instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void buffer_slow_realign(struct buffer *buf)
{
/* two possible cases :
* - the buffer is in one contiguous block, we move it in-place
* - the buffer is in two blocks, we move it via the swap_buffer
*/
if (buf->i) {
int block1 = buf->i;
int block2 = 0;
if (buf->p + buf->i > buf->data + buf->size) {
/* non-contiguous block */
block1 = buf->data + buf->size - buf->p;
block2 = buf->p + buf->i - (buf->data + buf->size);
}
if (block2)
memcpy(swap_buffer, buf->data, block2);
memmove(buf->data, buf->p, block1);
if (block2)
memcpy(buf->data + block1, swap_buffer, block2);
}
buf->p = buf->data;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void buffer_slow_realign(struct buffer *buf)
{
int block1 = buf->o;
int block2 = 0;
/* process output data in two steps to cover wrapping */
if (block1 > buf->p - buf->data) {
block2 = buf->p - buf->data;
block1 -= block2;
}
memcpy(swap_buffer + buf->size - buf->o, bo_ptr(buf), block1);
memcpy(swap_buffer + buf->size - block2, buf->data, block2);
/* process input data in two steps to cover wrapping */
block1 = buf->i;
block2 = 0;
if (block1 > buf->data + buf->size - buf->p) {
block1 = buf->data + buf->size - buf->p;
block2 = buf->i - block1;
}
memcpy(swap_buffer, bi_ptr(buf), block1);
memcpy(swap_buffer + block1, buf->data, block2);
/* reinject changes into the buffer */
memcpy(buf->data, swap_buffer, buf->i);
memcpy(buf->data + buf->size - buf->o, swap_buffer + buf->size - buf->o, buf->o);
buf->p = buf->data;
}
| 164,714 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void xen_netbk_fill_frags(struct xen_netbk *netbk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
int nr_frags = shinfo->nr_frags;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_frags; i++) {
skb_frag_t *frag = shinfo->frags + i;
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp;
struct page *page;
u16 pending_idx;
pending_idx = frag_get_pending_idx(frag);
txp = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
page = virt_to_page(idx_to_kaddr(netbk, pending_idx));
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, txp->offset, txp->size);
skb->len += txp->size;
skb->data_len += txp->size;
skb->truesize += txp->size;
/* Take an extra reference to offset xen_netbk_idx_release */
get_page(netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx]);
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx);
}
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void xen_netbk_fill_frags(struct xen_netbk *netbk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
int nr_frags = shinfo->nr_frags;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_frags; i++) {
skb_frag_t *frag = shinfo->frags + i;
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp;
struct page *page;
u16 pending_idx;
pending_idx = frag_get_pending_idx(frag);
txp = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
page = virt_to_page(idx_to_kaddr(netbk, pending_idx));
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, txp->offset, txp->size);
skb->len += txp->size;
skb->data_len += txp->size;
skb->truesize += txp->size;
/* Take an extra reference to offset xen_netbk_idx_release */
get_page(netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx]);
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx, XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY);
}
}
| 166,167 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int jffs2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int rc, xprefix;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
rc = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
if (inode->i_mode != mode) {
struct iattr attr;
attr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
attr.ia_mode = mode;
attr.ia_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
rc = jffs2_do_setattr(inode, &attr);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
}
if (rc == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = __jffs2_set_acl(inode, xprefix, acl);
if (!rc)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | int jffs2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int rc, xprefix;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
umode_t mode;
rc = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &mode, &acl);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (inode->i_mode != mode) {
struct iattr attr;
attr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
attr.ia_mode = mode;
attr.ia_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
rc = jffs2_do_setattr(inode, &attr);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
}
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = __jffs2_set_acl(inode, xprefix, acl);
if (!rc)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return rc;
}
| 166,974 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline size_t GetPSDRowSize(Image *image)
{
if (image->depth == 1)
return((image->columns+7)/8);
else
return(image->columns*GetPSDPacketSize(image));
}
Commit Message: Fixed head buffer overflow reported in: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/98
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static inline size_t GetPSDRowSize(Image *image)
{
if (image->depth == 1)
return(((image->columns+7)/8)*GetPSDPacketSize(image));
else
return(image->columns*GetPSDPacketSize(image));
}
| 168,804 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_get_asm_flags (png_structp png_ptr)
{
/* Obsolete, to be removed from libpng-1.4.0 */
return (png_ptr? 0L: 0L);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | png_get_asm_flags (png_structp png_ptr)
{
/* Obsolete, to be removed from libpng-1.4.0 */
PNG_UNUSED(png_ptr)
return 0L;
}
| 172,165 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void usb_xhci_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
{
int i;
XHCIState *xhci = XHCI(dev);
trace_usb_xhci_exit();
for (i = 0; i < xhci->numslots; i++) {
xhci_disable_slot(xhci, i + 1);
}
if (xhci->mfwrap_timer) {
timer_del(xhci->mfwrap_timer);
timer_free(xhci->mfwrap_timer);
xhci->mfwrap_timer = NULL;
}
memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &xhci->mem_cap);
memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &xhci->mem_oper);
memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &xhci->mem_runtime);
memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &xhci->mem_doorbell);
for (i = 0; i < xhci->numports; i++) {
XHCIPort *port = &xhci->ports[i];
memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &port->mem);
}
/* destroy msix memory region */
if (dev->msix_table && dev->msix_pba
&& dev->msix_entry_used) {
memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &dev->msix_table_mmio);
memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &dev->msix_pba_mmio);
}
usb_bus_release(&xhci->bus);
usb_bus_release(&xhci->bus);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void usb_xhci_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
{
int i;
XHCIState *xhci = XHCI(dev);
trace_usb_xhci_exit();
for (i = 0; i < xhci->numslots; i++) {
xhci_disable_slot(xhci, i + 1);
}
if (xhci->mfwrap_timer) {
timer_del(xhci->mfwrap_timer);
timer_free(xhci->mfwrap_timer);
xhci->mfwrap_timer = NULL;
}
memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &xhci->mem_cap);
memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &xhci->mem_oper);
memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &xhci->mem_runtime);
memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &xhci->mem_doorbell);
for (i = 0; i < xhci->numports; i++) {
XHCIPort *port = &xhci->ports[i];
memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &port->mem);
}
/* destroy msix memory region */
if (dev->msix_table && dev->msix_pba
&& dev->msix_entry_used) {
msix_uninit(dev, &xhci->mem, &xhci->mem);
}
usb_bus_release(&xhci->bus);
usb_bus_release(&xhci->bus);
}
| 164,926 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RenderFrameHostManager::GetSiteInstanceForNavigationRequest(
const NavigationRequest& request) {
SiteInstance* current_site_instance = render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance();
bool no_renderer_swap_allowed = false;
bool was_server_redirect = request.navigation_handle() &&
request.navigation_handle()->WasServerRedirect();
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
bool can_renderer_initiate_transfer =
(request.state() == NavigationRequest::FAILED &&
SiteIsolationPolicy::IsErrorPageIsolationEnabled(
true /* in_main_frame */)) ||
(render_frame_host_->IsRenderFrameLive() &&
IsURLHandledByNetworkStack(request.common_params().url) &&
IsRendererTransferNeededForNavigation(render_frame_host_.get(),
request.common_params().url));
no_renderer_swap_allowed |=
request.from_begin_navigation() && !can_renderer_initiate_transfer;
} else {
no_renderer_swap_allowed |= !CanSubframeSwapProcess(
request.common_params().url, request.source_site_instance(),
request.dest_site_instance(), was_server_redirect);
}
if (no_renderer_swap_allowed)
return scoped_refptr<SiteInstance>(current_site_instance);
SiteInstance* candidate_site_instance =
speculative_render_frame_host_
? speculative_render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance()
: nullptr;
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> dest_site_instance = GetSiteInstanceForNavigation(
request.common_params().url, request.source_site_instance(),
request.dest_site_instance(), candidate_site_instance,
request.common_params().transition,
request.state() == NavigationRequest::FAILED,
request.restore_type() != RestoreType::NONE, request.is_view_source(),
was_server_redirect);
return dest_site_instance;
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | RenderFrameHostManager::GetSiteInstanceForNavigationRequest(
const NavigationRequest& request) {
SiteInstance* current_site_instance = render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance();
bool no_renderer_swap_allowed = false;
bool was_server_redirect = request.navigation_handle() &&
request.navigation_handle()->WasServerRedirect();
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
bool can_renderer_initiate_transfer =
(request.state() == NavigationRequest::FAILED &&
SiteIsolationPolicy::IsErrorPageIsolationEnabled(
true /* in_main_frame */)) ||
(render_frame_host_->IsRenderFrameLive() &&
IsURLHandledByNetworkStack(request.common_params().url) &&
IsRendererTransferNeededForNavigation(render_frame_host_.get(),
request.common_params().url));
no_renderer_swap_allowed |=
request.from_begin_navigation() && !can_renderer_initiate_transfer;
} else {
no_renderer_swap_allowed |= !CanSubframeSwapProcess(
request.common_params().url, request.source_site_instance(),
request.dest_site_instance());
}
if (no_renderer_swap_allowed)
return scoped_refptr<SiteInstance>(current_site_instance);
SiteInstance* candidate_site_instance =
speculative_render_frame_host_
? speculative_render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance()
: nullptr;
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> dest_site_instance = GetSiteInstanceForNavigation(
request.common_params().url, request.source_site_instance(),
request.dest_site_instance(), candidate_site_instance,
request.common_params().transition,
request.state() == NavigationRequest::FAILED,
request.restore_type() != RestoreType::NONE, request.is_view_source(),
was_server_redirect);
return dest_site_instance;
}
| 173,182 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: transform_name(int t)
/* The name, if 't' has multiple bits set the name of the lowest set bit is
* returned.
*/
{
unsigned int i;
t &= -t; /* first set bit */
for (i=0; i<TTABLE_SIZE; ++i)
{
if ((transform_info[i].transform & t) != 0)
return transform_info[i].name;
}
return "invalid transform";
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | transform_name(int t)
/* The name, if 't' has multiple bits set the name of the lowest set bit is
* returned.
*/
{
unsigned int i;
t &= -t; /* first set bit */
for (i=0; i<TTABLE_SIZE; ++i) if (transform_info[i].name != NULL)
{
if ((transform_info[i].transform & t) != 0)
return transform_info[i].name;
}
return "invalid transform";
}
| 173,590 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int get_refcount(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t cluster_index)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int refcount_table_index, block_index;
int64_t refcount_block_offset;
int ret;
uint16_t *refcount_block;
uint16_t refcount;
refcount_table_index = cluster_index >> (s->cluster_bits - REFCOUNT_SHIFT);
if (refcount_table_index >= s->refcount_table_size)
return 0;
refcount_block_offset =
s->refcount_table[refcount_table_index] & REFT_OFFSET_MASK;
if (!refcount_block_offset)
return 0;
ret = qcow2_cache_get(bs, s->refcount_block_cache, refcount_block_offset,
(void**) &refcount_block);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
block_index = cluster_index &
((1 << (s->cluster_bits - REFCOUNT_SHIFT)) - 1);
refcount = be16_to_cpu(refcount_block[block_index]);
ret = qcow2_cache_put(bs, s->refcount_block_cache,
(void**) &refcount_block);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
return refcount;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int get_refcount(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t cluster_index)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
uint64_t refcount_table_index, block_index;
int64_t refcount_block_offset;
int ret;
uint16_t *refcount_block;
uint16_t refcount;
refcount_table_index = cluster_index >> (s->cluster_bits - REFCOUNT_SHIFT);
if (refcount_table_index >= s->refcount_table_size)
return 0;
refcount_block_offset =
s->refcount_table[refcount_table_index] & REFT_OFFSET_MASK;
if (!refcount_block_offset)
return 0;
ret = qcow2_cache_get(bs, s->refcount_block_cache, refcount_block_offset,
(void**) &refcount_block);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
block_index = cluster_index &
((1 << (s->cluster_bits - REFCOUNT_SHIFT)) - 1);
refcount = be16_to_cpu(refcount_block[block_index]);
ret = qcow2_cache_put(bs, s->refcount_block_cache,
(void**) &refcount_block);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
return refcount;
}
| 165,405 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void snd_timer_user_ccallback(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri,
int event,
struct timespec *tstamp,
unsigned long resolution)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu = timeri->callback_data;
struct snd_timer_tread r1;
unsigned long flags;
if (event >= SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_START &&
event <= SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_PAUSE)
tu->tstamp = *tstamp;
if ((tu->filter & (1 << event)) == 0 || !tu->tread)
return;
r1.event = event;
r1.tstamp = *tstamp;
r1.val = resolution;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tu->qlock, flags);
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tu->qlock, flags);
kill_fasync(&tu->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
wake_up(&tu->qchange_sleep);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_ccallback
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void snd_timer_user_ccallback(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri,
int event,
struct timespec *tstamp,
unsigned long resolution)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu = timeri->callback_data;
struct snd_timer_tread r1;
unsigned long flags;
if (event >= SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_START &&
event <= SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_PAUSE)
tu->tstamp = *tstamp;
if ((tu->filter & (1 << event)) == 0 || !tu->tread)
return;
memset(&r1, 0, sizeof(r1));
r1.event = event;
r1.tstamp = *tstamp;
r1.val = resolution;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tu->qlock, flags);
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tu->qlock, flags);
kill_fasync(&tu->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
wake_up(&tu->qchange_sleep);
}
| 169,969 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: NavigateParams::NavigateParams(Browser* a_browser,
TabContentsWrapper* a_target_contents)
: target_contents(a_target_contents),
source_contents(NULL),
disposition(CURRENT_TAB),
transition(content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK),
tabstrip_index(-1),
tabstrip_add_types(TabStripModel::ADD_ACTIVE),
window_action(NO_ACTION),
user_gesture(true),
path_behavior(RESPECT),
ref_behavior(IGNORE_REF),
browser(a_browser),
profile(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Fix memory error in previous CL.
BUG=100315
BUG=99016
TEST=Memory bots go green
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8302001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@105577 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | NavigateParams::NavigateParams(Browser* a_browser,
TabContentsWrapper* a_target_contents)
: target_contents(a_target_contents),
source_contents(NULL),
disposition(CURRENT_TAB),
transition(content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK),
is_renderer_initiated(false),
tabstrip_index(-1),
tabstrip_add_types(TabStripModel::ADD_ACTIVE),
window_action(NO_ACTION),
user_gesture(true),
path_behavior(RESPECT),
ref_behavior(IGNORE_REF),
browser(a_browser),
profile(NULL) {
}
| 170,250 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int mk_vhost_fdt_close(struct session_request *sr)
{
int id;
unsigned int hash;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_table *ht = NULL;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_chain *hc;
if (config->fdt == MK_FALSE) {
return close(sr->fd_file);
}
id = sr->vhost_fdt_id;
hash = sr->vhost_fdt_hash;
ht = mk_vhost_fdt_table_lookup(id, sr->host_conf);
if (mk_unlikely(!ht)) {
return close(sr->fd_file);
}
/* We got the hash table, now look around the chains array */
hc = mk_vhost_fdt_chain_lookup(hash, ht);
if (hc) {
/* Increment the readers and check if we should close */
hc->readers--;
if (hc->readers == 0) {
hc->fd = -1;
hc->hash = 0;
ht->av_slots++;
return close(sr->fd_file);
}
else {
return 0;
}
}
return close(sr->fd_file);
}
Commit Message: Request: new request session flag to mark those files opened by FDT
This patch aims to fix a potential DDoS problem that can be caused
in the server quering repetitive non-existent resources.
When serving a static file, the core use Vhost FDT mechanism, but if
it sends a static error page it does a direct open(2). When closing
the resources for the same request it was just calling mk_vhost_close()
which did not clear properly the file descriptor.
This patch adds a new field on the struct session_request called 'fd_is_fdt',
which contains MK_TRUE or MK_FALSE depending of how fd_file was opened.
Thanks to Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com> for report and troubleshoot this
problem.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <eduardo@monkey.io>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static inline int mk_vhost_fdt_close(struct session_request *sr)
{
int id;
unsigned int hash;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_table *ht = NULL;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_chain *hc;
if (config->fdt == MK_FALSE) {
return close(sr->fd_file);
}
id = sr->vhost_fdt_id;
hash = sr->vhost_fdt_hash;
ht = mk_vhost_fdt_table_lookup(id, sr->host_conf);
if (mk_unlikely(!ht)) {
return close(sr->fd_file);
}
/* We got the hash table, now look around the chains array */
hc = mk_vhost_fdt_chain_lookup(hash, ht);
if (hc) {
/* Increment the readers and check if we should close */
hc->readers--;
if (hc->readers == 0) {
hc->fd = -1;
hc->hash = 0;
ht->av_slots++;
return close(sr->fd_file);
}
else {
return 0;
}
}
return close(sr->fd_file);
}
| 166,278 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: FilePath ExtensionPrefs::GetExtensionPath(const std::string& extension_id) {
const DictionaryValue* dict = GetExtensionPref(extension_id);
std::string path;
if (!dict->GetString(kPrefPath, &path))
return FilePath();
return install_directory_.Append(FilePath::FromWStringHack(UTF8ToWide(path)));
}
Commit Message: Coverity: Add a missing NULL check.
BUG=none
TEST=none
CID=16813
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7216034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | FilePath ExtensionPrefs::GetExtensionPath(const std::string& extension_id) {
const DictionaryValue* dict = GetExtensionPref(extension_id);
if (!dict)
return FilePath();
std::string path;
if (!dict->GetString(kPrefPath, &path))
return FilePath();
return install_directory_.Append(FilePath::FromWStringHack(UTF8ToWide(path)));
}
| 170,309 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char *strstr(char *s1, char *s2)
{ /* from libiberty */
char *p;
int len = strlen(s2);
if (*s2 == '\0') /* everything matches empty string */
return s1;
for (p = s1; (p = strchr(p, *s2)) != NULL; p = strchr(p + 1, *s2)) {
if (strncmp(p, s2, len) == 0)
return (p);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: misc oom and possible memory leak fix
CWE ID: | char *strstr(char *s1, char *s2)
{ /* from libiberty */
char *p;
int len = strlen(s2);
if (*s2 == '\0') /* everything matches empty string */
return s1;
for (p = s1; (p = strchr(p, *s2)) != NULL; p++) {
if (strncmp(p, s2, len) == 0)
return (p);
}
return NULL;
}
| 169,755 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SyncManager::SyncInternal::OnIPAddressChanged() {
DVLOG(1) << "IP address change detected";
if (!observing_ip_address_changes_) {
DVLOG(1) << "IP address change dropped.";
return;
}
#if defined (OS_CHROMEOS)
MessageLoop::current()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SyncInternal::OnIPAddressChangedImpl,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
kChromeOSNetworkChangeReactionDelayHackMsec);
#else
OnIPAddressChangedImpl();
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
}
Commit Message: sync: remove Chrome OS specific logic to deal with flimflam shutdown / sync race.
No longer necessary as the ProfileSyncService now aborts sync network traffic on shutdown.
