instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int rpc_type_of_NPPVariable(int variable)
{
int type;
switch (variable) {
case NPPVpluginNameString:
case NPPVpluginDescriptionString:
case NPPVformValue: // byte values of 0 does not appear in the UTF-8 encoding but for U+0000
type = RPC_TYPE_STRING;
break;
case NPPVpluginWindowSize:
case NPPVpluginTimerInterval:
type = RPC_TYPE_INT32;
break;
case NPPVpluginNeedsXEmbed:
case NPPVpluginWindowBool:
case NPPVpluginTransparentBool:
case NPPVjavascriptPushCallerBool:
case NPPVpluginKeepLibraryInMemory:
type = RPC_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
break;
case NPPVpluginScriptableNPObject:
type = RPC_TYPE_NP_OBJECT;
break;
default:
type = RPC_ERROR_GENERIC;
break;
}
return type;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int rpc_type_of_NPPVariable(int variable)
{
int type;
switch (variable) {
case NPPVpluginNameString:
case NPPVpluginDescriptionString:
case NPPVformValue: // byte values of 0 does not appear in the UTF-8 encoding but for U+0000
case NPPVpluginNativeAccessibleAtkPlugId:
type = RPC_TYPE_STRING;
break;
case NPPVpluginWindowSize:
case NPPVpluginTimerInterval:
type = RPC_TYPE_INT32;
break;
case NPPVpluginNeedsXEmbed:
case NPPVpluginWindowBool:
case NPPVpluginTransparentBool:
case NPPVjavascriptPushCallerBool:
case NPPVpluginKeepLibraryInMemory:
case NPPVpluginUrlRequestsDisplayedBool:
case NPPVpluginWantsAllNetworkStreams:
case NPPVpluginCancelSrcStream:
case NPPVSupportsAdvancedKeyHandling:
type = RPC_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
break;
case NPPVpluginScriptableNPObject:
type = RPC_TYPE_NP_OBJECT;
break;
default:
type = RPC_ERROR_GENERIC;
break;
}
return type;
}
| 165,863 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
ASN1_TLC *ctx);
static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
ASN1_TLC *ctx);
static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
/* tags 4- 7 */
B_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0, 0, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
/* tags 8-11 */
B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
/* tags 12-15 */
B_ASN1_UTF8STRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
/* tags 16-19 */
B_ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0, B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING, B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING,
/* tags 20-22 */
B_ASN1_T61STRING, B_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING, B_ASN1_IA5STRING,
/* tags 23-24 */
B_ASN1_UTCTIME, B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,
/* tags 25-27 */
B_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING, B_ASN1_ISO64STRING, B_ASN1_GENERALSTRING,
/* tags 28-31 */
B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_BMPSTRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
};
unsigned long ASN1_tag2bit(int tag)
{
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth);
static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth);
static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
/* tags 4- 7 */
B_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0, 0, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
/* tags 8-11 */
B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
/* tags 12-15 */
B_ASN1_UTF8STRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
/* tags 16-19 */
B_ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0, B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING, B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING,
/* tags 20-22 */
B_ASN1_T61STRING, B_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING, B_ASN1_IA5STRING,
/* tags 23-24 */
B_ASN1_UTCTIME, B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,
/* tags 25-27 */
B_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING, B_ASN1_ISO64STRING, B_ASN1_GENERALSTRING,
/* tags 28-31 */
B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_BMPSTRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
};
unsigned long ASN1_tag2bit(int tag)
{
| 165,326 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoBeginQueryEXT(
GLenum target,
GLuint id,
int32_t sync_shm_id,
uint32_t sync_shm_offset) {
GLuint service_id = GetQueryServiceID(id, &query_id_map_);
QueryInfo* query_info = &query_info_map_[service_id];
scoped_refptr<gpu::Buffer> buffer = GetSharedMemoryBuffer(sync_shm_id);
if (!buffer)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
QuerySync* sync = static_cast<QuerySync*>(
buffer->GetDataAddress(sync_shm_offset, sizeof(QuerySync)));
if (!sync)
return error::kOutOfBounds;
if (IsEmulatedQueryTarget(target)) {
if (active_queries_.find(target) != active_queries_.end()) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "Query already active on target.");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (id == 0) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "Query id is 0.");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (query_info->type != GL_NONE && query_info->type != target) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"Query type does not match the target.");
return error::kNoError;
}
} else {
CheckErrorCallbackState();
api()->glBeginQueryFn(target, service_id);
if (CheckErrorCallbackState()) {
return error::kNoError;
}
}
query_info->type = target;
RemovePendingQuery(service_id);
ActiveQuery query;
query.service_id = service_id;
query.shm = std::move(buffer);
query.sync = sync;
active_queries_[target] = std::move(query);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoBeginQueryEXT(
GLenum target,
GLuint id,
int32_t sync_shm_id,
uint32_t sync_shm_offset) {
GLuint service_id = GetQueryServiceID(id, &query_id_map_);
QueryInfo* query_info = &query_info_map_[service_id];
scoped_refptr<gpu::Buffer> buffer = GetSharedMemoryBuffer(sync_shm_id);
if (!buffer)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
QuerySync* sync = static_cast<QuerySync*>(
buffer->GetDataAddress(sync_shm_offset, sizeof(QuerySync)));
if (!sync)
return error::kOutOfBounds;
if (target == GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM) {
linking_program_service_id_ = 0u;
}
if (IsEmulatedQueryTarget(target)) {
if (active_queries_.find(target) != active_queries_.end()) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "Query already active on target.");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (id == 0) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "Query id is 0.");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (query_info->type != GL_NONE && query_info->type != target) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"Query type does not match the target.");
return error::kNoError;
}
} else {
CheckErrorCallbackState();
api()->glBeginQueryFn(target, service_id);
if (CheckErrorCallbackState()) {
return error::kNoError;
}
}
query_info->type = target;
RemovePendingQuery(service_id);
ActiveQuery query;
query.service_id = service_id;
query.shm = std::move(buffer);
query.sync = sync;
active_queries_[target] = std::move(query);
return error::kNoError;
}
| 172,532 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionTtsController::SpeakOrEnqueue(Utterance* utterance) {
if (IsSpeaking() && utterance->can_enqueue()) {
utterance_queue_.push(utterance);
} else {
Stop();
SpeakNow(utterance);
}
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ExtensionTtsController::SpeakOrEnqueue(Utterance* utterance) {
std::string gender;
if (options->HasKey(constants::kGenderKey))
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetString(constants::kGenderKey, &gender));
if (!gender.empty() &&
gender != constants::kGenderFemale &&
gender != constants::kGenderMale) {
error_ = constants::kErrorInvalidGender;
return false;
}
| 170,389 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool mkvparser::Match(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos, unsigned long id_,
unsigned char*& buf, size_t& buflen) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
if (status < 0)
return false;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
if ((unsigned long)id != id_)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long size_ = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size_ >= 0);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
pos += len; // consume length of size of payload
assert((pos + size_) <= available);
const long buflen_ = static_cast<long>(size_);
buf = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[buflen_];
assert(buf); // TODO
status = pReader->Read(pos, buflen_, buf);
assert(status == 0); // TODO
buflen = buflen_;
pos += size_; // consume size of payload
return true;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool mkvparser::Match(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos, unsigned long id_,
bool Match(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos, unsigned long expected_id,
unsigned char*& buf, size_t& buflen) {
if (!pReader || pos < 0)
return false;
long long total = 0;
long long available = 0;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
if (status < 0 || (total >= 0 && available > total))
return false;
long len = 0;
const long long id = ReadID(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0 || (available - pos) > len)
return false;
if (static_cast<unsigned long>(id) != expected_id)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0 || len <= 0 || len > 8 || (available - pos) > len)
return false;
unsigned long long rollover_check =
static_cast<unsigned long long>(pos) + len;
if (rollover_check > LONG_LONG_MAX)
return false;
pos += len; // consume length of size of payload
rollover_check = static_cast<unsigned long long>(pos) + size;
if (rollover_check > LONG_LONG_MAX)
return false;
if ((pos + size) > available)
return false;
if (size >= LONG_MAX)
return false;
const long buflen_ = static_cast<long>(size);
buf = SafeArrayAlloc<unsigned char>(1, buflen_);
if (!buf)
return false;
status = pReader->Read(pos, buflen_, buf);
if (status != 0)
return false;
buflen = buflen_;
pos += size; // consume size of payload
return true;
}
| 173,833 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebp (gdImagePtr im, FILE * outFile)
{
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewFileCtx(outFile);
if (out == NULL) {
return;
}
gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, -1);
out->gd_free(out);
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6912
CWE ID: CWE-415 | BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebp (gdImagePtr im, FILE * outFile)
{
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewFileCtx(outFile);
if (out == NULL) {
return;
}
_gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, -1);
out->gd_free(out);
}
| 168,816 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void send_auth(char *username, char *password) {
struct mt_packet data;
unsigned short width = 0;
unsigned short height = 0;
char *terminal = getenv("TERM");
char md5data[100];
unsigned char md5sum[17];
int plen;
md5_state_t state;
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(_POSIX_MEMLOCK_RANGE)
mlock(md5data, sizeof(md5data));
mlock(md5sum, sizeof(md5data));
#endif
/* Concat string of 0 + password + pass_salt */
md5data[0] = 0;
strncpy(md5data + 1, password, 82);
md5data[83] = '\0';
memcpy(md5data + 1 + strlen(password), pass_salt, 16);
/* Generate md5 sum of md5data with a leading 0 */
md5_init(&state);
md5_append(&state, (const md5_byte_t *)md5data, strlen(password) + 17);
md5_finish(&state, (md5_byte_t *)md5sum + 1);
md5sum[0] = 0;
/* Send combined packet to server */
init_packet(&data, MT_PTYPE_DATA, srcmac, dstmac, sessionkey, outcounter);
plen = add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_PASSWORD, md5sum, 17);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_USERNAME, username, strlen(username));
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_TYPE, terminal, strlen(terminal));
if (is_a_tty && get_terminal_size(&width, &height) != -1) {
width = htole16(width);
height = htole16(height);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_WIDTH, &width, 2);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_HEIGHT, &height, 2);
}
outcounter += plen;
/* TODO: handle result */
send_udp(&data, 1);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void send_auth(char *username, char *password) {
struct mt_packet data;
unsigned short width = 0;
unsigned short height = 0;
char *terminal = getenv("TERM");
char md5data[100];
unsigned char md5sum[17];
int plen, act_pass_len;
md5_state_t state;
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(_POSIX_MEMLOCK_RANGE)
mlock(md5data, sizeof(md5data));
mlock(md5sum, sizeof(md5data));
#endif
/* calculate the actual password's length */
act_pass_len = strnlen(password, 82);
/* Concat string of 0 + password + pass_salt */
md5data[0] = 0;
memcpy(md5data + 1, password, act_pass_len);
/* in case that password is long, calculate only using the used-up parts */
memcpy(md5data + 1 + act_pass_len, pass_salt, 16);
/* Generate md5 sum of md5data with a leading 0 */
md5_init(&state);
md5_append(&state, (const md5_byte_t *)md5data, 1 + act_pass_len + 16);
md5_finish(&state, (md5_byte_t *)md5sum + 1);
md5sum[0] = 0;
/* Send combined packet to server */
init_packet(&data, MT_PTYPE_DATA, srcmac, dstmac, sessionkey, outcounter);
plen = add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_PASSWORD, md5sum, 17);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_USERNAME, username, strlen(username));
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_TYPE, terminal, strlen(terminal));
if (is_a_tty && get_terminal_size(&width, &height) != -1) {
width = htole16(width);
height = htole16(height);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_WIDTH, &width, 2);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_HEIGHT, &height, 2);
}
outcounter += plen;
/* TODO: handle result */
send_udp(&data, 1);
}
| 166,963 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ChromeMockRenderThread::print_preview_pages_remaining() {
return print_preview_pages_remaining_;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | int ChromeMockRenderThread::print_preview_pages_remaining() {
int ChromeMockRenderThread::print_preview_pages_remaining() const {
return print_preview_pages_remaining_;
}
| 170,855 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void registerStreamURLTask(void* context)
{
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> blobRegistryContext = adoptPtr(static_cast<BlobRegistryContext*>(context));
blobRegistry().registerStreamURL(blobRegistryContext->url, blobRegistryContext->type);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | static void registerStreamURLTask(void* context)
{
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> blobRegistryContext = adoptPtr(static_cast<BlobRegistryContext*>(context));
if (WebBlobRegistry* registry = blobRegistry())
registry->registerStreamURL(blobRegistryContext->url, blobRegistryContext->type);
}
| 170,689 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const SeekHead::VoidElement* SeekHead::GetVoidElement(int idx) const
{
if (idx < 0)
return 0;
if (idx >= m_void_element_count)
return 0;
return m_void_elements + idx;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const SeekHead::VoidElement* SeekHead::GetVoidElement(int idx) const
| 174,380 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"[æӕ] > ae; [þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋпԥ] > n; œ > ce;"
"[ŧтҭԏ] > t; [ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщพฟພຟ] > w;"
"[мӎ] > m; [єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f;"
"[ҫင] > c; ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടรຣຮ] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зҙӡ] > 3; [บບ] > u"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Add confusability mapping entries for Myanmar and Georgian
U+10D5 (ვ), U+1012 (ဒ) => 3
Bug: 847242, 849398
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I9abb8560cf1c9e8e5e8d89980780b89461f7be52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1091430
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565709}
CWE ID: | IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
// - {U+0437 (з), U+0499 (ҙ), U+04E1 (ӡ), U+10D5 (ვ), U+1012 (ဒ)} => 3
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"[æӕ] > ae; [þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋпԥ] > n; œ > ce;"
"[ŧтҭԏ] > t; [ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщพฟພຟ] > w;"
"[мӎ] > m; [єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f;"
"[ҫင] > c; ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടรຣຮ] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зҙӡვဒ] > 3; [บບ] > u"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
| 173,152 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static cJSON *get_object_item(const cJSON * const object, const char * const name, const cJSON_bool case_sensitive)
{
cJSON *current_element = NULL;
if ((object == NULL) || (name == NULL))
{
return NULL;
}
current_element = object->child;
if (case_sensitive)
{
while ((current_element != NULL) && (strcmp(name, current_element->string) != 0))
{
current_element = current_element->next;
}
}
else
{
while ((current_element != NULL) && (case_insensitive_strcmp((const unsigned char*)name, (const unsigned char*)(current_element->string)) != 0))
{
current_element = current_element->next;
}
}
return current_element;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754 | static cJSON *get_object_item(const cJSON * const object, const char * const name, const cJSON_bool case_sensitive)
{
cJSON *current_element = NULL;
if ((object == NULL) || (name == NULL))
{
return NULL;
}
current_element = object->child;
if (case_sensitive)
{
while ((current_element != NULL) && (current_element->string != NULL) && (strcmp(name, current_element->string) != 0))
{
current_element = current_element->next;
}
}
else
{
while ((current_element != NULL) && (case_insensitive_strcmp((const unsigned char*)name, (const unsigned char*)(current_element->string)) != 0))
{
current_element = current_element->next;
}
}
if ((current_element == NULL) || (current_element->string == NULL)) {
return NULL;
}
return current_element;
}
| 169,480 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main()
{
gdImagePtr im;
char *buffer;
size_t size;
size = read_test_file(&buffer, "heap_overflow.tga");
im = gdImageCreateFromTgaPtr(size, (void *) buffer);
gdTestAssert(im == NULL);
free(buffer);
return gdNumFailures();
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB reads of the TGA decompression buffer
It is possible to craft TGA files which will overflow the decompression
buffer, but not the image's bitmap. Therefore we also have to check for
potential decompression buffer overflows.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org;
a modified case exposing an off-by-one error of the first patch had been
provided by Konrad Beckmann.
This commit is an amendment to commit fb0e0cce, so we use CVE-2016-6906
as well.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int main()
{
check_file("heap_overflow_1.tga");
check_file("heap_overflow_2.tga");
return gdNumFailures();
}
static void check_file(char *basename)
{
gdImagePtr im;
char *buffer;
size_t size;
size = read_test_file(&buffer, basename);
im = gdImageCreateFromTgaPtr(size, (void *) buffer);
gdTestAssert(im == NULL);
free(buffer);
}
| 170,121 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_write_start_row(png_structp png_ptr)
{
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* Arrays to facilitate easy interlacing - use pass (0 - 6) as index */
/* Start of interlace block */
int png_pass_start[7] = {0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0};
/* Offset to next interlace block */
int png_pass_inc[7] = {8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1};
/* Start of interlace block in the y direction */
int png_pass_ystart[7] = {0, 0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1};
/* Offset to next interlace block in the y direction */
int png_pass_yinc[7] = {8, 8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2};
#endif
png_size_t buf_size;
png_debug(1, "in png_write_start_row");
buf_size = (png_size_t)(PNG_ROWBYTES(
png_ptr->usr_channels*png_ptr->usr_bit_depth, png_ptr->width) + 1);
/* Set up row buffer */
png_ptr->row_buf = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)buf_size);
png_ptr->row_buf[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_NONE;
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
/* Set up filtering buffer, if using this filter */
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_SUB)
{
png_ptr->sub_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->sub_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_SUB;
}
/* We only need to keep the previous row if we are using one of these. */
if (png_ptr->do_filter & (PNG_FILTER_AVG | PNG_FILTER_UP | PNG_FILTER_PAETH))
{
/* Set up previous row buffer */
png_ptr->prev_row = (png_bytep)png_calloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)buf_size);
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_UP)
{
png_ptr->up_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->up_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_UP;
}
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_AVG)
{
png_ptr->avg_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->avg_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_AVG;
}
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_PAETH)
{
png_ptr->paeth_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->paeth_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_PAETH;
}
}
#endif /* PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED */
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* If interlaced, we need to set up width and height of pass */
if (png_ptr->interlaced)
{
if (!(png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INTERLACE))
{
png_ptr->num_rows = (png_ptr->height + png_pass_yinc[0] - 1 -
png_pass_ystart[0]) / png_pass_yinc[0];
png_ptr->usr_width = (png_ptr->width + png_pass_inc[0] - 1 -
png_pass_start[0]) / png_pass_inc[0];
}
else
{
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->usr_width = png_ptr->width;
}
}
else
#endif
{
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->usr_width = png_ptr->width;
}
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = (uInt)png_ptr->zbuf_size;
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | png_write_start_row(png_structp png_ptr)
{
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
#ifndef PNG_USE_GLOBAL_ARRAYS
/* Arrays to facilitate easy interlacing - use pass (0 - 6) as index */
/* Start of interlace block */
int png_pass_start[7] = {0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0};
/* Offset to next interlace block */
int png_pass_inc[7] = {8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1};
/* Start of interlace block in the y direction */
int png_pass_ystart[7] = {0, 0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1};
/* Offset to next interlace block in the y direction */
int png_pass_yinc[7] = {8, 8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2};
#endif
#endif
png_size_t buf_size;
png_debug(1, "in png_write_start_row");
buf_size = (png_size_t)(PNG_ROWBYTES(
png_ptr->usr_channels*png_ptr->usr_bit_depth, png_ptr->width) + 1);
/* Set up row buffer */
png_ptr->row_buf = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)buf_size);
png_ptr->row_buf[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_NONE;
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
/* Set up filtering buffer, if using this filter */
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_SUB)
{
png_ptr->sub_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->sub_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_SUB;
}
/* We only need to keep the previous row if we are using one of these. */
if (png_ptr->do_filter & (PNG_FILTER_AVG | PNG_FILTER_UP | PNG_FILTER_PAETH))
{
/* Set up previous row buffer */
png_ptr->prev_row = (png_bytep)png_calloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)buf_size);
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_UP)
{
png_ptr->up_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->up_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_UP;
}
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_AVG)
{
png_ptr->avg_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->avg_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_AVG;
}
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_PAETH)
{
png_ptr->paeth_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->paeth_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_PAETH;
}
}
#endif /* PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED */
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* If interlaced, we need to set up width and height of pass */
if (png_ptr->interlaced)
{
if (!(png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INTERLACE))
{
png_ptr->num_rows = (png_ptr->height + png_pass_yinc[0] - 1 -
png_pass_ystart[0]) / png_pass_yinc[0];
png_ptr->usr_width = (png_ptr->width + png_pass_inc[0] - 1 -
png_pass_start[0]) / png_pass_inc[0];
}
else
{
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->usr_width = png_ptr->width;
}
}
else
#endif
{
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->usr_width = png_ptr->width;
}
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = (uInt)png_ptr->zbuf_size;
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
}
| 172,196 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const Chapters::Display* Chapters::Atom::GetDisplay(int index) const
{
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
if (index >= m_displays_count)
return NULL;
return m_displays + index;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const Chapters::Display* Chapters::Atom::GetDisplay(int index) const
| 174,304 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::CreateBlock(long long id,
long long pos, // absolute pos of payload
long long size, long long discard_padding) {
assert((id == 0x20) || (id == 0x23)); // BlockGroup or SimpleBlock
if (m_entries_count < 0) { // haven't parsed anything yet
assert(m_entries == NULL);
assert(m_entries_size == 0);
m_entries_size = 1024;
m_entries = new BlockEntry* [m_entries_size];
m_entries_count = 0;
} else {
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count <= m_entries_size);
if (m_entries_count >= m_entries_size) {
const long entries_size = 2 * m_entries_size;
BlockEntry** const entries = new BlockEntry* [entries_size];
assert(entries);
BlockEntry** src = m_entries;
BlockEntry** const src_end = src + m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** dst = entries;
while (src != src_end)
*dst++ = *src++;
delete[] m_entries;
m_entries = entries;
m_entries_size = entries_size;
}
}
if (id == 0x20) // BlockGroup ID
return CreateBlockGroup(pos, size, discard_padding);
else // SimpleBlock ID
return CreateSimpleBlock(pos, size);
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long Cluster::CreateBlock(long long id,
long long pos, // absolute pos of payload
long long size, long long discard_padding) {
assert((id == 0x20) || (id == 0x23)); // BlockGroup or SimpleBlock
if (m_entries_count < 0) { // haven't parsed anything yet
assert(m_entries == NULL);
assert(m_entries_size == 0);
m_entries_size = 1024;
m_entries = new (std::nothrow) BlockEntry*[m_entries_size];
if (m_entries == NULL)
return -1;
m_entries_count = 0;
} else {
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count <= m_entries_size);
if (m_entries_count >= m_entries_size) {
const long entries_size = 2 * m_entries_size;
BlockEntry** const entries = new (std::nothrow) BlockEntry*[entries_size];
if (entries == NULL)
return -1;
BlockEntry** src = m_entries;
BlockEntry** const src_end = src + m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** dst = entries;
while (src != src_end)
*dst++ = *src++;
delete[] m_entries;
m_entries = entries;
m_entries_size = entries_size;
}
}
if (id == 0x20) // BlockGroup ID
return CreateBlockGroup(pos, size, discard_padding);
else // SimpleBlock ID
return CreateSimpleBlock(pos, size);
}
| 173,805 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int amd_gpio_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev;
gpio_dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
gpiochip_remove(&gpio_dev->gc);
pinctrl_unregister(gpio_dev->pctrl);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: pinctrl/amd: Drop pinctrl_unregister for devm_ registered device
It's not necessary to unregister pin controller device registered
with devm_pinctrl_register() and using pinctrl_unregister() leads
to a double free.
