instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void _xml_endElementHandler(void *userData, const XML_Char *name)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
char *tag_name;
if (parser) {
zval *retval, *args[2];
tag_name = _xml_decode_tag(parser, name);
if (parser->endElementHandler) {
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_string_zval(((char *) tag_name) + parser->toffset);
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->endElementHandler, parser->endElementPtr, 2, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (parser->data) {
zval *tag;
if (parser->lastwasopen) {
add_assoc_string(*(parser->ctag),"type","complete",1);
} else {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tag);
array_init(tag);
_xml_add_to_info(parser,((char *) tag_name) + parser->toffset);
add_assoc_string(tag,"tag",((char *) tag_name) + parser->toffset,1); /* cast to avoid gcc-warning */
add_assoc_string(tag,"type","close",1);
add_assoc_long(tag,"level",parser->level);
zend_hash_next_index_insert(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data),&tag,sizeof(zval*),NULL);
}
parser->lastwasopen = 0;
}
efree(tag_name);
if ((parser->ltags) && (parser->level <= XML_MAXLEVEL)) {
efree(parser->ltags[parser->level-1]);
}
parser->level--;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void _xml_endElementHandler(void *userData, const XML_Char *name)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
char *tag_name;
if (parser) {
zval *retval, *args[2];
tag_name = _xml_decode_tag(parser, name);
if (parser->endElementHandler) {
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_string_zval(((char *) tag_name) + parser->toffset);
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->endElementHandler, parser->endElementPtr, 2, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (parser->data) {
zval *tag;
if (parser->lastwasopen) {
add_assoc_string(*(parser->ctag),"type","complete",1);
} else {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tag);
array_init(tag);
_xml_add_to_info(parser,((char *) tag_name) + parser->toffset);
add_assoc_string(tag,"tag",((char *) tag_name) + parser->toffset,1); /* cast to avoid gcc-warning */
add_assoc_string(tag,"type","close",1);
add_assoc_long(tag,"level",parser->level);
zend_hash_next_index_insert(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data),&tag,sizeof(zval*),NULL);
}
parser->lastwasopen = 0;
}
efree(tag_name);
if ((parser->ltags) && (parser->level <= XML_MAXLEVEL)) {
efree(parser->ltags[parser->level-1]);
}
parser->level--;
}
}
| 165,041 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: chdlc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
u_int proto;
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s, ethertype %s (0x%04x), length %u: ",
tok2str(chdlc_cast_values, "0x%02x", p[0]),
tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown", proto),
proto,
length));
}
length -= CHDLC_HDRLEN;
p += CHDLC_HDRLEN;
switch (proto) {
case ETHERTYPE_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case CHDLC_TYPE_SLARP:
chdlc_slarp_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
#if 0
case CHDLC_TYPE_CDP:
chdlc_cdp_print(p, length);
break;
#endif
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS:
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS_MULTI:
mpls_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_ISO:
/* is the fudge byte set ? lets verify by spotting ISO headers */
if (*(p+1) == 0x81 ||
*(p+1) == 0x82 ||
*(p+1) == 0x83)
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1, ndo->ndo_snapend - p - 1);
else
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, ndo->ndo_snapend - p);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown CHDLC protocol (0x%04x)", proto));
break;
}
return (CHDLC_HDRLEN);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13687/CHDLC: Improve bounds and length checks.
Prevent a possible buffer overread in chdlc_print() and replace the
custom check in chdlc_if_print() with a standard check in chdlc_print()
so that the latter certainly does not over-read even when reached via
juniper_chdlc_print(). Add length checks.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | chdlc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
u_int proto;
const u_char *bp = p;
if (length < CHDLC_HDRLEN)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, CHDLC_HDRLEN);
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s, ethertype %s (0x%04x), length %u: ",
tok2str(chdlc_cast_values, "0x%02x", p[0]),
tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown", proto),
proto,
length));
}
length -= CHDLC_HDRLEN;
p += CHDLC_HDRLEN;
switch (proto) {
case ETHERTYPE_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case CHDLC_TYPE_SLARP:
chdlc_slarp_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
#if 0
case CHDLC_TYPE_CDP:
chdlc_cdp_print(p, length);
break;
#endif
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS:
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS_MULTI:
mpls_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_ISO:
/* is the fudge byte set ? lets verify by spotting ISO headers */
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(p);
if (*(p+1) == 0x81 ||
*(p+1) == 0x82 ||
*(p+1) == 0x83)
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1, ndo->ndo_snapend - p - 1);
else
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, ndo->ndo_snapend - p);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown CHDLC protocol (0x%04x)", proto));
break;
}
return (CHDLC_HDRLEN);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|chdlc]"));
return ndo->ndo_snapend - bp;
}
| 170,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Document::InitSecurityContext(const DocumentInit& initializer) {
DCHECK(!GetSecurityOrigin());
if (!initializer.HasSecurityContext()) {
cookie_url_ = KURL(g_empty_string);
SetSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::CreateUniqueOpaque());
InitContentSecurityPolicy();
ApplyFeaturePolicy({});
return;
}
SandboxFlags sandbox_flags = initializer.GetSandboxFlags();
if (fetcher_->Archive()) {
sandbox_flags |=
kSandboxAll &
~(kSandboxPopups | kSandboxPropagatesToAuxiliaryBrowsingContexts);
}
EnforceSandboxFlags(sandbox_flags);
SetInsecureRequestPolicy(initializer.GetInsecureRequestPolicy());
if (initializer.InsecureNavigationsToUpgrade()) {
for (auto to_upgrade : *initializer.InsecureNavigationsToUpgrade())
AddInsecureNavigationUpgrade(to_upgrade);
}
ContentSecurityPolicy* policy_to_inherit = nullptr;
if (IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin)) {
cookie_url_ = url_;
scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> security_origin =
SecurityOrigin::CreateUniqueOpaque();
Document* owner = initializer.OwnerDocument();
if (owner) {
if (owner->GetSecurityOrigin()->IsPotentiallyTrustworthy())
security_origin->SetOpaqueOriginIsPotentiallyTrustworthy(true);
if (owner->GetSecurityOrigin()->CanLoadLocalResources())
security_origin->GrantLoadLocalResources();
policy_to_inherit = owner->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
}
SetSecurityOrigin(std::move(security_origin));
} else if (Document* owner = initializer.OwnerDocument()) {
cookie_url_ = owner->CookieURL();
SetSecurityOrigin(owner->GetMutableSecurityOrigin());
policy_to_inherit = owner->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
} else {
cookie_url_ = url_;
SetSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::Create(url_));
}
if (initializer.IsHostedInReservedIPRange()) {
SetAddressSpace(GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocalhost()
? mojom::IPAddressSpace::kLocal
: mojom::IPAddressSpace::kPrivate);
} else if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocal()) {
SetAddressSpace(mojom::IPAddressSpace::kLocal);
} else {
SetAddressSpace(mojom::IPAddressSpace::kPublic);
}
if (ImportsController()) {
SetContentSecurityPolicy(
ImportsController()->Master()->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
} else {
InitContentSecurityPolicy(nullptr, policy_to_inherit);
}
if (Settings* settings = initializer.GetSettings()) {
if (!settings->GetWebSecurityEnabled()) {
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->GrantUniversalAccess();
} else if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocal()) {
if (settings->GetAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs()) {
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->GrantUniversalAccess();
} else if (!settings->GetAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs()) {
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->BlockLocalAccessFromLocalOrigin();
}
}
}
if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsOpaque() &&
SecurityOrigin::Create(url_)->IsPotentiallyTrustworthy())
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->SetOpaqueOriginIsPotentiallyTrustworthy(true);
ApplyFeaturePolicy({});
InitSecureContextState();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | void Document::InitSecurityContext(const DocumentInit& initializer) {
DCHECK(!GetSecurityOrigin());
if (!initializer.HasSecurityContext()) {
cookie_url_ = KURL(g_empty_string);
SetSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::CreateUniqueOpaque());
InitContentSecurityPolicy();
ApplyFeaturePolicy({});
return;
}
SandboxFlags sandbox_flags = initializer.GetSandboxFlags();
if (fetcher_->Archive()) {
sandbox_flags |=
kSandboxAll &
~(kSandboxPopups | kSandboxPropagatesToAuxiliaryBrowsingContexts);
}
EnforceSandboxFlags(sandbox_flags);
SetInsecureRequestPolicy(initializer.GetInsecureRequestPolicy());
if (initializer.InsecureNavigationsToUpgrade()) {
for (auto to_upgrade : *initializer.InsecureNavigationsToUpgrade())
AddInsecureNavigationUpgrade(to_upgrade);
}
const ContentSecurityPolicy* policy_to_inherit = nullptr;
if (IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin)) {
cookie_url_ = url_;
scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> security_origin =
SecurityOrigin::CreateUniqueOpaque();
Document* owner = initializer.OwnerDocument();
if (owner) {
if (owner->GetSecurityOrigin()->IsPotentiallyTrustworthy())
security_origin->SetOpaqueOriginIsPotentiallyTrustworthy(true);
if (owner->GetSecurityOrigin()->CanLoadLocalResources())
security_origin->GrantLoadLocalResources();
policy_to_inherit = owner->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
}
SetSecurityOrigin(std::move(security_origin));
} else if (Document* owner = initializer.OwnerDocument()) {
cookie_url_ = owner->CookieURL();
SetSecurityOrigin(owner->GetMutableSecurityOrigin());
policy_to_inherit = owner->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
} else {
cookie_url_ = url_;
SetSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::Create(url_));
}
if (initializer.IsHostedInReservedIPRange()) {
SetAddressSpace(GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocalhost()
? mojom::IPAddressSpace::kLocal
: mojom::IPAddressSpace::kPrivate);
} else if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocal()) {
SetAddressSpace(mojom::IPAddressSpace::kLocal);
} else {
SetAddressSpace(mojom::IPAddressSpace::kPublic);
}
if (ImportsController()) {
SetContentSecurityPolicy(
ImportsController()->Master()->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
} else {
InitContentSecurityPolicy(nullptr, policy_to_inherit,
initializer.PreviousDocumentCSP());
}
if (Settings* settings = initializer.GetSettings()) {
if (!settings->GetWebSecurityEnabled()) {
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->GrantUniversalAccess();
} else if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocal()) {
if (settings->GetAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs()) {
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->GrantUniversalAccess();
} else if (!settings->GetAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs()) {
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->BlockLocalAccessFromLocalOrigin();
}
}
}
if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsOpaque() &&
SecurityOrigin::Create(url_)->IsPotentiallyTrustworthy())
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->SetOpaqueOriginIsPotentiallyTrustworthy(true);
ApplyFeaturePolicy({});
InitSecureContextState();
}
| 172,616 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int gdAlphaBlend (int dst, int src) {
int src_alpha = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(src);
int dst_alpha, alpha, red, green, blue;
int src_weight, dst_weight, tot_weight;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Simple cases we want to handle fast. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
if( src_alpha == gdAlphaOpaque )
return src;
dst_alpha = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(dst);
if( src_alpha == gdAlphaTransparent )
return dst;
if( dst_alpha == gdAlphaTransparent )
return src;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* What will the source and destination alphas be? Note that */
/* the destination weighting is substantially reduced as the */
/* overlay becomes quite opaque. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
src_weight = gdAlphaTransparent - src_alpha;
dst_weight = (gdAlphaTransparent - dst_alpha) * src_alpha / gdAlphaMax;
tot_weight = src_weight + dst_weight;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* What red, green and blue result values will we use? */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
alpha = src_alpha * dst_alpha / gdAlphaMax;
red = (gdTrueColorGetRed(src) * src_weight
+ gdTrueColorGetRed(dst) * dst_weight) / tot_weight;
green = (gdTrueColorGetGreen(src) * src_weight
+ gdTrueColorGetGreen(dst) * dst_weight) / tot_weight;
blue = (gdTrueColorGetBlue(src) * src_weight
+ gdTrueColorGetBlue(dst) * dst_weight) / tot_weight;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Return merged result. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
return ((alpha << 24) + (red << 16) + (green << 8) + blue);
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | int gdAlphaBlend (int dst, int src) {
int src_alpha = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(src);
int dst_alpha, alpha, red, green, blue;
int src_weight, dst_weight, tot_weight;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Simple cases we want to handle fast. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
if( src_alpha == gdAlphaOpaque )
return src;
dst_alpha = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(dst);
if( src_alpha == gdAlphaTransparent )
return dst;
if( dst_alpha == gdAlphaTransparent )
return src;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* What will the source and destination alphas be? Note that */
/* the destination weighting is substantially reduced as the */
/* overlay becomes quite opaque. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
src_weight = gdAlphaTransparent - src_alpha;
dst_weight = (gdAlphaTransparent - dst_alpha) * src_alpha / gdAlphaMax;
tot_weight = src_weight + dst_weight;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* What red, green and blue result values will we use? */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
alpha = src_alpha * dst_alpha / gdAlphaMax;
red = (gdTrueColorGetRed(src) * src_weight
+ gdTrueColorGetRed(dst) * dst_weight) / tot_weight;
green = (gdTrueColorGetGreen(src) * src_weight
+ gdTrueColorGetGreen(dst) * dst_weight) / tot_weight;
blue = (gdTrueColorGetBlue(src) * src_weight
+ gdTrueColorGetBlue(dst) * dst_weight) / tot_weight;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Return merged result. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
return ((alpha << 24) + (red << 16) + (green << 8) + blue);
}
| 167,124 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long Block::GetDiscardPadding() const
{
return m_discard_padding;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long Block::GetDiscardPadding() const
| 174,303 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: psf_fwrite (const void *ptr, sf_count_t bytes, sf_count_t items, SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ sf_count_t total = 0 ;
ssize_t count ;
if (psf->virtual_io)
return psf->vio.write (ptr, bytes*items, psf->vio_user_data) / bytes ;
items *= bytes ;
/* Do this check after the multiplication above. */
if (items <= 0)
return 0 ;
while (items > 0)
{ /* Break the writes down to a sensible size. */
count = (items > SENSIBLE_SIZE) ? SENSIBLE_SIZE : items ;
count = write (psf->file.filedes, ((const char*) ptr) + total, count) ;
if (count == -1)
{ if (errno == EINTR)
continue ;
psf_log_syserr (psf, errno) ;
break ;
} ;
if (count == 0)
break ;
total += count ;
items -= count ;
} ;
if (psf->is_pipe)
psf->pipeoffset += total ;
return total / bytes ;
} /* psf_fwrite */
Commit Message: src/file_io.c : Prevent potential divide-by-zero.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/92
CWE ID: CWE-189 | psf_fwrite (const void *ptr, sf_count_t bytes, sf_count_t items, SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ sf_count_t total = 0 ;
ssize_t count ;
if (bytes == 0 || items == 0)
return 0 ;
if (psf->virtual_io)
return psf->vio.write (ptr, bytes*items, psf->vio_user_data) / bytes ;
items *= bytes ;
/* Do this check after the multiplication above. */
if (items <= 0)
return 0 ;
while (items > 0)
{ /* Break the writes down to a sensible size. */
count = (items > SENSIBLE_SIZE) ? SENSIBLE_SIZE : items ;
count = write (psf->file.filedes, ((const char*) ptr) + total, count) ;
if (count == -1)
{ if (errno == EINTR)
continue ;
psf_log_syserr (psf, errno) ;
break ;
} ;
if (count == 0)
break ;
total += count ;
items -= count ;
} ;
if (psf->is_pipe)
psf->pipeoffset += total ;
return total / bytes ;
} /* psf_fwrite */
| 166,754 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ssize_t MPEG4DataSource::readAt(off64_t offset, void *data, size_t size) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (offset >= mCachedOffset
&& offset + size <= mCachedOffset + mCachedSize) {
memcpy(data, &mCache[offset - mCachedOffset], size);
return size;
}
return mSource->readAt(offset, data, size);
}
Commit Message: Add AUtils::isInRange, and use it to detect malformed MPEG4 nal sizes
Bug: 19641538
Change-Id: I5aae3f100846c125decc61eec7cd6563e3f33777
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ssize_t MPEG4DataSource::readAt(off64_t offset, void *data, size_t size) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (isInRange(mCachedOffset, mCachedSize, offset, size)) {
memcpy(data, &mCache[offset - mCachedOffset], size);
return size;
}
return mSource->readAt(offset, data, size);
}
| 173,364 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int link_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *ipipe,
struct pipe_inode_info *opipe,
size_t len, unsigned int flags)
{
struct pipe_buffer *ibuf, *obuf;
int ret = 0, i = 0, nbuf;
/*
* Potential ABBA deadlock, work around it by ordering lock
* grabbing by pipe info address. Otherwise two different processes
* could deadlock (one doing tee from A -> B, the other from B -> A).
