditionVariable in TaskService
There are non-trivial performance implications of using shared
SRWLocking on Windows as more state has to be checked.
Since there are only two uses of the ReadWriteLock in Chromium after
over 1 year, the decision is to remove it.
BUG=758721
Change-Id: I84d1987d7b624a89e896eb37184ee50845c39d80
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/634423
Commit-Queue: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Toyoshima <toyoshim@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Francois Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#497632}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | TaskService::TaskService()
| 172,213 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void r_bin_dwarf_dump_debug_info(FILE *f, const RBinDwarfDebugInfo *inf) {
size_t i, j, k;
RBinDwarfDIE *dies;
RBinDwarfAttrValue *values;
if (!inf || !f) {
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < inf->length; i++) {
fprintf (f, " Compilation Unit @ offset 0x%"PFMT64x":\n", inf->comp_units [i].offset);
fprintf (f, " Length: 0x%x\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.length);
fprintf (f, " Version: %d\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.version);
fprintf (f, " Abbrev Offset: 0x%x\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.abbrev_offset);
fprintf (f, " Pointer Size: %d\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.pointer_size);
dies = inf->comp_units[i].dies;
for (j = 0; j < inf->comp_units[i].length; j++) {
fprintf (f, " Abbrev Number: %"PFMT64u" ", dies[j].abbrev_code);
if (dies[j].tag && dies[j].tag <= DW_TAG_volatile_type &&
dwarf_tag_name_encodings[dies[j].tag]) {
fprintf (f, "(%s)\n", dwarf_tag_name_encodings[dies[j].tag]);
} else {
fprintf (f, "(Unknown abbrev tag)\n");
}
if (!dies[j].abbrev_code) {
continue;
}
values = dies[j].attr_values;
for (k = 0; k < dies[j].length; k++) {
if (!values[k].name)
continue;
if (values[k].name < DW_AT_vtable_elem_location &&
dwarf_attr_encodings[values[k].name]) {
fprintf (f, " %-18s : ", dwarf_attr_encodings[values[k].name]);
} else {
fprintf (f, " TODO\t");
}
r_bin_dwarf_dump_attr_value (&values[k], f);
fprintf (f, "\n");
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void r_bin_dwarf_dump_debug_info(FILE *f, const RBinDwarfDebugInfo *inf) {
size_t i, j, k;
RBinDwarfDIE *dies;
RBinDwarfAttrValue *values;
if (!inf || !f) {
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < inf->length; i++) {
fprintf (f, " Compilation Unit @ offset 0x%"PFMT64x":\n", inf->comp_units [i].offset);
fprintf (f, " Length: 0x%x\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.length);
fprintf (f, " Version: %d\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.version);
fprintf (f, " Abbrev Offset: 0x%x\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.abbrev_offset);
fprintf (f, " Pointer Size: %d\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.pointer_size);
dies = inf->comp_units[i].dies;
for (j = 0; j < inf->comp_units[i].length; j++) {
fprintf (f, " Abbrev Number: %"PFMT64u" ", dies[j].abbrev_code);
if (dies[j].tag && dies[j].tag <= DW_TAG_volatile_type &&
dwarf_tag_name_encodings[dies[j].tag]) {
fprintf (f, "(%s)\n", dwarf_tag_name_encodings[dies[j].tag]);
} else {
fprintf (f, "(Unknown abbrev tag)\n");
}
if (!dies[j].abbrev_code) {
continue;
}
values = dies[j].attr_values;
for (k = 0; k < dies[j].length; k++) {
if (!values[k].name) {
continue;
}
if (values[k].name < DW_AT_vtable_elem_location &&
dwarf_attr_encodings[values[k].name]) {
fprintf (f, " %-18s : ", dwarf_attr_encodings[values[k].name]);
} else {
fprintf (f, " TODO\t");
}
r_bin_dwarf_dump_attr_value (&values[k], f);
fprintf (f, "\n");
}
}
}
}
| 167,668 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XOpenDevice(
register Display *dpy,
register XID id)
{
register long rlen; /* raw length */
xOpenDeviceReq *req;
xOpenDeviceReply rep;
XDevice *dev;
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (_XiCheckExtInit(dpy, XInput_Initial_Release, info) == -1)
return NULL;
GetReq(OpenDevice, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->ReqType = X_OpenDevice;
req->deviceid = id;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (XDevice *) NULL;
return (XDevice *) NULL;
}
rlen = rep.length << 2;
dev = (XDevice *) Xmalloc(sizeof(XDevice) + rep.num_classes *
sizeof(XInputClassInfo));
if (dev) {
int dlen; /* data length */
_XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)rlen - dlen);
} else
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (dev);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284 | XOpenDevice(
register Display *dpy,
register XID id)
{
register long rlen; /* raw length */
xOpenDeviceReq *req;
xOpenDeviceReply rep;
XDevice *dev;
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (_XiCheckExtInit(dpy, XInput_Initial_Release, info) == -1)
return NULL;
GetReq(OpenDevice, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->ReqType = X_OpenDevice;
req->deviceid = id;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (XDevice *) NULL;
return (XDevice *) NULL;
}
if (rep.length < INT_MAX >> 2 &&
(rep.length << 2) >= rep.num_classes * sizeof(xInputClassInfo)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
dev = (XDevice *) Xmalloc(sizeof(XDevice) + rep.num_classes *
sizeof(XInputClassInfo));
} else {
rlen = 0;
dev = NULL;
}
if (dev) {
int dlen; /* data length */
_XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)rlen - dlen);
} else
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (dev);
}
| 164,921 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void svc_rdma_put_req_map(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
struct svc_rdma_req_map *map)
{
spin_lock(&xprt->sc_map_lock);
list_add(&map->free, &xprt->sc_maps);
spin_unlock(&xprt->sc_map_lock);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | void svc_rdma_put_req_map(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
| 168,183 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVorbis::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.vorbis",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioVorbis:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_VORBISTYPE *vorbisParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_VORBISTYPE *)params;
if (vorbisParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVorbis::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(roleParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.vorbis",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioVorbis:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_VORBISTYPE *vorbisParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_VORBISTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(vorbisParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (vorbisParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,221 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeOSStopInputMethodProcess(InputMethodStatusConnection* connection) {
g_return_val_if_fail(connection, false);
return connection->StopInputMethodProcess();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool ChromeOSStopInputMethodProcess(InputMethodStatusConnection* connection) {
| 170,528 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
size_t i, j;
i = c->num;
if (i != 0) {
if (i + len < MDC2_BLOCK) {
/* partial block */
memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, len);
c->num += (int)len;
return 1;
} else {
/* filled one */
j = MDC2_BLOCK - i;
memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, j);
len -= j;
in += j;
c->num = 0;
mdc2_body(c, &(c->data[0]), MDC2_BLOCK);
}
}
i = len & ~((size_t)MDC2_BLOCK - 1);
if (i > 0)
mdc2_body(c, in, i);
j = len - i;
if (j > 0) {
memcpy(&(c->data[0]), &(in[i]), j);
c->num = (int)j;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
size_t i, j;
i = c->num;
if (i != 0) {
if (len < MDC2_BLOCK - i) {
/* partial block */
memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, len);
c->num += (int)len;
return 1;
} else {
/* filled one */
j = MDC2_BLOCK - i;
memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, j);
len -= j;
in += j;
c->num = 0;
mdc2_body(c, &(c->data[0]), MDC2_BLOCK);
}
}
i = len & ~((size_t)MDC2_BLOCK - 1);
if (i > 0)
mdc2_body(c, in, i);
j = len - i;
if (j > 0) {
memcpy(&(c->data[0]), &(in[i]), j);
c->num = (int)j;
}
return 1;
}
| 164,965 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateGraphicBufferInMeta_l(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id buffer, OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = (BufferMeta *)(header->pAppPrivate);
bufferMeta->setGraphicBuffer(graphicBuffer);
if (mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource
&& header->nAllocLen >= sizeof(VideoGrallocMetadata)) {
VideoGrallocMetadata &metadata = *(VideoGrallocMetadata *)(header->pBuffer);
metadata.eType = kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource;
metadata.pHandle = graphicBuffer == NULL ? NULL : graphicBuffer->handle;
} else if (mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer
&& header->nAllocLen >= sizeof(VideoNativeMetadata)) {
VideoNativeMetadata &metadata = *(VideoNativeMetadata *)(header->pBuffer);
metadata.eType = kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
metadata.pBuffer = graphicBuffer == NULL ? NULL : graphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer();
metadata.nFenceFd = -1;
} else {
CLOG_BUFFER(updateGraphicBufferInMeta, "%s:%u, %#x bad type (%d) or size (%u)",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer, mMetadataType[portIndex], header->nAllocLen);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
CLOG_BUFFER(updateGraphicBufferInMeta, "%s:%u, %#x := %p",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer,
graphicBuffer == NULL ? NULL : graphicBuffer->handle);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateGraphicBufferInMeta_l(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id buffer, OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (header == NULL) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = (BufferMeta *)(header->pAppPrivate);
bufferMeta->setGraphicBuffer(graphicBuffer);
if (mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource
&& header->nAllocLen >= sizeof(VideoGrallocMetadata)) {
VideoGrallocMetadata &metadata = *(VideoGrallocMetadata *)(header->pBuffer);
metadata.eType = kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource;
metadata.pHandle = graphicBuffer == NULL ? NULL : graphicBuffer->handle;
} else if (mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer
&& header->nAllocLen >= sizeof(VideoNativeMetadata)) {
VideoNativeMetadata &metadata = *(VideoNativeMetadata *)(header->pBuffer);
metadata.eType = kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
metadata.pBuffer = graphicBuffer == NULL ? NULL : graphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer();
metadata.nFenceFd = -1;
} else {
CLOG_BUFFER(updateGraphicBufferInMeta, "%s:%u, %#x bad type (%d) or size (%u)",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer, mMetadataType[portIndex], header->nAllocLen);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
CLOG_BUFFER(updateGraphicBufferInMeta, "%s:%u, %#x := %p",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer,
graphicBuffer == NULL ? NULL : graphicBuffer->handle);
return OK;
}
| 173,532 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void OpenTwoTabs(const GURL& first_url, const GURL& second_url) {
content::WindowedNotificationObserver load1(
content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_COMPLETED_MAIN_FRAME,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
OpenURLParams open1(first_url, content::Referrer(),
WindowOpenDisposition::CURRENT_TAB,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED, false);
browser()->OpenURL(open1);
load1.Wait();
content::WindowedNotificationObserver load2(
content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_COMPLETED_MAIN_FRAME,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
OpenURLParams open2(second_url, content::Referrer(),
WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_BACKGROUND_TAB,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED, false);
browser()->OpenURL(open2);
load2.Wait();
ASSERT_EQ(2, tsm()->count());
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | void OpenTwoTabs(const GURL& first_url, const GURL& second_url) {
content::WindowedNotificationObserver load1(
content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_COMPLETED_MAIN_FRAME,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
OpenURLParams open1(first_url, content::Referrer(),
WindowOpenDisposition::CURRENT_TAB,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED, false);
content::WebContents* web_contents = browser()->OpenURL(open1);
load1.Wait();
if (URLShouldBeStoredInLocalDatabase(first_url))
testing::ExpireLocalDBObservationWindows(web_contents);
content::WindowedNotificationObserver load2(
content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_COMPLETED_MAIN_FRAME,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
OpenURLParams open2(second_url, content::Referrer(),
WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_BACKGROUND_TAB,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED, false);
web_contents = browser()->OpenURL(open2);
load2.Wait();
// Expire all the observation windows to prevent the discarding and freezing
// interventions to fail because of a lack of observations.
if (URLShouldBeStoredInLocalDatabase(second_url))
testing::ExpireLocalDBObservationWindows(web_contents);
ASSERT_EQ(2, tsm()->count());
}
| 172,228 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool do_write_pids(pid_t tpid, const char *contrl, const char *cg, const char *file, const char *buf)
{
int sock[2] = {-1, -1};
pid_t qpid, cpid = -1;
FILE *pids_file = NULL;
bool answer = false, fail = false;
pids_file = open_pids_file(contrl, cg);
if (!pids_file)
return false;
/*
* write the pids to a socket, have helper in writer's pidns
* call movepid for us
*/
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, sock) < 0) {
perror("socketpair");
goto out;
}
cpid = fork();
if (cpid == -1)
goto out;
if (!cpid) { // child
fclose(pids_file);
pid_from_ns_wrapper(sock[1], tpid);
}
const char *ptr = buf;
while (sscanf(ptr, "%d", &qpid) == 1) {
struct ucred cred;
char v;
if (write(sock[0], &qpid, sizeof(qpid)) != sizeof(qpid)) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: error writing pid to child: %s\n",
__func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (recv_creds(sock[0], &cred, &v)) {
if (v == '0') {
if (fprintf(pids_file, "%d", (int) cred.pid) < 0)
fail = true;
}
}
ptr = strchr(ptr, '\n');
if (!ptr)
break;
ptr++;
}
/* All good, write the value */
qpid = -1;
if (write(sock[0], &qpid ,sizeof(qpid)) != sizeof(qpid))
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: failed to ask child to exit\n");
if (!fail)
answer = true;
out:
if (cpid != -1)
wait_for_pid(cpid);
if (sock[0] != -1) {
close(sock[0]);
close(sock[1]);
}
if (pids_file) {
if (fclose(pids_file) != 0)
answer = false;
}
return answer;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static bool do_write_pids(pid_t tpid, const char *contrl, const char *cg, const char *file, const char *buf)
/*
* Given host @uid, return the uid to which it maps in
* @pid's user namespace, or -1 if none.