Fixes: 3bfd44306c65 ("pinctrl: amd: Add support for additional GPIO")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | static int amd_gpio_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev;
gpio_dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
gpiochip_remove(&gpio_dev->gc);
return 0;
}
| 169,419 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GLOzone* X11SurfaceFactory::GetGLOzone(gl::GLImplementation implementation) {
switch (implementation) {
case gl::kGLImplementationDesktopGL:
return glx_implementation_.get();
case gl::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2:
return egl_implementation_.get();
default:
return nullptr;
}
}
Commit Message: Add ThreadChecker for Ozone X11 GPU.
Ensure Ozone X11 tests the same thread constraints we have in Ozone GBM.
BUG=none
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2366643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421817}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | GLOzone* X11SurfaceFactory::GetGLOzone(gl::GLImplementation implementation) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
switch (implementation) {
case gl::kGLImplementationDesktopGL:
return glx_implementation_.get();
case gl::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2:
return egl_implementation_.get();
default:
return nullptr;
}
}
| 171,603 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool VideoTrack::VetEntry(const BlockEntry* pBlockEntry) const
{
return Track::VetEntry(pBlockEntry) && pBlockEntry->GetBlock()->IsKey();
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool VideoTrack::VetEntry(const BlockEntry* pBlockEntry) const
| 174,452 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int read_new_config_info (WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackMetadata *wpmd)
{
int bytecnt = wpmd->byte_length;
unsigned char *byteptr = wpmd->data;
wpc->version_five = 1; // just having this block signals version 5.0
wpc->file_format = wpc->config.qmode = wpc->channel_layout = 0;
if (wpc->channel_reordering) {
free (wpc->channel_reordering);
wpc->channel_reordering = NULL;
}
if (bytecnt) {
wpc->file_format = *byteptr++;
wpc->config.qmode = (wpc->config.qmode & ~0xff) | *byteptr++;
bytecnt -= 2;
if (bytecnt) {
int nchans, i;
wpc->channel_layout = (int32_t) *byteptr++ << 16;
bytecnt--;
if (bytecnt) {
wpc->channel_layout += nchans = *byteptr++;
bytecnt--;
if (bytecnt) {
if (bytecnt > nchans)
return FALSE;
wpc->channel_reordering = malloc (nchans);
if (wpc->channel_reordering) {
for (i = 0; i < nchans; ++i)
if (bytecnt) {
wpc->channel_reordering [i] = *byteptr++;
bytecnt--;
}
else
wpc->channel_reordering [i] = i;
}
}
}
else
wpc->channel_layout += wpc->config.num_channels;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: fixes for 4 fuzz failures posted to SourceForge mailing list
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int read_new_config_info (WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackMetadata *wpmd)
{
int bytecnt = wpmd->byte_length;
unsigned char *byteptr = wpmd->data;
wpc->version_five = 1; // just having this block signals version 5.0
wpc->file_format = wpc->config.qmode = wpc->channel_layout = 0;
if (wpc->channel_reordering) {
free (wpc->channel_reordering);
wpc->channel_reordering = NULL;
}
if (bytecnt >= 2) {
wpc->file_format = *byteptr++;
wpc->config.qmode = (wpc->config.qmode & ~0xff) | *byteptr++;
bytecnt -= 2;
if (bytecnt) {
int nchans, i;
wpc->channel_layout = (int32_t) *byteptr++ << 16;
bytecnt--;
if (bytecnt) {
wpc->channel_layout += nchans = *byteptr++;
bytecnt--;
if (bytecnt) {
if (bytecnt > nchans)
return FALSE;
wpc->channel_reordering = malloc (nchans);
if (wpc->channel_reordering) {
for (i = 0; i < nchans; ++i)
if (bytecnt) {
wpc->channel_reordering [i] = *byteptr++;
if (wpc->channel_reordering [i] >= nchans) // make sure index is in range
wpc->channel_reordering [i] = 0;
bytecnt--;
}
else
wpc->channel_reordering [i] = i;
}
}
}
else
wpc->channel_layout += wpc->config.num_channels;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
| 168,507 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserPpapiHostImpl::DeleteInstance(PP_Instance instance) {
auto it = instance_map_.find(instance);
DCHECK(it != instance_map_.end());
for (auto& observer : it->second->observer_list)
observer.OnHostDestroyed();
instance_map_.erase(it);
}
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void BrowserPpapiHostImpl::DeleteInstance(PP_Instance instance) {
// NOTE: 'instance' may be coming from a compromised renderer process. We
// take care here to make sure an attacker can't cause a UAF by deleting a
// non-existent plugin instance.
// See http://crbug.com/733548.
auto it = instance_map_.find(instance);
if (it != instance_map_.end()) {
// We need to tell the observers for that instance that we are destroyed
// because we won't have the opportunity to once we remove them from the
// |instance_map_|. If the instance was deleted, observers for those
// instances should never call back into the host anyway, so it is safe to
// tell them that the host is destroyed.
for (auto& observer : it->second->observer_list)
observer.OnHostDestroyed();
instance_map_.erase(it);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
| 172,310 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebsiteSettingsPopupAndroid::WebsiteSettingsPopupAndroid(
JNIEnv* env,
jobject java_website_settings_pop,
content::WebContents* web_contents) {
content::NavigationEntry* nav_entry =
web_contents->GetController().GetVisibleEntry();
if (nav_entry == NULL)
return;
url_ = nav_entry->GetURL();
popup_jobject_.Reset(env, java_website_settings_pop);
presenter_.reset(new WebsiteSettings(
this,
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext()),
TabSpecificContentSettings::FromWebContents(web_contents),
InfoBarService::FromWebContents(web_contents),
nav_entry->GetURL(),
nav_entry->GetSSL(),
content::CertStore::GetInstance()));
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID: | WebsiteSettingsPopupAndroid::WebsiteSettingsPopupAndroid(
JNIEnv* env,
jobject java_website_settings_pop,
content::WebContents* web_contents) {
content::NavigationEntry* nav_entry =
web_contents->GetController().GetVisibleEntry();
if (nav_entry == NULL)
return;
url_ = nav_entry->GetURL();
popup_jobject_.Reset(env, java_website_settings_pop);
presenter_.reset(new WebsiteSettings(
this,
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext()),
TabSpecificContentSettings::FromWebContents(web_contents),
web_contents,
nav_entry->GetURL(),
nav_entry->GetSSL(),
content::CertStore::GetInstance()));
}
| 171,778 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::RequestGlobalMemoryDumpAndAppendToTrace(
MemoryDumpType dump_type,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail level_of_detail,
const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpAndAppendToTraceCallback& callback) {
auto adapter =
[](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpAndAppendToTraceCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t dump_guid,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr) { callback.Run(success, dump_guid); };
QueuedRequest::Args args(dump_type, level_of_detail, {},
true /* add_to_trace */, base::kNullProcessId);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269 | void CoordinatorImpl::RequestGlobalMemoryDumpAndAppendToTrace(
MemoryDumpType dump_type,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail level_of_detail,
const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpAndAppendToTraceCallback& callback) {
// Don't allow arbitary processes to obtain VM regions. Only the heap profiler
// is allowed to obtain them using the special method on its own dedicated
// interface (HeapProfilingHelper).
if (level_of_detail ==
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::VM_REGIONS_ONLY_FOR_HEAP_PROFILER) {
bindings_.ReportBadMessage(
"Requested global memory dump using level of detail reserved for the "
"heap profiler.");
return;
}
auto adapter =
[](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpAndAppendToTraceCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t dump_guid,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr) { callback.Run(success, dump_guid); };
QueuedRequest::Args args(dump_type, level_of_detail, {},
true /* add_to_trace */, base::kNullProcessId);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
| 172,916 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DataReductionProxyConfig::InitializeOnIOThread(
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> url_loader_factory,
WarmupURLFetcher::CreateCustomProxyConfigCallback
create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
NetworkPropertiesManager* manager,
const std::string& user_agent) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
network_properties_manager_ = manager;
network_properties_manager_->ResetWarmupURLFetchMetrics();
secure_proxy_checker_.reset(new SecureProxyChecker(url_loader_factory));
warmup_url_fetcher_.reset(new WarmupURLFetcher(
create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
base::BindRepeating(
&DataReductionProxyConfig::HandleWarmupFetcherResponse,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindRepeating(&DataReductionProxyConfig::GetHttpRttEstimate,
base::Unretained(this)),
ui_task_runner_, user_agent));
AddDefaultProxyBypassRules();
network_connection_tracker_->AddNetworkConnectionObserver(this);
network_connection_tracker_->GetConnectionType(
&connection_type_,
base::BindOnce(&DataReductionProxyConfig::OnConnectionChanged,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void DataReductionProxyConfig::InitializeOnIOThread(
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> url_loader_factory,
WarmupURLFetcher::CreateCustomProxyConfigCallback
create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
NetworkPropertiesManager* manager,
const std::string& user_agent) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
network_properties_manager_ = manager;
network_properties_manager_->ResetWarmupURLFetchMetrics();
if (!params::IsIncludedInHoldbackFieldTrial()) {
secure_proxy_checker_.reset(new SecureProxyChecker(url_loader_factory));
warmup_url_fetcher_.reset(new WarmupURLFetcher(
create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
base::BindRepeating(
&DataReductionProxyConfig::HandleWarmupFetcherResponse,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindRepeating(&DataReductionProxyConfig::GetHttpRttEstimate,
base::Unretained(this)),
ui_task_runner_, user_agent));
}
AddDefaultProxyBypassRules();
network_connection_tracker_->AddNetworkConnectionObserver(this);
network_connection_tracker_->GetConnectionType(
&connection_type_,
base::BindOnce(&DataReductionProxyConfig::OnConnectionChanged,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
| 172,416 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void scsi_read_data(SCSIRequest *req)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
uint32_t n;
if (r->sector_count == (uint32_t)-1) {
DPRINTF("Read buf_len=%zd\n", r->iov.iov_len);
r->sector_count = 0;
scsi_req_data(&r->req, r->iov.iov_len);
return;
}
DPRINTF("Read sector_count=%d\n", r->sector_count);
if (r->sector_count == 0) {
/* This also clears the sense buffer for REQUEST SENSE. */
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
return;
}
/* No data transfer may already be in progress */
assert(r->req.aiocb == NULL);
if (r->req.cmd.mode == SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
DPRINTF("Data transfer direction invalid\n");
scsi_read_complete(r, -EINVAL);
return;
}
n = r->sector_count;
if (n > SCSI_DMA_BUF_SIZE / 512)
n = SCSI_DMA_BUF_SIZE / 512;
if (s->tray_open) {
scsi_read_complete(r, -ENOMEDIUM);
}
r->iov.iov_len = n * 512;
qemu_iovec_init_external(&r->qiov, &r->iov, 1);
bdrv_acct_start(s->bs, &r->acct, n * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE, BDRV_ACCT_READ);
r->req.aiocb = bdrv_aio_readv(s->bs, r->sector, &r->qiov, n,
scsi_read_complete, r);
if (r->req.aiocb == NULL) {
scsi_read_complete(r, -EIO);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: commonize iovec creation between reads and writes
Also, consistently use qiov.size instead of iov.iov_len.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void scsi_read_data(SCSIRequest *req)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
uint32_t n;
if (r->sector_count == (uint32_t)-1) {
DPRINTF("Read buf_len=%zd\n", r->iov.iov_len);
r->sector_count = 0;
scsi_req_data(&r->req, r->iov.iov_len);
return;
}
DPRINTF("Read sector_count=%d\n", r->sector_count);
if (r->sector_count == 0) {
/* This also clears the sense buffer for REQUEST SENSE. */
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
return;
}
/* No data transfer may already be in progress */
assert(r->req.aiocb == NULL);
if (r->req.cmd.mode == SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
DPRINTF("Data transfer direction invalid\n");
scsi_read_complete(r, -EINVAL);
return;
}
if (s->tray_open) {
scsi_read_complete(r, -ENOMEDIUM);
}
n = scsi_init_iovec(r);
bdrv_acct_start(s->bs, &r->acct, n * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE, BDRV_ACCT_READ);
r->req.aiocb = bdrv_aio_readv(s->bs, r->sector, &r->qiov, n,
scsi_read_complete, r);
if (r->req.aiocb == NULL) {
scsi_read_complete(r, -EIO);
}
}
| 169,921 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PreconnectManager::Start(const GURL& url,
std::vector<PreconnectRequest> requests) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
const std::string host = url.host();
if (preresolve_info_.find(host) != preresolve_info_.end())
return;
auto iterator_and_whether_inserted = preresolve_info_.emplace(
host, std::make_unique<PreresolveInfo>(url, requests.size()));
PreresolveInfo* info = iterator_and_whether_inserted.first->second.get();
for (auto request_it = requests.begin(); request_it != requests.end();
++request_it) {
DCHECK(request_it->origin.GetOrigin() == request_it->origin);
PreresolveJobId job_id = preresolve_jobs_.Add(
std::make_unique<PreresolveJob>(std::move(*request_it), info));
queued_jobs_.push_back(job_id);
}
TryToLaunchPreresolveJobs();
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void PreconnectManager::Start(const GURL& url,
std::vector<PreconnectRequest> requests) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
const std::string host = url.host();
if (preresolve_info_.find(host) != preresolve_info_.end())
return;
auto iterator_and_whether_inserted = preresolve_info_.emplace(
host, std::make_unique<PreresolveInfo>(url, requests.size()));
PreresolveInfo* info = iterator_and_whether_inserted.first->second.get();
for (auto request_it = requests.begin(); request_it != requests.end();
++request_it) {
PreresolveJobId job_id = preresolve_jobs_.Add(
std::make_unique<PreresolveJob>(std::move(*request_it), info));
queued_jobs_.push_back(job_id);
}
TryToLaunchPreresolveJobs();
}
| 172,377 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: size_t jsvGetString(const JsVar *v, char *str, size_t len) {
assert(len>0);
const char *s = jsvGetConstString(v);
if (s) {
/* don't use strncpy here because we don't
* want to pad the entire buffer with zeros */
len--;
int l = 0;
while (*s && l<len) {
str[l] = s[l];
l++;
}
str[l] = 0;
return l;
} else if (jsvIsInt(v)) {
itostr(v->varData.integer, str, 10);
return strlen(str);
} else if (jsvIsFloat(v)) {
ftoa_bounded(v->varData.floating, str, len);
return strlen(str);
} else if (jsvHasCharacterData(v)) {
assert(!jsvIsStringExt(v));
size_t l = len;
JsvStringIterator it;
jsvStringIteratorNewConst(&it, v, 0);
while (jsvStringIteratorHasChar(&it)) {
if (l--<=1) {
*str = 0;
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
return len;
}
*(str++) = jsvStringIteratorGetChar(&it);
jsvStringIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
*str = 0;
return len-l;
} else {
JsVar *stringVar = jsvAsString((JsVar*)v, false); // we know we're casting to non-const here
if (stringVar) {
size_t l = jsvGetString(stringVar, str, len); // call again - but this time with converted var
jsvUnLock(stringVar);
return l;
} else {
str[0] = 0;
jsExceptionHere(JSET_INTERNALERROR, "Variable type cannot be converted to string");
return 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | size_t jsvGetString(const JsVar *v, char *str, size_t len) {
assert(len>0);
const char *s = jsvGetConstString(v);
if (s) {
/* don't use strncpy here because we don't
* want to pad the entire buffer with zeros */
len--;
int l = 0;
while (s[l] && l<len) {
str[l] = s[l];
l++;
}
str[l] = 0;
return l;
} else if (jsvIsInt(v)) {
itostr(v->varData.integer, str, 10);
return strlen(str);
} else if (jsvIsFloat(v)) {
ftoa_bounded(v->varData.floating, str, len);
return strlen(str);
} else if (jsvHasCharacterData(v)) {
assert(!jsvIsStringExt(v));
size_t l = len;
JsvStringIterator it;
jsvStringIteratorNewConst(&it, v, 0);
while (jsvStringIteratorHasChar(&it)) {
if (l--<=1) {
*str = 0;
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
return len;
}
*(str++) = jsvStringIteratorGetChar(&it);
jsvStringIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
*str = 0;
return len-l;
} else {
JsVar *stringVar = jsvAsString((JsVar*)v, false); // we know we're casting to non-const here
if (stringVar) {
size_t l = jsvGetString(stringVar, str, len); // call again - but this time with converted var
jsvUnLock(stringVar);
return l;
} else {
str[0] = 0;
jsExceptionHere(JSET_INTERNALERROR, "Variable type cannot be converted to string");
return 0;
}
}
}
| 169,210 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int dv_extract_audio_info(DVDemuxContext* c, uint8_t* frame)
{
const uint8_t* as_pack;
int freq, stype, smpls, quant, i, ach;
as_pack = dv_extract_pack(frame, dv_audio_source);
if (!as_pack || !c->sys) { /* No audio ? */
c->ach = 0;
return 0;
}
smpls = as_pack[1] & 0x3f; /* samples in this frame - min. samples */
freq = (as_pack[4] >> 3) & 0x07; /* 0 - 48kHz, 1 - 44,1kHz, 2 - 32kHz */
stype = (as_pack[3] & 0x1f); /* 0 - 2CH, 2 - 4CH, 3 - 8CH */
quant = as_pack[4] & 0x07; /* 0 - 16bit linear, 1 - 12bit nonlinear */
/* note: ach counts PAIRS of channels (i.e. stereo channels) */
ach = ((int[4]){ 1, 0, 2, 4})[stype];
if (ach == 1 && quant && freq == 2)
if (!c->ast[i])
break;
avpriv_set_pts_info(c->ast[i], 64, 1, 30000);
c->ast[i]->codec->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO;
c->ast[i]->codec->codec_id = CODEC_ID_PCM_S16LE;
av_init_packet(&c->audio_pkt[i]);
c->audio_pkt[i].size = 0;
c->audio_pkt[i].data = c->audio_buf[i];
c->audio_pkt[i].stream_index = c->ast[i]->index;
c->audio_pkt[i].flags |= AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int dv_extract_audio_info(DVDemuxContext* c, uint8_t* frame)
{
const uint8_t* as_pack;
int freq, stype, smpls, quant, i, ach;
as_pack = dv_extract_pack(frame, dv_audio_source);
if (!as_pack || !c->sys) { /* No audio ? */
c->ach = 0;
return 0;
}
smpls = as_pack[1] & 0x3f; /* samples in this frame - min. samples */
freq = (as_pack[4] >> 3) & 0x07; /* 0 - 48kHz, 1 - 44,1kHz, 2 - 32kHz */
stype = (as_pack[3] & 0x1f); /* 0 - 2CH, 2 - 4CH, 3 - 8CH */
quant = as_pack[4] & 0x07; /* 0 - 16bit linear, 1 - 12bit nonlinear */
if (stype > 3) {
av_log(c->fctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "stype %d is invalid\n", stype);
c->ach = 0;
return 0;
}
/* note: ach counts PAIRS of channels (i.e. stereo channels) */
ach = ((int[4]){ 1, 0, 2, 4})[stype];
if (ach == 1 && quant && freq == 2)
if (!c->ast[i])
break;
avpriv_set_pts_info(c->ast[i], 64, 1, 30000);
c->ast[i]->codec->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO;
c->ast[i]->codec->codec_id = CODEC_ID_PCM_S16LE;
av_init_packet(&c->audio_pkt[i]);
c->audio_pkt[i].size = 0;
c->audio_pkt[i].data = c->audio_buf[i];
c->audio_pkt[i].stream_index = c->ast[i]->index;
c->audio_pkt[i].flags |= AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY;
}
| 165,243 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SoftMPEG4Encoder::~SoftMPEG4Encoder() {
ALOGV("Destruct SoftMPEG4Encoder");
releaseEncoder();
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
CHECK(outQueue.empty());
CHECK(inQueue.empty());
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID: | SoftMPEG4Encoder::~SoftMPEG4Encoder() {
ALOGV("Destruct SoftMPEG4Encoder");
onReset();
releaseEncoder();
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
CHECK(outQueue.empty());
CHECK(inQueue.empty());
}
| 174,011 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
int len = 0, l;
int c;
int count = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
nbParseNCNameComplex++;
#endif
/*
* Handler for more complex cases
*/