*/
pipe_double_lock(ipipe, opipe);
do {
if (!opipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = -EPIPE;
break;
}
/*
* If we have iterated all input buffers or ran out of
* output room, break.
*/
if (i >= ipipe->nrbufs || opipe->nrbufs >= opipe->buffers)
break;
ibuf = ipipe->bufs + ((ipipe->curbuf + i) & (ipipe->buffers-1));
nbuf = (opipe->curbuf + opipe->nrbufs) & (opipe->buffers - 1);
/*
* Get a reference to this pipe buffer,
* so we can copy the contents over.
*/
pipe_buf_get(ipipe, ibuf);
obuf = opipe->bufs + nbuf;
*obuf = *ibuf;
/*
* Don't inherit the gift flag, we need to
* prevent multiple steals of this page.
*/
obuf->flags &= ~PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT;
if (obuf->len > len)
obuf->len = len;
opipe->nrbufs++;
ret += obuf->len;
len -= obuf->len;
i++;
} while (len);
/*
* return EAGAIN if we have the potential of some data in the
* future, otherwise just return 0
*/
if (!ret && ipipe->waiting_writers && (flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK))
ret = -EAGAIN;
pipe_unlock(ipipe);
pipe_unlock(opipe);
/*
* If we put data in the output pipe, wakeup any potential readers.
*/
if (ret > 0)
wakeup_pipe_readers(opipe);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
Change pipe_buf_get() to return a bool indicating whether it succeeded
in raising the refcount of the page (if the thing in the pipe is a page).
This removes another mechanism for overflowing the page refcount. All
callers converted to handle a failure.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int link_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *ipipe,
struct pipe_inode_info *opipe,
size_t len, unsigned int flags)
{
struct pipe_buffer *ibuf, *obuf;
int ret = 0, i = 0, nbuf;
/*
* Potential ABBA deadlock, work around it by ordering lock
* grabbing by pipe info address. Otherwise two different processes
* could deadlock (one doing tee from A -> B, the other from B -> A).
*/
pipe_double_lock(ipipe, opipe);
do {
if (!opipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = -EPIPE;
break;
}
/*
* If we have iterated all input buffers or ran out of
* output room, break.
*/
if (i >= ipipe->nrbufs || opipe->nrbufs >= opipe->buffers)
break;
ibuf = ipipe->bufs + ((ipipe->curbuf + i) & (ipipe->buffers-1));
nbuf = (opipe->curbuf + opipe->nrbufs) & (opipe->buffers - 1);
/*
* Get a reference to this pipe buffer,
* so we can copy the contents over.
*/
if (!pipe_buf_get(ipipe, ibuf)) {
if (ret == 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
obuf = opipe->bufs + nbuf;
*obuf = *ibuf;
/*
* Don't inherit the gift flag, we need to
* prevent multiple steals of this page.
*/
obuf->flags &= ~PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT;
if (obuf->len > len)
obuf->len = len;
opipe->nrbufs++;
ret += obuf->len;
len -= obuf->len;
i++;
} while (len);
/*
* return EAGAIN if we have the potential of some data in the
* future, otherwise just return 0
*/
if (!ret && ipipe->waiting_writers && (flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK))
ret = -EAGAIN;
pipe_unlock(ipipe);
pipe_unlock(opipe);
/*
* If we put data in the output pipe, wakeup any potential readers.
*/
if (ret > 0)
wakeup_pipe_readers(opipe);
return ret;
}
| 170,230 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void spl_filesystem_dir_it_rewind(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object((spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter);
object->u.dir.index = 0;
if (object->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_rewinddir(object->u.dir.dirp);
}
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static void spl_filesystem_dir_it_rewind(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object((spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter);
object->u.dir.index = 0;
if (object->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_rewinddir(object->u.dir.dirp);
}
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
}
| 167,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
WORK_STATE ret;
ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
return ret;
}
#endif
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
* in case there are any unexpected retransmits
*/
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
}
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num = 0;
if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
/* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
if (s->server) {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
} else {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->hit)
s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
}
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* done with handshaking */
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
WORK_STATE ret;
ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
return ret;
}
#endif
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
* in case there are any unexpected retransmits
*/
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
}
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num = 0;
if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
/* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
if (s->server) {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
} else {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->hit)
s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
}
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* done with handshaking */
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
}
}
}
| 165,198 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: hb_buffer_ensure_separate (hb_buffer_t *buffer, unsigned int size)
{
hb_buffer_ensure (buffer, size);
if (buffer->out_info == buffer->info)
{
assert (buffer->have_output);
if (!buffer->pos)
buffer->pos = (hb_internal_glyph_position_t *) calloc (buffer->allocated, sizeof (buffer->pos[0]));
buffer->out_info = (hb_internal_glyph_info_t *) buffer->pos;
memcpy (buffer->out_info, buffer->info, buffer->out_len * sizeof (buffer->out_info[0]));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | hb_buffer_ensure_separate (hb_buffer_t *buffer, unsigned int size)
{
if (unlikely (!hb_buffer_ensure (buffer, size))) return FALSE;
if (buffer->out_info == buffer->info)
{
assert (buffer->have_output);
buffer->out_info = (hb_internal_glyph_info_t *) buffer->pos;
memcpy (buffer->out_info, buffer->info, buffer->out_len * sizeof (buffer->out_info[0]));
}
return TRUE;
}
| 164,775 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: modify_policy_2_svc(mpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_MODIFY, NULL, NULL)) {
log_unauth("kadm5_modify_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_modify_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_modify_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | modify_policy_2_svc(mpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_MODIFY, NULL, NULL)) {
log_unauth("kadm5_modify_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_modify_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_modify_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,520 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int parse_rock_ridge_inode(struct iso_directory_record *de, struct inode *inode)
{
int result = parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(de, inode, 0);
/*
* if rockridge flag was reset and we didn't look for attributes
* behind eventual XA attributes, have a look there
*/
if ((ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock_offset == -1)
&& (ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock == 2)) {
result = parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(de, inode, 14);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix unbounded recursion when processing relocated directories
We did not check relocated directory in any way when processing Rock
Ridge 'CL' tag. Thus a corrupted isofs image can possibly have a CL
entry pointing to another CL entry leading to possibly unbounded
recursion in kernel code and thus stack overflow or deadlocks (if there
is a loop created from CL entries).
Fix the problem by not allowing CL entry to point to a directory entry
with CL entry (such use makes no good sense anyway) and by checking
whether CL entry doesn't point to itself.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chris Evans <cevans@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int parse_rock_ridge_inode(struct iso_directory_record *de, struct inode *inode)
int parse_rock_ridge_inode(struct iso_directory_record *de, struct inode *inode,
int relocated)
{
int flags = relocated ? RR_RELOC_DE : 0;
int result = parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(de, inode, flags);
/*
* if rockridge flag was reset and we didn't look for attributes
* behind eventual XA attributes, have a look there
*/
if ((ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock_offset == -1)
&& (ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock == 2)) {
result = parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(de, inode,
flags | RR_REGARD_XA);
}
return result;
}
| 166,270 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SoftAACEncoder2::~SoftAACEncoder2() {
aacEncClose(&mAACEncoder);
delete[] mInputFrame;
mInputFrame = NULL;
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID: | SoftAACEncoder2::~SoftAACEncoder2() {
aacEncClose(&mAACEncoder);
onReset();
}
| 174,009 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static js_Ast *memberexp(js_State *J)
{
js_Ast *a;
INCREC();
a = newexp(J);
loop:
if (jsP_accept(J, '.')) { a = EXP2(MEMBER, a, identifiername(J)); goto loop; }
if (jsP_accept(J, '[')) { a = EXP2(INDEX, a, expression(J, 0)); jsP_expect(J, ']'); goto loop; }
DECREC();
return a;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-674 | static js_Ast *memberexp(js_State *J)
{
js_Ast *a = newexp(J);
SAVEREC();
loop:
INCREC();
if (jsP_accept(J, '.')) { a = EXP2(MEMBER, a, identifiername(J)); goto loop; }
if (jsP_accept(J, '[')) { a = EXP2(INDEX, a, expression(J, 0)); jsP_expect(J, ']'); goto loop; }
POPREC();
return a;
}
| 165,136 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int _our_safe_pcap_next_ex(pcap_t *pcap, struct pcap_pkthdr **pkthdr,
const u_char **pktdata, const char *funcname,
const int line, const char *file)
{
int res = pcap_next_ex(pcap, pkthdr, pktdata);
if (*pktdata && *pkthdr) {
if ((*pkthdr)->len > MAXPACKET) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next_ex ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: %u is greater than maximum %u\n",
file, funcname, line, (*pkthdr)->len, MAXPACKET);
exit(-1);
}
if ((*pkthdr)->len < (*pkthdr)->caplen) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next_ex ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: packet length %u is less than capture length %u\n",
file, funcname, line, (*pkthdr)->len, (*pkthdr)->caplen);
exit(-1);
}
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Bug #520 Fix heap overflow on zero or 0xFFFF packet length
Add check for packets that report zero packet length. Example
of fix:
src/tcpprep --auto=bridge --pcap=poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow --cachefile=/dev/null
Warning: poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow was captured using a snaplen of 17 bytes. This may mean you have truncated packets.
safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in tcpprep.c:process_raw_packets() line 334: packet length=0 capture length=0
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int _our_safe_pcap_next_ex(pcap_t *pcap, struct pcap_pkthdr **pkthdr,
const u_char **pktdata, const char *funcname,
const int line, const char *file)
{
int res = pcap_next_ex(pcap, pkthdr, pktdata);
if (*pktdata && *pkthdr) {
if ((*pkthdr)->len > MAXPACKET) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next_ex ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: %u is greater than maximum %u\n",
file, funcname, line, (*pkthdr)->len, MAXPACKET);
exit(-1);
}
if (!(*pkthdr)->len || (*pkthdr)->len < (*pkthdr)->caplen) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next_ex ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: packet length=%u capture length=%u\n",
file, funcname, line, (*pkthdr)->len, (*pkthdr)->caplen);
exit(-1);
}
}
return res;
}
| 168,947 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool SampleTable::isValid() const {
return mChunkOffsetOffset >= 0
&& mSampleToChunkOffset >= 0
&& mSampleSizeOffset >= 0
&& !mTimeToSample.empty();
}
Commit Message: SampleTable.cpp: Fixed a regression caused by a fix for bug
28076789.
Detail: Before the original fix
(Id207f369ab7b27787d83f5d8fc48dc53ed9fcdc9) for 28076789, the
code allowed a time-to-sample table size to be 0. The change
made in that fix disallowed such situation, which in fact should
be allowed. This current patch allows it again while maintaining
the security of the previous fix.
Bug: 28288202
Bug: 28076789
Change-Id: I1c9a60c7f0cfcbd3d908f24998dde15d5136a295
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool SampleTable::isValid() const {
return mChunkOffsetOffset >= 0
&& mSampleToChunkOffset >= 0
&& mSampleSizeOffset >= 0
&& mHasTimeToSample;
}
| 173,772 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ProxyLocaltimeCallToBrowser(time_t input, struct tm* output,
char* timezone_out,
size_t timezone_out_len) {
base::Pickle request;
request.WriteInt(LinuxSandbox::METHOD_LOCALTIME);
request.WriteString(
std::string(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&input), sizeof(input)));
uint8_t reply_buf[512];
const ssize_t r = base::UnixDomainSocket::SendRecvMsg(
GetSandboxFD(), reply_buf, sizeof(reply_buf), NULL, request);
if (r == -1) {
memset(output, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
return;
}
base::Pickle reply(reinterpret_cast<char*>(reply_buf), r);
base::PickleIterator iter(reply);
std::string result;
std::string timezone;
if (!iter.ReadString(&result) ||
!iter.ReadString(&timezone) ||
result.size() != sizeof(struct tm)) {
memset(output, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
return;
}
memcpy(output, result.data(), sizeof(struct tm));
if (timezone_out_len) {
const size_t copy_len = std::min(timezone_out_len - 1, timezone.size());
memcpy(timezone_out, timezone.data(), copy_len);
timezone_out[copy_len] = 0;
output->tm_zone = timezone_out;
} else {
base::AutoLock lock(g_timezones_lock.Get());
auto ret_pair = g_timezones.Get().insert(timezone);
output->tm_zone = ret_pair.first->c_str();
}
}
Commit Message: Serialize struct tm in a safe way.