*/
bool hostuid_to_ns(uid_t uid, pid_t pid, uid_t *answer)
{
FILE *f;
char line[400];
sprintf(line, "/proc/%d/uid_map", pid);
if ((f = fopen(line, "r")) == NULL) {
return false;
}
*answer = convert_id_to_ns(f, uid);
fclose(f);
if (*answer == -1)
return false;
return true;
}
/*
* get_pid_creds: get the real uid and gid of @pid from
* /proc/$$/status
* (XXX should we use euid here?)
*/
void get_pid_creds(pid_t pid, uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid)
{
char line[400];
uid_t u;
gid_t g;
FILE *f;
*uid = -1;
*gid = -1;
sprintf(line, "/proc/%d/status", pid);
if ((f = fopen(line, "r")) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error opening %s: %s\n", line, strerror(errno));
return;
}
while (fgets(line, 400, f)) {
if (strncmp(line, "Uid:", 4) == 0) {
if (sscanf(line+4, "%u", &u) != 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "bad uid line for pid %u\n", pid);
fclose(f);
return;
}
*uid = u;
} else if (strncmp(line, "Gid:", 4) == 0) {
if (sscanf(line+4, "%u", &g) != 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "bad gid line for pid %u\n", pid);
fclose(f);
return;
}
*gid = g;
}
}
fclose(f);
}
/*
* May the requestor @r move victim @v to a new cgroup?
* This is allowed if
* . they are the same task
* . they are ownedy by the same uid
* . @r is root on the host, or
* . @v's uid is mapped into @r's where @r is root.
*/
bool may_move_pid(pid_t r, uid_t r_uid, pid_t v)
{
uid_t v_uid, tmpuid;
gid_t v_gid;
if (r == v)
return true;
if (r_uid == 0)
return true;
get_pid_creds(v, &v_uid, &v_gid);
if (r_uid == v_uid)
return true;
if (hostuid_to_ns(r_uid, r, &tmpuid) && tmpuid == 0
&& hostuid_to_ns(v_uid, r, &tmpuid))
return true;
return false;
}
static bool do_write_pids(pid_t tpid, uid_t tuid, const char *contrl, const char *cg,
const char *file, const char *buf)
{
int sock[2] = {-1, -1};
pid_t qpid, cpid = -1;
FILE *pids_file = NULL;
bool answer = false, fail = false;
pids_file = open_pids_file(contrl, cg);
if (!pids_file)
return false;
/*
* write the pids to a socket, have helper in writer's pidns
* call movepid for us
*/
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, sock) < 0) {
perror("socketpair");
goto out;
}
cpid = fork();
if (cpid == -1)
goto out;
if (!cpid) { // child
fclose(pids_file);
pid_from_ns_wrapper(sock[1], tpid);
}
const char *ptr = buf;
while (sscanf(ptr, "%d", &qpid) == 1) {
struct ucred cred;
char v;
if (write(sock[0], &qpid, sizeof(qpid)) != sizeof(qpid)) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: error writing pid to child: %s\n",
__func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (recv_creds(sock[0], &cred, &v)) {
if (v == '0') {
if (!may_move_pid(tpid, tuid, cred.pid)) {
fail = true;
break;
}
if (fprintf(pids_file, "%d", (int) cred.pid) < 0)
fail = true;
}
}
ptr = strchr(ptr, '\n');
if (!ptr)
break;
ptr++;
}
/* All good, write the value */
qpid = -1;
if (write(sock[0], &qpid ,sizeof(qpid)) != sizeof(qpid))
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: failed to ask child to exit\n");
if (!fail)
answer = true;
out:
if (cpid != -1)
wait_for_pid(cpid);
if (sock[0] != -1) {
close(sock[0]);
close(sock[1]);
}
if (pids_file) {
if (fclose(pids_file) != 0)
answer = false;
}
return answer;
}
| 166,702 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ExtensionTtsController* ExtensionTtsController::GetInstance() {
return Singleton<ExtensionTtsController>::get();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ExtensionTtsController* ExtensionTtsController::GetInstance() {
| 170,379 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline void *host_from_stream_offset(QEMUFile *f,
ram_addr_t offset,
int flags)
{
static RAMBlock *block = NULL;
char id[256];
uint8_t len;
if (flags & RAM_SAVE_FLAG_CONTINUE) {
if (!block) {
error_report("Ack, bad migration stream!");
return NULL;
}
return memory_region_get_ram_ptr(block->mr) + offset;
}
len = qemu_get_byte(f);
qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)id, len);
id[len] = 0;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(block, &ram_list.blocks, next) {
if (!strncmp(id, block->idstr, sizeof(id)))
return memory_region_get_ram_ptr(block->mr) + offset;
}
error_report("Can't find block %s!", id);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static inline void *host_from_stream_offset(QEMUFile *f,
ram_addr_t offset,
int flags)
{
static RAMBlock *block = NULL;
char id[256];
uint8_t len;
if (flags & RAM_SAVE_FLAG_CONTINUE) {
if (!block || block->length <= offset) {
error_report("Ack, bad migration stream!");
return NULL;
}
return memory_region_get_ram_ptr(block->mr) + offset;
}
len = qemu_get_byte(f);
qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)id, len);
id[len] = 0;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(block, &ram_list.blocks, next) {
if (!strncmp(id, block->idstr, sizeof(id)) && block->length > offset) {
return memory_region_get_ram_ptr(block->mr) + offset;
}
}
error_report("Can't find block %s!", id);
}
| 164,900 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserPluginGuest::SetCompositingBufferData(int gpu_process_id,
uint32 client_id,
uint32 context_id,
uint32 texture_id_0,
uint32 texture_id_1,
uint32 sync_point) {
if (texture_id_0 == 0) {
DCHECK(texture_id_1 == 0);
return;
}
DCHECK(texture_id_1 != 0);
DCHECK(texture_id_0 != texture_id_1);
surface_handle_ = gfx::GLSurfaceHandle(gfx::kNullPluginWindow, true);
surface_handle_.parent_gpu_process_id = gpu_process_id;
surface_handle_.parent_client_id = client_id;
surface_handle_.parent_context_id = context_id;
surface_handle_.parent_texture_id[0] = texture_id_0;
surface_handle_.parent_texture_id[1] = texture_id_1;
surface_handle_.sync_point = sync_point;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BrowserPluginGuest::SetCompositingBufferData(int gpu_process_id,
uint32 client_id,
uint32 context_id,
uint32 texture_id_0,
uint32 texture_id_1,
uint32 sync_point) {
if (texture_id_0 == 0) {
DCHECK(texture_id_1 == 0);
return;
}
DCHECK(texture_id_1 != 0);
DCHECK(texture_id_0 != texture_id_1);
surface_handle_ = gfx::GLSurfaceHandle(gfx::kNullPluginWindow, true);
surface_handle_.parent_gpu_process_id = gpu_process_id;
surface_handle_.parent_client_id = client_id;
}
| 171,352 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void StorageHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
process_ = process_host;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void StorageHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
void StorageHandler::SetRenderer(int process_host_id,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
RenderProcessHost* process = RenderProcessHost::FromID(process_host_id);
storage_partition_ = process ? process->GetStoragePartition() : nullptr;
}
| 172,774 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int get_cox(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s, Jpeg2000CodingStyle *c)
{
uint8_t byte;
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 5)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
/* nreslevels = number of resolution levels
= number of decomposition level +1 */
c->nreslevels = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g) + 1;
if (c->nreslevels >= JPEG2000_MAX_RESLEVELS) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "nreslevels %d is invalid\n", c->nreslevels);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* compute number of resolution levels to decode */
if (c->nreslevels < s->reduction_factor)
c->nreslevels2decode = 1;
else
c->nreslevels2decode = c->nreslevels - s->reduction_factor;
c->log2_cblk_width = (bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g) & 15) + 2; // cblk width
c->log2_cblk_height = (bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g) & 15) + 2; // cblk height
if (c->log2_cblk_width > 10 || c->log2_cblk_height > 10 ||
c->log2_cblk_width + c->log2_cblk_height > 12) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "cblk size invalid\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
c->cblk_style = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
if (c->cblk_style != 0) { // cblk style
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "extra cblk styles %X\n", c->cblk_style);
}
c->transform = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g); // DWT transformation type
/* set integer 9/7 DWT in case of BITEXACT flag */
if ((s->avctx->flags & CODEC_FLAG_BITEXACT) && (c->transform == FF_DWT97))
c->transform = FF_DWT97_INT;
if (c->csty & JPEG2000_CSTY_PREC) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < c->nreslevels; i++) {
byte = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
c->log2_prec_widths[i] = byte & 0x0F; // precinct PPx
c->log2_prec_heights[i] = (byte >> 4) & 0x0F; // precinct PPy
}
} else {
memset(c->log2_prec_widths , 15, sizeof(c->log2_prec_widths ));
memset(c->log2_prec_heights, 15, sizeof(c->log2_prec_heights));
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: jpeg2000: check log2_cblk dimensions
Fixes out of array access
Fixes Ticket2895
Found-by: Piotr Bandurski <ami_stuff@o2.pl>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int get_cox(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s, Jpeg2000CodingStyle *c)
{
uint8_t byte;
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 5)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
/* nreslevels = number of resolution levels
= number of decomposition level +1 */
c->nreslevels = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g) + 1;
if (c->nreslevels >= JPEG2000_MAX_RESLEVELS) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "nreslevels %d is invalid\n", c->nreslevels);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* compute number of resolution levels to decode */
if (c->nreslevels < s->reduction_factor)
c->nreslevels2decode = 1;
else
c->nreslevels2decode = c->nreslevels - s->reduction_factor;
c->log2_cblk_width = (bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g) & 15) + 2; // cblk width
c->log2_cblk_height = (bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g) & 15) + 2; // cblk height
if (c->log2_cblk_width > 10 || c->log2_cblk_height > 10 ||
c->log2_cblk_width + c->log2_cblk_height > 12) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "cblk size invalid\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (c->log2_cblk_width > 6 || c->log2_cblk_height > 6) {
avpriv_request_sample(s->avctx, "cblk size > 64");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
c->cblk_style = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
if (c->cblk_style != 0) { // cblk style
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "extra cblk styles %X\n", c->cblk_style);
}
c->transform = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g); // DWT transformation type
/* set integer 9/7 DWT in case of BITEXACT flag */
if ((s->avctx->flags & CODEC_FLAG_BITEXACT) && (c->transform == FF_DWT97))
c->transform = FF_DWT97_INT;
if (c->csty & JPEG2000_CSTY_PREC) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < c->nreslevels; i++) {
byte = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
c->log2_prec_widths[i] = byte & 0x0F; // precinct PPx
c->log2_prec_heights[i] = (byte >> 4) & 0x0F; // precinct PPy
}
} else {
memset(c->log2_prec_widths , 15, sizeof(c->log2_prec_widths ));
memset(c->log2_prec_heights, 15, sizeof(c->log2_prec_heights));
}
return 0;
}
| 165,920 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int toggle_utf8(const char *name, int fd, bool utf8) {
int r;
struct termios tc = {};
assert(name);
r = ioctl(fd, KDSKBMODE, utf8 ? K_UNICODE : K_XLATE);
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to %s UTF-8 kbdmode on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
r = loop_write(fd, utf8 ? "\033%G" : "\033%@", 3, false);
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to %s UTF-8 term processing on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
r = tcgetattr(fd, &tc);
if (r >= 0) {
SET_FLAG(tc.c_iflag, IUTF8, utf8);
r = tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tc);
}
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to %s iutf8 flag on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
log_debug("UTF-8 kbdmode %sd on %s", enable_disable(utf8), name);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | static int toggle_utf8(const char *name, int fd, bool utf8) {
int r;
struct termios tc = {};
assert(name);
r = vt_verify_kbmode(fd);
if (r == -EBUSY) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Virtual console %s is not in K_XLATE or K_UNICODE: %m", name);
return 0;
} else if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to verify kbdmode on %s: %m", name);
r = ioctl(fd, KDSKBMODE, utf8 ? K_UNICODE : K_XLATE);
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to %s UTF-8 kbdmode on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
r = loop_write(fd, utf8 ? "\033%G" : "\033%@", 3, false);
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to %s UTF-8 term processing on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
r = tcgetattr(fd, &tc);
if (r >= 0) {
SET_FLAG(tc.c_iflag, IUTF8, utf8);
r = tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tc);
}
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to %s iutf8 flag on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
log_debug("UTF-8 kbdmode %sd on %s", enable_disable(utf8), name);
return 0;
}
| 169,779 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IceGenerateMagicCookie (
int len
)
{
char *auth;
#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
long ldata[2];
int seed;
int value;
int i;
#endif
if ((auth = malloc (len + 1)) == NULL)
return (NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
arc4random_buf(auth, len);
#else
#ifdef ITIMER_REAL
{
struct timeval now;
int i;
ldata[0] = now.tv_sec;
ldata[1] = now.tv_usec;
}
#else
{
long time ();
ldata[0] = time ((long *) 0);
ldata[1] = getpid ();
}
#endif
seed = (ldata[0]) + (ldata[1] << 16);
srand (seed);
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
ldata[1] = now.tv_usec;
value = rand ();
auth[i] = value & 0xff;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-331 | IceGenerateMagicCookie (
static void
emulate_getrandom_buf (
char *auth,
int len
)
{
long ldata[2];
int seed;
int value;
int i;
#ifdef ITIMER_REAL
{
struct timeval now;
int i;
ldata[0] = now.tv_sec;
ldata[1] = now.tv_usec;
}
#else /* ITIMER_REAL */
{
long time ();
ldata[0] = time ((long *) 0);
ldata[1] = getpid ();
}
#endif /* ITIMER_REAL */
seed = (ldata[0]) + (ldata[1] << 16);
srand (seed);
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
ldata[1] = now.tv_usec;
value = rand ();
auth[i] = value & 0xff;
}
| 165,471 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool GrabWindowSnapshot(gfx::NativeWindow window,
std::vector<unsigned char>* png_representation,
const gfx::Rect& snapshot_bounds) {
ui::Compositor* compositor = window->layer()->GetCompositor();
gfx::Rect read_pixels_bounds = snapshot_bounds;
read_pixels_bounds.set_origin(
snapshot_bounds.origin().Add(window->bounds().origin()));
gfx::Rect read_pixels_bounds_in_pixel =
ui::ConvertRectToPixel(window->layer(), read_pixels_bounds);
DCHECK_GE(compositor->size().width(), read_pixels_bounds_in_pixel.right());
DCHECK_GE(compositor->size().height(), read_pixels_bounds_in_pixel.bottom());
DCHECK_LE(0, read_pixels_bounds.x());
DCHECK_LE(0, read_pixels_bounds.y());
SkBitmap bitmap;
if (!compositor->ReadPixels(&bitmap, read_pixels_bounds_in_pixel))
return false;
unsigned char* pixels = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(bitmap.getPixels());
gfx::PNGCodec::Encode(pixels, gfx::PNGCodec::FORMAT_BGRA,
read_pixels_bounds_in_pixel.size(),
bitmap.rowBytes(), true,
std::vector<gfx::PNGCodec::Comment>(),
png_representation);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | bool GrabWindowSnapshot(gfx::NativeWindow window,
std::vector<unsigned char>* png_representation,
const gfx::Rect& snapshot_bounds) {
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
// We use XGetImage() for Linux/ChromeOS for performance reasons.