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if ((c == ' ') || (c == '>') || (c == '/') || /* accelerators */
(!xmlIsNameStartChar(ctxt, c) || (c == ':'))) {
return(NULL);
}
while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* test bigname.xml */
(xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c) && (c != ':'))) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
return(xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->input->cur - len, len));
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
int len = 0, l;
int c;
int count = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
nbParseNCNameComplex++;
#endif
/*
* Handler for more complex cases
*/
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if ((c == ' ') || (c == '>') || (c == '/') || /* accelerators */
(!xmlIsNameStartChar(ctxt, c) || (c == ':'))) {
return(NULL);
}
while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* test bigname.xml */
(xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c) && (c != ':'))) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
return(xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->input->cur - len, len));
}
| 171,295 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BOOL security_decrypt(BYTE* data, int length, rdpRdp* rdp)
{
if (rdp->decrypt_use_count >= 4096)
{
security_key_update(rdp->decrypt_key, rdp->decrypt_update_key, rdp->rc4_key_len);
crypto_rc4_free(rdp->rc4_decrypt_key);
rdp->rc4_decrypt_key = crypto_rc4_init(rdp->decrypt_key, rdp->rc4_key_len);
rdp->decrypt_use_count = 0;
}
crypto_rc4(rdp->rc4_decrypt_key, length, data, data);
rdp->decrypt_use_count += 1;
rdp->decrypt_checksum_use_count++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | BOOL security_decrypt(BYTE* data, int length, rdpRdp* rdp)
{
if (rdp->rc4_decrypt_key == NULL)
return FALSE;
if (rdp->decrypt_use_count >= 4096)
{
security_key_update(rdp->decrypt_key, rdp->decrypt_update_key, rdp->rc4_key_len);
crypto_rc4_free(rdp->rc4_decrypt_key);
rdp->rc4_decrypt_key = crypto_rc4_init(rdp->decrypt_key, rdp->rc4_key_len);
rdp->decrypt_use_count = 0;
}
crypto_rc4(rdp->rc4_decrypt_key, length, data, data);
rdp->decrypt_use_count += 1;
rdp->decrypt_checksum_use_count++;
return TRUE;
}
| 167,607 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: uint8_t* output() const {
return output_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize + BorderLeft();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | uint8_t* output() const {
uint8_t *output() const {
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
if (UUT_->use_highbd_ == 0) {
return output_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize + BorderLeft();
} else {
return CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(output16_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize +
BorderLeft());
}
#else
return output_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize + BorderLeft();
#endif
}
uint8_t *output_ref() const {
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
if (UUT_->use_highbd_ == 0) {
return output_ref_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize + BorderLeft();
} else {
return CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(output16_ref_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize +
BorderLeft());
}
#else
return output_ref_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize + BorderLeft();
#endif
}
uint16_t lookup(uint8_t *list, int index) const {
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
if (UUT_->use_highbd_ == 0) {
return list[index];
} else {
return CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(list)[index];
}
#else
return list[index];
#endif
}
void assign_val(uint8_t *list, int index, uint16_t val) const {
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
if (UUT_->use_highbd_ == 0) {
list[index] = (uint8_t) val;
} else {
CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(list)[index] = val;
}
#else
list[index] = (uint8_t) val;
#endif
}
void wrapper_filter_average_block2d_8_c(const uint8_t *src_ptr,
const unsigned int src_stride,
const int16_t *HFilter,
const int16_t *VFilter,
uint8_t *dst_ptr,
unsigned int dst_stride,
unsigned int output_width,
unsigned int output_height) {
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
if (UUT_->use_highbd_ == 0) {
filter_average_block2d_8_c(src_ptr, src_stride, HFilter, VFilter,
dst_ptr, dst_stride, output_width,
output_height);
} else {
highbd_filter_average_block2d_8_c(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src_ptr),
src_stride, HFilter, VFilter,
CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(dst_ptr),
dst_stride, output_width, output_height,
UUT_->use_highbd_);
}
#else
filter_average_block2d_8_c(src_ptr, src_stride, HFilter, VFilter,
dst_ptr, dst_stride, output_width,
output_height);
#endif
}
void wrapper_filter_block2d_8_c(const uint8_t *src_ptr,
const unsigned int src_stride,
const int16_t *HFilter,
const int16_t *VFilter,
uint8_t *dst_ptr,
unsigned int dst_stride,
unsigned int output_width,
unsigned int output_height) {
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
if (UUT_->use_highbd_ == 0) {
filter_block2d_8_c(src_ptr, src_stride, HFilter, VFilter,
dst_ptr, dst_stride, output_width, output_height);
} else {
highbd_filter_block2d_8_c(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src_ptr), src_stride,
HFilter, VFilter,
CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(dst_ptr), dst_stride,
output_width, output_height, UUT_->use_highbd_);
}
#else
filter_block2d_8_c(src_ptr, src_stride, HFilter, VFilter,
dst_ptr, dst_stride, output_width, output_height);
#endif
}
| 174,511 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NetworkHandler::SetCookie(const std::string& name,
const std::string& value,
Maybe<std::string> url,
Maybe<std::string> domain,
Maybe<std::string> path,
Maybe<bool> secure,
Maybe<bool> http_only,
Maybe<std::string> same_site,
Maybe<double> expires,
std::unique_ptr<SetCookieCallback> callback) {
if (!process_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
if (!url.isJust() && !domain.isJust()) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams(
"At least one of the url and domain needs to be specified"));
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&SetCookieOnIO,
base::Unretained(
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetURLRequestContext()),
name, value, url.fromMaybe(""), domain.fromMaybe(""),
path.fromMaybe(""), secure.fromMaybe(false),
http_only.fromMaybe(false), same_site.fromMaybe(""),
expires.fromMaybe(-1),
base::BindOnce(&CookieSetOnIO, std::move(callback))));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void NetworkHandler::SetCookie(const std::string& name,
const std::string& value,
Maybe<std::string> url,
Maybe<std::string> domain,
Maybe<std::string> path,
Maybe<bool> secure,
Maybe<bool> http_only,
Maybe<std::string> same_site,
Maybe<double> expires,
std::unique_ptr<SetCookieCallback> callback) {
if (!storage_partition_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
if (!url.isJust() && !domain.isJust()) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams(
"At least one of the url and domain needs to be specified"));
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&SetCookieOnIO,
base::Unretained(storage_partition_->GetURLRequestContext()), name,
value, url.fromMaybe(""), domain.fromMaybe(""), path.fromMaybe(""),
secure.fromMaybe(false), http_only.fromMaybe(false),
same_site.fromMaybe(""), expires.fromMaybe(-1),
base::BindOnce(&CookieSetOnIO, std::move(callback))));
}
| 172,760 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnPreviewDataIsAvailable(int expected_pages_count,
int preview_request_id) {
VLOG(1) << "Print preview request finished with "
<< expected_pages_count << " pages";
if (!initial_preview_start_time_.is_null()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("PrintPreview.InitialDisplayTime",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - initial_preview_start_time_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("PrintPreview.PageCount.Initial",
expected_pages_count);
initial_preview_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks();
}
base::StringValue ui_identifier(preview_ui_addr_str_);
base::FundamentalValue ui_preview_request_id(preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("updatePrintPreview", ui_identifier,
ui_preview_request_id);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void PrintPreviewUI::OnPreviewDataIsAvailable(int expected_pages_count,
int preview_request_id) {
VLOG(1) << "Print preview request finished with "
<< expected_pages_count << " pages";
if (!initial_preview_start_time_.is_null()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("PrintPreview.InitialDisplayTime",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - initial_preview_start_time_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("PrintPreview.PageCount.Initial",
expected_pages_count);
initial_preview_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks();
}
base::FundamentalValue ui_identifier(id_);
base::FundamentalValue ui_preview_request_id(preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("updatePrintPreview", ui_identifier,
ui_preview_request_id);
}
| 170,838 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuChannel::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
renderer_pid_ = peer_pid;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuChannel::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
| 170,932 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int entersafe_gen_key(sc_card_t *card, sc_entersafe_gen_key_data *data)
{
int r;
size_t len = data->key_length >> 3;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 rbuf[300];
u8 sbuf[4],*p;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
/* MSE */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x22, 0x01, 0xB8);
apdu.lc=0x04;
sbuf[0]=0x83;
sbuf[1]=0x02;
sbuf[2]=data->key_id;
sbuf[3]=0x2A;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen=4;
apdu.lc=4;
apdu.le=0;
r=entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu, 0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe set MSE failed");
/* generate key */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x46, 0x00, 0x00);
apdu.le = 0;
sbuf[0] = (u8)(data->key_length >> 8);
sbuf[1] = (u8)(data->key_length);
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.lc = 2;
apdu.datalen = 2;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe generate keypair failed");
/* read public key via READ PUBLIC KEY */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xE6, 0x2A, data->key_id);
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.le = 256;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe get pukey failed");
data->modulus = malloc(len);
if (!data->modulus)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
p=rbuf;
assert(*p=='E');
p+=2+p[1];
/* N */
assert(*p=='N');
++p;
if(*p++>0x80)
{
u8 len_bytes=(*(p-1))&0x0f;
size_t module_len=0;
while(len_bytes!=0)
{
module_len=module_len<<8;
module_len+=*p++;
--len_bytes;
}
}
entersafe_reverse_buffer(p,len);
memcpy(data->modulus,p,len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int entersafe_gen_key(sc_card_t *card, sc_entersafe_gen_key_data *data)
{
int r;
size_t len = data->key_length >> 3;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 rbuf[300];
u8 sbuf[4],*p;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
/* MSE */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x22, 0x01, 0xB8);
apdu.lc=0x04;
sbuf[0]=0x83;
sbuf[1]=0x02;
sbuf[2]=data->key_id;
sbuf[3]=0x2A;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen=4;
apdu.lc=4;
apdu.le=0;
r=entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu, 0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe set MSE failed");
/* generate key */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x46, 0x00, 0x00);
apdu.le = 0;
sbuf[0] = (u8)(data->key_length >> 8);
sbuf[1] = (u8)(data->key_length);
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.lc = 2;
apdu.datalen = 2;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe generate keypair failed");
/* read public key via READ PUBLIC KEY */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xE6, 0x2A, data->key_id);
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.le = 256;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe get pukey failed");
data->modulus = malloc(len);
if (!data->modulus)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
p=rbuf;
if (*p!='E')
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
p+=2+p[1];
/* N */
if (*p!='N')
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
++p;
if(*p++>0x80)
{
u8 len_bytes=(*(p-1))&0x0f;
size_t module_len=0;
while(len_bytes!=0)
{
module_len=module_len<<8;
module_len+=*p++;
--len_bytes;
}
}
entersafe_reverse_buffer(p,len);
memcpy(data->modulus,p,len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,SC_SUCCESS);
}
| 169,052 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: JSRetainPtr<JSStringRef> AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue()
{
return JSStringCreateWithCharacters(0, 0);
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | JSRetainPtr<JSStringRef> AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue()
{
if (!m_element || !ATK_IS_TEXT(m_element))
return JSStringCreateWithCharacters(0, 0);
GOwnPtr<gchar> text(atk_text_get_text(ATK_TEXT(m_element), 0, -1));
GOwnPtr<gchar> textWithReplacedCharacters(replaceCharactersForResults(text.get()));
GOwnPtr<gchar> axValue(g_strdup_printf("AXValue: %s", textWithReplacedCharacters.get()));
return JSStringCreateWithUTF8CString(axValue.get());
}
| 170,899 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType DrawStrokePolygon(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
MagickBooleanType
closed_path;
MagickStatusType
status;
PrimitiveInfo
*stroke_polygon;
register const PrimitiveInfo
*p,
*q;
/*
Draw stroked polygon.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" begin draw-stroke-polygon");
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
clone_info->fill=draw_info->stroke;
if (clone_info->fill_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
clone_info->fill_pattern=DestroyImage(clone_info->fill_pattern);
if (clone_info->stroke_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
clone_info->fill_pattern=CloneImage(clone_info->stroke_pattern,0,0,
MagickTrue,exception);
clone_info->stroke.alpha=(Quantum) TransparentAlpha;
clone_info->stroke_width=0.0;
clone_info->fill_rule=NonZeroRule;
status=MagickTrue;
for (p=primitive_info; p->primitive != UndefinedPrimitive; p+=p->coordinates)
{
stroke_polygon=TraceStrokePolygon(draw_info,p);
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,clone_info,stroke_polygon,exception);
if (status == 0)
break;
stroke_polygon=(PrimitiveInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stroke_polygon);
q=p+p->coordinates-1;
closed_path=(q->point.x == p->point.x) && (q->point.y == p->point.y) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((draw_info->linecap == RoundCap) && (closed_path == MagickFalse))
{
DrawRoundLinecap(image,draw_info,p,exception);
DrawRoundLinecap(image,draw_info,q,exception);
}
}
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" end draw-stroke-polygon");
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static MagickBooleanType DrawStrokePolygon(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
MagickBooleanType
closed_path;
MagickStatusType
status;
PrimitiveInfo
*stroke_polygon;
register const PrimitiveInfo
*p,
*q;
/*
Draw stroked polygon.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" begin draw-stroke-polygon");
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
clone_info->fill=draw_info->stroke;
if (clone_info->fill_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
clone_info->fill_pattern=DestroyImage(clone_info->fill_pattern);
if (clone_info->stroke_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
clone_info->fill_pattern=CloneImage(clone_info->stroke_pattern,0,0,
MagickTrue,exception);
clone_info->stroke.alpha=(MagickRealType) TransparentAlpha;
clone_info->stroke_width=0.0;
clone_info->fill_rule=NonZeroRule;
status=MagickTrue;
for (p=primitive_info; p->primitive != UndefinedPrimitive; p+=p->coordinates)
{
stroke_polygon=TraceStrokePolygon(draw_info,p);
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,clone_info,stroke_polygon,exception);
if (status == 0)
break;
stroke_polygon=(PrimitiveInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stroke_polygon);
q=p+p->coordinates-1;
closed_path=(q->point.x == p->point.x) && (q->point.y == p->point.y) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((draw_info->linecap == RoundCap) && (closed_path == MagickFalse))
{
DrawRoundLinecap(image,draw_info,p,exception);
DrawRoundLinecap(image,draw_info,q,exception);
}
}
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" end draw-stroke-polygon");
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
| 167,247 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void reds_handle_ticket(void *opaque)
{
RedLinkInfo *link = (RedLinkInfo *)opaque;
char password[SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH];
time_t ltime;
time(<ime);
RSA_private_decrypt(link->tiTicketing.rsa_size,
link->tiTicketing.encrypted_ticket.encrypted_data,
(unsigned char *)password, link->tiTicketing.rsa, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
if (ticketing_enabled && !link->skip_auth) {
int expired = taTicket.expiration_time < ltime;
if (strlen(taTicket.password) == 0) {
reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
spice_warning("Ticketing is enabled, but no password is set. "
"please set a ticket first");
reds_link_free(link);
return;
}
if (expired || strncmp(password, taTicket.password, SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH) != 0) {
if (expired) {
spice_warning("Ticket has expired");
} else {
spice_warning("Invalid password");
}
reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
reds_link_free(link);
return;
}
}
reds_handle_link(link);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void reds_handle_ticket(void *opaque)
{
RedLinkInfo *link = (RedLinkInfo *)opaque;
char *password;
time_t ltime;
int password_size;
time(<ime);
if (RSA_size(link->tiTicketing.rsa) < SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
spice_warning("RSA modulus size is smaller than SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH (%d < %d), "
"SPICE ticket sent from client may be truncated",
RSA_size(link->tiTicketing.rsa), SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
}
password = g_malloc0(RSA_size(link->tiTicketing.rsa) + 1);
password_size = RSA_private_decrypt(link->tiTicketing.rsa_size,
link->tiTicketing.encrypted_ticket.encrypted_data,
(unsigned char *)password,
link->tiTicketing.rsa,
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
if (password_size == -1) {
spice_warning("failed to decrypt RSA encrypted password: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
goto error;
}
password[password_size] = '\0';
if (ticketing_enabled && !link->skip_auth) {
int expired = taTicket.expiration_time < ltime;
if (strlen(taTicket.password) == 0) {
spice_warning("Ticketing is enabled, but no password is set. "
"please set a ticket first");
goto error;
}
if (expired || strcmp(password, taTicket.password) != 0) {
if (expired) {
spice_warning("Ticket has expired");
} else {
spice_warning("Invalid password");
}
goto error;
}
}
reds_handle_link(link);
goto end;
error:
reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
reds_link_free(link);
end:
g_free(password);
}
| 164,661 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: prologProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
const char *next = s;
int tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | prologProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
const char *next = s;
int tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer, XML_TRUE);
}
| 169,533 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: enum ImapAuthRes imap_auth_login(struct ImapData *idata, const char *method)
{
char q_user[SHORT_STRING], q_pass[SHORT_STRING];
char buf[STRING];
int rc;
if (mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, LOGINDISABLED))
{
mutt_message(_("LOGIN disabled on this server."));
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
}
if (mutt_account_getuser(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
if (mutt_account_getpass(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
mutt_message(_("Logging in..."));