BUG=chromium-os:20841
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120912 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void SyncManager::SyncInternal::OnIPAddressChanged() {
DVLOG(1) << "IP address change detected";
if (!observing_ip_address_changes_) {
DVLOG(1) << "IP address change dropped.";
return;
}
OnIPAddressChangedImpl();
}
| 170,987 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::LoadJavaScriptURL(const KURL& url) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
Document* owner_document = GetFrame()->GetDocument();
if (!owner_document || !GetFrame()->GetPage())
return;
if (SchemeRegistry::ShouldTreatURLSchemeAsNotAllowingJavascriptURLs(
owner_document->Url().Protocol()))
return;
String script = DecodeURLEscapeSequences(
url.GetString().Substring(strlen("javascript:")));
UserGestureIndicator gesture_indicator(
UserGestureToken::Create(owner_document, UserGestureToken::kNewGesture));
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(ToIsolate(GetFrame()));
v8::Local<v8::Value> result =
GetFrame()->GetScriptController().ExecuteScriptInMainWorldAndReturnValue(
ScriptSourceCode(script));
if (result.IsEmpty() || !result->IsString())
return;
String script_result = ToCoreString(v8::Local<v8::String>::Cast(result));
if (!GetFrame()->GetNavigationScheduler().LocationChangePending()) {
GetFrame()->Loader().ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
script_result, owner_document);
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | void WebLocalFrameImpl::LoadJavaScriptURL(const KURL& url) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
Document* owner_document = GetFrame()->GetDocument();
if (!owner_document || !GetFrame()->GetPage())
return;
if (SchemeRegistry::ShouldTreatURLSchemeAsNotAllowingJavascriptURLs(
owner_document->Url().Protocol()))
return;
String script = DecodeURLEscapeSequences(
url.GetString().Substring(strlen("javascript:")));
UserGestureIndicator gesture_indicator(
UserGestureToken::Create(owner_document, UserGestureToken::kNewGesture));
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(ToIsolate(GetFrame()));
v8::Local<v8::Value> result =
GetFrame()->GetScriptController().ExecuteScriptInMainWorldAndReturnValue(
ScriptSourceCode(script));
if (result.IsEmpty() || !result->IsString())
return;
String script_result = ToCoreString(v8::Local<v8::String>::Cast(result));
if (!GetFrame()->GetNavigationScheduler().LocationChangePending()) {
GetFrame()->Loader().ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
script_result, owner_document);
}
}
| 172,301 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ContentEncoding::ContentEncryption::ContentEncryption()
: algo(0),
key_id(NULL),
key_id_len(0),
signature(NULL),
signature_len(0),
sig_key_id(NULL),
sig_key_id_len(0),
sig_algo(0),
sig_hash_algo(0) {
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ContentEncoding::ContentEncryption::ContentEncryption()
: algo(0),
key_id(NULL),
key_id_len(0),
signature(NULL),
signature_len(0),
sig_key_id(NULL),
sig_key_id_len(0),
sig_algo(0),
| 174,252 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnCreateSnapshotFile(
int request_id, const GURL& blob_url, const GURL& path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
FileSystemURL url(path);
base::Callback<void(const FilePath&)> register_file_callback =
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::RegisterFileAsBlob,
this, blob_url, url.path());
FileSystemOperation* operation = GetNewOperation(url, request_id);
if (!operation)
return;
operation->CreateSnapshotFile(
url,
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidCreateSnapshot,
this, request_id, register_file_callback));
}
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnCreateSnapshotFile(
int request_id, const GURL& blob_url, const GURL& path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
FileSystemURL url(path);
base::Callback<void(const FilePath&)> register_file_callback =
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::RegisterFileAsBlob,
this, blob_url, url);
// Make sure if this file can be read by the renderer as this is
// called when the renderer is about to create a new File object
// (for reading the file).
base::PlatformFileError error;
if (!HasPermissionsForFile(url, kReadFilePermissions, &error)) {
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidFail(request_id, error));
return;
}
FileSystemOperation* operation = GetNewOperation(url, request_id);
if (!operation)
return;
operation->CreateSnapshotFile(
url,
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidCreateSnapshot,
this, request_id, register_file_callback));
}
| 171,586 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: flatpak_proxy_client_init (FlatpakProxyClient *client)
{
init_side (client, &client->client_side);
init_side (client, &client->bus_side);
client->auth_end_offset = AUTH_END_INIT_OFFSET;
client->rewrite_reply = g_hash_table_new_full (g_direct_hash, g_direct_equal, NULL, g_object_unref);
client->get_owner_reply = g_hash_table_new_full (g_direct_hash, g_direct_equal, NULL, g_free);
client->unique_id_policy = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | flatpak_proxy_client_init (FlatpakProxyClient *client)
{
init_side (client, &client->client_side);
init_side (client, &client->bus_side);
client->auth_buffer = g_byte_array_new ();
client->rewrite_reply = g_hash_table_new_full (g_direct_hash, g_direct_equal, NULL, g_object_unref);
client->get_owner_reply = g_hash_table_new_full (g_direct_hash, g_direct_equal, NULL, g_free);
client->unique_id_policy = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, NULL);
}
| 169,342 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cdf_unpack_summary_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
cdf_summary_info_header_t *ssi, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count)
{
size_t i, maxcount;
const cdf_summary_info_header_t *si =
CAST(const cdf_summary_info_header_t *, sst->sst_tab);
const cdf_section_declaration_t *sd =
CAST(const cdf_section_declaration_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + CDF_SECTION_DECLARATION_OFFSET));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, si, sizeof(*si), __LINE__) == -1 ||
cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, sd, sizeof(*sd), __LINE__) == -1)
return -1;
ssi->si_byte_order = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_byte_order);
ssi->si_os_version = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_os_version);
ssi->si_os = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_os);
ssi->si_class = si->si_class;
cdf_swap_class(&ssi->si_class);
ssi->si_count = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_count);
*count = 0;
maxcount = 0;
*info = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < CDF_TOLE4(si->si_count); i++) {
if (i >= CDF_LOOP_LIMIT) {
DPRINTF(("Unpack summary info loop limit"));
errno = EFTYPE;
return -1;
}
if (cdf_read_property_info(sst, h, CDF_TOLE4(sd->sd_offset),
info, count, &maxcount) == -1) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Remove loop that kept reading the same offset (Jan Kaluza)
CWE ID: CWE-399 | cdf_unpack_summary_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
cdf_summary_info_header_t *ssi, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count)
{
size_t maxcount;
const cdf_summary_info_header_t *si =
CAST(const cdf_summary_info_header_t *, sst->sst_tab);
const cdf_section_declaration_t *sd =
CAST(const cdf_section_declaration_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + CDF_SECTION_DECLARATION_OFFSET));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, si, sizeof(*si), __LINE__) == -1 ||
cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, sd, sizeof(*sd), __LINE__) == -1)
return -1;
ssi->si_byte_order = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_byte_order);
ssi->si_os_version = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_os_version);
ssi->si_os = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_os);
ssi->si_class = si->si_class;
cdf_swap_class(&ssi->si_class);
ssi->si_count = CDF_TOLE4(si->si_count);
*count = 0;
maxcount = 0;
*info = NULL;
if (cdf_read_property_info(sst, h, CDF_TOLE4(sd->sd_offset), info,
count, &maxcount) == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
| 166,443 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void v9fs_device_unrealize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
{
g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
g_free(s->tag);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | void v9fs_device_unrealize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
{
g_free(s->tag);
g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
}
| 164,896 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InitCallbacks(struct mg_context* ctx, Dispatcher* dispatcher,
base::WaitableEvent* shutdown_event,
bool forbid_other_requests) {
dispatcher->AddShutdown("/shutdown", shutdown_event);
dispatcher->AddStatus("/healthz");
dispatcher->Add<CreateSession>("/session");
dispatcher->Add<FindOneElementCommand>( "/session/*/element");
dispatcher->Add<FindManyElementsCommand>("/session/*/elements");
dispatcher->Add<ActiveElementCommand>( "/session/*/element/active");
dispatcher->Add<FindOneElementCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/element");
dispatcher->Add<FindManyElementsCommand>("/session/*/elements/*/elements");
dispatcher->Add<ElementAttributeCommand>("/session/*/element/*/attribute/*");
dispatcher->Add<ElementCssCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/css/*");
dispatcher->Add<ElementClearCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/clear");
dispatcher->Add<ElementDisplayedCommand>("/session/*/element/*/displayed");
dispatcher->Add<ElementEnabledCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/enabled");
dispatcher->Add<ElementEqualsCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/equals/*");
dispatcher->Add<ElementLocationCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/location");
dispatcher->Add<ElementLocationInViewCommand>(
"/session/*/element/*/location_in_view");
dispatcher->Add<ElementNameCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/name");
dispatcher->Add<ElementSelectedCommand>("/session/*/element/*/selected");
dispatcher->Add<ElementSizeCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/size");
dispatcher->Add<ElementSubmitCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/submit");
dispatcher->Add<ElementTextCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/text");
dispatcher->Add<ElementToggleCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/toggle");
dispatcher->Add<ElementValueCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/value");
dispatcher->Add<ScreenshotCommand>("/session/*/screenshot");
dispatcher->Add<MoveAndClickCommand>("/session/*/element/*/click");
dispatcher->Add<DragCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/drag");
dispatcher->Add<HoverCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/hover");
dispatcher->Add<MoveToCommand>( "/session/*/moveto");
dispatcher->Add<ClickCommand>( "/session/*/click");
dispatcher->Add<ButtonDownCommand>( "/session/*/buttondown");
dispatcher->Add<ButtonUpCommand>( "/session/*/buttonup");
dispatcher->Add<DoubleClickCommand>("/session/*/doubleclick");
dispatcher->Add<AcceptAlertCommand>( "/session/*/accept_alert");
dispatcher->Add<AlertTextCommand>( "/session/*/alert_text");
dispatcher->Add<BackCommand>( "/session/*/back");
dispatcher->Add<DismissAlertCommand>( "/session/*/dismiss_alert");
dispatcher->Add<ExecuteCommand>( "/session/*/execute");
dispatcher->Add<ExecuteAsyncScriptCommand>(
"/session/*/execute_async");
dispatcher->Add<ForwardCommand>( "/session/*/forward");
dispatcher->Add<SwitchFrameCommand>( "/session/*/frame");
dispatcher->Add<RefreshCommand>( "/session/*/refresh");
dispatcher->Add<SourceCommand>( "/session/*/source");
dispatcher->Add<TitleCommand>( "/session/*/title");
dispatcher->Add<URLCommand>( "/session/*/url");
dispatcher->Add<WindowCommand>( "/session/*/window");
dispatcher->Add<WindowHandleCommand>( "/session/*/window_handle");
dispatcher->Add<WindowHandlesCommand>("/session/*/window_handles");
dispatcher->Add<SetAsyncScriptTimeoutCommand>(
"/session/*/timeouts/async_script");
dispatcher->Add<ImplicitWaitCommand>( "/session/*/timeouts/implicit_wait");
dispatcher->Add<CookieCommand>( "/session/*/cookie");
dispatcher->Add<NamedCookieCommand>("/session/*/cookie/*");
dispatcher->Add<SessionWithID>("/session/*");
if (forbid_other_requests)
dispatcher->ForbidAllOtherRequests();
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void InitCallbacks(struct mg_context* ctx, Dispatcher* dispatcher,
base::WaitableEvent* shutdown_event,
bool forbid_other_requests) {
dispatcher->AddShutdown("/shutdown", shutdown_event);
dispatcher->AddHealthz("/healthz");
dispatcher->AddLog("/log");
dispatcher->Add<CreateSession>("/session");
dispatcher->Add<FindOneElementCommand>( "/session/*/element");
dispatcher->Add<FindManyElementsCommand>("/session/*/elements");
dispatcher->Add<ActiveElementCommand>( "/session/*/element/active");
dispatcher->Add<FindOneElementCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/element");
dispatcher->Add<FindManyElementsCommand>("/session/*/elements/*/elements");
dispatcher->Add<ElementAttributeCommand>("/session/*/element/*/attribute/*");
dispatcher->Add<ElementCssCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/css/*");
dispatcher->Add<ElementClearCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/clear");
dispatcher->Add<ElementDisplayedCommand>("/session/*/element/*/displayed");
dispatcher->Add<ElementEnabledCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/enabled");
dispatcher->Add<ElementEqualsCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/equals/*");
dispatcher->Add<ElementLocationCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/location");
dispatcher->Add<ElementLocationInViewCommand>(
"/session/*/element/*/location_in_view");
dispatcher->Add<ElementNameCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/name");
dispatcher->Add<ElementSelectedCommand>("/session/*/element/*/selected");
dispatcher->Add<ElementSizeCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/size");
dispatcher->Add<ElementSubmitCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/submit");
dispatcher->Add<ElementTextCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/text");
dispatcher->Add<ElementToggleCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/toggle");
dispatcher->Add<ElementValueCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/value");
dispatcher->Add<ScreenshotCommand>("/session/*/screenshot");
dispatcher->Add<MoveAndClickCommand>("/session/*/element/*/click");
dispatcher->Add<DragCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/drag");
dispatcher->Add<HoverCommand>( "/session/*/element/*/hover");
dispatcher->Add<MoveToCommand>( "/session/*/moveto");
dispatcher->Add<ClickCommand>( "/session/*/click");
dispatcher->Add<ButtonDownCommand>( "/session/*/buttondown");
dispatcher->Add<ButtonUpCommand>( "/session/*/buttonup");
dispatcher->Add<DoubleClickCommand>("/session/*/doubleclick");
dispatcher->Add<AcceptAlertCommand>( "/session/*/accept_alert");
dispatcher->Add<AlertTextCommand>( "/session/*/alert_text");
dispatcher->Add<BackCommand>( "/session/*/back");
dispatcher->Add<DismissAlertCommand>( "/session/*/dismiss_alert");
dispatcher->Add<ExecuteCommand>( "/session/*/execute");
dispatcher->Add<ExecuteAsyncScriptCommand>(
"/session/*/execute_async");
dispatcher->Add<ForwardCommand>( "/session/*/forward");
dispatcher->Add<SwitchFrameCommand>( "/session/*/frame");
dispatcher->Add<RefreshCommand>( "/session/*/refresh");
dispatcher->Add<SourceCommand>( "/session/*/source");
dispatcher->Add<TitleCommand>( "/session/*/title");
dispatcher->Add<URLCommand>( "/session/*/url");
dispatcher->Add<WindowCommand>( "/session/*/window");
dispatcher->Add<WindowHandleCommand>( "/session/*/window_handle");
dispatcher->Add<WindowHandlesCommand>("/session/*/window_handles");
dispatcher->Add<SetAsyncScriptTimeoutCommand>(
"/session/*/timeouts/async_script");
dispatcher->Add<ImplicitWaitCommand>( "/session/*/timeouts/implicit_wait");
dispatcher->Add<CookieCommand>( "/session/*/cookie");
dispatcher->Add<NamedCookieCommand>("/session/*/cookie/*");
dispatcher->Add<SessionWithID>("/session/*");
if (forbid_other_requests)
dispatcher->ForbidAllOtherRequests();
}
| 170,460 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::enableSpeechSynthesis(bool enable)
{
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::setSpeechSynthesisEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove SpeechSynthesis runtime flag (status=stable)
BUG=402536
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/482273005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180763 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-94 | void WebRuntimeFeatures::enableSpeechSynthesis(bool enable)
| 171,458 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannel(Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,const PSDInfo *psd_info,LayerInfo* layer_info,
const size_t channel,const PSDCompressionType compression,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*channel_image,
*mask;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickBooleanType
status;
channel_image=image;
mask=(Image *) NULL;
if ((layer_info->channel_info[channel].type < -1) &&
(layer_info->mask.page.width > 0) && (layer_info->mask.page.height > 0))
{
const char
*option;
/*
Ignore mask that is not a user supplied layer mask, if the mask is
disabled or if the flags have unsupported values.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"psd:preserve-opacity-mask");
if ((layer_info->channel_info[channel].type != -2) ||
(layer_info->mask.flags > 2) || ((layer_info->mask.flags & 0x02) &&
(IsStringTrue(option) == MagickFalse)))
{
SeekBlob(image,layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_CUR);
return(MagickTrue);
}
mask=CloneImage(image,layer_info->mask.page.width,
layer_info->mask.page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
{
SetImageType(mask,GrayscaleType,exception);
channel_image=mask;
}
}
offset=TellBlob(image);
status=MagickFalse;
switch(compression)
{
case Raw:
status=ReadPSDChannelRaw(channel_image,psd_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,exception);
break;
case RLE:
{
MagickOffsetType
*sizes;
sizes=ReadPSDRLESizes(channel_image,psd_info,channel_image->rows);
if (sizes == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
status=ReadPSDChannelRLE(channel_image,psd_info,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,sizes,exception);
sizes=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sizes);
}
break;
case ZipWithPrediction:
case ZipWithoutPrediction:
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
status=ReadPSDChannelZip(channel_image,layer_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,compression,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,exception);
#else
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateWarning,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn",
"'%s' (ZLIB)",image->filename);
#endif
break;
default:
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),TypeWarning,
"CompressionNotSupported","'%.20g'",(double) compression);
break;
}
SeekBlob(image,offset+layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_SET);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
DestroyImage(mask);
ThrowBinaryException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage",
image->filename);
}
layer_info->mask.image=mask;
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Slightly different fix for #714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannel(Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,const PSDInfo *psd_info,LayerInfo* layer_info,
const size_t channel,const PSDCompressionType compression,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*channel_image,
*mask;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickBooleanType
status;
channel_image=image;
mask=(Image *) NULL;
if ((layer_info->channel_info[channel].type < -1) &&
(layer_info->mask.page.width > 0) && (layer_info->mask.page.height > 0))
{
const char
*option;
/*
Ignore mask that is not a user supplied layer mask, if the mask is
disabled or if the flags have unsupported values.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"psd:preserve-opacity-mask");
if ((layer_info->channel_info[channel].type != -2) ||
(layer_info->mask.flags > 2) || ((layer_info->mask.flags & 0x02) &&
(IsStringTrue(option) == MagickFalse)))
{
SeekBlob(image,layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_CUR);
return(MagickTrue);
}
mask=CloneImage(image,layer_info->mask.page.width,
layer_info->mask.page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
{
SetImageType(mask,GrayscaleType,exception);
channel_image=mask;
}
}
offset=TellBlob(image);
status=MagickFalse;
switch(compression)
{
case Raw:
status=ReadPSDChannelRaw(channel_image,psd_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,exception);
break;
case RLE:
{
MagickOffsetType
*sizes;
sizes=ReadPSDRLESizes(channel_image,psd_info,channel_image->rows);
if (sizes == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
status=ReadPSDChannelRLE(channel_image,psd_info,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,sizes,exception);
sizes=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sizes);
}
break;
case ZipWithPrediction:
case ZipWithoutPrediction:
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
status=ReadPSDChannelZip(channel_image,layer_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,compression,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,exception);
#else
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateWarning,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn",
"'%s' (ZLIB)",image->filename);
#endif
break;
default:
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),TypeWarning,
"CompressionNotSupported","'%.20g'",(double) compression);
break;
}
SeekBlob(image,offset+layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_SET);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
DestroyImage(mask);
ThrowBinaryException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage",
image->filename);
}
layer_info->mask.image=mask;
return(status);
}
| 170,016 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void btsock_l2cap_signaled(int fd, int flags, uint32_t user_id)
{
l2cap_socket *sock;
char drop_it = FALSE;
/* We use MSG_DONTWAIT when sending data to JAVA, hence it can be accepted to hold the lock. */
pthread_mutex_lock(&state_lock);
sock = btsock_l2cap_find_by_id_l(user_id);
if (sock) {
if ((flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD) && !sock->server) {
if (sock->connected) {
int size = 0;
if (!(flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_EXCEPTION) || (ioctl(sock->our_fd, FIONREAD, &size)
== 0 && size)) {
uint8_t *buffer = osi_malloc(L2CAP_MAX_SDU_LENGTH);
/* Apparently we hijack the req_id (UINT32) to pass the pointer to the buffer to
* the write complete callback, which call a free... wonder if this works on a
* 64 bit platform? */
if (buffer != NULL) {
/* The socket is created with SOCK_SEQPACKET, hence we read one message at
* the time. The maximum size of a message is allocated to ensure data is
* not lost. This is okay to do as Android uses virtual memory, hence even
* if we only use a fraction of the memory it should not block for others
* to use the memory. As the definition of ioctl(FIONREAD) do not clearly
* define what value will be returned if multiple messages are written to
* the socket before any message is read from the socket, we could
* potentially risk to allocate way more memory than needed. One of the use
* cases for this socket is obex where multiple 64kbyte messages are
* typically written to the socket in a tight loop, hence we risk the ioctl
* will return the total amount of data in the buffer, which could be
* multiple 64kbyte chunks.
* UPDATE: As bluedroid cannot handle 64kbyte buffers, the size is reduced
* to around 8kbyte - and using malloc for buffer allocation here seems to
* be wrong
* UPDATE: Since we are responsible for freeing the buffer in the
* write_complete_ind, it is OK to use malloc. */
int count = recv(fd, buffer, L2CAP_MAX_SDU_LENGTH,
MSG_NOSIGNAL | MSG_DONTWAIT);
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("btsock_l2cap_signaled - %d bytes received from socket",
count);
if (sock->fixed_chan) {
if(BTA_JvL2capWriteFixed(sock->channel, (BD_ADDR*)&sock->addr,
(UINT32)buffer, btsock_l2cap_cbk, buffer, count,
(void *)user_id) != BTA_JV_SUCCESS) {
on_l2cap_write_fixed_done(buffer, user_id);
}
} else {
if(BTA_JvL2capWrite(sock->handle, (UINT32)buffer, buffer, count,
(void *)user_id) != BTA_JV_SUCCESS) {
on_l2cap_write_done(buffer, user_id);
}
}
} else {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("Unable to allocate memory for data packet from JAVA...")
}
}
} else
drop_it = TRUE;
}
if (flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_WR) {
if (flush_incoming_que_on_wr_signal_l(sock) && sock->connected)
btsock_thread_add_fd(pth, sock->our_fd, BTSOCK_L2CAP, SOCK_THREAD_FD_WR, sock->id);
}
if (drop_it || (flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_EXCEPTION)) {
int size = 0;
if (drop_it || ioctl(sock->our_fd, FIONREAD, &size) != 0 || size == 0)
btsock_l2cap_free_l(sock);
}
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&state_lock);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void btsock_l2cap_signaled(int fd, int flags, uint32_t user_id)
{
l2cap_socket *sock;
char drop_it = FALSE;
/* We use MSG_DONTWAIT when sending data to JAVA, hence it can be accepted to hold the lock. */
pthread_mutex_lock(&state_lock);
sock = btsock_l2cap_find_by_id_l(user_id);
if (sock) {
if ((flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD) && !sock->server) {
if (sock->connected) {
int size = 0;
if (!(flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_EXCEPTION) || (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(ioctl(sock->our_fd, FIONREAD, &size))
== 0 && size)) {
uint8_t *buffer = osi_malloc(L2CAP_MAX_SDU_LENGTH);
/* Apparently we hijack the req_id (UINT32) to pass the pointer to the buffer to
* the write complete callback, which call a free... wonder if this works on a
* 64 bit platform? */
if (buffer != NULL) {
/* The socket is created with SOCK_SEQPACKET, hence we read one message at
* the time. The maximum size of a message is allocated to ensure data is
* not lost. This is okay to do as Android uses virtual memory, hence even
* if we only use a fraction of the memory it should not block for others
* to use the memory. As the definition of ioctl(FIONREAD) do not clearly
* define what value will be returned if multiple messages are written to
* the socket before any message is read from the socket, we could
* potentially risk to allocate way more memory than needed. One of the use
* cases for this socket is obex where multiple 64kbyte messages are
* typically written to the socket in a tight loop, hence we risk the ioctl
* will return the total amount of data in the buffer, which could be
* multiple 64kbyte chunks.
