instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool BaseSettingChange::Init(Profile* profile) {
DCHECK(profile);
profile_ = profile;
return true;
}
Commit Message: [protector] Refactoring of --no-protector code.
*) On DSE change, new provider is not pushed to Sync.
*) Simplified code in BrowserInit.
BUG=None
TEST=protector.py
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10065016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132398 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool BaseSettingChange::Init(Profile* profile) {
DCHECK(profile && !profile_);
profile_ = profile;
return true;
}
| 170,756 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AXLayoutObject::elementAttributeValue(
const QualifiedName& attributeName) const {
if (!m_layoutObject)
return false;
return equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(attributeName), "true");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool AXLayoutObject::elementAttributeValue(
const QualifiedName& attributeName) const {
if (!m_layoutObject)
return false;
return equalIgnoringASCIICase(getAttribute(attributeName), "true");
}
| 171,904 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebSocketJob::Wakeup() {
if (!waiting_)
return;
waiting_ = false;
DCHECK(callback_);
MessageLoopForIO::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(this, &WebSocketJob::RetryPendingIO));
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void WebSocketJob::Wakeup() {
if (!waiting_)
return;
waiting_ = false;
DCHECK(callback_);
MessageLoopForIO::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
method_factory_.NewRunnableMethod(&WebSocketJob::RetryPendingIO));
}
| 170,307 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int pit_ioport_read(struct kvm_io_device *this,
gpa_t addr, int len, void *data)
{
struct kvm_pit *pit = dev_to_pit(this);
struct kvm_kpit_state *pit_state = &pit->pit_state;
struct kvm *kvm = pit->kvm;
int ret, count;
struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *s;
if (!pit_in_range(addr))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
addr &= KVM_PIT_CHANNEL_MASK;
s = &pit_state->channels[addr];
mutex_lock(&pit_state->lock);
if (s->status_latched) {
s->status_latched = 0;
ret = s->status;
} else if (s->count_latched) {
switch (s->count_latched) {
default:
case RW_STATE_LSB:
ret = s->latched_count & 0xff;
s->count_latched = 0;
break;
case RW_STATE_MSB:
ret = s->latched_count >> 8;
s->count_latched = 0;
break;
case RW_STATE_WORD0:
ret = s->latched_count & 0xff;
s->count_latched = RW_STATE_MSB;
break;
}
} else {
switch (s->read_state) {
default:
case RW_STATE_LSB:
count = pit_get_count(kvm, addr);
ret = count & 0xff;
break;
case RW_STATE_MSB:
count = pit_get_count(kvm, addr);
ret = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
break;
case RW_STATE_WORD0:
count = pit_get_count(kvm, addr);
ret = count & 0xff;
s->read_state = RW_STATE_WORD1;
break;
case RW_STATE_WORD1:
count = pit_get_count(kvm, addr);
ret = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
s->read_state = RW_STATE_WORD0;
break;
}
}
if (len > sizeof(ret))
len = sizeof(ret);
memcpy(data, (char *)&ret, len);
mutex_unlock(&pit_state->lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PIT: control word is write-only
PIT control word (address 0x43) is write-only, reads are undefined.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int pit_ioport_read(struct kvm_io_device *this,
gpa_t addr, int len, void *data)
{
struct kvm_pit *pit = dev_to_pit(this);
struct kvm_kpit_state *pit_state = &pit->pit_state;
struct kvm *kvm = pit->kvm;
int ret, count;
struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *s;
if (!pit_in_range(addr))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
addr &= KVM_PIT_CHANNEL_MASK;
if (addr == 3)
return 0;
s = &pit_state->channels[addr];
mutex_lock(&pit_state->lock);
if (s->status_latched) {
s->status_latched = 0;
ret = s->status;
} else if (s->count_latched) {
switch (s->count_latched) {
default:
case RW_STATE_LSB:
ret = s->latched_count & 0xff;
s->count_latched = 0;
break;
case RW_STATE_MSB:
ret = s->latched_count >> 8;
s->count_latched = 0;
break;
case RW_STATE_WORD0:
ret = s->latched_count & 0xff;
s->count_latched = RW_STATE_MSB;
break;
}
} else {
switch (s->read_state) {
default:
case RW_STATE_LSB:
count = pit_get_count(kvm, addr);
ret = count & 0xff;
break;
case RW_STATE_MSB:
count = pit_get_count(kvm, addr);
ret = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
break;
case RW_STATE_WORD0:
count = pit_get_count(kvm, addr);
ret = count & 0xff;
s->read_state = RW_STATE_WORD1;
break;
case RW_STATE_WORD1:
count = pit_get_count(kvm, addr);
ret = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
s->read_state = RW_STATE_WORD0;
break;
}
}
if (len > sizeof(ret))
len = sizeof(ret);
memcpy(data, (char *)&ret, len);
mutex_unlock(&pit_state->lock);
return 0;
}
| 166,627 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int32 CommandBufferProxyImpl::RegisterTransferBuffer(
base::SharedMemory* shared_memory,
size_t size,
int32 id_request) {
if (last_state_.error != gpu::error::kNoError)
return -1;
int32 id;
if (!Send(new GpuCommandBufferMsg_RegisterTransferBuffer(
route_id_,
shared_memory->handle(), // Returns FileDescriptor with auto_close off.
size,
id_request,
&id))) {
return -1;
}
return id;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | int32 CommandBufferProxyImpl::RegisterTransferBuffer(
base::SharedMemory* shared_memory,
size_t size,
int32 id_request) {
if (last_state_.error != gpu::error::kNoError)
return -1;
// Returns FileDescriptor with auto_close off.
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle = shared_memory->handle();
#if defined(OS_WIN)
// Windows needs to explicitly duplicate the handle out to another process.
if (!sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle(handle, channel_->gpu_pid(),
&handle, FILE_MAP_WRITE, 0)) {
return -1;
}
#endif
int32 id;
if (!Send(new GpuCommandBufferMsg_RegisterTransferBuffer(
route_id_,
handle,
size,
id_request,
&id))) {
return -1;
}
return id;
}
| 170,927 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void *hashtable_get(hashtable_t *hashtable, const char *key)
{
pair_t *pair;
size_t hash;
bucket_t *bucket;
hash = hash_str(key);
bucket = &hashtable->buckets[hash % num_buckets(hashtable)];
pair = hashtable_find_pair(hashtable, bucket, key, hash);
if(!pair)
return NULL;
return pair->value;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | void *hashtable_get(hashtable_t *hashtable, const char *key)
{
pair_t *pair;
size_t hash;
bucket_t *bucket;
hash = hash_str(key);
bucket = &hashtable->buckets[hash & hashmask(hashtable->order)];
pair = hashtable_find_pair(hashtable, bucket, key, hash);
if(!pair)
return NULL;
return pair->value;
}
| 166,530 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŧтҭ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"п > n; ћ > h; ґ > r; ғ > f; ҫ > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x; [ҽҿ] > e;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; ԍ > g; ട > s"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Map U+0454 (є) to 'e' (small E)
Bug: 803571
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I8cc473d0e74208076a2aa17c1869d14bbfaa20ed
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/882006
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531739}
CWE ID: | IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
// - U+043F (п) => n
// - {U+0454 (є), U+04BD (ҽ), U+04BF (ҿ)} => e
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŧтҭ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"п > n; [єҽҿ] > e; ґ > r; ғ > f; ҫ > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; ԍ > g; ട > s"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
| 172,737 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: native_handle* Parcel::readNativeHandle() const
{
int numFds, numInts;
status_t err;
err = readInt32(&numFds);
if (err != NO_ERROR) return 0;
err = readInt32(&numInts);
if (err != NO_ERROR) return 0;
native_handle* h = native_handle_create(numFds, numInts);
for (int i=0 ; err==NO_ERROR && i<numFds ; i++) {
h->data[i] = dup(readFileDescriptor());
if (h->data[i] < 0) err = BAD_VALUE;
}
err = read(h->data + numFds, sizeof(int)*numInts);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
native_handle_close(h);
native_handle_delete(h);
h = 0;
}
return h;
}
Commit Message: Verify that the native handle was created
The inputs to native_handle_create can cause an overflowed allocation,
so check the return value of native_handle_create before accessing
the memory it returns.
Bug:19334482
Change-Id: I1f489382776c2a1390793a79dc27ea17baa9b2a2
(cherry picked from commit eaac99a7172da52a76ba48c26413778a74951b1a)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | native_handle* Parcel::readNativeHandle() const
{
int numFds, numInts;
status_t err;
err = readInt32(&numFds);
if (err != NO_ERROR) return 0;
err = readInt32(&numInts);
if (err != NO_ERROR) return 0;
native_handle* h = native_handle_create(numFds, numInts);
if (!h) {
return 0;
}
for (int i=0 ; err==NO_ERROR && i<numFds ; i++) {
h->data[i] = dup(readFileDescriptor());
if (h->data[i] < 0) err = BAD_VALUE;
}
err = read(h->data + numFds, sizeof(int)*numInts);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
native_handle_close(h);
native_handle_delete(h);
h = 0;
}
return h;
}
| 173,373 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_objpath (MyObject *obj, const char *incoming, const char **outgoing, GError **error)
{
if (strcmp (incoming, "/org/freedesktop/DBus/GLib/Tests/MyTestObject"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid incoming object");
return FALSE;
}
*outgoing = "/org/freedesktop/DBus/GLib/Tests/MyTestObject2";
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_objpath (MyObject *obj, const char *incoming, const char **outgoing, GError **error)
| 165,114 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void t1_check_unusual_charstring(void)
{
char *p = strstr(t1_line_array, charstringname) + strlen(charstringname);
int i;
/* if no number follows "/CharStrings", let's read the next line */
if (sscanf(p, "%i", &i) != 1) {
/* pdftex_warn("no number found after `%s', I assume it's on the next line",
charstringname); */
strcpy(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array);
/* t1_getline always appends EOL to t1_line_array; let's change it to
* space before appending the next line
*/
*(strend(t1_buf_array) - 1) = ' ';
t1_getline();
strcat(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array);
strcpy(t1_line_array, t1_buf_array);
t1_line_ptr = eol(t1_line_array);
}
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void t1_check_unusual_charstring(void)
{
char *p = strstr(t1_line_array, charstringname) + strlen(charstringname);
int i;
/* if no number follows "/CharStrings", let's read the next line */
if (sscanf(p, "%i", &i) != 1) {
/* pdftex_warn("no number found after `%s', I assume it's on the next line",
charstringname); */
strcpy(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array);
/* t1_getline always appends EOL to t1_line_array; let's change it to
* space before appending the next line
*/
*(strend(t1_buf_array) - 1) = ' ';
t1_getline();
alloc_array(t1_buf, strlen(t1_line_array) + strlen(t1_buf_array) + 1, T1_BUF_SIZE);
strcat(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array);
alloc_array(t1_line, strlen(t1_buf_array) + 1, T1_BUF_SIZE);
strcpy(t1_line_array, t1_buf_array);
t1_line_ptr = eol(t1_line_array);
}
}
| 169,020 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_get_algo_block_size)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir)
RETURN_LONG(mcrypt_module_get_algo_block_size(module, dir));
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_get_algo_block_size)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir)
RETURN_LONG(mcrypt_module_get_algo_block_size(module, dir));
}
| 167,099 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: server_request_direct_streamlocal(void)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *target, *originator;
u_short originator_port;
target = packet_get_string(NULL);
originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
originator_port = packet_get_int();
packet_check_eom();
debug("server_request_direct_streamlocal: originator %s port %d, target %s",
originator, originator_port, target);
/* XXX fine grained permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
!no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding) {
c = channel_connect_to_path(target,
"direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
} else {
logit("refused streamlocal port forward: "
"originator %s port %d, target %s",
originator, originator_port, target);
}
free(originator);
free(target);
return c;
}
Commit Message: disable Unix-domain socket forwarding when privsep is disabled
CWE ID: CWE-264 | server_request_direct_streamlocal(void)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *target, *originator;
u_short originator_port;
target = packet_get_string(NULL);
originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
originator_port = packet_get_int();
packet_check_eom();
debug("server_request_direct_streamlocal: originator %s port %d, target %s",
originator, originator_port, target);
/* XXX fine grained permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
!no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding &&
use_privsep) {
c = channel_connect_to_path(target,
"direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
} else {
logit("refused streamlocal port forward: "
"originator %s port %d, target %s",
originator, originator_port, target);
}
free(originator);
free(target);
return c;
}
| 168,662 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator(
media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::Client* client,
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process)
: client_(client),
egl_config_(NULL),
state_(kUninitialized),
pictures_requested_(false),
renderer_process_(renderer_process),
last_input_buffer_id_(-1),
inputs_before_decode_(0) {
memset(&input_stream_info_, 0, sizeof(input_stream_info_));
memset(&output_stream_info_, 0, sizeof(output_stream_info_));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator(
media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::Client* client)
: client_(client),
egl_config_(NULL),
state_(kUninitialized),
pictures_requested_(false),
last_input_buffer_id_(-1),
inputs_before_decode_(0) {
memset(&input_stream_info_, 0, sizeof(input_stream_info_));
memset(&output_stream_info_, 0, sizeof(output_stream_info_));
}
| 170,940 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TestOpenCallback()
: callback_(
base::Bind(&TestOpenCallback::SetResult, base::Unretained(this))) {}
Commit Message: Update helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest for OnceCallback
Helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest.cc don't fit to OnceCallback
migration, as they are copied and passed to others.
This CL updates them to pass new callbacks for each use to avoid the
copy of callbacks.
Bug: 714018
Change-Id: Ifb70901439ae92b6b049b84534283c39ebc40ee0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/527549
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478549}
CWE ID: | TestOpenCallback()
| 171,976 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void spl_filesystem_tree_it_move_forward(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator = (spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter;
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object(iterator);
object->u.dir.index++;
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
} while (spl_filesystem_is_dot(object->u.dir.entry.d_name));
if (object->file_name) {
efree(object->file_name);
object->file_name = NULL;
}
if (iterator->current) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iterator->current);
iterator->current = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static void spl_filesystem_tree_it_move_forward(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator = (spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter;
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object(iterator);
object->u.dir.index++;
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
} while (spl_filesystem_is_dot(object->u.dir.entry.d_name));
if (object->file_name) {
efree(object->file_name);
object->file_name = NULL;
}
if (iterator->current) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iterator->current);
iterator->current = NULL;
}
}
| 167,087 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppCacheHost::SelectCache(const GURL& document_url,
const int64 cache_document_was_loaded_from,
const GURL& manifest_url) {
DCHECK(pending_start_update_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_swap_cache_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_get_status_callback_.is_null() &&
!is_selection_pending() && !was_select_cache_called_);
was_select_cache_called_ = true;
if (!is_cache_selection_enabled_) {
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
return;
}
origin_in_use_ = document_url.GetOrigin();
if (service()->quota_manager_proxy() && !origin_in_use_.is_empty())
service()->quota_manager_proxy()->NotifyOriginInUse(origin_in_use_);
if (main_resource_blocked_)
frontend_->OnContentBlocked(host_id_,
blocked_manifest_url_);
if (cache_document_was_loaded_from != kAppCacheNoCacheId) {
LoadSelectedCache(cache_document_was_loaded_from);
return;
}
if (!manifest_url.is_empty() &&
(manifest_url.GetOrigin() == document_url.GetOrigin())) {
DCHECK(!first_party_url_.is_empty());
AppCachePolicy* policy = service()->appcache_policy();
if (policy &&
!policy->CanCreateAppCache(manifest_url, first_party_url_)) {
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
std::vector<int> host_ids(1, host_id_);
frontend_->OnEventRaised(host_ids, APPCACHE_CHECKING_EVENT);
frontend_->OnErrorEventRaised(
host_ids,
AppCacheErrorDetails(
"Cache creation was blocked by the content policy",
APPCACHE_POLICY_ERROR,
GURL(),
0,
false /*is_cross_origin*/));
frontend_->OnContentBlocked(host_id_, manifest_url);
return;
}
set_preferred_manifest_url(manifest_url);
new_master_entry_url_ = document_url;
LoadOrCreateGroup(manifest_url);
return;
}
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID: | void AppCacheHost::SelectCache(const GURL& document_url,
bool AppCacheHost::SelectCache(const GURL& document_url,
const int64 cache_document_was_loaded_from,
const GURL& manifest_url) {
if (was_select_cache_called_)
return false;
DCHECK(pending_start_update_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_swap_cache_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_get_status_callback_.is_null() &&
!is_selection_pending());
was_select_cache_called_ = true;
if (!is_cache_selection_enabled_) {
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
return true;
}
origin_in_use_ = document_url.GetOrigin();
if (service()->quota_manager_proxy() && !origin_in_use_.is_empty())
service()->quota_manager_proxy()->NotifyOriginInUse(origin_in_use_);
if (main_resource_blocked_)
frontend_->OnContentBlocked(host_id_,
blocked_manifest_url_);
if (cache_document_was_loaded_from != kAppCacheNoCacheId) {
LoadSelectedCache(cache_document_was_loaded_from);
return true;
}
if (!manifest_url.is_empty() &&
(manifest_url.GetOrigin() == document_url.GetOrigin())) {
DCHECK(!first_party_url_.is_empty());
AppCachePolicy* policy = service()->appcache_policy();
if (policy &&
!policy->CanCreateAppCache(manifest_url, first_party_url_)) {
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
std::vector<int> host_ids(1, host_id_);
frontend_->OnEventRaised(host_ids, APPCACHE_CHECKING_EVENT);
frontend_->OnErrorEventRaised(
host_ids,
AppCacheErrorDetails(
"Cache creation was blocked by the content policy",
APPCACHE_POLICY_ERROR,
GURL(),
0,
false /*is_cross_origin*/));
frontend_->OnContentBlocked(host_id_, manifest_url);
return true;
}
set_preferred_manifest_url(manifest_url);
new_master_entry_url_ = document_url;
LoadOrCreateGroup(manifest_url);
return true;
}
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
return true;
}
| 171,740 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DefragRegisterTests(void)
{
#ifdef UNITTESTS
UtRegisterTest("DefragInOrderSimpleTest", DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragReverseSimpleTest", DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest", DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest", DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest", DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLastTest", DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4NoDataTest", DefragIPv4NoDataTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4TooLargeTest", DefragIPv4TooLargeTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest", IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest", IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanTest", DefragVlanTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanQinQTest", DefragVlanQinQTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTrackerReuseTest", DefragTrackerReuseTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTimeoutTest", DefragTimeoutTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv4Test", DefragMfIpv4Test);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv6Test", DefragMfIpv6Test);
#endif /* UNITTESTS */
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | DefragRegisterTests(void)
{
#ifdef UNITTESTS
UtRegisterTest("DefragInOrderSimpleTest", DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragReverseSimpleTest", DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest", DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest", DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest", DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLastTest", DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4NoDataTest", DefragIPv4NoDataTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4TooLargeTest", DefragIPv4TooLargeTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest", IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest", IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanTest", DefragVlanTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanQinQTest", DefragVlanQinQTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTrackerReuseTest", DefragTrackerReuseTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTimeoutTest", DefragTimeoutTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv4Test", DefragMfIpv4Test);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv6Test", DefragMfIpv6Test);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTestBadProto", DefragTestBadProto);
#endif /* UNITTESTS */
}
| 168,301 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebPageSerializerImpl::openTagToString(Element* element,
SerializeDomParam* param)
{
bool needSkip;
StringBuilder result;
result.append(preActionBeforeSerializeOpenTag(element, param, &needSkip));
if (needSkip)
return;
result.append('<');
result.append(element->nodeName().lower());
AttributeCollection attributes = element->attributes();
AttributeCollection::iterator end = attributes.end();
for (AttributeCollection::iterator it = attributes.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
result.append(' ');
result.append(it->name().toString());
result.appendLiteral("=\"");
if (!it->value().isEmpty()) {
const String& attrValue = it->value();
const QualifiedName& attrName = it->name();
if (element->hasLegalLinkAttribute(attrName)) {
if (attrValue.startsWith("javascript:", TextCaseInsensitive)) {
result.append(attrValue);
} else {
WebLocalFrameImpl* subFrame = WebLocalFrameImpl::fromFrameOwnerElement(element);
String completeURL = subFrame ? subFrame->frame()->document()->url() :
param->document->completeURL(attrValue);
if (m_localLinks.contains(completeURL)) {
if (!param->directoryName.isEmpty()) {
result.appendLiteral("./");
result.append(param->directoryName);
result.append('/');
}
result.append(m_localLinks.get(completeURL));
} else {
result.append(completeURL);
}
}
} else {
if (param->isHTMLDocument)
result.append(m_htmlEntities.convertEntitiesInString(attrValue));
else
result.append(m_xmlEntities.convertEntitiesInString(attrValue));
}
}
result.append('\"');
}
String addedContents = postActionAfterSerializeOpenTag(element, param);
if (element->hasChildren() || param->haveAddedContentsBeforeEnd)
result.append('>');
result.append(addedContents);
saveHTMLContentToBuffer(result.toString(), param);
}
Commit Message: Make WebPageSerializerImpl to escape URL attribute values in result.