imap_quote_string(q_user, sizeof(q_user), idata->conn->account.user);
imap_quote_string(q_pass, sizeof(q_pass), idata->conn->account.pass);
/* don't print the password unless we're at the ungodly debugging level
* of 5 or higher */
if (DebugLevel < IMAP_LOG_PASS)
mutt_debug(2, "Sending LOGIN command for %s...\n", idata->conn->account.user);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "LOGIN %s %s", q_user, q_pass);
rc = imap_exec(idata, buf, IMAP_CMD_FAIL_OK | IMAP_CMD_PASS);
if (!rc)
{
mutt_clear_error(); /* clear "Logging in...". fixes #3524 */
return IMAP_AUTH_SUCCESS;
}
mutt_error(_("Login failed."));
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | enum ImapAuthRes imap_auth_login(struct ImapData *idata, const char *method)
{
char q_user[SHORT_STRING], q_pass[SHORT_STRING];
char buf[STRING];
int rc;
if (mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, LOGINDISABLED))
{
mutt_message(_("LOGIN disabled on this server."));
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
}
if (mutt_account_getuser(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
if (mutt_account_getpass(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
mutt_message(_("Logging in..."));
imap_quote_string(q_user, sizeof(q_user), idata->conn->account.user, false);
imap_quote_string(q_pass, sizeof(q_pass), idata->conn->account.pass, false);
/* don't print the password unless we're at the ungodly debugging level
* of 5 or higher */
if (DebugLevel < IMAP_LOG_PASS)
mutt_debug(2, "Sending LOGIN command for %s...\n", idata->conn->account.user);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "LOGIN %s %s", q_user, q_pass);
rc = imap_exec(idata, buf, IMAP_CMD_FAIL_OK | IMAP_CMD_PASS);
if (!rc)
{
mutt_clear_error(); /* clear "Logging in...". fixes #3524 */
return IMAP_AUTH_SUCCESS;
}
mutt_error(_("Login failed."));
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
}
| 169,133 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ServiceWorkerContextCore::OnReportConsoleMessage(
ServiceWorkerVersion* version,
blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageSource source,
blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel message_level,
const base::string16& message,
int line_number,
const GURL& source_url) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
const bool is_builtin_component = HasWebUIScheme(source_url);
LogConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessageLevelToLogSeverity(message_level), message,
line_number, is_builtin_component, wrapper_->is_incognito(),
base::UTF8ToUTF16(source_url.spec()));
observer_list_->Notify(
FROM_HERE, &ServiceWorkerContextCoreObserver::OnReportConsoleMessage,
version->version_id(),
ConsoleMessage(source, message_level, message, line_number, source_url));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void ServiceWorkerContextCore::OnReportConsoleMessage(
ServiceWorkerVersion* version,
blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageSource source,
blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel message_level,
const base::string16& message,
int line_number,
const GURL& source_url) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
// RenderFrameHostImpl::DidAddMessageToConsole, which also asks the
const bool is_builtin_component = HasWebUIScheme(source_url);
LogConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessageLevelToLogSeverity(message_level), message,
line_number, is_builtin_component, wrapper_->is_incognito(),
base::UTF8ToUTF16(source_url.spec()));
observer_list_->Notify(
FROM_HERE, &ServiceWorkerContextCoreObserver::OnReportConsoleMessage,
version->version_id(),
ConsoleMessage(source, message_level, message, line_number, source_url));
}
| 172,487 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_set_property (GObject *object,
guint prop_id,
const GValue *value,
GParamSpec *pspec)
{
MyObject *mobject;
mobject = MY_OBJECT (object);
switch (prop_id)
{
case PROP_THIS_IS_A_STRING:
g_free (mobject->this_is_a_string);
mobject->this_is_a_string = g_value_dup_string (value);
break;
default:
G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID (object, prop_id, pspec);
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_set_property (GObject *object,
| 165,120 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::EnsureRenderFrameHostVisibilityConsistent() {
if (render_frame_host_->GetView() &&
render_frame_host_->render_view_host()->GetWidget()->is_hidden() !=
delegate_->IsHidden()) {
if (delegate_->IsHidden()) {
render_frame_host_->GetView()->Hide();
} else {
render_frame_host_->GetView()->Show();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void RenderFrameHostManager::EnsureRenderFrameHostVisibilityConsistent() {
RenderWidgetHostView* view = GetRenderWidgetHostView();
if (view && static_cast<RenderWidgetHostImpl*>(view->GetRenderWidgetHost())
->is_hidden() != delegate_->IsHidden()) {
if (delegate_->IsHidden()) {
view->Hide();
} else {
view->Show();
}
}
}
| 172,321 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FolderHeaderView::SetFolderItem(AppListFolderItem* folder_item) {
if (folder_item_)
folder_item_->RemoveObserver(this);
folder_item_ = folder_item;
if (!folder_item_)
return;
folder_item_->AddObserver(this);
folder_name_view_->SetEnabled(folder_item->folder_type() !=
AppListFolderItem::FOLDER_TYPE_OEM);
Update();
}
Commit Message: Enforce the maximum length of the folder name in UI.
BUG=355797
R=xiyuan@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/203863005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260156 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void FolderHeaderView::SetFolderItem(AppListFolderItem* folder_item) {
if (folder_item_)
folder_item_->RemoveObserver(this);
folder_item_ = folder_item;
if (!folder_item_)
return;
folder_item_->AddObserver(this);
folder_name_view_->SetEnabled(folder_item_->folder_type() !=
AppListFolderItem::FOLDER_TYPE_OEM);
Update();
}
| 171,201 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int hwsim_new_radio_nl(struct sk_buff *msg, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct hwsim_new_radio_params param = { 0 };
const char *hwname = NULL;
int ret;
param.reg_strict = info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_REG_STRICT_REG];
param.p2p_device = info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_SUPPORT_P2P_DEVICE];
param.channels = channels;
param.destroy_on_close =
info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_DESTROY_RADIO_ON_CLOSE];
if (info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_CHANNELS])
param.channels = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_CHANNELS]);
if (info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_NO_VIF])
param.no_vif = true;
if (info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME]) {
hwname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%.*s",
nla_len(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME]),
(char *)nla_data(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME]));
if (!hwname)
return -ENOMEM;
param.hwname = hwname;
}
if (info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_USE_CHANCTX])
param.use_chanctx = true;
else
param.use_chanctx = (param.channels > 1);
if (info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_REG_HINT_ALPHA2])
param.reg_alpha2 =
nla_data(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_REG_HINT_ALPHA2]);
if (info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_REG_CUSTOM_REG]) {
u32 idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_REG_CUSTOM_REG]);
if (idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(hwsim_world_regdom_custom))
return -EINVAL;
param.regd = hwsim_world_regdom_custom[idx];
}
ret = mac80211_hwsim_new_radio(info, ¶m);
kfree(hwname);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | static int hwsim_new_radio_nl(struct sk_buff *msg, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct hwsim_new_radio_params param = { 0 };
const char *hwname = NULL;
int ret;
param.reg_strict = info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_REG_STRICT_REG];
param.p2p_device = info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_SUPPORT_P2P_DEVICE];
param.channels = channels;
param.destroy_on_close =
info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_DESTROY_RADIO_ON_CLOSE];
if (info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_CHANNELS])
param.channels = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_CHANNELS]);
if (info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_NO_VIF])
param.no_vif = true;
if (info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME]) {
hwname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%.*s",
nla_len(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME]),
(char *)nla_data(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME]));
if (!hwname)
return -ENOMEM;
param.hwname = hwname;
}
if (info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_USE_CHANCTX])
param.use_chanctx = true;
else
param.use_chanctx = (param.channels > 1);
if (info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_REG_HINT_ALPHA2])
param.reg_alpha2 =
nla_data(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_REG_HINT_ALPHA2]);
if (info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_REG_CUSTOM_REG]) {
u32 idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_REG_CUSTOM_REG]);
if (idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(hwsim_world_regdom_custom)) {
kfree(hwname);
return -EINVAL;
}
param.regd = hwsim_world_regdom_custom[idx];
}
ret = mac80211_hwsim_new_radio(info, ¶m);
kfree(hwname);
return ret;
}
| 169,302 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int vp8_remove_decoder_instances(struct frame_buffers *fb)
{
if(!fb->use_frame_threads)
{
VP8D_COMP *pbi = fb->pbi[0];
if (!pbi)
return VPX_CODEC_ERROR;
#if CONFIG_MULTITHREAD
if (pbi->b_multithreaded_rd)
vp8mt_de_alloc_temp_buffers(pbi, pbi->common.mb_rows);
vp8_decoder_remove_threads(pbi);
#endif
/* decoder instance for single thread mode */
remove_decompressor(pbi);
}
else
{
/* TODO : remove frame threads and decoder instances for each
* thread here */
}
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
Commit Message: vp8:fix threading issues
1 - stops de allocating before threads are closed.
2 - limits threads to mb_rows when mb_rows < partitions
BUG=webm:851
Bug: 30436808
Change-Id: Ie017818ed28103ca9d26d57087f31361b642e09b
(cherry picked from commit 70cca742efa20617c70c3209aa614a70f282f90e)
CWE ID: | int vp8_remove_decoder_instances(struct frame_buffers *fb)
{
if(!fb->use_frame_threads)
{
VP8D_COMP *pbi = fb->pbi[0];
if (!pbi)
return VPX_CODEC_ERROR;
#if CONFIG_MULTITHREAD
vp8_decoder_remove_threads(pbi);
#endif
/* decoder instance for single thread mode */
remove_decompressor(pbi);
}
else
{
/* TODO : remove frame threads and decoder instances for each
* thread here */
}
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
| 174,065 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static InputMethodStatusConnection* GetConnection(
void* language_library,
LanguageCurrentInputMethodMonitorFunction current_input_method_changed,
LanguageRegisterImePropertiesFunction register_ime_properties,
LanguageUpdateImePropertyFunction update_ime_property,
LanguageConnectionChangeMonitorFunction connection_change_handler) {
DCHECK(language_library);
DCHECK(current_input_method_changed),
DCHECK(register_ime_properties);
DCHECK(update_ime_property);
InputMethodStatusConnection* object = GetInstance();
if (!object->language_library_) {
object->language_library_ = language_library;
object->current_input_method_changed_ = current_input_method_changed;
object->register_ime_properties_= register_ime_properties;
object->update_ime_property_ = update_ime_property;
object->connection_change_handler_ = connection_change_handler;
object->MaybeRestoreConnections();
} else if (object->language_library_ != language_library) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown language_library is passed";
}
return object;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static InputMethodStatusConnection* GetConnection(
// TODO(satorux,yusukes): Remove use of singleton here.
static IBusControllerImpl* GetInstance() {
return Singleton<IBusControllerImpl,
LeakySingletonTraits<IBusControllerImpl> >::get();
}
| 170,534 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool BackingStoreGtk::CopyFromBackingStore(const gfx::Rect& rect,
skia::PlatformCanvas* output) {
base::TimeTicks begin_time = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (visual_depth_ < 24) {
return false;
}
const int width = std::min(size().width(), rect.width());
const int height = std::min(size().height(), rect.height());
XImage* image;
XShmSegmentInfo shminfo; // Used only when shared memory is enabled.
if (shared_memory_support_ != ui::SHARED_MEMORY_NONE) {
Visual* visual = static_cast<Visual*>(visual_);
memset(&shminfo, 0, sizeof(shminfo));
image = XShmCreateImage(display_, visual, 32,
ZPixmap, NULL, &shminfo, width, height);
if (!image) {
return false;
}
if (image->bytes_per_line == 0 || image->height == 0 ||
static_cast<size_t>(image->height) >
(std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max() / image->bytes_per_line)) {
XDestroyImage(image);
return false;
}
shminfo.shmid = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, image->bytes_per_line * image->height,
IPC_CREAT|0666);
if (shminfo.shmid == -1) {
XDestroyImage(image);
return false;
}
void* mapped_memory = shmat(shminfo.shmid, NULL, SHM_RDONLY);
shmctl(shminfo.shmid, IPC_RMID, 0);
if (mapped_memory == (void*)-1) {
XDestroyImage(image);
return false;
}
shminfo.shmaddr = image->data = static_cast<char*>(mapped_memory);
if (!XShmAttach(display_, &shminfo) ||
!XShmGetImage(display_, pixmap_, image, rect.x(), rect.y(),
AllPlanes)) {
DestroySharedImage(display_, image, &shminfo);
return false;
}
} else {
image = XGetImage(display_, pixmap_,
rect.x(), rect.y(), width, height,
AllPlanes, ZPixmap);
}
if (!output->initialize(width, height, true) ||
image->bits_per_pixel != 32) {
if (shared_memory_support_ != ui::SHARED_MEMORY_NONE)
DestroySharedImage(display_, image, &shminfo);
else
XDestroyImage(image);
return false;
}
SkBitmap bitmap = skia::GetTopDevice(*output)->accessBitmap(true);
SkAutoLockPixels alp(bitmap);
for (int y = 0; y < height; y++) {
const uint32* src_row = reinterpret_cast<uint32*>(
&image->data[image->bytes_per_line * y]);
uint32* dest_row = bitmap.getAddr32(0, y);
for (int x = 0; x < width; ++x, ++dest_row) {
*dest_row = src_row[x] | 0xff000000;
}
}
if (shared_memory_support_ != ui::SHARED_MEMORY_NONE)
DestroySharedImage(display_, image, &shminfo);
else
XDestroyImage(image);
HISTOGRAM_TIMES("BackingStore.RetrievalFromX",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - begin_time);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool BackingStoreGtk::CopyFromBackingStore(const gfx::Rect& rect,
skia::PlatformCanvas* output) {
base::TimeTicks begin_time = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (visual_depth_ < 24) {
return false;
}
const int width = std::min(size().width(), rect.width());
const int height = std::min(size().height(), rect.height());
XImage* image;
XShmSegmentInfo shminfo; // Used only when shared memory is enabled.
if (shared_memory_support_ != ui::SHARED_MEMORY_NONE) {
Visual* visual = static_cast<Visual*>(visual_);
memset(&shminfo, 0, sizeof(shminfo));
image = XShmCreateImage(display_, visual, 32,
ZPixmap, NULL, &shminfo, width, height);
if (!image) {
return false;
}
if (image->bytes_per_line == 0 || image->height == 0 ||
static_cast<size_t>(image->height) >
(std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max() / image->bytes_per_line)) {
XDestroyImage(image);
return false;
}
shminfo.shmid = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, image->bytes_per_line * image->height,
IPC_CREAT|0600);
if (shminfo.shmid == -1) {
XDestroyImage(image);
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to get shared memory segment. "
"Performance may be degraded.";
return false;
} else {
VLOG(1) << "Got shared memory segment " << shminfo.shmid;
}
void* mapped_memory = shmat(shminfo.shmid, NULL, SHM_RDONLY);
shmctl(shminfo.shmid, IPC_RMID, 0);
if (mapped_memory == (void*)-1) {
XDestroyImage(image);
return false;
}
shminfo.shmaddr = image->data = static_cast<char*>(mapped_memory);
if (!XShmAttach(display_, &shminfo) ||
!XShmGetImage(display_, pixmap_, image, rect.x(), rect.y(),
AllPlanes)) {
DestroySharedImage(display_, image, &shminfo);
LOG(WARNING) << "X failed to get shared memory segment. "
"Performance may be degraded.";
return false;
}
VLOG(1) << "Using X shared memory segment " << shminfo.shmid;
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << "Not using X shared memory.";
image = XGetImage(display_, pixmap_,
rect.x(), rect.y(), width, height,
AllPlanes, ZPixmap);
}
if (!output->initialize(width, height, true) ||
image->bits_per_pixel != 32) {
if (shared_memory_support_ != ui::SHARED_MEMORY_NONE)
DestroySharedImage(display_, image, &shminfo);
else
XDestroyImage(image);
return false;
}
SkBitmap bitmap = skia::GetTopDevice(*output)->accessBitmap(true);
SkAutoLockPixels alp(bitmap);
for (int y = 0; y < height; y++) {
const uint32* src_row = reinterpret_cast<uint32*>(
&image->data[image->bytes_per_line * y]);
uint32* dest_row = bitmap.getAddr32(0, y);
for (int x = 0; x < width; ++x, ++dest_row) {
*dest_row = src_row[x] | 0xff000000;
}
}
if (shared_memory_support_ != ui::SHARED_MEMORY_NONE)
DestroySharedImage(display_, image, &shminfo);
else
XDestroyImage(image);
HISTOGRAM_TIMES("BackingStore.RetrievalFromX",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - begin_time);
return true;
}
| 171,592 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Cues::Init() const
{
if (m_cue_points)
return;
assert(m_count == 0);
assert(m_preload_count == 0);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
long long pos = m_start;
long cue_points_size = 0;
while (pos < stop)
{
const long long idpos = pos;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); //TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; //consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; //consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x3B) //CuePoint ID
PreloadCuePoint(cue_points_size, idpos);
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Cues::Init() const
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, m_pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((m_pos + len) <= stop);
m_pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, m_pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((m_pos + len) <= stop);
m_pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((m_pos + size) <= stop);
if (id != 0x3B) { // CuePoint ID
m_pos += size; // consume payload
assert(m_pos <= stop);
| 174,390 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ahci_uninit(AHCIState *s)
{
g_free(s->dev);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | void ahci_uninit(AHCIState *s)
{
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < s->ports; i++) {
AHCIDevice *ad = &s->dev[i];
for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
IDEState *s = &ad->port.ifs[j];
ide_exit(s);
}
}
g_free(s->dev);
}
| 164,797 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void umount_tree(struct mount *mnt, enum umount_tree_flags how)
{
LIST_HEAD(tmp_list);
struct mount *p;
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_mount_unlock(mnt);
/* Gather the mounts to umount */
for (p = mnt; p; p = next_mnt(p, mnt)) {
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_UMOUNT;
list_move(&p->mnt_list, &tmp_list);
}
/* Hide the mounts from mnt_mounts */
list_for_each_entry(p, &tmp_list, mnt_list) {
list_del_init(&p->mnt_child);
}
/* Add propogated mounts to the tmp_list */
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_umount(&tmp_list);
while (!list_empty(&tmp_list)) {
p = list_first_entry(&tmp_list, struct mount, mnt_list);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_expire);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_list);
__touch_mnt_namespace(p->mnt_ns);
p->mnt_ns = NULL;
if (how & UMOUNT_SYNC)
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT;
pin_insert_group(&p->mnt_umount, &p->mnt_parent->mnt, &unmounted);
if (mnt_has_parent(p)) {
mnt_add_count(p->mnt_parent, -1);
umount_mnt(p);
}
change_mnt_propagation(p, MS_PRIVATE);
}
}
Commit Message: mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts
Modify umount(MNT_DETACH) to keep mounts in the hash table that are
locked to their parent mounts, when the parent is lazily unmounted.