* UPDATE: As bluedroid cannot handle 64kbyte buffers, the size is reduced
* to around 8kbyte - and using malloc for buffer allocation here seems to
* be wrong
* UPDATE: Since we are responsible for freeing the buffer in the
* write_complete_ind, it is OK to use malloc. */
int count = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(recv(fd, buffer, L2CAP_MAX_SDU_LENGTH,
MSG_NOSIGNAL | MSG_DONTWAIT));
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("btsock_l2cap_signaled - %d bytes received from socket",
count);
if (sock->fixed_chan) {
if(BTA_JvL2capWriteFixed(sock->channel, (BD_ADDR*)&sock->addr,
(UINT32)buffer, btsock_l2cap_cbk, buffer, count,
(void *)user_id) != BTA_JV_SUCCESS) {
on_l2cap_write_fixed_done(buffer, user_id);
}
} else {
if(BTA_JvL2capWrite(sock->handle, (UINT32)buffer, buffer, count,
(void *)user_id) != BTA_JV_SUCCESS) {
on_l2cap_write_done(buffer, user_id);
}
}
} else {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("Unable to allocate memory for data packet from JAVA...")
}
}
} else
drop_it = TRUE;
}
if (flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_WR) {
if (flush_incoming_que_on_wr_signal_l(sock) && sock->connected)
btsock_thread_add_fd(pth, sock->our_fd, BTSOCK_L2CAP, SOCK_THREAD_FD_WR, sock->id);
}
if (drop_it || (flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_EXCEPTION)) {
int size = 0;
if (drop_it || TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(ioctl(sock->our_fd, FIONREAD, &size)) != 0 || size == 0)
btsock_l2cap_free_l(sock);
}
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&state_lock);
}
| 173,453 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int test(char *URL)
{
int errors = 0;
(void)URL; /* not used */
errors += test_weird_arguments();
errors += test_unsigned_short_formatting();
errors += test_signed_short_formatting();
errors += test_unsigned_int_formatting();
errors += test_signed_int_formatting();
errors += test_unsigned_long_formatting();
errors += test_signed_long_formatting();
errors += test_curl_off_t_formatting();
errors += test_string_formatting();
if(errors)
return TEST_ERR_MAJOR_BAD;
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: printf: fix floating point buffer overflow issues
... and add a bunch of floating point printf tests
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int test(char *URL)
{
int errors = 0;
(void)URL; /* not used */
errors += test_weird_arguments();
errors += test_unsigned_short_formatting();
errors += test_signed_short_formatting();
errors += test_unsigned_int_formatting();
errors += test_signed_int_formatting();
errors += test_unsigned_long_formatting();
errors += test_signed_long_formatting();
errors += test_curl_off_t_formatting();
errors += test_string_formatting();
errors += test_float_formatting();
if(errors)
return TEST_ERR_MAJOR_BAD;
else
return 0;
}
| 169,438 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: random_32(void)
{
for(;;)
{
png_byte mark[4];
png_uint_32 result;
store_pool_mark(mark);
result = png_get_uint_32(mark);
if (result != 0)
return result;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | random_32(void)
{
for (;;)
{
png_byte mark[4];
png_uint_32 result;
store_pool_mark(mark);
result = png_get_uint_32(mark);
if (result != 0)
return result;
}
}
| 173,687 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MessageService::OpenChannelToExtension(
int source_process_id, int source_routing_id, int receiver_port_id,
const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& target_extension_id,
const std::string& channel_name) {
content::RenderProcessHost* source =
content::RenderProcessHost::FromID(source_process_id);
if (!source)
return;
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(source->GetBrowserContext());
MessagePort* receiver = new ExtensionMessagePort(
GetExtensionProcess(profile, target_extension_id), MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL,
target_extension_id);
WebContents* source_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
source_process_id, source_routing_id);
std::string tab_json = "null";
if (source_contents) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> tab_value(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
source_contents, ExtensionTabUtil::INCLUDE_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS));
base::JSONWriter::Write(tab_value.get(), &tab_json);
}
OpenChannelParams* params = new OpenChannelParams(source, tab_json, receiver,
receiver_port_id,
source_extension_id,
target_extension_id,
channel_name);
if (MaybeAddPendingOpenChannelTask(profile, params)) {
return;
}
OpenChannelImpl(scoped_ptr<OpenChannelParams>(params));
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void MessageService::OpenChannelToExtension(
int source_process_id, int source_routing_id, int receiver_port_id,
const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& target_extension_id,
const std::string& channel_name) {
content::RenderProcessHost* source =
content::RenderProcessHost::FromID(source_process_id);
if (!source)
return;
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(source->GetBrowserContext());
MessagePort* receiver = new ExtensionMessagePort(
GetExtensionProcess(profile, target_extension_id), MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL,
target_extension_id);
WebContents* source_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
source_process_id, source_routing_id);
std::string tab_json = "null";
if (source_contents) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> tab_value(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
source_contents));
base::JSONWriter::Write(tab_value.get(), &tab_json);
}
OpenChannelParams* params = new OpenChannelParams(source, tab_json, receiver,
receiver_port_id,
source_extension_id,
target_extension_id,
channel_name);
if (MaybeAddPendingOpenChannelTask(profile, params)) {
return;
}
OpenChannelImpl(scoped_ptr<OpenChannelParams>(params));
}
| 171,446 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline bool shouldSetStrutOnBlock(const LayoutBlockFlow& block, const RootInlineBox& lineBox, LayoutUnit lineLogicalOffset, int lineIndex, LayoutUnit remainingLogicalHeight)
{
bool wantsStrutOnBlock = false;
if (!block.style()->hasAutoOrphans() && block.style()->orphans() >= lineIndex) {
wantsStrutOnBlock = true;
} else if (lineBox == block.firstRootBox() && lineLogicalOffset == block.borderAndPaddingBefore()) {
LayoutUnit lineHeight = lineBox.lineBottomWithLeading() - lineBox.lineTopWithLeading();
LayoutUnit totalLogicalHeight = lineHeight + std::max<LayoutUnit>(0, lineLogicalOffset);
LayoutUnit pageLogicalHeightAtNewOffset = block.pageLogicalHeightForOffset(lineLogicalOffset + remainingLogicalHeight);
if (totalLogicalHeight < pageLogicalHeightAtNewOffset)
wantsStrutOnBlock = true;
}
if (!wantsStrutOnBlock || block.isOutOfFlowPositioned())
return false;
LayoutBlock* containingBlock = block.containingBlock();
return containingBlock && containingBlock->isLayoutBlockFlow();
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | static inline bool shouldSetStrutOnBlock(const LayoutBlockFlow& block, const RootInlineBox& lineBox, LayoutUnit lineLogicalOffset, int lineIndex, LayoutUnit remainingLogicalHeight)
{
bool wantsStrutOnBlock = false;
if (!block.style()->hasAutoOrphans() && block.style()->orphans() >= lineIndex) {
wantsStrutOnBlock = true;
} else if (lineBox == block.firstRootBox() && lineLogicalOffset == block.borderAndPaddingBefore()) {
LayoutUnit lineHeight = lineBox.lineBottomWithLeading() - lineBox.lineTopWithLeading();
LayoutUnit totalLogicalHeight = lineHeight + std::max<LayoutUnit>(0, lineLogicalOffset);
LayoutUnit pageLogicalHeightAtNewOffset = block.pageLogicalHeightForOffset(lineLogicalOffset + remainingLogicalHeight);
if (totalLogicalHeight < pageLogicalHeightAtNewOffset)
wantsStrutOnBlock = true;
}
return wantsStrutOnBlock && block.allowsPaginationStrut();
}
| 171,694 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev2_ID_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct ikev2_id id;
int id_len, idtype_len, i;
unsigned int dumpascii, dumphex;
const unsigned char *typedata;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&id, ext, sizeof(id));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), id.h.critical);
id_len = ntohs(id.h.len);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", id_len - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < id_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), id_len - 4))
goto trunc;
}
idtype_len =id_len - sizeof(struct ikev2_id);
dumpascii = 0;
dumphex = 0;
typedata = (const unsigned char *)(ext)+sizeof(struct ikev2_id);
switch(id.type) {
case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ipv4:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_FQDN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fqdn:"));
dumpascii=1;
break;
case ID_RFC822_ADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rfc822:"));
dumpascii=1;
break;
case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ipv6:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " dn:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_DER_ASN1_GN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " gn:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_KEY_ID:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " keyid:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
}
if(dumpascii) {
ND_TCHECK2(*typedata, idtype_len);
for(i=0; i<idtype_len; i++) {
if(ND_ISPRINT(typedata[i])) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", typedata[i]));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
}
}
}
if(dumphex) {
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)typedata, idtype_len))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + id_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev2_ID_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev2_id *idp;
struct ikev2_id id;
int id_len, idtype_len, i;
unsigned int dumpascii, dumphex;
const unsigned char *typedata;
idp = (const struct ikev2_id *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*idp);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&id, ext, sizeof(id));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), id.h.critical);
id_len = ntohs(id.h.len);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", id_len - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < id_len) {
/* Print the entire payload in hex */
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), id_len - 4))
goto trunc;
}
idtype_len =id_len - sizeof(struct ikev2_id);
dumpascii = 0;
dumphex = 0;
typedata = (const unsigned char *)(ext)+sizeof(struct ikev2_id);
switch(id.type) {
case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ipv4:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_FQDN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fqdn:"));
dumpascii=1;
break;
case ID_RFC822_ADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rfc822:"));
dumpascii=1;
break;
case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ipv6:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " dn:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_DER_ASN1_GN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " gn:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_KEY_ID:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " keyid:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
}
if(dumpascii) {
ND_TCHECK2(*typedata, idtype_len);
for(i=0; i<idtype_len; i++) {
if(ND_ISPRINT(typedata[i])) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", typedata[i]));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
}
}
}
if(dumphex) {
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)typedata, idtype_len))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + id_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,796 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_uppercase (MyObject *obj, const char *str, char **ret, GError **error)
{
*ret = g_ascii_strup (str, -1);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_uppercase (MyObject *obj, const char *str, char **ret, GError **error)
| 165,126 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int sysMapFile(const char* fn, MemMapping* pMap)
{
memset(pMap, 0, sizeof(*pMap));
if (fn && fn[0] == '@') {
FILE* mapf = fopen(fn+1, "r");
if (mapf == NULL) {
LOGV("Unable to open '%s': %s\n", fn+1, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (sysMapBlockFile(mapf, pMap) != 0) {
LOGW("Map of '%s' failed\n", fn);
return -1;
}
fclose(mapf);
} else {
int fd = open(fn, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd < 0) {
LOGE("Unable to open '%s': %s\n", fn, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (sysMapFD(fd, pMap) != 0) {
LOGE("Map of '%s' failed\n", fn);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
close(fd);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows in recovery procedure.
Bug: 26960931
Change-Id: Ieae45caccfb4728fcf514f0d920976585d8e6caf
(cherry picked from commit 4f2df162c6ab4a71ca86e4b38735b681729c353b)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | int sysMapFile(const char* fn, MemMapping* pMap)
{
memset(pMap, 0, sizeof(*pMap));
if (fn && fn[0] == '@') {
FILE* mapf = fopen(fn+1, "r");
if (mapf == NULL) {
LOGV("Unable to open '%s': %s\n", fn+1, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (sysMapBlockFile(mapf, pMap) != 0) {
LOGW("Map of '%s' failed\n", fn);
fclose(mapf);
return -1;
}
fclose(mapf);
} else {
int fd = open(fn, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd < 0) {
LOGE("Unable to open '%s': %s\n", fn, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (sysMapFD(fd, pMap) != 0) {
LOGE("Map of '%s' failed\n", fn);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
close(fd);
}
return 0;
}
| 173,905 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: EAS_BOOL WT_CheckSampleEnd (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame, EAS_BOOL update)
{
EAS_U32 endPhaseAccum;
EAS_U32 endPhaseFrac;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
EAS_BOOL done = EAS_FALSE;
/* check to see if we hit the end of the waveform this time */
/*lint -e{703} use shift for performance */
endPhaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac + (pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement << SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
endPhaseAccum = pWTVoice->phaseAccum + GET_PHASE_INT_PART(endPhaseFrac);
if (endPhaseAccum >= pWTVoice->loopEnd)
{
/* calculate how far current ptr is from end */
numSamples = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd - pWTVoice->phaseAccum);
/* now account for the fractional portion */
/*lint -e{703} use shift for performance */
numSamples = (EAS_I32) ((numSamples << NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS) - pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
if (pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement) {
pWTIntFrame->numSamples = 1 + (numSamples / pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement);
} else {
pWTIntFrame->numSamples = numSamples;
}
/* sound will be done this frame */
done = EAS_TRUE;
}
/* update data for off-chip synth */
if (update)
{
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = endPhaseFrac;
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = endPhaseAccum;
}
return done;
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
CWE ID: CWE-119 | EAS_BOOL WT_CheckSampleEnd (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame, EAS_BOOL update)
{
EAS_U32 endPhaseAccum;
EAS_U32 endPhaseFrac;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
EAS_BOOL done = EAS_FALSE;
/* check to see if we hit the end of the waveform this time */
/*lint -e{703} use shift for performance */
endPhaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac + (pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement << SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
endPhaseAccum = pWTVoice->phaseAccum + GET_PHASE_INT_PART(endPhaseFrac);
if (endPhaseAccum >= pWTVoice->loopEnd)
{
/* calculate how far current ptr is from end */
numSamples = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd - pWTVoice->phaseAccum);
/* now account for the fractional portion */
/*lint -e{703} use shift for performance */
numSamples = (EAS_I32) ((numSamples << NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS) - pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
if (pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement) {
pWTIntFrame->numSamples = 1 + (numSamples / pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement);
} else {
pWTIntFrame->numSamples = numSamples;
}
if (pWTIntFrame->numSamples < 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
pWTIntFrame->numSamples = 0;
}
/* sound will be done this frame */
done = EAS_TRUE;
}
/* update data for off-chip synth */
if (update)
{
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = endPhaseFrac;
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = endPhaseAccum;
}
return done;
}
| 173,923 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev2_t_print(netdissect_options *ndo, int tcount,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep)
{
const struct ikev2_t *p;
struct ikev2_t t;
uint16_t t_id;
const u_char *cp;
const char *idstr;
const struct attrmap *map;
size_t nmap;
const u_char *ep2;
p = (const struct ikev2_t *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&t, ext, sizeof(t));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T), t.h.critical);
t_id = ntohs(t.t_id);
map = NULL;
nmap = 0;
switch (t.t_type) {
case IV2_T_ENCR:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, esp_p_map);
map = encr_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(encr_t_map)/sizeof(encr_t_map[0]);
break;
case IV2_T_PRF:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, prf_p_map);
break;
case IV2_T_INTEG:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, integ_p_map);
break;
case IV2_T_DH:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, dh_p_map);
break;
case IV2_T_ESN:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, esn_p_map);
break;
default:
idstr = NULL;
break;
}
if (idstr)
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%u type=%s id=%s ", tcount,
STR_OR_ID(t.t_type, ikev2_t_type_map),
idstr));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%u type=%s id=%u ", tcount,
STR_OR_ID(t.t_type, ikev2_t_type_map),
t.t_id));
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1);
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
if (map && nmap) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp, (ep < ep2) ? ep : ep2,
map, nmap);
} else
cp = ikev1_attr_print(ndo, cp, (ep < ep2) ? ep : ep2);
}
if (ep < ep2)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"..."));
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13039/IKEv1: Do more bounds checking.