This patch makes |WebPageSerializerImpl| to escape URL attribute values rather
than directly output URL attribute values into result.
BUG=542054
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.URLAttributeValues
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1398453005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#353712}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void WebPageSerializerImpl::openTagToString(Element* element,
SerializeDomParam* param)
{
bool needSkip;
StringBuilder result;
result.append(preActionBeforeSerializeOpenTag(element, param, &needSkip));
if (needSkip)
return;
result.append('<');
result.append(element->nodeName().lower());
AttributeCollection attributes = element->attributes();
AttributeCollection::iterator end = attributes.end();
for (AttributeCollection::iterator it = attributes.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
result.append(' ');
result.append(it->name().toString());
result.appendLiteral("=\"");
if (!it->value().isEmpty()) {
const String& attrValue = it->value();
const QualifiedName& attrName = it->name();
if (element->hasLegalLinkAttribute(attrName)) {
if (attrValue.startsWith("javascript:", TextCaseInsensitive)) {
result.append(m_htmlEntities.convertEntitiesInString(attrValue));
} else {
WebLocalFrameImpl* subFrame = WebLocalFrameImpl::fromFrameOwnerElement(element);
String completeURL = subFrame ? subFrame->frame()->document()->url() :
param->document->completeURL(attrValue);
if (m_localLinks.contains(completeURL)) {
if (!param->directoryName.isEmpty()) {
result.appendLiteral("./");
result.append(param->directoryName);
result.append('/');
}
result.append(m_htmlEntities.convertEntitiesInString(m_localLinks.get(completeURL)));
} else {
result.append(m_htmlEntities.convertEntitiesInString(completeURL));
}
}
} else {
if (param->isHTMLDocument)
result.append(m_htmlEntities.convertEntitiesInString(attrValue));
else
result.append(m_xmlEntities.convertEntitiesInString(attrValue));
}
}
result.append('\"');
}
String addedContents = postActionAfterSerializeOpenTag(element, param);
if (element->hasChildren() || param->haveAddedContentsBeforeEnd)
result.append('>');
result.append(addedContents);
saveHTMLContentToBuffer(result.toString(), param);
}
| 171,727 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NetworkHandler::SetNetworkConditions(
network::mojom::NetworkConditionsPtr conditions) {
if (!process_)
return;
StoragePartition* partition = process_->GetStoragePartition();
network::mojom::NetworkContext* context = partition->GetNetworkContext();
context->SetNetworkConditions(host_id_, std::move(conditions));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void NetworkHandler::SetNetworkConditions(
network::mojom::NetworkConditionsPtr conditions) {
if (!storage_partition_)
return;
network::mojom::NetworkContext* context =
storage_partition_->GetNetworkContext();
context->SetNetworkConditions(host_id_, std::move(conditions));
}
| 172,762 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DownloadUrlParameters::DownloadUrlParameters(
const GURL& url,
int render_process_host_id,
int render_view_host_routing_id,
int render_frame_host_routing_id,
const net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag& traffic_annotation)
: content_initiated_(false),
use_if_range_(true),
method_("GET"),
post_id_(-1),
prefer_cache_(false),
referrer_policy_(
net::URLRequest::
CLEAR_REFERRER_ON_TRANSITION_FROM_SECURE_TO_INSECURE),
render_process_host_id_(render_process_host_id),
render_view_host_routing_id_(render_view_host_routing_id),
render_frame_host_routing_id_(render_frame_host_routing_id),
url_(url),
do_not_prompt_for_login_(false),
follow_cross_origin_redirects_(true),
fetch_error_body_(false),
transient_(false),
traffic_annotation_(traffic_annotation),
download_source_(DownloadSource::UNKNOWN) {}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | DownloadUrlParameters::DownloadUrlParameters(
const GURL& url,
int render_process_host_id,
int render_view_host_routing_id,
int render_frame_host_routing_id,
const net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag& traffic_annotation)
: content_initiated_(false),
use_if_range_(true),
method_("GET"),
post_id_(-1),
prefer_cache_(false),
referrer_policy_(
net::URLRequest::
CLEAR_REFERRER_ON_TRANSITION_FROM_SECURE_TO_INSECURE),
render_process_host_id_(render_process_host_id),
render_view_host_routing_id_(render_view_host_routing_id),
render_frame_host_routing_id_(render_frame_host_routing_id),
frame_tree_node_id_(-1),
url_(url),
do_not_prompt_for_login_(false),
follow_cross_origin_redirects_(true),
fetch_error_body_(false),
transient_(false),
traffic_annotation_(traffic_annotation),
download_source_(DownloadSource::UNKNOWN) {}
| 173,020 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void sig_server_setup_fill_chatnet(IRC_SERVER_CONNECT_REC *conn,
IRC_CHATNET_REC *ircnet)
{
if (!IS_IRC_SERVER_CONNECT(conn))
return;
g_return_if_fail(IS_IRCNET(ircnet));
if (ircnet->alternate_nick != NULL) {
g_free_and_null(conn->alternate_nick);
conn->alternate_nick = g_strdup(ircnet->alternate_nick);
}
if (ircnet->usermode != NULL) {
g_free_and_null(conn->usermode);
conn->usermode = g_strdup(ircnet->usermode);
}
if (ircnet->max_kicks > 0) conn->max_kicks = ircnet->max_kicks;
if (ircnet->max_msgs > 0) conn->max_msgs = ircnet->max_msgs;
if (ircnet->max_modes > 0) conn->max_modes = ircnet->max_modes;
if (ircnet->max_whois > 0) conn->max_whois = ircnet->max_whois;
if (ircnet->max_cmds_at_once > 0)
conn->max_cmds_at_once = ircnet->max_cmds_at_once;
if (ircnet->cmd_queue_speed > 0)
conn->cmd_queue_speed = ircnet->cmd_queue_speed;
if (ircnet->max_query_chans > 0)
conn->max_query_chans = ircnet->max_query_chans;
/* Validate the SASL parameters filled by sig_chatnet_read() or cmd_network_add */
conn->sasl_mechanism = SASL_MECHANISM_NONE;
conn->sasl_username = NULL;
conn->sasl_password = NULL;
if (ircnet->sasl_mechanism != NULL) {
if (!g_ascii_strcasecmp(ircnet->sasl_mechanism, "plain")) {
/* The PLAIN method needs both the username and the password */
conn->sasl_mechanism = SASL_MECHANISM_PLAIN;
if (ircnet->sasl_username != NULL && *ircnet->sasl_username &&
ircnet->sasl_password != NULL && *ircnet->sasl_password) {
conn->sasl_username = ircnet->sasl_username;
conn->sasl_password = ircnet->sasl_password;
} else
g_warning("The fields sasl_username and sasl_password are either missing or empty");
}
else if (!g_ascii_strcasecmp(ircnet->sasl_mechanism, "external")) {
conn->sasl_mechanism = SASL_MECHANISM_EXTERNAL;
}
else
g_warning("Unsupported SASL mechanism \"%s\" selected", ircnet->sasl_mechanism);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1058 from ailin-nemui/sasl-reconnect
copy sasl username and password values
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static void sig_server_setup_fill_chatnet(IRC_SERVER_CONNECT_REC *conn,
IRC_CHATNET_REC *ircnet)
{
if (!IS_IRC_SERVER_CONNECT(conn))
return;
g_return_if_fail(IS_IRCNET(ircnet));
if (ircnet->alternate_nick != NULL) {
g_free_and_null(conn->alternate_nick);
conn->alternate_nick = g_strdup(ircnet->alternate_nick);
}
if (ircnet->usermode != NULL) {
g_free_and_null(conn->usermode);
conn->usermode = g_strdup(ircnet->usermode);
}
if (ircnet->max_kicks > 0) conn->max_kicks = ircnet->max_kicks;
if (ircnet->max_msgs > 0) conn->max_msgs = ircnet->max_msgs;
if (ircnet->max_modes > 0) conn->max_modes = ircnet->max_modes;
if (ircnet->max_whois > 0) conn->max_whois = ircnet->max_whois;
if (ircnet->max_cmds_at_once > 0)
conn->max_cmds_at_once = ircnet->max_cmds_at_once;
if (ircnet->cmd_queue_speed > 0)
conn->cmd_queue_speed = ircnet->cmd_queue_speed;
if (ircnet->max_query_chans > 0)
conn->max_query_chans = ircnet->max_query_chans;
/* Validate the SASL parameters filled by sig_chatnet_read() or cmd_network_add */
conn->sasl_mechanism = SASL_MECHANISM_NONE;
conn->sasl_username = NULL;
conn->sasl_password = NULL;
if (ircnet->sasl_mechanism != NULL) {
if (!g_ascii_strcasecmp(ircnet->sasl_mechanism, "plain")) {
/* The PLAIN method needs both the username and the password */
conn->sasl_mechanism = SASL_MECHANISM_PLAIN;
if (ircnet->sasl_username != NULL && *ircnet->sasl_username &&
ircnet->sasl_password != NULL && *ircnet->sasl_password) {
conn->sasl_username = g_strdup(ircnet->sasl_username);
conn->sasl_password = g_strdup(ircnet->sasl_password);
} else
g_warning("The fields sasl_username and sasl_password are either missing or empty");
}
else if (!g_ascii_strcasecmp(ircnet->sasl_mechanism, "external")) {
conn->sasl_mechanism = SASL_MECHANISM_EXTERNAL;
}
else
g_warning("Unsupported SASL mechanism \"%s\" selected", ircnet->sasl_mechanism);
}
}
| 169,644 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void StreamingProcessor::releaseRecordingFrame(const sp<IMemory>& mem) {
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
Mutex::Autolock m(mMutex);
ssize_t offset;
size_t size;
sp<IMemoryHeap> heap = mem->getMemory(&offset, &size);
if (heap->getHeapID() != mRecordingHeap->mHeap->getHeapID()) {
ALOGW("%s: Camera %d: Mismatched heap ID, ignoring release "
"(got %x, expected %x)", __FUNCTION__, mId,
heap->getHeapID(), mRecordingHeap->mHeap->getHeapID());
return;
}
VideoNativeMetadata *payload = reinterpret_cast<VideoNativeMetadata*>(
(uint8_t*)heap->getBase() + offset);
if (payload->eType != kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Recording frame type invalid (got %x, expected %x)",
__FUNCTION__, mId, payload->eType,
kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer);
return;
}
size_t itemIndex;
for (itemIndex = 0; itemIndex < mRecordingBuffers.size(); itemIndex++) {
const BufferItem item = mRecordingBuffers[itemIndex];
if (item.mBuf != BufferItemConsumer::INVALID_BUFFER_SLOT &&
item.mGraphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer() == payload->pBuffer) {
break;
}
}
if (itemIndex == mRecordingBuffers.size()) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't find returned ANW Buffer %p in list of "
"outstanding buffers", __FUNCTION__, mId,
payload->pBuffer);
return;
}
ALOGVV("%s: Camera %d: Freeing returned ANW buffer %p index %d", __FUNCTION__,
mId, payload->pBuffer, itemIndex);
res = mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(mRecordingBuffers[itemIndex]);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to free recording frame "
"(Returned ANW buffer: %p): %s (%d)", __FUNCTION__,
mId, payload->pBuffer, strerror(-res), res);
return;
}
mRecordingBuffers.replaceAt(itemIndex);
mRecordingHeapFree++;
ALOGV_IF(mRecordingHeapFree == mRecordingHeapCount,
"%s: Camera %d: All %d recording buffers returned",
__FUNCTION__, mId, mRecordingHeapCount);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void StreamingProcessor::releaseRecordingFrame(const sp<IMemory>& mem) {
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
Mutex::Autolock m(mMutex);
ssize_t offset;
size_t size;
sp<IMemoryHeap> heap = mem->getMemory(&offset, &size);
if (heap->getHeapID() != mRecordingHeap->mHeap->getHeapID()) {
ALOGW("%s: Camera %d: Mismatched heap ID, ignoring release "
"(got %x, expected %x)", __FUNCTION__, mId,
heap->getHeapID(), mRecordingHeap->mHeap->getHeapID());
return;
}
VideoNativeMetadata *payload = reinterpret_cast<VideoNativeMetadata*>(
(uint8_t*)heap->getBase() + offset);
if (payload->eType != kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Recording frame type invalid (got %x, expected %x)",
__FUNCTION__, mId, payload->eType,
kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer);
return;
}
// b/28466701
payload->pBuffer = (ANativeWindowBuffer*)(((uint8_t*)payload->pBuffer) +
ICameraRecordingProxy::getCommonBaseAddress());
size_t itemIndex;
for (itemIndex = 0; itemIndex < mRecordingBuffers.size(); itemIndex++) {
const BufferItem item = mRecordingBuffers[itemIndex];
if (item.mBuf != BufferItemConsumer::INVALID_BUFFER_SLOT &&
item.mGraphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer() == payload->pBuffer) {
break;
}
}
if (itemIndex == mRecordingBuffers.size()) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't find returned ANW Buffer %p in list of "
"outstanding buffers", __FUNCTION__, mId,
payload->pBuffer);
return;
}
ALOGVV("%s: Camera %d: Freeing returned ANW buffer %p index %d", __FUNCTION__,
mId, payload->pBuffer, itemIndex);
res = mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(mRecordingBuffers[itemIndex]);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to free recording frame "
"(Returned ANW buffer: %p): %s (%d)", __FUNCTION__,
mId, payload->pBuffer, strerror(-res), res);
return;
}
mRecordingBuffers.replaceAt(itemIndex);
mRecordingHeapFree++;
ALOGV_IF(mRecordingHeapFree == mRecordingHeapCount,
"%s: Camera %d: All %d recording buffers returned",
__FUNCTION__, mId, mRecordingHeapCount);
}
| 173,512 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ProcXSendExtensionEvent(ClientPtr client)
{
int ret;
DeviceIntPtr dev;
xEvent *first;
XEventClass *list;
struct tmask tmp[EMASKSIZE];
REQUEST(xSendExtensionEventReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xSendExtensionEventReq);
if (stuff->length !=
bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xSendExtensionEventReq)) + stuff->count +
(stuff->num_events * bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xEvent))))
return BadLength;
ret = dixLookupDevice(&dev, stuff->deviceid, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (ret != Success)
return ret;
if (stuff->num_events == 0)
return ret;
/* The client's event type must be one defined by an extension. */
first = ((xEvent *) &stuff[1]);
if (!((EXTENSION_EVENT_BASE <= first->u.u.type) &&
(first->u.u.type < lastEvent))) {
client->errorValue = first->u.u.type;
return BadValue;
}
list = (XEventClass *) (first + stuff->num_events);
return ret;
ret = (SendEvent(client, dev, stuff->destination,
stuff->propagate, (xEvent *) &stuff[1],
tmp[stuff->deviceid].mask, stuff->num_events));
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ProcXSendExtensionEvent(ClientPtr client)
{
int ret, i;
DeviceIntPtr dev;
xEvent *first;
XEventClass *list;
struct tmask tmp[EMASKSIZE];
REQUEST(xSendExtensionEventReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xSendExtensionEventReq);
if (stuff->length !=
bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xSendExtensionEventReq)) + stuff->count +
(stuff->num_events * bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xEvent))))
return BadLength;
ret = dixLookupDevice(&dev, stuff->deviceid, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (ret != Success)
return ret;
if (stuff->num_events == 0)
return ret;
/* The client's event type must be one defined by an extension. */
first = ((xEvent *) &stuff[1]);
for (i = 0; i < stuff->num_events; i++) {
if (!((EXTENSION_EVENT_BASE <= first[i].u.u.type) &&
(first[i].u.u.type < lastEvent))) {
client->errorValue = first[i].u.u.type;
return BadValue;
}
}
list = (XEventClass *) (first + stuff->num_events);
return ret;
ret = (SendEvent(client, dev, stuff->destination,
stuff->propagate, (xEvent *) &stuff[1],
tmp[stuff->deviceid].mask, stuff->num_events));
return ret;
}
| 164,765 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int NaClIPCAdapter::TakeClientFileDescriptor() {
return io_thread_data_.channel_->TakeClientFileDescriptor();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | int NaClIPCAdapter::TakeClientFileDescriptor() {
| 170,731 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(icu::UnicodeString("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
transliterator_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d; ӏ > l; [кĸκ] > k; п > n;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Add a few more confusable map entries
1. Map Malaylam U+0D1F to 's'.
2. Map 'small-cap-like' Cyrillic letters to "look-alike" Latin lowercase
letters.
The characters in new confusable map entries are replaced by their Latin
"look-alike" characters before the skeleton is calculated to compare with
top domain names.
Bug: 784761,773930
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDNToUni*
Change-Id: Ib26664e21ac5eb290e4a2993b01cbf0edaade0ee
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/805214
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#521648}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(icu::UnicodeString("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
// removal; NFC".
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
// Supplement the Unicode confusable list by the following mapping.