In mntput_no_expire detach the children from the hash table, depending
on mnt_pin_kill in cleanup_mnt to decrement the mnt_count of the children.
In __detach_mounts if there are any mounts that have been unmounted
but still are on the list of mounts of a mountpoint, remove their
children from the mount hash table and those children to the unmounted
list so they won't linger potentially indefinitely waiting for their
final mntput, now that the mounts serve no purpose.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void umount_tree(struct mount *mnt, enum umount_tree_flags how)
{
LIST_HEAD(tmp_list);
struct mount *p;
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_mount_unlock(mnt);
/* Gather the mounts to umount */
for (p = mnt; p; p = next_mnt(p, mnt)) {
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_UMOUNT;
list_move(&p->mnt_list, &tmp_list);
}
/* Hide the mounts from mnt_mounts */
list_for_each_entry(p, &tmp_list, mnt_list) {
list_del_init(&p->mnt_child);
}
/* Add propogated mounts to the tmp_list */
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_umount(&tmp_list);
while (!list_empty(&tmp_list)) {
bool disconnect;
p = list_first_entry(&tmp_list, struct mount, mnt_list);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_expire);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_list);
__touch_mnt_namespace(p->mnt_ns);
p->mnt_ns = NULL;
if (how & UMOUNT_SYNC)
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT;
disconnect = !IS_MNT_LOCKED_AND_LAZY(p);
pin_insert_group(&p->mnt_umount, &p->mnt_parent->mnt,
disconnect ? &unmounted : NULL);
if (mnt_has_parent(p)) {
mnt_add_count(p->mnt_parent, -1);
if (!disconnect) {
/* Don't forget about p */
list_add_tail(&p->mnt_child, &p->mnt_parent->mnt_mounts);
} else {
umount_mnt(p);
}
}
change_mnt_propagation(p, MS_PRIVATE);
}
}
| 167,590 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GfxImageColorMap::getGrayLine(Guchar *in, Guchar *out, int length) {
int i, j;
Guchar *inp, *tmp_line;
switch (colorSpace->getMode()) {
case csIndexed:
case csSeparation:
tmp_line = (Guchar *) gmalloc (length * nComps2);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nComps2; j++) {
tmp_line[i * nComps2 + j] = byte_lookup[in[i] * nComps2 + j];
}
}
colorSpace2->getGrayLine(tmp_line, out, length);
gfree (tmp_line);
break;
default:
inp = in;
for (j = 0; j < length; j++)
for (i = 0; i < nComps; i++) {
*inp = byte_lookup[*inp * nComps + i];
inp++;
}
colorSpace->getGrayLine(in, out, length);
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void GfxImageColorMap::getGrayLine(Guchar *in, Guchar *out, int length) {
int i, j;
Guchar *inp, *tmp_line;
switch (colorSpace->getMode()) {
case csIndexed:
case csSeparation:
tmp_line = (Guchar *) gmallocn (length, nComps2);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nComps2; j++) {
tmp_line[i * nComps2 + j] = byte_lookup[in[i] * nComps2 + j];
}
}
colorSpace2->getGrayLine(tmp_line, out, length);
gfree (tmp_line);
break;
default:
inp = in;
for (j = 0; j < length; j++)
for (i = 0; i < nComps; i++) {
*inp = byte_lookup[*inp * nComps + i];
inp++;
}
colorSpace->getGrayLine(in, out, length);
break;
}
}
| 164,609 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: V8ContextNativeHandler::V8ContextNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context), context_(context) {
RouteFunction("GetAvailability",
base::Bind(&V8ContextNativeHandler::GetAvailability,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetModuleSystem",
base::Bind(&V8ContextNativeHandler::GetModuleSystem,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction(
"RunWithNativesEnabled",
base::Bind(&V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabled,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | V8ContextNativeHandler::V8ContextNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context), context_(context) {
RouteFunction("GetAvailability",
base::Bind(&V8ContextNativeHandler::GetAvailability,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetModuleSystem",
base::Bind(&V8ContextNativeHandler::GetModuleSystem,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("RunWithNativesEnabled", "test",
base::Bind(&V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabled,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,256 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport void RemoveDuplicateLayers(Image **images,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register Image
*curr,
*next;
RectangleInfo
bounds;
assert((*images) != (const Image *) NULL);
assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",(*images)->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
curr=GetFirstImageInList(*images);
for (; (next=GetNextImageInList(curr)) != (Image *) NULL; curr=next)
{
if ( curr->columns != next->columns || curr->rows != next->rows
|| curr->page.x != next->page.x || curr->page.y != next->page.y )
continue;
bounds=CompareImagesBounds(curr,next,CompareAnyLayer,exception);
if ( bounds.x < 0 ) {
/*
the two images are the same, merge time delays and delete one.
*/
size_t time;
time = curr->delay*1000/curr->ticks_per_second;
time += next->delay*1000/next->ticks_per_second;
next->ticks_per_second = 100L;
next->delay = time*curr->ticks_per_second/1000;
next->iterations = curr->iterations;
*images = curr;
(void) DeleteImageFromList(images);
}
}
*images = GetFirstImageInList(*images);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1629
CWE ID: CWE-369 | MagickExport void RemoveDuplicateLayers(Image **images,
MagickExport void RemoveDuplicateLayers(Image **images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
RectangleInfo
bounds;
register Image
*image,
*next;
assert((*images) != (const Image *) NULL);
assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
(*images)->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=GetFirstImageInList(*images);
for ( ; (next=GetNextImageInList(image)) != (Image *) NULL; image=next)
{
if ((image->columns != next->columns) || (image->rows != next->rows) ||
(image->page.x != next->page.x) || (image->page.y != next->page.y))
continue;
bounds=CompareImagesBounds(image,next,CompareAnyLayer,exception);
if (bounds.x < 0)
{
/*
Two images are the same, merge time delays and delete one.
*/
size_t
time;
time=1000*image->delay*PerceptibleReciprocal(image->ticks_per_second);
time+=1000*next->delay*PerceptibleReciprocal(next->ticks_per_second);
next->ticks_per_second=100L;
next->delay=time*image->ticks_per_second/1000;
next->iterations=image->iterations;
*images=image;
(void) DeleteImageFromList(images);
}
}
*images=GetFirstImageInList(*images);
}
| 170,192 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
size_t len;
((void) ssl);
/*
* PSK parameters:
*
* opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
*/
if( (*p) > end - 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message "
"(psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1];
*p += 2;
if( (*p) + len > end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message "
"(psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
/*
* Note: we currently ignore the PKS identity hint, as we only allow one
* PSK to be provisionned on the client. This could be changed later if
* someone needs that feature.
*/
*p += len;
ret = 0;
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Prevent arithmetic overflow on bounds check
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
size_t len;
((void) ssl);
/*
* PSK parameters:
*
* opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
*/
if( (*p) > end - 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message "
"(psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1];
*p += 2;
if( (*p) > end - len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message "
"(psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
/*
* Note: we currently ignore the PKS identity hint, as we only allow one
* PSK to be provisionned on the client. This could be changed later if
* someone needs that feature.
*/
*p += len;
ret = 0;
return( ret );
}
| 170,169 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Chapters::Edition::Clear()
{
while (m_atoms_count > 0)
{
Atom& a = m_atoms[--m_atoms_count];
a.Clear();
}
delete[] m_atoms;
m_atoms = NULL;
m_atoms_size = 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Chapters::Edition::Clear()
while (m_displays_count > 0) {
Display& d = m_displays[--m_displays_count];
d.Clear();
}
delete[] m_displays;
m_displays = NULL;
m_displays_size = 0;
}
long Chapters::Atom::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x00) { // Display ID
status = ParseDisplay(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
} else if (id == 0x1654) { // StringUID ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_string_uid);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
} else if (id == 0x33C4) { // UID ID
long long val;
status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, size, val);
if (val < 0) // error
return status;
m_uid = static_cast<unsigned long long>(val);
} else if (id == 0x11) { // TimeStart ID
const long long val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (val < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(val);
m_start_timecode = val;
} else if (id == 0x12) { // TimeEnd ID
const long long val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (val < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(val);
m_stop_timecode = val;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
| 174,244 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: horDiff32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
TIFFPredictorState* sp = PredictorState(tif);
tmsize_t stride = sp->stride;
uint32 *wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc/4;
assert((cc%(4*stride))==0);
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
wp += wc - 1;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] -= wp[0]; wp--)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | horDiff32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
TIFFPredictorState* sp = PredictorState(tif);
tmsize_t stride = sp->stride;
uint32 *wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc/4;
if((cc%(4*stride))!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "horDiff32",
"%s", "(cc%(4*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
wp += wc - 1;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] -= wp[0]; wp--)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
return 1;
}
| 166,886 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int pop_sync_mailbox(struct Context *ctx, int *index_hint)
{
int i, j, ret = 0;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
struct Progress progress;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
header_cache_t *hc = NULL;
#endif
pop_data->check_time = 0;
while (true)
{
if (pop_reconnect(ctx) < 0)
return -1;
mutt_progress_init(&progress, _("Marking messages deleted..."),
MUTT_PROGRESS_MSG, WriteInc, ctx->deleted);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
hc = pop_hcache_open(pop_data, ctx->path);
#endif
for (i = 0, j = 0, ret = 0; ret == 0 && i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
{
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->deleted && ctx->hdrs[i]->refno != -1)
{
j++;
if (!ctx->quiet)
mutt_progress_update(&progress, j, -1);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "DELE %d\r\n", ctx->hdrs[i]->refno);
ret = pop_query(pop_data, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret == 0)
{
mutt_bcache_del(pop_data->bcache, ctx->hdrs[i]->data);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
mutt_hcache_delete(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data));
#endif
}
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->changed)
{
mutt_hcache_store(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data),
ctx->hdrs[i], 0);
}
#endif
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
mutt_hcache_close(hc);
#endif
if (ret == 0)
{
mutt_str_strfcpy(buf, "QUIT\r\n", sizeof(buf));
ret = pop_query(pop_data, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
if (ret == 0)
{
pop_data->clear_cache = true;
pop_clear_cache(pop_data);
pop_data->status = POP_DISCONNECTED;
return 0;
}
if (ret == -2)
{
mutt_error("%s", pop_data->err_msg);
return -1;
}
}
}
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-22 | static int pop_sync_mailbox(struct Context *ctx, int *index_hint)
{
int i, j, ret = 0;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
struct Progress progress;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
header_cache_t *hc = NULL;
#endif
pop_data->check_time = 0;
while (true)
{
if (pop_reconnect(ctx) < 0)
return -1;
mutt_progress_init(&progress, _("Marking messages deleted..."),
MUTT_PROGRESS_MSG, WriteInc, ctx->deleted);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
hc = pop_hcache_open(pop_data, ctx->path);
#endif
for (i = 0, j = 0, ret = 0; ret == 0 && i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
{
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->deleted && ctx->hdrs[i]->refno != -1)
{
j++;
if (!ctx->quiet)
mutt_progress_update(&progress, j, -1);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "DELE %d\r\n", ctx->hdrs[i]->refno);
ret = pop_query(pop_data, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret == 0)
{
mutt_bcache_del(pop_data->bcache, cache_id(ctx->hdrs[i]->data));
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
mutt_hcache_delete(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data));
#endif
}
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->changed)
{
mutt_hcache_store(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data),
ctx->hdrs[i], 0);
}
#endif
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
mutt_hcache_close(hc);
#endif
if (ret == 0)
{
mutt_str_strfcpy(buf, "QUIT\r\n", sizeof(buf));
ret = pop_query(pop_data, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
if (ret == 0)
{
pop_data->clear_cache = true;
pop_clear_cache(pop_data);
pop_data->status = POP_DISCONNECTED;
return 0;
}
if (ret == -2)
{
mutt_error("%s", pop_data->err_msg);
return -1;
}
}
}
| 169,123 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RunMemCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 5000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, input_extreme_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_ref_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_block, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
input_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() - rnd.Rand8();
input_extreme_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() % 2 ? 255 : -255;
}
if (i == 0)
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_extreme_block[j] = 255;
if (i == 1)
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_extreme_block[j] = -255;
fwd_txfm_ref(input_extreme_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_extreme_block,
output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
EXPECT_GE(4 * DCT_MAX_VALUE, abs(output_block[j]))
<< "Error: 16x16 FDCT has coefficient larger than 4*DCT_MAX_VALUE";
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void RunMemCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 5000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, int16_t, input_extreme_block[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, output_ref_block[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, output_block[kNumCoeffs]);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
// Initialize a test block with input range [-mask_, mask_].
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
input_extreme_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() % 2 ? mask_ : -mask_;
}
if (i == 0) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_extreme_block[j] = mask_;
} else if (i == 1) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_extreme_block[j] = -mask_;
}
fwd_txfm_ref(input_extreme_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_extreme_block,
output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
EXPECT_GE(4 * DCT_MAX_VALUE << (bit_depth_ - 8), abs(output_block[j]))
<< "Error: 4x4 FDCT has coefficient larger than 4*DCT_MAX_VALUE";
}
}
}
| 174,554 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Track::GetFirst(const BlockEntry*& pBlockEntry) const {
const Cluster* pCluster = m_pSegment->GetFirst();
for (int i = 0;;) {
if (pCluster == NULL) {
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
if (pCluster->EOS()) {
#if 0
if (m_pSegment->Unparsed() <= 0) { //all clusters have been loaded
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#else
if (m_pSegment->DoneParsing()) {
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#endif
pBlockEntry = 0;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long status = pCluster->GetFirst(pBlockEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pBlockEntry == 0) { // empty cluster
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
continue;
}
for (;;) {
const Block* const pBlock = pBlockEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
const long long tn = pBlock->GetTrackNumber();
if ((tn == m_info.number) && VetEntry(pBlockEntry))
return 0;
const BlockEntry* pNextEntry;
status = pCluster->GetNext(pBlockEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pNextEntry == 0)
break;
pBlockEntry = pNextEntry;
}
++i;
if (i >= 100)
break;
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
}
pBlockEntry = GetEOS(); // so we can return a non-NULL value
return 1;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long Track::GetFirst(const BlockEntry*& pBlockEntry) const {
const Cluster* pCluster = m_pSegment->GetFirst();
for (int i = 0;;) {
if (pCluster == NULL) {
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
if (pCluster->EOS()) {
if (m_pSegment->DoneParsing()) {
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
pBlockEntry = 0;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long status = pCluster->GetFirst(pBlockEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pBlockEntry == 0) { // empty cluster
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
continue;
}
for (;;) {
const Block* const pBlock = pBlockEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
const long long tn = pBlock->GetTrackNumber();
if ((tn == m_info.number) && VetEntry(pBlockEntry))
return 0;
const BlockEntry* pNextEntry;
status = pCluster->GetNext(pBlockEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pNextEntry == 0)
break;
pBlockEntry = pNextEntry;
}
++i;
if (i >= 100)
break;
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
}
pBlockEntry = GetEOS(); // so we can return a non-NULL value
return 1;
}
| 173,819 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static unsigned int subpel_variance_ref(const uint8_t *ref, const uint8_t *src,
int l2w, int l2h, int xoff, int yoff,
unsigned int *sse_ptr) {
int se = 0;
unsigned int sse = 0;
const int w = 1 << l2w, h = 1 << l2h;
for (int y = 0; y < h; y++) {
for (int x = 0; x < w; x++) {
const int a1 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 0) + x + 0];
const int a2 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 0) + x + 1];
const int b1 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 1) + x + 0];
const int b2 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 1) + x + 1];
const int a = a1 + (((a2 - a1) * xoff + 8) >> 4);
const int b = b1 + (((b2 - b1) * xoff + 8) >> 4);
const int r = a + (((b - a) * yoff + 8) >> 4);
int diff = r - src[w * y + x];
se += diff;
sse += diff * diff;
}
}
*sse_ptr = sse;
return sse - (((int64_t) se * se) >> (l2w + l2h));
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static unsigned int subpel_variance_ref(const uint8_t *ref, const uint8_t *src,
static unsigned int mb_ss_ref(const int16_t *src) {
unsigned int res = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < 256; ++i) {
res += src[i] * src[i];
}
return res;
}
static uint32_t variance_ref(const uint8_t *src, const uint8_t *ref,
int l2w, int l2h, int src_stride_coeff,
int ref_stride_coeff, uint32_t *sse_ptr,
bool use_high_bit_depth_,
vpx_bit_depth_t bit_depth) {
int64_t se = 0;
uint64_t sse = 0;
const int w = 1 << l2w;
const int h = 1 << l2h;
for (int y = 0; y < h; y++) {
for (int x = 0; x < w; x++) {
int diff;
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
diff = ref[w * y * ref_stride_coeff + x] -
src[w * y * src_stride_coeff + x];
se += diff;
sse += diff * diff;
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
diff = CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref)[w * y * ref_stride_coeff + x] -
CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src)[w * y * src_stride_coeff + x];
se += diff;
sse += diff * diff;
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
}
}
RoundHighBitDepth(bit_depth, &se, &sse);
*sse_ptr = static_cast<uint32_t>(sse);
return static_cast<uint32_t>(sse -
((static_cast<int64_t>(se) * se) >>
(l2w + l2h)));
}
/* The subpel reference functions differ from the codec version in one aspect:
* they calculate the bilinear factors directly instead of using a lookup table
* and therefore upshift xoff and yoff by 1. Only every other calculated value
* is used so the codec version shrinks the table to save space and maintain
* compatibility with vp8.
*/
static uint32_t subpel_variance_ref(const uint8_t *ref, const uint8_t *src,
int l2w, int l2h, int xoff, int yoff,
uint32_t *sse_ptr,
bool use_high_bit_depth_,
vpx_bit_depth_t bit_depth) {
int64_t se = 0;
uint64_t sse = 0;
const int w = 1 << l2w;
const int h = 1 << l2h;
xoff <<= 1;
yoff <<= 1;
for (int y = 0; y < h; y++) {
for (int x = 0; x < w; x++) {
// Bilinear interpolation at a 16th pel step.