Have ikev1_attrmap_print() and ikev1_attr_print() do full bounds
checking, and return null on a bounds overflow. Have their callers
check for a null return.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev2_t_print(netdissect_options *ndo, int tcount,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep)
{
const struct ikev2_t *p;
struct ikev2_t t;
uint16_t t_id;
const u_char *cp;
const char *idstr;
const struct attrmap *map;
size_t nmap;
const u_char *ep2;
p = (const struct ikev2_t *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&t, ext, sizeof(t));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T), t.h.critical);
t_id = ntohs(t.t_id);
map = NULL;
nmap = 0;
switch (t.t_type) {
case IV2_T_ENCR:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, esp_p_map);
map = encr_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(encr_t_map)/sizeof(encr_t_map[0]);
break;
case IV2_T_PRF:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, prf_p_map);
break;
case IV2_T_INTEG:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, integ_p_map);
break;
case IV2_T_DH:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, dh_p_map);
break;
case IV2_T_ESN:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, esn_p_map);
break;
default:
idstr = NULL;
break;
}
if (idstr)
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%u type=%s id=%s ", tcount,
STR_OR_ID(t.t_type, ikev2_t_type_map),
idstr));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%u type=%s id=%u ", tcount,
STR_OR_ID(t.t_type, ikev2_t_type_map),
t.t_id));
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1);
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
if (map && nmap) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp, ep2, map, nmap);
} else
cp = ikev1_attr_print(ndo, cp, ep2);
if (cp == NULL)
goto trunc;
}
if (ep < ep2)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"..."));
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,843 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gplotCreate(const char *rootname,
l_int32 outformat,
const char *title,
const char *xlabel,
const char *ylabel)
{
char *newroot;
char buf[L_BUF_SIZE];
l_int32 badchar;
GPLOT *gplot;
PROCNAME("gplotCreate");
if (!rootname)
return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("rootname not defined", procName, NULL);
if (outformat != GPLOT_PNG && outformat != GPLOT_PS &&
outformat != GPLOT_EPS && outformat != GPLOT_LATEX)
return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("outformat invalid", procName, NULL);
stringCheckForChars(rootname, "`;&|><\"?*", &badchar);
if (badchar) /* danger of command injection */
return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("invalid rootname", procName, NULL);
if ((gplot = (GPLOT *)LEPT_CALLOC(1, sizeof(GPLOT))) == NULL)
return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("gplot not made", procName, NULL);
gplot->cmddata = sarrayCreate(0);
gplot->datanames = sarrayCreate(0);
gplot->plotdata = sarrayCreate(0);
gplot->plottitles = sarrayCreate(0);
gplot->plotstyles = numaCreate(0);
/* Save title, labels, rootname, outformat, cmdname, outname */
newroot = genPathname(rootname, NULL);
gplot->rootname = newroot;
gplot->outformat = outformat;
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.cmd", rootname);
gplot->cmdname = stringNew(buf);
if (outformat == GPLOT_PNG)
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.png", newroot);
else if (outformat == GPLOT_PS)
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.ps", newroot);
else if (outformat == GPLOT_EPS)
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.eps", newroot);
else if (outformat == GPLOT_LATEX)
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.tex", newroot);
gplot->outname = stringNew(buf);
if (title) gplot->title = stringNew(title);
if (xlabel) gplot->xlabel = stringNew(xlabel);
if (ylabel) gplot->ylabel = stringNew(ylabel);
return gplot;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | gplotCreate(const char *rootname,
l_int32 outformat,
const char *title,
const char *xlabel,
const char *ylabel)
{
char *newroot;
char buf[L_BUFSIZE];
l_int32 badchar;
GPLOT *gplot;
PROCNAME("gplotCreate");
if (!rootname)
return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("rootname not defined", procName, NULL);
if (outformat != GPLOT_PNG && outformat != GPLOT_PS &&
outformat != GPLOT_EPS && outformat != GPLOT_LATEX)
return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("outformat invalid", procName, NULL);
stringCheckForChars(rootname, "`;&|><\"?*", &badchar);
if (badchar) /* danger of command injection */
return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("invalid rootname", procName, NULL);
if ((gplot = (GPLOT *)LEPT_CALLOC(1, sizeof(GPLOT))) == NULL)
return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("gplot not made", procName, NULL);
gplot->cmddata = sarrayCreate(0);
gplot->datanames = sarrayCreate(0);
gplot->plotdata = sarrayCreate(0);
gplot->plottitles = sarrayCreate(0);
gplot->plotstyles = numaCreate(0);
/* Save title, labels, rootname, outformat, cmdname, outname */
newroot = genPathname(rootname, NULL);
gplot->rootname = newroot;
gplot->outformat = outformat;
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "%s.cmd", rootname);
gplot->cmdname = stringNew(buf);
if (outformat == GPLOT_PNG)
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "%s.png", newroot);
else if (outformat == GPLOT_PS)
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "%s.ps", newroot);
else if (outformat == GPLOT_EPS)
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "%s.eps", newroot);
else if (outformat == GPLOT_LATEX)
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "%s.tex", newroot);
gplot->outname = stringNew(buf);
if (title) gplot->title = stringNew(title);
if (xlabel) gplot->xlabel = stringNew(xlabel);
if (ylabel) gplot->ylabel = stringNew(ylabel);
return gplot;
}
| 169,324 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int on_http_message_complete(http_parser* parser)
{
struct clt_info *info = parser->data;
ws_svr *svr = ws_svr_from_ses(info->ses);
info->request->version_major = parser->http_major;
info->request->version_minor = parser->http_minor;
info->request->method = parser->method;
dict_entry *entry;
dict_iterator *iter = dict_get_iterator(info->request->headers);
while ((entry = dict_next(iter)) != NULL) {
log_trace("Header: %s: %s", (char *)entry->key, (char *)entry->val);
}
dict_release_iterator(iter);
if (info->request->method != HTTP_GET)
goto error;
if (http_request_get_header(info->request, "Host") == NULL)
goto error;
double version = info->request->version_major + info->request->version_minor * 0.1;
if (version < 1.1)
goto error;
const char *upgrade = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Upgrade");
if (upgrade == NULL || strcasecmp(upgrade, "websocket") != 0)
goto error;
const char *connection = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Connection");
if (connection == NULL)
goto error;
else {
bool found_upgrade = false;
int count;
sds *tokens = sdssplitlen(connection, strlen(connection), ",", 1, &count);
if (tokens == NULL)
goto error;
for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
sds token = tokens[i];
sdstrim(token, " ");
if (strcasecmp(token, "Upgrade") == 0) {
found_upgrade = true;
break;
}
}
sdsfreesplitres(tokens, count);
if (!found_upgrade)
goto error;
}
const char *ws_version = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Sec-WebSocket-Version");
if (ws_version == NULL || strcmp(ws_version, "13") != 0)
goto error;
const char *ws_key = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Sec-WebSocket-Key");
if (ws_key == NULL)
goto error;
const char *protocol_list = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Sec-WebSocket-Protocol");
if (protocol_list && !is_good_protocol(protocol_list, svr->protocol))
goto error;
if (strlen(svr->origin) > 0) {
const char *origin = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Origin");
if (origin == NULL || !is_good_origin(origin, svr->origin))
goto error;
}
if (svr->type.on_privdata_alloc) {
info->privdata = svr->type.on_privdata_alloc(svr);
if (info->privdata == NULL)
goto error;
}
info->upgrade = true;
info->remote = sdsnew(http_get_remote_ip(info->ses, info->request));
info->url = sdsnew(info->request->url);
if (svr->type.on_upgrade) {
svr->type.on_upgrade(info->ses, info->remote);
}
if (protocol_list) {
send_hand_shake_reply(info->ses, svr->protocol, ws_key);
} else {
send_hand_shake_reply(info->ses, NULL, ws_key);
}
return 0;
error:
ws_svr_close_clt(ws_svr_from_ses(info->ses), info->ses);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #131 from benjaminchodroff/master
fix memory corruption and other 32bit overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int on_http_message_complete(http_parser* parser)
{
struct clt_info *info = parser->data;
ws_svr *svr = ws_svr_from_ses(info->ses);
info->request->version_major = parser->http_major;
info->request->version_minor = parser->http_minor;
info->request->method = parser->method;
dict_entry *entry;
dict_iterator *iter = dict_get_iterator(info->request->headers);
while ((entry = dict_next(iter)) != NULL) {
log_trace("Header: %s: %s", (char *)entry->key, (char *)entry->val);
}
dict_release_iterator(iter);
if (info->request->method != HTTP_GET)
goto error;
if (http_request_get_header(info->request, "Host") == NULL)
goto error;
double version = info->request->version_major + info->request->version_minor * 0.1;
if (version < 1.1)
goto error;
const char *upgrade = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Upgrade");
if (upgrade == NULL || strcasecmp(upgrade, "websocket") != 0)
goto error;
const char *connection = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Connection");
if (connection == NULL || strlen(connection) > UT_WS_SVR_MAX_HEADER_SIZE)
goto error;
else {
bool found_upgrade = false;
int count;
sds *tokens = sdssplitlen(connection, strlen(connection), ",", 1, &count);
if (tokens == NULL)
goto error;
for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
sds token = tokens[i];
sdstrim(token, " ");
if (strcasecmp(token, "Upgrade") == 0) {
found_upgrade = true;
break;
}
}
sdsfreesplitres(tokens, count);
if (!found_upgrade)
goto error;
}
const char *ws_version = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Sec-WebSocket-Version");
if (ws_version == NULL || strcmp(ws_version, "13") != 0)
goto error;
const char *ws_key = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Sec-WebSocket-Key");
if (ws_key == NULL)
goto error;
const char *protocol_list = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Sec-WebSocket-Protocol");
if (protocol_list && !is_good_protocol(protocol_list, svr->protocol))
goto error;
if (strlen(svr->origin) > 0) {
const char *origin = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Origin");
if (origin == NULL || !is_good_origin(origin, svr->origin))
goto error;
}
if (svr->type.on_privdata_alloc) {
info->privdata = svr->type.on_privdata_alloc(svr);
if (info->privdata == NULL)
goto error;
}
info->upgrade = true;
info->remote = sdsnew(http_get_remote_ip(info->ses, info->request));
info->url = sdsnew(info->request->url);
if (svr->type.on_upgrade) {
svr->type.on_upgrade(info->ses, info->remote);
}
if (protocol_list) {
send_hand_shake_reply(info->ses, svr->protocol, ws_key);
} else {
send_hand_shake_reply(info->ses, NULL, ws_key);
}
return 0;
error:
ws_svr_close_clt(ws_svr_from_ses(info->ses), info->ses);
return -1;
}
| 169,018 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PreconnectManager::FinishPreresolveJob(PreresolveJobId job_id,
bool success) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
PreresolveJob* job = preresolve_jobs_.Lookup(job_id);
DCHECK(job);
bool need_preconnect = success && job->need_preconnect();
if (need_preconnect) {
PreconnectUrl(job->url, job->num_sockets, job->allow_credentials,
job->network_isolation_key);
}
PreresolveInfo* info = job->info;
if (info)
info->stats->requests_stats.emplace_back(job->url, need_preconnect);
preresolve_jobs_.Remove(job_id);
--inflight_preresolves_count_;
if (info) {
DCHECK_LE(1u, info->inflight_count);
--info->inflight_count;
}
if (info && info->is_done())
AllPreresolvesForUrlFinished(info);
TryToLaunchPreresolveJobs();
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void PreconnectManager::FinishPreresolveJob(PreresolveJobId job_id,
bool success) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
PreresolveJob* job = preresolve_jobs_.Lookup(job_id);
DCHECK(job);
bool need_preconnect = success && job->need_preconnect();
if (need_preconnect) {
PreconnectUrl(job->url, job->num_sockets, job->allow_credentials,
job->network_isolation_key);
}
PreresolveInfo* info = job->info;
if (info) {
info->stats->requests_stats.emplace_back(url::Origin::Create(job->url),
need_preconnect);
}
preresolve_jobs_.Remove(job_id);
--inflight_preresolves_count_;
if (info) {
DCHECK_LE(1u, info->inflight_count);
--info->inflight_count;
}
if (info && info->is_done())
AllPreresolvesForUrlFinished(info);
TryToLaunchPreresolveJobs();
}
| 172,374 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int handle_packet(unsigned char *data, int data_len) {
struct mt_mactelnet_hdr pkthdr;
/* Minimal size checks (pings are not supported here) */
if (data_len < MT_HEADER_LEN){
return -1;
}
parse_packet(data, &pkthdr);
/* We only care about packets with correct sessionkey */
if (pkthdr.seskey != sessionkey) {
return -1;
}
/* Handle data packets */
if (pkthdr.ptype == MT_PTYPE_DATA) {
struct mt_packet odata;
struct mt_mactelnet_control_hdr cpkt;
int success = 0;
/* Always transmit ACKNOWLEDGE packets in response to DATA packets */
init_packet(&odata, MT_PTYPE_ACK, srcmac, dstmac, sessionkey, pkthdr.counter + (data_len - MT_HEADER_LEN));
send_udp(&odata, 0);
/* Accept first packet, and all packets greater than incounter, and if counter has
wrapped around. */
if (pkthdr.counter > incounter || (incounter - pkthdr.counter) > 65535) {
incounter = pkthdr.counter;
} else {
/* Ignore double or old packets */
return -1;
}
/* Parse controlpacket data */
success = parse_control_packet(data + MT_HEADER_LEN, data_len - MT_HEADER_LEN, &cpkt);
while (success) {
/* If we receive pass_salt, transmit auth data back */
if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PASSSALT) {
memcpy(pass_salt, cpkt.data, cpkt.length);
send_auth(username, password);
}
/* If the (remaining) data did not have a control-packet magic byte sequence,
the data is raw terminal data to be outputted to the terminal. */
else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PLAINDATA) {
fwrite((const void *)cpkt.data, 1, cpkt.length, stdout);
}
/* END_AUTH means that the user/password negotiation is done, and after this point
terminal data may arrive, so we set up the terminal to raw mode. */
else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_END_AUTH) {
/* we have entered "terminal mode" */
terminal_mode = 1;
if (is_a_tty) {
/* stop input buffering at all levels. Give full control of terminal to RouterOS */
raw_term();
setvbuf(stdin, (char*)NULL, _IONBF, 0);
/* Add resize signal handler */
signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
}
}
/* Parse next controlpacket */
success = parse_control_packet(NULL, 0, &cpkt);
}
}
else if (pkthdr.ptype == MT_PTYPE_ACK) {
/* Handled elsewhere */
}
/* The server wants to terminate the connection, we have to oblige */
else if (pkthdr.ptype == MT_PTYPE_END) {
struct mt_packet odata;
/* Acknowledge the disconnection by sending a END packet in return */
init_packet(&odata, MT_PTYPE_END, srcmac, dstmac, pkthdr.seskey, 0);
send_udp(&odata, 0);
if (!quiet_mode) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Connection closed.\n"));
}
/* exit */
running = 0;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, _("Unhandeled packet type: %d received from server %s\n"), pkthdr.ptype, ether_ntoa((struct ether_addr *)dstmac));
return -1;
}
return pkthdr.ptype;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int handle_packet(unsigned char *data, int data_len) {
struct mt_mactelnet_hdr pkthdr;
/* Minimal size checks (pings are not supported here) */
if (data_len < MT_HEADER_LEN){
return -1;
}
parse_packet(data, &pkthdr);
/* We only care about packets with correct sessionkey */
if (pkthdr.seskey != sessionkey) {
return -1;
}
/* Handle data packets */
if (pkthdr.ptype == MT_PTYPE_DATA) {
struct mt_packet odata;
struct mt_mactelnet_control_hdr cpkt;
int success = 0;
/* Always transmit ACKNOWLEDGE packets in response to DATA packets */
init_packet(&odata, MT_PTYPE_ACK, srcmac, dstmac, sessionkey, pkthdr.counter + (data_len - MT_HEADER_LEN));
send_udp(&odata, 0);
/* Accept first packet, and all packets greater than incounter, and if counter has
wrapped around. */
if (pkthdr.counter > incounter || (incounter - pkthdr.counter) > 65535) {
incounter = pkthdr.counter;
} else {
/* Ignore double or old packets */
return -1;
}
/* Parse controlpacket data */
success = parse_control_packet(data + MT_HEADER_LEN, data_len - MT_HEADER_LEN, &cpkt);
while (success) {
/* If we receive pass_salt, transmit auth data back */
if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PASSSALT) {
/* check validity, server sends exactly 16 bytes */
if (cpkt.length != 16) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Invalid salt length: %d (instead of 16) received from server %s\n"), cpkt.length, ether_ntoa((struct ether_addr *)dstmac));
}
memcpy(pass_salt, cpkt.data, 16);
send_auth(username, password);
}
/* If the (remaining) data did not have a control-packet magic byte sequence,
the data is raw terminal data to be outputted to the terminal. */
else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PLAINDATA) {
fwrite((const void *)cpkt.data, 1, cpkt.length, stdout);
}
/* END_AUTH means that the user/password negotiation is done, and after this point
terminal data may arrive, so we set up the terminal to raw mode. */
else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_END_AUTH) {
/* we have entered "terminal mode" */
terminal_mode = 1;
if (is_a_tty) {
/* stop input buffering at all levels. Give full control of terminal to RouterOS */
raw_term();
setvbuf(stdin, (char*)NULL, _IONBF, 0);
/* Add resize signal handler */
signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
}
}
/* Parse next controlpacket */
success = parse_control_packet(NULL, 0, &cpkt);
}
}
else if (pkthdr.ptype == MT_PTYPE_ACK) {
/* Handled elsewhere */
}
/* The server wants to terminate the connection, we have to oblige */
else if (pkthdr.ptype == MT_PTYPE_END) {
struct mt_packet odata;
/* Acknowledge the disconnection by sending a END packet in return */
init_packet(&odata, MT_PTYPE_END, srcmac, dstmac, pkthdr.seskey, 0);
send_udp(&odata, 0);
if (!quiet_mode) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Connection closed.\n"));
}
/* exit */
running = 0;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, _("Unhandeled packet type: %d received from server %s\n"), pkthdr.ptype, ether_ntoa((struct ether_addr *)dstmac));
return -1;
}
return pkthdr.ptype;
}
| 166,962 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: set_modifier_for_read(png_modifier *pm, png_infopp ppi, png_uint_32 id,
PNG_CONST char *name)
{
/* Do this first so that the modifier fields are cleared even if an error
* happens allocating the png_struct. No allocation is done here so no
* cleanup is required.
*/
pm->state = modifier_start;
pm->bit_depth = 0;
pm->colour_type = 255;
pm->pending_len = 0;
pm->pending_chunk = 0;
pm->flush = 0;
pm->buffer_count = 0;
pm->buffer_position = 0;
return set_store_for_read(&pm->this, ppi, id, name);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | set_modifier_for_read(png_modifier *pm, png_infopp ppi, png_uint_32 id,
const char *name)
{
/* Do this first so that the modifier fields are cleared even if an error
* happens allocating the png_struct. No allocation is done here so no
* cleanup is required.
*/
pm->state = modifier_start;
pm->bit_depth = 0;
pm->colour_type = 255;
pm->pending_len = 0;
pm->pending_chunk = 0;
pm->flush = 0;
pm->buffer_count = 0;
pm->buffer_position = 0;
return set_store_for_read(&pm->this, ppi, id, name);
}
| 173,694 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL enable, OMX_U32 maxFrameWidth,
OMX_U32 maxFrameHeight) {
Mutex::Autolock autolock(mLock);
CLOG_CONFIG(prepareForAdaptivePlayback, "%s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight);
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.prepareForAdaptivePlayback");
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR_IF(enable, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.bEnable = enable;
params.nMaxFrameWidth = maxFrameWidth;
params.nMaxFrameHeight = maxFrameHeight;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL enable, OMX_U32 maxFrameWidth,
OMX_U32 maxFrameHeight) {
Mutex::Autolock autolock(mLock);
if (mSailed) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(prepareForAdaptivePlayback, "%s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight);
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.prepareForAdaptivePlayback");
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR_IF(enable, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.bEnable = enable;
params.nMaxFrameWidth = maxFrameWidth;
params.nMaxFrameHeight = maxFrameHeight;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
| 174,136 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, getFilename)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
int path_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_filesystem_object_get_path(intern, &path_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (path_len && path_len < intern->file_name_len) {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name + path_len + 1, intern->file_name_len - (path_len + 1), 1);
} else {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, getFilename)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
int path_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_filesystem_object_get_path(intern, &path_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (path_len && path_len < intern->file_name_len) {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name + path_len + 1, intern->file_name_len - (path_len + 1), 1);
} else {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
}
}
| 167,032 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void RemoveObserver(Observer* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual void RemoveObserver(Observer* observer) {
virtual void RemoveObserver(InputMethodLibrary::Observer* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
| 170,503 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void *) gdImageWebpPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx(2048, NULL);
if (out == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, -1);
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
out->gd_free(out);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6912
CWE ID: CWE-415 | BGD_DECLARE(void *) gdImageWebpPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx(2048, NULL);
if (out == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (_gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, -1)) {
rv = NULL;
} else {
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
}
out->gd_free(out);
return rv;
}
| 168,819 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: CuePoint::~CuePoint()
{
delete[] m_track_positions;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | CuePoint::~CuePoint()
| 174,462 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char *print_string_ptr( const char *str )
{
const char *ptr;
char *ptr2, *out;
int len = 0;
unsigned char token;
if ( ! str )
return cJSON_strdup( "" );
ptr = str;
while ( ( token = *ptr ) && ++len ) {
if ( strchr( "\"\\\b\f\n\r\t", token ) )
++len;
else if ( token < 32 )
len += 5;
++ptr;
}
if ( ! ( out = (char*) cJSON_malloc( len + 3 ) ) )
return 0;
ptr2 = out;
ptr = str;
*ptr2++ = '\"';
while ( *ptr ) {
if ( (unsigned char) *ptr > 31 && *ptr != '\"' && *ptr != '\\' )
*ptr2++ = *ptr++;
else {
*ptr2++ = '\\';
switch ( token = *ptr++ ) {
case '\\': *ptr2++ = '\\'; break;
case '\"': *ptr2++ = '\"'; break;
case '\b': *ptr2++ = 'b'; break;
case '\f': *ptr2++ = 'f'; break;
case '\n': *ptr2++ = 'n'; break;
case '\r': *ptr2++ = 'r'; break;
case '\t': *ptr2++ = 't'; break;
default:
/* Escape and print. */
sprintf( ptr2, "u%04x", token );
ptr2 += 5;
break;
}
}
}
*ptr2++ = '\"';
*ptr2++ = 0;
return out;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static char *print_string_ptr( const char *str )
static char *print_string_ptr(const char *str,printbuffer *p)
{
const char *ptr;char *ptr2,*out;int len=0,flag=0;unsigned char token;
if (!str)
{
if (p) out=ensure(p,3);
else out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(3);
if (!out) return 0;
strcpy(out,"\"\"");
return out;
}
for (ptr=str;*ptr;ptr++) flag|=((*ptr>0 && *ptr<32)||(*ptr=='\"')||(*ptr=='\\'))?1:0;
if (!flag)
{
len=ptr-str;
if (p) out=ensure(p,len+3);
else out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(len+3);
if (!out) return 0;
ptr2=out;*ptr2++='\"';
strcpy(ptr2,str);
ptr2[len]='\"';
ptr2[len+1]=0;
return out;
}
ptr=str;while ((token=*ptr) && ++len) {if (strchr("\"\\\b\f\n\r\t",token)) len++; else if (token<32) len+=5;ptr++;}
if (p) out=ensure(p,len+3);
else out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(len+3);
if (!out) return 0;
ptr2=out;ptr=str;
*ptr2++='\"';
while (*ptr)
{
if ((unsigned char)*ptr>31 && *ptr!='\"' && *ptr!='\\') *ptr2++=*ptr++;
else
{
*ptr2++='\\';
switch (token=*ptr++)
{
case '\\': *ptr2++='\\'; break;
case '\"': *ptr2++='\"'; break;
case '\b': *ptr2++='b'; break;
case '\f': *ptr2++='f'; break;
case '\n': *ptr2++='n'; break;
case '\r': *ptr2++='r'; break;
case '\t': *ptr2++='t'; break;
default: sprintf(ptr2,"u%04x",token);ptr2+=5; break; /* escape and print */
}
}
}
*ptr2++='\"';*ptr2++=0;
return out;
}
| 167,310 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const Cluster* BlockEntry::GetCluster() const
{
return m_pCluster;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const Cluster* BlockEntry::GetCluster() const
| 174,291 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Chapters::Parse() {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start; // payload start
const long long stop = pos + m_size; // payload stop
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x05B9) { // EditionEntry ID
status = ParseEdition(pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long Chapters::Parse() {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start; // payload start
const long long stop = pos + m_size; // payload stop
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x05B9) { // EditionEntry ID
status = ParseEdition(pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
| 173,838 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void V8Window::namedPropertyGetterCustom(v8::Local<v8::Name> name, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (!name->IsString())
return;
auto nameString = name.As<v8::String>();
LocalDOMWindow* window = toLocalDOMWindow(V8Window::toImpl(info.Holder()));
if (!window)
return;
LocalFrame* frame = window->frame();
if (!frame)
return;
AtomicString propName = toCoreAtomicString(nameString);
Frame* child = frame->tree().scopedChild(propName);
if (child) {
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, child->domWindow(), window);
return;
}
if (!info.Holder()->GetRealNamedProperty(nameString).IsEmpty())
return;
Document* doc = frame->document();
if (doc && doc->isHTMLDocument()) {
if (toHTMLDocument(doc)->hasNamedItem(propName) || doc->hasElementWithId(propName)) {
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<HTMLCollection> items = doc->windowNamedItems(propName);
if (!items->isEmpty()) {
if (items->hasExactlyOneItem()) {
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, items->item(0), window);
return;
}
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, items.release(), window);
return;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Reload frame in V8Window::namedPropertyGetterCustom after js call
R=marja@chromium.org
BUG=454954
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/901053006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@189574 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void V8Window::namedPropertyGetterCustom(v8::Local<v8::Name> name, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (!name->IsString())
return;
auto nameString = name.As<v8::String>();
LocalDOMWindow* window = toLocalDOMWindow(V8Window::toImpl(info.Holder()));
if (!window)
return;
LocalFrame* frame = window->frame();
if (!frame)
return;
AtomicString propName = toCoreAtomicString(nameString);
Frame* child = frame->tree().scopedChild(propName);
if (child) {
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, child->domWindow(), window);
return;
}
if (!info.Holder()->GetRealNamedProperty(nameString).IsEmpty())
return;
// Frame could have been detached in call to GetRealNamedProperty.
frame = window->frame();
// window is detached.
if (!frame)
return;
Document* doc = frame->document();
if (doc && doc->isHTMLDocument()) {
if (toHTMLDocument(doc)->hasNamedItem(propName) || doc->hasElementWithId(propName)) {
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<HTMLCollection> items = doc->windowNamedItems(propName);
if (!items->isEmpty()) {
if (items->hasExactlyOneItem()) {
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, items->item(0), window);
return;
}
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, items.release(), window);
return;
}
}
}
}
| 172,024 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Tracks::~Tracks()
{
Track** i = m_trackEntries;
Track** const j = m_trackEntriesEnd;
while (i != j)
{
Track* const pTrack = *i++;
delete pTrack;
}
delete[] m_trackEntries;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Tracks::~Tracks()
| 174,473 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static zend_always_inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, zend_long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval key, *data, d, *old_data;
zend_ulong idx;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&key);
if (!php_var_unserialize_internal(&key, p, max, NULL, classes)) {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
data = NULL;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&d);
if (!objprops) {
if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
idx = Z_LVAL(key);
numeric_key:
if (UNEXPECTED((old_data = zend_hash_index_find(ht, idx)) != NULL)) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_index_update(ht, idx, &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_index_add_new(ht, idx, &d);
}
} else if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_STRING) {
if (UNEXPECTED(ZEND_HANDLE_NUMERIC(Z_STR(key), idx))) {
goto numeric_key;
}
if (UNEXPECTED((old_data = zend_hash_find(ht, Z_STR(key))) != NULL)) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_add_new(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
}
} else {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE(key) == IS_STRING)) {
string_key:
if ((old_data = zend_hash_find(ht, Z_STR(key))) != NULL) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(old_data) == IS_INDIRECT) {
old_data = Z_INDIRECT_P(old_data);
}
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_update_ind(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_add_new(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
}
} else if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(&key);
goto string_key;
} else {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
}
if (!php_var_unserialize_internal(data, p, max, var_hash, classes)) {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
if (UNEXPECTED(Z_ISUNDEF_P(data))) {
if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
zend_hash_index_del(ht, Z_LVAL(key));
} else {
zend_hash_del_ind(ht, Z_STR(key));
}
} else {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, data);
}
zval_dtor(&key);
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #74103 and bug #75054
Directly fail unserialization when trying to acquire an r/R
reference to an UNDEF HT slot. Previously this left an UNDEF and
later deleted the index/key from the HT.