// - U+04CF (ӏ) => l
// - {U+043A (к), U+0138(ĸ), U+03BA(κ)} => k
// - U+043F(п) => n
// - {U+0185 (ƅ), U+044C (ь)} => b
// - U+0432 (в) => b
// - U+043C (м) => m
// - U+043D (н) => h
// - U+0442 (т) => t
// - {U+0448 (ш), U+0449 (щ)} => w
// - U+0D1F (ട) => s
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString(
"ӏ > l; [кĸκ] > k; п > n; [ƅь] > b; в > b; м > m; н > h; "
"т > t; [шщ] > w; ട > s;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
| 172,685 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int tga_readheader(FILE *fp, unsigned int *bits_per_pixel,
unsigned int *width, unsigned int *height, int *flip_image)
{
int palette_size;
unsigned char tga[TGA_HEADER_SIZE];
unsigned char id_len, /*cmap_type,*/ image_type;
unsigned char pixel_depth, image_desc;
unsigned short /*cmap_index,*/ cmap_len, cmap_entry_size;
unsigned short /*x_origin, y_origin,*/ image_w, image_h;
if (!bits_per_pixel || !width || !height || !flip_image) {
return 0;
}
if (fread(tga, TGA_HEADER_SIZE, 1, fp) != 1) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
return 0 ;
}
id_len = tga[0];
/*cmap_type = tga[1];*/
image_type = tga[2];
/*cmap_index = get_ushort(&tga[3]);*/
cmap_len = get_ushort(&tga[5]);
cmap_entry_size = tga[7];
#if 0
x_origin = get_ushort(&tga[8]);
y_origin = get_ushort(&tga[10]);
#endif
image_w = get_ushort(&tga[12]);
image_h = get_ushort(&tga[14]);
pixel_depth = tga[16];
image_desc = tga[17];
*bits_per_pixel = (unsigned int)pixel_depth;
*width = (unsigned int)image_w;
*height = (unsigned int)image_h;
/* Ignore tga identifier, if present ... */
if (id_len) {
unsigned char *id = (unsigned char *) malloc(id_len);
if (id == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "tga_readheader: memory out\n");
return 0;
}
if (!fread(id, id_len, 1, fp)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
free(id);
return 0 ;
}
free(id);
}
/* Test for compressed formats ... not yet supported ...
if (image_type > 8) {
fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, compressed tga files are not currently supported.\n");
return 0 ;
}
*flip_image = !(image_desc & 32);
/* Palettized formats are not yet supported, skip over the palette, if present ... */
palette_size = cmap_len * (cmap_entry_size / 8);
if (palette_size > 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "File contains a palette - not yet supported.");
fseek(fp, palette_size, SEEK_CUR);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: tgatoimage(): avoid excessive memory allocation attempt, and fixes unaligned load (#995)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static int tga_readheader(FILE *fp, unsigned int *bits_per_pixel,
unsigned int *width, unsigned int *height, int *flip_image)
{
int palette_size;
unsigned char tga[TGA_HEADER_SIZE];
unsigned char id_len, /*cmap_type,*/ image_type;
unsigned char pixel_depth, image_desc;
unsigned short /*cmap_index,*/ cmap_len, cmap_entry_size;
unsigned short /*x_origin, y_origin,*/ image_w, image_h;
if (!bits_per_pixel || !width || !height || !flip_image) {
return 0;
}
if (fread(tga, TGA_HEADER_SIZE, 1, fp) != 1) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
return 0 ;
}
id_len = tga[0];
/*cmap_type = tga[1];*/
image_type = tga[2];
/*cmap_index = get_tga_ushort(&tga[3]);*/
cmap_len = get_tga_ushort(&tga[5]);
cmap_entry_size = tga[7];
#if 0
x_origin = get_tga_ushort(&tga[8]);
y_origin = get_tga_ushort(&tga[10]);
#endif
image_w = get_tga_ushort(&tga[12]);
image_h = get_tga_ushort(&tga[14]);
pixel_depth = tga[16];
image_desc = tga[17];
*bits_per_pixel = (unsigned int)pixel_depth;
*width = (unsigned int)image_w;
*height = (unsigned int)image_h;
/* Ignore tga identifier, if present ... */
if (id_len) {
unsigned char *id = (unsigned char *) malloc(id_len);
if (id == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "tga_readheader: memory out\n");
return 0;
}
if (!fread(id, id_len, 1, fp)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
free(id);
return 0 ;
}
free(id);
}
/* Test for compressed formats ... not yet supported ...
if (image_type > 8) {
fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, compressed tga files are not currently supported.\n");
return 0 ;
}
*flip_image = !(image_desc & 32);
/* Palettized formats are not yet supported, skip over the palette, if present ... */
palette_size = cmap_len * (cmap_entry_size / 8);
if (palette_size > 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "File contains a palette - not yet supported.");
fseek(fp, palette_size, SEEK_CUR);
}
return 1;
}
| 167,781 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct tcp_sock_t *tcp_open(uint16_t port)
{
struct tcp_sock_t *this = calloc(1, sizeof *this);
if (this == NULL) {
ERR("callocing this failed");
goto error;
}
this->sd = -1;
this->sd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (this->sd < 0) {
ERR("sockect open failed");
goto error;
}
struct sockaddr_in6 addr;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof addr);
addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
addr.sin6_port = htons(port);
addr.sin6_addr = in6addr_any;
if (bind(this->sd,
(struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof addr) < 0) {
if (g_options.only_desired_port == 1)
ERR("Bind on port failed. "
"Requested port may be taken or require root permissions.");
goto error;
}
if (listen(this->sd, HTTP_MAX_PENDING_CONNS) < 0) {
ERR("listen failed on socket");
goto error;
}
return this;
error:
if (this != NULL) {
if (this->sd != -1) {
close(this->sd);
}
free(this);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY FIX: Actually restrict the access to the printer to localhost
Before, any machine in any network connected by any of the interfaces (as
listed by "ifconfig") could access to an IPP-over-USB printer on the assigned
port, allowing users on remote machines to print and to access the web
configuration interface of a IPP-over-USB printer in contrary to conventional
USB printers which are only accessible locally.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | struct tcp_sock_t *tcp_open(uint16_t port)
{
struct tcp_sock_t *this = calloc(1, sizeof *this);
if (this == NULL) {
ERR("IPv4: callocing this failed");
goto error;
}
// Open [S]ocket [D]escriptor
this->sd = -1;
this->sd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (this->sd < 0) {
ERR("IPv4 socket open failed");
goto error;
}
// Configure socket params
struct sockaddr_in addr;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof addr);
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr.sin_port = htons(port);
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(0x7F000001);
// Bind to localhost
if (bind(this->sd,
(struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof addr) < 0) {
if (g_options.only_desired_port == 1)
ERR("IPv4 bind on port failed. "
"Requested port may be taken or require root permissions.");
goto error;
}
// Let kernel over-accept max number of connections
if (listen(this->sd, HTTP_MAX_PENDING_CONNS) < 0) {
ERR("IPv4 listen failed on socket");
goto error;
}
return this;
error:
if (this != NULL) {
if (this->sd != -1) {
close(this->sd);
}
free(this);
}
return NULL;
}
struct tcp_sock_t *tcp6_open(uint16_t port)
{
struct tcp_sock_t *this = calloc(1, sizeof *this);
if (this == NULL) {
ERR("IPv6: callocing this failed");
goto error;
}
this->sd = -1;
this->sd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (this->sd < 0) {
ERR("Ipv6 socket open failed");
goto error;
}
struct sockaddr_in6 addr;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof addr);
addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
addr.sin6_port = htons(port);
addr.sin6_addr = in6addr_loopback;
if (bind(this->sd,
(struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof addr) < 0) {
if (g_options.only_desired_port == 1)
ERR("IPv6 bind on port failed. "
"Requested port may be taken or require root permissions.");
goto error;
}
if (listen(this->sd, HTTP_MAX_PENDING_CONNS) < 0) {
ERR("IPv6 listen failed on socket");
goto error;
}
return this;
error:
if (this != NULL) {
if (this->sd != -1) {
close(this->sd);
}
free(this);
}
return NULL;
}
| 166,590 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ogg_uint32_t decpack(long entry,long used_entry,long quantvals,
codebook *b,oggpack_buffer *opb,int maptype){
ogg_uint32_t ret=0;
int j;
switch(b->dec_type){
case 0:
return (ogg_uint32_t)entry;
case 1:
if(maptype==1){
/* vals are already read into temporary column vector here */
for(j=0;j<b->dim;j++){
ogg_uint32_t off=entry%quantvals;
entry/=quantvals;
ret|=((ogg_uint16_t *)(b->q_val))[off]<<(b->q_bits*j);
}
}else{
for(j=0;j<b->dim;j++)
ret|=oggpack_read(opb,b->q_bits)<<(b->q_bits*j);
}
return ret;
case 2:
for(j=0;j<b->dim;j++){
ogg_uint32_t off=entry%quantvals;
entry/=quantvals;
ret|=off<<(b->q_pack*j);
}
return ret;
case 3:
return (ogg_uint32_t)used_entry;
}
return 0; /* silence compiler */
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static ogg_uint32_t decpack(long entry,long used_entry,long quantvals,
codebook *b,oggpack_buffer *opb,int maptype){
ogg_uint32_t ret=0;
int j;
switch(b->dec_type){
case 0:
return (ogg_uint32_t)entry;
case 1:
if(maptype==1){
/* vals are already read into temporary column vector here */
for(j=0;j<b->dim;j++){
ogg_uint32_t off=entry%quantvals;
entry/=quantvals;
ret|=((ogg_uint16_t *)(b->q_val))[off]<<(b->q_bits*j);
}
}else{
for(j=0;j<b->dim;j++)
ret|=oggpack_read(opb,b->q_bits)<<(b->q_bits*j);
}
return ret;
case 2:
for(j=0;j<b->dim;j++){
ogg_uint32_t off=entry%quantvals;
entry/=quantvals;
ret|=off<<(b->q_pack*j);
}
return ret;
case 3:
return (ogg_uint32_t)used_entry;
}
return 0; /* silence compiler */
}
| 173,985 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserContextDestroyer::FinishDestroyContext() {
DCHECK_EQ(pending_hosts_, 0U);
delete context_;
context_ = nullptr;
delete this;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void BrowserContextDestroyer::FinishDestroyContext() {
DCHECK(finish_destroy_scheduled_);
CHECK_EQ(GetHostsForContext(context_.get()).size(), 0U)
<< "One or more RenderProcessHosts exist whilst its BrowserContext is "
<< "being deleted!";
g_contexts_pending_deletion.Get().remove(this);
if (context_->IsOffTheRecord()) {
// If this is an OTR context and its owner BrowserContext has been scheduled
// for deletion, update the owner's BrowserContextDestroyer
BrowserContextDestroyer* orig_destroyer =
GetForContext(context_->GetOriginalContext());
if (orig_destroyer) {
DCHECK_GT(orig_destroyer->otr_contexts_pending_deletion_, 0U);
DCHECK(!orig_destroyer->finish_destroy_scheduled_);
--orig_destroyer->otr_contexts_pending_deletion_;
orig_destroyer->MaybeScheduleFinishDestroyContext();
}
}
delete this;
}
| 165,420 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChromotingInstance::Init(uint32_t argc,
const char* argn[],
const char* argv[]) {
CHECK(!initialized_);
initialized_ = true;
VLOG(1) << "Started ChromotingInstance::Init";
if (!media::IsMediaLibraryInitialized()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Media library not initialized.";
return false;
}
net::EnableSSLServerSockets();
context_.Start();
scoped_refptr<FrameConsumerProxy> consumer_proxy =
new FrameConsumerProxy(plugin_task_runner_);
rectangle_decoder_ = new RectangleUpdateDecoder(context_.main_task_runner(),
context_.decode_task_runner(),
consumer_proxy);
view_.reset(new PepperView(this, &context_, rectangle_decoder_.get()));
consumer_proxy->Attach(view_->AsWeakPtr());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Restrict the Chromoting client plugin to use by extensions & apps.
BUG=160456
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11365276
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | bool ChromotingInstance::Init(uint32_t argc,
const char* argn[],
const char* argv[]) {
CHECK(!initialized_);
initialized_ = true;
VLOG(1) << "Started ChromotingInstance::Init";
if (!media::IsMediaLibraryInitialized()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Media library not initialized.";
return false;
}
// Check that the calling content is part of an app or extension.
if (!IsCallerAppOrExtension()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not an app or extension";
return false;
}
net::EnableSSLServerSockets();
context_.Start();
scoped_refptr<FrameConsumerProxy> consumer_proxy =
new FrameConsumerProxy(plugin_task_runner_);
rectangle_decoder_ = new RectangleUpdateDecoder(context_.main_task_runner(),
context_.decode_task_runner(),
consumer_proxy);
view_.reset(new PepperView(this, &context_, rectangle_decoder_.get()));
consumer_proxy->Attach(view_->AsWeakPtr());
return true;
}
| 170,671 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const BlockEntry* Track::GetEOS() const
{
return &m_eos;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const BlockEntry* Track::GetEOS() const
| 174,309 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_size_of_type(int color_type, int bit_depth, unsigned int *colors)
{
if (*colors)
return 16;
else
{
int pixel_depth = pixel_depth_of_type(color_type, bit_depth);
if (pixel_depth < 8)
return 64;
else if (pixel_depth > 16)
return 1024;
else
return 256;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_size_of_type(int color_type, int bit_depth, unsigned int *colors)
image_size_of_type(int color_type, int bit_depth, unsigned int *colors,
int small)
{
if (*colors)
return 16;
else
{
int pixel_depth = pixel_depth_of_type(color_type, bit_depth);
if (small)
{
if (pixel_depth <= 8) /* there will be one row */
return 1 << pixel_depth;
else
return 256;
}
else if (pixel_depth < 8)
return 64;
else if (pixel_depth > 16)
return 1024;
else
return 256;
}
}
| 173,581 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: magic_getparam(struct magic_set *ms, int param, void *val)
{
switch (param) {
case MAGIC_PARAM_INDIR_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->indir_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_NAME_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->name_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_PHNUM_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->elf_phnum_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_SHNUM_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->elf_shnum_max;
return 0;
default:
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | magic_getparam(struct magic_set *ms, int param, void *val)
{
switch (param) {
case MAGIC_PARAM_INDIR_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->indir_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_NAME_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->name_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_PHNUM_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->elf_phnum_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_SHNUM_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->elf_shnum_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_NOTES_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->elf_notes_max;
return 0;
default:
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
}
| 166,774 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: tChecksumCheckResult ParaNdis_CheckRxChecksum(
PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext,
ULONG virtioFlags,
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pPacketPages,
ULONG ulPacketLength,
ULONG ulDataOffset)
{
tOffloadSettingsFlags f = pContext->Offload.flags;
tChecksumCheckResult res;
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ppr;
ULONG flagsToCalculate = 0;
res.value = 0;
if (f.fRxIPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrIpChecksum; // check only
if (!(virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID))
{
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM)
{
flagsToCalculate |= pcrFixXxpChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrUdpChecksum;
}
else
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV6Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV6Checksum;
}
}
ppr = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(pPacketPages, ulPacketLength - ETH_HEADER_SIZE, ulDataOffset + ETH_HEADER_SIZE, flagsToCalculate, __FUNCTION__);
if (ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresIPTooShort || ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpIncomplete)
{
res.flags.IpOK = FALSE;
res.flags.IpFailed = TRUE;
return res;
}
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID)
{
pContext->extraStatistics.framesRxCSHwOK++;
ppr.xxpCheckSum = ppresCSOK;
}
if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV4 && !ppr.IsFragment)
{
if (f.fRxIPChecksum)
{
res.flags.IpOK = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSOK;
res.flags.IpFailed = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSBad;
}
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
else if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | tChecksumCheckResult ParaNdis_CheckRxChecksum(
PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext,
ULONG virtioFlags,
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pPacketPages,
ULONG ulPacketLength,
ULONG ulDataOffset,
BOOLEAN verifyLength)
{
tOffloadSettingsFlags f = pContext->Offload.flags;
tChecksumCheckResult res;
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ppr;
ULONG flagsToCalculate = 0;
res.value = 0;
if (f.fRxIPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrIpChecksum; // check only
if (!(virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID))
{
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM)
{
flagsToCalculate |= pcrFixXxpChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrUdpChecksum;
}
else
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV6Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV6Checksum;
}
}
ppr = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(pPacketPages, ulPacketLength - ETH_HEADER_SIZE, ulDataOffset + ETH_HEADER_SIZE, flagsToCalculate,
verifyLength, __FUNCTION__);
if (ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresIPTooShort || ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpIncomplete)
{
res.flags.IpOK = FALSE;
res.flags.IpFailed = TRUE;
return res;
}
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID)
{
pContext->extraStatistics.framesRxCSHwOK++;
ppr.xxpCheckSum = ppresCSOK;
}
if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV4 && !ppr.IsFragment)
{
if (f.fRxIPChecksum)
{
res.flags.IpOK = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSOK;
res.flags.IpFailed = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSBad;
}
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
else if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
return res;
}
| 170,139 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: update_max_tr(struct trace_array *tr, struct task_struct *tsk, int cpu)
{
struct ring_buffer *buf;
if (tr->stop_count)
return;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
if (!tr->allocated_snapshot) {
/* Only the nop tracer should hit this when disabling */
WARN_ON_ONCE(tr->current_trace != &nop_trace);
return;
}
arch_spin_lock(&tr->max_lock);
buf = tr->trace_buffer.buffer;
tr->trace_buffer.buffer = tr->max_buffer.buffer;
tr->max_buffer.buffer = buf;
__update_max_tr(tr, tsk, cpu);
arch_spin_unlock(&tr->max_lock);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | update_max_tr(struct trace_array *tr, struct task_struct *tsk, int cpu)
{
if (tr->stop_count)
return;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
if (!tr->allocated_snapshot) {
/* Only the nop tracer should hit this when disabling */
WARN_ON_ONCE(tr->current_trace != &nop_trace);
return;
}
arch_spin_lock(&tr->max_lock);
swap(tr->trace_buffer.buffer, tr->max_buffer.buffer);
__update_max_tr(tr, tsk, cpu);
arch_spin_unlock(&tr->max_lock);
}
| 169,185 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev1_vid_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_VID)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_VID)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev1_vid_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_VID)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
/* Print the entire payload in hex */
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_VID)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,795 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: CreateFileHelper(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CreateFileResult> result, const String& name, const KURL& url, FileSystemType type)
: m_result(result)
, m_name(name)
, m_url(url)
, m_type(type)
{
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | CreateFileHelper(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CreateFileResult> result, const String& name, const KURL& url, FileSystemType type)
CreateFileHelper(CreateFileResult* result, const String& name, const KURL& url, FileSystemType type)
: m_result(result)
, m_name(name)
, m_url(url)
, m_type(type)
{
}
| 171,412 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void spl_filesystem_tree_it_rewind(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator = (spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter;
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object(iterator);
object->u.dir.index = 0;
if (object->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_rewinddir(object->u.dir.dirp);
}
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
} while (spl_filesystem_is_dot(object->u.dir.entry.d_name));
if (iterator->current) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iterator->current);
iterator->current = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static void spl_filesystem_tree_it_rewind(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator = (spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter;