// See crbug.com/122720
if (window->GetRootWindow()->GrabSnapshot(
snapshot_bounds, png_representation))
return true;
#endif // OS_LINUX
ui::Compositor* compositor = window->layer()->GetCompositor();
gfx::Rect read_pixels_bounds = snapshot_bounds;
read_pixels_bounds.set_origin(
snapshot_bounds.origin().Add(window->bounds().origin()));
gfx::Rect read_pixels_bounds_in_pixel =
ui::ConvertRectToPixel(window->layer(), read_pixels_bounds);
DCHECK_GE(compositor->size().width(), read_pixels_bounds_in_pixel.right());
DCHECK_GE(compositor->size().height(), read_pixels_bounds_in_pixel.bottom());
DCHECK_LE(0, read_pixels_bounds.x());
DCHECK_LE(0, read_pixels_bounds.y());
SkBitmap bitmap;
if (!compositor->ReadPixels(&bitmap, read_pixels_bounds_in_pixel))
return false;
unsigned char* pixels = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(bitmap.getPixels());
gfx::PNGCodec::Encode(pixels, gfx::PNGCodec::FORMAT_BGRA,
read_pixels_bounds_in_pixel.size(),
bitmap.rowBytes(), true,
std::vector<gfx::PNGCodec::Comment>(),
png_representation);
return true;
}
| 170,760 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Track::~Track()
{
Info& info = const_cast<Info&>(m_info);
info.Clear();
ContentEncoding** i = content_encoding_entries_;
ContentEncoding** const j = content_encoding_entries_end_;
while (i != j) {
ContentEncoding* const encoding = *i++;
delete encoding;
}
delete [] content_encoding_entries_;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Track::~Track()
long Track::Create(Segment* pSegment, const Info& info, long long element_start,
long long element_size, Track*& pResult) {
if (pResult)
return -1;
Track* const pTrack =
new (std::nothrow) Track(pSegment, element_start, element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; // generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status) { // error
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; // success
}
| 174,472 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void uv__process_child_init(const uv_process_options_t* options,
int stdio_count,
int (*pipes)[2],
int error_fd) {
int close_fd;
int use_fd;
int fd;
if (options->flags & UV_PROCESS_DETACHED)
setsid();
for (fd = 0; fd < stdio_count; fd++) {
close_fd = pipes[fd][0];
use_fd = pipes[fd][1];
if (use_fd < 0) {
if (fd >= 3)
continue;
else {
/* redirect stdin, stdout and stderr to /dev/null even if UV_IGNORE is
* set
*/
use_fd = open("/dev/null", fd == 0 ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR);
close_fd = use_fd;
if (use_fd == -1) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("failed to open stdio");
_exit(127);
}
}
}
if (fd == use_fd)
uv__cloexec(use_fd, 0);
else
dup2(use_fd, fd);
if (fd <= 2)
uv__nonblock(fd, 0);
if (close_fd != -1)
uv__close(close_fd);
}
for (fd = 0; fd < stdio_count; fd++) {
use_fd = pipes[fd][1];
if (use_fd >= 0 && fd != use_fd)
close(use_fd);
}
if (options->cwd != NULL && chdir(options->cwd)) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("chdir()");
_exit(127);
}
if ((options->flags & UV_PROCESS_SETGID) && setgid(options->gid)) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("setgid()");
_exit(127);
}
if ((options->flags & UV_PROCESS_SETUID) && setuid(options->uid)) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("setuid()");
_exit(127);
}
if (options->env != NULL) {
environ = options->env;
}
execvp(options->file, options->args);
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("execvp()");
_exit(127);
}
Commit Message: unix: call setgoups before calling setuid/setgid
Partial fix for #1093
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void uv__process_child_init(const uv_process_options_t* options,
int stdio_count,
int (*pipes)[2],
int error_fd) {
int close_fd;
int use_fd;
int fd;
if (options->flags & UV_PROCESS_DETACHED)
setsid();
for (fd = 0; fd < stdio_count; fd++) {
close_fd = pipes[fd][0];
use_fd = pipes[fd][1];
if (use_fd < 0) {
if (fd >= 3)
continue;
else {
/* redirect stdin, stdout and stderr to /dev/null even if UV_IGNORE is
* set
*/
use_fd = open("/dev/null", fd == 0 ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR);
close_fd = use_fd;
if (use_fd == -1) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("failed to open stdio");
_exit(127);
}
}
}
if (fd == use_fd)
uv__cloexec(use_fd, 0);
else
dup2(use_fd, fd);
if (fd <= 2)
uv__nonblock(fd, 0);
if (close_fd != -1)
uv__close(close_fd);
}
for (fd = 0; fd < stdio_count; fd++) {
use_fd = pipes[fd][1];
if (use_fd >= 0 && fd != use_fd)
close(use_fd);
}
if (options->cwd != NULL && chdir(options->cwd)) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("chdir()");
_exit(127);
}
if (options->flags & (UV_PROCESS_SETUID | UV_PROCESS_SETGID)) {
/* When dropping privileges from root, the `setgroups` call will
* remove any extraneous groups. If we don't call this, then
* even though our uid has dropped, we may still have groups
* that enable us to do super-user things. This will fail if we
* aren't root, so don't bother checking the return value, this
* is just done as an optimistic privilege dropping function.
*/
SAVE_ERRNO(setgroups(0, NULL));
}
if ((options->flags & UV_PROCESS_SETGID) && setgid(options->gid)) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("setgid()");
_exit(127);
}
if ((options->flags & UV_PROCESS_SETUID) && setuid(options->uid)) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("setuid()");
_exit(127);
}
if (options->env != NULL) {
environ = options->env;
}
execvp(options->file, options->args);
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("execvp()");
_exit(127);
}
| 166,728 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(SecurityOrigin* origin, const KURL& url, const KURL& srcURL)
{
if (origin && BlobURL::getOrigin(url) == "null")
originMap()->add(url.string(), origin);
if (isMainThread())
blobRegistry().registerBlobURL(url, srcURL);
else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url, srcURL));
callOnMainThread(®isterBlobURLFromTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(SecurityOrigin* origin, const KURL& url, const KURL& srcURL)
void BlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(SecurityOrigin* origin, const KURL& url, const KURL& srcURL)
{
if (origin && BlobURL::getOrigin(url) == "null")
originMap()->add(url.string(), origin);
if (isMainThread()) {
if (WebBlobRegistry* registry = blobRegistry())
registry->registerBlobURL(url, srcURL);
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url, srcURL));
callOnMainThread(®isterBlobURLFromTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
| 170,685 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs,
int bits_per_pixel, int depth,
int big_endian_flag, int true_color_flag,
int red_max, int green_max, int blue_max,
int red_shift, int green_shift, int blue_shift)
{
if (!true_color_flag) {
vnc_client_error(vs);
return;
}
vs->client_pf.rmax = red_max;
vs->client_pf.rbits = hweight_long(red_max);
vs->client_pf.rshift = red_shift;
vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel / 8;
vs->client_pf.depth = bits_per_pixel == 32 ? 24 : bits_per_pixel;
vs->client_be = big_endian_flag;
set_pixel_conversion(vs);
graphic_hw_invalidate(NULL);
graphic_hw_update(NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs,
int bits_per_pixel, int depth,
int big_endian_flag, int true_color_flag,
int red_max, int green_max, int blue_max,
int red_shift, int green_shift, int blue_shift)
{
if (!true_color_flag) {
vnc_client_error(vs);
return;
}
switch (bits_per_pixel) {
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
break;
default:
vnc_client_error(vs);
return;
}
vs->client_pf.rmax = red_max;
vs->client_pf.rbits = hweight_long(red_max);
vs->client_pf.rshift = red_shift;
vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel / 8;
vs->client_pf.depth = bits_per_pixel == 32 ? 24 : bits_per_pixel;
vs->client_be = big_endian_flag;
set_pixel_conversion(vs);
graphic_hw_invalidate(NULL);
graphic_hw_update(NULL);
}
| 164,902 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnInitiatePrintPreview(bool selection_only) {
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame = NULL;
GetPrintFrame(&frame);
DCHECK(frame);
auto plugin = delegate_->GetPdfElement(frame);
if (!plugin.isNull()) {
PrintNode(plugin);
return;
}
print_preview_context_.InitWithFrame(frame);
RequestPrintPreview(selection_only
? PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_SELECTION
: PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_ENTIRE_FRAME);
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | void PrintWebViewHelper::OnInitiatePrintPreview(bool selection_only) {
CHECK_LE(ipc_nesting_level_, 1);
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame = NULL;
GetPrintFrame(&frame);
DCHECK(frame);
auto plugin = delegate_->GetPdfElement(frame);
if (!plugin.isNull()) {
PrintNode(plugin);
return;
}
print_preview_context_.InitWithFrame(frame);
RequestPrintPreview(selection_only
? PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_SELECTION
: PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_ENTIRE_FRAME);
}
| 171,871 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: write_message( RenderState state )
{
ADisplay adisplay = (ADisplay)state->display.disp;
if ( state->message == NULL )
{
FontFace face = &state->faces[state->face_index];
int idx, total;
idx = face->index;
total = 1;
while ( total + state->face_index < state->num_faces &&
face[total].filepath == face[0].filepath )
total++;
total += idx;
state->message = state->message0;
if ( total > 1 )
sprintf( state->message0, "%s %d/%d @ %5.1fpt",
state->filename, idx + 1, total,
state->char_size );
else
sprintf( state->message0, "%s @ %5.1fpt",
state->filename,
state->char_size );
}
grWriteCellString( adisplay->bitmap, 0, DIM_Y - 10, state->message,
adisplay->fore_color );
state->message = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | write_message( RenderState state )
{
ADisplay adisplay = (ADisplay)state->display.disp;
if ( state->message == NULL )
{
FontFace face = &state->faces[state->face_index];
int idx, total;
idx = face->index;
total = 1;
while ( total + state->face_index < state->num_faces &&
face[total].filepath == face[0].filepath )
total++;
total += idx;
state->message = state->message0;
if ( total > 1 )
sprintf( state->message0, "%.100s %d/%d @ %5.1fpt",
state->filename, idx + 1, total,
state->char_size );
else
sprintf( state->message0, "%.100s @ %5.1fpt",
state->filename,
state->char_size );
}
grWriteCellString( adisplay->bitmap, 0, DIM_Y - 10, state->message,
adisplay->fore_color );
state->message = NULL;
}
| 164,997 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppResult::Open(int event_flags) {
RecordHistogram(APP_SEARCH_RESULT);
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_service()
->GetInstalledExtension(app_id_);
if (!extension)
return;
if (!extensions::util::IsAppLaunchable(app_id_, profile_))
return;
if (RunExtensionEnableFlow())
return;
if (display_type() != DISPLAY_RECOMMENDATION) {
extensions::RecordAppListSearchLaunch(extension);
content::RecordAction(
base::UserMetricsAction("AppList_ClickOnAppFromSearch"));
}
controller_->ActivateApp(
profile_,
extension,
AppListControllerDelegate::LAUNCH_FROM_APP_LIST_SEARCH,
event_flags);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | void AppResult::Open(int event_flags) {
RecordHistogram(APP_SEARCH_RESULT);
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_)->GetInstalledExtension(
app_id_);
if (!extension)
return;
if (!extensions::util::IsAppLaunchable(app_id_, profile_))
return;
if (RunExtensionEnableFlow())
return;
if (display_type() != DISPLAY_RECOMMENDATION) {
extensions::RecordAppListSearchLaunch(extension);
content::RecordAction(
base::UserMetricsAction("AppList_ClickOnAppFromSearch"));
}
controller_->ActivateApp(
profile_,
extension,
AppListControllerDelegate::LAUNCH_FROM_APP_LIST_SEARCH,
event_flags);
}
| 171,726 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct nfs4_state *nfs4_do_open(struct inode *dir, struct path *path, int flags, struct iattr *sattr, struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
struct nfs4_state *res;
int status;
do {
status = _nfs4_do_open(dir, path, flags, sattr, cred, &res);
if (status == 0)
break;
/* NOTE: BAD_SEQID means the server and client disagree about the
* book-keeping w.r.t. state-changing operations
* (OPEN/CLOSE/LOCK/LOCKU...)