What actually caused the issue here is a combination of two
factors: First, the key deletion was performed using the hash API,
rather than the symtable API, such that the element was not actually
removed if it used an integral string key. Second, a subsequent
deletion operation, while collecting trailing UNDEF ranges, would
mark the element as available for reuse (leaving a corrupted HT
state with nNumOfElemnts > nNumUsed).
Fix this by failing early and dropping the deletion code.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static zend_always_inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, zend_long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval key, *data, d, *old_data;
zend_ulong idx;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&key);
if (!php_var_unserialize_internal(&key, p, max, NULL, classes)) {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
data = NULL;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&d);
if (!objprops) {
if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
idx = Z_LVAL(key);
numeric_key:
if (UNEXPECTED((old_data = zend_hash_index_find(ht, idx)) != NULL)) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_index_update(ht, idx, &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_index_add_new(ht, idx, &d);
}
} else if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_STRING) {
if (UNEXPECTED(ZEND_HANDLE_NUMERIC(Z_STR(key), idx))) {
goto numeric_key;
}
if (UNEXPECTED((old_data = zend_hash_find(ht, Z_STR(key))) != NULL)) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_add_new(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
}
} else {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE(key) == IS_STRING)) {
string_key:
if ((old_data = zend_hash_find(ht, Z_STR(key))) != NULL) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(old_data) == IS_INDIRECT) {
old_data = Z_INDIRECT_P(old_data);
}
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_update_ind(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_add_new(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
}
} else if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(&key);
goto string_key;
} else {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
}
if (!php_var_unserialize_internal(data, p, max, var_hash, classes)) {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
var_push_dtor(var_hash, data);
zval_dtor(&key);
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
| 167,934 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NetworkHandler::ClearBrowserCookies(
std::unique_ptr<ClearBrowserCookiesCallback> callback) {
if (!process_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&ClearCookiesOnIO,
base::Unretained(
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetURLRequestContext()),
std::move(callback)));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void NetworkHandler::ClearBrowserCookies(
std::unique_ptr<ClearBrowserCookiesCallback> callback) {
if (!storage_partition_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&ClearCookiesOnIO,
base::Unretained(storage_partition_->GetURLRequestContext()),
std::move(callback)));
}
| 172,753 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: videobuf_vm_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct videobuf_mapping *map = vma->vm_private_data;
struct videobuf_queue *q = map->q;
int i;
dprintk(2,"vm_close %p [count=%d,vma=%08lx-%08lx]\n",map,
map->count,vma->vm_start,vma->vm_end);
map->count--;
if (0 == map->count) {
dprintk(1,"munmap %p q=%p\n",map,q);
mutex_lock(&q->lock);
for (i = 0; i < VIDEO_MAX_FRAME; i++) {
if (NULL == q->bufs[i])
continue;
if (q->bufs[i]->map != map)
continue;
q->ops->buf_release(q,q->bufs[i]);
q->bufs[i]->map = NULL;
q->bufs[i]->baddr = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
kfree(map);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: V4L/DVB (6751): V4L: Memory leak! Fix count in videobuf-vmalloc mmap
This is pretty serious bug. map->count is never initialized after the
call to kmalloc making the count start at some random trash value. The
end result is leaking videobufs.
Also, fix up the debug statements to print unsigned values.
Pushed to http://ifup.org/hg/v4l-dvb too
Signed-off-by: Brandon Philips <bphilips@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | videobuf_vm_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct videobuf_mapping *map = vma->vm_private_data;
struct videobuf_queue *q = map->q;
int i;
dprintk(2,"vm_close %p [count=%u,vma=%08lx-%08lx]\n",map,
map->count,vma->vm_start,vma->vm_end);
map->count--;
if (0 == map->count) {
dprintk(1,"munmap %p q=%p\n",map,q);
mutex_lock(&q->lock);
for (i = 0; i < VIDEO_MAX_FRAME; i++) {
if (NULL == q->bufs[i])
continue;
if (q->bufs[i]->map != map)
continue;
q->ops->buf_release(q,q->bufs[i]);
q->bufs[i]->map = NULL;
q->bufs[i]->baddr = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
kfree(map);
}
return;
}
| 168,918 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::UpdateFrameHost(
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (frame_host == frame_host_) {
if (frame_host && !render_frame_alive_) {
render_frame_alive_ = true;
MaybeReattachToRenderFrame();
}
return;
}
if (frame_host && !ShouldCreateDevToolsForHost(frame_host)) {
DestroyOnRenderFrameGone();
return;
}
if (IsAttached())
RevokePolicy();
frame_host_ = frame_host;
agent_ptr_.reset();
render_frame_alive_ = true;
if (IsAttached()) {
GrantPolicy();
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions()) {
session->SetRenderer(frame_host ? frame_host->GetProcess() : nullptr,
frame_host);
}
MaybeReattachToRenderFrame();
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::UpdateFrameHost(
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (frame_host == frame_host_) {
if (frame_host && !render_frame_alive_) {
render_frame_alive_ = true;
MaybeReattachToRenderFrame();
}
return;
}
if (frame_host && !ShouldCreateDevToolsForHost(frame_host)) {
DestroyOnRenderFrameGone();
return;
}
if (IsAttached())
RevokePolicy();
frame_host_ = frame_host;
agent_ptr_.reset();
render_frame_alive_ = true;
if (IsAttached()) {
GrantPolicy();
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions()) {
session->SetRenderer(frame_host ? frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID() : -1,
frame_host);
}
MaybeReattachToRenderFrame();
}
}
| 172,782 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
{
const unsigned char *p;
int plen;
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
*pmaskHash = NULL;
if (!alg->parameter || alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
return NULL;
p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
pss = d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(NULL, &p, plen);
if (!pss)
return NULL;
if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter;
if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1
&& param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
p = param->value.sequence->data;
plen = param->value.sequence->length;
*pmaskHash = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
}
}
return pss;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
{
const unsigned char *p;
int plen;
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
*pmaskHash = NULL;
if (!alg->parameter || alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
return NULL;
p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
pss = d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(NULL, &p, plen);
if (!pss)
return NULL;
if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter;
if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1
&& param && param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
p = param->value.sequence->data;
plen = param->value.sequence->length;
*pmaskHash = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
}
}
return pss;
}
| 164,719 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int read_gab2_sub(AVFormatContext *s, AVStream *st, AVPacket *pkt)
{
if (pkt->size >= 7 &&
pkt->size < INT_MAX - AVPROBE_PADDING_SIZE &&
!strcmp(pkt->data, "GAB2") && AV_RL16(pkt->data + 5) == 2) {
uint8_t desc[256];
int score = AVPROBE_SCORE_EXTENSION, ret;
AVIStream *ast = st->priv_data;
AVInputFormat *sub_demuxer;
AVRational time_base;
int size;
AVIOContext *pb = avio_alloc_context(pkt->data + 7,
pkt->size - 7,
0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
AVProbeData pd;
unsigned int desc_len = avio_rl32(pb);
if (desc_len > pb->buf_end - pb->buf_ptr)
goto error;
ret = avio_get_str16le(pb, desc_len, desc, sizeof(desc));
avio_skip(pb, desc_len - ret);
if (*desc)
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "title", desc, 0);
avio_rl16(pb); /* flags? */
avio_rl32(pb); /* data size */
size = pb->buf_end - pb->buf_ptr;
pd = (AVProbeData) { .buf = av_mallocz(size + AVPROBE_PADDING_SIZE),
.buf_size = size };
if (!pd.buf)
goto error;
memcpy(pd.buf, pb->buf_ptr, size);
sub_demuxer = av_probe_input_format2(&pd, 1, &score);
av_freep(&pd.buf);
if (!sub_demuxer)
goto error;
if (!(ast->sub_ctx = avformat_alloc_context()))
goto error;
ast->sub_ctx->pb = pb;
if (ff_copy_whiteblacklists(ast->sub_ctx, s) < 0)
goto error;
if (!avformat_open_input(&ast->sub_ctx, "", sub_demuxer, NULL)) {
if (ast->sub_ctx->nb_streams != 1)
goto error;
ff_read_packet(ast->sub_ctx, &ast->sub_pkt);
avcodec_parameters_copy(st->codecpar, ast->sub_ctx->streams[0]->codecpar);
time_base = ast->sub_ctx->streams[0]->time_base;
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 64, time_base.num, time_base.den);
}
ast->sub_buffer = pkt->data;
memset(pkt, 0, sizeof(*pkt));
return 1;
error:
av_freep(&ast->sub_ctx);
av_freep(&pb);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/avidec: Limit formats in gab2 to srt and ass/ssa
This prevents part of one exploit leading to an information leak
Found-by: Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by: Thierry Foucu <tfoucu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int read_gab2_sub(AVFormatContext *s, AVStream *st, AVPacket *pkt)
{
if (pkt->size >= 7 &&
pkt->size < INT_MAX - AVPROBE_PADDING_SIZE &&
!strcmp(pkt->data, "GAB2") && AV_RL16(pkt->data + 5) == 2) {
uint8_t desc[256];
int score = AVPROBE_SCORE_EXTENSION, ret;
AVIStream *ast = st->priv_data;
AVInputFormat *sub_demuxer;
AVRational time_base;
int size;
AVIOContext *pb = avio_alloc_context(pkt->data + 7,
pkt->size - 7,
0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
AVProbeData pd;
unsigned int desc_len = avio_rl32(pb);
if (desc_len > pb->buf_end - pb->buf_ptr)
goto error;
ret = avio_get_str16le(pb, desc_len, desc, sizeof(desc));
avio_skip(pb, desc_len - ret);
if (*desc)
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "title", desc, 0);
avio_rl16(pb); /* flags? */
avio_rl32(pb); /* data size */
size = pb->buf_end - pb->buf_ptr;
pd = (AVProbeData) { .buf = av_mallocz(size + AVPROBE_PADDING_SIZE),
.buf_size = size };
if (!pd.buf)
goto error;
memcpy(pd.buf, pb->buf_ptr, size);
sub_demuxer = av_probe_input_format2(&pd, 1, &score);
av_freep(&pd.buf);
if (!sub_demuxer)
goto error;
if (strcmp(sub_demuxer->name, "srt") && strcmp(sub_demuxer->name, "ass"))
goto error;
if (!(ast->sub_ctx = avformat_alloc_context()))
goto error;
ast->sub_ctx->pb = pb;
if (ff_copy_whiteblacklists(ast->sub_ctx, s) < 0)
goto error;
if (!avformat_open_input(&ast->sub_ctx, "", sub_demuxer, NULL)) {
if (ast->sub_ctx->nb_streams != 1)
goto error;
ff_read_packet(ast->sub_ctx, &ast->sub_pkt);
avcodec_parameters_copy(st->codecpar, ast->sub_ctx->streams[0]->codecpar);
time_base = ast->sub_ctx->streams[0]->time_base;
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 64, time_base.num, time_base.den);
}
ast->sub_buffer = pkt->data;
memset(pkt, 0, sizeof(*pkt));
return 1;
error:
av_freep(&ast->sub_ctx);
av_freep(&pb);
}
return 0;
}
| 168,073 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int Track::Info::CopyStr(char* Info::*str, Info& dst_) const
{
if (str == static_cast<char* Info::*>(NULL))
return -1;
char*& dst = dst_.*str;
if (dst) //should be NULL already
return -1;
const char* const src = this->*str;
if (src == NULL)
return 0;
const size_t len = strlen(src);
dst = new (std::nothrow) char[len+1];
if (dst == NULL)
return -1;
strcpy(dst, src);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int Track::Info::CopyStr(char* Info::*str, Info& dst_) const
if (src == NULL)
return 0;
const size_t len = strlen(src);
dst = new (std::nothrow) char[len + 1];
if (dst == NULL)
return -1;
strcpy(dst, src);
return 0;
}
| 174,254 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ActionReply Smb4KMountHelper::mount(const QVariantMap &args)
{
ActionReply reply;
QMapIterator<QString, QVariant> it(args);
proc.setOutputChannelMode(KProcess::SeparateChannels);
proc.setProcessEnvironment(QProcessEnvironment::systemEnvironment());
#if defined(Q_OS_LINUX)
proc.setEnv("PASSWD", entry["mh_url"].toUrl().password(), true);
#endif
QVariantMap entry = it.value().toMap();
KProcess proc(this);
command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList();
#elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD)
command << entry["mh_command"].toString();
command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList();
command << entry["mh_unc"].toString();
command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
#else
#endif
proc.setProgram(command);
proc.start();
if (proc.waitForStarted(-1))
{
bool userKill = false;
QStringList command;
#if defined(Q_OS_LINUX)
command << entry["mh_command"].toString();
command << entry["mh_unc"].toString();
command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList();
#elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD)
command << entry["mh_command"].toString();
command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList();
command << entry["mh_unc"].toString();
command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
else
{
}
if (HelperSupport::isStopped())
{
proc.kill();
userKill = true;
break;
}
else
{
}
}
if (proc.exitStatus() == KProcess::CrashExit)
{
if (!userKill)
{
reply.setType(ActionReply::HelperErrorType);
reply.setErrorDescription(i18n("The mount process crashed."));
break;
}
else
{
}
}
else
{
QString stdErr = QString::fromUtf8(proc.readAllStandardError());
reply.addData(QString("mh_error_message_%1").arg(index), stdErr.trimmed());
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ActionReply Smb4KMountHelper::mount(const QVariantMap &args)
{
//
// The action reply
//
ActionReply reply;
// Get the mount executable
//
const QString mount = findMountExecutable();
//
QMapIterator<QString, QVariant> it(args);
proc.setOutputChannelMode(KProcess::SeparateChannels);
proc.setProcessEnvironment(QProcessEnvironment::systemEnvironment());
#if defined(Q_OS_LINUX)
proc.setEnv("PASSWD", entry["mh_url"].toUrl().password(), true);
#endif
QVariantMap entry = it.value().toMap();
// Check the executable
//
if (mount != entry["mh_command"].toString())
{
// Something weird is going on, bail out.