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
const int a1 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 0) + x + 0];
const int a2 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 0) + x + 1];
const int b1 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 1) + x + 0];
const int b2 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 1) + x + 1];
const int a = a1 + (((a2 - a1) * xoff + 8) >> 4);
const int b = b1 + (((b2 - b1) * xoff + 8) >> 4);
const int r = a + (((b - a) * yoff + 8) >> 4);
const int diff = r - src[w * y + x];
se += diff;
sse += diff * diff;
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
uint16_t *ref16 = CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref);
uint16_t *src16 = CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src);
const int a1 = ref16[(w + 1) * (y + 0) + x + 0];
const int a2 = ref16[(w + 1) * (y + 0) + x + 1];
const int b1 = ref16[(w + 1) * (y + 1) + x + 0];
const int b2 = ref16[(w + 1) * (y + 1) + x + 1];
const int a = a1 + (((a2 - a1) * xoff + 8) >> 4);
const int b = b1 + (((b2 - b1) * xoff + 8) >> 4);
const int r = a + (((b - a) * yoff + 8) >> 4);
const int diff = r - src16[w * y + x];
se += diff;
sse += diff * diff;
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
}
}
RoundHighBitDepth(bit_depth, &se, &sse);
*sse_ptr = static_cast<uint32_t>(sse);
return static_cast<uint32_t>(sse -
((static_cast<int64_t>(se) * se) >>
(l2w + l2h)));
}
class SumOfSquaresTest : public ::testing::TestWithParam<SumOfSquaresFunction> {
public:
SumOfSquaresTest() : func_(GetParam()) {}
virtual ~SumOfSquaresTest() {
libvpx_test::ClearSystemState();
}
protected:
void ConstTest();
void RefTest();
SumOfSquaresFunction func_;
ACMRandom rnd_;
};
void SumOfSquaresTest::ConstTest() {
int16_t mem[256];
unsigned int res;
for (int v = 0; v < 256; ++v) {
for (int i = 0; i < 256; ++i) {
mem[i] = v;
}
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(res = func_(mem));
EXPECT_EQ(256u * (v * v), res);
}
}
void SumOfSquaresTest::RefTest() {
int16_t mem[256];
for (int i = 0; i < 100; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 256; ++j) {
mem[j] = rnd_.Rand8() - rnd_.Rand8();
}
const unsigned int expected = mb_ss_ref(mem);
unsigned int res;
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(res = func_(mem));
EXPECT_EQ(expected, res);
}
}
| 174,595 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::string ExtensionTtsController::GetMatchingExtensionId(
Utterance* utterance) {
ExtensionService* service = utterance->profile()->GetExtensionService();
DCHECK(service);
ExtensionEventRouter* event_router =
utterance->profile()->GetExtensionEventRouter();
DCHECK(event_router);
const ExtensionList* extensions = service->extensions();
ExtensionList::const_iterator iter;
for (iter = extensions->begin(); iter != extensions->end(); ++iter) {
const Extension* extension = *iter;
if (!event_router->ExtensionHasEventListener(
extension->id(), events::kOnSpeak) ||
!event_router->ExtensionHasEventListener(
extension->id(), events::kOnStop)) {
continue;
}
const std::vector<Extension::TtsVoice>& tts_voices =
extension->tts_voices();
for (size_t i = 0; i < tts_voices.size(); ++i) {
const Extension::TtsVoice& voice = tts_voices[i];
if (!voice.voice_name.empty() &&
!utterance->voice_name().empty() &&
voice.voice_name != utterance->voice_name()) {
continue;
}
if (!voice.locale.empty() &&
!utterance->locale().empty() &&
voice.locale != utterance->locale()) {
continue;
}
if (!voice.gender.empty() &&
!utterance->gender().empty() &&
voice.gender != utterance->gender()) {
continue;
}
return extension->id();
}
}
return std::string();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | std::string ExtensionTtsController::GetMatchingExtensionId(
double rate = 1.0;
if (options->HasKey(constants::kRateKey)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetDouble(constants::kRateKey, &rate));
if (rate < 0.1 || rate > 10.0) {
error_ = constants::kErrorInvalidRate;
return false;
}
| 170,380 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static UINT drdynvc_process_capability_request(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, int Sp,
int cbChId, wStream* s)
{
UINT status;
if (!drdynvc)
return CHANNEL_RC_BAD_INIT_HANDLE;
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_TRACE, "capability_request Sp=%d cbChId=%d", Sp, cbChId);
Stream_Seek(s, 1); /* pad */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->version);
/* RDP8 servers offer version 3, though Microsoft forgot to document it
* in their early documents. It behaves the same as version 2.
*/
if ((drdynvc->version == 2) || (drdynvc->version == 3))
{
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge0);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge1);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge2);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge3);
}
status = drdynvc_send_capability_response(drdynvc);
drdynvc->state = DRDYNVC_STATE_READY;
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID: | static UINT drdynvc_process_capability_request(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, int Sp,
int cbChId, wStream* s)
{
UINT status;
if (!drdynvc)
return CHANNEL_RC_BAD_INIT_HANDLE;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 3)
return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_TRACE, "capability_request Sp=%d cbChId=%d", Sp, cbChId);
Stream_Seek(s, 1); /* pad */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->version);
/* RDP8 servers offer version 3, though Microsoft forgot to document it
* in their early documents. It behaves the same as version 2.
*/
if ((drdynvc->version == 2) || (drdynvc->version == 3))
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 8)
return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge0);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge1);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge2);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge3);
}
status = drdynvc_send_capability_response(drdynvc);
drdynvc->state = DRDYNVC_STATE_READY;
return status;
}
| 168,934 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: tight_detect_smooth_image24(VncState *vs, int w, int h)
{
int off;
int x, y, d, dx;
unsigned int c;
unsigned int stats[256];
int pixels = 0;
int pix, left[3];
unsigned int errors;
unsigned char *buf = vs->tight.tight.buffer;
/*
* If client is big-endian, color samples begin from the second
* byte (offset 1) of a 32-bit pixel value.
*/
off = !!(vs->clientds.flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG);
memset(stats, 0, sizeof (stats));
for (y = 0, x = 0; y < h && x < w;) {
for (d = 0; d < h - y && d < w - x - VNC_TIGHT_DETECT_SUBROW_WIDTH;
d++) {
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
left[c] = buf[((y+d)*w+x+d)*4+off+c] & 0xFF;
}
for (dx = 1; dx <= VNC_TIGHT_DETECT_SUBROW_WIDTH; dx++) {
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
pix = buf[((y+d)*w+x+d+dx)*4+off+c] & 0xFF;
stats[abs(pix - left[c])]++;
left[c] = pix;
}
pixels++;
}
}
if (w > h) {
x += h;
y = 0;
} else {
x = 0;
y += w;
}
}
/* 95% smooth or more ... */
if (stats[0] * 33 / pixels >= 95) {
return 0;
}
errors = 0;
for (c = 1; c < 8; c++) {
errors += stats[c] * (c * c);
if (stats[c] == 0 || stats[c] > stats[c-1] * 2) {
return 0;
}
}
for (; c < 256; c++) {
errors += stats[c] * (c * c);
}
errors /= (pixels * 3 - stats[0]);
return errors;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | tight_detect_smooth_image24(VncState *vs, int w, int h)
{
int off;
int x, y, d, dx;
unsigned int c;
unsigned int stats[256];
int pixels = 0;
int pix, left[3];
unsigned int errors;
unsigned char *buf = vs->tight.tight.buffer;
/*
* If client is big-endian, color samples begin from the second
* byte (offset 1) of a 32-bit pixel value.
*/
off = vs->client_be;
memset(stats, 0, sizeof (stats));
for (y = 0, x = 0; y < h && x < w;) {
for (d = 0; d < h - y && d < w - x - VNC_TIGHT_DETECT_SUBROW_WIDTH;
d++) {
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
left[c] = buf[((y+d)*w+x+d)*4+off+c] & 0xFF;
}
for (dx = 1; dx <= VNC_TIGHT_DETECT_SUBROW_WIDTH; dx++) {
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
pix = buf[((y+d)*w+x+d+dx)*4+off+c] & 0xFF;
stats[abs(pix - left[c])]++;
left[c] = pix;
}
pixels++;
}
}
if (w > h) {
x += h;
y = 0;
} else {
x = 0;
y += w;
}
}
/* 95% smooth or more ... */
if (stats[0] * 33 / pixels >= 95) {
return 0;
}
errors = 0;
for (c = 1; c < 8; c++) {
errors += stats[c] * (c * c);
if (stats[c] == 0 || stats[c] > stats[c-1] * 2) {
return 0;
}
}
for (; c < 256; c++) {
errors += stats[c] * (c * c);
}
errors /= (pixels * 3 - stats[0]);
return errors;
}
| 165,465 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t* r_bin_dyldcache_from_bytes_new(const ut8* buf, ut64 size) {
struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t *bin;
if (!(bin = malloc (sizeof (struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t)))) {
return NULL;
}
memset (bin, 0, sizeof (struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t));
if (!buf) {
return r_bin_dyldcache_free (bin);
}
bin->b = r_buf_new();
if (!r_buf_set_bytes (bin->b, buf, size)) {
return r_bin_dyldcache_free (bin);
}
if (!r_bin_dyldcache_init (bin)) {
return r_bin_dyldcache_free (bin);
}
bin->size = size;
return bin;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12374 - oobread crash in truncated dyldcache ##bin
CWE ID: CWE-125 | struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t* r_bin_dyldcache_from_bytes_new(const ut8* buf, ut64 size) {
struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t *bin = R_NEW0 (struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t);
if (!bin) {
return NULL;
}
if (!buf) {
return r_bin_dyldcache_free (bin);
}
bin->b = r_buf_new ();
if (!bin->b || !r_buf_set_bytes (bin->b, buf, size)) {
return r_bin_dyldcache_free (bin);
}
if (!r_bin_dyldcache_init (bin)) {
return r_bin_dyldcache_free (bin);
}
bin->size = size;
return bin;
}
| 168,955 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void nw_cache_free(nw_cache *cache, void *obj)
{
if (cache->free < cache->free_total) {
cache->free_arr[cache->free++] = obj;
} else {
uint32_t new_free_total = cache->free_total * 2;
void *new_arr = realloc(cache->free_arr, new_free_total * sizeof(void *));
if (new_arr) {
cache->free_total = new_free_total;
cache->free_arr = new_arr;
cache->free_arr[cache->free++] = obj;
} else {
free(obj);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #131 from benjaminchodroff/master
fix memory corruption and other 32bit overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | void nw_cache_free(nw_cache *cache, void *obj)
{
if (cache->free < cache->free_total) {
cache->free_arr[cache->free++] = obj;
} else if (cache->free_total < NW_CACHE_MAX_SIZE) {
uint32_t new_free_total = cache->free_total * 2;
void *new_arr = realloc(cache->free_arr, new_free_total * sizeof(void *));
if (new_arr) {
cache->free_total = new_free_total;
cache->free_arr = new_arr;
cache->free_arr[cache->free++] = obj;
} else {
free(obj);
}
} else {
free(obj);
}
}
| 169,016 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: chrand_principal_2_svc(chrand_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static chrand_ret ret;
krb5_keyblock *k;
int nkeys;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_chrand_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_randkey_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = randkey_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
FALSE, 0, NULL, &k, &nkeys);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_randkey_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
&k, &nkeys);
} else {
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if(ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
ret.keys = k;
ret.n_keys = nkeys;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | chrand_principal_2_svc(chrand_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static chrand_ret ret;
krb5_keyblock *k;
int nkeys;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_chrand_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_randkey_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = randkey_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
FALSE, 0, NULL, &k, &nkeys);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_randkey_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
&k, &nkeys);
} else {
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if(ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
ret.keys = k;
ret.n_keys = nkeys;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,507 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: UNCURL_EXPORT int32_t uncurl_ws_accept(struct uncurl_conn *ucc, char **origins, int32_t n_origins)
{
int32_t e;
e = uncurl_read_header(ucc);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Upgrade", "websocket");
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Connection", "Upgrade");
char *origin = NULL;
e = uncurl_get_header_str(ucc, "Origin", &origin);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
bool origin_ok = false;
for (int32_t x = 0; x < n_origins; x++)
if (strstr(origin, origins[x])) {origin_ok = true; break;}
if (!origin_ok) return UNCURL_WS_ERR_ORIGIN;
char *sec_key = NULL;
e = uncurl_get_header_str(ucc, "Sec-WebSocket-Key", &sec_key);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
char *accept_key = ws_create_accept_key(sec_key);
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Sec-WebSocket-Accept", accept_key);
free(accept_key);
e = uncurl_write_header(ucc, "101", "Switching Protocols", UNCURL_RESPONSE);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
ucc->ws_mask = 0;
return UNCURL_OK;
}
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
CWE ID: CWE-352 | UNCURL_EXPORT int32_t uncurl_ws_accept(struct uncurl_conn *ucc, char **origins, int32_t n_origins)
{
int32_t e;
e = uncurl_read_header(ucc);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Upgrade", "websocket");
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Connection", "Upgrade");
char *origin = NULL;
e = uncurl_get_header_str(ucc, "Origin", &origin);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
//the substring MUST came at the end of the origin header, thus a strstr AND a strcmp
bool origin_ok = false;
for (int32_t x = 0; x < n_origins; x++) {
char *match = strstr(origin, origins[x]);
if (match && !strcmp(match, origins[x])) {origin_ok = true; break;}
}
if (!origin_ok) return UNCURL_WS_ERR_ORIGIN;
char *sec_key = NULL;
e = uncurl_get_header_str(ucc, "Sec-WebSocket-Key", &sec_key);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
char *accept_key = ws_create_accept_key(sec_key);
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Sec-WebSocket-Accept", accept_key);
free(accept_key);
e = uncurl_write_header(ucc, "101", "Switching Protocols", UNCURL_RESPONSE);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
ucc->ws_mask = 0;
return UNCURL_OK;
}
| 169,336 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoEndQueryEXT(GLenum target,
uint32_t submit_count) {
if (IsEmulatedQueryTarget(target)) {
auto active_query_iter = active_queries_.find(target);
if (active_query_iter == active_queries_.end()) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "No active query on target.");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (target == GL_ASYNC_PIXEL_PACK_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM &&
!pending_read_pixels_.empty()) {
GLuint query_service_id = active_query_iter->second.service_id;
pending_read_pixels_.back().waiting_async_pack_queries.insert(
query_service_id);
}
} else {
CheckErrorCallbackState();
api()->glEndQueryFn(target);
if (CheckErrorCallbackState()) {
return error::kNoError;
}
}
DCHECK(active_queries_.find(target) != active_queries_.end());
ActiveQuery active_query = std::move(active_queries_[target]);
active_queries_.erase(target);
PendingQuery pending_query;
pending_query.target = target;
pending_query.service_id = active_query.service_id;
pending_query.shm = std::move(active_query.shm);
pending_query.sync = active_query.sync;
pending_query.submit_count = submit_count;
switch (target) {
case GL_COMMANDS_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
pending_query.commands_completed_fence = gl::GLFence::Create();
break;
case GL_READBACK_SHADOW_COPIES_UPDATED_CHROMIUM:
pending_query.buffer_shadow_update_fence = gl::GLFence::Create();
pending_query.buffer_shadow_updates = std::move(buffer_shadow_updates_);
buffer_shadow_updates_.clear();
break;
default:
break;
}
pending_queries_.push_back(std::move(pending_query));
return ProcessQueries(false);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoEndQueryEXT(GLenum target,
uint32_t submit_count) {
if (IsEmulatedQueryTarget(target)) {
auto active_query_iter = active_queries_.find(target);
if (active_query_iter == active_queries_.end()) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "No active query on target.");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (target == GL_ASYNC_PIXEL_PACK_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM &&
!pending_read_pixels_.empty()) {
GLuint query_service_id = active_query_iter->second.service_id;
pending_read_pixels_.back().waiting_async_pack_queries.insert(
query_service_id);
}
} else {
CheckErrorCallbackState();
api()->glEndQueryFn(target);
if (CheckErrorCallbackState()) {
return error::kNoError;
}
}
DCHECK(active_queries_.find(target) != active_queries_.end());
ActiveQuery active_query = std::move(active_queries_[target]);
active_queries_.erase(target);
PendingQuery pending_query;
pending_query.target = target;
pending_query.service_id = active_query.service_id;
pending_query.shm = std::move(active_query.shm);
pending_query.sync = active_query.sync;
pending_query.submit_count = submit_count;
switch (target) {
case GL_COMMANDS_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
pending_query.commands_completed_fence = gl::GLFence::Create();
break;
case GL_READBACK_SHADOW_COPIES_UPDATED_CHROMIUM:
pending_query.buffer_shadow_update_fence = gl::GLFence::Create();
pending_query.buffer_shadow_updates = std::move(buffer_shadow_updates_);
buffer_shadow_updates_.clear();
break;
case GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
pending_query.program_service_id = linking_program_service_id_;
break;
default:
break;
}
pending_queries_.push_back(std::move(pending_query));
return ProcessQueries(false);
}
| 172,533 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: CmdBufferImageTransportFactory::CreateSharedSurfaceHandle() {
if (!context_->makeContextCurrent()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Failed to make shared graphics context current";
return gfx::GLSurfaceHandle();
}
gfx::GLSurfaceHandle handle = gfx::GLSurfaceHandle(
gfx::kNullPluginWindow, true);
handle.parent_gpu_process_id = context_->GetGPUProcessID();
handle.parent_client_id = context_->GetChannelID();
handle.parent_context_id = context_->GetContextID();
handle.parent_texture_id[0] = context_->createTexture();
handle.parent_texture_id[1] = context_->createTexture();
handle.sync_point = context_->insertSyncPoint();
context_->flush();
return handle;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | CmdBufferImageTransportFactory::CreateSharedSurfaceHandle() {
if (!context_->makeContextCurrent()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Failed to make shared graphics context current";
return gfx::GLSurfaceHandle();
}
gfx::GLSurfaceHandle handle = gfx::GLSurfaceHandle(
gfx::kNullPluginWindow, true);
handle.parent_gpu_process_id = context_->GetGPUProcessID();
context_->flush();
return handle;
}
| 171,363 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: lockd(void *vrqstp)
{
int err = 0;
struct svc_rqst *rqstp = vrqstp;
/* try_to_freeze() is called from svc_recv() */
set_freezable();
/* Allow SIGKILL to tell lockd to drop all of its locks */
allow_signal(SIGKILL);
dprintk("NFS locking service started (ver " LOCKD_VERSION ").\n");
/*
* The main request loop. We don't terminate until the last
* NFS mount or NFS daemon has gone away.
*/
while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
long timeout = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
RPC_IFDEBUG(char buf[RPC_MAX_ADDRBUFLEN]);
/* update sv_maxconn if it has changed */
rqstp->rq_server->sv_maxconn = nlm_max_connections;
if (signalled()) {
flush_signals(current);
restart_grace();
continue;
}
timeout = nlmsvc_retry_blocked();
/*
* Find a socket with data available and call its
* recvfrom routine.
*/
err = svc_recv(rqstp, timeout);
if (err == -EAGAIN || err == -EINTR)
continue;
dprintk("lockd: request from %s\n",
svc_print_addr(rqstp, buf, sizeof(buf)));
svc_process(rqstp);
}
flush_signals(current);
if (nlmsvc_ops)
nlmsvc_invalidate_all();
nlm_shutdown_hosts();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | lockd(void *vrqstp)
{
int err = 0;
struct svc_rqst *rqstp = vrqstp;
struct net *net = &init_net;
struct lockd_net *ln = net_generic(net, lockd_net_id);
/* try_to_freeze() is called from svc_recv() */
set_freezable();
/* Allow SIGKILL to tell lockd to drop all of its locks */
allow_signal(SIGKILL);
dprintk("NFS locking service started (ver " LOCKD_VERSION ").\n");
/*
* The main request loop. We don't terminate until the last
* NFS mount or NFS daemon has gone away.
*/
while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
long timeout = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
RPC_IFDEBUG(char buf[RPC_MAX_ADDRBUFLEN]);
/* update sv_maxconn if it has changed */
rqstp->rq_server->sv_maxconn = nlm_max_connections;
if (signalled()) {
flush_signals(current);
restart_grace();
continue;
}
timeout = nlmsvc_retry_blocked();
/*
* Find a socket with data available and call its
* recvfrom routine.