* It is actually a sign of a bug on the client or on the server.
*
* If we receive a BAD_SEQID error in the particular case of
* doing an OPEN, we assume that nfs_increment_open_seqid() will
* have unhashed the old state_owner for us, and that we can
* therefore safely retry using a new one. We should still warn
* the user though...
*/
if (status == -NFS4ERR_BAD_SEQID) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "NFS: v4 server %s "
" returned a bad sequence-id error!\n",
NFS_SERVER(dir)->nfs_client->cl_hostname);
exception.retry = 1;
continue;
}
/*
* BAD_STATEID on OPEN means that the server cancelled our
* state before it received the OPEN_CONFIRM.
* Recover by retrying the request as per the discussion
* on Page 181 of RFC3530.
*/
if (status == -NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID) {
exception.retry = 1;
continue;
}
if (status == -EAGAIN) {
/* We must have found a delegation */
exception.retry = 1;
continue;
}
res = ERR_PTR(nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir),
status, &exception));
} while (exception.retry);
return res;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | static struct nfs4_state *nfs4_do_open(struct inode *dir, struct path *path, int flags, struct iattr *sattr, struct rpc_cred *cred)
static struct nfs4_state *nfs4_do_open(struct inode *dir, struct path *path, fmode_t fmode, int flags, struct iattr *sattr, struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
struct nfs4_state *res;
int status;
do {
status = _nfs4_do_open(dir, path, fmode, flags, sattr, cred, &res);
if (status == 0)
break;
/* NOTE: BAD_SEQID means the server and client disagree about the
* book-keeping w.r.t. state-changing operations
* (OPEN/CLOSE/LOCK/LOCKU...)
* It is actually a sign of a bug on the client or on the server.
*
* If we receive a BAD_SEQID error in the particular case of
* doing an OPEN, we assume that nfs_increment_open_seqid() will
* have unhashed the old state_owner for us, and that we can
* therefore safely retry using a new one. We should still warn
* the user though...
*/
if (status == -NFS4ERR_BAD_SEQID) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "NFS: v4 server %s "
" returned a bad sequence-id error!\n",
NFS_SERVER(dir)->nfs_client->cl_hostname);
exception.retry = 1;
continue;
}
/*
* BAD_STATEID on OPEN means that the server cancelled our
* state before it received the OPEN_CONFIRM.
* Recover by retrying the request as per the discussion
* on Page 181 of RFC3530.
*/
if (status == -NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID) {
exception.retry = 1;
continue;
}
if (status == -EAGAIN) {
/* We must have found a delegation */
exception.retry = 1;
continue;
}
res = ERR_PTR(nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir),
status, &exception));
} while (exception.retry);
return res;
}
| 165,692 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: get_control(png_const_structrp png_ptr)
{
/* This just returns the (file*). The chunk and idat control structures
* don't always exist.
*/
struct control *control = png_voidcast(struct control*,
png_get_error_ptr(png_ptr));
return &control->file;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | get_control(png_const_structrp png_ptr)
{
/* This just returns the (file*). The chunk and idat control structures
* don't always exist.
*/
struct control *control = voidcast(struct control*,
png_get_error_ptr(png_ptr));
return &control->file;
}
| 173,732 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ComputePrincipleComponent(const float *covariance,
DDSVector3 *principle)
{
DDSVector4
row0,
row1,
row2,
v;
register ssize_t
i;
row0.x = covariance[0];
row0.y = covariance[1];
row0.z = covariance[2];
row0.w = 0.0f;
row1.x = covariance[1];
row1.y = covariance[3];
row1.z = covariance[4];
row1.w = 0.0f;
row2.x = covariance[2];
row2.y = covariance[4];
row2.z = covariance[5];
row2.w = 0.0f;
VectorInit(v,1.0f);
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
{
DDSVector4
w;
float
a;
w.x = row0.x * v.x;
w.y = row0.y * v.x;
w.z = row0.z * v.x;
w.w = row0.w * v.x;
w.x = (row1.x * v.y) + w.x;
w.y = (row1.y * v.y) + w.y;
w.z = (row1.z * v.y) + w.z;
w.w = (row1.w * v.y) + w.w;
w.x = (row2.x * v.z) + w.x;
w.y = (row2.y * v.z) + w.y;
w.z = (row2.z * v.z) + w.z;
w.w = (row2.w * v.z) + w.w;
a = 1.0f / MaxF(w.x,MaxF(w.y,w.z));
v.x = w.x * a;
v.y = w.y * a;
v.z = w.z * a;
v.w = w.w * a;
}
VectorCopy43(v,principle);
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void ComputePrincipleComponent(const float *covariance,
DDSVector3 *principle)
{
DDSVector4
row0,
row1,
row2,
v;
register ssize_t
i;
row0.x = covariance[0];
row0.y = covariance[1];
row0.z = covariance[2];
row0.w = 0.0f;
row1.x = covariance[1];
row1.y = covariance[3];
row1.z = covariance[4];
row1.w = 0.0f;
row2.x = covariance[2];
row2.y = covariance[4];
row2.z = covariance[5];
row2.w = 0.0f;
VectorInit(v,1.0f);
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
{
DDSVector4
w;
float
a;
w.x = row0.x * v.x;
w.y = row0.y * v.x;
w.z = row0.z * v.x;
w.w = row0.w * v.x;
w.x = (row1.x * v.y) + w.x;
w.y = (row1.y * v.y) + w.y;
w.z = (row1.z * v.y) + w.z;
w.w = (row1.w * v.y) + w.w;
w.x = (row2.x * v.z) + w.x;
w.y = (row2.y * v.z) + w.y;
w.z = (row2.z * v.z) + w.z;
w.w = (row2.w * v.z) + w.w;
a = 1.0f / MagickMax(w.x,MagickMax(w.y,w.z));
v.x = w.x * a;
v.y = w.y * a;
v.z = w.z * a;
v.w = w.w * a;
}
VectorCopy43(v,principle);
}
| 168,898 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeDownloadDelegate::RequestHTTPGetDownload(
const std::string& url,
const std::string& user_agent,
const std::string& content_disposition,
const std::string& mime_type,
const std::string& cookie,
const std::string& referer,
const base::string16& file_name,
int64_t content_length,
bool has_user_gesture,
bool must_download) {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jurl =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, url);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> juser_agent =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, user_agent);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jcontent_disposition =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, content_disposition);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jmime_type =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, mime_type);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jcookie =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, cookie);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jreferer =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, referer);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jfilename =
base::android::ConvertUTF16ToJavaString(env, file_name);
Java_ChromeDownloadDelegate_requestHttpGetDownload(
env, java_ref_, jurl, juser_agent, jcontent_disposition, jmime_type,
jcookie, jreferer, has_user_gesture, jfilename, content_length,
must_download);
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void ChromeDownloadDelegate::RequestHTTPGetDownload(
| 171,880 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ntlm_write_message_fields(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (fields->MaxLen < 1)
fields->MaxLen = fields->Len;
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, fields->Len); /* Len (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, fields->MaxLen); /* MaxLen (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT32(s, fields->BufferOffset); /* BufferOffset (4 bytes) */
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void ntlm_write_message_fields(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
static void ntlm_write_message_fields(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (fields->MaxLen < 1)
fields->MaxLen = fields->Len;
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, fields->Len); /* Len (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, fields->MaxLen); /* MaxLen (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT32(s, fields->BufferOffset); /* BufferOffset (4 bytes) */
}
| 169,279 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfs3svc_decode_readdirplusargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_readdirargs *args)
{
int len;
u32 max_blocksize = svc_max_payload(rqstp);
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &args->cookie);
args->verf = p; p += 2;
args->dircount = ntohl(*p++);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
len = args->count = min(args->count, max_blocksize);
while (len > 0) {
struct page *p = *(rqstp->rq_next_page++);
if (!args->buffer)
args->buffer = page_address(p);
len -= PAGE_SIZE;
}
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | nfs3svc_decode_readdirplusargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_readdirargs *args)
{
int len;
u32 max_blocksize = svc_max_payload(rqstp);
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &args->cookie);
args->verf = p; p += 2;
args->dircount = ntohl(*p++);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
if (!xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p))
return 0;
len = args->count = min(args->count, max_blocksize);
while (len > 0) {
struct page *p = *(rqstp->rq_next_page++);
if (!args->buffer)
args->buffer = page_address(p);
len -= PAGE_SIZE;
}
return 1;
}
| 168,142 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WindowOpenDisposition TestBrowserWindow::GetDispositionForPopupBounds(
const gfx::Rect& bounds) {
return WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_POPUP;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | WindowOpenDisposition TestBrowserWindow::GetDispositionForPopupBounds(
| 173,208 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: read_png(struct control *control)
/* Read a PNG, return 0 on success else an error (status) code; a bit mask as
* defined for file::status_code as above.
*/
{
png_structp png_ptr;
png_infop info_ptr = NULL;
volatile png_bytep row = NULL, display = NULL;
volatile int rc;
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, control,
error_handler, warning_handler);
if (png_ptr == NULL)
{
/* This is not really expected. */
log_error(&control->file, LIBPNG_ERROR_CODE, "OOM allocating png_struct");
control->file.status_code |= INTERNAL_ERROR;
return LIBPNG_ERROR_CODE;
}
rc = setjmp(control->file.jmpbuf);
if (rc == 0)
{
png_set_read_fn(png_ptr, control, read_callback);
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (info_ptr == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating info structure");
if (control->file.global->verbose)
fprintf(stderr, " INFO\n");
png_read_info(png_ptr, info_ptr);
{
png_size_t rowbytes = png_get_rowbytes(png_ptr, info_ptr);
row = png_voidcast(png_byte*, malloc(rowbytes));
display = png_voidcast(png_byte*, malloc(rowbytes));
if (row == NULL || display == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating row buffers");
{
png_uint_32 height = png_get_image_height(png_ptr, info_ptr);
int passes = png_set_interlace_handling(png_ptr);
int pass;
png_start_read_image(png_ptr);
for (pass = 0; pass < passes; ++pass)
{
png_uint_32 y = height;
/* NOTE: this trashes the row each time; interlace handling won't
* work, but this avoids memory thrashing for speed testing.
*/
while (y-- > 0)
png_read_row(png_ptr, row, display);
}
}
}
if (control->file.global->verbose)
fprintf(stderr, " END\n");
/* Make sure to read to the end of the file: */
png_read_end(png_ptr, info_ptr);
}
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
if (row != NULL) free(row);
if (display != NULL) free(display);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | read_png(struct control *control)
/* Read a PNG, return 0 on success else an error (status) code; a bit mask as
* defined for file::status_code as above.
*/
{
png_structp png_ptr;
png_infop info_ptr = NULL;
volatile int rc;
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, control,
error_handler, warning_handler);
if (png_ptr == NULL)
{
/* This is not really expected. */
log_error(&control->file, LIBPNG_ERROR_CODE, "OOM allocating png_struct");
control->file.status_code |= INTERNAL_ERROR;
return LIBPNG_ERROR_CODE;
}
rc = setjmp(control->file.jmpbuf);
if (rc == 0)
{
# ifdef PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
/* Remove any limits on the size of PNG files that can be read,
* without this we may reject files based on built-in safety
* limits.
*/
png_set_user_limits(png_ptr, 0x7fffffff, 0x7fffffff);
png_set_chunk_cache_max(png_ptr, 0);
png_set_chunk_malloc_max(png_ptr, 0);
# endif
png_set_read_fn(png_ptr, control, read_callback);
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (info_ptr == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating info structure");
if (control->file.global->verbose)
fprintf(stderr, " INFO\n");
png_read_info(png_ptr, info_ptr);
{
png_uint_32 height = png_get_image_height(png_ptr, info_ptr);
int passes = png_set_interlace_handling(png_ptr);
int pass;
png_start_read_image(png_ptr);
for (pass = 0; pass < passes; ++pass)
{
png_uint_32 y = height;
/* NOTE: this skips asking libpng to return either version of
* the image row, but libpng still reads the rows.