reply.setType(ActionReply::HelperErrorType);
return reply;
}
else
{
// Do nothing
}
//
KProcess proc(this);
command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList();
#elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD)
command << entry["mh_command"].toString();
command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList();
command << entry["mh_unc"].toString();
command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
#else
#endif
proc.setProgram(command);
proc.start();
if (proc.waitForStarted(-1))
{
bool userKill = false;
QStringList command;
#if defined(Q_OS_LINUX)
command << mount;
command << entry["mh_unc"].toString();
command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList();
#elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD)
command << mount;
command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList();
command << entry["mh_unc"].toString();
command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
else
{
}
if (HelperSupport::isStopped())
{
proc.kill();
userKill = true;
break;
}
else
{
}
}
if (proc.exitStatus() == KProcess::CrashExit)
{
if (!userKill)
{
reply.setType(ActionReply::HelperErrorType);
reply.setErrorDescription(i18n("The mount process crashed."));
break;
}
else
{
}
}
else
{
QString stdErr = QString::fromUtf8(proc.readAllStandardError());
reply.addData(QString("mh_error_message_%1").arg(index), stdErr.trimmed());
}
}
| 164,827 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: QuicConnectionHelperTest()
: framer_(QuicDecrypter::Create(kNULL), QuicEncrypter::Create(kNULL)),
creator_(guid_, &framer_),
net_log_(BoundNetLog()),
scheduler_(new MockScheduler()),
socket_(&empty_data_, net_log_.net_log()),
runner_(new TestTaskRunner(&clock_)),
helper_(new TestConnectionHelper(runner_.get(), &clock_, &socket_)),
connection_(guid_, IPEndPoint(), helper_),
frame1_(1, false, 0, data1) {
connection_.set_visitor(&visitor_);
connection_.SetScheduler(scheduler_);
}
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized access in QuicConnectionHelperTest
BUG=159928
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11360153
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@166708 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | QuicConnectionHelperTest()
: guid_(0),
framer_(QuicDecrypter::Create(kNULL), QuicEncrypter::Create(kNULL)),
creator_(guid_, &framer_),
net_log_(BoundNetLog()),
scheduler_(new MockScheduler()),
socket_(&empty_data_, net_log_.net_log()),
runner_(new TestTaskRunner(&clock_)),
helper_(new TestConnectionHelper(runner_.get(), &clock_, &socket_)),
connection_(guid_, IPEndPoint(), helper_),
frame1_(1, false, 0, data1) {
connection_.set_visitor(&visitor_);
connection_.SetScheduler(scheduler_);
}
| 171,411 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int get_exif_tag_dbl_value(struct iw_exif_state *e, unsigned int tag_pos,
double *pv)
{
unsigned int field_type;
unsigned int value_count;
unsigned int value_pos;
unsigned int numer, denom;
field_type = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[tag_pos+2],e->endian);
value_count = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+4],e->endian);
if(value_count!=1) return 0;
if(field_type!=5) return 0; // 5=Rational (two uint32's)
value_pos = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+8],e->endian);
if(value_pos > e->d_len-8) return 0;
numer = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[value_pos ],e->endian);
denom = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[value_pos+4],e->endian);
if(denom==0) return 0;
*pv = ((double)numer)/denom;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed invalid memory access bugs when decoding JPEG Exif data
Fixes issues #22, #23, #24, #25
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int get_exif_tag_dbl_value(struct iw_exif_state *e, unsigned int tag_pos,
double *pv)
{
unsigned int field_type;
unsigned int value_count;
unsigned int value_pos;
unsigned int numer, denom;
field_type = get_exif_ui16(e, tag_pos+2);
value_count = get_exif_ui32(e, tag_pos+4);
if(value_count!=1) return 0;
if(field_type!=5) return 0; // 5=Rational (two uint32's)
value_pos = get_exif_ui32(e, tag_pos+8);
if(value_pos > e->d_len-8) return 0;
numer = get_exif_ui32(e, value_pos);
denom = get_exif_ui32(e, value_pos+4);
if(denom==0) return 0;
*pv = ((double)numer)/denom;
return 1;
}
| 168,113 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void usage(char *progname) {
printf("Usage:\n");
printf("%s <input_yuv> <width>x<height> <target_width>x<target_height> ",
progname);
printf("<output_yuv> [<frames>]\n");
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void usage(char *progname) {
static const char *exec_name = NULL;
static void usage() {
printf("Usage:\n");
printf("%s <input_yuv> <width>x<height> <target_width>x<target_height> ",
exec_name);
printf("<output_yuv> [<frames>]\n");
}
| 174,480 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int uhid_write(int fd, const struct uhid_event *ev)
{
ssize_t ret = write(fd, ev, sizeof(*ev));
if (ret < 0){
int rtn = -errno;
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Cannot write to uhid:%s",
__FUNCTION__, strerror(errno));
return rtn;
} else if (ret != (ssize_t)sizeof(*ev)) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Wrong size written to uhid: %zd != %zu",
__FUNCTION__, ret, sizeof(*ev));
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static int uhid_write(int fd, const struct uhid_event *ev)
{
ssize_t ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(write(fd, ev, sizeof(*ev)));
if (ret < 0){
int rtn = -errno;
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Cannot write to uhid:%s",
__FUNCTION__, strerror(errno));
return rtn;
} else if (ret != (ssize_t)sizeof(*ev)) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Wrong size written to uhid: %zd != %zu",
__FUNCTION__, ret, sizeof(*ev));
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
| 173,433 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool NaClProcessHost::SendStart() {
if (!enable_ipc_proxy_) {
if (!ReplyToRenderer(IPC::ChannelHandle()))
return false;
}
return StartNaClExecution();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool NaClProcessHost::SendStart() {
| 170,728 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ProcScreenSaverUnsetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
{
#ifdef PANORAMIX
if (!noPanoramiXExtension) {
REQUEST(xScreenSaverUnsetAttributesReq);
PanoramiXRes *draw;
int rc, i;
rc = dixLookupResourceByClass((void **) &draw, stuff->drawable,
XRC_DRAWABLE, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (rc != Success)
for (i = PanoramiXNumScreens - 1; i > 0; i--) {
stuff->drawable = draw->info[i].id;
ScreenSaverUnsetAttributes(client);
}
stuff->drawable = draw->info[0].id;
}
#endif
return ScreenSaverUnsetAttributes(client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ProcScreenSaverUnsetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
{
#ifdef PANORAMIX
if (!noPanoramiXExtension) {
REQUEST(xScreenSaverUnsetAttributesReq);
PanoramiXRes *draw;
int rc, i;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xScreenSaverUnsetAttributesReq);
rc = dixLookupResourceByClass((void **) &draw, stuff->drawable,
XRC_DRAWABLE, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (rc != Success)
for (i = PanoramiXNumScreens - 1; i > 0; i--) {
stuff->drawable = draw->info[i].id;
ScreenSaverUnsetAttributes(client);
}
stuff->drawable = draw->info[0].id;
}
#endif
return ScreenSaverUnsetAttributes(client);
}
| 165,433 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int store_icy(URLContext *h, int size)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
/* until next metadata packet */
int remaining = s->icy_metaint - s->icy_data_read;
if (remaining < 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!remaining) {
/* The metadata packet is variable sized. It has a 1 byte header
* which sets the length of the packet (divided by 16). If it's 0,
* the metadata doesn't change. After the packet, icy_metaint bytes
* of normal data follows. */
uint8_t ch;
int len = http_read_stream_all(h, &ch, 1);
if (len < 0)
return len;
if (ch > 0) {
char data[255 * 16 + 1];
int ret;
len = ch * 16;
ret = http_read_stream_all(h, data, len);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
data[len + 1] = 0;
if ((ret = av_opt_set(s, "icy_metadata_packet", data, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
update_metadata(s, data);
}
s->icy_data_read = 0;
remaining = s->icy_metaint;
}
return FFMIN(size, remaining);
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int store_icy(URLContext *h, int size)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
/* until next metadata packet */
uint64_t remaining;
if (s->icy_metaint < s->icy_data_read)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
remaining = s->icy_metaint - s->icy_data_read;
if (!remaining) {
/* The metadata packet is variable sized. It has a 1 byte header
* which sets the length of the packet (divided by 16). If it's 0,
* the metadata doesn't change. After the packet, icy_metaint bytes
* of normal data follows. */
uint8_t ch;
int len = http_read_stream_all(h, &ch, 1);
if (len < 0)
return len;
if (ch > 0) {
char data[255 * 16 + 1];
int ret;
len = ch * 16;
ret = http_read_stream_all(h, data, len);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
data[len + 1] = 0;
if ((ret = av_opt_set(s, "icy_metadata_packet", data, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
update_metadata(s, data);
}
s->icy_data_read = 0;
remaining = s->icy_metaint;
}
return FFMIN(size, remaining);
}
| 168,505 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: size_t mptsas_config_manufacturing_1(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
/* VPD - all zeros */
return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(1, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_MANUFACTURING, 0x00,
"s256");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | size_t mptsas_config_manufacturing_1(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
/* VPD - all zeros */
return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(1, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_MANUFACTURING, 0x00,
"*s256");
}
| 164,935 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8ValueConverterImpl::ToV8Object(
v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::Local<v8::Object> creation_context,
const base::DictionaryValue* val) const {
v8::Local<v8::Object> result(v8::Object::New(isolate));
for (base::DictionaryValue::Iterator iter(*val);
!iter.IsAtEnd(); iter.Advance()) {
const std::string& key = iter.key();
v8::Local<v8::Value> child_v8 =
ToV8ValueImpl(isolate, creation_context, &iter.value());
CHECK(!child_v8.IsEmpty());
v8::TryCatch try_catch(isolate);
result->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate, key.c_str(), v8::String::kNormalString, key.length()),
child_v8);
if (try_catch.HasCaught()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Setter for property " << key.c_str() << " threw an "
<< "exception.";
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
CWE ID: | v8::Local<v8::Value> V8ValueConverterImpl::ToV8Object(
v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::Local<v8::Object> creation_context,
const base::DictionaryValue* val) const {
v8::Local<v8::Object> result(v8::Object::New(isolate));
// TODO(robwu): Callers should pass in the context.
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = isolate->GetCurrentContext();
for (base::DictionaryValue::Iterator iter(*val);
!iter.IsAtEnd(); iter.Advance()) {
const std::string& key = iter.key();
v8::Local<v8::Value> child_v8 =
ToV8ValueImpl(isolate, creation_context, &iter.value());
CHECK(!child_v8.IsEmpty());
v8::Maybe<bool> maybe = result->CreateDataProperty(
context,
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, key.c_str(), v8::String::kNormalString,
key.length()),
child_v8);
if (!maybe.IsJust() || !maybe.FromJust())
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set property with key " << key;
}
return result;
}
| 173,284 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ProcXResQueryResourceBytes (ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
int rc;
ConstructResourceBytesCtx ctx;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq,
stuff->numSpecs * sizeof(ctx.specs[0]));
(void*) ((char*) stuff +
sz_xXResQueryResourceBytesReq))) {
return BadAlloc;
}
rc = ConstructResourceBytes(stuff->client, &ctx);
if (rc == Success) {
xXResQueryResourceBytesReply rep = {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = bytes_to_int32(ctx.resultBytes),
.numSizes = ctx.numSizes
};
if (client->swapped) {
swaps (&rep.sequenceNumber);
swapl (&rep.length);
swapl (&rep.numSizes);
SwapXResQueryResourceBytes(&ctx.response);
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(rep), &rep);
WriteFragmentsToClient(client, &ctx.response);
}
DestroyConstructResourceBytesCtx(&ctx);
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ProcXResQueryResourceBytes (ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
int rc;
ConstructResourceBytesCtx ctx;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
if (stuff->numSpecs > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(ctx.specs[0]))
return BadLength;
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq,
stuff->numSpecs * sizeof(ctx.specs[0]));
(void*) ((char*) stuff +
sz_xXResQueryResourceBytesReq))) {
return BadAlloc;
}
rc = ConstructResourceBytes(stuff->client, &ctx);
if (rc == Success) {
xXResQueryResourceBytesReply rep = {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = bytes_to_int32(ctx.resultBytes),
.numSizes = ctx.numSizes
};
if (client->swapped) {
swaps (&rep.sequenceNumber);
swapl (&rep.length);
swapl (&rep.numSizes);
SwapXResQueryResourceBytes(&ctx.response);
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(rep), &rep);
WriteFragmentsToClient(client, &ctx.response);
}
DestroyConstructResourceBytesCtx(&ctx);
return rc;
}
| 165,434 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gpk_parse_fileinfo(sc_card_t *card,
const u8 *buf, size_t buflen,
sc_file_t *file)
{
const u8 *sp, *end, *next;
int i, rc;
memset(file, 0, sizeof(*file));
for (i = 0; i < SC_MAX_AC_OPS; i++)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, i, SC_AC_UNKNOWN, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
end = buf + buflen;
for (sp = buf; sp + 2 < end; sp = next) {
next = sp + 2 + sp[1];
if (next > end)
break;
if (sp[0] == 0x84) {
/* ignore if name is longer than what it should be */
if (sp[1] > sizeof(file->name))
continue;
memset(file->name, 0, sizeof(file->name));
memcpy(file->name, sp+2, sp[1]);
} else
if (sp[0] == 0x85) {
unsigned int ac[3], n;
file->id = (sp[4] << 8) | sp[5];
file->size = (sp[8] << 8) | sp[9];
file->record_length = sp[7];
/* Map ACLs. Note the third AC byte is
* valid of EFs only */
for (n = 0; n < 3; n++)
ac[n] = (sp[10+2*n] << 8) | sp[11+2*n];
/* Examine file type */
switch (sp[6] & 7) {
case 0x01: case 0x02: case 0x03: case 0x04:
case 0x05: case 0x06: case 0x07:
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF;
file->ef_structure = sp[6] & 7;
ac_to_acl(ac[0], file, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE);
ac_to_acl(ac[1], file, SC_AC_OP_WRITE);
ac_to_acl(ac[2], file, SC_AC_OP_READ);
break;
case 0x00: /* 0x38 is DF */
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF;
/* Icky: the GPK uses different ACLs
* for creating data files and
* 'sensitive' i.e. key files */
ac_to_acl(ac[0], file, SC_AC_OP_LOCK);
ac_to_acl(ac[1], file, SC_AC_OP_CREATE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_SELECT,
SC_AC_NONE, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_DELETE,
SC_AC_NEVER, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_REHABILITATE,
SC_AC_NEVER, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_INVALIDATE,
SC_AC_NEVER, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_LIST_FILES,
SC_AC_NEVER, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
break;
}
} else
if (sp[0] == 0x6f) {
/* oops - this is a directory with an IADF.
* This happens with the personalized GemSafe cards
* for instance. */
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF;
rc = gpk_parse_fci(card, sp + 2, sp[1], file);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
}
}
if (file->record_length)
file->record_count = file->size / file->record_length;
file->magic = SC_FILE_MAGIC;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | gpk_parse_fileinfo(sc_card_t *card,
const u8 *buf, size_t buflen,
sc_file_t *file)
{
const u8 *sp, *end, *next;
int i, rc;
memset(file, 0, sizeof(*file));
for (i = 0; i < SC_MAX_AC_OPS; i++)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, i, SC_AC_UNKNOWN, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
end = buf + buflen;
for (sp = buf; sp + 2 < end; sp = next) {
next = sp + 2 + sp[1];
if (next > end)
break;
if (sp[0] == 0x84) {
/* ignore if name is longer than what it should be */
if (sp[1] > sizeof(file->name))
continue;
memset(file->name, 0, sizeof(file->name));
memcpy(file->name, sp+2, sp[1]);
} else
if (sp[0] == 0x85) {
unsigned int ac[3], n;
if (sp + 11 + 2*3 >= end)
break;
file->id = (sp[4] << 8) | sp[5];
file->size = (sp[8] << 8) | sp[9];
file->record_length = sp[7];
/* Map ACLs. Note the third AC byte is
* valid of EFs only */
for (n = 0; n < 3; n++)
ac[n] = (sp[10+2*n] << 8) | sp[11+2*n];
/* Examine file type */
switch (sp[6] & 7) {
case 0x01: case 0x02: case 0x03: case 0x04:
case 0x05: case 0x06: case 0x07:
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF;
file->ef_structure = sp[6] & 7;
ac_to_acl(ac[0], file, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE);
ac_to_acl(ac[1], file, SC_AC_OP_WRITE);
ac_to_acl(ac[2], file, SC_AC_OP_READ);
break;
case 0x00: /* 0x38 is DF */
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF;
/* Icky: the GPK uses different ACLs
* for creating data files and
* 'sensitive' i.e. key files */
ac_to_acl(ac[0], file, SC_AC_OP_LOCK);
ac_to_acl(ac[1], file, SC_AC_OP_CREATE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_SELECT,
SC_AC_NONE, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_DELETE,
SC_AC_NEVER, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_REHABILITATE,
SC_AC_NEVER, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_INVALIDATE,
SC_AC_NEVER, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_LIST_FILES,
SC_AC_NEVER, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
break;
}
} else
if (sp[0] == 0x6f) {
/* oops - this is a directory with an IADF.
* This happens with the personalized GemSafe cards
* for instance. */
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF;
rc = gpk_parse_fci(card, sp + 2, sp[1], file);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
}
}
if (file->record_length)
file->record_count = file->size / file->record_length;
file->magic = SC_FILE_MAGIC;
return 0;
}
| 169,056 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int inet6_sk_rebuild_header(struct sock *sk)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct dst_entry *dst;
dst = __sk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
if (!dst) {
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
sk->sk_err_soft = -PTR_ERR(dst);
return PTR_ERR(dst);
}
__ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | int inet6_sk_rebuild_header(struct sock *sk)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct dst_entry *dst;
dst = __sk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
if (!dst) {
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
rcu_read_lock();
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
&final);
rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
sk->sk_err_soft = -PTR_ERR(dst);
return PTR_ERR(dst);
}
__ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
}
return 0;
}
| 167,328 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline void VectorClamp(DDSVector4 *value)
{
value->x = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->x));
value->y = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->y));
value->z = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->z));
value->w = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->w));
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static inline void VectorClamp(DDSVector4 *value)
{
value->x = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->x));
value->y = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->y));
value->z = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->z));
value->w = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->w));
}
| 168,906 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ims_pcu_get_cdc_union_desc(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
const void *buf = intf->altsetting->extra;
size_t buflen = intf->altsetting->extralen;
struct usb_cdc_union_desc *union_desc;
if (!buf) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Missing descriptor data\n");
return NULL;
}
if (!buflen) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Zero length descriptor\n");
return NULL;
}
while (buflen > 0) {
union_desc = (struct usb_cdc_union_desc *)buf;
if (union_desc->bDescriptorType == USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE &&
union_desc->bDescriptorSubType == USB_CDC_UNION_TYPE) {
dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "Found union header\n");
return union_desc;
}
buflen -= union_desc->bLength;
buf += union_desc->bLength;
}
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Missing CDC union descriptor\n");
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-psu - check if CDC union descriptor is sane
Before trying to use CDC union descriptor, try to validate whether that it
is sane by checking that intf->altsetting->extra is big enough and that
descriptor bLength is not too big and not too small.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ims_pcu_get_cdc_union_desc(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
const void *buf = intf->altsetting->extra;
size_t buflen = intf->altsetting->extralen;
struct usb_cdc_union_desc *union_desc;
if (!buf) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Missing descriptor data\n");
return NULL;
}
if (!buflen) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Zero length descriptor\n");
return NULL;
}
while (buflen >= sizeof(*union_desc)) {
union_desc = (struct usb_cdc_union_desc *)buf;
if (union_desc->bLength > buflen) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Too large descriptor\n");
return NULL;
}
if (union_desc->bDescriptorType == USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE &&
union_desc->bDescriptorSubType == USB_CDC_UNION_TYPE) {
dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "Found union header\n");
if (union_desc->bLength >= sizeof(*union_desc))
return union_desc;
dev_err(&intf->dev,
"Union descriptor to short (%d vs %zd\n)",
union_desc->bLength, sizeof(*union_desc));
return NULL;
}
buflen -= union_desc->bLength;
buf += union_desc->bLength;
}
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Missing CDC union descriptor\n");
return NULL;
}
| 167,672 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
fwd_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(0);
inv_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(1);
tx_type_ = GET_PARAM(2);
pitch_ = 4;
fwd_txfm_ref = fdct4x4_ref;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void SetUp() {
fwd_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(0);
inv_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(1);
tx_type_ = GET_PARAM(2);
pitch_ = 4;
fwd_txfm_ref = fdct4x4_ref;
bit_depth_ = GET_PARAM(3);
mask_ = (1 << bit_depth_) - 1;
}
| 174,555 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateBufferWithBackup(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
if (params == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size()) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(params, portIndex, true);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, allottedSize);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBufferWithBackup, err,
SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, params->pointer()));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateBufferWithBackup, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p :> %u@%p",
params->size(), params->pointer(), allottedSize, header->pBuffer));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateBufferWithBackup(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
if (params == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size() || portIndex >= NELEM(mNumPortBuffers)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
// metadata buffers are not connected cross process; only copy if not meta
bool copy = mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(
params, portIndex,
(portIndex == kPortIndexInput) && copy /* copyToOmx */,
(portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) && copy /* copyFromOmx */,
NULL /* data */);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, allottedSize);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBufferWithBackup, err,
SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, params->pointer()));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
memset(header->pBuffer, 0, header->nAllocLen);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateBufferWithBackup, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p :> %u@%p",
params->size(), params->pointer(), allottedSize, header->pBuffer));
return OK;
}
| 174,130 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::DisplayPasskey(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
uint32 passkey,
uint16 entered) {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(device_path == object_path_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": DisplayPasskey: " << passkey
<< " (" << entered << " entered)";
if (entered == 0)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_DISPLAY_PASSKEY,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
if (entered == 0)
pairing_delegate_->DisplayPasskey(this, passkey);
pairing_delegate_->KeysEntered(this, entered);
pairing_delegate_used_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::DisplayPasskey(
| 171,222 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_get_val (MyObject *obj, guint *ret, GError **error)
{
*ret = obj->val;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_get_val (MyObject *obj, guint *ret, GError **error)
| 165,103 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void cJSON_Delete( cJSON *c )
{
cJSON *next;
while ( c ) {
next = c->next;
if ( ! ( c->type & cJSON_IsReference ) && c->child )
cJSON_Delete( c->child );
if ( ! ( c->type & cJSON_IsReference ) && c->valuestring )
cJSON_free( c->valuestring );
if ( c->string )
cJSON_free( c->string );
cJSON_free( c );
c = next;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void cJSON_Delete( cJSON *c )
void cJSON_Delete(cJSON *c)
{
cJSON *next;
while (c)
{
next=c->next;
if (!(c->type&cJSON_IsReference) && c->child) cJSON_Delete(c->child);
if (!(c->type&cJSON_IsReference) && c->valuestring) cJSON_free(c->valuestring);
if (!(c->type&cJSON_StringIsConst) && c->string) cJSON_free(c->string);
cJSON_free(c);
c=next;
}
}
| 167,281 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static vpx_codec_err_t decoder_peek_si_internal(const uint8_t *data,
unsigned int data_sz,
vpx_codec_stream_info_t *si,
int *is_intra_only,
vpx_decrypt_cb decrypt_cb,
void *decrypt_state) {
int intra_only_flag = 0;
uint8_t clear_buffer[9];
if (data + data_sz <= data)
return VPX_CODEC_INVALID_PARAM;
si->is_kf = 0;
si->w = si->h = 0;
if (decrypt_cb) {
data_sz = VPXMIN(sizeof(clear_buffer), data_sz);
decrypt_cb(decrypt_state, data, clear_buffer, data_sz);
data = clear_buffer;
}
{
int show_frame;
int error_resilient;
struct vpx_read_bit_buffer rb = { data, data + data_sz, 0, NULL, NULL };
const int frame_marker = vpx_rb_read_literal(&rb, 2);
const BITSTREAM_PROFILE profile = vp9_read_profile(&rb);
if (frame_marker != VP9_FRAME_MARKER)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (profile >= MAX_PROFILES)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if ((profile >= 2 && data_sz <= 1) || data_sz < 1)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb)) { // show an existing frame
vpx_rb_read_literal(&rb, 3); // Frame buffer to show.
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
if (data_sz <= 8)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
si->is_kf = !vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
show_frame = vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
error_resilient = vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
if (si->is_kf) {
if (!vp9_read_sync_code(&rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (!parse_bitdepth_colorspace_sampling(profile, &rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
vp9_read_frame_size(&rb, (int *)&si->w, (int *)&si->h);
} else {
intra_only_flag = show_frame ? 0 : vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
rb.bit_offset += error_resilient ? 0 : 2; // reset_frame_context
if (intra_only_flag) {
if (!vp9_read_sync_code(&rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (profile > PROFILE_0) {
if (!parse_bitdepth_colorspace_sampling(profile, &rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
}
rb.bit_offset += REF_FRAMES; // refresh_frame_flags
vp9_read_frame_size(&rb, (int *)&si->w, (int *)&si->h);
}
}
}
if (is_intra_only != NULL)
*is_intra_only = intra_only_flag;
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: cherry-pick aa1c813 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9: Fix potential SEGV in decoder_peek_si_internal
decoder_peek_si_internal could potentially read more bytes than
what actually exists in the input buffer. We check for the buffer
size to be at least 8, but we try to read up to 10 bytes in the
worst case. A well crafted file could thus cause a segfault.