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object(iterator);
object->u.dir.index = 0;
if (object->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_rewinddir(object->u.dir.dirp);
}
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
} while (spl_filesystem_is_dot(object->u.dir.entry.d_name));
if (iterator->current) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iterator->current);
iterator->current = NULL;
}
}
| 167,088 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: StateBase* writeFileList(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value, StateBase* next)
{
FileList* fileList = V8FileList::toNative(value.As<v8::Object>());
if (!fileList)
return 0;
unsigned length = fileList->length();
Vector<int> blobIndices;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
int blobIndex = -1;
const File* file = fileList->item(i);
if (file->hasBeenClosed())
return handleError(DataCloneError, "A File object has been closed, and could therefore not be cloned.", next);
m_blobDataHandles.add(file->uuid(), file->blobDataHandle());
if (appendFileInfo(file, &blobIndex)) {
ASSERT(!i || blobIndex > 0);
ASSERT(blobIndex >= 0);
blobIndices.append(blobIndex);
}
}
if (!blobIndices.isEmpty())
m_writer.writeFileListIndex(blobIndices);
else
m_writer.writeFileList(*fileList);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | StateBase* writeFileList(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value, StateBase* next)
{
FileList* fileList = V8FileList::toNative(value.As<v8::Object>());
if (!fileList)
return 0;
unsigned length = fileList->length();
Vector<int> blobIndices;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
int blobIndex = -1;
const File* file = fileList->item(i);
if (file->hasBeenClosed())
return handleError(DataCloneError, "A File object has been closed, and could therefore not be cloned.", next);
m_blobDataHandles.set(file->uuid(), file->blobDataHandle());
if (appendFileInfo(file, &blobIndex)) {
ASSERT(!i || blobIndex > 0);
ASSERT(blobIndex >= 0);
blobIndices.append(blobIndex);
}
}
if (!blobIndices.isEmpty())
m_writer.writeFileListIndex(blobIndices);
else
m_writer.writeFileList(*fileList);
return 0;
}
| 171,652 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DictionaryValue* NigoriSpecificsToValue(
const sync_pb::NigoriSpecifics& proto) {
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue();
SET(encrypted, EncryptedDataToValue);
SET_BOOL(using_explicit_passphrase);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_bookmarks);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_preferences);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_autofill_profile);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_autofill);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_themes);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_typed_urls);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_extension_settings);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_extensions);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_sessions);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_app_settings);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_apps);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_search_engines);
SET_BOOL(sync_tabs);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_everything);
SET_REP(device_information, DeviceInformationToValue);
SET_BOOL(sync_tab_favicons);
return value;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | DictionaryValue* NigoriSpecificsToValue(
const sync_pb::NigoriSpecifics& proto) {
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue();
SET(encrypted, EncryptedDataToValue);
SET_BOOL(using_explicit_passphrase);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_bookmarks);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_preferences);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_autofill_profile);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_autofill);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_themes);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_typed_urls);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_extension_settings);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_extensions);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_sessions);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_app_settings);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_apps);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_search_engines);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_everything);
SET_REP(device_information, DeviceInformationToValue);
SET_BOOL(sync_tab_favicons);
return value;
}
| 170,800 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DOMFileSystemSync* WorkerGlobalScopeFileSystem::webkitRequestFileSystemSync(WorkerGlobalScope& worker, int type, long long size, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
ExecutionContext* secureContext = worker.executionContext();
if (!secureContext->securityOrigin()->canAccessFileSystem()) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError(FileError::securityErrorMessage);
return 0;
}
FileSystemType fileSystemType = static_cast<FileSystemType>(type);
if (!DOMFileSystemBase::isValidType(fileSystemType)) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidModificationError, "the type must be TEMPORARY or PERSISTENT.");
return 0;
}
RefPtr<FileSystemSyncCallbackHelper> helper = FileSystemSyncCallbackHelper::create();
OwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks = FileSystemCallbacks::create(helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), &worker, fileSystemType);
callbacks->setShouldBlockUntilCompletion(true);
LocalFileSystem::from(worker)->requestFileSystem(&worker, fileSystemType, size, callbacks.release());
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | DOMFileSystemSync* WorkerGlobalScopeFileSystem::webkitRequestFileSystemSync(WorkerGlobalScope& worker, int type, long long size, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
ExecutionContext* secureContext = worker.executionContext();
if (!secureContext->securityOrigin()->canAccessFileSystem()) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError(FileError::securityErrorMessage);
return 0;
}
FileSystemType fileSystemType = static_cast<FileSystemType>(type);
if (!DOMFileSystemBase::isValidType(fileSystemType)) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidModificationError, "the type must be TEMPORARY or PERSISTENT.");
return 0;
}
FileSystemSyncCallbackHelper* helper = FileSystemSyncCallbackHelper::create();
OwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks = FileSystemCallbacks::create(helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), &worker, fileSystemType);
callbacks->setShouldBlockUntilCompletion(true);
LocalFileSystem::from(worker)->requestFileSystem(&worker, fileSystemType, size, callbacks.release());
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
| 171,432 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct import_t* MACH0_(get_imports)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
struct import_t *imports;
int i, j, idx, stridx;
const char *symstr;
if (!bin->symtab || !bin->symstr || !bin->sects || !bin->indirectsyms)
return NULL;
if (bin->dysymtab.nundefsym < 1 || bin->dysymtab.nundefsym > 0xfffff) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(imports = malloc ((bin->dysymtab.nundefsym + 1) * sizeof (struct import_t)))) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = j = 0; i < bin->dysymtab.nundefsym; i++) {
idx = bin->dysymtab.iundefsym + i;
if (idx < 0 || idx >= bin->nsymtab) {
bprintf ("WARNING: Imports index out of bounds. Ignoring relocs\n");
free (imports);
return NULL;
}
stridx = bin->symtab[idx].n_strx;
if (stridx >= 0 && stridx < bin->symstrlen) {
symstr = (char *)bin->symstr + stridx;
} else {
symstr = "";
}
if (!*symstr) {
continue;
}
{
int i = 0;
int len = 0;
char *symstr_dup = NULL;
len = bin->symstrlen - stridx;
imports[j].name[0] = 0;
if (len > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if ((unsigned char)symstr[i] == 0xff || !symstr[i]) {
len = i;
break;
}
}
symstr_dup = r_str_ndup (symstr, len);
if (symstr_dup) {
r_str_ncpy (imports[j].name, symstr_dup, R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH);
r_str_filter (imports[j].name, - 1);
imports[j].name[R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH - 2] = 0;
free (symstr_dup);
}
}
}
imports[j].ord = i;
imports[j++].last = 0;
}
imports[j].last = 1;
if (!bin->imports_by_ord_size) {
if (j > 0) {
bin->imports_by_ord_size = j;
bin->imports_by_ord = (RBinImport**)calloc (j, sizeof (RBinImport*));
} else {
bin->imports_by_ord_size = 0;
bin->imports_by_ord = NULL;
}
}
return imports;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | struct import_t* MACH0_(get_imports)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
struct import_t *imports;
int i, j, idx, stridx;
const char *symstr;
if (!bin->symtab || !bin->symstr || !bin->sects || !bin->indirectsyms) {
return NULL;
}
if (bin->dysymtab.nundefsym < 1 || bin->dysymtab.nundefsym > 0xfffff) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(imports = malloc ((bin->dysymtab.nundefsym + 1) * sizeof (struct import_t)))) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = j = 0; i < bin->dysymtab.nundefsym; i++) {
idx = bin->dysymtab.iundefsym + i;
if (idx < 0 || idx >= bin->nsymtab) {
bprintf ("WARNING: Imports index out of bounds. Ignoring relocs\n");
free (imports);
return NULL;
}
stridx = bin->symtab[idx].n_strx;
if (stridx >= 0 && stridx < bin->symstrlen) {
symstr = (char *)bin->symstr + stridx;
} else {
symstr = "";
}
if (!*symstr) {
continue;
}
{
int i = 0;
int len = 0;
char *symstr_dup = NULL;
len = bin->symstrlen - stridx;
imports[j].name[0] = 0;
if (len > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if ((unsigned char)symstr[i] == 0xff || !symstr[i]) {
len = i;
break;
}
}
symstr_dup = r_str_ndup (symstr, len);
if (symstr_dup) {
r_str_ncpy (imports[j].name, symstr_dup, R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH);
r_str_filter (imports[j].name, - 1);
imports[j].name[R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH - 2] = 0;
free (symstr_dup);
}
}
}
imports[j].ord = i;
imports[j++].last = 0;
}
imports[j].last = 1;
if (!bin->imports_by_ord_size) {
if (j > 0) {
bin->imports_by_ord_size = j;
bin->imports_by_ord = (RBinImport**)calloc (j, sizeof (RBinImport*));
} else {
bin->imports_by_ord_size = 0;
bin->imports_by_ord = NULL;
}
}
return imports;
}
| 169,225 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void set_sda(int state)
{
qrio_set_opendrain_gpio(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SDA1, state);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | void set_sda(int state)
| 169,633 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
bool off_is_neg)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
u32 alu_state, alu_limit;
struct bpf_reg_state tmp;
bool ret;
if (env->allow_ptr_leaks || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)
return 0;
/* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative
* paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care
* to explore bad access from here.
*/
if (vstate->speculative)
goto do_sim;
alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
if (retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, opcode, off_is_neg))
return 0;
/* If we arrived here from different branches with different
* limits to sanitize, then this won't work.
*/
if (aux->alu_state &&
(aux->alu_state != alu_state ||
aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
return -EACCES;
/* Corresponding fixup done in fixup_bpf_calls(). */
aux->alu_state = alu_state;
aux->alu_limit = alu_limit;
do_sim:
/* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
* speculative execution from truncation as a result of
* masking when off was not within expected range. If off
* sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there
* to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example,
* for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction
* and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore
* bad access.
*/
if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) {
tmp = *dst_reg;
*dst_reg = *ptr_reg;
}
ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, true);
if (!ptr_is_dst_reg)
*dst_reg = tmp;
return !ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
bool off_is_neg)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
u32 alu_state, alu_limit;
struct bpf_reg_state tmp;
bool ret;
if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn))
return 0;
/* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative
* paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care
* to explore bad access from here.
*/
if (vstate->speculative)
goto do_sim;
alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
if (retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, opcode, off_is_neg))
return 0;
if (update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit))
return -EACCES;
do_sim:
/* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
* speculative execution from truncation as a result of
* masking when off was not within expected range. If off
* sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there
* to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example,
* for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction
* and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore
* bad access.
*/
if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) {
tmp = *dst_reg;
*dst_reg = *ptr_reg;
}
ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, true);
if (!ptr_is_dst_reg)
*dst_reg = tmp;
return !ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
| 169,731 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int git_delta_apply(
void **out,
size_t *out_len,
const unsigned char *base,
size_t base_len,
const unsigned char *delta,
size_t delta_len)
{
const unsigned char *delta_end = delta + delta_len;
size_t base_sz, res_sz, alloc_sz;
unsigned char *res_dp;
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
/*
* Check that the base size matches the data we were given;
* if not we would underflow while accessing data from the
* base object, resulting in data corruption or segfault.
*/
if ((hdr_sz(&base_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) || (base_sz != base_len)) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
if (hdr_sz(&res_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloc_sz, res_sz, 1);
res_dp = git__malloc(alloc_sz);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(res_dp);
res_dp[res_sz] = '\0';
*out = res_dp;
*out_len = res_sz;
while (delta < delta_end) {
unsigned char cmd = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x80) {
/* cmd is a copy instruction; copy from the base. */
size_t off = 0, len = 0;
#define ADD_DELTA(o, shift) { if (delta < delta_end) (o) |= ((unsigned) *delta++ << shift); else goto fail; }
if (cmd & 0x01) ADD_DELTA(off, 0UL);
if (cmd & 0x02) ADD_DELTA(off, 8UL);
if (cmd & 0x04) ADD_DELTA(off, 16UL);
if (cmd & 0x08) ADD_DELTA(off, 24UL);
if (cmd & 0x10) ADD_DELTA(len, 0UL);
if (cmd & 0x20) ADD_DELTA(len, 8UL);
if (cmd & 0x40) ADD_DELTA(len, 16UL);
if (!len) len = 0x10000;
#undef ADD_DELTA
if (base_len < off + len || res_sz < len)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, base + off, len);
res_dp += len;
res_sz -= len;
} else if (cmd) {
/*
* cmd is a literal insert instruction; copy from
* the delta stream itself.
*/
if (delta_end - delta < cmd || res_sz < cmd)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, delta, cmd);
delta += cmd;
res_dp += cmd;
res_sz -= cmd;
} else {
/* cmd == 0 is reserved for future encodings. */
goto fail;
}
}
if (delta != delta_end || res_sz)
goto fail;
return 0;
fail:
git__free(*out);
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta");
return -1;
}
Commit Message: delta: fix overflow when computing limit
When checking whether a delta base offset and length fit into the base
we have in memory already, we can trigger an overflow which breaks the
check. This would subsequently result in us reading memory from out of
bounds of the base.
The issue is easily fixed by checking for overflow when adding `off` and
`len`, thus guaranteeting that we are never indexing beyond `base_len`.
This corresponds to the git patch 8960844a7 (check patch_delta bounds
more carefully, 2006-04-07), which adds these overflow checks.
Reported-by: Riccardo Schirone <rschiron@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int git_delta_apply(
void **out,
size_t *out_len,
const unsigned char *base,
size_t base_len,
const unsigned char *delta,
size_t delta_len)
{
const unsigned char *delta_end = delta + delta_len;
size_t base_sz, res_sz, alloc_sz;
unsigned char *res_dp;
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
/*
* Check that the base size matches the data we were given;
* if not we would underflow while accessing data from the
* base object, resulting in data corruption or segfault.
*/
if ((hdr_sz(&base_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) || (base_sz != base_len)) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
if (hdr_sz(&res_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloc_sz, res_sz, 1);
res_dp = git__malloc(alloc_sz);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(res_dp);
res_dp[res_sz] = '\0';
*out = res_dp;
*out_len = res_sz;
while (delta < delta_end) {
unsigned char cmd = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x80) {
/* cmd is a copy instruction; copy from the base. */
size_t off = 0, len = 0, end;
#define ADD_DELTA(o, shift) { if (delta < delta_end) (o) |= ((unsigned) *delta++ << shift); else goto fail; }
if (cmd & 0x01) ADD_DELTA(off, 0UL);
if (cmd & 0x02) ADD_DELTA(off, 8UL);
if (cmd & 0x04) ADD_DELTA(off, 16UL);
if (cmd & 0x08) ADD_DELTA(off, 24UL);
if (cmd & 0x10) ADD_DELTA(len, 0UL);
if (cmd & 0x20) ADD_DELTA(len, 8UL);
if (cmd & 0x40) ADD_DELTA(len, 16UL);
if (!len) len = 0x10000;
#undef ADD_DELTA
if (GIT_ADD_SIZET_OVERFLOW(&end, off, len) ||
base_len < end || res_sz < len)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, base + off, len);
res_dp += len;
res_sz -= len;
} else if (cmd) {
/*
* cmd is a literal insert instruction; copy from
* the delta stream itself.
*/
if (delta_end - delta < cmd || res_sz < cmd)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, delta, cmd);
delta += cmd;
res_dp += cmd;
res_sz -= cmd;
} else {
/* cmd == 0 is reserved for future encodings. */
goto fail;
}
}
if (delta != delta_end || res_sz)
goto fail;
return 0;
fail:
git__free(*out);
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta");
return -1;
}
| 169,245 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void LauncherView::OnBoundsChanged(const gfx::Rect& previous_bounds) {
LayoutToIdealBounds();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(LauncherIconObserver, observers_,
OnLauncherIconPositionsChanged());
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void LauncherView::OnBoundsChanged(const gfx::Rect& previous_bounds) {
LayoutToIdealBounds();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(LauncherIconObserver, observers_,
OnLauncherIconPositionsChanged());
if (IsShowingOverflowBubble())
overflow_bubble_->Hide();
}
| 170,894 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: download::DownloadInterruptReason DownloadManagerImpl::BeginDownloadRequest(
std::unique_ptr<net::URLRequest> url_request,
ResourceContext* resource_context,
download::DownloadUrlParameters* params) {
if (ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get()->is_shutdown())
return download::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_USER_SHUTDOWN;
ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get()->InitializeURLRequest(
url_request.get(),
Referrer(params->referrer(),
Referrer::NetReferrerPolicyToBlinkReferrerPolicy(
params->referrer_policy())),
true, // download.
params->render_process_host_id(), params->render_view_host_routing_id(),
params->render_frame_host_routing_id(), PREVIEWS_OFF, resource_context);
url_request->set_first_party_url_policy(
net::URLRequest::UPDATE_FIRST_PARTY_URL_ON_REDIRECT);
const GURL& url = url_request->original_url();
const net::URLRequestContext* request_context = url_request->context();
if (!request_context->job_factory()->IsHandledProtocol(url.scheme())) {
DVLOG(1) << "Download request for unsupported protocol: "
<< url.possibly_invalid_spec();
return download::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NETWORK_INVALID_REQUEST;
}
std::unique_ptr<ResourceHandler> handler(
DownloadResourceHandler::CreateForNewRequest(
url_request.get(), params->request_origin(),
params->download_source(), params->follow_cross_origin_redirects()));
ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get()->BeginURLRequest(
std::move(url_request), std::move(handler), true, // download
params->content_initiated(), params->do_not_prompt_for_login(),
resource_context);
return download::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE;
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | download::DownloadInterruptReason DownloadManagerImpl::BeginDownloadRequest(
std::unique_ptr<net::URLRequest> url_request,
ResourceContext* resource_context,
download::DownloadUrlParameters* params) {
if (ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get()->is_shutdown())
return download::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_USER_SHUTDOWN;
ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get()->InitializeURLRequest(
url_request.get(),
Referrer(params->referrer(),
Referrer::NetReferrerPolicyToBlinkReferrerPolicy(
params->referrer_policy())),
true, // download.