*/
while (y-- > 0)
png_read_row(png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
}
}
if (control->file.global->verbose)
fprintf(stderr, " END\n");
/* Make sure to read to the end of the file: */
png_read_end(png_ptr, info_ptr);
}
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return rc;
}
| 173,738 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const char* Chapters::Atom::GetStringUID() const
{
return m_string_uid;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const char* Chapters::Atom::GetStringUID() const
| 174,360 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltGenerateIdFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs){
static char base_address;
xmlNodePtr cur = NULL;
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj = NULL;
long val;
xmlChar str[30];
xmlDocPtr doc;
if (nargs == 0) {
cur = ctxt->context->node;
} else if (nargs == 1) {
xmlNodeSetPtr nodelist;
int i, ret;
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) || (ctxt->value->type != XPATH_NODESET)) {
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_TYPE;
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid arg expecting a node-set\n");
return;
}
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
nodelist = obj->nodesetval;
if ((nodelist == NULL) || (nodelist->nodeNr <= 0)) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewCString(""));
return;
}
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[0];
for (i = 1;i < nodelist->nodeNr;i++) {
ret = xmlXPathCmpNodes(cur, nodelist->nodeTab[i]);
if (ret == -1)
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[i];
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid number of args %d\n", nargs);
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_ARITY;
return;
}
/*
* Okay this is ugly but should work, use the NodePtr address
* to forge the ID
*/
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
doc = cur->doc;
else {
xmlNsPtr ns = (xmlNsPtr) cur;
if (ns->context != NULL)
doc = ns->context;
else
doc = ctxt->context->doc;
}
if (obj)
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
val = (long)((char *)cur - (char *)&base_address);
if (val >= 0) {
sprintf((char *)str, "idp%ld", val);
} else {
sprintf((char *)str, "idm%ld", -val);
}
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(str));
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xsltGenerateIdFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs){
static char base_address;
xmlNodePtr cur = NULL;
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj = NULL;
long val;
xmlChar str[30];
if (nargs == 0) {
cur = ctxt->context->node;
} else if (nargs == 1) {
xmlNodeSetPtr nodelist;
int i, ret;
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) || (ctxt->value->type != XPATH_NODESET)) {
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_TYPE;
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid arg expecting a node-set\n");
return;
}
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
nodelist = obj->nodesetval;
if ((nodelist == NULL) || (nodelist->nodeNr <= 0)) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewCString(""));
return;
}
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[0];
for (i = 1;i < nodelist->nodeNr;i++) {
ret = xmlXPathCmpNodes(cur, nodelist->nodeTab[i]);
if (ret == -1)
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[i];
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid number of args %d\n", nargs);
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_ARITY;
return;
}
if (obj)
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
val = (long)((char *)cur - (char *)&base_address);
if (val >= 0) {
snprintf((char *)str, sizeof(str), "idp%ld", val);
} else {
snprintf((char *)str, sizeof(str), "idm%ld", -val);
}
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(str));
}
| 173,302 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: frag6_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bp, register const u_char *bp2)
{
register const struct ip6_frag *dp;
register const struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
dp = (const struct ip6_frag *)bp;
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp2;
ND_TCHECK(dp->ip6f_offlg);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "frag (0x%08x:%d|%ld)",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->ip6f_ident),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->ip6f_offlg) & IP6F_OFF_MASK,
sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) + EXTRACT_16BITS(&ip6->ip6_plen) -
(long)(bp - bp2) - sizeof(struct ip6_frag)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "frag (%d|%ld)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->ip6f_offlg) & IP6F_OFF_MASK,
sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) + EXTRACT_16BITS(&ip6->ip6_plen) -
(long)(bp - bp2) - sizeof(struct ip6_frag)));
}
/* it is meaningless to decode non-first fragment */
if ((EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->ip6f_offlg) & IP6F_OFF_MASK) != 0)
return -1;
else
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
return sizeof(struct ip6_frag);
}
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|frag]"));
return -1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13031/Check for the presence of the entire IPv6 fragment header.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Clean up some whitespace in tests/TESTLIST while we're at it.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | frag6_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bp, register const u_char *bp2)
{
register const struct ip6_frag *dp;
register const struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
dp = (const struct ip6_frag *)bp;
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp2;
ND_TCHECK(*dp);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "frag (0x%08x:%d|%ld)",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->ip6f_ident),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->ip6f_offlg) & IP6F_OFF_MASK,
sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) + EXTRACT_16BITS(&ip6->ip6_plen) -
(long)(bp - bp2) - sizeof(struct ip6_frag)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "frag (%d|%ld)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->ip6f_offlg) & IP6F_OFF_MASK,
sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) + EXTRACT_16BITS(&ip6->ip6_plen) -
(long)(bp - bp2) - sizeof(struct ip6_frag)));
}
/* it is meaningless to decode non-first fragment */
if ((EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->ip6f_offlg) & IP6F_OFF_MASK) != 0)
return -1;
else
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
return sizeof(struct ip6_frag);
}
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|frag]"));
return -1;
}
| 167,852 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: __ext4_set_acl(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, int type,
struct posix_acl *acl)
{
int name_index;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
int error;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
if (error < 0)
return error;
else {
inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
if (error == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
value = ext4_acl_to_disk(acl, &size);
if (IS_ERR(value))
return (int)PTR_ERR(value);
}
error = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, name_index, "",
value, size, 0);
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | __ext4_set_acl(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, int type,
struct posix_acl *acl)
{
int name_index;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
int error;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
if (error)
return error;
inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
value = ext4_acl_to_disk(acl, &size);
if (IS_ERR(value))
return (int)PTR_ERR(value);
}
error = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, name_index, "",
value, size, 0);
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
| 166,970 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BrowserContextImpl::~BrowserContextImpl() {
CHECK(!otr_context_);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | BrowserContextImpl::~BrowserContextImpl() {
| 165,417 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::LaunchProcess(
IPC::Listener* delegate,
ScopedHandle* process_exit_event_out) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
CommandLine command_line(CommandLine::NO_PROGRAM);
if (launch_elevated_) {
if (!job_.IsValid()) {
return false;
}
FilePath daemon_binary;
if (!GetInstalledBinaryPath(kDaemonBinaryName, &daemon_binary))
return false;
command_line.SetProgram(daemon_binary);
command_line.AppendSwitchPath(kElevateSwitchName, binary_path_);
CHECK(ResetEvent(process_exit_event_));
} else {
command_line.SetProgram(binary_path_);
}
scoped_ptr<IPC::ChannelProxy> channel;
std::string channel_name = GenerateIpcChannelName(this);
if (!CreateIpcChannel(channel_name, channel_security_, io_task_runner_,
delegate, &channel))
return false;
command_line.AppendSwitchNative(kDaemonPipeSwitchName,
UTF8ToWide(channel_name));
command_line.CopySwitchesFrom(*CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(),
kCopiedSwitchNames,
arraysize(kCopiedSwitchNames));
ScopedHandle worker_process;
ScopedHandle worker_thread;
if (!LaunchProcessWithToken(command_line.GetProgram(),
command_line.GetCommandLineString(),
session_token_,
false,
CREATE_SUSPENDED | CREATE_BREAKAWAY_FROM_JOB,
&worker_process,
&worker_thread)) {
return false;
}
HANDLE local_process_exit_event;
if (launch_elevated_) {
if (!AssignProcessToJobObject(job_, worker_process)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR)
<< "Failed to assign the worker to the job object";
TerminateProcess(worker_process, CONTROL_C_EXIT);
return false;
}
local_process_exit_event = process_exit_event_;
} else {
worker_process_ = worker_process.Pass();
local_process_exit_event = worker_process_;
}
if (!ResumeThread(worker_thread)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) << "Failed to resume the worker thread";
KillProcess(CONTROL_C_EXIT);
return false;
}
ScopedHandle process_exit_event;
if (!DuplicateHandle(GetCurrentProcess(),
local_process_exit_event,
GetCurrentProcess(),
process_exit_event.Receive(),
SYNCHRONIZE,
FALSE,
0)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) << "Failed to duplicate a handle";
KillProcess(CONTROL_C_EXIT);
return false;
}
channel_ = channel.Pass();
*process_exit_event_out = process_exit_event.Pass();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::LaunchProcess(
IPC::Listener* delegate,
ScopedHandle* process_exit_event_out) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
CommandLine command_line(CommandLine::NO_PROGRAM);
if (launch_elevated_) {
if (!job_.IsValid()) {
return false;
}
FilePath daemon_binary;
if (!GetInstalledBinaryPath(kDaemonBinaryName, &daemon_binary))
return false;
command_line.SetProgram(daemon_binary);
command_line.AppendSwitchPath(kElevateSwitchName, binary_path_);
CHECK(ResetEvent(process_exit_event_));
} else {
command_line.SetProgram(binary_path_);
}
std::string channel_name = GenerateIpcChannelName(this);
ScopedHandle pipe;
if (!CreateIpcChannel(channel_name, channel_security_, &pipe))
return false;
// Wrap the pipe into an IPC channel.
scoped_ptr<IPC::ChannelProxy> channel(new IPC::ChannelProxy(
IPC::ChannelHandle(pipe),
IPC::Channel::MODE_SERVER,
delegate,
io_task_runner_));
command_line.AppendSwitchNative(kDaemonPipeSwitchName,
UTF8ToWide(channel_name));
command_line.CopySwitchesFrom(*CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(),
kCopiedSwitchNames,
arraysize(kCopiedSwitchNames));
ScopedHandle worker_process;
ScopedHandle worker_thread;
if (!LaunchProcessWithToken(command_line.GetProgram(),
command_line.GetCommandLineString(),
session_token_,
false,
CREATE_SUSPENDED | CREATE_BREAKAWAY_FROM_JOB,
&worker_process,
&worker_thread)) {
return false;
}
HANDLE local_process_exit_event;
if (launch_elevated_) {
if (!AssignProcessToJobObject(job_, worker_process)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR)
<< "Failed to assign the worker to the job object";
TerminateProcess(worker_process, CONTROL_C_EXIT);
return false;
}
local_process_exit_event = process_exit_event_;
} else {
worker_process_ = worker_process.Pass();
local_process_exit_event = worker_process_;
}
if (!ResumeThread(worker_thread)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) << "Failed to resume the worker thread";
KillProcess(CONTROL_C_EXIT);
return false;
}
ScopedHandle process_exit_event;
if (!DuplicateHandle(GetCurrentProcess(),
local_process_exit_event,
GetCurrentProcess(),
process_exit_event.Receive(),
SYNCHRONIZE,
FALSE,
0)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) << "Failed to duplicate a handle";
KillProcess(CONTROL_C_EXIT);
return false;
}
channel_ = channel.Pass();
pipe_ = pipe.Pass();
*process_exit_event_out = process_exit_event.Pass();
return true;
}
| 171,560 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int local_name_to_path(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path,
const char *name, V9fsPath *target)
{
if (dir_path) {
v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s/%s", dir_path->data, name);
} else {
v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s", name);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-732 | static int local_name_to_path(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path,
const char *name, V9fsPath *target)
{
if (dir_path) {
v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s/%s", dir_path->data, name);
} else if (strcmp(name, "/")) {
v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s", name);
} else {
/* We want the path of the export root to be relative, otherwise
* "*at()" syscalls would treat it as "/" in the host.