Likely change that introduced this bug was:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/#/c/70439 (git hash:
7c43fb6)
Bug: 30013856
Change-Id: If556414cb5b82472d5673e045bc185cc57bb9af3
(cherry picked from commit bd57d587c2eb743c61b049add18f9fd72bf78c33)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static vpx_codec_err_t decoder_peek_si_internal(const uint8_t *data,
unsigned int data_sz,
vpx_codec_stream_info_t *si,
int *is_intra_only,
vpx_decrypt_cb decrypt_cb,
void *decrypt_state) {
int intra_only_flag = 0;
uint8_t clear_buffer[10];
if (data + data_sz <= data)
return VPX_CODEC_INVALID_PARAM;
si->is_kf = 0;
si->w = si->h = 0;
if (decrypt_cb) {
data_sz = VPXMIN(sizeof(clear_buffer), data_sz);
decrypt_cb(decrypt_state, data, clear_buffer, data_sz);
data = clear_buffer;
}
// A maximum of 6 bits are needed to read the frame marker, profile and
// show_existing_frame.
if (data_sz < 1)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
{
int show_frame;
int error_resilient;
struct vpx_read_bit_buffer rb = { data, data + data_sz, 0, NULL, NULL };
const int frame_marker = vpx_rb_read_literal(&rb, 2);
const BITSTREAM_PROFILE profile = vp9_read_profile(&rb);
if (frame_marker != VP9_FRAME_MARKER)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (profile >= MAX_PROFILES)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb)) { // show an existing frame
// If profile is > 2 and show_existing_frame is true, then at least 1 more
// byte (6+3=9 bits) is needed.
if (profile > 2 && data_sz < 2)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
vpx_rb_read_literal(&rb, 3); // Frame buffer to show.
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
// For the rest of the function, a maximum of 9 more bytes are needed
// (computed by taking the maximum possible bits needed in each case). Note
// that this has to be updated if we read any more bits in this function.
if (data_sz < 10)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
si->is_kf = !vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
show_frame = vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
error_resilient = vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
if (si->is_kf) {
if (!vp9_read_sync_code(&rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (!parse_bitdepth_colorspace_sampling(profile, &rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
vp9_read_frame_size(&rb, (int *)&si->w, (int *)&si->h);
} else {
intra_only_flag = show_frame ? 0 : vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
rb.bit_offset += error_resilient ? 0 : 2; // reset_frame_context
if (intra_only_flag) {
if (!vp9_read_sync_code(&rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (profile > PROFILE_0) {
if (!parse_bitdepth_colorspace_sampling(profile, &rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
}
rb.bit_offset += REF_FRAMES; // refresh_frame_flags
vp9_read_frame_size(&rb, (int *)&si->w, (int *)&si->h);
}
}
}
if (is_intra_only != NULL)
*is_intra_only = intra_only_flag;
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
| 173,409 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> create(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CreateFileResult> result, const String& name, const KURL& url, FileSystemType type)
{
return adoptPtr(static_cast<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks*>(new CreateFileHelper(result, name, url, type)));
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> create(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CreateFileResult> result, const String& name, const KURL& url, FileSystemType type)
static PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> create(CreateFileResult* result, const String& name, const KURL& url, FileSystemType type)
{
return adoptPtr(static_cast<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks*>(new CreateFileHelper(result, name, url, type)));
}
| 171,414 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_tRNS_to_alpha_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
/* LIBPNG BUG: this always forces palette images to RGB. */
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
/* This effectively does an 'expand' only if there is some transparency to
* convert to an alpha channel.
*/
if (that->have_tRNS)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this);
/* LIBPNG BUG: otherwise libpng still expands to 8 bits! */
else
{
if (that->bit_depth < 8)
that->bit_depth =8;
if (that->sample_depth < 8)
that->sample_depth = 8;
}
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_tRNS_to_alpha_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_tRNS_to_alpha_mod(const image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
const transform_display *display)
{
#if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10700
/* LIBPNG BUG: this always forces palette images to RGB. */
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
#endif
/* This effectively does an 'expand' only if there is some transparency to
* convert to an alpha channel.
*/
if (that->have_tRNS)
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10700
if (that->colour_type != PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE &&
(that->colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) == 0)
# endif
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this, 0/*!for background*/);
#if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10700
/* LIBPNG BUG: otherwise libpng still expands to 8 bits! */
else
{
if (that->bit_depth < 8)
that->bit_depth =8;
if (that->sample_depth < 8)
that->sample_depth = 8;
}
#endif
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
| 173,655 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AudioOutputDevice::OnStreamCreated(
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle,
base::SyncSocket::Handle socket_handle,
int length) {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(handle);
DCHECK(socket_handle);
#else
DCHECK_GE(handle.fd, 0);
DCHECK_GE(socket_handle, 0);
#endif
DCHECK(stream_id_);
if (!audio_thread_.get())
return;
DCHECK(audio_thread_->IsStopped());
audio_callback_.reset(new AudioOutputDevice::AudioThreadCallback(
audio_parameters_, input_channels_, handle, length, callback_));
audio_thread_->Start(
audio_callback_.get(), socket_handle, "AudioOutputDevice");
is_started_ = true;
if (play_on_start_)
PlayOnIOThread();
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void AudioOutputDevice::OnStreamCreated(
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle,
base::SyncSocket::Handle socket_handle,
int length) {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(handle);
DCHECK(socket_handle);
#else
DCHECK_GE(handle.fd, 0);
DCHECK_GE(socket_handle, 0);
#endif
DCHECK(stream_id_);
DCHECK(audio_thread_.IsStopped());
audio_callback_.reset(new AudioOutputDevice::AudioThreadCallback(
audio_parameters_, input_channels_, handle, length, callback_));
audio_thread_.Start(audio_callback_.get(), socket_handle,
"AudioOutputDevice");
is_started_ = true;
if (play_on_start_)
PlayOnIOThread();
}
| 170,705 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int key_verify(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, PKCS11_KEY *authkey)
{
int ok = 0;
unsigned char challenge[30];
unsigned char signature[256];
unsigned int siglen = sizeof signature;
const EVP_MD *md = EVP_sha1();
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
EVP_PKEY *privkey = PKCS11_get_private_key(authkey);
EVP_PKEY *pubkey = PKCS11_get_public_key(authkey);
/* Verify a SHA-1 hash of random data, signed by the key.
*
* Note that this will not work keys that aren't eligible for signing.
* Unfortunately, libp11 currently has no way of checking
* C_GetAttributeValue(CKA_SIGN), see
* https://github.com/OpenSC/libp11/issues/219. Since we don't want to
* implement try and error, we live with this limitation */
if (1 != randomize(pamh, challenge, sizeof challenge)) {
goto err;
}
if (NULL == pubkey || NULL == privkey || NULL == md_ctx || NULL == md
|| !EVP_SignInit(md_ctx, md)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, challenge, sizeof challenge)
|| !EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, signature, &siglen, privkey)
|| !EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md_ctx)
|| !EVP_VerifyInit(md_ctx, md)
|| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, challenge, sizeof challenge)
|| 1 != EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, signature, siglen, pubkey)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "Error verifying key: %s\n",
ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_get_error()));
prompt(flags, pamh, PAM_ERROR_MSG, NULL, _("Error verifying key"));
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (NULL != pubkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
if (NULL != privkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(privkey);
if (NULL != md_ctx) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
}
return ok;
}
Commit Message: Use EVP_PKEY_size() to allocate correct size of signature buffer. (#18)
Do not use fixed buffer size for signature, EVP_SignFinal() requires
buffer for signature at least EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes in size.
Fixes crash when using 4K RSA signatures (https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/16, https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/15)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int key_verify(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, PKCS11_KEY *authkey)
{
int ok = 0;
unsigned char challenge[30];
unsigned char *signature = NULL;
unsigned int siglen;
const EVP_MD *md = EVP_sha1();
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
EVP_PKEY *privkey = PKCS11_get_private_key(authkey);
EVP_PKEY *pubkey = PKCS11_get_public_key(authkey);
if (NULL == privkey)
goto err;
siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(privkey);
if (siglen <= 0)
goto err;
signature = malloc(siglen);
if (NULL == signature)
goto err;
/* Verify a SHA-1 hash of random data, signed by the key.
*
* Note that this will not work keys that aren't eligible for signing.
* Unfortunately, libp11 currently has no way of checking
* C_GetAttributeValue(CKA_SIGN), see
* https://github.com/OpenSC/libp11/issues/219. Since we don't want to
* implement try and error, we live with this limitation */
if (1 != randomize(pamh, challenge, sizeof challenge)) {
goto err;
}
if (NULL == pubkey || NULL == privkey || NULL == md_ctx || NULL == md
|| !EVP_SignInit(md_ctx, md)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, challenge, sizeof challenge)
|| !EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, signature, &siglen, privkey)
|| !EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md_ctx)
|| !EVP_VerifyInit(md_ctx, md)
|| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, challenge, sizeof challenge)
|| 1 != EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, signature, siglen, pubkey)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "Error verifying key: %s\n",
ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_get_error()));
prompt(flags, pamh, PAM_ERROR_MSG, NULL, _("Error verifying key"));
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
free(signature);
if (NULL != pubkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
if (NULL != privkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(privkey);
if (NULL != md_ctx) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
}
return ok;
}
| 169,513 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int32 CommandBufferProxyImpl::CreateTransferBuffer(
size_t size, int32 id_request) {
if (last_state_.error != gpu::error::kNoError)
return -1;
scoped_ptr<base::SharedMemory> shm(
channel_->factory()->AllocateSharedMemory(size));
if (!shm.get())
return -1;
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle = shm->handle();
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
DCHECK(!handle.auto_close);
#endif
int32 id;
if (!Send(new GpuCommandBufferMsg_RegisterTransferBuffer(route_id_,
handle,
size,
id_request,
&id))) {
return -1;
}
return id;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | int32 CommandBufferProxyImpl::CreateTransferBuffer(
size_t size, int32 id_request) {
if (last_state_.error != gpu::error::kNoError)
return -1;
scoped_ptr<base::SharedMemory> shm(
channel_->factory()->AllocateSharedMemory(size));
if (!shm.get())
return -1;
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle = shm->handle();
#if defined(OS_WIN)
// Windows needs to explicitly duplicate the handle out to another process.
if (!sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle(handle, channel_->gpu_pid(),
&handle, FILE_MAP_WRITE, 0)) {
return -1;
}
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
DCHECK(!handle.auto_close);
#endif
int32 id;
if (!Send(new GpuCommandBufferMsg_RegisterTransferBuffer(route_id_,
handle,
size,
id_request,
&id))) {
return -1;
}
return id;
}
| 170,926 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Chapters::Display::Clear()
{
delete[] m_string;
m_string = NULL;
delete[] m_language;
m_language = NULL;
delete[] m_country;
m_country = NULL;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Chapters::Display::Clear()
| 174,246 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PersistentHistogramAllocator::RecordCreateHistogramResult(
CreateHistogramResultType result) {
HistogramBase* result_histogram = GetCreateHistogramResultHistogram();
if (result_histogram)
result_histogram->Add(result);
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void PersistentHistogramAllocator::RecordCreateHistogramResult(
| 172,135 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const CuePoint::TrackPosition* CuePoint::Find(const Track* pTrack) const
{
assert(pTrack);
const long long n = pTrack->GetNumber();
const TrackPosition* i = m_track_positions;
const TrackPosition* const j = i + m_track_positions_count;
while (i != j)
{
const TrackPosition& p = *i++;
if (p.m_track == n)
return &p;
}
return NULL; //no matching track number found
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const CuePoint::TrackPosition* CuePoint::Find(const Track* pTrack) const
const long long n = pTrack->GetNumber();
const TrackPosition* i = m_track_positions;
const TrackPosition* const j = i + m_track_positions_count;
while (i != j) {
const TrackPosition& p = *i++;
if (p.m_track == n)
return &p;
}
return NULL; // no matching track number found
}
| 174,278 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ImageBitmapFactories::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(pending_loaders_);
Supplement<LocalDOMWindow>::Trace(visitor);
Supplement<WorkerGlobalScope>::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAP in ImageBitmapLoader/FileReaderLoader
FileReaderLoader stores its client as a raw pointer, so in cases like
ImageBitmapLoader where the FileReaderLoaderClient really is garbage
collected we have to make sure to destroy the FileReaderLoader when
the ExecutionContext that owns it is destroyed.
Bug: 913970
Change-Id: I40b02115367cf7bf5bbbbb8e9b57874d2510f861
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1374511
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616342}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void ImageBitmapFactories::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::~ImageBitmapLoader() {
DCHECK(!loader_);
}
| 173,070 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void StoreAccumulatedContentLength(int received_content_length,
int original_content_length,
bool data_reduction_proxy_was_used) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&UpdateContentLengthPrefs,
received_content_length, original_content_length,
data_reduction_proxy_was_used));
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void StoreAccumulatedContentLength(int received_content_length,
void StoreAccumulatedContentLength(
int received_content_length,
int original_content_length,
chrome_browser_net::DataReductionRequestType data_reduction_type) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&UpdateContentLengthPrefs,
received_content_length, original_content_length,
data_reduction_type));
}
| 171,333 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfs4_proc_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *sattr,
int flags, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct path path = {
.mnt = nd->path.mnt,
.dentry = dentry,
};
struct nfs4_state *state;
struct rpc_cred *cred;
int status = 0;
cred = rpc_lookup_cred();
if (IS_ERR(cred)) {
status = PTR_ERR(cred);
goto out;
}
state = nfs4_do_open(dir, &path, flags, sattr, cred);
d_drop(dentry);
if (IS_ERR(state)) {
status = PTR_ERR(state);
goto out_putcred;
}
d_add(dentry, igrab(state->inode));
nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
if (flags & O_EXCL) {
struct nfs_fattr fattr;
status = nfs4_do_setattr(state->inode, cred, &fattr, sattr, state);
if (status == 0)
nfs_setattr_update_inode(state->inode, sattr);
nfs_post_op_update_inode(state->inode, &fattr);
}
if (status == 0 && (nd->flags & LOOKUP_OPEN) != 0)
status = nfs4_intent_set_file(nd, &path, state);
else
nfs4_close_sync(&path, state, flags);
out_putcred:
put_rpccred(cred);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | nfs4_proc_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *sattr,
int flags, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct path path = {
.mnt = nd->path.mnt,
.dentry = dentry,
};
struct nfs4_state *state;
struct rpc_cred *cred;
fmode_t fmode = flags & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE);
int status = 0;
cred = rpc_lookup_cred();
if (IS_ERR(cred)) {
status = PTR_ERR(cred);
goto out;
}
state = nfs4_do_open(dir, &path, fmode, flags, sattr, cred);
d_drop(dentry);
if (IS_ERR(state)) {
status = PTR_ERR(state);
goto out_putcred;
}
d_add(dentry, igrab(state->inode));
nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
if (flags & O_EXCL) {
struct nfs_fattr fattr;
status = nfs4_do_setattr(state->inode, cred, &fattr, sattr, state);
if (status == 0)
nfs_setattr_update_inode(state->inode, sattr);
nfs_post_op_update_inode(state->inode, &fattr);
}
if (status == 0 && (nd->flags & LOOKUP_OPEN) != 0)
status = nfs4_intent_set_file(nd, &path, state, fmode);
else
nfs4_close_sync(&path, state, fmode);
out_putcred:
put_rpccred(cred);
out:
return status;
}
| 165,702 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_server_method());
#endif
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_server_method());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
#endif
if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
| 165,158 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long SeekHead::Parse()
{
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
int entry_count = 0;
int void_element_count = 0;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x0DBB) //SeekEntry ID
++entry_count;
else if (id == 0x6C) //Void ID
++void_element_count;
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
m_entries = new (std::nothrow) Entry[entry_count];
if (m_entries == NULL)
return -1;
m_void_elements = new (std::nothrow) VoidElement[void_element_count];
if (m_void_elements == NULL)
return -1;
Entry* pEntry = m_entries;
VoidElement* pVoidElement = m_void_elements;
pos = m_start;
while (pos < stop)
{
const long long idpos = pos;
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x0DBB) //SeekEntry ID
{
if (ParseEntry(pReader, pos, size, pEntry))
{
Entry& e = *pEntry++;
e.element_start = idpos;
e.element_size = (pos + size) - idpos;
}
}
else if (id == 0x6C) //Void ID
{
VoidElement& e = *pVoidElement++;
e.element_start = idpos;
e.element_size = (pos + size) - idpos;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
ptrdiff_t count_ = ptrdiff_t(pEntry - m_entries);
assert(count_ >= 0);
assert(count_ <= entry_count);
m_entry_count = static_cast<int>(count_);
count_ = ptrdiff_t(pVoidElement - m_void_elements);
assert(count_ >= 0);
assert(count_ <= void_element_count);
m_void_element_count = static_cast<int>(count_);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long SeekHead::Parse()
long long pos = m_start;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
// first count the seek head entries
int entry_count = 0;
int void_element_count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x0DBB) // SeekEntry ID
++entry_count;
else if (id == 0x6C) // Void ID
++void_element_count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
m_entries = new (std::nothrow) Entry[entry_count];
if (m_entries == NULL)
return -1;
m_void_elements = new (std::nothrow) VoidElement[void_element_count];
if (m_void_elements == NULL)
return -1;
// now parse the entries and void elements
Entry* pEntry = m_entries;
VoidElement* pVoidElement = m_void_elements;
pos = m_start;
while (pos < stop) {
const long long idpos = pos;
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x0DBB) { // SeekEntry ID
if (ParseEntry(pReader, pos, size, pEntry)) {
Entry& e = *pEntry++;
e.element_start = idpos;
e.element_size = (pos + size) - idpos;
}
} else if (id == 0x6C) { // Void ID
VoidElement& e = *pVoidElement++;
e.element_start = idpos;
e.element_size = (pos + size) - idpos;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
ptrdiff_t count_ = ptrdiff_t(pEntry - m_entries);
assert(count_ >= 0);
assert(count_ <= entry_count);
m_entry_count = static_cast<int>(count_);
count_ = ptrdiff_t(pVoidElement - m_void_elements);
assert(count_ >= 0);
assert(count_ <= void_element_count);
m_void_element_count = static_cast<int>(count_);
return 0;
}
int SeekHead::GetCount() const { return m_entry_count; }
const SeekHead::Entry* SeekHead::GetEntry(int idx) const {
if (idx < 0)
return 0;
if (idx >= m_entry_count)
return 0;
return m_entries + idx;
}
| 174,413 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void bta_hl_co_put_rx_data (UINT8 app_id, tBTA_HL_MDL_HANDLE mdl_handle,
UINT16 data_size, UINT8 *p_data, UINT16 evt)
{
UINT8 app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx;
btif_hl_mdl_cb_t *p_dcb;
tBTA_HL_STATUS status = BTA_HL_STATUS_FAIL;
int r;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s app_id=%d mdl_handle=0x%x data_size=%d",
__FUNCTION__,app_id, mdl_handle, data_size);
if (btif_hl_find_mdl_idx_using_handle(mdl_handle, &app_idx, &mcl_idx, &mdl_idx))
{
p_dcb = BTIF_HL_GET_MDL_CB_PTR(app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx);
if ((p_dcb->p_rx_pkt = (UINT8 *)btif_hl_get_buf(data_size)) != NULL)
{
memcpy(p_dcb->p_rx_pkt, p_data, data_size);
if (p_dcb->p_scb)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("app_idx=%d mcl_idx=0x%x mdl_idx=0x%x data_size=%d",
app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx, data_size);
r = send(p_dcb->p_scb->socket_id[1], p_dcb->p_rx_pkt, data_size, 0);
if (r == data_size)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("socket send success data_size=%d", data_size);
status = BTA_HL_STATUS_OK;
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("socket send failed r=%d data_size=%d",r, data_size);
}
}
btif_hl_free_buf((void **) &p_dcb->p_rx_pkt);
}
}
bta_hl_ci_put_rx_data(mdl_handle, status, evt);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void bta_hl_co_put_rx_data (UINT8 app_id, tBTA_HL_MDL_HANDLE mdl_handle,
UINT16 data_size, UINT8 *p_data, UINT16 evt)
{
UINT8 app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx;
btif_hl_mdl_cb_t *p_dcb;
tBTA_HL_STATUS status = BTA_HL_STATUS_FAIL;
int r;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s app_id=%d mdl_handle=0x%x data_size=%d",
__FUNCTION__,app_id, mdl_handle, data_size);
if (btif_hl_find_mdl_idx_using_handle(mdl_handle, &app_idx, &mcl_idx, &mdl_idx))
{
p_dcb = BTIF_HL_GET_MDL_CB_PTR(app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx);
if ((p_dcb->p_rx_pkt = (UINT8 *)btif_hl_get_buf(data_size)) != NULL)
{
memcpy(p_dcb->p_rx_pkt, p_data, data_size);
if (p_dcb->p_scb)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("app_idx=%d mcl_idx=0x%x mdl_idx=0x%x data_size=%d",
app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx, data_size);
r = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(p_dcb->p_scb->socket_id[1], p_dcb->p_rx_pkt, data_size, 0));
if (r == data_size)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("socket send success data_size=%d", data_size);
status = BTA_HL_STATUS_OK;
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("socket send failed r=%d data_size=%d",r, data_size);
}
}
btif_hl_free_buf((void **) &p_dcb->p_rx_pkt);
}
}
bta_hl_ci_put_rx_data(mdl_handle, status, evt);
}
| 173,434 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void EntrySync::remove(ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
RefPtr<VoidSyncCallbackHelper> helper = VoidSyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->remove(this, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void EntrySync::remove(ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
VoidSyncCallbackHelper* helper = VoidSyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->remove(this, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
| 171,423 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MaybeChangeCurrentKeyboardLayout(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value)) {
ChangeCurrentInputMethodFromId(value.string_list_value[0]);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void MaybeChangeCurrentKeyboardLayout(const std::string& section,
void MaybeChangeCurrentKeyboardLayout(
const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const input_method::ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value)) {
ChangeCurrentInputMethodFromId(value.string_list_value[0]);
}
}
| 170,498 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: vbf_stp_error(struct worker *wrk, struct busyobj *bo)
{
ssize_t l, ll, o;
double now;
uint8_t *ptr;
struct vsb *synth_body;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(wrk, WORKER_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(bo, BUSYOBJ_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(bo->fetch_objcore, OBJCORE_MAGIC);
AN(bo->fetch_objcore->flags & OC_F_BUSY);
assert(bo->director_state == DIR_S_NULL);
wrk->stats->fetch_failed++;
now = W_TIM_real(wrk);
VSLb_ts_busyobj(bo, "Error", now);
if (bo->fetch_objcore->stobj->stevedore != NULL)
ObjFreeObj(bo->wrk, bo->fetch_objcore);
HTTP_Setup(bo->beresp, bo->ws, bo->vsl, SLT_BerespMethod);
http_PutResponse(bo->beresp, "HTTP/1.1", 503, "Backend fetch failed");
http_TimeHeader(bo->beresp, "Date: ", now);
http_SetHeader(bo->beresp, "Server: Varnish");
bo->fetch_objcore->t_origin = now;
if (!VTAILQ_EMPTY(&bo->fetch_objcore->objhead->waitinglist)) {
/*
* If there is a waitinglist, it means that there is no
* grace-able object, so cache the error return for a
* short time, so the waiting list can drain, rather than
* each objcore on the waiting list sequentially attempt
* to fetch from the backend.