BUG=765512
Change-Id: If235b8677eb527be2ac0fe621fc210e4116a7566
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/679441
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void ProxyLocaltimeCallToBrowser(time_t input, struct tm* output,
char* timezone_out,
size_t timezone_out_len) {
base::Pickle request;
request.WriteInt(LinuxSandbox::METHOD_LOCALTIME);
request.WriteString(
std::string(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&input), sizeof(input)));
memset(output, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
uint8_t reply_buf[512];
const ssize_t r = base::UnixDomainSocket::SendRecvMsg(
GetSandboxFD(), reply_buf, sizeof(reply_buf), NULL, request);
if (r == -1) {
return;
}
base::Pickle reply(reinterpret_cast<char*>(reply_buf), r);
base::PickleIterator iter(reply);
if (!ReadTimeStruct(&iter, output, timezone_out, timezone_out_len)) {
memset(output, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
}
}
| 172,926 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool mkvparser::Match(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long& pos,
unsigned long id_,
long long& val)
{
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
const long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
if (status < 0)
return false;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
if ((unsigned long)id != id_)
return false;
pos += len; //consume id
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert(size <= 8);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
pos += len; //consume length of size of payload
val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
assert(val >= 0);
pos += size; //consume size of payload
return true;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool mkvparser::Match(
long long total, available;
const long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
if (status < 0)
return false;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
if ((unsigned long)id != id_)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert(size <= 8);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
pos += len; // consume length of size of payload
val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
assert(val >= 0);
pos += size; // consume size of payload
return true;
}
| 174,398 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DevToolsUIBindings::DevToolsUIBindings(content::WebContents* web_contents)
: profile_(Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext())),
android_bridge_(DevToolsAndroidBridge::Factory::GetForProfile(profile_)),
web_contents_(web_contents),
delegate_(new DefaultBindingsDelegate(web_contents_)),
devices_updates_enabled_(false),
frontend_loaded_(false),
reloading_(false),
weak_factory_(this) {
g_instances.Get().push_back(this);
frontend_contents_observer_.reset(new FrontendWebContentsObserver(this));
web_contents_->GetMutableRendererPrefs()->can_accept_load_drops = false;
file_helper_.reset(new DevToolsFileHelper(web_contents_, profile_, this));
file_system_indexer_ = new DevToolsFileSystemIndexer();
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::CreateForWebContents(
web_contents_);
embedder_message_dispatcher_.reset(
DevToolsEmbedderMessageDispatcher::CreateForDevToolsFrontend(this));
frontend_host_.reset(content::DevToolsFrontendHost::Create(
web_contents_->GetMainFrame(),
base::Bind(&DevToolsUIBindings::HandleMessageFromDevToolsFrontend,
base::Unretained(this))));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | DevToolsUIBindings::DevToolsUIBindings(content::WebContents* web_contents)
: profile_(Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext())),
android_bridge_(DevToolsAndroidBridge::Factory::GetForProfile(profile_)),
web_contents_(web_contents),
delegate_(new DefaultBindingsDelegate(web_contents_)),
devices_updates_enabled_(false),
frontend_loaded_(false),
reloading_(false),
weak_factory_(this) {
g_instances.Get().push_back(this);
frontend_contents_observer_.reset(new FrontendWebContentsObserver(this));
web_contents_->GetMutableRendererPrefs()->can_accept_load_drops = false;
file_helper_.reset(new DevToolsFileHelper(web_contents_, profile_, this));
file_system_indexer_ = new DevToolsFileSystemIndexer();
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::CreateForWebContents(
web_contents_);
embedder_message_dispatcher_.reset(
DevToolsEmbedderMessageDispatcher::CreateForDevToolsFrontend(this));
UpdateFrontendHost();
}
| 172,452 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: lldp_private_8023_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *tptr, u_int tlv_len)
{
int subtype, hexdump = FALSE;
if (tlv_len < 4) {
return hexdump;
}
subtype = *(tptr+3);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Subtype (%u)",
tok2str(lldp_8023_subtype_values, "unknown", subtype),
subtype));
switch (subtype) {
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MACPHY:
if (tlv_len < 9) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t autonegotiation [%s] (0x%02x)",
bittok2str(lldp_8023_autonegotiation_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
*(tptr + 4)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t PMD autoneg capability [%s] (0x%04x)",
bittok2str(lldp_pmd_capability_values,"unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+5)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 5)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MAU type %s (0x%04x)",
tok2str(lldp_mau_types_values, "unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+7)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 7)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MDIPOWER:
if (tlv_len < 7) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MDI power support [%s], power pair %s, power class %s",
bittok2str(lldp_mdi_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
tok2str(lldp_mdi_power_pairs_values, "unknown", *(tptr+5)),
tok2str(lldp_mdi_power_class_values, "unknown", *(tptr + 6))));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_LINKAGGR:
if (tlv_len < 9) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t aggregation status [%s], aggregation port ID %u",
bittok2str(lldp_aggregation_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 5)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MTU:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MTU size %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 4)));
break;
default:
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
}
return hexdump;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13054/LLDP: add a missing length check
In lldp_private_8023_print() the case block for subtype 4 (Maximum Frame
Size TLV, IEEE 802.3bc-2009 Section 79.3.4) did not include the length
check and could over-read the input buffer, put it right.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | lldp_private_8023_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *tptr, u_int tlv_len)
{
int subtype, hexdump = FALSE;
if (tlv_len < 4) {
return hexdump;
}
subtype = *(tptr+3);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Subtype (%u)",
tok2str(lldp_8023_subtype_values, "unknown", subtype),
subtype));
switch (subtype) {
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MACPHY:
if (tlv_len < 9) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t autonegotiation [%s] (0x%02x)",
bittok2str(lldp_8023_autonegotiation_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
*(tptr + 4)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t PMD autoneg capability [%s] (0x%04x)",
bittok2str(lldp_pmd_capability_values,"unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+5)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 5)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MAU type %s (0x%04x)",
tok2str(lldp_mau_types_values, "unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+7)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 7)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MDIPOWER:
if (tlv_len < 7) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MDI power support [%s], power pair %s, power class %s",
bittok2str(lldp_mdi_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
tok2str(lldp_mdi_power_pairs_values, "unknown", *(tptr+5)),
tok2str(lldp_mdi_power_class_values, "unknown", *(tptr + 6))));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_LINKAGGR:
if (tlv_len < 9) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t aggregation status [%s], aggregation port ID %u",
bittok2str(lldp_aggregation_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 5)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MTU:
if (tlv_len < 6) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MTU size %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 4)));
break;
default:
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
}
return hexdump;
}
| 167,819 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::SetCommittedFirstRealLoad() {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
GetFrame()->Loader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedMultipleRealLoads);
GetFrame()->DidSendResourceTimingInfoToParent();
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void WebLocalFrameImpl::SetCommittedFirstRealLoad() {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
GetFrame()->Loader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedMultipleRealLoads);
GetFrame()->SetShouldSendResourceTimingInfoToParent(false);
}
| 172,655 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DailyDataSavingUpdate(
const char* pref_original, const char* pref_received,
PrefService* pref_service)
: pref_original_(pref_original),
pref_received_(pref_received),
original_update_(pref_service, pref_original_),
received_update_(pref_service, pref_received_) {
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | DailyDataSavingUpdate(
const char* pref_original,
const char* pref_received,
PrefService* pref_service)
: original_(pref_original, pref_service),
received_(pref_received, pref_service) {
}
| 171,322 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev1_ke_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_KE)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," key len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_KE)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev1_ke_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_KE)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," key len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
/* Print the entire payload in hex */
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_KE)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,792 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void fillWidgetStates(AXObject& axObject,
protocol::Array<AXProperty>& properties) {
AccessibilityRole role = axObject.roleValue();
if (roleAllowsChecked(role)) {
AccessibilityButtonState checked = axObject.checkboxOrRadioValue();
switch (checked) {
case ButtonStateOff:
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Checked,
createValue("false", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
break;
case ButtonStateOn:
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Checked,
createValue("true", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
break;
case ButtonStateMixed:
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Checked,
createValue("mixed", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
break;
}
}
AccessibilityExpanded expanded = axObject.isExpanded();
switch (expanded) {
case ExpandedUndefined:
break;
case ExpandedCollapsed:
properties.addItem(createProperty(
AXWidgetStatesEnum::Expanded,
createBooleanValue(false, AXValueTypeEnum::BooleanOrUndefined)));
break;
case ExpandedExpanded:
properties.addItem(createProperty(
AXWidgetStatesEnum::Expanded,
createBooleanValue(true, AXValueTypeEnum::BooleanOrUndefined)));
break;
}
if (role == ToggleButtonRole) {
if (!axObject.isPressed()) {
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Pressed,
createValue("false", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
} else {
const AtomicString& pressedAttr =
axObject.getAttribute(HTMLNames::aria_pressedAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(pressedAttr, "mixed"))
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Pressed,
createValue("mixed", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
else
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Pressed,
createValue("true", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
}
}
if (roleAllowsSelected(role)) {
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Selected,
createBooleanValue(axObject.isSelected())));
}
if (roleAllowsModal(role)) {
properties.addItem(createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Modal,
createBooleanValue(axObject.isModal())));
}
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void fillWidgetStates(AXObject& axObject,
protocol::Array<AXProperty>& properties) {
AccessibilityRole role = axObject.roleValue();
if (roleAllowsChecked(role)) {
AccessibilityButtonState checked = axObject.checkboxOrRadioValue();
switch (checked) {
case ButtonStateOff:
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Checked,
createValue("false", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
break;
case ButtonStateOn:
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Checked,
createValue("true", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
break;
case ButtonStateMixed:
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Checked,
createValue("mixed", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
break;
}
}
AccessibilityExpanded expanded = axObject.isExpanded();
switch (expanded) {
case ExpandedUndefined:
break;
case ExpandedCollapsed:
properties.addItem(createProperty(
AXWidgetStatesEnum::Expanded,
createBooleanValue(false, AXValueTypeEnum::BooleanOrUndefined)));
break;
case ExpandedExpanded:
properties.addItem(createProperty(
AXWidgetStatesEnum::Expanded,
createBooleanValue(true, AXValueTypeEnum::BooleanOrUndefined)));
break;
}
if (role == ToggleButtonRole) {
if (!axObject.isPressed()) {
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Pressed,
createValue("false", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
} else {
const AtomicString& pressedAttr =
axObject.getAttribute(HTMLNames::aria_pressedAttr);
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(pressedAttr, "mixed"))
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Pressed,
createValue("mixed", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
else
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Pressed,
createValue("true", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
}
}
if (roleAllowsSelected(role)) {
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Selected,
createBooleanValue(axObject.isSelected())));
}
if (roleAllowsModal(role)) {
properties.addItem(createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Modal,
createBooleanValue(axObject.isModal())));
}
}
| 171,934 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: LookupModMask(struct xkb_context *ctx, const void *priv, xkb_atom_t field,
enum expr_value_type type, xkb_mod_mask_t *val_rtrn)
{
const char *str;
xkb_mod_index_t ndx;
const LookupModMaskPriv *arg = priv;
const struct xkb_mod_set *mods = arg->mods;
enum mod_type mod_type = arg->mod_type;
if (type != EXPR_TYPE_INT)
return false;
str = xkb_atom_text(ctx, field);
if (istreq(str, "all")) {
*val_rtrn = MOD_REAL_MASK_ALL;
return true;
}
if (istreq(str, "none")) {
*val_rtrn = 0;
return true;
}
ndx = XkbModNameToIndex(mods, field, mod_type);
if (ndx == XKB_MOD_INVALID)
return false;
*val_rtrn = (1u << ndx);
return true;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't explode on invalid virtual modifiers
testcase: 'virtualModifiers=LevelThreC'
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | LookupModMask(struct xkb_context *ctx, const void *priv, xkb_atom_t field,
enum expr_value_type type, xkb_mod_mask_t *val_rtrn)
{
const char *str;
xkb_mod_index_t ndx;
const LookupModMaskPriv *arg = priv;
const struct xkb_mod_set *mods = arg->mods;
enum mod_type mod_type = arg->mod_type;
if (type != EXPR_TYPE_INT)
return false;
str = xkb_atom_text(ctx, field);
if (!str)
return false;
if (istreq(str, "all")) {
*val_rtrn = MOD_REAL_MASK_ALL;
return true;
}
if (istreq(str, "none")) {
*val_rtrn = 0;
return true;
}
ndx = XkbModNameToIndex(mods, field, mod_type);
if (ndx == XKB_MOD_INVALID)
return false;
*val_rtrn = (1u << ndx);
return true;
}
| 169,089 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents,
int index) {
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents,
void TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt(WebContents* contents,
int index) {
}
| 171,518 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PS_SERIALIZER_DECODE_FUNC(php) /* {{{ */
{
const char *p, *q;
char *name;
const char *endptr = val + vallen;
zval *current;
int namelen;
int has_value;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
p = val;
while (p < endptr) {
zval **tmp;
q = p;
while (*q != PS_DELIMITER) {
if (++q >= endptr) goto break_outer_loop;
}
if (p[0] == PS_UNDEF_MARKER) {
p++;
has_value = 0;
} else {
has_value = 1;
}
namelen = q - p;
name = estrndup(p, namelen);
q++;
if (zend_hash_find(&EG(symbol_table), name, namelen + 1, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
if ((Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_ARRAY && Z_ARRVAL_PP(tmp) == &EG(symbol_table)) || *tmp == PS(http_session_vars)) {
goto skip;
}
}
if (has_value) {
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(current);
if (php_var_unserialize(¤t, (const unsigned char **) &q, (const unsigned char *) endptr, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
php_set_session_var(name, namelen, current, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
var_push_dtor_no_addref(&var_hash, ¤t);
efree(name);
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return FAILURE;
}
var_push_dtor_no_addref(&var_hash, ¤t);
}
PS_ADD_VARL(name, namelen);
skip:
efree(name);
p = q;
}
break_outer_loop:
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72681 - consume data even if we're not storing them
CWE ID: CWE-74 | PS_SERIALIZER_DECODE_FUNC(php) /* {{{ */
{
const char *p, *q;
char *name;
const char *endptr = val + vallen;
zval *current;
int namelen;
int has_value;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
int skip = 0;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
p = val;
while (p < endptr) {
zval **tmp;
q = p;
skip = 0;
while (*q != PS_DELIMITER) {
if (++q >= endptr) goto break_outer_loop;
}
if (p[0] == PS_UNDEF_MARKER) {
p++;
has_value = 0;
} else {
has_value = 1;
}
namelen = q - p;
name = estrndup(p, namelen);
q++;
if (zend_hash_find(&EG(symbol_table), name, namelen + 1, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
if ((Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_ARRAY && Z_ARRVAL_PP(tmp) == &EG(symbol_table)) || *tmp == PS(http_session_vars)) {
skip = 1;
}
}
if (has_value) {
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(current);
if (php_var_unserialize(¤t, (const unsigned char **) &q, (const unsigned char *) endptr, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (!skip) {
php_set_session_var(name, namelen, current, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
}
} else {
var_push_dtor_no_addref(&var_hash, ¤t);
efree(name);
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return FAILURE;
}
var_push_dtor_no_addref(&var_hash, ¤t);
}
if (!skip) {
PS_ADD_VARL(name, namelen);
}
skip:
efree(name);
p = q;
}
break_outer_loop:
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
| 166,959 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void *Sys_LoadDll(const char *name, qboolean useSystemLib)
{
void *dllhandle;
if(useSystemLib)
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\"...\n", name);
if(!useSystemLib || !(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(name)))
{
const char *topDir;
char libPath[MAX_OSPATH];
topDir = Sys_BinaryPath();
if(!*topDir)
topDir = ".";
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, topDir);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", topDir, PATH_SEP, name);
if(!(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath)))
{
const char *basePath = Cvar_VariableString("fs_basepath");
if(!basePath || !*basePath)
basePath = ".";
if(FS_FilenameCompare(topDir, basePath))
{
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, basePath);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", basePath, PATH_SEP, name);
dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath);
}
if(!dllhandle)
Com_Printf("Loading \"%s\" failed\n", name);
}
}
return dllhandle;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | void *Sys_LoadDll(const char *name, qboolean useSystemLib)
{
void *dllhandle;
// Don't load any DLLs that end with the pk3 extension
if (COM_CompareExtension(name, ".pk3"))
{
Com_Printf("Rejecting DLL named \"%s\"", name);
return NULL;
}
if(useSystemLib)
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\"...\n", name);
if(!useSystemLib || !(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(name)))
{
const char *topDir;
char libPath[MAX_OSPATH];
topDir = Sys_BinaryPath();
if(!*topDir)
topDir = ".";
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, topDir);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", topDir, PATH_SEP, name);
if(!(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath)))
{
const char *basePath = Cvar_VariableString("fs_basepath");
if(!basePath || !*basePath)
basePath = ".";
if(FS_FilenameCompare(topDir, basePath))
{
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, basePath);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", basePath, PATH_SEP, name);
dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath);
}
if(!dllhandle)
Com_Printf("Loading \"%s\" failed\n", name);
}
}
return dllhandle;
}
| 170,084 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Document::InitContentSecurityPolicy(
ContentSecurityPolicy* csp,
const ContentSecurityPolicy* policy_to_inherit) {
SetContentSecurityPolicy(csp ? csp : ContentSecurityPolicy::Create());
if (policy_to_inherit) {
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyStateFrom(policy_to_inherit);
} else if (frame_) {
Frame* inherit_from = frame_->Tree().Parent() ? frame_->Tree().Parent()
: frame_->Client()->Opener();
if (inherit_from && frame_ != inherit_from) {
DCHECK(inherit_from->GetSecurityContext() &&
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
policy_to_inherit =
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
if (url_.IsEmpty() || url_.ProtocolIsAbout() || url_.ProtocolIsData() ||
url_.ProtocolIs("blob") || url_.ProtocolIs("filesystem")) {
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyStateFrom(policy_to_inherit);
}
}
}
if (policy_to_inherit && IsPluginDocument())