*/
err = svc_recv(rqstp, timeout);
if (err == -EAGAIN || err == -EINTR)
continue;
dprintk("lockd: request from %s\n",
svc_print_addr(rqstp, buf, sizeof(buf)));
svc_process(rqstp);
}
flush_signals(current);
if (nlmsvc_ops)
nlmsvc_invalidate_all();
nlm_shutdown_hosts();
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ln->grace_period_end);
locks_end_grace(&ln->lockd_manager);
return 0;
}
| 168,134 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long Block::GetTrackNumber() const
{
return m_track;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long Block::GetTrackNumber() const
bool Block::IsKey() const {
return ((m_flags & static_cast<unsigned char>(1 << 7)) != 0);
}
| 174,372 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void setup_test_dir(char *tmp_dir, const char *files, ...) {
va_list ap;
assert_se(mkdtemp(tmp_dir) != NULL);
va_start(ap, files);
while (files != NULL) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = strappend(tmp_dir, files);
assert_se(touch_file(path, true, USEC_INFINITY, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID, 0) == 0);
files = va_arg(ap, const char *);
}
va_end(ap);
}
Commit Message: util-lib: use MODE_INVALID as invalid value for mode_t everywhere
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void setup_test_dir(char *tmp_dir, const char *files, ...) {
va_list ap;
assert_se(mkdtemp(tmp_dir) != NULL);
va_start(ap, files);
while (files != NULL) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = strappend(tmp_dir, files);
assert_se(touch_file(path, true, USEC_INFINITY, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID, MODE_INVALID) == 0);
files = va_arg(ap, const char *);
}
va_end(ap);
}
| 170,108 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::setConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const void *params, size_t size) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE extIndex = (OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)index;
CLOG_CONFIG(setConfig, "%s(%#x), %zu@%p)", asString(extIndex), index, size, params);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_SetConfig(
mHandle, index, const_cast<void *>(params));
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setConfig, err, "%s(%#x)", asString(extIndex), index);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::setConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const void *params, size_t size) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE extIndex = (OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)index;
CLOG_CONFIG(setConfig, "%s(%#x), %zu@%p)", asString(extIndex), index, size, params);
if (isProhibitedIndex_l(index)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return BAD_INDEX;
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_SetConfig(
mHandle, index, const_cast<void *>(params));
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setConfig, err, "%s(%#x)", asString(extIndex), index);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
| 174,138 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void add_bytes_c(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src, int w){
long i;
for(i=0; i<=w-sizeof(long); i+=sizeof(long)){
long a = *(long*)(src+i);
long b = *(long*)(dst+i);
*(long*)(dst+i) = ((a&pb_7f) + (b&pb_7f)) ^ ((a^b)&pb_80);
}
for(; i<w; i++)
dst[i+0] += src[i+0];
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static void add_bytes_c(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src, int w){
long i;
for(i=0; i<=w-(int)sizeof(long); i+=sizeof(long)){
long a = *(long*)(src+i);
long b = *(long*)(dst+i);
*(long*)(dst+i) = ((a&pb_7f) + (b&pb_7f)) ^ ((a^b)&pb_80);
}
for(; i<w; i++)
dst[i+0] += src[i+0];
}
| 165,929 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ipv6_dup_options(struct sock *sk, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt2;
opt2 = sock_kmalloc(sk, opt->tot_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (opt2) {
long dif = (char *)opt2 - (char *)opt;
memcpy(opt2, opt, opt->tot_len);
if (opt2->hopopt)
*((char **)&opt2->hopopt) += dif;
if (opt2->dst0opt)
*((char **)&opt2->dst0opt) += dif;
if (opt2->dst1opt)
*((char **)&opt2->dst1opt) += dif;
if (opt2->srcrt)
*((char **)&opt2->srcrt) += dif;
}
return opt2;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | ipv6_dup_options(struct sock *sk, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt2;
opt2 = sock_kmalloc(sk, opt->tot_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (opt2) {
long dif = (char *)opt2 - (char *)opt;
memcpy(opt2, opt, opt->tot_len);
if (opt2->hopopt)
*((char **)&opt2->hopopt) += dif;
if (opt2->dst0opt)
*((char **)&opt2->dst0opt) += dif;
if (opt2->dst1opt)
*((char **)&opt2->dst1opt) += dif;
if (opt2->srcrt)
*((char **)&opt2->srcrt) += dif;
atomic_set(&opt2->refcnt, 1);
}
return opt2;
}
| 167,330 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos::PreEarlyInitialization() {
base::CommandLine* singleton_command_line =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kGuestSession)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitch(::switches::kDisableSync);
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitch(::switches::kDisableExtensions);
browser_defaults::bookmarks_enabled = false;
}
if (!base::SysInfo::IsRunningOnChromeOS() &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginManager) &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginUser) &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kGuestSession)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kLoginUser,
cryptohome::Identification(user_manager::StubAccountId()).id());
if (!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginProfile)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kLoginProfile,
chrome::kTestUserProfileDir);
}
LOG(WARNING) << "Running as stub user with profile dir: "
<< singleton_command_line
->GetSwitchValuePath(switches::kLoginProfile)
.value();
}
RegisterStubPathOverridesIfNecessary();
#if defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
const char kChromeOSReleaseTrack[] = "CHROMEOS_RELEASE_TRACK";
std::string channel;
if (base::SysInfo::GetLsbReleaseValue(kChromeOSReleaseTrack, &channel))
chrome::SetChannel(channel);
#endif
dbus_pre_early_init_ = std::make_unique<internal::DBusPreEarlyInit>();
return ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux::PreEarlyInitialization();
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | int ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos::PreEarlyInitialization() {
base::CommandLine* singleton_command_line =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kGuestSession)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitch(::switches::kDisableSync);
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitch(::switches::kDisableExtensions);
browser_defaults::bookmarks_enabled = false;
}
if (!base::SysInfo::IsRunningOnChromeOS() &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginManager) &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginUser) &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kGuestSession)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kLoginUser,
cryptohome::Identification(user_manager::StubAccountId()).id());
if (!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginProfile)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kLoginProfile,
chrome::kTestUserProfileDir);
}
LOG(WARNING) << "Running as stub user with profile dir: "
<< singleton_command_line
->GetSwitchValuePath(switches::kLoginProfile)
.value();
}
RegisterStubPathOverridesIfNecessary();
#if defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
const char kChromeOSReleaseTrack[] = "CHROMEOS_RELEASE_TRACK";
std::string channel;
if (base::SysInfo::GetLsbReleaseValue(kChromeOSReleaseTrack, &channel))
chrome::SetChannel(channel);
#endif
dbus_pre_early_init_ = std::make_unique<internal::DBusPreEarlyInit>();
if (!base::SysInfo::IsRunningOnChromeOS() &&
parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(
switches::kFakeDriveFsLauncherChrootPath) &&
parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(
switches::kFakeDriveFsLauncherSocketPath)) {
drivefs::FakeDriveFsLauncherClient::Init(
parsed_command_line().GetSwitchValuePath(
switches::kFakeDriveFsLauncherChrootPath),
parsed_command_line().GetSwitchValuePath(
switches::kFakeDriveFsLauncherSocketPath));
}
return ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux::PreEarlyInitialization();
}
| 171,728 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ShellMainDelegate::ShellMainDelegate() {
}
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <jcivelli@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | ShellMainDelegate::ShellMainDelegate() {
| 172,121 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct se_portal_group *tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg(
struct se_wwn *wwn,
struct config_group *group,
const char *name)
{
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba = container_of(wwn,
struct tcm_loop_hba, tl_hba_wwn);
struct tcm_loop_tpg *tl_tpg;
char *tpgt_str, *end_ptr;
int ret;
unsigned short int tpgt;
tpgt_str = strstr(name, "tpgt_");
if (!tpgt_str) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to locate \"tpgt_#\" directory"
" group\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
tpgt_str += 5; /* Skip ahead of "tpgt_" */
tpgt = (unsigned short int) simple_strtoul(tpgt_str, &end_ptr, 0);
if (tpgt > TL_TPGS_PER_HBA) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Passed tpgt: %hu exceeds TL_TPGS_PER_HBA:"
" %u\n", tpgt, TL_TPGS_PER_HBA);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
tl_tpg = &tl_hba->tl_hba_tpgs[tpgt];
tl_tpg->tl_hba = tl_hba;
tl_tpg->tl_tpgt = tpgt;
/*
* Register the tl_tpg as a emulated SAS TCM Target Endpoint
*/
ret = core_tpg_register(&tcm_loop_fabric_configfs->tf_ops,
wwn, &tl_tpg->tl_se_tpg, tl_tpg,
TRANSPORT_TPG_TYPE_NORMAL);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
printk(KERN_INFO "TCM_Loop_ConfigFS: Allocated Emulated %s"
" Target Port %s,t,0x%04x\n", tcm_loop_dump_proto_id(tl_hba),
config_item_name(&wwn->wwn_group.cg_item), tpgt);
return &tl_tpg->tl_se_tpg;
}
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | struct se_portal_group *tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg(
struct se_wwn *wwn,
struct config_group *group,
const char *name)
{
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba = container_of(wwn,
struct tcm_loop_hba, tl_hba_wwn);
struct tcm_loop_tpg *tl_tpg;
char *tpgt_str, *end_ptr;
int ret;
unsigned short int tpgt;
tpgt_str = strstr(name, "tpgt_");
if (!tpgt_str) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to locate \"tpgt_#\" directory"
" group\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
tpgt_str += 5; /* Skip ahead of "tpgt_" */
tpgt = (unsigned short int) simple_strtoul(tpgt_str, &end_ptr, 0);
if (tpgt >= TL_TPGS_PER_HBA) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Passed tpgt: %hu exceeds TL_TPGS_PER_HBA:"
" %u\n", tpgt, TL_TPGS_PER_HBA);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
tl_tpg = &tl_hba->tl_hba_tpgs[tpgt];
tl_tpg->tl_hba = tl_hba;
tl_tpg->tl_tpgt = tpgt;
/*
* Register the tl_tpg as a emulated SAS TCM Target Endpoint
*/
ret = core_tpg_register(&tcm_loop_fabric_configfs->tf_ops,
wwn, &tl_tpg->tl_se_tpg, tl_tpg,
TRANSPORT_TPG_TYPE_NORMAL);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
printk(KERN_INFO "TCM_Loop_ConfigFS: Allocated Emulated %s"
" Target Port %s,t,0x%04x\n", tcm_loop_dump_proto_id(tl_hba),
config_item_name(&wwn->wwn_group.cg_item), tpgt);
return &tl_tpg->tl_se_tpg;
}
| 169,870 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: NotificationsNativeHandler::NotificationsNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetNotificationImageSizes",
base::Bind(&NotificationsNativeHandler::GetNotificationImageSizes,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | NotificationsNativeHandler::NotificationsNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetNotificationImageSizes", "notifications",
base::Bind(&NotificationsNativeHandler::GetNotificationImageSizes,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 173,276 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TabContents* TabStripModel::DetachTabContentsAt(int index) {
if (contents_data_.empty())
return NULL;
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(index));
TabContents* removed_contents = GetTabContentsAtImpl(index);
bool was_selected = IsTabSelected(index);
int next_selected_index = order_controller_->DetermineNewSelectedIndex(index);
delete contents_data_[index];
contents_data_.erase(contents_data_.begin() + index);
ForgetOpenersAndGroupsReferencing(removed_contents->web_contents());
if (empty())
closing_all_ = true;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabDetachedAt(removed_contents, index));
if (empty()) {
selection_model_.Clear();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_, TabStripEmpty());
} else {
int old_active = active_index();
selection_model_.DecrementFrom(index);
TabStripSelectionModel old_model;
old_model.Copy(selection_model_);
if (index == old_active) {
NotifyIfTabDeactivated(removed_contents);
if (!selection_model_.empty()) {
selection_model_.set_active(selection_model_.selected_indices()[0]);
selection_model_.set_anchor(selection_model_.active());
} else {
selection_model_.SetSelectedIndex(next_selected_index);
}
NotifyIfActiveTabChanged(removed_contents, NOTIFY_DEFAULT);
}
if (was_selected) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabSelectionChanged(this, old_model));
}
}
return removed_contents;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | TabContents* TabStripModel::DetachTabContentsAt(int index) {
if (contents_data_.empty())
return NULL;
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(index));
TabContents* removed_contents = GetTabContentsAtImpl(index);
bool was_selected = IsTabSelected(index);
int next_selected_index = order_controller_->DetermineNewSelectedIndex(index);
delete contents_data_[index];
contents_data_.erase(contents_data_.begin() + index);
ForgetOpenersAndGroupsReferencing(removed_contents->web_contents());
if (empty())
closing_all_ = true;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabDetachedAt(removed_contents->web_contents(), index));
if (empty()) {
selection_model_.Clear();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_, TabStripEmpty());
} else {
int old_active = active_index();
selection_model_.DecrementFrom(index);
TabStripSelectionModel old_model;
old_model.Copy(selection_model_);
if (index == old_active) {
NotifyIfTabDeactivated(removed_contents);
if (!selection_model_.empty()) {
selection_model_.set_active(selection_model_.selected_indices()[0]);
selection_model_.set_anchor(selection_model_.active());
} else {
selection_model_.SetSelectedIndex(next_selected_index);
}
NotifyIfActiveTabChanged(removed_contents, NOTIFY_DEFAULT);
}
if (was_selected) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabSelectionChanged(this, old_model));
}
}
return removed_contents;
}
| 171,517 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::AttachInterstitialPage(
InterstitialPageImpl* interstitial_page) {
DCHECK(interstitial_page);
render_manager_.set_interstitial_page(interstitial_page);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
DidAttachInterstitialPage());
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void WebContentsImpl::AttachInterstitialPage(
InterstitialPageImpl* interstitial_page) {
DCHECK(interstitial_page);
render_manager_.set_interstitial_page(interstitial_page);
// Cancel any visible dialogs so that they don't interfere with the
// interstitial.
if (dialog_manager_)
dialog_manager_->CancelActiveAndPendingDialogs(this);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
DidAttachInterstitialPage());
}
| 171,160 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NetworkHandler::ContinueInterceptedRequest(
const std::string& interception_id,
Maybe<std::string> error_reason,
Maybe<std::string> base64_raw_response,
Maybe<std::string> url,
Maybe<std::string> method,
Maybe<std::string> post_data,
Maybe<protocol::Network::Headers> headers,
Maybe<protocol::Network::AuthChallengeResponse> auth_challenge_response,
std::unique_ptr<ContinueInterceptedRequestCallback> callback) {
DevToolsInterceptorController* interceptor =
DevToolsInterceptorController::FromBrowserContext(
process_->GetBrowserContext());
if (!interceptor) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
base::Optional<std::string> raw_response;
if (base64_raw_response.isJust()) {
std::string decoded;
if (!base::Base64Decode(base64_raw_response.fromJust(), &decoded)) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams("Invalid rawResponse."));
return;
}
raw_response = decoded;
}
base::Optional<net::Error> error;
bool mark_as_canceled = false;
if (error_reason.isJust()) {
bool ok;
error = NetErrorFromString(error_reason.fromJust(), &ok);
if (!ok) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams("Invalid errorReason."));
return;
}
mark_as_canceled = true;
}
interceptor->ContinueInterceptedRequest(
interception_id,
std::make_unique<DevToolsURLRequestInterceptor::Modifications>(
std::move(error), std::move(raw_response), std::move(url),
std::move(method), std::move(post_data), std::move(headers),
std::move(auth_challenge_response), mark_as_canceled),
std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void NetworkHandler::ContinueInterceptedRequest(
const std::string& interception_id,
Maybe<std::string> error_reason,
Maybe<std::string> base64_raw_response,
Maybe<std::string> url,
Maybe<std::string> method,
Maybe<std::string> post_data,
Maybe<protocol::Network::Headers> headers,
Maybe<protocol::Network::AuthChallengeResponse> auth_challenge_response,
std::unique_ptr<ContinueInterceptedRequestCallback> callback) {
DevToolsInterceptorController* interceptor =
DevToolsInterceptorController::FromBrowserContext(browser_context_);
if (!interceptor) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
base::Optional<std::string> raw_response;
if (base64_raw_response.isJust()) {
std::string decoded;
if (!base::Base64Decode(base64_raw_response.fromJust(), &decoded)) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams("Invalid rawResponse."));
return;
}
raw_response = decoded;
}
base::Optional<net::Error> error;
bool mark_as_canceled = false;
if (error_reason.isJust()) {
bool ok;
error = NetErrorFromString(error_reason.fromJust(), &ok);
if (!ok) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams("Invalid errorReason."));
return;
}
mark_as_canceled = true;
}
interceptor->ContinueInterceptedRequest(
interception_id,
std::make_unique<DevToolsURLRequestInterceptor::Modifications>(
std::move(error), std::move(raw_response), std::move(url),
std::move(method), std::move(post_data), std::move(headers),
std::move(auth_challenge_response), mark_as_canceled),
std::move(callback));
}
| 172,754 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppModalDialog::CompleteDialog() {
AppModalDialogQueue::GetInstance()->ShowNextDialog();
}
Commit Message: Fix a Windows crash bug with javascript alerts from extension popups.
BUG=137707
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10828423
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152716 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void AppModalDialog::CompleteDialog() {
if (!completed_) {
completed_ = true;
AppModalDialogQueue::GetInstance()->ShowNextDialog();
}
}
| 170,754 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderParamsFromPrintSettings(const PrintSettings& settings,
PrintMsg_Print_Params* params) {
params->page_size = settings.page_setup_device_units().physical_size();
params->content_size.SetSize(
settings.page_setup_device_units().content_area().width(),
settings.page_setup_device_units().content_area().height());
params->printable_area.SetRect(
settings.page_setup_device_units().printable_area().x(),
settings.page_setup_device_units().printable_area().y(),
settings.page_setup_device_units().printable_area().width(),
settings.page_setup_device_units().printable_area().height());
params->margin_top = settings.page_setup_device_units().content_area().y();
params->margin_left = settings.page_setup_device_units().content_area().x();
params->dpi = settings.dpi();
params->scale_factor = settings.scale_factor();
params->rasterize_pdf = settings.rasterize_pdf();
params->document_cookie = 0;
params->selection_only = settings.selection_only();
params->supports_alpha_blend = settings.supports_alpha_blend();
params->should_print_backgrounds = settings.should_print_backgrounds();
params->display_header_footer = settings.display_header_footer();
params->title = settings.title();
params->url = settings.url();
params->printed_doc_type = SkiaDocumentType::PDF;
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void RenderParamsFromPrintSettings(const PrintSettings& settings,
PrintMsg_Print_Params* params) {
params->page_size = settings.page_setup_device_units().physical_size();
params->content_size.SetSize(
settings.page_setup_device_units().content_area().width(),
settings.page_setup_device_units().content_area().height());
params->printable_area.SetRect(
settings.page_setup_device_units().printable_area().x(),
settings.page_setup_device_units().printable_area().y(),
settings.page_setup_device_units().printable_area().width(),
settings.page_setup_device_units().printable_area().height());
params->margin_top = settings.page_setup_device_units().content_area().y();
params->margin_left = settings.page_setup_device_units().content_area().x();
params->dpi = settings.dpi();
params->scale_factor = settings.scale_factor();
params->rasterize_pdf = settings.rasterize_pdf();
params->document_cookie = 0;
params->selection_only = settings.selection_only();
params->supports_alpha_blend = settings.supports_alpha_blend();
params->should_print_backgrounds = settings.should_print_backgrounds();
params->display_header_footer = settings.display_header_footer();
params->title = settings.title();
params->url = settings.url();
params->printed_doc_type =
IsOopifEnabled() ? SkiaDocumentType::MSKP : SkiaDocumentType::PDF;
}
| 171,895 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::UnregisterAgent() {
if (!agent_.get())
return;
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
DCHECK(pincode_callback_.is_null());
DCHECK(passkey_callback_.is_null());
DCHECK(confirmation_callback_.is_null());
pairing_delegate_->DismissDisplayOrConfirm();
pairing_delegate_ = NULL;
agent_.reset();
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Unregistering pairing agent";
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothAgentManagerClient()->
UnregisterAgent(
dbus::ObjectPath(kAgentPath),
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing),
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnUnregisterAgentError,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::UnregisterAgent() {
| 171,241 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int check_line_charstring(void)
{
char *p = line;
while (isspace(*p))
p++;
return (*p == '/' || (p[0] == 'd' && p[1] == 'u' && p[2] == 'p'));
}
Commit Message: Security fixes.