*/
bo->fetch_objcore->ttl = 1;
bo->fetch_objcore->grace = 5;
bo->fetch_objcore->keep = 5;
} else {
bo->fetch_objcore->ttl = 0;
bo->fetch_objcore->grace = 0;
bo->fetch_objcore->keep = 0;
}
synth_body = VSB_new_auto();
AN(synth_body);
VCL_backend_error_method(bo->vcl, wrk, NULL, bo, synth_body);
AZ(VSB_finish(synth_body));
if (wrk->handling == VCL_RET_ABANDON || wrk->handling == VCL_RET_FAIL) {
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
if (wrk->handling == VCL_RET_RETRY) {
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
if (bo->retries++ < cache_param->max_retries)
return (F_STP_RETRY);
VSLb(bo->vsl, SLT_VCL_Error, "Too many retries, failing");
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
assert(wrk->handling == VCL_RET_DELIVER);
bo->vfc->bo = bo;
bo->vfc->wrk = bo->wrk;
bo->vfc->oc = bo->fetch_objcore;
bo->vfc->http = bo->beresp;
bo->vfc->esi_req = bo->bereq;
if (vbf_beresp2obj(bo)) {
(void)VFP_Error(bo->vfc, "Could not get storage");
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
ll = VSB_len(synth_body);
o = 0;
while (ll > 0) {
l = ll;
if (VFP_GetStorage(bo->vfc, &l, &ptr) != VFP_OK)
break;
memcpy(ptr, VSB_data(synth_body) + o, l);
VFP_Extend(bo->vfc, l);
ll -= l;
o += l;
}
AZ(ObjSetU64(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, OA_LEN, o));
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
HSH_Unbusy(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore);
ObjSetState(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, BOS_FINISHED);
return (F_STP_DONE);
}
Commit Message: Avoid buffer read overflow on vcl_error and -sfile
The file stevedore may return a buffer larger than asked for when
requesting storage. Due to lack of check for this condition, the code
to copy the synthetic error memory buffer from vcl_error would overrun
the buffer.
Patch by @shamger
Fixes: #2429
CWE ID: CWE-119 | vbf_stp_error(struct worker *wrk, struct busyobj *bo)
{
ssize_t l, ll, o;
double now;
uint8_t *ptr;
struct vsb *synth_body;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(wrk, WORKER_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(bo, BUSYOBJ_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(bo->fetch_objcore, OBJCORE_MAGIC);
AN(bo->fetch_objcore->flags & OC_F_BUSY);
assert(bo->director_state == DIR_S_NULL);
wrk->stats->fetch_failed++;
now = W_TIM_real(wrk);
VSLb_ts_busyobj(bo, "Error", now);
if (bo->fetch_objcore->stobj->stevedore != NULL)
ObjFreeObj(bo->wrk, bo->fetch_objcore);
HTTP_Setup(bo->beresp, bo->ws, bo->vsl, SLT_BerespMethod);
http_PutResponse(bo->beresp, "HTTP/1.1", 503, "Backend fetch failed");
http_TimeHeader(bo->beresp, "Date: ", now);
http_SetHeader(bo->beresp, "Server: Varnish");
bo->fetch_objcore->t_origin = now;
if (!VTAILQ_EMPTY(&bo->fetch_objcore->objhead->waitinglist)) {
/*
* If there is a waitinglist, it means that there is no
* grace-able object, so cache the error return for a
* short time, so the waiting list can drain, rather than
* each objcore on the waiting list sequentially attempt
* to fetch from the backend.
*/
bo->fetch_objcore->ttl = 1;
bo->fetch_objcore->grace = 5;
bo->fetch_objcore->keep = 5;
} else {
bo->fetch_objcore->ttl = 0;
bo->fetch_objcore->grace = 0;
bo->fetch_objcore->keep = 0;
}
synth_body = VSB_new_auto();
AN(synth_body);
VCL_backend_error_method(bo->vcl, wrk, NULL, bo, synth_body);
AZ(VSB_finish(synth_body));
if (wrk->handling == VCL_RET_ABANDON || wrk->handling == VCL_RET_FAIL) {
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
if (wrk->handling == VCL_RET_RETRY) {
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
if (bo->retries++ < cache_param->max_retries)
return (F_STP_RETRY);
VSLb(bo->vsl, SLT_VCL_Error, "Too many retries, failing");
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
assert(wrk->handling == VCL_RET_DELIVER);
bo->vfc->bo = bo;
bo->vfc->wrk = bo->wrk;
bo->vfc->oc = bo->fetch_objcore;
bo->vfc->http = bo->beresp;
bo->vfc->esi_req = bo->bereq;
if (vbf_beresp2obj(bo)) {
(void)VFP_Error(bo->vfc, "Could not get storage");
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
ll = VSB_len(synth_body);
o = 0;
while (ll > 0) {
l = ll;
if (VFP_GetStorage(bo->vfc, &l, &ptr) != VFP_OK)
break;
if (l > ll)
l = ll;
memcpy(ptr, VSB_data(synth_body) + o, l);
VFP_Extend(bo->vfc, l);
ll -= l;
o += l;
}
AZ(ObjSetU64(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, OA_LEN, o));
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
HSH_Unbusy(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore);
ObjSetState(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, BOS_FINISHED);
return (F_STP_DONE);
}
| 168,193 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostViewAura::ShouldFastACK(uint64 surface_id) {
ui::Texture* container = image_transport_clients_[surface_id];
DCHECK(container);
if (can_lock_compositor_ == NO_PENDING_RENDERER_FRAME ||
can_lock_compositor_ == NO_PENDING_COMMIT ||
resize_locks_.empty())
return false;
gfx::Size container_size = ConvertSizeToDIP(this, container->size());
ResizeLockList::iterator it = resize_locks_.begin();
while (it != resize_locks_.end()) {
if ((*it)->expected_size() == container_size)
break;
++it;
}
return it == resize_locks_.end() || ++it != resize_locks_.end();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | bool RenderWidgetHostViewAura::ShouldFastACK(uint64 surface_id) {
bool RenderWidgetHostViewAura::ShouldSkipFrame(const gfx::Size& size) {
if (can_lock_compositor_ == NO_PENDING_RENDERER_FRAME ||
can_lock_compositor_ == NO_PENDING_COMMIT ||
resize_locks_.empty())
return false;
gfx::Size container_size = ConvertSizeToDIP(this, size);
ResizeLockList::iterator it = resize_locks_.begin();
while (it != resize_locks_.end()) {
if ((*it)->expected_size() == container_size)
break;
++it;
}
return it == resize_locks_.end() || ++it != resize_locks_.end();
}
| 171,386 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void GetCSI(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
WebLocalFrame* frame = WebLocalFrame::frameForCurrentContext();
if (frame) {
WebDataSource* data_source = frame->dataSource();
if (data_source) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(data_source);
v8::Isolate* isolate = args.GetIsolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> csi = v8::Object::New(isolate);
base::Time now = base::Time::Now();
base::Time start = document_state->request_time().is_null() ?
document_state->start_load_time() :
document_state->request_time();
base::Time onload = document_state->finish_document_load_time();
base::TimeDelta page = now - start;
csi->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "startE"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, floor(start.ToDoubleT() * 1000)));
csi->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "onloadT"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, floor(onload.ToDoubleT() * 1000)));
csi->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "pageT"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, page.InMillisecondsF()));
csi->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "tran"),
v8::Number::New(
isolate, GetCSITransitionType(data_source->navigationType())));
args.GetReturnValue().Set(csi);
return;
}
}
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
return;
}
Commit Message: Cache csi info before passing it to JS setters.
JS setters invalidate the pointers frame, data_source and document_state.
BUG=590455
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1751553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#379047}
CWE ID: | static void GetCSI(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
WebLocalFrame* frame = WebLocalFrame::frameForCurrentContext();
if (!frame) {
return;
}
WebDataSource* data_source = frame->dataSource();
if (!data_source) {
return;
}
DocumentState* document_state = DocumentState::FromDataSource(data_source);
if (!document_state) {
return;
}
base::Time now = base::Time::Now();
base::Time start = document_state->request_time().is_null()
? document_state->start_load_time()
: document_state->request_time();
base::Time onload = document_state->finish_document_load_time();
base::TimeDelta page = now - start;
int navigation_type = GetCSITransitionType(data_source->navigationType());
// Important: |frame|, |data_source| and |document_state| should not be
// referred to below this line, as JS setters below can invalidate these
// pointers.
v8::Isolate* isolate = args.GetIsolate();
v8::Local<v8::Context> ctx = isolate->GetCurrentContext();
v8::Local<v8::Object> csi = v8::Object::New(isolate);
if (!csi->Set(ctx, v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "startE",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::Number::New(isolate, floor(start.ToDoubleT() * 1000)))
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
if (!csi->Set(ctx, v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "onloadT",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::Number::New(isolate, floor(onload.ToDoubleT() * 1000)))
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
if (!csi->Set(ctx, v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "pageT",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::Number::New(isolate, page.InMillisecondsF()))
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
if (!csi->Set(ctx, v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "tran",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::Number::New(isolate, navigation_type))
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
args.GetReturnValue().Set(csi);
}
| 172,117 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: update_display(struct display *dp)
/* called once after the first read to update all the info, original_pp and
* original_ip must have been filled in.
*/
{
png_structp pp;
png_infop ip;
/* Now perform the initial read with a 0 tranform. */
read_png(dp, &dp->original_file, "original read", 0/*no transform*/);
/* Move the result to the 'original' fields */
dp->original_pp = pp = dp->read_pp, dp->read_pp = NULL;
dp->original_ip = ip = dp->read_ip, dp->read_ip = NULL;
dp->original_rowbytes = png_get_rowbytes(pp, ip);
if (dp->original_rowbytes == 0)
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_get_rowbytes returned 0");
dp->chunks = png_get_valid(pp, ip, 0xffffffff);
if ((dp->chunks & PNG_INFO_IDAT) == 0) /* set by png_read_png */
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_read_png did not set IDAT flag");
dp->original_rows = png_get_rows(pp, ip);
if (dp->original_rows == NULL)
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_read_png did not create row buffers");
if (!png_get_IHDR(pp, ip,
&dp->width, &dp->height, &dp->bit_depth, &dp->color_type,
&dp->interlace_method, &dp->compression_method, &dp->filter_method))
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_get_IHDR failed");
/* 'active' transforms are discovered based on the original image format;
* running one active transform can activate others. At present the code
* does not attempt to determine the closure.
*/
{
png_uint_32 chunks = dp->chunks;
int active = 0, inactive = 0;
int ct = dp->color_type;
int bd = dp->bit_depth;
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<TTABLE_SIZE; ++i)
{
int transform = transform_info[i].transform;
if ((transform_info[i].valid_chunks == 0 ||
(transform_info[i].valid_chunks & chunks) != 0) &&
(transform_info[i].color_mask_required & ct) ==
transform_info[i].color_mask_required &&
(transform_info[i].color_mask_absent & ct) == 0 &&
(transform_info[i].bit_depths & bd) != 0 &&
(transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_R) != 0)
active |= transform;
else if ((transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_R) != 0)
inactive |= transform;
}
/* Some transforms appear multiple times in the table; the 'active' status
* is the logical OR of these and the inactive status must be adjusted to
* take this into account.
*/
inactive &= ~active;
dp->active_transforms = active;
dp->ignored_transforms = inactive; /* excluding write-only transforms */
if (active == 0)
display_log(dp, INTERNAL_ERROR, "bad transform table");
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | update_display(struct display *dp)
/* called once after the first read to update all the info, original_pp and
* original_ip must have been filled in.
*/
{
png_structp pp;
png_infop ip;
/* Now perform the initial read with a 0 tranform. */
read_png(dp, &dp->original_file, "original read", 0/*no transform*/);
/* Move the result to the 'original' fields */
dp->original_pp = pp = dp->read_pp, dp->read_pp = NULL;
dp->original_ip = ip = dp->read_ip, dp->read_ip = NULL;
dp->original_rowbytes = png_get_rowbytes(pp, ip);
if (dp->original_rowbytes == 0)
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_get_rowbytes returned 0");
dp->chunks = png_get_valid(pp, ip, 0xffffffff);
if ((dp->chunks & PNG_INFO_IDAT) == 0) /* set by png_read_png */
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_read_png did not set IDAT flag");
dp->original_rows = png_get_rows(pp, ip);
if (dp->original_rows == NULL)
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_read_png did not create row buffers");
if (!png_get_IHDR(pp, ip,
&dp->width, &dp->height, &dp->bit_depth, &dp->color_type,
&dp->interlace_method, &dp->compression_method, &dp->filter_method))
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_get_IHDR failed");
/* 'active' transforms are discovered based on the original image format;
* running one active transform can activate others. At present the code
* does not attempt to determine the closure.
*/
{
png_uint_32 chunks = dp->chunks;
int active = 0, inactive = 0;
int ct = dp->color_type;
int bd = dp->bit_depth;
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<TTABLE_SIZE; ++i) if (transform_info[i].name != NULL)
{
int transform = transform_info[i].transform;
if ((transform_info[i].valid_chunks == 0 ||
(transform_info[i].valid_chunks & chunks) != 0) &&
(transform_info[i].color_mask_required & ct) ==
transform_info[i].color_mask_required &&
(transform_info[i].color_mask_absent & ct) == 0 &&
(transform_info[i].bit_depths & bd) != 0 &&
(transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_R) != 0)
active |= transform;
else if ((transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_R) != 0)
inactive |= transform;
}
/* Some transforms appear multiple times in the table; the 'active' status
* is the logical OR of these and the inactive status must be adjusted to
* take this into account.
*/
inactive &= ~active;
dp->active_transforms = active;
dp->ignored_transforms = inactive; /* excluding write-only transforms */
}
}
| 173,591 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void EnsureInitializeForAndroidLayoutTests() {
CHECK(CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kDumpRenderTree));
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
content::NestedMessagePumpAndroid::RegisterJni(env);
content::RegisterNativesImpl(env);
bool success = base::MessageLoop::InitMessagePumpForUIFactory(
&CreateMessagePumpForUI);
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the message pump for Android.";
base::FilePath files_dir(GetTestFilesDirectory(env));
base::FilePath stdout_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("test.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdout_fifo);
base::FilePath stderr_fifo(
files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stderr.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stderr_fifo);
base::FilePath stdin_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stdin.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdin_fifo);
success = base::android::RedirectStream(stdout, stdout_fifo, "w") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stdin, stdin_fifo, "r") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stderr, stderr_fifo, "w");
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the Android FIFOs.";
}
Commit Message: Content Shell: Move shell_layout_tests_android into layout_tests/.
BUG=420994
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/661743002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299892}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void EnsureInitializeForAndroidLayoutTests() {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
content::NestedMessagePumpAndroid::RegisterJni(env);
content::RegisterNativesImpl(env);
bool success = base::MessageLoop::InitMessagePumpForUIFactory(
&CreateMessagePumpForUI);
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the message pump for Android.";
base::FilePath files_dir(GetTestFilesDirectory(env));
base::FilePath stdout_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("test.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdout_fifo);
base::FilePath stderr_fifo(
files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stderr.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stderr_fifo);
base::FilePath stdin_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stdin.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdin_fifo);
success = base::android::RedirectStream(stdout, stdout_fifo, "w") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stdin, stdin_fifo, "r") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stderr, stderr_fifo, "w");
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the Android FIFOs.";
}
| 171,161 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Huff_Compress(msg_t *mbuf, int offset) {
int i, ch, size;
byte seq[65536];
byte* buffer;
huff_t huff;
size = mbuf->cursize - offset;
buffer = mbuf->data+ + offset;
if (size<=0) {
return;
}
Com_Memset(&huff, 0, sizeof(huff_t));
huff.tree = huff.lhead = huff.loc[NYT] = &(huff.nodeList[huff.blocNode++]);
huff.tree->symbol = NYT;
huff.tree->weight = 0;
huff.lhead->next = huff.lhead->prev = NULL;
huff.tree->parent = huff.tree->left = huff.tree->right = NULL;
seq[0] = (size>>8);
seq[1] = size&0xff;
bloc = 16;
for (i=0; i<size; i++ ) {
ch = buffer[i];
Huff_transmit(&huff, ch, seq); /* Transmit symbol */
Huff_addRef(&huff, (byte)ch); /* Do update */
}
bloc += 8; // next byte
mbuf->cursize = (bloc>>3) + offset;
Com_Memcpy(mbuf->data+offset, seq, (bloc>>3));
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Huff_Compress(msg_t *mbuf, int offset) {
int i, ch, size;
byte seq[65536];
byte* buffer;
huff_t huff;
size = mbuf->cursize - offset;
buffer = mbuf->data+ + offset;
if (size<=0) {
return;
}
Com_Memset(&huff, 0, sizeof(huff_t));
huff.tree = huff.lhead = huff.loc[NYT] = &(huff.nodeList[huff.blocNode++]);
huff.tree->symbol = NYT;
huff.tree->weight = 0;
huff.lhead->next = huff.lhead->prev = NULL;
huff.tree->parent = huff.tree->left = huff.tree->right = NULL;
seq[0] = (size>>8);
seq[1] = size&0xff;
bloc = 16;
for (i=0; i<size; i++ ) {
ch = buffer[i];
Huff_transmit(&huff, ch, seq, size<<3); /* Transmit symbol */
Huff_addRef(&huff, (byte)ch); /* Do update */
}
bloc += 8; // next byte
mbuf->cursize = (bloc>>3) + offset;
Com_Memcpy(mbuf->data+offset, seq, (bloc>>3));
}
| 167,993 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ContainerNode::parserInsertBefore(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> newChild, Node& nextChild)
{
ASSERT(newChild);
ASSERT(nextChild.parentNode() == this);
ASSERT(!newChild->isDocumentFragment());
ASSERT(!isHTMLTemplateElement(this));
if (nextChild.previousSibling() == newChild || &nextChild == newChild) // nothing to do
return;
if (!checkParserAcceptChild(*newChild))
return;
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> protect(this);
while (RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ContainerNode> parent = newChild->parentNode())
parent->parserRemoveChild(*newChild);
if (document() != newChild->document())
document().adoptNode(newChild.get(), ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
{
EventDispatchForbiddenScope assertNoEventDispatch;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbidScript;
treeScope().adoptIfNeeded(*newChild);
insertBeforeCommon(nextChild, *newChild);
newChild->updateAncestorConnectedSubframeCountForInsertion();
ChildListMutationScope(*this).childAdded(*newChild);
}
notifyNodeInserted(*newChild, ChildrenChangeSourceParser);
}
Commit Message: parserInsertBefore: Bail out if the parent no longer contains the child.
nextChild may be removed from the DOM tree during the
|parserRemoveChild(*newChild)| call which triggers unload events of newChild's
descendant iframes. In order to maintain the integrity of the DOM tree, the
insertion of newChild must be aborted in this case.
This patch adds a return statement that rectifies the behavior in this
edge case.
BUG=519558
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1283263002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@200690 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void ContainerNode::parserInsertBefore(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> newChild, Node& nextChild)
{
ASSERT(newChild);
ASSERT(nextChild.parentNode() == this);
ASSERT(!newChild->isDocumentFragment());
ASSERT(!isHTMLTemplateElement(this));
if (nextChild.previousSibling() == newChild || &nextChild == newChild) // nothing to do
return;
if (!checkParserAcceptChild(*newChild))
return;
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> protect(this);
while (RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ContainerNode> parent = newChild->parentNode())
parent->parserRemoveChild(*newChild);
if (nextChild.parentNode() != this)
return;
if (document() != newChild->document())
document().adoptNode(newChild.get(), ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
{
EventDispatchForbiddenScope assertNoEventDispatch;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbidScript;
treeScope().adoptIfNeeded(*newChild);
insertBeforeCommon(nextChild, *newChild);
newChild->updateAncestorConnectedSubframeCountForInsertion();
ChildListMutationScope(*this).childAdded(*newChild);
}
notifyNodeInserted(*newChild, ChildrenChangeSourceParser);
}
| 171,850 |
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