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyPluginTypesFrom(policy_to_inherit);
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->BindToExecutionContext(this);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | void Document::InitContentSecurityPolicy(
ContentSecurityPolicy* csp,
const ContentSecurityPolicy* policy_to_inherit) {
SetContentSecurityPolicy(csp ? csp : ContentSecurityPolicy::Create());
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->BindToExecutionContext(this);
if (policy_to_inherit) {
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyStateFrom(policy_to_inherit);
} else if (frame_) {
Frame* inherit_from = frame_->Tree().Parent() ? frame_->Tree().Parent()
: frame_->Client()->Opener();
if (inherit_from && frame_ != inherit_from) {
DCHECK(inherit_from->GetSecurityContext() &&
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
policy_to_inherit =
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
if (url_.IsEmpty() || url_.ProtocolIsAbout() || url_.ProtocolIsData() ||
url_.ProtocolIs("blob") || url_.ProtocolIs("filesystem")) {
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyStateFrom(policy_to_inherit);
}
}
}
if (policy_to_inherit && IsPluginDocument())
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyPluginTypesFrom(policy_to_inherit);
}
| 172,683 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool GetURLRowForAutocompleteMatch(Profile* profile,
const AutocompleteMatch& match,
history::URLRow* url_row) {
DCHECK(url_row);
HistoryService* history_service =
profile->GetHistoryService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (!history_service)
return false;
history::URLDatabase* url_db = history_service->InMemoryDatabase();
return url_db && (url_db->GetRowForURL(match.destination_url, url_row) != 0);
}
Commit Message: Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool GetURLRowForAutocompleteMatch(Profile* profile,
| 170,958 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool asn1_read_BOOLEAN_context(struct asn1_data *data, bool *v, int context)
{
uint8_t tmp = 0;
asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(context));
asn1_read_uint8(data, &tmp);
if (tmp == 0xFF) {
*v = true;
} else {
*v = false;
}
asn1_end_tag(data);
return !data->has_error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool asn1_read_BOOLEAN_context(struct asn1_data *data, bool *v, int context)
{
uint8_t tmp = 0;
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(context))) return false;
*v = false;
if (!asn1_read_uint8(data, &tmp)) return false;
if (tmp == 0xFF) {
*v = true;
}
return asn1_end_tag(data);
}
| 164,584 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int tight_fill_palette(VncState *vs, int x, int y,
size_t count, uint32_t *bg, uint32_t *fg,
VncPalette **palette)
{
int max;
max = count / tight_conf[vs->tight.compression].idx_max_colors_divisor;
if (max < 2 &&
count >= tight_conf[vs->tight.compression].mono_min_rect_size) {
max = 2;
}
if (max >= 256) {
max = 256;
}
switch(vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel) {
case 4:
return tight_fill_palette32(vs, x, y, max, count, bg, fg, palette);
case 2:
return tight_fill_palette16(vs, x, y, max, count, bg, fg, palette);
default:
max = 2;
return tight_fill_palette8(vs, x, y, max, count, bg, fg, palette);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int tight_fill_palette(VncState *vs, int x, int y,
size_t count, uint32_t *bg, uint32_t *fg,
VncPalette **palette)
{
int max;
max = count / tight_conf[vs->tight.compression].idx_max_colors_divisor;
if (max < 2 &&
count >= tight_conf[vs->tight.compression].mono_min_rect_size) {
max = 2;
}
if (max >= 256) {
max = 256;
}
switch (vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel) {
case 4:
return tight_fill_palette32(vs, x, y, max, count, bg, fg, palette);
case 2:
return tight_fill_palette16(vs, x, y, max, count, bg, fg, palette);
default:
max = 2;
return tight_fill_palette8(vs, x, y, max, count, bg, fg, palette);
}
return 0;
}
| 165,466 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void IOThread::RegisterPrefs(PrefRegistrySimple* registry) {
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kAuthSchemes,
"basic,digest,ntlm,negotiate,"
"spdyproxy");
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kDisableAuthNegotiateCnameLookup, false);
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kEnableAuthNegotiatePort, false);
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kAuthServerWhitelist, std::string());
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kAuthNegotiateDelegateWhitelist,
std::string());
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kGSSAPILibraryName, std::string());
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kSpdyProxyAuthOrigin, std::string());
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kEnableReferrers, true);
registry->RegisterInt64Pref(prefs::kHttpReceivedContentLength, 0);
registry->RegisterInt64Pref(prefs::kHttpOriginalContentLength, 0);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
registry->RegisterListPref(prefs::kDailyHttpOriginalContentLength);
registry->RegisterListPref(prefs::kDailyHttpReceivedContentLength);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyOriginalContentLengthWithDataReductionProxyEnabled);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyContentLengthWithDataReductionProxyEnabled);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyOriginalContentLengthViaDataReductionProxy);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyContentLengthViaDataReductionProxy);
registry->RegisterInt64Pref(prefs::kDailyHttpContentLengthLastUpdateDate, 0L);
#endif
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kBuiltInDnsClientEnabled, true);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void IOThread::RegisterPrefs(PrefRegistrySimple* registry) {
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kAuthSchemes,
"basic,digest,ntlm,negotiate,"
"spdyproxy");
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kDisableAuthNegotiateCnameLookup, false);
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kEnableAuthNegotiatePort, false);
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kAuthServerWhitelist, std::string());
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kAuthNegotiateDelegateWhitelist,
std::string());
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kGSSAPILibraryName, std::string());
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kSpdyProxyAuthOrigin, std::string());
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kEnableReferrers, true);
registry->RegisterInt64Pref(prefs::kHttpReceivedContentLength, 0);
registry->RegisterInt64Pref(prefs::kHttpOriginalContentLength, 0);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
registry->RegisterListPref(prefs::kDailyHttpOriginalContentLength);
registry->RegisterListPref(prefs::kDailyHttpReceivedContentLength);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyOriginalContentLengthWithDataReductionProxyEnabled);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyContentLengthWithDataReductionProxyEnabled);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyContentLengthHttpsWithDataReductionProxyEnabled);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyContentLengthShortBypassWithDataReductionProxyEnabled);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyContentLengthLongBypassWithDataReductionProxyEnabled);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyContentLengthUnknownWithDataReductionProxyEnabled);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyOriginalContentLengthViaDataReductionProxy);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyContentLengthViaDataReductionProxy);
registry->RegisterInt64Pref(prefs::kDailyHttpContentLengthLastUpdateDate, 0L);
#endif
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kBuiltInDnsClientEnabled, true);
}
| 171,320 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, getCsvControl)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char delimiter[2], enclosure[2];
array_init(return_value);
delimiter[0] = intern->u.file.delimiter;
delimiter[1] = '\0';
enclosure[0] = intern->u.file.enclosure;
enclosure[1] = '\0';
add_next_index_string(return_value, delimiter, 1);
add_next_index_string(return_value, enclosure, 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, getCsvControl)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char delimiter[2], enclosure[2];
array_init(return_value);
delimiter[0] = intern->u.file.delimiter;
delimiter[1] = '\0';
enclosure[0] = intern->u.file.enclosure;
enclosure[1] = '\0';
add_next_index_string(return_value, delimiter, 1);
add_next_index_string(return_value, enclosure, 1);
}
| 167,064 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: fpDiff(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
assert((cc%(bps*stride))==0);
if (!tmp)
return;
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[byte * wc + count] = tmp[bps * count + byte];
#else
cp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count] =
tmp[bps * count + byte];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
cp += cc - stride - 1;
for (count = cc; count > stride; count -= stride)
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] = (unsigned char)((cp[stride] - cp[0])&0xff); cp--)
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | fpDiff(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
if((cc%(bps*stride))!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "fpDiff",
"%s", "(cc%(bps*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
if (!tmp)
return 0;
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[byte * wc + count] = tmp[bps * count + byte];
#else
cp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count] =
tmp[bps * count + byte];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
cp += cc - stride - 1;
for (count = cc; count > stride; count -= stride)
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] = (unsigned char)((cp[stride] - cp[0])&0xff); cp--)
return 1;
}
| 166,881 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct ib_ucontext *hns_roce_alloc_ucontext(struct ib_device *ib_dev,
struct ib_udata *udata)
{
int ret = 0;
struct hns_roce_ucontext *context;
struct hns_roce_ib_alloc_ucontext_resp resp;
struct hns_roce_dev *hr_dev = to_hr_dev(ib_dev);
resp.qp_tab_size = hr_dev->caps.num_qps;
context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!context)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ret = hns_roce_uar_alloc(hr_dev, &context->uar);
if (ret)
goto error_fail_uar_alloc;
if (hr_dev->caps.flags & HNS_ROCE_CAP_FLAG_RECORD_DB) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->page_list);
mutex_init(&context->page_mutex);
}
ret = ib_copy_to_udata(udata, &resp, sizeof(resp));
if (ret)
goto error_fail_copy_to_udata;
return &context->ibucontext;
error_fail_copy_to_udata:
hns_roce_uar_free(hr_dev, &context->uar);
error_fail_uar_alloc:
kfree(context);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Commit Message: RDMA/hns: Fix init resp when alloc ucontext
The data in resp will be copied from kernel to userspace, thus it needs to
be initialized to zeros to avoid copying uninited stack memory.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: e088a685eae9 ("RDMA/hns: Support rq record doorbell for the user space")
Signed-off-by: Yixian Liu <liuyixian@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-665 | static struct ib_ucontext *hns_roce_alloc_ucontext(struct ib_device *ib_dev,
struct ib_udata *udata)
{
int ret = 0;
struct hns_roce_ucontext *context;
struct hns_roce_ib_alloc_ucontext_resp resp = {};
struct hns_roce_dev *hr_dev = to_hr_dev(ib_dev);
resp.qp_tab_size = hr_dev->caps.num_qps;
context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!context)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ret = hns_roce_uar_alloc(hr_dev, &context->uar);
if (ret)
goto error_fail_uar_alloc;
if (hr_dev->caps.flags & HNS_ROCE_CAP_FLAG_RECORD_DB) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->page_list);
mutex_init(&context->page_mutex);
}
ret = ib_copy_to_udata(udata, &resp, sizeof(resp));
if (ret)
goto error_fail_copy_to_udata;
return &context->ibucontext;
error_fail_copy_to_udata:
hns_roce_uar_free(hr_dev, &context->uar);
error_fail_uar_alloc:
kfree(context);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
| 169,504 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
bool effective, has_cap = false;
int ret;
effective = false;
ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
/*
* If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
if (has_cap && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
goto skip;
}
/*
* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
* executables under compatibility mode, we override the
* capability sets for the file.
*
* If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
*/
if (new->euid == 0 || new->uid == 0) {
/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
old->cap_inheritable);
}
if (new->euid == 0)
effective = true;
}
skip:
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
*/
if ((new->euid != old->uid ||
new->egid != old->gid ||
!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
new->euid = new->uid;
new->egid = new->gid;
}
new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
old->cap_permitted);
}
new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
if (effective)
new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
else
cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
bprm->cap_effective = effective;
/*
* Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
*
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
* 2) we are root
* 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
* Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
*
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
*/
if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) {
if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
new->euid != 0 || new->uid != 0 ||
issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
}
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used
If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
bool effective, has_cap = false;
int ret;
effective = false;
ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
/*
* If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
if (has_cap && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
goto skip;
}
/*
* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
* executables under compatibility mode, we override the
* capability sets for the file.
*
* If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
*/
if (new->euid == 0 || new->uid == 0) {
/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
old->cap_inheritable);
}
if (new->euid == 0)
effective = true;
}
skip:
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
*/
if ((new->euid != old->uid ||
new->egid != old->gid ||
!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
new->euid = new->uid;
new->egid = new->gid;
}
new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
old->cap_permitted);
}
new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
if (effective)
new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
else
cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
bprm->cap_effective = effective;
/*
* Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
*
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
* 2) we are root
* 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
* Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
*
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
*/
if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) {
if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
new->euid != 0 || new->uid != 0 ||
issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
}
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
return 0;
}
| 165,616 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SplashBitmap::SplashBitmap(int widthA, int heightA, int rowPad,
SplashColorMode modeA, GBool alphaA,
GBool topDown) {
width = widthA;
height = heightA;
mode = modeA;
switch (mode) {
case splashModeMono1:
rowSize = (width + 7) >> 3;
break;
case splashModeMono8:
rowSize = width;
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
case splashModeBGR8:
rowSize = width * 3;
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
rowSize = width * 4;
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
rowSize = width * 4;
break;
#endif
}
rowSize += rowPad - 1;
rowSize -= rowSize % rowPad;
data = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(rowSize * height);
if (!topDown) {
data += (height - 1) * rowSize;
rowSize = -rowSize;
}
if (alphaA) {
alpha = (Guchar *)gmalloc(width * height);
} else {
alpha = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | SplashBitmap::SplashBitmap(int widthA, int heightA, int rowPad,
SplashColorMode modeA, GBool alphaA,
GBool topDown) {
width = widthA;
height = heightA;
mode = modeA;
switch (mode) {
case splashModeMono1:
rowSize = (width + 7) >> 3;
break;
case splashModeMono8:
rowSize = width;
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
case splashModeBGR8:
rowSize = width * 3;
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
rowSize = width * 4;
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
rowSize = width * 4;
break;
#endif
}
rowSize += rowPad - 1;
rowSize -= rowSize % rowPad;
data = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(rowSize, height);
if (!topDown) {
data += (height - 1) * rowSize;
rowSize = -rowSize;
}
if (alphaA) {
alpha = (Guchar *)gmallocn(width, height);
} else {
alpha = NULL;
}
}
| 164,620 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char *get_pid_environ_val(pid_t pid,char *val){
char temp[500];
int i=0;
int foundit=0;
FILE *fp;
sprintf(temp,"/proc/%d/environ",pid);
fp=fopen(temp,"r");
if(fp==NULL)
return NULL;
for(;;){
temp[i]=fgetc(fp);
if(foundit==1 && (temp[i]==0 || temp[i]=='\0' || temp[i]==EOF)){
char *ret;
temp[i]=0;
ret=malloc(strlen(temp)+10);
sprintf(ret,"%s",temp);
fclose(fp);
return ret;
}
switch(temp[i]){
case EOF:
fclose(fp);
return NULL;
case '=':
temp[i]=0;
if(!strcmp(temp,val)){
foundit=1;
}
i=0;
break;
case '\0':
i=0;
break;
default:
i++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix memory overflow if the name of an environment is larger than 500 characters. Bug found by Adam Sampson.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static char *get_pid_environ_val(pid_t pid,char *val){
int temp_size = 500;
char *temp = malloc(temp_size);
int i=0;
int foundit=0;
FILE *fp;
sprintf(temp,"/proc/%d/environ",pid);
fp=fopen(temp,"r");
if(fp==NULL)
return NULL;
for(;;){
if (i >= temp_size) {
temp_size *= 2;
temp = realloc(temp, temp_size);
}
temp[i]=fgetc(fp);
if(foundit==1 && (temp[i]==0 || temp[i]=='\0' || temp[i]==EOF)){
char *ret;
temp[i]=0;
ret=malloc(strlen(temp)+10);
sprintf(ret,"%s",temp);
fclose(fp);
return ret;
}
switch(temp[i]){
case EOF:
fclose(fp);
return NULL;
case '=':
temp[i]=0;
if(!strcmp(temp,val)){
foundit=1;
}
i=0;
break;
case '\0':
i=0;
break;
default:
i++;
}
}
}
| 166,639 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::setNextPlayer(const sp<IMediaPlayer>& player) {
ALOGV("setNextPlayer");
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
sp<Client> c = static_cast<Client*>(player.get());
mNextClient = c;
if (c != NULL) {
if (mAudioOutput != NULL) {
mAudioOutput->setNextOutput(c->mAudioOutput);
} else if ((mPlayer != NULL) && !mPlayer->hardwareOutput()) {
ALOGE("no current audio output");
}
if ((mPlayer != NULL) && (mNextClient->getPlayer() != NULL)) {
mPlayer->setNextPlayer(mNextClient->getPlayer());
}
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::setNextPlayer(const sp<IMediaPlayer>& player) {
ALOGV("setNextPlayer");
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
sp<Client> c = static_cast<Client*>(player.get());
if (!mService->hasClient(c)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
mNextClient = c;
if (c != NULL) {
if (mAudioOutput != NULL) {
mAudioOutput->setNextOutput(c->mAudioOutput);
} else if ((mPlayer != NULL) && !mPlayer->hardwareOutput()) {
ALOGE("no current audio output");
}
if ((mPlayer != NULL) && (mNextClient->getPlayer() != NULL)) {
mPlayer->setNextPlayer(mNextClient->getPlayer());
}
}
return OK;
}
| 173,398 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BrowserContextDestroyer::BrowserContextDestroyer(
BrowserContext* context,
const std::set<content::RenderProcessHost*>& hosts)
: context_(context),
pending_hosts_(0) {
for (std::set<content::RenderProcessHost*>::iterator it = hosts.begin();
it != hosts.end(); ++it) {
(*it)->AddObserver(this);
++pending_hosts_;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | BrowserContextDestroyer::BrowserContextDestroyer(
std::unique_ptr<BrowserContext> context,
const std::set<content::RenderProcessHost*>& hosts,
uint32_t otr_contexts_pending_deletion)
: context_(std::move(context)),
otr_contexts_pending_deletion_(otr_contexts_pending_deletion),
finish_destroy_scheduled_(false) {
DCHECK(hosts.size() > 0 ||
(!context->IsOffTheRecord() &&
(otr_contexts_pending_deletion > 0 ||
context->HasOffTheRecordContext())));
g_contexts_pending_deletion.Get().push_back(this);
for (auto* host : hosts) {
ObserveHost(host);
}
}
| 165,418 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void StopCast() {
CastConfigDelegate* cast_config =
Shell::GetInstance()->system_tray_delegate()->GetCastConfigDelegate();
if (cast_config && cast_config->HasCastExtension()) {
cast_config->GetReceiversAndActivities(
base::Bind(&StopCastCallback, cast_config));
}
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void StopCast() {
| 171,625 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int Chapters::GetEditionCount() const
{
return m_editions_count;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int Chapters::GetEditionCount() const
const Chapters::Edition* Chapters::GetEdition(int idx) const {
if (idx < 0)
return NULL;
if (idx >= m_editions_count)
return NULL;
return m_editions + idx;
}
| 174,311 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static uint32_t select_lease_time(struct dhcp_packet *packet)
{
uint32_t lease_time_sec = server_config.max_lease_sec;
uint8_t *lease_time_opt = udhcp_get_option(packet, DHCP_LEASE_TIME);
if (lease_time_opt) {
move_from_unaligned32(lease_time_sec, lease_time_opt);
lease_time_sec = ntohl(lease_time_sec);
if (lease_time_sec > server_config.max_lease_sec)
lease_time_sec = server_config.max_lease_sec;
if (lease_time_sec < server_config.min_lease_sec)
lease_time_sec = server_config.min_lease_sec;
}
return lease_time_sec;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static uint32_t select_lease_time(struct dhcp_packet *packet)
{
uint32_t lease_time_sec = server_config.max_lease_sec;