*/
v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s", ".");
}
return 0;
}
| 165,457 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void set_cfg_option(char *opt_string)
{
char *sep, *sep2, szSec[1024], szKey[1024], szVal[1024];
sep = strchr(opt_string, ':');
if (!sep) {
fprintf(stderr, "Badly formatted option %s - expected Section:Name=Value\n", opt_string);
return;
}
{
const size_t sepIdx = sep - opt_string;
strncpy(szSec, opt_string, sepIdx);
szSec[sepIdx] = 0;
}
sep ++;
sep2 = strchr(sep, '=');
if (!sep2) {
fprintf(stderr, "Badly formatted option %s - expected Section:Name=Value\n", opt_string);
return;
}
{
const size_t sepIdx = sep2 - sep;
strncpy(szKey, sep, sepIdx);
szKey[sepIdx] = 0;
strcpy(szVal, sep2+1);
}
if (!stricmp(szKey, "*")) {
if (stricmp(szVal, "null")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Badly formatted option %s - expected Section:*=null\n", opt_string);
return;
}
gf_cfg_del_section(cfg_file, szSec);
return;
}
if (!stricmp(szVal, "null")) {
szVal[0]=0;
}
gf_cfg_set_key(cfg_file, szSec, szKey, szVal[0] ? szVal : NULL);
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void set_cfg_option(char *opt_string)
{
char *sep, *sep2, szSec[1024], szKey[1024], szVal[1024];
sep = strchr(opt_string, ':');
if (!sep) {
fprintf(stderr, "Badly formatted option %s - expected Section:Name=Value\n", opt_string);
return;
}
{
const size_t sepIdx = sep - opt_string;
if (sepIdx >= sizeof(szSec)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Badly formatted option %s - Section name is too long\n", opt_string);
return;
}
strncpy(szSec, opt_string, sepIdx);
szSec[sepIdx] = 0;
}
sep ++;
sep2 = strchr(sep, '=');
if (!sep2) {
fprintf(stderr, "Badly formatted option %s - expected Section:Name=Value\n", opt_string);
return;
}
{
const size_t sepIdx = sep2 - sep;
if (sepIdx >= sizeof(szKey)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Badly formatted option %s - key name is too long\n", opt_string);
return;
}
strncpy(szKey, sep, sepIdx);
szKey[sepIdx] = 0;
if (strlen(sep2 + 1) >= sizeof(szVal)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Badly formatted option %s - value is too long\n", opt_string);
return;
}
strcpy(szVal, sep2+1);
}
if (!stricmp(szKey, "*")) {
if (stricmp(szVal, "null")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Badly formatted option %s - expected Section:*=null\n", opt_string);
return;
}
gf_cfg_del_section(cfg_file, szSec);
return;
}
if (!stricmp(szVal, "null")) {
szVal[0]=0;
}
gf_cfg_set_key(cfg_file, szSec, szKey, szVal[0] ? szVal : NULL);
}
| 169,791 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppListControllerDelegateImpl::DoCreateShortcutsFlow(
Profile* profile,
const std::string& extension_id) {
DCHECK(CanDoCreateShortcutsFlow());
ExtensionService* service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->extension_service();
DCHECK(service);
const extensions::Extension* extension = service->GetInstalledExtension(
extension_id);
DCHECK(extension);
gfx::NativeWindow parent_window = GetAppListWindow();
if (!parent_window)
return;
OnShowChildDialog();
chrome::ShowCreateChromeAppShortcutsDialog(
parent_window, profile, extension,
base::Bind(&AppListControllerDelegateImpl::OnCloseCreateShortcutsPrompt,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | void AppListControllerDelegateImpl::DoCreateShortcutsFlow(
Profile* profile,
const std::string& extension_id) {
DCHECK(CanDoCreateShortcutsFlow());
extensions::ExtensionRegistry* registry =
extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile);
const extensions::Extension* extension = registry->GetInstalledExtension(
extension_id);
DCHECK(extension);
gfx::NativeWindow parent_window = GetAppListWindow();
if (!parent_window)
return;
OnShowChildDialog();
chrome::ShowCreateChromeAppShortcutsDialog(
parent_window, profile, extension,
base::Bind(&AppListControllerDelegateImpl::OnCloseCreateShortcutsPrompt,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 171,721 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: store_current_palette(png_store *ps, int *npalette)
{
/* This is an internal error (the call has been made outside a read
* operation.)
*/
if (ps->current == NULL)
store_log(ps, ps->pread, "no current stream for palette", 1);
/* The result may be null if there is no palette. */
*npalette = ps->current->npalette;
return ps->current->palette;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | store_current_palette(png_store *ps, int *npalette)
{
/* This is an internal error (the call has been made outside a read
* operation.)
*/
if (ps->current == NULL)
{
store_log(ps, ps->pread, "no current stream for palette", 1);
return NULL;
}
/* The result may be null if there is no palette. */
*npalette = ps->current->npalette;
return ps->current->palette;
}
| 173,703 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: do_async_increment (IncrementData *data)
{
gint32 newx = data->x + 1;
dbus_g_method_return (data->context, newx);
g_free (data);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | do_async_increment (IncrementData *data)
| 165,083 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_inflate(png_structp png_ptr, const png_byte *data, png_size_t size,
png_bytep output, png_size_t output_size)
{
png_size_t count = 0;
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = (png_bytep)data; /* const_cast: VALID */
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = size;
while (1)
{
int ret, avail;
/* Reset the output buffer each time round - we empty it
* after every inflate call.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = png_ptr->zbuf_size;
ret = inflate(&png_ptr->zstream, Z_NO_FLUSH);
avail = png_ptr->zbuf_size - png_ptr->zstream.avail_out;
/* First copy/count any new output - but only if we didn't
* get an error code.
*/
if ((ret == Z_OK || ret == Z_STREAM_END) && avail > 0)
{
if (output != 0 && output_size > count)
{
png_size_t copy = output_size - count;
if ((png_size_t) avail < copy) copy = (png_size_t) avail;
png_memcpy(output + count, png_ptr->zbuf, copy);
}
count += avail;
}
if (ret == Z_OK)
continue;
/* Termination conditions - always reset the zstream, it
* must be left in inflateInit state.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = 0;
inflateReset(&png_ptr->zstream);
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
return count; /* NOTE: may be zero. */
/* Now handle the error codes - the API always returns 0
* and the error message is dumped into the uncompressed
* buffer if available.
*/
{
PNG_CONST char *msg;
if (png_ptr->zstream.msg != 0)
msg = png_ptr->zstream.msg;
else
{
#if defined(PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
char umsg[52];
switch (ret)
{
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
msg = "Buffer error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
msg = "Data error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
default:
msg = "Incomplete compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
}
png_snprintf(umsg, sizeof umsg, msg, png_ptr->chunk_name);
msg = umsg;
#else
msg = "Damaged compressed datastream in chunk other than IDAT";
#endif
}
png_warning(png_ptr, msg);
}
/* 0 means an error - notice that this code simple ignores
* zero length compressed chunks as a result.
*/
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | png_inflate(png_structp png_ptr, const png_byte *data, png_size_t size,
png_bytep output, png_size_t output_size)
{
png_size_t count = 0;
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = (png_bytep)data; /* const_cast: VALID */
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = size;
while (1)
{
int ret, avail;
/* Reset the output buffer each time round - we empty it
* after every inflate call.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = png_ptr->zbuf_size;
ret = inflate(&png_ptr->zstream, Z_NO_FLUSH);
avail = png_ptr->zbuf_size - png_ptr->zstream.avail_out;
/* First copy/count any new output - but only if we didn't
* get an error code.
*/
if ((ret == Z_OK || ret == Z_STREAM_END) && avail > 0)
{
if (output != 0 && output_size > count)
{
png_size_t copy = output_size - count;
if ((png_size_t) avail < copy) copy = (png_size_t) avail;
png_memcpy(output + count, png_ptr->zbuf, copy);
}
count += avail;
}
if (ret == Z_OK)
continue;
/* Termination conditions - always reset the zstream, it
* must be left in inflateInit state.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = 0;
inflateReset(&png_ptr->zstream);
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
return count; /* NOTE: may be zero. */
/* Now handle the error codes - the API always returns 0
* and the error message is dumped into the uncompressed
* buffer if available.
*/
{
PNG_CONST char *msg;
if (png_ptr->zstream.msg != 0)
msg = png_ptr->zstream.msg;
else
{
#if defined(PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
char umsg[52];
switch (ret)
{
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
msg = "Buffer error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
msg = "Data error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
default:
msg = "Incomplete compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
}
png_snprintf(umsg, sizeof umsg, msg, png_ptr->chunk_name);
msg = umsg;
png_warning(png_ptr, msg);
#else
msg = "Damaged compressed datastream in chunk other than IDAT";
#endif
}
#ifndef PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED
png_warning(png_ptr, msg);
#endif
}
/* 0 means an error - notice that this code simple ignores
* zero length compressed chunks as a result.
*/
return 0;
}
}
| 172,179 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FileSystemManagerImpl::CreateWriter(const GURL& file_path,
CreateWriterCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
FileSystemURL url(context_->CrackURL(file_path));
base::Optional<base::File::Error> opt_error = ValidateFileSystemURL(url);
if (opt_error) {
std::move(callback).Run(opt_error.value(), nullptr);
return;
}
if (!security_policy_->CanWriteFileSystemFile(process_id_, url)) {
std::move(callback).Run(base::File::FILE_ERROR_SECURITY, nullptr);
return;
}
blink::mojom::FileWriterPtr writer;
mojo::MakeStrongBinding(std::make_unique<storage::FileWriterImpl>(
url, context_->CreateFileSystemOperationRunner(),
blob_storage_context_->context()->AsWeakPtr()),
MakeRequest(&writer));
std::move(callback).Run(base::File::FILE_OK, std::move(writer));
}
Commit Message: Disable FileSystemManager::CreateWriter if WritableFiles isn't enabled.
Bug: 922677
Change-Id: Ib16137cbabb2ec07f1ffc0484722f1d9cc533404
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1416570
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623552}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void FileSystemManagerImpl::CreateWriter(const GURL& file_path,
CreateWriterCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(blink::features::kWritableFilesAPI)) {
bindings_.ReportBadMessage("FileSystemManager.CreateWriter");
return;
}
FileSystemURL url(context_->CrackURL(file_path));
base::Optional<base::File::Error> opt_error = ValidateFileSystemURL(url);
if (opt_error) {
std::move(callback).Run(opt_error.value(), nullptr);
return;
}
if (!security_policy_->CanWriteFileSystemFile(process_id_, url)) {
std::move(callback).Run(base::File::FILE_ERROR_SECURITY, nullptr);
return;
}
blink::mojom::FileWriterPtr writer;
mojo::MakeStrongBinding(std::make_unique<storage::FileWriterImpl>(
url, context_->CreateFileSystemOperationRunner(),
blob_storage_context_->context()->AsWeakPtr()),
MakeRequest(&writer));
std::move(callback).Run(base::File::FILE_OK, std::move(writer));
}
| 173,077 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::UnregisterClientProcess(
mojom::ClientProcess* client_process) {
QueuedRequest* request = GetCurrentRequest();
if (request != nullptr) {
auto it = request->pending_responses.begin();
while (it != request->pending_responses.end()) {
std::set<QueuedRequest::PendingResponse>::iterator current = it++;
if (current->client != client_process)
continue;
RemovePendingResponse(client_process, current->type);
request->failed_memory_dump_count++;
}
FinalizeGlobalMemoryDumpIfAllManagersReplied();
}
for (auto& pair : in_progress_vm_region_requests_) {
QueuedVmRegionRequest* request = pair.second.get();
auto it = request->pending_responses.begin();
while (it != request->pending_responses.end()) {
auto current = it++;
if (*current == client_process) {
request->pending_responses.erase(current);
}
}
}
for (auto& pair : in_progress_vm_region_requests_) {
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&CoordinatorImpl::FinalizeVmRegionDumpIfAllManagersReplied,
base::Unretained(this), pair.second->dump_guid));
}
size_t num_deleted = clients_.erase(client_process);
DCHECK(num_deleted == 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void CoordinatorImpl::UnregisterClientProcess(
mojom::ClientProcess* client_process) {
QueuedRequest* request = GetCurrentRequest();
if (request != nullptr) {
auto it = request->pending_responses.begin();
while (it != request->pending_responses.end()) {
std::set<QueuedRequest::PendingResponse>::iterator current = it++;
if (current->client != client_process)
continue;
RemovePendingResponse(client_process, current->type);
request->failed_memory_dump_count++;
}
FinalizeGlobalMemoryDumpIfAllManagersReplied();
}
for (auto& pair : in_progress_vm_region_requests_) {
QueuedVmRegionRequest* request = pair.second.get();
auto it = request->pending_responses.begin();
while (it != request->pending_responses.end()) {
auto current = it++;
if (*current == client_process) {
request->pending_responses.erase(current);
}
}
}
for (auto& pair : in_progress_vm_region_requests_) {
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&CoordinatorImpl::FinalizeVmRegionDumpIfAllManagersReplied,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), pair.second->dump_guid));
}
size_t num_deleted = clients_.erase(client_process);
DCHECK(num_deleted == 1);
}
| 173,216 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ntlm_read_message_fields(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 8)
return -1;
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, fields->Len); /* Len (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, fields->MaxLen); /* MaxLen (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, fields->BufferOffset); /* BufferOffset (4 bytes) */
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int ntlm_read_message_fields(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
static int ntlm_read_message_fields(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 8)
return -1;
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, fields->Len); /* Len (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, fields->MaxLen); /* MaxLen (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, fields->BufferOffset); /* BufferOffset (4 bytes) */
return 1;
}
| 169,276 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void IBusBusConnectedCallback(IBusBus* bus, gpointer user_data) {
LOG(WARNING) << "IBus connection is recovered.";
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->MaybeRestoreConnections();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void IBusBusConnectedCallback(IBusBus* bus, gpointer user_data) {
void IBusBusConnected(IBusBus* bus) {
LOG(WARNING) << "IBus connection is recovered.";
MaybeRestoreConnections();
}
| 170,536 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_many_stringify (MyObject *obj, GHashTable /* char * -> GValue * */ *vals, GHashTable /* char * -> GValue * */ **ret, GError **error)
{
*ret = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal,
g_free, unset_and_free_gvalue);
g_hash_table_foreach (vals, hash_foreach_stringify, *ret);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_many_stringify (MyObject *obj, GHashTable /* char * -> GValue * */ *vals, GHashTable /* char * -> GValue * */ **ret, GError **error)