params->render_process_host_id(), params->render_view_host_routing_id(),
params->render_frame_host_routing_id(), params->frame_tree_node_id(),
PREVIEWS_OFF, resource_context);
url_request->set_first_party_url_policy(
net::URLRequest::UPDATE_FIRST_PARTY_URL_ON_REDIRECT);
const GURL& url = url_request->original_url();
const net::URLRequestContext* request_context = url_request->context();
if (!request_context->job_factory()->IsHandledProtocol(url.scheme())) {
DVLOG(1) << "Download request for unsupported protocol: "
<< url.possibly_invalid_spec();
return download::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NETWORK_INVALID_REQUEST;
}
std::unique_ptr<ResourceHandler> handler(
DownloadResourceHandler::CreateForNewRequest(
url_request.get(), params->request_origin(),
params->download_source(), params->follow_cross_origin_redirects()));
ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get()->BeginURLRequest(
std::move(url_request), std::move(handler), true, // download
params->content_initiated(), params->do_not_prompt_for_login(),
resource_context);
return download::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE;
}
| 173,021 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ZSTD_encodeSequences_body(
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
FSE_CTable const* CTable_MatchLength, BYTE const* mlCodeTable,
FSE_CTable const* CTable_OffsetBits, BYTE const* ofCodeTable,
FSE_CTable const* CTable_LitLength, BYTE const* llCodeTable,
seqDef const* sequences, size_t nbSeq, int longOffsets)
{
BIT_CStream_t blockStream;
FSE_CState_t stateMatchLength;
FSE_CState_t stateOffsetBits;
FSE_CState_t stateLitLength;
CHECK_E(BIT_initCStream(&blockStream, dst, dstCapacity), dstSize_tooSmall); /* not enough space remaining */
/* first symbols */
FSE_initCState2(&stateMatchLength, CTable_MatchLength, mlCodeTable[nbSeq-1]);
FSE_initCState2(&stateOffsetBits, CTable_OffsetBits, ofCodeTable[nbSeq-1]);
FSE_initCState2(&stateLitLength, CTable_LitLength, llCodeTable[nbSeq-1]);
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[nbSeq-1].litLength, LL_bits[llCodeTable[nbSeq-1]]);
if (MEM_32bits()) BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[nbSeq-1].matchLength, ML_bits[mlCodeTable[nbSeq-1]]);
if (MEM_32bits()) BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
if (longOffsets) {
U32 const ofBits = ofCodeTable[nbSeq-1];
int const extraBits = ofBits - MIN(ofBits, STREAM_ACCUMULATOR_MIN-1);
if (extraBits) {
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[nbSeq-1].offset, extraBits);
BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
}
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[nbSeq-1].offset >> extraBits,
ofBits - extraBits);
} else {
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[nbSeq-1].offset, ofCodeTable[nbSeq-1]);
}
BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
{ size_t n;
for (n=nbSeq-2 ; n<nbSeq ; n--) { /* intentional underflow */
BYTE const llCode = llCodeTable[n];
BYTE const ofCode = ofCodeTable[n];
BYTE const mlCode = mlCodeTable[n];
U32 const llBits = LL_bits[llCode];
U32 const ofBits = ofCode;
U32 const mlBits = ML_bits[mlCode];
DEBUGLOG(6, "encoding: litlen:%2u - matchlen:%2u - offCode:%7u",
sequences[n].litLength,
sequences[n].matchLength + MINMATCH,
sequences[n].offset);
/* 32b*/ /* 64b*/
/* (7)*/ /* (7)*/
FSE_encodeSymbol(&blockStream, &stateOffsetBits, ofCode); /* 15 */ /* 15 */
FSE_encodeSymbol(&blockStream, &stateMatchLength, mlCode); /* 24 */ /* 24 */
if (MEM_32bits()) BIT_flushBits(&blockStream); /* (7)*/
FSE_encodeSymbol(&blockStream, &stateLitLength, llCode); /* 16 */ /* 33 */
if (MEM_32bits() || (ofBits+mlBits+llBits >= 64-7-(LLFSELog+MLFSELog+OffFSELog)))
BIT_flushBits(&blockStream); /* (7)*/
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[n].litLength, llBits);
if (MEM_32bits() && ((llBits+mlBits)>24)) BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[n].matchLength, mlBits);
if (MEM_32bits() || (ofBits+mlBits+llBits > 56)) BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
if (longOffsets) {
int const extraBits = ofBits - MIN(ofBits, STREAM_ACCUMULATOR_MIN-1);
if (extraBits) {
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[n].offset, extraBits);
BIT_flushBits(&blockStream); /* (7)*/
}
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[n].offset >> extraBits,
ofBits - extraBits); /* 31 */
} else {
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[n].offset, ofBits); /* 31 */
}
BIT_flushBits(&blockStream); /* (7)*/
} }
DEBUGLOG(6, "ZSTD_encodeSequences: flushing ML state with %u bits", stateMatchLength.stateLog);
FSE_flushCState(&blockStream, &stateMatchLength);
DEBUGLOG(6, "ZSTD_encodeSequences: flushing Off state with %u bits", stateOffsetBits.stateLog);
FSE_flushCState(&blockStream, &stateOffsetBits);
DEBUGLOG(6, "ZSTD_encodeSequences: flushing LL state with %u bits", stateLitLength.stateLog);
FSE_flushCState(&blockStream, &stateLitLength);
{ size_t const streamSize = BIT_closeCStream(&blockStream);
if (streamSize==0) return ERROR(dstSize_tooSmall); /* not enough space */
return streamSize;
}
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | ZSTD_encodeSequences_body(
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
FSE_CTable const* CTable_MatchLength, BYTE const* mlCodeTable,
FSE_CTable const* CTable_OffsetBits, BYTE const* ofCodeTable,
FSE_CTable const* CTable_LitLength, BYTE const* llCodeTable,
seqDef const* sequences, size_t nbSeq, int longOffsets)
{
BIT_CStream_t blockStream;
FSE_CState_t stateMatchLength;
FSE_CState_t stateOffsetBits;
FSE_CState_t stateLitLength;
CHECK_E(BIT_initCStream(&blockStream, dst, dstCapacity), dstSize_tooSmall); /* not enough space remaining */
DEBUGLOG(6, "available space for bitstream : %i (dstCapacity=%u)",
(int)(blockStream.endPtr - blockStream.startPtr),
(unsigned)dstCapacity);
/* first symbols */
FSE_initCState2(&stateMatchLength, CTable_MatchLength, mlCodeTable[nbSeq-1]);
FSE_initCState2(&stateOffsetBits, CTable_OffsetBits, ofCodeTable[nbSeq-1]);
FSE_initCState2(&stateLitLength, CTable_LitLength, llCodeTable[nbSeq-1]);
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[nbSeq-1].litLength, LL_bits[llCodeTable[nbSeq-1]]);
if (MEM_32bits()) BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[nbSeq-1].matchLength, ML_bits[mlCodeTable[nbSeq-1]]);
if (MEM_32bits()) BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
if (longOffsets) {
U32 const ofBits = ofCodeTable[nbSeq-1];
int const extraBits = ofBits - MIN(ofBits, STREAM_ACCUMULATOR_MIN-1);
if (extraBits) {
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[nbSeq-1].offset, extraBits);
BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
}
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[nbSeq-1].offset >> extraBits,
ofBits - extraBits);
} else {
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[nbSeq-1].offset, ofCodeTable[nbSeq-1]);
}
BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
{ size_t n;
for (n=nbSeq-2 ; n<nbSeq ; n--) { /* intentional underflow */
BYTE const llCode = llCodeTable[n];
BYTE const ofCode = ofCodeTable[n];
BYTE const mlCode = mlCodeTable[n];
U32 const llBits = LL_bits[llCode];
U32 const ofBits = ofCode;
U32 const mlBits = ML_bits[mlCode];
DEBUGLOG(6, "encoding: litlen:%2u - matchlen:%2u - offCode:%7u",
sequences[n].litLength,
sequences[n].matchLength + MINMATCH,
sequences[n].offset);
/* 32b*/ /* 64b*/
/* (7)*/ /* (7)*/
FSE_encodeSymbol(&blockStream, &stateOffsetBits, ofCode); /* 15 */ /* 15 */
FSE_encodeSymbol(&blockStream, &stateMatchLength, mlCode); /* 24 */ /* 24 */
if (MEM_32bits()) BIT_flushBits(&blockStream); /* (7)*/
FSE_encodeSymbol(&blockStream, &stateLitLength, llCode); /* 16 */ /* 33 */
if (MEM_32bits() || (ofBits+mlBits+llBits >= 64-7-(LLFSELog+MLFSELog+OffFSELog)))
BIT_flushBits(&blockStream); /* (7)*/
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[n].litLength, llBits);
if (MEM_32bits() && ((llBits+mlBits)>24)) BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[n].matchLength, mlBits);
if (MEM_32bits() || (ofBits+mlBits+llBits > 56)) BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
if (longOffsets) {
int const extraBits = ofBits - MIN(ofBits, STREAM_ACCUMULATOR_MIN-1);
if (extraBits) {
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[n].offset, extraBits);
BIT_flushBits(&blockStream); /* (7)*/
}
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[n].offset >> extraBits,
ofBits - extraBits); /* 31 */
} else {
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[n].offset, ofBits); /* 31 */
}
BIT_flushBits(&blockStream); /* (7)*/
DEBUGLOG(7, "remaining space : %i", (int)(blockStream.endPtr - blockStream.ptr));
} }
DEBUGLOG(6, "ZSTD_encodeSequences: flushing ML state with %u bits", stateMatchLength.stateLog);
FSE_flushCState(&blockStream, &stateMatchLength);
DEBUGLOG(6, "ZSTD_encodeSequences: flushing Off state with %u bits", stateOffsetBits.stateLog);
FSE_flushCState(&blockStream, &stateOffsetBits);
DEBUGLOG(6, "ZSTD_encodeSequences: flushing LL state with %u bits", stateLitLength.stateLog);
FSE_flushCState(&blockStream, &stateLitLength);
{ size_t const streamSize = BIT_closeCStream(&blockStream);
if (streamSize==0) return ERROR(dstSize_tooSmall); /* not enough space */
return streamSize;
}
}
| 169,674 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void regulator_ena_gpio_free(struct regulator_dev *rdev)
{
struct regulator_enable_gpio *pin, *n;
if (!rdev->ena_pin)
return;
/* Free the GPIO only in case of no use */
list_for_each_entry_safe(pin, n, ®ulator_ena_gpio_list, list) {
if (pin->gpiod == rdev->ena_pin->gpiod) {
if (pin->request_count <= 1) {
pin->request_count = 0;
gpiod_put(pin->gpiod);
list_del(&pin->list);
kfree(pin);
} else {
pin->request_count--;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static void regulator_ena_gpio_free(struct regulator_dev *rdev)
{
struct regulator_enable_gpio *pin, *n;
if (!rdev->ena_pin)
return;
/* Free the GPIO only in case of no use */
list_for_each_entry_safe(pin, n, ®ulator_ena_gpio_list, list) {
if (pin->gpiod == rdev->ena_pin->gpiod) {
if (pin->request_count <= 1) {
pin->request_count = 0;
gpiod_put(pin->gpiod);
list_del(&pin->list);
kfree(pin);
rdev->ena_pin = NULL;
return;
} else {
pin->request_count--;
}
}
}
}
| 168,894 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void OffscreenCanvas::Dispose() {
if (context_) {
context_->DetachHost();
context_ = nullptr;
}
if (HasPlaceholderCanvas() && GetTopExecutionContext() &&
GetTopExecutionContext()->IsWorkerGlobalScope()) {
WorkerAnimationFrameProvider* animation_frame_provider =
To<WorkerGlobalScope>(GetTopExecutionContext())
->GetAnimationFrameProvider();
if (animation_frame_provider)
animation_frame_provider->DeregisterOffscreenCanvas(this);
}
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void OffscreenCanvas::Dispose() {
// We need to drop frame dispatcher, to prevent mojo calls from completing.
frame_dispatcher_ = nullptr;
if (context_) {
context_->DetachHost();
context_ = nullptr;
}
if (HasPlaceholderCanvas() && GetTopExecutionContext() &&
GetTopExecutionContext()->IsWorkerGlobalScope()) {
WorkerAnimationFrameProvider* animation_frame_provider =
To<WorkerGlobalScope>(GetTopExecutionContext())
->GetAnimationFrameProvider();
if (animation_frame_provider)
animation_frame_provider->DeregisterOffscreenCanvas(this);
}
}
| 173,029 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, cpu_used_);
} else if (video->frame() == 3) {
vpx_active_map_t map = {0};
uint8_t active_map[9 * 13] = {
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1,
0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0,
};
map.cols = (kWidth + 15) / 16;
map.rows = (kHeight + 15) / 16;
ASSERT_EQ(map.cols, 13u);
ASSERT_EQ(map.rows, 9u);
map.active_map = active_map;
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ACTIVEMAP, &map);
} else if (video->frame() == 15) {
vpx_active_map_t map = {0};
map.cols = (kWidth + 15) / 16;
map.rows = (kHeight + 15) / 16;
map.active_map = NULL;
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ACTIVEMAP, &map);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, cpu_used_);
} else if (video->frame() == 3) {
vpx_active_map_t map = vpx_active_map_t();
uint8_t active_map[9 * 13] = {
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1,
0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0,
};
map.cols = (kWidth + 15) / 16;
map.rows = (kHeight + 15) / 16;
ASSERT_EQ(map.cols, 13u);
ASSERT_EQ(map.rows, 9u);
map.active_map = active_map;
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ACTIVEMAP, &map);
} else if (video->frame() == 15) {
vpx_active_map_t map = vpx_active_map_t();
map.cols = (kWidth + 15) / 16;
map.rows = (kHeight + 15) / 16;
map.active_map = NULL;
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ACTIVEMAP, &map);
}
}
| 174,501 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PPB_URLLoader_Impl::FinishLoading(int32_t done_status) {
done_status_ = done_status;
if (TrackedCallback::IsPending(pending_callback_))
RunCallback(done_status_);
}
Commit Message: Remove possibility of stale user_buffer_ member in PPB_URLLoader_Impl when FinishedLoading() is called.
BUG=137778
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10797037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@147914 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void PPB_URLLoader_Impl::FinishLoading(int32_t done_status) {
done_status_ = done_status;
user_buffer_ = NULL;
user_buffer_size_ = 0;
if (TrackedCallback::IsPending(pending_callback_))
RunCallback(done_status_);
}
| 170,900 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static BOOL gdi_Bitmap_Decompress(rdpContext* context, rdpBitmap* bitmap,
const BYTE* pSrcData, UINT32 DstWidth, UINT32 DstHeight,
UINT32 bpp, UINT32 length, BOOL compressed,
UINT32 codecId)
{
UINT32 SrcSize = length;
rdpGdi* gdi = context->gdi;
bitmap->compressed = FALSE;
bitmap->format = gdi->dstFormat;
bitmap->length = DstWidth * DstHeight * GetBytesPerPixel(bitmap->format);
bitmap->data = (BYTE*) _aligned_malloc(bitmap->length, 16);
if (!bitmap->data)
return FALSE;
if (compressed)
{
if (bpp < 32)
{
if (!interleaved_decompress(context->codecs->interleaved,
pSrcData, SrcSize,
DstWidth, DstHeight,
bpp,
bitmap->data, bitmap->format,
0, 0, 0, DstWidth, DstHeight,
&gdi->palette))
return FALSE;
}
else
{
if (!planar_decompress(context->codecs->planar, pSrcData, SrcSize,
DstWidth, DstHeight,
bitmap->data, bitmap->format, 0, 0, 0,
DstWidth, DstHeight, TRUE))
return FALSE;
}
}
else
{
const UINT32 SrcFormat = gdi_get_pixel_format(bpp);
const size_t sbpp = GetBytesPerPixel(SrcFormat);
const size_t dbpp = GetBytesPerPixel(bitmap->format);
if ((sbpp == 0) || (dbpp == 0))
return FALSE;
else
{
const size_t dstSize = SrcSize * dbpp / sbpp;
if (dstSize < bitmap->length)
return FALSE;
}
if (!freerdp_image_copy(bitmap->data, bitmap->format, 0, 0, 0,
DstWidth, DstHeight, pSrcData, SrcFormat,
0, 0, 0, &gdi->palette, FREERDP_FLIP_VERTICAL))
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8787
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static BOOL gdi_Bitmap_Decompress(rdpContext* context, rdpBitmap* bitmap,
const BYTE* pSrcData, UINT32 DstWidth, UINT32 DstHeight,
UINT32 bpp, UINT32 length, BOOL compressed,
UINT32 codecId)
{
UINT32 SrcSize = length;
rdpGdi* gdi = context->gdi;
UINT32 size = DstWidth * DstHeight;
bitmap->compressed = FALSE;
bitmap->format = gdi->dstFormat;
if ((GetBytesPerPixel(bitmap->format) == 0) ||
(DstWidth == 0) || (DstHeight == 0) || (DstWidth > UINT32_MAX / DstHeight) ||
(size > (UINT32_MAX / GetBytesPerPixel(bitmap->format))))
return FALSE;
size *= GetBytesPerPixel(bitmap->format);
bitmap->length = size;
bitmap->data = (BYTE*) _aligned_malloc(bitmap->length, 16);
if (!bitmap->data)
return FALSE;
if (compressed)
{
if (bpp < 32)
{
if (!interleaved_decompress(context->codecs->interleaved,
pSrcData, SrcSize,
DstWidth, DstHeight,
bpp,
bitmap->data, bitmap->format,
0, 0, 0, DstWidth, DstHeight,
&gdi->palette))
return FALSE;
}
else
{
if (!planar_decompress(context->codecs->planar, pSrcData, SrcSize,
DstWidth, DstHeight,
bitmap->data, bitmap->format, 0, 0, 0,
DstWidth, DstHeight, TRUE))
return FALSE;
}
}
else
{
const UINT32 SrcFormat = gdi_get_pixel_format(bpp);
const size_t sbpp = GetBytesPerPixel(SrcFormat);
const size_t dbpp = GetBytesPerPixel(bitmap->format);
if ((sbpp == 0) || (dbpp == 0))
return FALSE;
else
{
const size_t dstSize = SrcSize * dbpp / sbpp;
if (dstSize < bitmap->length)
return FALSE;
}
if (!freerdp_image_copy(bitmap->data, bitmap->format, 0, 0, 0,
DstWidth, DstHeight, pSrcData, SrcFormat,
0, 0, 0, &gdi->palette, FREERDP_FLIP_VERTICAL))
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
| 169,292 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jbig2_decode_mmr_init(Jbig2MmrCtx *mmr, int width, int height, const byte *data, size_t size)
{
int i;
uint32_t word = 0;
mmr->width = width;
mmr->size = size;
mmr->data_index = 0;
mmr->bit_index = 0;
for (i = 0; i < size && i < 4; i++)
word |= (data[i] << ((3 - i) << 3));
mmr->word = word;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | jbig2_decode_mmr_init(Jbig2MmrCtx *mmr, int width, int height, const byte *data, size_t size)
{
size_t i;
uint32_t word = 0;
mmr->width = width;
mmr->size = size;
mmr->data_index = 0;
mmr->bit_index = 0;
for (i = 0; i < size && i < 4; i++)
word |= (data[i] << ((3 - i) << 3));
mmr->word = word;
}
| 165,493 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlDocPtr soap_xmlParseFile(const char *filename TSRMLS_DC)
{
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = NULL;
xmlDocPtr ret;
zend_bool old_allow_url_fopen;
/*
xmlInitParser();
*/
old_allow_url_fopen = PG(allow_url_fopen);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = 1;
ctxt = xmlCreateFileParserCtxt(filename);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
if (ctxt) {
ctxt->keepBlanks = 0;
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = soap_ignorableWhitespace;
ctxt->sax->comment = soap_Comment;
ctxt->sax->warning = NULL;
/*ctxt->sax->fatalError = NULL;*/
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if (ctxt->wellFormed) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
if (ret->URL == NULL && ctxt->directory != NULL) {
ret->URL = xmlCharStrdup(ctxt->directory);
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
} else {
ret = NULL;
}
/*
xmlCleanupParser();
*/
if (ret) {
cleanup_xml_node((xmlNodePtr)ret);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | xmlDocPtr soap_xmlParseFile(const char *filename TSRMLS_DC)
{
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = NULL;
xmlDocPtr ret;
zend_bool old_allow_url_fopen;
/*
xmlInitParser();
*/
old_allow_url_fopen = PG(allow_url_fopen);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = 1;
ctxt = xmlCreateFileParserCtxt(filename);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
if (ctxt) {
ctxt->keepBlanks = 0;
ctxt->options -= XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD;
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = soap_ignorableWhitespace;
ctxt->sax->comment = soap_Comment;
ctxt->sax->warning = NULL;
/*ctxt->sax->fatalError = NULL;*/
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if (ctxt->wellFormed) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
if (ret->URL == NULL && ctxt->directory != NULL) {
ret->URL = xmlCharStrdup(ctxt->directory);
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
} else {
ret = NULL;
}
/*
xmlCleanupParser();
*/
if (ret) {
cleanup_xml_node((xmlNodePtr)ret);
}
return ret;
}
| 164,727 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void *arm_dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, dma_addr_t *handle,
gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, pgprot_kernel);
void *memory;
if (dma_alloc_from_coherent(dev, size, handle, &memory))
return memory;
return __dma_alloc(dev, size, handle, gfp, prot, false,
__builtin_return_address(0));
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void *arm_dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, dma_addr_t *handle,
gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, PAGE_KERNEL);
void *memory;
if (dma_alloc_from_coherent(dev, size, handle, &memory))
return memory;
return __dma_alloc(dev, size, handle, gfp, prot, false,
__builtin_return_address(0));
}
| 167,578 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CameraSource::dataCallbackTimestamp(int64_t timestampUs,
int32_t msgType __unused, const sp<IMemory> &data) {
ALOGV("dataCallbackTimestamp: timestamp %lld us", (long long)timestampUs);
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (!mStarted || (mNumFramesReceived == 0 && timestampUs < mStartTimeUs)) {
ALOGV("Drop frame at %lld/%lld us", (long long)timestampUs, (long long)mStartTimeUs);
releaseOneRecordingFrame(data);
return;
}
if (skipCurrentFrame(timestampUs)) {
releaseOneRecordingFrame(data);
return;
}
if (mNumFramesReceived > 0) {
if (timestampUs <= mLastFrameTimestampUs) {
ALOGW("Dropping frame with backward timestamp %lld (last %lld)",
(long long)timestampUs, (long long)mLastFrameTimestampUs);
releaseOneRecordingFrame(data);
return;
}
if (timestampUs - mLastFrameTimestampUs > mGlitchDurationThresholdUs) {
++mNumGlitches;
}
}
mLastFrameTimestampUs = timestampUs;
if (mNumFramesReceived == 0) {
mFirstFrameTimeUs = timestampUs;
if (mStartTimeUs > 0) {
if (timestampUs < mStartTimeUs) {
releaseOneRecordingFrame(data);
return;
}
mStartTimeUs = timestampUs - mStartTimeUs;
}
}
++mNumFramesReceived;
CHECK(data != NULL && data->size() > 0);
mFramesReceived.push_back(data);
int64_t timeUs = mStartTimeUs + (timestampUs - mFirstFrameTimeUs);
mFrameTimes.push_back(timeUs);
ALOGV("initial delay: %" PRId64 ", current time stamp: %" PRId64,
mStartTimeUs, timeUs);
mFrameAvailableCondition.signal();
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void CameraSource::dataCallbackTimestamp(int64_t timestampUs,
int32_t msgType __unused, const sp<IMemory> &data) {
ALOGV("dataCallbackTimestamp: timestamp %lld us", (long long)timestampUs);
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (!mStarted || (mNumFramesReceived == 0 && timestampUs < mStartTimeUs)) {
ALOGV("Drop frame at %lld/%lld us", (long long)timestampUs, (long long)mStartTimeUs);
releaseOneRecordingFrame(data);
return;
}
if (skipCurrentFrame(timestampUs)) {
releaseOneRecordingFrame(data);
return;
}
if (mNumFramesReceived > 0) {
if (timestampUs <= mLastFrameTimestampUs) {
ALOGW("Dropping frame with backward timestamp %lld (last %lld)",
(long long)timestampUs, (long long)mLastFrameTimestampUs);
releaseOneRecordingFrame(data);
return;
}
if (timestampUs - mLastFrameTimestampUs > mGlitchDurationThresholdUs) {
++mNumGlitches;
}
}
mLastFrameTimestampUs = timestampUs;
if (mNumFramesReceived == 0) {
mFirstFrameTimeUs = timestampUs;
if (mStartTimeUs > 0) {
if (timestampUs < mStartTimeUs) {
releaseOneRecordingFrame(data);
return;
}
mStartTimeUs = timestampUs - mStartTimeUs;
}
}
++mNumFramesReceived;
CHECK(data != NULL && data->size() > 0);
// b/28466701
adjustIncomingANWBuffer(data.get());
mFramesReceived.push_back(data);
int64_t timeUs = mStartTimeUs + (timestampUs - mFirstFrameTimeUs);
mFrameTimes.push_back(timeUs);
ALOGV("initial delay: %" PRId64 ", current time stamp: %" PRId64,
mStartTimeUs, timeUs);
mFrameAvailableCondition.signal();
}
| 173,508 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: rs_filter_graph(RSFilter *filter)
{
g_return_if_fail(RS_IS_FILTER(filter));
GString *str = g_string_new("digraph G {\n");
rs_filter_graph_helper(str, filter);
g_string_append_printf(str, "}\n");
g_file_set_contents("/tmp/rs-filter-graph", str->str, str->len, NULL);
if (0 != system("dot -Tpng >/tmp/rs-filter-graph.png </tmp/rs-filter-graph"))
g_warning("Calling dot failed");
if (0 != system("gnome-open /tmp/rs-filter-graph.png"))
g_warning("Calling gnome-open failed.");
g_string_free(str, TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Fixes insecure use of temporary file (CVE-2014-4978).