uint8_t *lease_time_opt = udhcp_get_option32(packet, DHCP_LEASE_TIME);
if (lease_time_opt) {
move_from_unaligned32(lease_time_sec, lease_time_opt);
lease_time_sec = ntohl(lease_time_sec);
if (lease_time_sec > server_config.max_lease_sec)
lease_time_sec = server_config.max_lease_sec;
if (lease_time_sec < server_config.min_lease_sec)
lease_time_sec = server_config.min_lease_sec;
}
return lease_time_sec;
}
| 165,225 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long vorbis_book_decodevv_add(codebook *book,ogg_int32_t **a,
long offset,int ch,
oggpack_buffer *b,int n,int point){
if(book->used_entries>0){
ogg_int32_t *v = book->dec_buf;//(ogg_int32_t *)alloca(sizeof(*v)*book->dim);
long i,j;
int chptr=0;
if (!v) return -1;
for(i=offset;i<offset+n;){
if(decode_map(book,b,v,point))return -1;
for (j=0;j<book->dim;j++){
a[chptr++][i]+=v[j];
if(chptr==ch){
chptr=0;
i++;
}
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | long vorbis_book_decodevv_add(codebook *book,ogg_int32_t **a,
long offset,int ch,
oggpack_buffer *b,int n,int point){
if(book->used_entries>0){
ogg_int32_t *v = book->dec_buf;//(ogg_int32_t *)alloca(sizeof(*v)*book->dim);
long i,j;
int chptr=0;
if (!v) return -1;
for(i=offset;i<offset+n;){
if(decode_map(book,b,v,point))return -1;
for (j=0;j<book->dim && i < offset + n;j++){
a[chptr++][i]+=v[j];
if(chptr==ch){
chptr=0;
i++;
}
}
}
}
return 0;
}
| 173,989 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PageRequestSummary::UpdateOrAddToOrigins(
const content::mojom::ResourceLoadInfo& resource_load_info) {
for (const auto& redirect_info : resource_load_info.redirect_info_chain)
UpdateOrAddToOrigins(redirect_info->url, redirect_info->network_info);
UpdateOrAddToOrigins(resource_load_info.url, resource_load_info.network_info);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void PageRequestSummary::UpdateOrAddToOrigins(
const content::mojom::ResourceLoadInfo& resource_load_info) {
for (const auto& redirect_info : resource_load_info.redirect_info_chain) {
UpdateOrAddToOrigins(url::Origin::Create(redirect_info->url),
redirect_info->network_info);
}
UpdateOrAddToOrigins(url::Origin::Create(resource_load_info.url),
resource_load_info.network_info);
}
| 172,367 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void vmxnet3_process_tx_queue(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx)
{
struct Vmxnet3_TxDesc txd;
uint32_t txd_idx;
uint32_t data_len;
hwaddr data_pa;
for (;;) {
if (!vmxnet3_pop_next_tx_descr(s, qidx, &txd, &txd_idx)) {
break;
}
vmxnet3_dump_tx_descr(&txd);
if (!s->skip_current_tx_pkt) {
data_len = (txd.len > 0) ? txd.len : VMXNET3_MAX_TX_BUF_SIZE;
data_pa = le64_to_cpu(txd.addr);
if (!vmxnet_tx_pkt_add_raw_fragment(s->tx_pkt,
data_pa,
data_len)) {
s->skip_current_tx_pkt = true;
}
}
if (s->tx_sop) {
vmxnet3_tx_retrieve_metadata(s, &txd);
s->tx_sop = false;
}
if (txd.eop) {
if (!s->skip_current_tx_pkt) {
vmxnet_tx_pkt_parse(s->tx_pkt);
if (s->needs_vlan) {
vmxnet_tx_pkt_setup_vlan_header(s->tx_pkt, s->tci);
}
vmxnet_tx_pkt_setup_vlan_header(s->tx_pkt, s->tci);
}
vmxnet3_send_packet(s, qidx);
} else {
vmxnet3_on_tx_done_update_stats(s, qidx,
VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_ERROR);
}
vmxnet3_complete_packet(s, qidx, txd_idx);
s->tx_sop = true;
s->skip_current_tx_pkt = false;
vmxnet_tx_pkt_reset(s->tx_pkt);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void vmxnet3_process_tx_queue(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx)
{
struct Vmxnet3_TxDesc txd;
uint32_t txd_idx;
uint32_t data_len;
hwaddr data_pa;
for (;;) {
if (!vmxnet3_pop_next_tx_descr(s, qidx, &txd, &txd_idx)) {
break;
}
vmxnet3_dump_tx_descr(&txd);
if (!s->skip_current_tx_pkt) {
data_len = (txd.len > 0) ? txd.len : VMXNET3_MAX_TX_BUF_SIZE;
data_pa = le64_to_cpu(txd.addr);
if (!vmxnet_tx_pkt_add_raw_fragment(s->tx_pkt,
data_pa,
data_len)) {
s->skip_current_tx_pkt = true;
}
}
if (s->tx_sop) {
vmxnet3_tx_retrieve_metadata(s, &txd);
s->tx_sop = false;
}
if (txd.eop) {
if (!s->skip_current_tx_pkt && vmxnet_tx_pkt_parse(s->tx_pkt)) {
if (s->needs_vlan) {
vmxnet_tx_pkt_setup_vlan_header(s->tx_pkt, s->tci);
}
vmxnet_tx_pkt_setup_vlan_header(s->tx_pkt, s->tci);
}
vmxnet3_send_packet(s, qidx);
} else {
vmxnet3_on_tx_done_update_stats(s, qidx,
VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_ERROR);
}
vmxnet3_complete_packet(s, qidx, txd_idx);
s->tx_sop = true;
s->skip_current_tx_pkt = false;
vmxnet_tx_pkt_reset(s->tx_pkt);
}
}
| 165,276 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::MediaLoadingFailed(WebMediaPlayer::NetworkState error,
const String& message) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "MediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this << ", "
<< static_cast<int>(error) << ", message='" << message
<< "')";
StopPeriodicTimers();
if (ready_state_ < kHaveMetadata &&
load_state_ == kLoadingFromSourceElement) {
if (current_source_node_) {
current_source_node_->ScheduleErrorEvent();
} else {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - error event not sent, <source> was removed";
}
ForgetResourceSpecificTracks();
if (HavePotentialSourceChild()) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - scheduling next <source>";
ScheduleNextSourceChild();
} else {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - no more <source> elements, waiting";
WaitForSourceChange();
}
return;
}
if (error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateNetworkError &&
ready_state_ >= kHaveMetadata) {
MediaEngineError(MediaError::Create(MediaError::kMediaErrNetwork, message));
} else if (error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateDecodeError) {
MediaEngineError(MediaError::Create(MediaError::kMediaErrDecode, message));
} else if ((error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError ||
error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateNetworkError) &&
load_state_ == kLoadingFromSrcAttr) {
if (message.IsEmpty()) {
NoneSupported(BuildElementErrorMessage(
error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError ? "Format error"
: "Network error"));
} else {
NoneSupported(message);
}
}
UpdateDisplayState();
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void HTMLMediaElement::MediaLoadingFailed(WebMediaPlayer::NetworkState error,
const String& input_message) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "MediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this << ", "
<< static_cast<int>(error) << ", message='" << input_message
<< "')";
bool should_be_opaque = MediaShouldBeOpaque();
if (should_be_opaque)
error = WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateNetworkError;
String empty_string;
const String& message = should_be_opaque ? empty_string : input_message;
StopPeriodicTimers();
if (ready_state_ < kHaveMetadata &&
load_state_ == kLoadingFromSourceElement) {
if (current_source_node_) {
current_source_node_->ScheduleErrorEvent();
} else {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - error event not sent, <source> was removed";
}
ForgetResourceSpecificTracks();
if (HavePotentialSourceChild()) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - scheduling next <source>";
ScheduleNextSourceChild();
} else {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - no more <source> elements, waiting";
WaitForSourceChange();
}
return;
}
if (error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateNetworkError &&
ready_state_ >= kHaveMetadata) {
MediaEngineError(MediaError::Create(MediaError::kMediaErrNetwork, message));
} else if (error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateDecodeError) {
MediaEngineError(MediaError::Create(MediaError::kMediaErrDecode, message));
} else if ((error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError ||
error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateNetworkError) &&
load_state_ == kLoadingFromSrcAttr) {
if (message.IsEmpty()) {
NoneSupported(BuildElementErrorMessage(
error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError ? "Format error"
: "Network error"));
} else {
NoneSupported(message);
}
}
UpdateDisplayState();
}
| 173,162 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int copy_cred(struct svc_cred *target, struct svc_cred *source)
{
int ret;
ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_principal, source->cr_principal);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_raw_principal,
source->cr_raw_principal);
if (ret)
return ret;
target->cr_flavor = source->cr_flavor;
target->cr_uid = source->cr_uid;
target->cr_gid = source->cr_gid;
target->cr_group_info = source->cr_group_info;
get_group_info(target->cr_group_info);
target->cr_gss_mech = source->cr_gss_mech;
if (source->cr_gss_mech)
gss_mech_get(source->cr_gss_mech);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | static int copy_cred(struct svc_cred *target, struct svc_cred *source)
{
target->cr_principal = kstrdup(source->cr_principal, GFP_KERNEL);
target->cr_raw_principal = kstrdup(source->cr_raw_principal,
GFP_KERNEL);
if ((source->cr_principal && ! target->cr_principal) ||
(source->cr_raw_principal && ! target->cr_raw_principal))
return -ENOMEM;
target->cr_flavor = source->cr_flavor;
target->cr_uid = source->cr_uid;
target->cr_gid = source->cr_gid;
target->cr_group_info = source->cr_group_info;
get_group_info(target->cr_group_info);
target->cr_gss_mech = source->cr_gss_mech;
if (source->cr_gss_mech)
gss_mech_get(source->cr_gss_mech);
return 0;
}
| 168,145 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int get_exif_tag_int_value(struct iw_exif_state *e, unsigned int tag_pos,
unsigned int *pv)
{
unsigned int field_type;
unsigned int value_count;
field_type = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[tag_pos+2],e->endian);
value_count = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+4],e->endian);
if(value_count!=1) return 0;
if(field_type==3) { // SHORT (uint16)
*pv = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[tag_pos+8],e->endian);
return 1;
}
else if(field_type==4) { // LONG (uint32)
*pv = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+8],e->endian);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed invalid memory access bugs when decoding JPEG Exif data
Fixes issues #22, #23, #24, #25
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int get_exif_tag_int_value(struct iw_exif_state *e, unsigned int tag_pos,
unsigned int *pv)
{
unsigned int field_type;
unsigned int value_count;
field_type = get_exif_ui16(e, tag_pos+2);
value_count = get_exif_ui32(e, tag_pos+4);
if(value_count!=1) return 0;
if(field_type==3) { // SHORT (uint16)
*pv = get_exif_ui16(e, tag_pos+8);
return 1;
}
else if(field_type==4) { // LONG (uint32)
*pv = get_exif_ui32(e, tag_pos+8);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,114 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, isDot)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(spl_filesystem_is_dot(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name));
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, isDot)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(spl_filesystem_is_dot(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name));
}
| 167,037 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
int r, rl;
int s, sl;
int cur, l;
int count = 0;
/* Check 2.6.0 was NXT(0) not RAW */
if (CMP9(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', '[', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A', '[')) {
SKIP(9);
} else
return;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION;
r = CUR_CHAR(rl);
if (!IS_CHAR(r)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
return;
}
NEXTL(rl);
s = CUR_CHAR(sl);
if (!IS_CHAR(s)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
return;
}
NEXTL(sl);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return;
}
while (IS_CHAR(cur) &&
((r != ']') || (s != ']') || (cur != '>'))) {
if (len + 5 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlFree(buf);
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return;
}
buf = tmp;
}
COPY_BUF(rl,buf,len,r);
r = s;
rl = sl;
s = cur;
sl = l;
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
count = 0;
}
NEXTL(l);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
buf[len] = 0;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
if (cur != '>') {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED,
"CData section not finished\n%.50s\n", buf);
xmlFree(buf);
return;
}
NEXTL(l);
/*
* OK the buffer is to be consumed as cdata.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL)
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData, buf, len);
else if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData, buf, len);
}
xmlFree(buf);
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
int r, rl;
int s, sl;
int cur, l;
int count = 0;
/* Check 2.6.0 was NXT(0) not RAW */
if (CMP9(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', '[', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A', '[')) {
SKIP(9);
} else
return;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION;
r = CUR_CHAR(rl);
if (!IS_CHAR(r)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
return;
}
NEXTL(rl);
s = CUR_CHAR(sl);
if (!IS_CHAR(s)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
return;
}
NEXTL(sl);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return;
}
while (IS_CHAR(cur) &&
((r != ']') || (s != ']') || (cur != '>'))) {
if (len + 5 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlFree(buf);
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return;
}
buf = tmp;
}
COPY_BUF(rl,buf,len,r);
r = s;
rl = sl;
s = cur;
sl = l;
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(buf);
return;
}
count = 0;
}
NEXTL(l);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
buf[len] = 0;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
if (cur != '>') {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED,
"CData section not finished\n%.50s\n", buf);
xmlFree(buf);
return;
}
NEXTL(l);
/*
* OK the buffer is to be consumed as cdata.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL)
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData, buf, len);
else if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData, buf, len);
}
xmlFree(buf);
}
| 171,273 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Browser::AddNewContents(WebContents* source,
std::unique_ptr<WebContents> new_contents,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
const gfx::Rect& initial_rect,
bool user_gesture,
bool* was_blocked) {
if (source && PopupBlockerTabHelper::ConsiderForPopupBlocking(disposition))
PopupTracker::CreateForWebContents(new_contents.get(), source);
chrome::AddWebContents(this, source, std::move(new_contents), disposition,
initial_rect);
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void Browser::AddNewContents(WebContents* source,
std::unique_ptr<WebContents> new_contents,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
const gfx::Rect& initial_rect,
bool user_gesture,
bool* was_blocked) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
// On the Mac, the convention is to turn popups into new tabs when in
// fullscreen mode. Only worry about user-initiated fullscreen as showing a
// popup in HTML5 fullscreen would have kicked the page out of fullscreen.
if (disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_POPUP &&
exclusive_access_manager_->fullscreen_controller()
->IsFullscreenForBrowser()) {
disposition = WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB;
}
#endif
if (source && PopupBlockerTabHelper::ConsiderForPopupBlocking(disposition))
PopupTracker::CreateForWebContents(new_contents.get(), source);
chrome::AddWebContents(this, source, std::move(new_contents), disposition,
initial_rect);
}
| 173,205 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void scsi_dma_restart_bh(void *opaque)
{
SCSIDiskState *s = opaque;
SCSIRequest *req;
SCSIDiskReq *r;
qemu_bh_delete(s->bh);
s->bh = NULL;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(req, &s->qdev.requests, next) {
r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
if (r->status & SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY) {
int status = r->status;
int ret;
r->status &=
~(SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY | SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_TYPE_MASK);
switch (status & SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_TYPE_MASK) {
case SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_READ:
scsi_read_data(&r->req);
break;
case SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_WRITE:
scsi_write_data(&r->req);
break;
case SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_FLUSH:
ret = scsi_disk_emulate_command(r, r->iov.iov_base);
if (ret == 0) {
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void scsi_dma_restart_bh(void *opaque)
{
SCSIDiskState *s = opaque;
SCSIRequest *req;
SCSIDiskReq *r;
qemu_bh_delete(s->bh);
s->bh = NULL;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(req, &s->qdev.requests, next) {
r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
if (r->status & SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY) {
int status = r->status;
int ret;
r->status &=
~(SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY | SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_TYPE_MASK);
switch (status & SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_TYPE_MASK) {
case SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_READ:
scsi_read_data(&r->req);
break;
case SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_WRITE:
scsi_write_data(&r->req);
break;
case SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_FLUSH:
ret = scsi_disk_emulate_command(r);
if (ret == 0) {
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
}
}
}
}
}
| 166,552 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void fht8x8_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fht8x8_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void fht8x8_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
void reference_8x8_dct_2d(const int16_t input[kNumCoeffs],
double output[kNumCoeffs]) {
// First transform columns
for (int i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
double temp_in[8], temp_out[8];
for (int j = 0; j < 8; ++j)
temp_in[j] = input[j*8 + i];
reference_8x8_dct_1d(temp_in, temp_out, 1);
for (int j = 0; j < 8; ++j)
output[j * 8 + i] = temp_out[j];
}
// Then transform rows
for (int i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
double temp_in[8], temp_out[8];
for (int j = 0; j < 8; ++j)
temp_in[j] = output[j + i*8];
reference_8x8_dct_1d(temp_in, temp_out, 1);
// Scale by some magic number
for (int j = 0; j < 8; ++j)
output[j + i * 8] = temp_out[j] * 2;
}
}
void fdct8x8_ref(const int16_t *in, tran_low_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vpx_fdct8x8_c(in, out, stride);
}
void fht8x8_ref(const int16_t *in, tran_low_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fht8x8_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
| 174,565 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void nsc_decode(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
UINT16 rw = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
BYTE shift = context->ColorLossLevel - 1; /* colorloss recovery + YCoCg shift */
BYTE* bmpdata = context->BitmapData;
for (y = 0; y < context->height; y++)
{
const BYTE* yplane;
const BYTE* coplane;
const BYTE* cgplane;
const BYTE* aplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[3] + y * context->width; /* A */
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel)
{
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * rw; /* Y */
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + (y >> 1) * (rw >>
1); /* Co, supersampled */
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + (y >> 1) * (rw >>
1); /* Cg, supersampled */
}
else
{
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * context->width; /* Y */
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * context->width; /* Co */
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * context->width; /* Cg */
}
for (x = 0; x < context->width; x++)
{
INT16 y_val = (INT16) * yplane;
INT16 co_val = (INT16)(INT8)(*coplane << shift);
INT16 cg_val = (INT16)(INT8)(*cgplane << shift);
INT16 r_val = y_val + co_val - cg_val;
INT16 g_val = y_val + cg_val;
INT16 b_val = y_val - co_val - cg_val;
*bmpdata++ = MINMAX(b_val, 0, 0xFF);
*bmpdata++ = MINMAX(g_val, 0, 0xFF);
*bmpdata++ = MINMAX(r_val, 0, 0xFF);
*bmpdata++ = *aplane;
yplane++;
coplane += (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel ? x % 2 : 1);
cgplane += (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel ? x % 2 : 1);
aplane++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static void nsc_decode(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
static BOOL nsc_decode(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
UINT16 rw;
BYTE shift;
BYTE* bmpdata;
size_t pos = 0;
if (!context)
return FALSE;
rw = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
shift = context->ColorLossLevel - 1; /* colorloss recovery + YCoCg shift */
bmpdata = context->BitmapData;
if (!bmpdata)
return FALSE;
for (y = 0; y < context->height; y++)
{
const BYTE* yplane;
const BYTE* coplane;
const BYTE* cgplane;
const BYTE* aplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[3] + y * context->width; /* A */
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel)
{
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * rw; /* Y */
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + (y >> 1) * (rw >>
1); /* Co, supersampled */
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + (y >> 1) * (rw >>
1); /* Cg, supersampled */
}
else
{
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * context->width; /* Y */
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * context->width; /* Co */
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * context->width; /* Cg */
}
for (x = 0; x < context->width; x++)
{
INT16 y_val = (INT16) * yplane;
INT16 co_val = (INT16)(INT8)(*coplane << shift);
INT16 cg_val = (INT16)(INT8)(*cgplane << shift);
INT16 r_val = y_val + co_val - cg_val;
INT16 g_val = y_val + cg_val;
INT16 b_val = y_val - co_val - cg_val;
if (pos + 4 > context->BitmapDataLength)
return FALSE;
pos += 4;
*bmpdata++ = MINMAX(b_val, 0, 0xFF);
*bmpdata++ = MINMAX(g_val, 0, 0xFF);
*bmpdata++ = MINMAX(r_val, 0, 0xFF);
*bmpdata++ = *aplane;
yplane++;
coplane += (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel ? x % 2 : 1);
cgplane += (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel ? x % 2 : 1);
aplane++;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
| 169,282 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto)
{
if (upto)
{
BIO *tbio;
do
{
tbio = BIO_pop(f);
BIO_free(f);
f = tbio;
}
while (f != upto);
}
else
BIO_free_all(f);
}
Commit Message: Canonicalise input in CMS_verify.