| 165,112 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: juniper_pppoe_atm_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
uint16_t extracted_ethertype;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_PPPOE_ATM;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
extracted_ethertype = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
/* this DLT contains nothing but raw PPPoE frames,
* prepended with a type field*/
if (ethertype_print(ndo, extracted_ethertype,
p+ETHERTYPE_LEN,
l2info.length-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
l2info.caplen-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
NULL, NULL) == 0)
/* ether_type not known, probably it wasn't one */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown ethertype 0x%04x", extracted_ethertype));
return l2info.header_len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | juniper_pppoe_atm_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
uint16_t extracted_ethertype;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_PPPOE_ATM;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 2);
extracted_ethertype = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
/* this DLT contains nothing but raw PPPoE frames,
* prepended with a type field*/
if (ethertype_print(ndo, extracted_ethertype,
p+ETHERTYPE_LEN,
l2info.length-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
l2info.caplen-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
NULL, NULL) == 0)
/* ether_type not known, probably it wasn't one */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown ethertype 0x%04x", extracted_ethertype));
return l2info.header_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|juniper_pppoe_atm]"));
return l2info.header_len;
}
| 167,920 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: sparse_dump_region (struct tar_sparse_file *file, size_t i)
{
union block *blk;
off_t bytes_left = file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].numbytes;
if (!lseek_or_error (file, file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].offset))
return false;
while (bytes_left > 0)
{
size_t bufsize = (bytes_left > BLOCKSIZE) ? BLOCKSIZE : bytes_left;
size_t bytes_read;
blk = find_next_block ();
bytes_read = safe_read (file->fd, blk->buffer, bufsize);
if (bytes_read == SAFE_READ_ERROR)
{
read_diag_details (file->stat_info->orig_file_name,
(file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].offset
+ file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].numbytes
- bytes_left),
bufsize);
return false;
}
memset (blk->buffer + bytes_read, 0, BLOCKSIZE - bytes_read);
bytes_left -= bytes_read;
{
size_t count;
size_t wrbytes = (write_size > BLOCKSIZE) ? BLOCKSIZE : write_size;
union block *blk = find_next_block ();
if (!blk)
{
ERROR ((0, 0, _("Unexpected EOF in archive")));
return false;
}
set_next_block_after (blk);
count = blocking_write (file->fd, blk->buffer, wrbytes);
write_size -= count;
file->dumped_size += count;
mv_size_left (file->stat_info->archive_file_size - file->dumped_size);
file->offset += count;
if (count != wrbytes)
{
write_error_details (file->stat_info->orig_file_name,
count, wrbytes);
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
/* Interface functions */
enum dump_status
sparse_dump_file (int fd, struct tar_stat_info *st)
{
return false;
}
set_next_block_after (blk);
count = blocking_write (file->fd, blk->buffer, wrbytes);
write_size -= count;
file->dumped_size += count;
mv_size_left (file->stat_info->archive_file_size - file->dumped_size);
file->offset += count;
if (count != wrbytes)
rc = sparse_scan_file (&file);
if (rc && file.optab->dump_region)
{
tar_sparse_dump_header (&file);
if (fd >= 0)
{
size_t i;
mv_begin_write (file.stat_info->file_name,
file.stat_info->stat.st_size,
file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size);
for (i = 0; rc && i < file.stat_info->sparse_map_avail; i++)
rc = tar_sparse_dump_region (&file, i);
}
}
pad_archive (file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size);
return (tar_sparse_done (&file) && rc) ? dump_status_ok : dump_status_short;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | sparse_dump_region (struct tar_sparse_file *file, size_t i)
{
union block *blk;
off_t bytes_left = file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].numbytes;
if (!lseek_or_error (file, file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].offset))
return false;
while (bytes_left > 0)
{
size_t bufsize = (bytes_left > BLOCKSIZE) ? BLOCKSIZE : bytes_left;
size_t bytes_read;
blk = find_next_block ();
bytes_read = safe_read (file->fd, blk->buffer, bufsize);
if (bytes_read == SAFE_READ_ERROR)
{
read_diag_details (file->stat_info->orig_file_name,
(file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].offset
+ file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].numbytes
- bytes_left),
bufsize);
return false;
}
else if (bytes_read == 0)
{
char buf[UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND];
struct stat st;
size_t n;
if (fstat (file->fd, &st) == 0)
n = file->stat_info->stat.st_size - st.st_size;
else
n = file->stat_info->stat.st_size
- (file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].offset
+ file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].numbytes
- bytes_left);
WARNOPT (WARN_FILE_SHRANK,
(0, 0,
ngettext ("%s: File shrank by %s byte; padding with zeros",
"%s: File shrank by %s bytes; padding with zeros",
n),
quotearg_colon (file->stat_info->orig_file_name),
STRINGIFY_BIGINT (n, buf)));
if (! ignore_failed_read_option)
set_exit_status (TAREXIT_DIFFERS);
return false;
}
memset (blk->buffer + bytes_read, 0, BLOCKSIZE - bytes_read);
bytes_left -= bytes_read;
{
size_t count;
size_t wrbytes = (write_size > BLOCKSIZE) ? BLOCKSIZE : write_size;
union block *blk = find_next_block ();
if (!blk)
{
ERROR ((0, 0, _("Unexpected EOF in archive")));
return false;
}
set_next_block_after (blk);
count = blocking_write (file->fd, blk->buffer, wrbytes);
write_size -= count;
file->dumped_size += count;
mv_size_left (file->stat_info->archive_file_size - file->dumped_size);
file->offset += count;
if (count != wrbytes)
{
write_error_details (file->stat_info->orig_file_name,
count, wrbytes);
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
/* Interface functions */
enum dump_status
sparse_dump_file (int fd, struct tar_stat_info *st)
{
return false;
}
set_next_block_after (blk);
file->dumped_size += BLOCKSIZE;
count = blocking_write (file->fd, blk->buffer, wrbytes);
write_size -= count;
mv_size_left (file->stat_info->archive_file_size - file->dumped_size);
file->offset += count;
if (count != wrbytes)
rc = sparse_scan_file (&file);
if (rc && file.optab->dump_region)
{
tar_sparse_dump_header (&file);
if (fd >= 0)
{
size_t i;
mv_begin_write (file.stat_info->file_name,
file.stat_info->stat.st_size,
file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size);
for (i = 0; rc && i < file.stat_info->sparse_map_avail; i++)
rc = tar_sparse_dump_region (&file, i);
}
}
pad_archive (file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size);
return (tar_sparse_done (&file) && rc) ? dump_status_ok : dump_status_short;
}
| 164,596 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: unsigned int SAD(unsigned int max_sad, int block_idx = 0) {
unsigned int ret;
const uint8_t* const reference = GetReference(block_idx);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(ret = GET_PARAM(2)(source_data_, source_stride_,
reference, reference_stride_,
max_sad));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | unsigned int SAD(unsigned int max_sad, int block_idx = 0) {
| 174,575 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Set(const std::string& addr, int value) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
map_[addr] = value;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void Set(const std::string& addr, int value) {
// Sets the |value| for |preview_id|.
void Set(int32 preview_id, int value) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
map_[preview_id] = value;
}
| 170,842 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfs41_callback_svc(void *vrqstp)
{
struct svc_rqst *rqstp = vrqstp;
struct svc_serv *serv = rqstp->rq_server;
struct rpc_rqst *req;
int error;
DEFINE_WAIT(wq);
set_freezable();
while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
if (try_to_freeze())
continue;
prepare_to_wait(&serv->sv_cb_waitq, &wq, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
spin_lock_bh(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
if (!list_empty(&serv->sv_cb_list)) {
req = list_first_entry(&serv->sv_cb_list,
struct rpc_rqst, rq_bc_list);
list_del(&req->rq_bc_list);
spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
finish_wait(&serv->sv_cb_waitq, &wq);
dprintk("Invoking bc_svc_process()\n");
error = bc_svc_process(serv, req, rqstp);
dprintk("bc_svc_process() returned w/ error code= %d\n",
error);
} else {
spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
schedule();
finish_wait(&serv->sv_cb_waitq, &wq);
}
flush_signals(current);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | nfs41_callback_svc(void *vrqstp)
{
struct svc_rqst *rqstp = vrqstp;
struct svc_serv *serv = rqstp->rq_server;
struct rpc_rqst *req;
int error;
DEFINE_WAIT(wq);
set_freezable();
while (!kthread_freezable_should_stop(NULL)) {
if (signal_pending(current))
flush_signals(current);
prepare_to_wait(&serv->sv_cb_waitq, &wq, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
spin_lock_bh(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
if (!list_empty(&serv->sv_cb_list)) {
req = list_first_entry(&serv->sv_cb_list,
struct rpc_rqst, rq_bc_list);
list_del(&req->rq_bc_list);
spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
finish_wait(&serv->sv_cb_waitq, &wq);
dprintk("Invoking bc_svc_process()\n");
error = bc_svc_process(serv, req, rqstp);
dprintk("bc_svc_process() returned w/ error code= %d\n",
error);
} else {
spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
if (!kthread_should_stop())
schedule();
finish_wait(&serv->sv_cb_waitq, &wq);
}
}
svc_exit_thread(rqstp);
module_put_and_exit(0);
return 0;
}
| 168,137 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: http_dissect_hdrs(struct worker *w, struct http *hp, int fd, char *p,
const struct http_conn *htc)
{
char *q, *r;
txt t = htc->rxbuf;
if (*p == '\r')
p++;
hp->nhd = HTTP_HDR_FIRST;
hp->conds = 0;
r = NULL; /* For FlexeLint */
for (; p < t.e; p = r) {
/* Find end of next header */
q = r = p;
while (r < t.e) {
if (!vct_iscrlf(*r)) {
r++;
continue;
}
q = r;
assert(r < t.e);
r += vct_skipcrlf(r);
if (r >= t.e)
break;
/* If line does not continue: got it. */
if (!vct_issp(*r))
break;
/* Clear line continuation LWS to spaces */
while (vct_islws(*q))
*q++ = ' ';
}
if (q - p > htc->maxhdr) {
VSC_C_main->losthdr++;
WSL(w, SLT_LostHeader, fd, "%.*s",
q - p > 20 ? 20 : q - p, p);
return (413);
}
/* Empty header = end of headers */
if (p == q)
break;
if ((p[0] == 'i' || p[0] == 'I') &&
(p[1] == 'f' || p[1] == 'F') &&
p[2] == '-')
hp->conds = 1;
while (q > p && vct_issp(q[-1]))
q--;
*q = '\0';
if (hp->nhd < hp->shd) {
hp->hdf[hp->nhd] = 0;
hp->hd[hp->nhd].b = p;
hp->hd[hp->nhd].e = q;
WSLH(w, fd, hp, hp->nhd);
hp->nhd++;
} else {
VSC_C_main->losthdr++;
WSL(w, SLT_LostHeader, fd, "%.*s",
q - p > 20 ? 20 : q - p, p);
return (413);
}
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Do not consider a CR by itself as a valid line terminator
Varnish (prior to version 4.0) was not following the standard with
regard to line separator.
Spotted and analyzed by: Régis Leroy [regilero] regis.leroy@makina-corpus.com
CWE ID: | http_dissect_hdrs(struct worker *w, struct http *hp, int fd, char *p,
const struct http_conn *htc)
{
char *q, *r;
txt t = htc->rxbuf;
if (*p == '\r')
p++;
hp->nhd = HTTP_HDR_FIRST;
hp->conds = 0;
r = NULL; /* For FlexeLint */
for (; p < t.e; p = r) {
/* Find end of next header */
q = r = p;
while (r < t.e) {
if (!vct_iscrlf(r)) {
r++;
continue;
}
q = r;
assert(r < t.e);
r += vct_skipcrlf(r);
if (r >= t.e)
break;
/* If line does not continue: got it. */
if (!vct_issp(*r))
break;
/* Clear line continuation LWS to spaces */
while (vct_islws(*q))
*q++ = ' ';
}
if (q - p > htc->maxhdr) {
VSC_C_main->losthdr++;
WSL(w, SLT_LostHeader, fd, "%.*s",
q - p > 20 ? 20 : q - p, p);
return (413);
}
/* Empty header = end of headers */
if (p == q)
break;
if ((p[0] == 'i' || p[0] == 'I') &&
(p[1] == 'f' || p[1] == 'F') &&
p[2] == '-')
hp->conds = 1;
while (q > p && vct_issp(q[-1]))
q--;
*q = '\0';
if (hp->nhd < hp->shd) {
hp->hdf[hp->nhd] = 0;
hp->hd[hp->nhd].b = p;
hp->hd[hp->nhd].e = q;
WSLH(w, fd, hp, hp->nhd);
hp->nhd++;
} else {
VSC_C_main->losthdr++;
WSL(w, SLT_LostHeader, fd, "%.*s",
q - p > 20 ? 20 : q - p, p);
return (413);
}
}
return (0);
}
| 169,997 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport void *DetachBlob(BlobInfo *blob_info)
{
void
*data;
assert(blob_info != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
if (blob_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
if (blob_info->mapped != MagickFalse)
{
(void) UnmapBlob(blob_info->data,blob_info->length);
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,blob_info->length);
}
blob_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
blob_info->length=0;
blob_info->offset=0;
blob_info->eof=MagickFalse;
blob_info->error=0;
blob_info->exempt=MagickFalse;
blob_info->type=UndefinedStream;
blob_info->file_info.file=(FILE *) NULL;
data=blob_info->data;
blob_info->data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
blob_info->stream=(StreamHandler) NULL;
blob_info->custom_stream=(CustomStreamInfo *) NULL;
return(data);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416 | MagickExport void *DetachBlob(BlobInfo *blob_info)
{
void
*data;
assert(blob_info != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
if (blob_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
if (blob_info->mapped != MagickFalse)
{
(void) UnmapBlob(blob_info->data,blob_info->length);
blob_info->data=NULL;
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,blob_info->length);
}
blob_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
blob_info->length=0;
blob_info->offset=0;
blob_info->eof=MagickFalse;
blob_info->error=0;
blob_info->exempt=MagickFalse;
blob_info->type=UndefinedStream;
blob_info->file_info.file=(FILE *) NULL;
data=blob_info->data;
blob_info->data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
blob_info->stream=(StreamHandler) NULL;
blob_info->custom_stream=(CustomStreamInfo *) NULL;
return(data);
}
| 170,190 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DataReductionProxySettings::~DataReductionProxySettings() {
spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.Destroy();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | DataReductionProxySettings::~DataReductionProxySettings() {
| 172,559 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ScreenPositionController::ConvertHostPointToRelativeToRootWindow(
aura::Window* root_window,
const aura::Window::Windows& root_windows,
gfx::Point* point,
aura::Window** target_root) {
DCHECK(!root_window->parent());
gfx::Point point_in_root(*point);
root_window->GetHost()->ConvertPointFromHost(&point_in_root);
*target_root = root_window;
*point = point_in_root;
#if defined(USE_X11) || defined(USE_OZONE)
if (!root_window->GetHost()->GetBounds().Contains(*point)) {
gfx::Point location_in_native(point_in_root);
root_window->GetHost()->ConvertPointToNativeScreen(&location_in_native);
for (size_t i = 0; i < root_windows.size(); ++i) {
aura::WindowTreeHost* host = root_windows[i]->GetHost();
const gfx::Rect native_bounds = host->GetBounds();
if (native_bounds.Contains(location_in_native)) {
*target_root = root_windows[i];
*point = location_in_native;
host->ConvertPointFromNativeScreen(point);
break;
}
}
}
#else
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Use the host coordinate when comparing to host window bounds.