CWE ID: CWE-59 | rs_filter_graph(RSFilter *filter)
{
g_return_if_fail(RS_IS_FILTER(filter));
gchar *dot_filename;
gchar *png_filename;
gchar *command_line;
GString *str = g_string_new("digraph G {\n");
rs_filter_graph_helper(str, filter);
g_string_append_printf(str, "}\n");
/* Here we would like to use g_mkdtemp(), but due to a bug in upstream, that's impossible */
dot_filename = g_strdup_printf("/tmp/rs-filter-graph.%u", g_random_int());
png_filename = g_strdup_printf("%s.%u.png", dot_filename, g_random_int());
g_file_set_contents(dot_filename, str->str, str->len, NULL);
command_line = g_strdup_printf("dot -Tpng >%s <%s", png_filename, dot_filename);
if (0 != system(command_line))
g_warning("Calling dot failed");
g_free(command_line);
command_line = g_strdup_printf("gnome-open %s", png_filename);
if (0 != system(command_line))
g_warning("Calling gnome-open failed.");
g_free(command_line);
g_free(dot_filename);
g_free(png_filename);
g_string_free(str, TRUE);
}
| 168,914 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: native_handle* Parcel::readNativeHandle() const
{
int numFds, numInts;
status_t err;
err = readInt32(&numFds);
if (err != NO_ERROR) return 0;
err = readInt32(&numInts);
if (err != NO_ERROR) return 0;
native_handle* h = native_handle_create(numFds, numInts);
if (!h) {
return 0;
}
for (int i=0 ; err==NO_ERROR && i<numFds ; i++) {
h->data[i] = dup(readFileDescriptor());
if (h->data[i] < 0) err = BAD_VALUE;
}
err = read(h->data + numFds, sizeof(int)*numInts);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
native_handle_close(h);
native_handle_delete(h);
h = 0;
}
return h;
}
Commit Message: Correctly handle dup() failure in Parcel::readNativeHandle
bail out if dup() fails, instead of creating an invalid native_handle_t
Bug: 28395952
Change-Id: Ia1a6198c0f45165b9c6a55a803e5f64d8afa0572
CWE ID: CWE-20 | native_handle* Parcel::readNativeHandle() const
{
int numFds, numInts;
status_t err;
err = readInt32(&numFds);
if (err != NO_ERROR) return 0;
err = readInt32(&numInts);
if (err != NO_ERROR) return 0;
native_handle* h = native_handle_create(numFds, numInts);
if (!h) {
return 0;
}
for (int i=0 ; err==NO_ERROR && i<numFds ; i++) {
h->data[i] = dup(readFileDescriptor());
if (h->data[i] < 0) {
for (int j = 0; j < i; j++) {
close(h->data[j]);
}
native_handle_delete(h);
return 0;
}
}
err = read(h->data + numFds, sizeof(int)*numInts);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
native_handle_close(h);
native_handle_delete(h);
h = 0;
}
return h;
}
| 173,744 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void QuotaTask::DeleteSoon() {
MessageLoop::current()->DeleteSoon(FROM_HERE, this);
}
Commit Message: Quota double-delete fix
BUG=142310
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10832407
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152532 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void QuotaTask::DeleteSoon() {
DCHECK(original_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (delete_scheduled_)
return;
delete_scheduled_ = true;
MessageLoop::current()->DeleteSoon(FROM_HERE, this);
}
| 170,803 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void copyStereo24(
short *dst,
const int *const *src,
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i] >> 8;
*dst++ = src[1][i] >> 8;
}
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void copyStereo24(
short *dst,
const int * src[FLACParser::kMaxChannels],
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i] >> 8;
*dst++ = src[1][i] >> 8;
}
}
| 174,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ptaReadStream(FILE *fp)
{
char typestr[128];
l_int32 i, n, ix, iy, type, version;
l_float32 x, y;
PTA *pta;
PROCNAME("ptaReadStream");
if (!fp)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("stream not defined", procName, NULL);
if (fscanf(fp, "\n Pta Version %d\n", &version) != 1)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("not a pta file", procName, NULL);
if (version != PTA_VERSION_NUMBER)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("invalid pta version", procName, NULL);
if (fscanf(fp, " Number of pts = %d; format = %s\n", &n, typestr) != 2)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("not a pta file", procName, NULL);
if (!strcmp(typestr, "float"))
type = 0;
else /* typestr is "integer" */
type = 1;
if ((pta = ptaCreate(n)) == NULL)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("pta not made", procName, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (type == 0) { /* data is float */
if (fscanf(fp, " (%f, %f)\n", &x, &y) != 2) {
ptaDestroy(&pta);
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("error reading floats", procName, NULL);
}
ptaAddPt(pta, x, y);
} else { /* data is integer */
if (fscanf(fp, " (%d, %d)\n", &ix, &iy) != 2) {
ptaDestroy(&pta);
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("error reading ints", procName, NULL);
}
ptaAddPt(pta, ix, iy);
}
}
return pta;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ptaReadStream(FILE *fp)
{
char typestr[128]; /* hardcoded below in fscanf */
l_int32 i, n, ix, iy, type, version;
l_float32 x, y;
PTA *pta;
PROCNAME("ptaReadStream");
if (!fp)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("stream not defined", procName, NULL);
if (fscanf(fp, "\n Pta Version %d\n", &version) != 1)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("not a pta file", procName, NULL);
if (version != PTA_VERSION_NUMBER)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("invalid pta version", procName, NULL);
if (fscanf(fp, " Number of pts = %d; format = %127s\n", &n, typestr) != 2)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("not a pta file", procName, NULL);
if (!strcmp(typestr, "float"))
type = 0;
else /* typestr is "integer" */
type = 1;
if ((pta = ptaCreate(n)) == NULL)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("pta not made", procName, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (type == 0) { /* data is float */
if (fscanf(fp, " (%f, %f)\n", &x, &y) != 2) {
ptaDestroy(&pta);
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("error reading floats", procName, NULL);
}
ptaAddPt(pta, x, y);
} else { /* data is integer */
if (fscanf(fp, " (%d, %d)\n", &ix, &iy) != 2) {
ptaDestroy(&pta);
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("error reading ints", procName, NULL);
}
ptaAddPt(pta, ix, iy);
}
}
return pta;
}
| 169,328 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char *__filterQuotedShell(const char *arg) {
r_return_val_if_fail (arg, NULL);
char *a = malloc (strlen (arg) + 1);
if (!a) {
return NULL;
}
char *b = a;
while (*arg) {
switch (*arg) {
case ' ':
case '=':
case '\r':
case '\n':
break;
default:
*b++ = *arg;
break;
}
arg++;
}
*b = 0;
return a;
}
Commit Message: More fixes for the CVE-2019-14745
CWE ID: CWE-78 | static char *__filterQuotedShell(const char *arg) {
r_return_val_if_fail (arg, NULL);
char *a = malloc (strlen (arg) + 1);
if (!a) {
return NULL;
}
char *b = a;
while (*arg) {
switch (*arg) {
case ' ':
case '=':
case '"':
case '\\':
case '\r':
case '\n':
break;
default:
*b++ = *arg;
break;
}
arg++;
}
*b = 0;
return a;
}
| 170,184 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeDownloadDelegate::OnDownloadStarted(const std::string& filename,
const std::string& mime_type) {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jfilename = ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(
env, filename);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jmime_type =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, mime_type);
Java_ChromeDownloadDelegate_onDownloadStarted(env, java_ref_, jfilename,
jmime_type);
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void ChromeDownloadDelegate::OnDownloadStarted(const std::string& filename,
void ChromeDownloadDelegate::OnDownloadStarted(const std::string& filename) {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jfilename = ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(
env, filename);
Java_ChromeDownloadDelegate_onDownloadStarted(env, java_ref_, jfilename);
}
| 171,879 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnDidPreviewPage(int page_number,
int preview_request_id) {
DCHECK_GE(page_number, 0);
base::FundamentalValue number(page_number);
StringValue ui_identifier(preview_ui_addr_str_);
base::FundamentalValue request_id(preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction(
"onDidPreviewPage", number, ui_identifier, request_id);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void PrintPreviewUI::OnDidPreviewPage(int page_number,
int preview_request_id) {
DCHECK_GE(page_number, 0);
base::FundamentalValue number(page_number);
base::FundamentalValue ui_identifier(id_);
base::FundamentalValue request_id(preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction(
"onDidPreviewPage", number, ui_identifier, request_id);
}
| 170,837 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BuildTestPacket(uint16_t id, uint16_t off, int mf, const char content,
int content_len)
{
Packet *p = NULL;
int hlen = 20;
int ttl = 64;
uint8_t *pcontent;
IPV4Hdr ip4h;
p = SCCalloc(1, sizeof(*p) + default_packet_size);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return NULL;
PACKET_INITIALIZE(p);
gettimeofday(&p->ts, NULL);
ip4h.ip_verhl = 4 << 4;
ip4h.ip_verhl |= hlen >> 2;
ip4h.ip_len = htons(hlen + content_len);
ip4h.ip_id = htons(id);
ip4h.ip_off = htons(off);
if (mf)
ip4h.ip_off = htons(IP_MF | off);
else
ip4h.ip_off = htons(off);
ip4h.ip_ttl = ttl;
ip4h.ip_proto = IPPROTO_ICMP;
ip4h.s_ip_src.s_addr = 0x01010101; /* 1.1.1.1 */
ip4h.s_ip_dst.s_addr = 0x02020202; /* 2.2.2.2 */
/* copy content_len crap, we need full length */
PacketCopyData(p, (uint8_t *)&ip4h, sizeof(ip4h));
p->ip4h = (IPV4Hdr *)GET_PKT_DATA(p);
SET_IPV4_SRC_ADDR(p, &p->src);
SET_IPV4_DST_ADDR(p, &p->dst);
pcontent = SCCalloc(1, content_len);
if (unlikely(pcontent == NULL))
return NULL;
memset(pcontent, content, content_len);
PacketCopyDataOffset(p, hlen, pcontent, content_len);
SET_PKT_LEN(p, hlen + content_len);
SCFree(pcontent);
p->ip4h->ip_csum = IPV4CalculateChecksum((uint16_t *)GET_PKT_DATA(p), hlen);
/* Self test. */
if (IPV4_GET_VER(p) != 4)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_HLEN(p) != hlen)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(p) != hlen + content_len)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPID(p) != id)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPOFFSET(p) != off)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_MF(p) != mf)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPTTL(p) != ttl)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPPROTO(p) != IPPROTO_ICMP)
goto error;
return p;
error:
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | BuildTestPacket(uint16_t id, uint16_t off, int mf, const char content,
BuildTestPacket(uint8_t proto, uint16_t id, uint16_t off, int mf,
const char content, int content_len)
{
Packet *p = NULL;
int hlen = 20;
int ttl = 64;
uint8_t *pcontent;
IPV4Hdr ip4h;
p = SCCalloc(1, sizeof(*p) + default_packet_size);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return NULL;
PACKET_INITIALIZE(p);
gettimeofday(&p->ts, NULL);
ip4h.ip_verhl = 4 << 4;
ip4h.ip_verhl |= hlen >> 2;
ip4h.ip_len = htons(hlen + content_len);
ip4h.ip_id = htons(id);
ip4h.ip_off = htons(off);
if (mf)
ip4h.ip_off = htons(IP_MF | off);
else
ip4h.ip_off = htons(off);
ip4h.ip_ttl = ttl;
ip4h.ip_proto = proto;
ip4h.s_ip_src.s_addr = 0x01010101; /* 1.1.1.1 */
ip4h.s_ip_dst.s_addr = 0x02020202; /* 2.2.2.2 */
/* copy content_len crap, we need full length */
PacketCopyData(p, (uint8_t *)&ip4h, sizeof(ip4h));
p->ip4h = (IPV4Hdr *)GET_PKT_DATA(p);
SET_IPV4_SRC_ADDR(p, &p->src);
SET_IPV4_DST_ADDR(p, &p->dst);
pcontent = SCCalloc(1, content_len);
if (unlikely(pcontent == NULL))
return NULL;
memset(pcontent, content, content_len);
PacketCopyDataOffset(p, hlen, pcontent, content_len);
SET_PKT_LEN(p, hlen + content_len);
SCFree(pcontent);
p->ip4h->ip_csum = IPV4CalculateChecksum((uint16_t *)GET_PKT_DATA(p), hlen);
/* Self test. */
if (IPV4_GET_VER(p) != 4)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_HLEN(p) != hlen)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(p) != hlen + content_len)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPID(p) != id)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPOFFSET(p) != off)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_MF(p) != mf)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPTTL(p) != ttl)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPPROTO(p) != proto)
goto error;
return p;
error:
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
return NULL;
}
| 168,294 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const char* Track::GetNameAsUTF8() const
{
return m_info.nameAsUTF8;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const char* Track::GetNameAsUTF8() const
| 174,343 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::Process(size_t number_of_frames) {
AudioBus* output_bus = Output(0).Bus();
MutexTryLocker try_locker(process_lock_);
if (try_locker.Locked()) {
if (!MediaElement() || !source_sample_rate_) {
output_bus->Zero();
return;
}
if (source_number_of_channels_ != output_bus->NumberOfChannels()) {
output_bus->Zero();
return;
}
AudioSourceProvider& provider = MediaElement()->GetAudioSourceProvider();
if (multi_channel_resampler_.get()) {
DCHECK_NE(source_sample_rate_, Context()->sampleRate());
multi_channel_resampler_->Process(&provider, output_bus,
number_of_frames);
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(source_sample_rate_, Context()->sampleRate());
provider.ProvideInput(output_bus, number_of_frames);
}
if (!PassesCORSAccessCheck()) {
if (maybe_print_cors_message_) {
maybe_print_cors_message_ = false;
PostCrossThreadTask(
*task_runner_, FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(&MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::PrintCORSMessage,
WrapRefCounted(this), current_src_string_));
}
output_bus->Zero();
}
} else {
output_bus->Zero();
}
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::Process(size_t number_of_frames) {
AudioBus* output_bus = Output(0).Bus();
MutexTryLocker try_locker(process_lock_);
if (try_locker.Locked()) {
if (!MediaElement() || !source_sample_rate_) {
output_bus->Zero();
return;
}
if (source_number_of_channels_ != output_bus->NumberOfChannels()) {
output_bus->Zero();
return;
}
AudioSourceProvider& provider = MediaElement()->GetAudioSourceProvider();
if (multi_channel_resampler_.get()) {
DCHECK_NE(source_sample_rate_, Context()->sampleRate());
multi_channel_resampler_->Process(&provider, output_bus,
number_of_frames);
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(source_sample_rate_, Context()->sampleRate());
provider.ProvideInput(output_bus, number_of_frames);
}
if (is_origin_tainted_) {
output_bus->Zero();
}
} else {
output_bus->Zero();
}
}
| 173,149 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool PermissionsRemoveFunction::RunImpl() {
scoped_ptr<Remove::Params> params(Remove::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> permissions =
helpers::UnpackPermissionSet(params->permissions, &error_);
if (!permissions.get())
return false;
const extensions::Extension* extension = GetExtension();
APIPermissionSet apis = permissions->apis();
for (APIPermissionSet::const_iterator i = apis.begin();
i != apis.end(); ++i) {
if (!i->info()->supports_optional()) {
error_ = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kNotWhitelistedError, i->name());
return false;
}
}
const PermissionSet* required = extension->required_permission_set();
scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> intersection(
PermissionSet::CreateIntersection(permissions.get(), required));
if (!intersection->IsEmpty()) {
error_ = kCantRemoveRequiredPermissionsError;
results_ = Remove::Results::Create(false);
return false;
}
PermissionsUpdater(profile()).RemovePermissions(extension, permissions.get());
results_ = Remove::Results::Create(true);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool PermissionsRemoveFunction::RunImpl() {
scoped_ptr<Remove::Params> params(Remove::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params);
ExtensionPrefs* prefs = ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_prefs();
scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> permissions =
helpers::UnpackPermissionSet(params->permissions,
prefs->AllowFileAccess(extension_->id()),
&error_);
if (!permissions.get())
return false;
const extensions::Extension* extension = GetExtension();
APIPermissionSet apis = permissions->apis();
for (APIPermissionSet::const_iterator i = apis.begin();
i != apis.end(); ++i) {
if (!i->info()->supports_optional()) {
error_ = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kNotWhitelistedError, i->name());
return false;
}
}
const PermissionSet* required = extension->required_permission_set();
scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> intersection(
PermissionSet::CreateIntersection(permissions.get(), required));
if (!intersection->IsEmpty()) {
error_ = kCantRemoveRequiredPermissionsError;
results_ = Remove::Results::Create(false);
return false;
}
PermissionsUpdater(profile()).RemovePermissions(extension, permissions.get());
results_ = Remove::Results::Create(true);
return true;
}
| 171,443 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int rose_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_rose *srose = (struct sockaddr_rose *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
unsigned char *asmptr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int n, er, qbit;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -ENOTCONN;
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL)
return er;
qbit = (skb->data[0] & ROSE_Q_BIT) == ROSE_Q_BIT;
skb_pull(skb, ROSE_MIN_LEN);
if (rose->qbitincl) {
asmptr = skb_push(skb, 1);
*asmptr = qbit;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (srose != NULL) {
srose->srose_family = AF_ROSE;
srose->srose_addr = rose->dest_addr;
srose->srose_call = rose->dest_call;
srose->srose_ndigis = rose->dest_ndigis;
if (msg->msg_namelen >= sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_rose)) {
struct full_sockaddr_rose *full_srose = (struct full_sockaddr_rose *)msg->msg_name;
for (n = 0 ; n < rose->dest_ndigis ; n++)
full_srose->srose_digis[n] = rose->dest_digis[n];
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_rose);
} else {
if (rose->dest_ndigis >= 1) {
srose->srose_ndigis = 1;
srose->srose_digi = rose->dest_digis[0];
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_rose);
}
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return copied;
}
Commit Message: rose: fix info leak via msg_name in rose_recvmsg()
The code in rose_recvmsg() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_rose/full_sockaddr_rose when filling the sockaddr info.