If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to
CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim
which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto)
{
if (upto)
{
BIO *tbio;
do
{
tbio = BIO_pop(f);
BIO_free(f);
f = tbio;
}
while (f && f != upto);
}
else
BIO_free_all(f);
}
| 166,690 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HTMLAnchorElement::handleClick(Event* event)
{
event->setDefaultHandled();
LocalFrame* frame = document().frame();
if (!frame)
return;
StringBuilder url;
url.append(stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(fastGetAttribute(hrefAttr)));
appendServerMapMousePosition(url, event);
KURL completedURL = document().completeURL(url.toString());
sendPings(completedURL);
ResourceRequest request(completedURL);
request.setUIStartTime(event->platformTimeStamp());
request.setInputPerfMetricReportPolicy(InputToLoadPerfMetricReportPolicy::ReportLink);
ReferrerPolicy policy;
if (hasAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr) && SecurityPolicy::referrerPolicyFromString(fastGetAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr), &policy) && !hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
request.setHTTPReferrer(SecurityPolicy::generateReferrer(policy, completedURL, document().outgoingReferrer()));
}
if (hasAttribute(downloadAttr)) {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextDownload);
bool isSameOrigin = completedURL.protocolIsData() || document().getSecurityOrigin()->canRequest(completedURL);
const AtomicString& suggestedName = (isSameOrigin ? fastGetAttribute(downloadAttr) : nullAtom);
frame->loader().client()->loadURLExternally(request, NavigationPolicyDownload, suggestedName, false);
} else {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextHyperlink);
FrameLoadRequest frameRequest(&document(), request, getAttribute(targetAttr));
frameRequest.setTriggeringEvent(event);
if (hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
frameRequest.setShouldSendReferrer(NeverSendReferrer);
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
}
if (hasRel(RelationNoOpener))
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
frame->loader().load(frameRequest);
}
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void HTMLAnchorElement::handleClick(Event* event)
{
event->setDefaultHandled();
LocalFrame* frame = document().frame();
if (!frame)
return;
StringBuilder url;
url.append(stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(fastGetAttribute(hrefAttr)));
appendServerMapMousePosition(url, event);
KURL completedURL = document().completeURL(url.toString());
sendPings(completedURL);
ResourceRequest request(completedURL);
request.setUIStartTime(event->platformTimeStamp());
request.setInputPerfMetricReportPolicy(InputToLoadPerfMetricReportPolicy::ReportLink);
ReferrerPolicy policy;
if (hasAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr) && SecurityPolicy::referrerPolicyFromString(fastGetAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr), &policy) && !hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
request.setHTTPReferrer(SecurityPolicy::generateReferrer(policy, completedURL, document().outgoingReferrer()));
}
if (hasAttribute(downloadAttr)) {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextDownload);
bool isSameOrigin = completedURL.protocolIsData() || document().getSecurityOrigin()->canRequest(completedURL);
const AtomicString& suggestedName = (isSameOrigin ? fastGetAttribute(downloadAttr) : nullAtom);
frame->loader().client()->loadURLExternally(request, NavigationPolicyDownload, suggestedName, false);
} else {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextHyperlink);
FrameLoadRequest frameRequest(&document(), request, getAttribute(targetAttr));
frameRequest.setTriggeringEvent(event);
if (hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
frameRequest.setShouldSendReferrer(NeverSendReferrer);
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
}
if (hasRel(RelationNoOpener))
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
// TODO(japhet): Link clicks can be emulated via JS without a user gesture.
// Why doesn't this go through NavigationScheduler?
frame->loader().load(frameRequest);
}
}
| 172,257 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int fmtid;
int id;
char *infile;
jas_stream_t *instream;
jas_image_t *image;
int width;
int height;
int depth;
int numcmpts;
int verbose;
char *fmtname;
if (jas_init()) {
abort();
}
cmdname = argv[0];
infile = 0;
verbose = 0;
/* Parse the command line options. */
while ((id = jas_getopt(argc, argv, opts)) >= 0) {
switch (id) {
case OPT_VERBOSE:
verbose = 1;
break;
case OPT_VERSION:
printf("%s\n", JAS_VERSION);
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
break;
case OPT_INFILE:
infile = jas_optarg;
break;
case OPT_HELP:
default:
usage();
break;
}
}
/* Open the image file. */
if (infile) {
/* The image is to be read from a file. */
if (!(instream = jas_stream_fopen(infile, "rb"))) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot open input image file %s\n", infile);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
} else {
/* The image is to be read from standard input. */
if (!(instream = jas_stream_fdopen(0, "rb"))) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot open standard input\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
if ((fmtid = jas_image_getfmt(instream)) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "unknown image format\n");
}
/* Decode the image. */
if (!(image = jas_image_decode(instream, fmtid, 0))) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot load image\n");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
/* Close the image file. */
jas_stream_close(instream);
numcmpts = jas_image_numcmpts(image);
width = jas_image_cmptwidth(image, 0);
height = jas_image_cmptheight(image, 0);
depth = jas_image_cmptprec(image, 0);
if (!(fmtname = jas_image_fmttostr(fmtid))) {
abort();
}
printf("%s %d %d %d %d %ld\n", fmtname, numcmpts, width, height, depth, (long) jas_image_rawsize(image));
jas_image_destroy(image);
jas_image_clearfmts();
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a sanitizer failure in the BMP codec.
Also, added a --debug-level command line option to the imginfo command
for debugging purposes.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int fmtid;
int id;
char *infile;
jas_stream_t *instream;
jas_image_t *image;
int width;
int height;
int depth;
int numcmpts;
int verbose;
char *fmtname;
int debug;
if (jas_init()) {
abort();
}
cmdname = argv[0];
infile = 0;
verbose = 0;
debug = 0;
/* Parse the command line options. */
while ((id = jas_getopt(argc, argv, opts)) >= 0) {
switch (id) {
case OPT_VERBOSE:
verbose = 1;
break;
case OPT_VERSION:
printf("%s\n", JAS_VERSION);
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
break;
case OPT_DEBUG:
debug = atoi(jas_optarg);
break;
case OPT_INFILE:
infile = jas_optarg;
break;
case OPT_HELP:
default:
usage();
break;
}
}
jas_setdbglevel(debug);
/* Open the image file. */
if (infile) {
/* The image is to be read from a file. */
if (!(instream = jas_stream_fopen(infile, "rb"))) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot open input image file %s\n", infile);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
} else {
/* The image is to be read from standard input. */
if (!(instream = jas_stream_fdopen(0, "rb"))) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot open standard input\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
if ((fmtid = jas_image_getfmt(instream)) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "unknown image format\n");
}
/* Decode the image. */
if (!(image = jas_image_decode(instream, fmtid, 0))) {
jas_stream_close(instream);
fprintf(stderr, "cannot load image\n");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
/* Close the image file. */
jas_stream_close(instream);
numcmpts = jas_image_numcmpts(image);
width = jas_image_cmptwidth(image, 0);
height = jas_image_cmptheight(image, 0);
depth = jas_image_cmptprec(image, 0);
if (!(fmtname = jas_image_fmttostr(fmtid))) {
abort();
}
printf("%s %d %d %d %d %ld\n", fmtname, numcmpts, width, height, depth, (long) jas_image_rawsize(image));
jas_image_destroy(image);
jas_image_clearfmts();
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
| 168,761 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltShallowCopyElem(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr insert, int isLRE)
{
xmlNodePtr copy;
if ((node->type == XML_DTD_NODE) || (insert == NULL))
return(NULL);
if ((node->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) ||
(node->type == XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE))
return(xsltCopyText(ctxt, insert, node, 0));
copy = xmlDocCopyNode(node, insert->doc, 0);
if (copy != NULL) {
copy->doc = ctxt->output;
copy = xsltAddChild(insert, copy);
if (node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
/*
* Add namespaces as they are needed
*/
if (node->nsDef != NULL) {
/*
* TODO: Remove the LRE case in the refactored code
* gets enabled.
*/
if (isLRE)
xsltCopyNamespaceList(ctxt, copy, node->nsDef);
else
xsltCopyNamespaceListInternal(copy, node->nsDef);
}
/*
* URGENT TODO: The problem with this is that it does not
* copy over all namespace nodes in scope.
* The damn thing about this is, that we would need to
* use the xmlGetNsList(), for every single node; this is
* also done in xsltCopyTreeInternal(), but only for the top node.
*/
if (node->ns != NULL) {
if (isLRE) {
/*
* REVISIT TODO: Since the non-refactored code still does
* ns-aliasing, we need to call xsltGetNamespace() here.
* Remove this when ready.
*/
copy->ns = xsltGetNamespace(ctxt, node, node->ns, copy);
} else {
copy->ns = xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt,
node, node->ns->href, node->ns->prefix, copy);
}
} else if ((insert->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(insert->ns != NULL))
{
/*
* "Undeclare" the default namespace.
*/
xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt, node, NULL, NULL, copy);
}
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, node,
"xsltShallowCopyElem: copy %s failed\n", node->name);
}
return(copy);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xsltShallowCopyElem(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr insert, int isLRE)
{
xmlNodePtr copy;
if ((node->type == XML_DTD_NODE) || (insert == NULL))
return(NULL);
if ((node->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) ||
(node->type == XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE))
return(xsltCopyText(ctxt, insert, node, 0));
copy = xmlDocCopyNode(node, insert->doc, 0);
if (copy != NULL) {
copy->doc = ctxt->output;
copy = xsltAddChild(insert, copy);
if (copy == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, node,
"xsltShallowCopyElem: copy failed\n");
return (copy);
}
if (node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
/*
* Add namespaces as they are needed
*/
if (node->nsDef != NULL) {
/*
* TODO: Remove the LRE case in the refactored code
* gets enabled.
*/
if (isLRE)
xsltCopyNamespaceList(ctxt, copy, node->nsDef);
else
xsltCopyNamespaceListInternal(copy, node->nsDef);
}
/*
* URGENT TODO: The problem with this is that it does not
* copy over all namespace nodes in scope.
* The damn thing about this is, that we would need to
* use the xmlGetNsList(), for every single node; this is
* also done in xsltCopyTreeInternal(), but only for the top node.
*/
if (node->ns != NULL) {
if (isLRE) {
/*
* REVISIT TODO: Since the non-refactored code still does
* ns-aliasing, we need to call xsltGetNamespace() here.
* Remove this when ready.
*/
copy->ns = xsltGetNamespace(ctxt, node, node->ns, copy);
} else {
copy->ns = xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt,
node, node->ns->href, node->ns->prefix, copy);
}
} else if ((insert->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(insert->ns != NULL))
{
/*
* "Undeclare" the default namespace.