I somehow overlooked this and the test was not strict enough to catch this.
BUG=521919
TEST=Updated ScreenPositionControllerTest.ConvertHostPointToScreenHiDPI so that it fails without the patch.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344186}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void ScreenPositionController::ConvertHostPointToRelativeToRootWindow(
aura::Window* root_window,
const aura::Window::Windows& root_windows,
gfx::Point* point,
aura::Window** target_root) {
DCHECK(!root_window->parent());
gfx::Point point_in_root(*point);
root_window->GetHost()->ConvertPointFromHost(&point_in_root);
#if defined(USE_X11) || defined(USE_OZONE)
gfx::Rect host_bounds(root_window->GetHost()->GetBounds().size());
if (!host_bounds.Contains(*point)) {
gfx::Point location_in_native(point_in_root);
root_window->GetHost()->ConvertPointToNativeScreen(&location_in_native);
for (size_t i = 0; i < root_windows.size(); ++i) {
aura::WindowTreeHost* host = root_windows[i]->GetHost();
const gfx::Rect native_bounds = host->GetBounds();
if (native_bounds.Contains(location_in_native)) {
*target_root = root_windows[i];
*point = location_in_native;
host->ConvertPointFromNativeScreen(point);
return;
}
}
}
#endif
*target_root = root_window;
*point = point_in_root;
}
| 171,711 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::FinalizeGlobalMemoryDumpIfAllManagersReplied() {
TRACE_EVENT0(base::trace_event::MemoryDumpManager::kTraceCategory,
"GlobalMemoryDump.Computation");
DCHECK(!queued_memory_dump_requests_.empty());
QueuedRequest* request = &queued_memory_dump_requests_.front();
if (!request->dump_in_progress || request->pending_responses.size() > 0 ||
request->heap_dump_in_progress) {
return;
}
QueuedRequestDispatcher::Finalize(request, tracing_observer_.get());
queued_memory_dump_requests_.pop_front();
request = nullptr;
if (!queued_memory_dump_requests_.empty()) {
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CoordinatorImpl::PerformNextQueuedGlobalMemoryDump,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void CoordinatorImpl::FinalizeGlobalMemoryDumpIfAllManagersReplied() {
TRACE_EVENT0(base::trace_event::MemoryDumpManager::kTraceCategory,
"GlobalMemoryDump.Computation");
DCHECK(!queued_memory_dump_requests_.empty());
QueuedRequest* request = &queued_memory_dump_requests_.front();
if (!request->dump_in_progress || request->pending_responses.size() > 0 ||
request->heap_dump_in_progress) {
return;
}
QueuedRequestDispatcher::Finalize(request, tracing_observer_.get());
queued_memory_dump_requests_.pop_front();
request = nullptr;
if (!queued_memory_dump_requests_.empty()) {
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CoordinatorImpl::PerformNextQueuedGlobalMemoryDump,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
}
| 173,212 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DisconnectWindowLinux::Hide() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Initial implementation of DisconnectWindow on Linux.
BUG=None
TEST=Manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88889 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void DisconnectWindowLinux::Hide() {
DCHECK(disconnect_window_);
gtk_widget_hide(disconnect_window_);
}
gboolean DisconnectWindowLinux::OnWindowDelete(GtkWidget* widget,
GdkEvent* event) {
// Don't allow the window to be closed.
return TRUE;
}
void DisconnectWindowLinux::OnDisconnectClicked(GtkButton* sender) {
DCHECK(host_);
host_->Shutdown();
}
| 170,473 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int nfs4_intent_set_file(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state)
{
struct file *filp;
int ret;
/* If the open_intent is for execute, we have an extra check to make */
if (nd->intent.open.flags & FMODE_EXEC) {
ret = nfs_may_open(state->inode,
state->owner->so_cred,
nd->intent.open.flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_close;
}
filp = lookup_instantiate_filp(nd, path->dentry, NULL);
if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
struct nfs_open_context *ctx;
ctx = nfs_file_open_context(filp);
ctx->state = state;
return 0;
}
ret = PTR_ERR(filp);
out_close:
nfs4_close_sync(path, state, nd->intent.open.flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | static int nfs4_intent_set_file(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state)
static int nfs4_intent_set_file(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, fmode_t fmode)
{
struct file *filp;
int ret;
/* If the open_intent is for execute, we have an extra check to make */
if (fmode & FMODE_EXEC) {
ret = nfs_may_open(state->inode,
state->owner->so_cred,
nd->intent.open.flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_close;
}
filp = lookup_instantiate_filp(nd, path->dentry, NULL);
if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
struct nfs_open_context *ctx;
ctx = nfs_file_open_context(filp);
ctx->state = state;
return 0;
}
ret = PTR_ERR(filp);
out_close:
nfs4_close_sync(path, state, fmode & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE));
return ret;
}
| 165,693 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ip6_mroute_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
int olr;
int val;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct mr6_table *mrt;
mrt = ip6mr_get_table(net, raw6_sk(sk)->ip6mr_table ? : RT6_TABLE_DFLT);
if (!mrt)
return -ENOENT;
switch (optname) {
case MRT6_VERSION:
val = 0x0305;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_PIMSM_V2
case MRT6_PIM:
val = mrt->mroute_do_pim;
break;
#endif
case MRT6_ASSERT:
val = mrt->mroute_do_assert;
break;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
if (get_user(olr, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
olr = min_t(int, olr, sizeof(int));
if (olr < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (put_user(olr, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, olr))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int ip6_mroute_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
int olr;
int val;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct mr6_table *mrt;
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_RAW ||
inet_sk(sk)->inet_num != IPPROTO_ICMPV6)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
mrt = ip6mr_get_table(net, raw6_sk(sk)->ip6mr_table ? : RT6_TABLE_DFLT);
if (!mrt)
return -ENOENT;
switch (optname) {
case MRT6_VERSION:
val = 0x0305;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_PIMSM_V2
case MRT6_PIM:
val = mrt->mroute_do_pim;
break;
#endif
case MRT6_ASSERT:
val = mrt->mroute_do_assert;
break;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
if (get_user(olr, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
olr = min_t(int, olr, sizeof(int));
if (olr < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (put_user(olr, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, olr))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
| 169,857 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(PrintWebViewHelper, message)
#if defined(ENABLE_BASIC_PRINTING)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintPages, OnPrintPages)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintForSystemDialog, OnPrintForSystemDialog)
#endif // ENABLE_BASIC_PRINTING
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_InitiatePrintPreview, OnInitiatePrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintPreview, OnPrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintForPrintPreview, OnPrintForPrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintingDone, OnPrintingDone)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_SetScriptedPrintingBlocked,
SetScriptedPrintBlocked)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | bool PrintWebViewHelper::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
// The class is not designed to handle recursive messages. This is not
// expected during regular flow. However, during rendering of content for
// printing, lower level code may run nested message loop. E.g. PDF may has
// script to show message box http://crbug.com/502562. In that moment browser
// may receive updated printer capabilities and decide to restart print
// preview generation. When this happened message handling function may
// choose to ignore message or safely crash process.
++ipc_nesting_level_;
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(PrintWebViewHelper, message)
#if defined(ENABLE_BASIC_PRINTING)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintPages, OnPrintPages)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintForSystemDialog, OnPrintForSystemDialog)
#endif // ENABLE_BASIC_PRINTING
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_InitiatePrintPreview, OnInitiatePrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintPreview, OnPrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintForPrintPreview, OnPrintForPrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintingDone, OnPrintingDone)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_SetScriptedPrintingBlocked,
SetScriptedPrintBlocked)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
--ipc_nesting_level_;
return handled;
}
| 171,872 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void __exit exit_ext2_fs(void)
{
unregister_filesystem(&ext2_fs_type);
destroy_inodecache();
exit_ext2_xattr();
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | static void __exit exit_ext2_fs(void)
{
unregister_filesystem(&ext2_fs_type);
destroy_inodecache();
}
| 169,972 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Segment::Segment(IMkvReader* pReader, long long elem_start,
long long start, long long size)
: m_pReader(pReader),
m_element_start(elem_start),
m_start(start),
m_size(size),
m_pos(start),
m_pUnknownSize(0),
m_pSeekHead(NULL),
m_pInfo(NULL),
m_pTracks(NULL),
m_pCues(NULL),
m_pChapters(NULL),
m_clusters(NULL),
m_clusterCount(0),
m_clusterPreloadCount(0),
m_clusterSize(0) {}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | Segment::Segment(IMkvReader* pReader, long long elem_start,
long long start, long long size)
: m_pReader(pReader),
m_element_start(elem_start),
m_start(start),
m_size(size),
m_pos(start),
m_pUnknownSize(0),
m_pSeekHead(NULL),
m_pInfo(NULL),
m_pTracks(NULL),
m_pCues(NULL),
m_pChapters(NULL),
m_pTags(NULL),
m_clusters(NULL),
m_clusterCount(0),
m_clusterPreloadCount(0),
m_clusterSize(0) {}
| 173,864 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, seek)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
long line_pos;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &line_pos) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (line_pos < 0) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_LogicException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Can't seek file %s to negative line %ld", intern->file_name, line_pos);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
spl_filesystem_file_rewind(getThis(), intern TSRMLS_CC);
while(intern->u.file.current_line_num < line_pos) {
if (spl_filesystem_file_read_line(getThis(), intern, 1 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
break;
}
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ Function/Class/Method definitions */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, seek)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
long line_pos;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &line_pos) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (line_pos < 0) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_LogicException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Can't seek file %s to negative line %ld", intern->file_name, line_pos);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
spl_filesystem_file_rewind(getThis(), intern TSRMLS_CC);
while(intern->u.file.current_line_num < line_pos) {
if (spl_filesystem_file_read_line(getThis(), intern, 1 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
break;
}
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ Function/Class/Method definitions */
| 167,068 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::RequestConfirmation(
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device,
int passkey) {
}
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void BluetoothOptionsHandler::RequestConfirmation(
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device,
int passkey) {
DictionaryValue params;
params.SetString("pairing", "bluetoothConfirmPasskey");
params.SetInteger("passkey", passkey);
SendDeviceNotification(device, ¶ms);
}
| 170,971 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t CameraDeviceClient::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
String8 result;
result.appendFormat("CameraDeviceClient[%d] (%p) PID: %d, dump:\n",
mCameraId,
getRemoteCallback()->asBinder().get(),
mClientPid);
result.append(" State: ");
mFrameProcessor->dump(fd, args);
return dumpDevice(fd, args);
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | status_t CameraDeviceClient::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
return BasicClient::dump(fd, args);
}
status_t CameraDeviceClient::dumpClient(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
String8 result;
result.appendFormat("CameraDeviceClient[%d] (%p) PID: %d, dump:\n",
mCameraId,
getRemoteCallback()->asBinder().get(),
mClientPid);
result.append(" State: ");
mFrameProcessor->dump(fd, args);
return dumpDevice(fd, args);
}
| 173,939 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static byte parseHexByte(const char * &str) {
byte b = parseHexChar(str[0]);
if (str[1] == ':' || str[1] == '\0') {
str += 2;
return b;
} else {
b = b << 4 | parseHexChar(str[1]);
str += 3;
return b;
}
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static byte parseHexByte(const char * &str) {
if (str[0] == '\0') {
ALOGE("Passed an empty string");
return 0;
}
byte b = parseHexChar(str[0]);
if (str[1] == '\0' || str[1] == ':') {
str ++;
} else {
b = b << 4 | parseHexChar(str[1]);
str += 2;
}
// Skip trailing delimiter if not at the end of the string.
if (str[0] != '\0') {
str++;
}
return b;
}
| 173,500 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.