Nor does it initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by
the compiler for alignment. This will lead to leaking uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix the issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info with
memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int rose_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_rose *srose = (struct sockaddr_rose *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
unsigned char *asmptr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int n, er, qbit;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -ENOTCONN;
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL)
return er;
qbit = (skb->data[0] & ROSE_Q_BIT) == ROSE_Q_BIT;
skb_pull(skb, ROSE_MIN_LEN);
if (rose->qbitincl) {
asmptr = skb_push(skb, 1);
*asmptr = qbit;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (srose != NULL) {
memset(srose, 0, msg->msg_namelen);
srose->srose_family = AF_ROSE;
srose->srose_addr = rose->dest_addr;
srose->srose_call = rose->dest_call;
srose->srose_ndigis = rose->dest_ndigis;
if (msg->msg_namelen >= sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_rose)) {
struct full_sockaddr_rose *full_srose = (struct full_sockaddr_rose *)msg->msg_name;
for (n = 0 ; n < rose->dest_ndigis ; n++)
full_srose->srose_digis[n] = rose->dest_digis[n];
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_rose);
} else {
if (rose->dest_ndigis >= 1) {
srose->srose_ndigis = 1;
srose->srose_digi = rose->dest_digis[0];
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_rose);
}
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return copied;
}
| 166,033 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: do_local_notify(xmlNode * notify_src, const char *client_id,
gboolean sync_reply, gboolean from_peer)
{
/* send callback to originating child */
cib_client_t *client_obj = NULL;
int local_rc = pcmk_ok;
if (client_id != NULL) {
client_obj = g_hash_table_lookup(client_list, client_id);
} else {
crm_trace("No client to sent the response to. F_CIB_CLIENTID not set.");
}
if (client_obj == NULL) {
local_rc = -ECONNRESET;
} else {
int rid = 0;
if(sync_reply) {
CRM_LOG_ASSERT(client_obj->request_id);
rid = client_obj->request_id;
client_obj->request_id = 0;
crm_trace("Sending response %d to %s %s",
rid, client_obj->name, from_peer?"(originator of delegated request)":"");
} else {
crm_trace("Sending an event to %s %s",
client_obj->name, from_peer?"(originator of delegated request)":"");
}
if (client_obj->ipc && crm_ipcs_send(client_obj->ipc, rid, notify_src, !sync_reply) < 0) {
local_rc = -ENOMSG;
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
} else if (client_obj->session) {
crm_send_remote_msg(client_obj->session, notify_src, client_obj->encrypted);
#endif
} else if(client_obj->ipc == NULL) {
crm_err("Unknown transport for %s", client_obj->name);
}
}
if (local_rc != pcmk_ok && client_obj != NULL) {
crm_warn("%sSync reply to %s failed: %s",
sync_reply ? "" : "A-",
client_obj ? client_obj->name : "<unknown>", pcmk_strerror(local_rc));
}
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | do_local_notify(xmlNode * notify_src, const char *client_id,
gboolean sync_reply, gboolean from_peer)
{
/* send callback to originating child */
cib_client_t *client_obj = NULL;
int local_rc = pcmk_ok;
if (client_id != NULL) {
client_obj = g_hash_table_lookup(client_list, client_id);
} else {
crm_trace("No client to sent the response to. F_CIB_CLIENTID not set.");
}
if (client_obj == NULL) {
local_rc = -ECONNRESET;
} else {
int rid = 0;
if(sync_reply) {
if (client_obj->ipc) {
CRM_LOG_ASSERT(client_obj->request_id);
rid = client_obj->request_id;
client_obj->request_id = 0;
crm_trace("Sending response %d to %s %s",
rid, client_obj->name, from_peer?"(originator of delegated request)":"");
} else {
crm_trace("Sending response to %s %s",
client_obj->name, from_peer?"(originator of delegated request)":"");
}
} else {
crm_trace("Sending an event to %s %s",
client_obj->name, from_peer?"(originator of delegated request)":"");
}
if (client_obj->ipc && crm_ipcs_send(client_obj->ipc, rid, notify_src, !sync_reply) < 0) {
local_rc = -ENOMSG;
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
} else if (client_obj->session) {
crm_send_remote_msg(client_obj->session, notify_src, client_obj->encrypted);
#endif
} else if(client_obj->ipc == NULL) {
crm_err("Unknown transport for %s", client_obj->name);
}
}
if (local_rc != pcmk_ok && client_obj != NULL) {
crm_warn("%sSync reply to %s failed: %s",
sync_reply ? "" : "A-",
client_obj ? client_obj->name : "<unknown>", pcmk_strerror(local_rc));
}
}
| 166,145 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int av_reallocp_array(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
void **ptrptr = ptr;
*ptrptr = av_realloc_f(*ptrptr, nmemb, size);
if (!*ptrptr && !(nmemb && size))
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avutil/mem: Fix flipped condition
Fixes return code and later null pointer dereference
Found-by: Laurent Butti <laurentb@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | int av_reallocp_array(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
void **ptrptr = ptr;
*ptrptr = av_realloc_f(*ptrptr, nmemb, size);
if (!*ptrptr && nmemb && size)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
return 0;
}
| 165,995 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Dispatcher::AddStatus(const std::string& pattern) {
mg_set_uri_callback(context_, (root_ + pattern).c_str(), &SendStatus, NULL);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void Dispatcher::AddStatus(const std::string& pattern) {
void Dispatcher::AddHealthz(const std::string& pattern) {
mg_set_uri_callback(context_, (root_ + pattern).c_str(), &SendHealthz, NULL);
}
void Dispatcher::AddLog(const std::string& pattern) {
mg_set_uri_callback(context_, (root_ + pattern).c_str(), &SendLog, NULL);
}
| 170,455 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void Sp_search(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
Resub m;
text = checkstring(J, 0);
if (js_isregexp(J, 1))
js_copy(J, 1);
else if (js_isundefined(J, 1))
js_newregexp(J, "", 0);
else
js_newregexp(J, js_tostring(J, 1), 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, -1);
if (!js_regexec(re->prog, text, &m, 0))
js_pushnumber(J, js_utfptrtoidx(text, m.sub[0].sp));
else
js_pushnumber(J, -1);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | static void Sp_search(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
Resub m;
text = checkstring(J, 0);
if (js_isregexp(J, 1))
js_copy(J, 1);
else if (js_isundefined(J, 1))
js_newregexp(J, "", 0);
else
js_newregexp(J, js_tostring(J, 1), 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, -1);
if (!js_doregexec(J, re->prog, text, &m, 0))
js_pushnumber(J, js_utfptrtoidx(text, m.sub[0].sp));
else
js_pushnumber(J, -1);
}
| 169,700 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mainloop_destroy_trigger(crm_trigger_t * source)
{
source->trigger = FALSE;
if (source->id > 0) {
g_source_remove(source->id);
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | mainloop_destroy_trigger(crm_trigger_t * source)
{
source->trigger = FALSE;
if (source->id > 0) {
g_source_remove(source->id);
source->id = 0;
}
return TRUE;
}
| 166,157 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message,
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_WITH_PARAM(PrintPreviewMessageHandler, message,
render_frame_host)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview,
OnRequestPrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (handled)
return true;
handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(PrintPreviewMessageHandler, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_DidGetPreviewPageCount,
OnDidGetPreviewPageCount)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage,
OnDidPreviewPage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_MetafileReadyForPrinting,
OnMetafileReadyForPrinting)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewFailed,
OnPrintPreviewFailed)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_DidGetDefaultPageLayout,
OnDidGetDefaultPageLayout)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewCancelled,
OnPrintPreviewCancelled)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewInvalidPrinterSettings,
OnInvalidPrinterSettings)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument,
OnSetOptionsFromDocument)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message,
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_WITH_PARAM(PrintPreviewMessageHandler, message,
render_frame_host)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview,
OnRequestPrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (handled)
return true;
handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(PrintPreviewMessageHandler, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_DidGetPreviewPageCount,
OnDidGetPreviewPageCount)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage, OnDidPreviewPage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_MetafileReadyForPrinting,
OnMetafileReadyForPrinting)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewFailed,
OnPrintPreviewFailed)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_DidGetDefaultPageLayout,
OnDidGetDefaultPageLayout)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewCancelled,
OnPrintPreviewCancelled)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewInvalidPrinterSettings,
OnInvalidPrinterSettings)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument,
OnSetOptionsFromDocument)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
| 171,889 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mkvparser::IMkvReader::~IMkvReader()
{
//// Disable MSVC warnings that suggest making code non-portable.
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | mkvparser::IMkvReader::~IMkvReader()
#ifdef _MSC_VER
//// Disable MSVC warnings that suggest making code non-portable.
#pragma warning(disable : 4996)
#endif
mkvparser::IMkvReader::~IMkvReader() {}
void mkvparser::GetVersion(int& major, int& minor, int& build, int& revision) {
major = 1;
minor = 0;
build = 0;
revision = 28;
}
| 174,467 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params,
int gpu_host_id) {
texture_layer_->setTextureId(params.surface_handle);
DCHECK(texture_layer_ == layer_);
layer_->setBounds(params.size);
texture_id_in_layer_ = params.surface_handle;
texture_size_in_layer_ = params.size;
DCHECK(!CompositorImpl::IsThreadingEnabled());
uint32 sync_point =
ImageTransportFactoryAndroid::GetInstance()->InsertSyncPoint();
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
params.route_id, gpu_host_id, true, sync_point);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params,
int gpu_host_id) {
ImageTransportFactoryAndroid* factory =
ImageTransportFactoryAndroid::GetInstance();
// need to delay the ACK until after commit and use more than a single
// texture.
DCHECK(!CompositorImpl::IsThreadingEnabled());
uint64 previous_buffer = current_buffer_id_;
if (previous_buffer && texture_id_in_layer_) {
DCHECK(id_to_mailbox_.find(previous_buffer) != id_to_mailbox_.end());
ImageTransportFactoryAndroid::GetInstance()->ReleaseTexture(
texture_id_in_layer_,
reinterpret_cast<const signed char*>(
id_to_mailbox_[previous_buffer].c_str()));
}
current_buffer_id_ = params.surface_handle;
if (!texture_id_in_layer_) {
texture_id_in_layer_ = factory->CreateTexture();
texture_layer_->setTextureId(texture_id_in_layer_);
}
DCHECK(id_to_mailbox_.find(current_buffer_id_) != id_to_mailbox_.end());
ImageTransportFactoryAndroid::GetInstance()->AcquireTexture(
texture_id_in_layer_,
reinterpret_cast<const signed char*>(
id_to_mailbox_[current_buffer_id_].c_str()));
texture_layer_->setNeedsDisplay();
texture_layer_->setBounds(params.size);
texture_size_in_layer_ = params.size;
uint32 sync_point =
ImageTransportFactoryAndroid::GetInstance()->InsertSyncPoint();
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
params.route_id, gpu_host_id, previous_buffer, sync_point);
}
| 171,369 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserContextDestroyer::DestroyContext(BrowserContext* context) {
CHECK(context->IsOffTheRecord() || !context->HasOffTheRecordContext());
content::BrowserContext::NotifyWillBeDestroyed(context);
std::set<content::RenderProcessHost*> hosts;
for (content::RenderProcessHost::iterator it =
content::RenderProcessHost::AllHostsIterator();
!it.IsAtEnd(); it.Advance()) {
content::RenderProcessHost* host = it.GetCurrentValue();
if (host->GetBrowserContext() != context) {
continue;
}
hosts.insert(host);
//// static
}
if (hosts.empty()) {
delete context;
} else {
new BrowserContextDestroyer(context, hosts);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void BrowserContextDestroyer::DestroyContext(BrowserContext* context) {
void BrowserContextDestroyer::Shutdown() {
auto destroy_all_unused_contexts = []() {
auto it = g_contexts_pending_deletion.Get().begin();
while (it != g_contexts_pending_deletion.Get().end()) {
BrowserContextDestroyer* destroyer = *it;
++it;
if (!destroyer->finish_destroy_scheduled_) {
continue;
}
destroyer->FinishDestroyContext();
// |destroyer| is invalid now
}
};
// We make 2 passes over the list because the first pass can destroy an
// incognito BrowserContext that subsequently schedules its owner context for
// deletion
destroy_all_unused_contexts();
destroy_all_unused_contexts();
}
//// static
void BrowserContextDestroyer::RenderProcessHostAssignedToSiteInstance(
content::RenderProcessHost* host) {
BrowserContextDestroyer* destroyer = GetForContext(host->GetBrowserContext());
if (!destroyer) {
return;
}
CHECK(!destroyer->finish_destroy_scheduled_);
if (destroyer->pending_host_ids_.find(host->GetID()) !=
destroyer->pending_host_ids_.end()) {
return;
}
destroyer->ObserveHost(host);
}
| 165,419 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int parse_csum_name(const char *name, int len)
{
if (len < 0 && name)
len = strlen(name);
if (!name || (len == 4 && strncasecmp(name, "auto", 4) == 0)) {
if (protocol_version >= 30)
return CSUM_MD5;
if (protocol_version >= 27)
return CSUM_MD4_OLD;
if (protocol_version >= 21)
return CSUM_MD4_BUSTED;
return CSUM_ARCHAIC;
}
if (len == 3 && strncasecmp(name, "md4", 3) == 0)
return CSUM_MD4;
if (len == 3 && strncasecmp(name, "md5", 3) == 0)
return CSUM_MD5;
if (len == 4 && strncasecmp(name, "none", 4) == 0)
return CSUM_NONE;
rprintf(FERROR, "unknown checksum name: %s\n", name);
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-354 | int parse_csum_name(const char *name, int len)
{
if (len < 0 && name)
len = strlen(name);
if (!name || (len == 4 && strncasecmp(name, "auto", 4) == 0)) {
if (protocol_version >= 30)
return CSUM_MD5;
if (protocol_version >= 27)
return CSUM_MD4_OLD;
if (protocol_version >= 21)
return CSUM_MD4_BUSTED;
return CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC;
}
if (len == 3 && strncasecmp(name, "md4", 3) == 0)
return CSUM_MD4;
if (len == 3 && strncasecmp(name, "md5", 3) == 0)
return CSUM_MD5;
if (len == 4 && strncasecmp(name, "none", 4) == 0)
return CSUM_NONE;
rprintf(FERROR, "unknown checksum name: %s\n", name);
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
| 164,645 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: get_princs_2_svc(gprincs_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gprincs_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gprincs_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->exp;
if (prime_arg == NULL)
prime_arg = "*";
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_LIST,
NULL,
NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_LIST;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_principals", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_principals((void *)handle,
arg->exp, &ret.princs,
&ret.count);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_principals", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | get_princs_2_svc(gprincs_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gprincs_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gprincs_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->exp;
if (prime_arg == NULL)
prime_arg = "*";
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_LIST,
NULL,
NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_LIST;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_principals", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_principals((void *)handle,
arg->exp, &ret.princs,
&ret.count);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_principals", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,516 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintMsg_Print_Params::Reset() {
page_size = gfx::Size();
content_size = gfx::Size();
printable_area = gfx::Rect();
margin_top = 0;
margin_left = 0;
dpi = 0;
scale_factor = 1.0f;
rasterize_pdf = false;
document_cookie = 0;
selection_only = false;
supports_alpha_blend = false;
preview_ui_id = -1;
preview_request_id = 0;
is_first_request = false;
print_scaling_option = blink::kWebPrintScalingOptionSourceSize;
print_to_pdf = false;
display_header_footer = false;
title = base::string16();
url = base::string16();
should_print_backgrounds = false;
printed_doc_type = printing::SkiaDocumentType::PDF;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void PrintMsg_Print_Params::Reset() {
page_size = gfx::Size();
content_size = gfx::Size();
printable_area = gfx::Rect();
margin_top = 0;
margin_left = 0;
dpi = 0;
scale_factor = 1.0f;
rasterize_pdf = false;
document_cookie = 0;
selection_only = false;
supports_alpha_blend = false;
preview_ui_id = -1;
preview_request_id = 0;
is_first_request = false;
print_scaling_option = blink::kWebPrintScalingOptionSourceSize;
print_to_pdf = false;
display_header_footer = false;
title = base::string16();
url = base::string16();
header_template = base::string16();
footer_template = base::string16();
should_print_backgrounds = false;
printed_doc_type = printing::SkiaDocumentType::PDF;
}
| 172,898 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int blkcg_init_queue(struct request_queue *q)
{
struct blkcg_gq *new_blkg, *blkg;
bool preloaded;
int ret;
new_blkg = blkg_alloc(&blkcg_root, q, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_blkg)
return -ENOMEM;
preloaded = !radix_tree_preload(GFP_KERNEL);
/*
* Make sure the root blkg exists and count the existing blkgs. As
* @q is bypassing at this point, blkg_lookup_create() can't be
* used. Open code insertion.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
spin_lock_irq(q->queue_lock);
blkg = blkg_create(&blkcg_root, q, new_blkg);
spin_unlock_irq(q->queue_lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (preloaded)
radix_tree_preload_end();
if (IS_ERR(blkg)) {
blkg_free(new_blkg);
return PTR_ERR(blkg);
}
q->root_blkg = blkg;
q->root_rl.blkg = blkg;
ret = blk_throtl_init(q);
if (ret) {
spin_lock_irq(q->queue_lock);
blkg_destroy_all(q);
spin_unlock_irq(q->queue_lock);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: blkcg: fix double free of new_blkg in blkcg_init_queue
If blkg_create fails, new_blkg passed as an argument will
be freed by blkg_create, so there is no need to free it again.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | int blkcg_init_queue(struct request_queue *q)
{
struct blkcg_gq *new_blkg, *blkg;
bool preloaded;
int ret;
new_blkg = blkg_alloc(&blkcg_root, q, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_blkg)
return -ENOMEM;
preloaded = !radix_tree_preload(GFP_KERNEL);
/*
* Make sure the root blkg exists and count the existing blkgs. As
* @q is bypassing at this point, blkg_lookup_create() can't be
* used. Open code insertion.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
spin_lock_irq(q->queue_lock);
blkg = blkg_create(&blkcg_root, q, new_blkg);
spin_unlock_irq(q->queue_lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (preloaded)
radix_tree_preload_end();
if (IS_ERR(blkg))
return PTR_ERR(blkg);
q->root_blkg = blkg;
q->root_rl.blkg = blkg;
ret = blk_throtl_init(q);
if (ret) {
spin_lock_irq(q->queue_lock);
blkg_destroy_all(q);
spin_unlock_irq(q->queue_lock);
}
return ret;
}
| 169,318 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SynchronousCompositorOutputSurface::InvokeComposite(
const gfx::Transform& transform,
gfx::Rect viewport,
gfx::Rect clip,
gfx::Rect viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
gfx::Transform transform_for_tile_priority,
bool hardware_draw) {
DCHECK(!frame_holder_.get());
gfx::Transform adjusted_transform = transform;
adjusted_transform.matrix().postTranslate(-viewport.x(), -viewport.y(), 0);
SetExternalDrawConstraints(adjusted_transform, viewport, clip,
viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
transform_for_tile_priority, !hardware_draw);
if (!hardware_draw || next_hardware_draw_needs_damage_) {
next_hardware_draw_needs_damage_ = false;
SetNeedsRedrawRect(gfx::Rect(viewport.size()));
}
client_->OnDraw();
if (hardware_draw) {
cached_hw_transform_ = adjusted_transform;
cached_hw_viewport_ = viewport;
cached_hw_clip_ = clip;
cached_hw_viewport_rect_for_tile_priority_ =
viewport_rect_for_tile_priority;
cached_hw_transform_for_tile_priority_ = transform_for_tile_priority;
} else {
bool resourceless_software_draw = false;
SetExternalDrawConstraints(cached_hw_transform_,
cached_hw_viewport_,
cached_hw_clip_,
cached_hw_viewport_rect_for_tile_priority_,
cached_hw_transform_for_tile_priority_,
resourceless_software_draw);
next_hardware_draw_needs_damage_ = true;
}
if (frame_holder_.get())
client_->DidSwapBuffersComplete();
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void SynchronousCompositorOutputSurface::InvokeComposite(
const gfx::Transform& transform,
const gfx::Rect& viewport,
const gfx::Rect& clip,
const gfx::Rect& viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
const gfx::Transform& transform_for_tile_priority,
bool hardware_draw) {
DCHECK(!frame_holder_.get());
gfx::Transform adjusted_transform = transform;
adjusted_transform.matrix().postTranslate(-viewport.x(), -viewport.y(), 0);
SetExternalDrawConstraints(adjusted_transform, viewport, clip,
viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
transform_for_tile_priority, !hardware_draw);
if (!hardware_draw || next_hardware_draw_needs_damage_) {
next_hardware_draw_needs_damage_ = false;
SetNeedsRedrawRect(gfx::Rect(viewport.size()));
}
client_->OnDraw();
if (hardware_draw) {
cached_hw_transform_ = adjusted_transform;
cached_hw_viewport_ = viewport;
cached_hw_clip_ = clip;
cached_hw_viewport_rect_for_tile_priority_ =
viewport_rect_for_tile_priority;
cached_hw_transform_for_tile_priority_ = transform_for_tile_priority;
} else {
bool resourceless_software_draw = false;
SetExternalDrawConstraints(cached_hw_transform_,
cached_hw_viewport_,
cached_hw_clip_,
cached_hw_viewport_rect_for_tile_priority_,
cached_hw_transform_for_tile_priority_,
resourceless_software_draw);