*/
xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt, node, NULL, NULL, copy);
}
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, node,
"xsltShallowCopyElem: copy %s failed\n", node->name);
}
return(copy);
}
| 173,330 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Splash::blitMask(SplashBitmap *src, int xDest, int yDest,
SplashClipResult clipRes) {
SplashPipe pipe;
Guchar *p;
int w, h, x, y;
w = src->getWidth();
h = src->getHeight();
if (vectorAntialias && clipRes != splashClipAllInside) {
pipeInit(&pipe, xDest, yDest, state->fillPattern, NULL,
(Guchar)splashRound(state->fillAlpha * 255), gTrue, gFalse);
drawAAPixelInit();
p = src->getDataPtr();
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
pipe.shape = *p++;
pipeInit(&pipe, xDest, yDest, state->fillPattern, NULL,
(Guchar)splashRound(state->fillAlpha * 255), gTrue, gFalse);
p = src->getDataPtr();
} else {
pipeInit(&pipe, xDest, yDest, state->fillPattern, NULL,
(Guchar)splashRound(state->fillAlpha * 255), gTrue, gFalse);
p = src->getDataPtr();
if (clipRes == splashClipAllInside) {
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
pipeSetXY(&pipe, xDest, yDest + y);
(this->*pipe.run)(&pipe);
} else {
pipeIncX(&pipe);
}
++p;
}
}
updateModX(xDest);
updateModX(xDest + w - 1);
updateModY(yDest);
updateModY(yDest + h - 1);
} else {
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
pipeSetXY(&pipe, xDest, yDest + y);
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
if (*p && state->clip->test(xDest + x, yDest + y)) {
pipe.shape = *p;
(this->*pipe.run)(&pipe);
updateModX(xDest + x);
updateModY(yDest + y);
} else {
pipeIncX(&pipe);
}
++p;
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | void Splash::blitMask(SplashBitmap *src, int xDest, int yDest,
SplashClipResult clipRes) {
SplashPipe pipe;
Guchar *p;
int w, h, x, y;
w = src->getWidth();
h = src->getHeight();
p = src->getDataPtr();
if (p == NULL) {
error(errInternal, -1, "src->getDataPtr() is NULL in Splash::blitMask");
return;
}
if (vectorAntialias && clipRes != splashClipAllInside) {
pipeInit(&pipe, xDest, yDest, state->fillPattern, NULL,
(Guchar)splashRound(state->fillAlpha * 255), gTrue, gFalse);
drawAAPixelInit();
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
pipe.shape = *p++;
pipeInit(&pipe, xDest, yDest, state->fillPattern, NULL,
(Guchar)splashRound(state->fillAlpha * 255), gTrue, gFalse);
p = src->getDataPtr();
} else {
pipeInit(&pipe, xDest, yDest, state->fillPattern, NULL,
(Guchar)splashRound(state->fillAlpha * 255), gTrue, gFalse);
if (clipRes == splashClipAllInside) {
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
pipeSetXY(&pipe, xDest, yDest + y);
(this->*pipe.run)(&pipe);
} else {
pipeIncX(&pipe);
}
++p;
}
}
updateModX(xDest);
updateModX(xDest + w - 1);
updateModY(yDest);
updateModY(yDest + h - 1);
} else {
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
pipeSetXY(&pipe, xDest, yDest + y);
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
if (*p && state->clip->test(xDest + x, yDest + y)) {
pipe.shape = *p;
(this->*pipe.run)(&pipe);
updateModX(xDest + x);
updateModY(yDest + y);
} else {
pipeIncX(&pipe);
}
++p;
}
}
}
}
}
| 164,732 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: exsltStrPaddingFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int number, str_len = 0;
xmlChar *str = NULL, *ret = NULL, *tmp;
if ((nargs < 1) || (nargs > 2)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs == 2) {
str = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen(str);
}
if (str_len == 0) {
if (str != NULL) xmlFree(str);
str = xmlStrdup((const xmlChar *) " ");
str_len = 1;
}
number = (int) xmlXPathPopNumber(ctxt);
if (number <= 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
xmlFree(str);
return;
}
while (number >= str_len) {
ret = xmlStrncat(ret, str, str_len);
number -= str_len;
}
tmp = xmlUTF8Strndup (str, number);
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, tmp);
if (tmp != NULL)
xmlFree (tmp);
xmlXPathReturnString(ctxt, ret);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree(str);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | exsltStrPaddingFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int number, str_len = 0, str_size = 0;
xmlChar *str = NULL, *ret = NULL;
if ((nargs < 1) || (nargs > 2)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs == 2) {
str = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen(str);
str_size = xmlStrlen(str);
}
if (str_len == 0) {
if (str != NULL) xmlFree(str);
str = xmlStrdup((const xmlChar *) " ");
str_len = 1;
str_size = 1;
}
number = (int) xmlXPathPopNumber(ctxt);
if (number <= 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
xmlFree(str);
return;
}
while (number >= str_len) {
ret = xmlStrncat(ret, str, str_size);
number -= str_len;
}
if (number > 0) {
str_size = xmlUTF8Strsize(str, number);
ret = xmlStrncat(ret, str, str_size);
}
xmlXPathReturnString(ctxt, ret);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree(str);
}
| 173,296 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc __unused, char** argv)
{
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
bool doLog = (property_get("ro.test_harness", value, "0") > 0) && (atoi(value) == 1);
pid_t childPid;
if (doLog && (childPid = fork()) != 0) {
strcpy(argv[0], "media.log");
sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
MediaLogService::instantiate();
ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
for (;;) {
siginfo_t info;
int ret = waitid(P_PID, childPid, &info, WEXITED | WSTOPPED | WCONTINUED);
if (ret == EINTR) {
continue;
}
if (ret < 0) {
break;
}
char buffer[32];
const char *code;
switch (info.si_code) {
case CLD_EXITED:
code = "CLD_EXITED";
break;
case CLD_KILLED:
code = "CLD_KILLED";
break;
case CLD_DUMPED:
code = "CLD_DUMPED";
break;
case CLD_STOPPED:
code = "CLD_STOPPED";
break;
case CLD_TRAPPED:
code = "CLD_TRAPPED";
break;
case CLD_CONTINUED:
code = "CLD_CONTINUED";
break;
default:
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "unknown (%d)", info.si_code);
code = buffer;
break;
}
struct rusage usage;
getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, &usage);
ALOG(LOG_ERROR, "media.log", "pid %d status %d code %s user %ld.%03lds sys %ld.%03lds",
info.si_pid, info.si_status, code,
usage.ru_utime.tv_sec, usage.ru_utime.tv_usec / 1000,
usage.ru_stime.tv_sec, usage.ru_stime.tv_usec / 1000);
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
sp<IBinder> binder = sm->getService(String16("media.log"));
if (binder != 0) {
Vector<String16> args;
binder->dump(-1, args);
}
switch (info.si_code) {
case CLD_EXITED:
case CLD_KILLED:
case CLD_DUMPED: {
ALOG(LOG_INFO, "media.log", "exiting");
_exit(0);
}
default:
break;
}
}
} else {
if (doLog) {
prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL); // if parent media.log dies before me, kill me also
setpgid(0, 0); // but if I die first, don't kill my parent
}
InitializeIcuOrDie();
sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
ALOGI("ServiceManager: %p", sm.get());
AudioFlinger::instantiate();
MediaPlayerService::instantiate();
ResourceManagerService::instantiate();
CameraService::instantiate();
AudioPolicyService::instantiate();
SoundTriggerHwService::instantiate();
RadioService::instantiate();
registerExtensions();
ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
IPCThreadState::self()->joinThreadPool();
}
}
Commit Message: limit mediaserver memory
Limit mediaserver using rlimit, to prevent it from bringing down the system
via the low memory killer.
Default max is 65% of total RAM, but can be customized via system property.
Bug: 28471206
Bug: 28615448
Change-Id: Ic84137435d1ef0a6883e9789a4b4f399e4283f05
CWE ID: CWE-399 | int main(int argc __unused, char** argv)
{
limitProcessMemory(
"ro.media.maxmem", /* property that defines limit */
SIZE_MAX, /* upper limit in bytes */
65 /* upper limit as percentage of physical RAM */);
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
bool doLog = (property_get("ro.test_harness", value, "0") > 0) && (atoi(value) == 1);
pid_t childPid;
if (doLog && (childPid = fork()) != 0) {
strcpy(argv[0], "media.log");
sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
MediaLogService::instantiate();
ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
for (;;) {
siginfo_t info;
int ret = waitid(P_PID, childPid, &info, WEXITED | WSTOPPED | WCONTINUED);
if (ret == EINTR) {
continue;
}
if (ret < 0) {
break;
}
char buffer[32];
const char *code;
switch (info.si_code) {
case CLD_EXITED:
code = "CLD_EXITED";
break;
case CLD_KILLED:
code = "CLD_KILLED";
break;
case CLD_DUMPED:
code = "CLD_DUMPED";
break;
case CLD_STOPPED:
code = "CLD_STOPPED";
break;
case CLD_TRAPPED:
code = "CLD_TRAPPED";
break;
case CLD_CONTINUED:
code = "CLD_CONTINUED";
break;
default:
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "unknown (%d)", info.si_code);
code = buffer;
break;
}
struct rusage usage;
getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, &usage);
ALOG(LOG_ERROR, "media.log", "pid %d status %d code %s user %ld.%03lds sys %ld.%03lds",
info.si_pid, info.si_status, code,
usage.ru_utime.tv_sec, usage.ru_utime.tv_usec / 1000,
usage.ru_stime.tv_sec, usage.ru_stime.tv_usec / 1000);
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
sp<IBinder> binder = sm->getService(String16("media.log"));
if (binder != 0) {
Vector<String16> args;
binder->dump(-1, args);
}
switch (info.si_code) {
case CLD_EXITED:
case CLD_KILLED:
case CLD_DUMPED: {
ALOG(LOG_INFO, "media.log", "exiting");
_exit(0);
}
default:
break;
}
}
} else {
if (doLog) {
prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL); // if parent media.log dies before me, kill me also
setpgid(0, 0); // but if I die first, don't kill my parent
}
InitializeIcuOrDie();
sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
ALOGI("ServiceManager: %p", sm.get());
AudioFlinger::instantiate();
MediaPlayerService::instantiate();
ResourceManagerService::instantiate();
CameraService::instantiate();
AudioPolicyService::instantiate();
SoundTriggerHwService::instantiate();
RadioService::instantiate();
registerExtensions();
ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
IPCThreadState::self()->joinThreadPool();
}
}
| 173,564 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void cJSON_DeleteItemFromObject( cJSON *object, const char *string )
{
cJSON_Delete( cJSON_DetachItemFromObject( object, string ) );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void cJSON_DeleteItemFromObject( cJSON *object, const char *string )
| 167,283 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void inbound_data_waiting(void *context) {
eager_reader_t *reader = (eager_reader_t *)context;
data_buffer_t *buffer = (data_buffer_t *)reader->allocator->alloc(reader->buffer_size + sizeof(data_buffer_t));
if (!buffer) {
LOG_ERROR("%s couldn't aquire memory for inbound data buffer.", __func__);
return;
}
buffer->length = 0;
buffer->offset = 0;
int bytes_read = read(reader->inbound_fd, buffer->data, reader->buffer_size);
if (bytes_read > 0) {
buffer->length = bytes_read;
fixed_queue_enqueue(reader->buffers, buffer);
eventfd_write(reader->bytes_available_fd, bytes_read);
} else {
if (bytes_read == 0)
LOG_WARN("%s fd said bytes existed, but none were found.", __func__);
else
LOG_WARN("%s unable to read from file descriptor: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
reader->allocator->free(buffer);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void inbound_data_waiting(void *context) {
eager_reader_t *reader = (eager_reader_t *)context;
data_buffer_t *buffer = (data_buffer_t *)reader->allocator->alloc(reader->buffer_size + sizeof(data_buffer_t));
if (!buffer) {
LOG_ERROR("%s couldn't aquire memory for inbound data buffer.", __func__);
return;
}
buffer->length = 0;
buffer->offset = 0;
int bytes_read = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(reader->inbound_fd, buffer->data, reader->buffer_size));
if (bytes_read > 0) {
buffer->length = bytes_read;
fixed_queue_enqueue(reader->buffers, buffer);
eventfd_write(reader->bytes_available_fd, bytes_read);
} else {
if (bytes_read == 0)
LOG_WARN("%s fd said bytes existed, but none were found.", __func__);
else
LOG_WARN("%s unable to read from file descriptor: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
reader->allocator->free(buffer);
}
}
| 173,481 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Initialize() {
Initialize(kDefaultChannelLayout, kDefaultSampleBits);
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Initialize() {
Initialize(kDefaultChannelLayout, kDefaultSampleBits, kSamplesPerSecond);
}
| 171,533 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ConfirmInfoBar::ConfirmInfoBar(std::unique_ptr<ConfirmInfoBarDelegate> delegate)
: InfoBarView(std::move(delegate)) {
auto* delegate_ptr = GetDelegate();
label_ = CreateLabel(delegate_ptr->GetMessageText());
AddChildView(label_);
const auto buttons = delegate_ptr->GetButtons();
if (buttons & ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_OK) {
ok_button_ = CreateButton(ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_OK);
ok_button_->SetProminent(true);
if (delegate_ptr->OKButtonTriggersUACPrompt()) {
elevation_icon_setter_.reset(new ElevationIconSetter(
ok_button_,
base::BindOnce(&ConfirmInfoBar::Layout, base::Unretained(this))));
}
}
if (buttons & ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_CANCEL) {
cancel_button_ = CreateButton(ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_CANCEL);
if (buttons == ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_CANCEL)
cancel_button_->SetProminent(true);
}
link_ = CreateLink(delegate_ptr->GetLinkText(), this);
AddChildView(link_);
}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | ConfirmInfoBar::ConfirmInfoBar(std::unique_ptr<ConfirmInfoBarDelegate> delegate)
: InfoBarView(std::move(delegate)) {
auto* delegate_ptr = GetDelegate();
label_ = CreateLabel(delegate_ptr->GetMessageText());
label_->SetElideBehavior(delegate_ptr->GetMessageElideBehavior());
AddChildView(label_);
const auto buttons = delegate_ptr->GetButtons();
if (buttons & ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_OK) {
ok_button_ = CreateButton(ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_OK);
ok_button_->SetProminent(true);
if (delegate_ptr->OKButtonTriggersUACPrompt()) {
elevation_icon_setter_.reset(new ElevationIconSetter(
ok_button_,
base::BindOnce(&ConfirmInfoBar::Layout, base::Unretained(this))));
}
}
if (buttons & ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_CANCEL) {
cancel_button_ = CreateButton(ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_CANCEL);
if (buttons == ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_CANCEL)
cancel_button_->SetProminent(true);
}
link_ = CreateLink(delegate_ptr->GetLinkText(), this);
AddChildView(link_);
}
| 173,165 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void pid_ns_release_proc(struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
mntput(ns->proc_mnt);
}
Commit Message: procfs: fix a vfsmount longterm reference leak
kern_mount() doesn't pair with plain mntput()...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void pid_ns_release_proc(struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
kern_unmount(ns->proc_mnt);
}
| 165,614 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual bool Speak(
const std::string& utterance,
const std::string& language,
const std::string& gender,
double rate,
double pitch,
double volume) {
error_ = kNotSupportedError;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | virtual bool Speak(
int utterance_id,
const std::string& utterance,
const std::string& lang,
const UtteranceContinuousParameters& params) {
error_ = kNotSupportedError;
return false;
}
| 170,400 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: juniper_services_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
struct juniper_services_header {
uint8_t svc_id;
uint8_t flags_len;
uint8_t svc_set_id[2];
uint8_t dir_iif[4];
};
const struct juniper_services_header *sh;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_SERVICES;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
sh = (const struct juniper_services_header *)p;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "service-id %u flags 0x%02x service-set-id 0x%04x iif %u: ",
sh->svc_id,
sh->flags_len,
EXTRACT_16BITS(&sh->svc_set_id),
EXTRACT_24BITS(&sh->dir_iif[1])));
/* no proto field - lets guess by first byte of IP header*/
ip_heuristic_guess (ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | juniper_services_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
struct juniper_services_header {
uint8_t svc_id;
uint8_t flags_len;
uint8_t svc_set_id[2];
uint8_t dir_iif[4];
};
const struct juniper_services_header *sh;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_SERVICES;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
sh = (const struct juniper_services_header *)p;
ND_TCHECK(*sh);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "service-id %u flags 0x%02x service-set-id 0x%04x iif %u: ",
sh->svc_id,
sh->flags_len,
EXTRACT_16BITS(&sh->svc_set_id),
EXTRACT_24BITS(&sh->dir_iif[1])));
/* no proto field - lets guess by first byte of IP header*/
ip_heuristic_guess (ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|juniper_services]"));
return l2info.header_len;
}
| 167,921 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct edid *drm_load_edid_firmware(struct drm_connector *connector)
{
const char *connector_name = connector->name;
char *edidname, *last, *colon, *fwstr, *edidstr, *fallback = NULL;
struct edid *edid;
if (edid_firmware[0] == '\0')
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
/*
* If there are multiple edid files specified and separated
* by commas, search through the list looking for one that
* matches the connector.
*
* If there's one or more that doesn't specify a connector, keep
* the last one found one as a fallback.
*/
fwstr = kstrdup(edid_firmware, GFP_KERNEL);
edidstr = fwstr;
while ((edidname = strsep(&edidstr, ","))) {
if (strncmp(connector_name, edidname, colon - edidname))
continue;
edidname = colon + 1;
break;
}
if (*edidname != '\0') /* corner case: multiple ',' */
fallback = edidname;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | struct edid *drm_load_edid_firmware(struct drm_connector *connector)
{
const char *connector_name = connector->name;
char *edidname, *last, *colon, *fwstr, *edidstr, *fallback = NULL;
struct edid *edid;
if (edid_firmware[0] == '\0')
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
/*
* If there are multiple edid files specified and separated
* by commas, search through the list looking for one that
* matches the connector.
*
* If there's one or more that doesn't specify a connector, keep
* the last one found one as a fallback.
*/
fwstr = kstrdup(edid_firmware, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fwstr)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
edidstr = fwstr;
while ((edidname = strsep(&edidstr, ","))) {
if (strncmp(connector_name, edidname, colon - edidname))
continue;
edidname = colon + 1;
break;
}
if (*edidname != '\0') /* corner case: multiple ',' */
fallback = edidname;
}
| 164,709 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: next_format(png_bytep colour_type, png_bytep bit_depth,
unsigned int* palette_number, int no_low_depth_gray)
{
if (*bit_depth == 0)
{
*colour_type = 0;
if (no_low_depth_gray)
*bit_depth = 8;
else
*bit_depth = 1;
*palette_number = 0;
return 1;
}
if (*colour_type == 3)
{
/* Add multiple palettes for colour type 3. */
if (++*palette_number < PALETTE_COUNT(*bit_depth))
return 1;
*palette_number = 0;
}
*bit_depth = (png_byte)(*bit_depth << 1);
/* Palette images are restricted to 8 bit depth */
if (*bit_depth <= 8
# ifdef DO_16BIT
|| (*colour_type != 3 && *bit_depth <= 16)
# endif
)
return 1;
/* Move to the next color type, or return 0 at the end. */
switch (*colour_type)
{
case 0:
*colour_type = 2;
*bit_depth = 8;
return 1;
case 2:
*colour_type = 3;
*bit_depth = 1;
return 1;
case 3:
*colour_type = 4;
*bit_depth = 8;
return 1;
case 4:
*colour_type = 6;
*bit_depth = 8;
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | next_format(png_bytep colour_type, png_bytep bit_depth,
unsigned int* palette_number, int low_depth_gray, int tRNS)
{
if (*bit_depth == 0)
{
*colour_type = 0;
if (low_depth_gray)
*bit_depth = 1;
else
*bit_depth = 8;
*palette_number = 0;
return 1;
}
if (*colour_type < 4/*no alpha channel*/)
{
/* Add multiple palettes for colour type 3, one image with tRNS
* and one without for other non-alpha formats:
*/
unsigned int pn = ++*palette_number;
png_byte ct = *colour_type;
if (((ct == 0/*GRAY*/ || ct/*RGB*/ == 2) && tRNS && pn < 2) ||
(ct == 3/*PALETTE*/ && pn < PALETTE_COUNT(*bit_depth)))
return 1;
/* No: next bit depth */
*palette_number = 0;
}
*bit_depth = (png_byte)(*bit_depth << 1);
/* Palette images are restricted to 8 bit depth */
if (*bit_depth <= 8
#ifdef DO_16BIT
|| (*colour_type != 3 && *bit_depth <= 16)
#endif
)
return 1;
/* Move to the next color type, or return 0 at the end. */
switch (*colour_type)
{
case 0:
*colour_type = 2;
*bit_depth = 8;
return 1;
case 2:
*colour_type = 3;
*bit_depth = 1;
return 1;
case 3:
*colour_type = 4;
*bit_depth = 8;
return 1;
case 4:
*colour_type = 6;
*bit_depth = 8;
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
| 173,672 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PerformanceNavigationTiming::PerformanceNavigationTiming(
LocalFrame* frame,
ResourceTimingInfo* info,
TimeTicks time_origin,
const WebVector<WebServerTimingInfo>& server_timing)
: PerformanceResourceTiming(info ? info->InitialURL().GetString() : "",
"navigation",
time_origin,
server_timing),
ContextClient(frame),
resource_timing_info_(info) {
DCHECK(frame);
DCHECK(info);
}
Commit Message: Fix the |name| of PerformanceNavigationTiming
Previously, the |name| of a PerformanceNavigationTiming entry was the initial
URL (the request URL). After this CL, it is the response URL, so for example
a url of the form 'redirect?location=newLoc' will have 'newLoc' as the |name|.