- Don't overflow the small cs_start buffer (reported by Niels
Thykier via the debian tracker (Jakub Wilk), found with a
fuzzer ("American fuzzy lop")).
- Cast arguments to <ctype.h> functions to unsigned char.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int check_line_charstring(void)
{
char *p = line;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *p))
p++;
return (*p == '/' || (p[0] == 'd' && p[1] == 'u' && p[2] == 'p'));
}
| 166,620 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int DecodeTunnel(ThreadVars *tv, DecodeThreadVars *dtv, Packet *p,
uint8_t *pkt, uint32_t len, PacketQueue *pq, enum DecodeTunnelProto proto)
{
switch (proto) {
case DECODE_TUNNEL_PPP:
return DecodePPP(tv, dtv, p, pkt, len, pq);
case DECODE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
return DecodeIPV4(tv, dtv, p, pkt, len, pq);
case DECODE_TUNNEL_IPV6:
return DecodeIPV6(tv, dtv, p, pkt, len, pq);
case DECODE_TUNNEL_VLAN:
return DecodeVLAN(tv, dtv, p, pkt, len, pq);
case DECODE_TUNNEL_ETHERNET:
return DecodeEthernet(tv, dtv, p, pkt, len, pq);
case DECODE_TUNNEL_ERSPAN:
return DecodeERSPAN(tv, dtv, p, pkt, len, pq);
default:
SCLogInfo("FIXME: DecodeTunnel: protocol %" PRIu32 " not supported.", proto);
break;
}
return TM_ECODE_OK;
}
Commit Message: teredo: be stricter on what to consider valid teredo
Invalid Teredo can lead to valid DNS traffic (or other UDP traffic)
being misdetected as Teredo. This leads to false negatives in the
UDP payload inspection.
Make the teredo code only consider a packet teredo if the encapsulated
data was decoded without any 'invalid' events being set.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int DecodeTunnel(ThreadVars *tv, DecodeThreadVars *dtv, Packet *p,
uint8_t *pkt, uint32_t len, PacketQueue *pq, enum DecodeTunnelProto proto)
{
switch (proto) {
case DECODE_TUNNEL_PPP:
return DecodePPP(tv, dtv, p, pkt, len, pq);
case DECODE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
return DecodeIPV4(tv, dtv, p, pkt, len, pq);
case DECODE_TUNNEL_IPV6:
case DECODE_TUNNEL_IPV6_TEREDO:
return DecodeIPV6(tv, dtv, p, pkt, len, pq);
case DECODE_TUNNEL_VLAN:
return DecodeVLAN(tv, dtv, p, pkt, len, pq);
case DECODE_TUNNEL_ETHERNET:
return DecodeEthernet(tv, dtv, p, pkt, len, pq);
case DECODE_TUNNEL_ERSPAN:
return DecodeERSPAN(tv, dtv, p, pkt, len, pq);
default:
SCLogDebug("FIXME: DecodeTunnel: protocol %" PRIu32 " not supported.", proto);
break;
}
return TM_ECODE_OK;
}
| 169,478 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Utterance::Utterance(Profile* profile,
const std::string& text,
DictionaryValue* options,
Task* completion_task)
: profile_(profile),
id_(next_utterance_id_++),
text_(text),
rate_(-1.0),
pitch_(-1.0),
volume_(-1.0),
can_enqueue_(false),
completion_task_(completion_task) {
if (!options) {
options_.reset(new DictionaryValue());
return;
}
options_.reset(options->DeepCopy());
if (options->HasKey(util::kVoiceNameKey))
options->GetString(util::kVoiceNameKey, &voice_name_);
if (options->HasKey(util::kLocaleKey))
options->GetString(util::kLocaleKey, &locale_);
if (options->HasKey(util::kGenderKey))
options->GetString(util::kGenderKey, &gender_);
if (options->GetDouble(util::kRateKey, &rate_)) {
if (!base::IsFinite(rate_) || rate_ < 0.0 || rate_ > 1.0)
rate_ = -1.0;
}
if (options->GetDouble(util::kPitchKey, &pitch_)) {
if (!base::IsFinite(pitch_) || pitch_ < 0.0 || pitch_ > 1.0)
pitch_ = -1.0;
}
if (options->GetDouble(util::kVolumeKey, &volume_)) {
if (!base::IsFinite(volume_) || volume_ < 0.0 || volume_ > 1.0)
volume_ = -1.0;
}
if (options->HasKey(util::kEnqueueKey))
options->GetBoolean(util::kEnqueueKey, &can_enqueue_);
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | Utterance::Utterance(Profile* profile,
bool ExtensionTtsSpeakFunction::RunImpl() {
std::string text;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetString(0, &text));
if (text.size() > 32768) {
error_ = constants::kErrorUtteranceTooLong;
return false;
}
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> options;
if (args_->GetSize() >= 2) {
DictionaryValue* temp_options = NULL;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetDictionary(1, &temp_options));
options.reset(temp_options->DeepCopy());
}
std::string voice_name;
if (options->HasKey(constants::kVoiceNameKey)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetString(constants::kVoiceNameKey, &voice_name));
}
std::string lang;
if (options->HasKey(constants::kLangKey))
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(options->GetString(constants::kLangKey, &lang));
if (!lang.empty() && !l10n_util::IsValidLocaleSyntax(lang)) {
error_ = constants::kErrorInvalidLang;
return false;
}
| 170,392 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::PassesCORSAccessCheck() {
DCHECK(MediaElement());
return (MediaElement()->GetWebMediaPlayer() &&
MediaElement()->GetWebMediaPlayer()->DidPassCORSAccessCheck()) ||
passes_current_src_cors_access_check_;
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::PassesCORSAccessCheck() {
| 173,147 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::postViolationReport(
const SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& violationData,
LocalFrame* contextFrame,
const Vector<String>& reportEndpoints) {
Document* document =
contextFrame ? contextFrame->document() : this->document();
if (!document)
return;
std::unique_ptr<JSONObject> cspReport = JSONObject::create();
cspReport->setString("document-uri", violationData.documentURI());
cspReport->setString("referrer", violationData.referrer());
cspReport->setString("violated-directive", violationData.violatedDirective());
cspReport->setString("effective-directive",
violationData.effectiveDirective());
cspReport->setString("original-policy", violationData.originalPolicy());
cspReport->setString("disposition", violationData.disposition());
cspReport->setString("blocked-uri", violationData.blockedURI());
if (violationData.lineNumber())
cspReport->setInteger("line-number", violationData.lineNumber());
if (violationData.columnNumber())
cspReport->setInteger("column-number", violationData.columnNumber());
if (!violationData.sourceFile().isEmpty())
cspReport->setString("source-file", violationData.sourceFile());
cspReport->setInteger("status-code", violationData.statusCode());
if (experimentalFeaturesEnabled())
cspReport->setString("sample", violationData.sample());
std::unique_ptr<JSONObject> reportObject = JSONObject::create();
reportObject->setObject("csp-report", std::move(cspReport));
String stringifiedReport = reportObject->toJSONString();
if (shouldSendViolationReport(stringifiedReport)) {
didSendViolationReport(stringifiedReport);
RefPtr<EncodedFormData> report =
EncodedFormData::create(stringifiedReport.utf8());
LocalFrame* frame = document->frame();
if (!frame)
return;
for (const String& endpoint : reportEndpoints) {
DCHECK(!contextFrame || !m_executionContext);
DCHECK(!contextFrame ||
getDirectiveType(violationData.effectiveDirective()) ==
DirectiveType::FrameAncestors);
KURL url =
contextFrame
? frame->document()->completeURLWithOverride(
endpoint, KURL(ParsedURLString, violationData.blockedURI()))
: completeURL(endpoint);
PingLoader::sendViolationReport(
frame, url, report, PingLoader::ContentSecurityPolicyViolationReport);
}
}
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void ContentSecurityPolicy::postViolationReport(
const SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& violationData,
LocalFrame* contextFrame,
const Vector<String>& reportEndpoints) {
Document* document =
contextFrame ? contextFrame->document() : this->document();
if (!document)
return;
//
// TODO(mkwst): This justification is BS. Insecure reports are mixed content,
// let's kill them. https://crbug.com/695363
std::unique_ptr<JSONObject> cspReport = JSONObject::create();
cspReport->setString("document-uri", violationData.documentURI());
cspReport->setString("referrer", violationData.referrer());
cspReport->setString("violated-directive", violationData.violatedDirective());
cspReport->setString("effective-directive",
violationData.effectiveDirective());
cspReport->setString("original-policy", violationData.originalPolicy());
cspReport->setString("disposition", violationData.disposition());
cspReport->setString("blocked-uri", violationData.blockedURI());
if (violationData.lineNumber())
cspReport->setInteger("line-number", violationData.lineNumber());
if (violationData.columnNumber())
cspReport->setInteger("column-number", violationData.columnNumber());
if (!violationData.sourceFile().isEmpty())
cspReport->setString("source-file", violationData.sourceFile());
cspReport->setInteger("status-code", violationData.statusCode());
if (experimentalFeaturesEnabled())
cspReport->setString("sample", violationData.sample());
std::unique_ptr<JSONObject> reportObject = JSONObject::create();
reportObject->setObject("csp-report", std::move(cspReport));
String stringifiedReport = reportObject->toJSONString();
if (shouldSendViolationReport(stringifiedReport)) {
didSendViolationReport(stringifiedReport);
RefPtr<EncodedFormData> report =
EncodedFormData::create(stringifiedReport.utf8());
LocalFrame* frame = document->frame();
if (!frame)
return;
for (const String& endpoint : reportEndpoints) {
DCHECK(!contextFrame || !m_executionContext);
DCHECK(!contextFrame ||
getDirectiveType(violationData.effectiveDirective()) ==
DirectiveType::FrameAncestors);
KURL url =
contextFrame
? frame->document()->completeURLWithOverride(
endpoint, KURL(ParsedURLString, violationData.blockedURI()))
: completeURL(endpoint);
PingLoader::sendViolationReport(
frame, url, report, PingLoader::ContentSecurityPolicyViolationReport);
}
}
}
| 172,362 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int btsock_thread_wakeup(int h)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("thread handle:%d, cmd socket is not created", h);
return FALSE;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_WAKEUP, 0, 0, 0, 0};
return send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0) == sizeof(cmd);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | int btsock_thread_wakeup(int h)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("thread handle:%d, cmd socket is not created", h);
return FALSE;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_WAKEUP, 0, 0, 0, 0};
return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0)) == sizeof(cmd);
}
| 173,464 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ExtensionViewGuest::NavigateGuest(const std::string& src,
bool force_navigation) {
GURL url = extension_url_.Resolve(src);
bool url_not_allowed = (url != GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL)) &&
(url.GetOrigin() != extension_url_.GetOrigin());
if (!url.is_valid() || url_not_allowed)
return NavigateGuest(url::kAboutBlankURL, true /* force_navigation */);
if (!force_navigation && (url_ == url))
return false;
web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost()->FilterURL(false, &url);
web_contents()->GetController().LoadURL(url, content::Referrer(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL,
std::string());
url_ = url;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | bool ExtensionViewGuest::NavigateGuest(const std::string& src,
bool force_navigation) {
GURL url = extension_url_.Resolve(src);
bool url_not_allowed = url != GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL) &&
!url::IsSameOriginWith(url, extension_url_);
if (!url.is_valid() || url_not_allowed)
return NavigateGuest(url::kAboutBlankURL, true /* force_navigation */);
if (!force_navigation && (url_ == url))
return false;
web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost()->FilterURL(false, &url);
web_contents()->GetController().LoadURL(url, content::Referrer(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL,
std::string());
url_ = url;
return true;
}
| 172,284 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnSwapOut(const ViewMsg_SwapOut_Params& params) {
OnStop();
if (!is_swapped_out_) {
SyncNavigationState();
webview()->dispatchUnloadEvent();
SetSwappedOut(true);
WebURLRequest request(GURL("about:swappedout"));
webview()->mainFrame()->loadRequest(request);
}
Send(new ViewHostMsg_SwapOut_ACK(routing_id_, params));
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderViewImpl::OnSwapOut(const ViewMsg_SwapOut_Params& params) {
OnStop();
if (!is_swapped_out_) {
SyncNavigationState();
webview()->dispatchUnloadEvent();
SetSwappedOut(true);
// to chrome::kSwappedOutURL. If that happens to be to the page we had been
GURL swappedOutURL(chrome::kSwappedOutURL);
WebURLRequest request(swappedOutURL);
webview()->mainFrame()->loadRequest(request);
}
Send(new ViewHostMsg_SwapOut_ACK(routing_id_, params));
}
| 171,031 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_many_return (MyObject *obj, guint32 *arg0, char **arg1, gint32 *arg2, guint32 *arg3, guint32 *arg4, const char **arg5, GError **error)
{
*arg0 = 42;
*arg1 = g_strdup ("42");
*arg2 = -67;
*arg3 = 2;
*arg4 = 26;
*arg5 = "hello world"; /* Annotation specifies as const */
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_many_return (MyObject *obj, guint32 *arg0, char **arg1, gint32 *arg2, guint32 *arg3, guint32 *arg4, const char **arg5, GError **error)
| 165,111 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HostPortAllocatorSession::OnSessionRequestDone(
UrlFetcher* url_fetcher,
const net::URLRequestStatus& status,
int response_code,
const std::string& response) {
url_fetchers_.erase(url_fetcher);
delete url_fetcher;
if (response_code != net::HTTP_OK) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Received error when allocating relay session: "
<< response_code;
TryCreateRelaySession();
return;
}
ReceiveSessionResponse(response);
}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void HostPortAllocatorSession::OnSessionRequestDone(
void HostPortAllocatorSession::OnURLFetchComplete(
const net::URLFetcher* source) {
url_fetchers_.erase(source);
delete source;
if (source->GetResponseCode() != net::HTTP_OK) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Received error when allocating relay session: "
<< source->GetResponseCode();
TryCreateRelaySession();
return;
}
std::string response;
source->GetResponseAsString(&response);
ReceiveSessionResponse(response);
}
| 170,810 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebView* RenderViewImpl::createView(
WebFrame* creator,
const WebURLRequest& request,
const WebWindowFeatures& features,
const WebString& frame_name,
WebNavigationPolicy policy) {
if (shared_popup_counter_->data > kMaximumNumberOfUnacknowledgedPopups)
return NULL;
ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params params;
params.opener_id = routing_id_;
params.user_gesture = creator->isProcessingUserGesture();
params.window_container_type = WindowFeaturesToContainerType(features);
params.session_storage_namespace_id = session_storage_namespace_id_;
params.frame_name = frame_name;
params.opener_frame_id = creator->identifier();
params.opener_url = creator->document().url();
params.opener_security_origin =
creator->document().securityOrigin().toString().utf8();
params.opener_suppressed = creator->willSuppressOpenerInNewFrame();
params.disposition = NavigationPolicyToDisposition(policy);
if (!request.isNull())
params.target_url = request.url();
int32 routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
int32 surface_id = 0;
int64 cloned_session_storage_namespace_id;
RenderThread::Get()->Send(
new ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow(params,
&routing_id,
&surface_id,
&cloned_session_storage_namespace_id));
if (routing_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
return NULL;
creator->consumeUserGesture();
RenderViewImpl* view = RenderViewImpl::Create(
routing_id_,
renderer_preferences_,
webkit_preferences_,
shared_popup_counter_,
routing_id,
surface_id,
cloned_session_storage_namespace_id,
frame_name,
true,
false,
1,
screen_info_,
accessibility_mode_);
view->opened_by_user_gesture_ = params.user_gesture;
view->opener_suppressed_ = params.opener_suppressed;
view->alternate_error_page_url_ = alternate_error_page_url_;
return view->webview();
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | WebView* RenderViewImpl::createView(
WebFrame* creator,
const WebURLRequest& request,
const WebWindowFeatures& features,
const WebString& frame_name,
WebNavigationPolicy policy) {
if (shared_popup_counter_->data > kMaximumNumberOfUnacknowledgedPopups)
return NULL;
ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params params;
params.opener_id = routing_id_;
params.user_gesture = creator->isProcessingUserGesture();
params.window_container_type = WindowFeaturesToContainerType(features);
params.session_storage_namespace_id = session_storage_namespace_id_;
params.frame_name = frame_name;
params.opener_frame_id = creator->identifier();
params.opener_url = creator->document().url();
GURL security_url(creator->document().securityOrigin().toString().utf8());
if (!security_url.is_valid())
security_url = GURL();
params.opener_security_origin = security_url;
params.opener_suppressed = creator->willSuppressOpenerInNewFrame();
params.disposition = NavigationPolicyToDisposition(policy);
if (!request.isNull())
params.target_url = request.url();
int32 routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
int32 surface_id = 0;
int64 cloned_session_storage_namespace_id;
RenderThread::Get()->Send(
new ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow(params,
&routing_id,
&surface_id,
&cloned_session_storage_namespace_id));
if (routing_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
return NULL;
creator->consumeUserGesture();
RenderViewImpl* view = RenderViewImpl::Create(
routing_id_,
renderer_preferences_,
webkit_preferences_,
shared_popup_counter_,
routing_id,
surface_id,
cloned_session_storage_namespace_id,
frame_name,
true,
false,
1,
screen_info_,
accessibility_mode_);
view->opened_by_user_gesture_ = params.user_gesture;
view->opener_suppressed_ = params.opener_suppressed;
view->alternate_error_page_url_ = alternate_error_page_url_;
return view->webview();
}
| 171,499 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TouchpadLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetTouchpadLibrary() {
return touchpad_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | TouchpadLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetTouchpadLibrary() {
| 170,633 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long FS_FOpenFileRead(const char *filename, fileHandle_t *file, qboolean uniqueFILE)
{
searchpath_t *search;
long len;
if(!fs_searchpaths)
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization");
for(search = fs_searchpaths; search; search = search->next)
{
len = FS_FOpenFileReadDir(filename, search, file, uniqueFILE, qfalse);
if(file == NULL)
{
if(len > 0)
return len;
}
else
{
if(len >= 0 && *file)
return len;
}
}
#ifdef FS_MISSING
if(missingFiles)
fprintf(missingFiles, "%s\n", filename);
#endif
if(file)
{
*file = 0;
return -1;
}
else
{
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | long FS_FOpenFileRead(const char *filename, fileHandle_t *file, qboolean uniqueFILE)
{
searchpath_t *search;
long len;
qboolean isLocalConfig;
if(!fs_searchpaths)
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization");
isLocalConfig = !strcmp(filename, "autoexec.cfg") || !strcmp(filename, Q3CONFIG_CFG);
for(search = fs_searchpaths; search; search = search->next)
{
// autoexec.cfg and wolfconfig.cfg can only be loaded outside of pk3 files.
if (isLocalConfig && search->pack)
continue;
len = FS_FOpenFileReadDir(filename, search, file, uniqueFILE, qfalse);
if(file == NULL)
{
if(len > 0)
return len;
}
else
{
if(len >= 0 && *file)
return len;
}
}
#ifdef FS_MISSING
if(missingFiles)
fprintf(missingFiles, "%s\n", filename);
#endif
if(file)
{
*file = 0;
return -1;
}
else
{
return 0;
}
}
| 170,087 |
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