next_hardware_draw_needs_damage_ = true;
}
if (frame_holder_.get())
client_->DidSwapBuffersComplete();
}
| 171,622 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int __jfs_set_acl(tid_t tid, struct inode *inode, int type,
struct posix_acl *acl)
{
char *ea_name;
int rc;
int size = 0;
char *value = NULL;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
ea_name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
rc = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
if (rc == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
ea_name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
value = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return -ENOMEM;
rc = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
}
rc = __jfs_setxattr(tid, inode, ea_name, value, size, 0);
out:
kfree(value);
if (!rc)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | static int __jfs_set_acl(tid_t tid, struct inode *inode, int type,
struct posix_acl *acl)
{
char *ea_name;
int rc;
int size = 0;
char *value = NULL;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
ea_name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
rc = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
if (rc)
return rc;
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
ea_name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
value = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return -ENOMEM;
rc = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
}
rc = __jfs_setxattr(tid, inode, ea_name, value, size, 0);
out:
kfree(value);
if (!rc)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return rc;
}
| 166,975 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static MagickOffsetType TIFFSeekCustomStream(const MagickOffsetType offset,
const int whence,void *user_data)
{
PhotoshopProfile
*profile;
profile=(PhotoshopProfile *) user_data;
switch (whence)
{
case SEEK_SET:
default:
{
if (offset < 0)
return(-1);
profile->offset=offset;
break;
}
case SEEK_CUR:
{
if ((profile->offset+offset) < 0)
return(-1);
profile->offset+=offset;
break;
}
case SEEK_END:
{
if (((MagickOffsetType) profile->length+offset) < 0)
return(-1);
profile->offset=profile->length+offset;
break;
}
}
return(profile->offset);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1602
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static MagickOffsetType TIFFSeekCustomStream(const MagickOffsetType offset,
const int whence,void *user_data)
{
PhotoshopProfile
*profile;
profile=(PhotoshopProfile *) user_data;
switch (whence)
{
case SEEK_SET:
default:
{
if (offset < 0)
return(-1);
profile->offset=offset;
break;
}
case SEEK_CUR:
{
if (((offset > 0) && (profile->offset > (SSIZE_MAX-offset))) ||
((offset < 0) && (profile->offset < (-SSIZE_MAX-offset))))
{
errno=EOVERFLOW;
return(-1);
}
if ((profile->offset+offset) < 0)
return(-1);
profile->offset+=offset;
break;
}
case SEEK_END:
{
if (((MagickOffsetType) profile->length+offset) < 0)
return(-1);
profile->offset=profile->length+offset;
break;
}
}
return(profile->offset);
}
| 169,620 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateNativeHandleInMeta(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<NativeHandle>& nativeHandle, OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, portIndex);
if (header == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = (BufferMeta *)(header->pAppPrivate);
sp<ABuffer> data = bufferMeta->getBuffer(
header, portIndex == kPortIndexInput /* backup */, false /* limit */);
bufferMeta->setNativeHandle(nativeHandle);
if (mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeNativeHandleSource
&& data->capacity() >= sizeof(VideoNativeHandleMetadata)) {
VideoNativeHandleMetadata &metadata = *(VideoNativeHandleMetadata *)(data->data());
metadata.eType = mMetadataType[portIndex];
metadata.pHandle =
nativeHandle == NULL ? NULL : const_cast<native_handle*>(nativeHandle->handle());
} else {
CLOG_ERROR(updateNativeHandleInMeta, BAD_VALUE, "%s:%u, %#x bad type (%d) or size (%zu)",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer, mMetadataType[portIndex], data->capacity());
return BAD_VALUE;
}
CLOG_BUFFER(updateNativeHandleInMeta, "%s:%u, %#x := %p",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer,
nativeHandle == NULL ? NULL : nativeHandle->handle());
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateNativeHandleInMeta(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<NativeHandle>& nativeHandle, OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, portIndex);
if (header == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = (BufferMeta *)(header->pAppPrivate);
sp<ABuffer> data = bufferMeta->getBuffer(
header, false /* backup */, false /* limit */);
bufferMeta->setNativeHandle(nativeHandle);
if (mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeNativeHandleSource
&& data->capacity() >= sizeof(VideoNativeHandleMetadata)) {
VideoNativeHandleMetadata &metadata = *(VideoNativeHandleMetadata *)(data->data());
metadata.eType = mMetadataType[portIndex];
metadata.pHandle =
nativeHandle == NULL ? NULL : const_cast<native_handle*>(nativeHandle->handle());
} else {
CLOG_ERROR(updateNativeHandleInMeta, BAD_VALUE, "%s:%u, %#x bad type (%d) or size (%zu)",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer, mMetadataType[portIndex], data->capacity());
return BAD_VALUE;
}
CLOG_BUFFER(updateNativeHandleInMeta, "%s:%u, %#x := %p",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer,
nativeHandle == NULL ? NULL : nativeHandle->handle());
return OK;
}
| 174,142 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
FakeDBusThreadManager* fake_dbus_thread_manager = new FakeDBusThreadManager;
fake_bluetooth_profile_manager_client_ =
new FakeBluetoothProfileManagerClient;
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothProfileManagerClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothProfileManagerClient>(
fake_bluetooth_profile_manager_client_));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothAdapterClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothAdapterClient>(new FakeBluetoothAdapterClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothDeviceClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothDeviceClient>(new FakeBluetoothDeviceClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothInputClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothInputClient>(new FakeBluetoothInputClient));
DBusThreadManager::InitializeForTesting(fake_dbus_thread_manager);
device::BluetoothAdapterFactory::GetAdapter(
base::Bind(&BluetoothProfileChromeOSTest::AdapterCallback,
base::Unretained(this)));
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_.get() != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsInitialized());
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsPresent());
adapter_->SetPowered(
true,
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing),
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing));
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsPowered());
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | virtual void SetUp() {
FakeDBusThreadManager* fake_dbus_thread_manager = new FakeDBusThreadManager;
fake_bluetooth_profile_manager_client_ =
new FakeBluetoothProfileManagerClient;
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothProfileManagerClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothProfileManagerClient>(
fake_bluetooth_profile_manager_client_));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothAgentManagerClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothAgentManagerClient>(
new FakeBluetoothAgentManagerClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothAdapterClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothAdapterClient>(new FakeBluetoothAdapterClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothDeviceClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothDeviceClient>(new FakeBluetoothDeviceClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothInputClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothInputClient>(new FakeBluetoothInputClient));
DBusThreadManager::InitializeForTesting(fake_dbus_thread_manager);
device::BluetoothAdapterFactory::GetAdapter(
base::Bind(&BluetoothProfileChromeOSTest::AdapterCallback,
base::Unretained(this)));
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_.get() != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsInitialized());
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsPresent());
adapter_->SetPowered(
true,
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing),
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing));
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsPowered());
}
| 171,242 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage::Draw(cc::PaintCanvas* canvas,
const cc::PaintFlags& flags,
const FloatRect& dst_rect,
const FloatRect& src_rect,
RespectImageOrientationEnum,
ImageClampingMode clamp_mode,
ImageDecodingMode) {
StaticBitmapImage::DrawHelper(canvas, flags, dst_rect, src_rect, clamp_mode,
PaintImageForCurrentFrame());
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage::Draw(cc::PaintCanvas* canvas,
const cc::PaintFlags& flags,
const FloatRect& dst_rect,
const FloatRect& src_rect,
RespectImageOrientationEnum,
ImageClampingMode clamp_mode,
ImageDecodingMode) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
StaticBitmapImage::DrawHelper(canvas, flags, dst_rect, src_rect, clamp_mode,
PaintImageForCurrentFrame());
}
| 172,600 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (! kcontrol)
return err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n",
id.iface,
id.device,
id.subdevice,
id.name,
id.index);
err = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < kcontrol->count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Don't access controls outside of protected regions
A control that is visible on the card->controls list can be freed at any time.
This means we must not access any of its memory while not holding the
controls_rw_lock. Otherwise we risk a use after free access.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
unsigned int count;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (! kcontrol)
return err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n",
id.iface,
id.device,
id.subdevice,
id.name,
id.index);
err = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
count = kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return err;
}
| 166,292 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: uint64 Clipboard::GetSequenceNumber(Buffer buffer) {
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Use XFixes to update the clipboard sequence number.
BUG=73478
TEST=manual testing
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8501002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109528 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | uint64 Clipboard::GetSequenceNumber(Buffer buffer) {
if (buffer == BUFFER_STANDARD)
return SelectionChangeObserver::GetInstance()->clipboard_sequence_number();
else
return SelectionChangeObserver::GetInstance()->primary_sequence_number();
}
| 170,962 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ReturnFrameBuffer(vpx_codec_frame_buffer_t *fb) {
EXPECT_TRUE(fb != NULL);
ExternalFrameBuffer *const ext_fb =
reinterpret_cast<ExternalFrameBuffer*>(fb->priv);
EXPECT_TRUE(ext_fb != NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(1, ext_fb->in_use);
ext_fb->in_use = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int ReturnFrameBuffer(vpx_codec_frame_buffer_t *fb) {
if (fb == NULL) {
EXPECT_TRUE(fb != NULL);
return -1;
}
ExternalFrameBuffer *const ext_fb =
reinterpret_cast<ExternalFrameBuffer*>(fb->priv);
if (ext_fb == NULL) {
EXPECT_TRUE(ext_fb != NULL);
return -1;
}
EXPECT_EQ(1, ext_fb->in_use);
ext_fb->in_use = 0;
return 0;
}
| 174,545 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: unsigned long lh_char_hash(const void *k)
{
unsigned int h = 0;
const char* data = (const char*)k;
while( *data!=0 ) h = h*129 + (unsigned int)(*data++) + LH_PRIME;
return h;
}
Commit Message: Patch to address the following issues:
* CVE-2013-6371: hash collision denial of service
* CVE-2013-6370: buffer overflow if size_t is larger than int
CWE ID: CWE-310 | unsigned long lh_char_hash(const void *k)
{
static volatile int random_seed = -1;
if (random_seed == -1) {
int seed;
/* we can't use -1 as it is the unitialized sentinel */
while ((seed = json_c_get_random_seed()) == -1);
#if defined __GNUC__
__sync_val_compare_and_swap(&random_seed, -1, seed);
#elif defined _MSC_VER
InterlockedCompareExchange(&random_seed, seed, -1);
#else
#warning "racy random seed initializtion if used by multiple threads"
random_seed = seed; /* potentially racy */
#endif
}
return hashlittle((const char*)k, strlen((const char*)k), random_seed);
}
| 166,540 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::GetEntry(long index, const mkvparser::BlockEntry*& pEntry) const
{
assert(m_pos >= m_element_start);
pEntry = NULL;
if (index < 0)
return -1; //generic error
if (m_entries_count < 0)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count <= m_entries_size);
if (index < m_entries_count)
{
pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
return 1; //found entry
}
if (m_element_size < 0) //we don't know cluster end yet
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; //underflow
const long long element_stop = m_element_start + m_element_size;
if (m_pos >= element_stop)
return 0; //nothing left to parse
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; //underflow, since more remains to be parsed
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Cluster::GetEntry(long index, const mkvparser::BlockEntry*& pEntry) const
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
unsigned char flags;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &flags);
| 174,314 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: INLINE void impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(void* pv_ctxt, UWORD32 u4_no_of_bits)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = (stream_t *)pv_ctxt;
if (ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
{
FLUSH_BITS(ps_stream->u4_offset,ps_stream->u4_buf,ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_no_of_bits,ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Fixed out of bound read in flush_bits
Bug: 28168413
Change-Id: I3db5432a08daf665e160c0dab2d1928a576418b4
CWE ID: CWE-200 | INLINE void impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(void* pv_ctxt, UWORD32 u4_no_of_bits)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = (stream_t *)pv_ctxt;
if ((ps_stream->u4_offset + 64) < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
{
FLUSH_BITS(ps_stream->u4_offset,ps_stream->u4_buf,ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_no_of_bits,ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)
}
else
{
UWORD32 u4_temp;
if (((ps_stream->u4_offset & 0x1f) + u4_no_of_bits) >= 32)
{
ps_stream->u4_buf = ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt;
ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt = 0;
}
ps_stream->u4_offset += u4_no_of_bits;
}
return;
}
| 173,549 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmalloc (size_t size)
{
void *ptr = malloc (size);
if (!ptr
&& (size != 0)) /* some libc don't like size == 0 */
{
perror ("xmalloc: Memory allocation failure");
abort();
}
return ptr;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows and harden memory allocator.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | xmalloc (size_t size)
xmalloc (size_t num, size_t size)
{
size_t res;
if (check_mul_overflow(num, size, &res))
abort();
void *ptr = malloc (res);
if (!ptr
&& (size != 0)) /* some libc don't like size == 0 */
{
perror ("xmalloc: Memory allocation failure");
abort();
}
return ptr;
}
| 168,359 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Gfx::Gfx(XRef *xrefA, OutputDev *outA, Dict *resDict, Catalog *catalogA,
PDFRectangle *box, PDFRectangle *cropBox,
GBool (*abortCheckCbkA)(void *data),
void *abortCheckCbkDataA)
#ifdef USE_CMS
: iccColorSpaceCache(5)
#endif
{
int i;
xref = xrefA;
catalog = catalogA;
subPage = gTrue;
printCommands = globalParams->getPrintCommands();
profileCommands = globalParams->getProfileCommands();
textHaveCSPattern = gFalse;
drawText = gFalse;
drawText = gFalse;
maskHaveCSPattern = gFalse;
mcStack = NULL;
res = new GfxResources(xref, resDict, NULL);
out = outA;
state = new GfxState(72, 72, box, 0, gFalse);
stackHeight = 1;
pushStateGuard();
fontChanged = gFalse;
clip = clipNone;
ignoreUndef = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i) {
baseMatrix[i] = state->getCTM()[i];
}
formDepth = 0;
abortCheckCbk = abortCheckCbkA;
abortCheckCbkData = abortCheckCbkDataA;
if (cropBox) {
state->moveTo(cropBox->x1, cropBox->y1);
state->lineTo(cropBox->x2, cropBox->y1);
state->lineTo(cropBox->x2, cropBox->y2);
state->lineTo(cropBox->x1, cropBox->y2);
state->closePath();
state->clip();
out->clip(state);
state->clearPath();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | Gfx::Gfx(XRef *xrefA, OutputDev *outA, Dict *resDict, Catalog *catalogA,
PDFRectangle *box, PDFRectangle *cropBox,
GBool (*abortCheckCbkA)(void *data),
void *abortCheckCbkDataA)
#ifdef USE_CMS
: iccColorSpaceCache(5)
#endif
{
int i;
xref = xrefA;
catalog = catalogA;
subPage = gTrue;
printCommands = globalParams->getPrintCommands();
profileCommands = globalParams->getProfileCommands();
textHaveCSPattern = gFalse;
drawText = gFalse;
drawText = gFalse;
maskHaveCSPattern = gFalse;
mcStack = NULL;
parser = NULL;
res = new GfxResources(xref, resDict, NULL);
out = outA;
state = new GfxState(72, 72, box, 0, gFalse);
stackHeight = 1;
pushStateGuard();
fontChanged = gFalse;
clip = clipNone;
ignoreUndef = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i) {
baseMatrix[i] = state->getCTM()[i];
}
formDepth = 0;
abortCheckCbk = abortCheckCbkA;
abortCheckCbkData = abortCheckCbkDataA;
if (cropBox) {
state->moveTo(cropBox->x1, cropBox->y1);
state->lineTo(cropBox->x2, cropBox->y1);
state->lineTo(cropBox->x2, cropBox->y2);
state->lineTo(cropBox->x1, cropBox->y2);
state->closePath();
state->clip();
out->clip(state);
state->clearPath();
}
}
| 164,905 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageaffinematrixconcat)
{
double m1[6];
double m2[6];
double mr[6];
zval **tmp;
zval *z_m1;
zval *z_m2;
int i, nelems;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "aa", &z_m1, &z_m2) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (((nelems = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m1))) != 6) || (nelems = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m2))) != 6) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Affine arrays must have six elements");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m1), i, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp)) {
case IS_LONG:
m1[i] = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
m1[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_STRING:
convert_to_double_ex(tmp);
m1[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %i", i);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m2), i, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp)) {
case IS_LONG:
m2[i] = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
m2[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_STRING:
convert_to_double_ex(tmp);
m2[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %i", i);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
if (gdAffineConcat (mr, m1, m2) != GD_TRUE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
add_index_double(return_value, i, mr[i]);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #66356 (Heap Overflow Vulnerability in imagecrop())
And also fixed the bug: arguments are altered after some calls
CWE ID: CWE-189 | PHP_FUNCTION(imageaffinematrixconcat)
{
double m1[6];
double m2[6];
double mr[6];
zval **tmp;
zval *z_m1;
zval *z_m2;
int i, nelems;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "aa", &z_m1, &z_m2) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (((nelems = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m1))) != 6) || (nelems = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m2))) != 6) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Affine arrays must have six elements");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m1), i, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp)) {
case IS_LONG:
m1[i] = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
m1[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_STRING:
{
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
m1[i] = Z_DVAL(dval);
}
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %i", i);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m2), i, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp)) {
case IS_LONG:
m2[i] = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
m2[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_STRING:
{
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
m2[i] = Z_DVAL(dval);
}
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %i", i);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
if (gdAffineConcat (mr, m1, m2) != GD_TRUE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
add_index_double(return_value, i, mr[i]);
}
}
| 166,430 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TestFeaturesNativeHandler::TestFeaturesNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction("GetAPIFeatures",
base::Bind(&TestFeaturesNativeHandler::GetAPIFeatures,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | TestFeaturesNativeHandler::TestFeaturesNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction("GetAPIFeatures", "test",
base::Bind(&TestFeaturesNativeHandler::GetAPIFeatures,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,254 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MostVisitedSitesBridge::SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& j_observer,
jint num_sites) {
java_observer_.reset(new JavaObserver(env, j_observer));
most_visited_->SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(java_observer_.get(), num_sites);
}
Commit Message: Rename MostVisitedSites.MostVisitedURLsObserver to Observer.
BUG=677672
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2697543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#449958}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | void MostVisitedSitesBridge::SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(
void MostVisitedSitesBridge::SetObserver(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& j_observer,
jint num_sites) {
java_observer_.reset(new JavaObserver(env, j_observer));
most_visited_->SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(java_observer_.get(), num_sites);
}
| 172,036 |
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