Bug: 797465
Change-Id: Icab53ad8027d066422562c82bcf0354c264fea40
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/996579
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548773}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | PerformanceNavigationTiming::PerformanceNavigationTiming(
LocalFrame* frame,
ResourceTimingInfo* info,
TimeTicks time_origin,
const WebVector<WebServerTimingInfo>& server_timing)
: PerformanceResourceTiming(
info ? info->FinalResponse().Url().GetString() : "",
"navigation",
time_origin,
server_timing),
ContextClient(frame),
resource_timing_info_(info) {
DCHECK(frame);
DCHECK(info);
}
| 173,225 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_lookup(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
struct crypto_alg *alg;
if (!name)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
mask &= ~(CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL | CRYPTO_ALG_DEAD);
type &= mask;
alg = crypto_alg_lookup(name, type, mask);
if (!alg) {
request_module("%s", name);
if (!((type ^ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK) & mask &
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK))
request_module("%s-all", name);
alg = crypto_alg_lookup(name, type, mask);
}
if (alg)
return crypto_is_larval(alg) ? crypto_larval_wait(alg) : alg;
return crypto_larval_add(name, type, mask);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_lookup(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
struct crypto_alg *alg;
if (!name)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
mask &= ~(CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL | CRYPTO_ALG_DEAD);
type &= mask;
alg = crypto_alg_lookup(name, type, mask);
if (!alg) {
request_module("crypto-%s", name);
if (!((type ^ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK) & mask &
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK))
request_module("crypto-%s-all", name);
alg = crypto_alg_lookup(name, type, mask);
}
if (alg)
return crypto_is_larval(alg) ? crypto_larval_wait(alg) : alg;
return crypto_larval_add(name, type, mask);
}
| 166,839 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long VideoTrack::GetHeight() const
{
return m_height;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long VideoTrack::GetHeight() const
| 174,327 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, key)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
/* Do not read the next line to support correct counting with fgetc()
if (!intern->current_line) {
spl_filesystem_file_read_line(getThis(), intern, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
} */
RETURN_LONG(intern->u.file.current_line_num);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplFileObject::next()
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, key)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
/* Do not read the next line to support correct counting with fgetc()
if (!intern->current_line) {
spl_filesystem_file_read_line(getThis(), intern, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
} */
RETURN_LONG(intern->u.file.current_line_num);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplFileObject::next()
| 167,056 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void svc_rdma_xdr_encode_reply_array(struct rpcrdma_write_array *ary,
int chunks)
{
ary->wc_discrim = xdr_one;
ary->wc_nchunks = cpu_to_be32(chunks);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | void svc_rdma_xdr_encode_reply_array(struct rpcrdma_write_array *ary,
| 168,161 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int svc_can_register(const uint16_t *name, size_t name_len, pid_t spid, uid_t uid)
{
const char *perm = "add";
if (uid >= AID_APP) {
return 0; /* Don't allow apps to register services */
}
return check_mac_perms_from_lookup(spid, uid, perm, str8(name, name_len)) ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: ServiceManager: Allow system services running as secondary users to add services
This should be reverted when all system services have been cleaned up to not
do this. A process looking up a service while running in the background will
see the service registered by the active user (assuming the service is
registered on every user switch), not the service registered by the user that
the process itself belongs to.
BUG: 30795333
Change-Id: I1b74d58be38ed358f43c163692f9e704f8f31dbe
(cherry picked from commit e6bbe69ba739c8a08837134437aaccfea5f1d943)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int svc_can_register(const uint16_t *name, size_t name_len, pid_t spid, uid_t uid)
{
const char *perm = "add";
if (multiuser_get_app_id(uid) >= AID_APP) {
return 0; /* Don't allow apps to register services */
}
return check_mac_perms_from_lookup(spid, uid, perm, str8(name, name_len)) ? 1 : 0;
}
| 173,403 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebURLLoaderImpl::Context::OnReceivedResponse(
const ResourceResponseInfo& info) {
if (!client_)
return;
WebURLResponse response;
response.initialize();
PopulateURLResponse(request_.url(), info, &response);
bool show_raw_listing = (GURL(request_.url()).query() == "raw");
if (info.mime_type == "text/vnd.chromium.ftp-dir") {
if (show_raw_listing) {
response.setMIMEType("text/plain");
} else {
response.setMIMEType("text/html");
}
}
client_->didReceiveResponse(loader_, response);
if (!client_)
return;
DCHECK(!ftp_listing_delegate_.get());
DCHECK(!multipart_delegate_.get());
if (info.headers && info.mime_type == "multipart/x-mixed-replace") {
std::string content_type;
info.headers->EnumerateHeader(NULL, "content-type", &content_type);
std::string mime_type;
std::string charset;
bool had_charset = false;
std::string boundary;
net::HttpUtil::ParseContentType(content_type, &mime_type, &charset,
&had_charset, &boundary);
TrimString(boundary, " \"", &boundary);
if (!boundary.empty()) {
multipart_delegate_.reset(
new MultipartResponseDelegate(client_, loader_, response, boundary));
}
} else if (info.mime_type == "text/vnd.chromium.ftp-dir" &&
!show_raw_listing) {
ftp_listing_delegate_.reset(
new FtpDirectoryListingResponseDelegate(client_, loader_, response));
}
}
Commit Message: Protect WebURLLoaderImpl::Context while receiving responses.
A client's didReceiveResponse can cancel a request; by protecting the
Context we avoid a use after free in this case.
Interestingly, we really had very good warning about this problem, see
https://codereview.chromium.org/11900002/ back in January.
R=darin
BUG=241139
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15738007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void WebURLLoaderImpl::Context::OnReceivedResponse(
const ResourceResponseInfo& info) {
if (!client_)
return;
WebURLResponse response;
response.initialize();
PopulateURLResponse(request_.url(), info, &response);
bool show_raw_listing = (GURL(request_.url()).query() == "raw");
if (info.mime_type == "text/vnd.chromium.ftp-dir") {
if (show_raw_listing) {
response.setMIMEType("text/plain");
} else {
response.setMIMEType("text/html");
}
}
scoped_refptr<Context> protect(this);
client_->didReceiveResponse(loader_, response);
if (!client_)
return;
DCHECK(!ftp_listing_delegate_.get());
DCHECK(!multipart_delegate_.get());
if (info.headers && info.mime_type == "multipart/x-mixed-replace") {
std::string content_type;
info.headers->EnumerateHeader(NULL, "content-type", &content_type);
std::string mime_type;
std::string charset;
bool had_charset = false;
std::string boundary;
net::HttpUtil::ParseContentType(content_type, &mime_type, &charset,
&had_charset, &boundary);
TrimString(boundary, " \"", &boundary);
if (!boundary.empty()) {
multipart_delegate_.reset(
new MultipartResponseDelegate(client_, loader_, response, boundary));
}
} else if (info.mime_type == "text/vnd.chromium.ftp-dir" &&
!show_raw_listing) {
ftp_listing_delegate_.reset(
new FtpDirectoryListingResponseDelegate(client_, loader_, response));
}
}
| 171,266 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Block::Frame::Read(IMkvReader* pReader, unsigned char* buf) const
{
assert(pReader);
assert(buf);
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, len, buf);
return status;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Block::Frame::Read(IMkvReader* pReader, unsigned char* buf) const
| 174,433 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadMONOImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
bit,
byte;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
/*
Initialize image colormap.
*/
image->depth=1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,2) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Convert bi-level image to pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (bit == 0)
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (image_info->endian == LSBEndian)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,((byte & 0x01) != 0) ? 0x00 : 0x01)
else
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,((byte & 0x01) != 0) ? 0x01 : 0x00)
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
bit=0;
byte>>=1;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static Image *ReadMONOImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
bit,
byte;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
/*
Initialize image colormap.
*/
image->depth=1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,2) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Convert bi-level image to pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (bit == 0)
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (image_info->endian == LSBEndian)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,((byte & 0x01) != 0) ? 0x00 : 0x01)
else
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,((byte & 0x01) != 0) ? 0x01 : 0x00)
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
bit=0;
byte>>=1;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,582 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: NetworkChangeNotifierMac::NetworkChangeNotifierMac()
: NetworkChangeNotifier(NetworkChangeCalculatorParamsMac()),
connection_type_(CONNECTION_UNKNOWN),
connection_type_initialized_(false),
initial_connection_type_cv_(&connection_type_lock_),
forwarder_(this),
dns_config_service_thread_(base::MakeUnique<DnsConfigServiceThread>()) {
config_watcher_ = base::MakeUnique<NetworkConfigWatcherMac>(&forwarder_);
dns_config_service_thread_->StartWithOptions(
base::Thread::Options(base::MessageLoop::TYPE_IO, 0));
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | NetworkChangeNotifierMac::NetworkChangeNotifierMac()
: NetworkChangeNotifier(NetworkChangeCalculatorParamsMac()),
connection_type_(CONNECTION_UNKNOWN),
connection_type_initialized_(false),
initial_connection_type_cv_(&connection_type_lock_),
forwarder_(this),
dns_config_service_thread_(std::make_unique<DnsConfigServiceThread>()) {
config_watcher_ = std::make_unique<NetworkConfigWatcherMac>(&forwarder_);
dns_config_service_thread_->StartWithOptions(
base::Thread::Options(base::MessageLoop::TYPE_IO, 0));
}
| 173,264 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void LauncherView::CalculateIdealBounds(IdealBounds* bounds) {
int available_size = primary_axis_coordinate(width(), height());
if (!available_size)
return;
int x = primary_axis_coordinate(kLeadingInset, 0);
int y = primary_axis_coordinate(0, kLeadingInset);
for (int i = 0; i < view_model_->view_size(); ++i) {
view_model_->set_ideal_bounds(i, gfx::Rect(
x, y, kLauncherPreferredSize, kLauncherPreferredSize));
x = primary_axis_coordinate(x + kLauncherPreferredSize + kButtonSpacing, 0);
y = primary_axis_coordinate(0, y + kLauncherPreferredSize + kButtonSpacing);
}
if (view_model_->view_size() > 0) {
view_model_->set_ideal_bounds(0, gfx::Rect(gfx::Size(
primary_axis_coordinate(kLeadingInset + kLauncherPreferredSize,
kLauncherPreferredSize),
primary_axis_coordinate(kLauncherPreferredSize,
kLeadingInset + kLauncherPreferredSize))));
}
bounds->overflow_bounds.set_size(
gfx::Size(kLauncherPreferredSize, kLauncherPreferredSize));
last_visible_index_ = DetermineLastVisibleIndex(
available_size - kLeadingInset - kLauncherPreferredSize -
kButtonSpacing - kLauncherPreferredSize);
int app_list_index = view_model_->view_size() - 1;
bool show_overflow = (last_visible_index_ + 1 < app_list_index);
for (int i = 0; i < view_model_->view_size(); ++i) {
view_model_->view_at(i)->SetVisible(
i == app_list_index || i <= last_visible_index_);
}
overflow_button_->SetVisible(show_overflow);
if (show_overflow) {
DCHECK_NE(0, view_model_->view_size());
if (last_visible_index_ == -1) {
x = primary_axis_coordinate(kLeadingInset, 0);
y = primary_axis_coordinate(0, kLeadingInset);
} else {
x = primary_axis_coordinate(
view_model_->ideal_bounds(last_visible_index_).right(), 0);
y = primary_axis_coordinate(0,
view_model_->ideal_bounds(last_visible_index_).bottom());
}
gfx::Rect app_list_bounds = view_model_->ideal_bounds(app_list_index);
app_list_bounds.set_x(x);
app_list_bounds.set_y(y);
view_model_->set_ideal_bounds(app_list_index, app_list_bounds);
x = primary_axis_coordinate(x + kLauncherPreferredSize + kButtonSpacing, 0);
y = primary_axis_coordinate(0, y + kLauncherPreferredSize + kButtonSpacing);
bounds->overflow_bounds.set_x(x);
bounds->overflow_bounds.set_y(y);
}
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void LauncherView::CalculateIdealBounds(IdealBounds* bounds) {
int available_size = primary_axis_coordinate(width(), height());
if (!available_size)
return;
int x = primary_axis_coordinate(leading_inset(), 0);
int y = primary_axis_coordinate(0, leading_inset());
for (int i = 0; i < view_model_->view_size(); ++i) {
if (i < first_visible_index_) {
view_model_->set_ideal_bounds(i, gfx::Rect(x, y, 0, 0));
continue;
}
view_model_->set_ideal_bounds(i, gfx::Rect(
x, y, kLauncherPreferredSize, kLauncherPreferredSize));
x = primary_axis_coordinate(x + kLauncherPreferredSize + kButtonSpacing, 0);
y = primary_axis_coordinate(0, y + kLauncherPreferredSize + kButtonSpacing);
}
int app_list_index = view_model_->view_size() - 1;
if (is_overflow_mode()) {
last_visible_index_ = app_list_index - 1;
for (int i = 0; i < view_model_->view_size(); ++i) {
view_model_->view_at(i)->SetVisible(
i >= first_visible_index_ && i <= last_visible_index_);
}
return;
}
if (view_model_->view_size() > 0) {
view_model_->set_ideal_bounds(0, gfx::Rect(gfx::Size(
primary_axis_coordinate(leading_inset() + kLauncherPreferredSize,
kLauncherPreferredSize),
primary_axis_coordinate(kLauncherPreferredSize,
leading_inset() + kLauncherPreferredSize))));
}
bounds->overflow_bounds.set_size(
gfx::Size(kLauncherPreferredSize, kLauncherPreferredSize));
last_visible_index_ = DetermineLastVisibleIndex(
available_size - leading_inset() - kLauncherPreferredSize -
kButtonSpacing - kLauncherPreferredSize);
bool show_overflow = (last_visible_index_ + 1 < app_list_index);
for (int i = 0; i < view_model_->view_size(); ++i) {
view_model_->view_at(i)->SetVisible(
i == app_list_index || i <= last_visible_index_);
}
overflow_button_->SetVisible(show_overflow);
if (show_overflow) {
DCHECK_NE(0, view_model_->view_size());
if (last_visible_index_ == -1) {
x = primary_axis_coordinate(leading_inset(), 0);
y = primary_axis_coordinate(0, leading_inset());
} else {
x = primary_axis_coordinate(
view_model_->ideal_bounds(last_visible_index_).right(), 0);
y = primary_axis_coordinate(0,
view_model_->ideal_bounds(last_visible_index_).bottom());
}
gfx::Rect app_list_bounds = view_model_->ideal_bounds(app_list_index);
bounds->overflow_bounds.set_x(x);
bounds->overflow_bounds.set_y(y);
x = primary_axis_coordinate(x + kLauncherPreferredSize + kButtonSpacing, 0);
y = primary_axis_coordinate(0, y + kLauncherPreferredSize + kButtonSpacing);
app_list_bounds.set_x(x);
app_list_bounds.set_y(y);
view_model_->set_ideal_bounds(app_list_index, app_list_bounds);
} else {
if (overflow_bubble_.get())
overflow_bubble_->Hide();
}
}
| 170,888 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DetachWebContentsTest(DiscardReason reason) {
LifecycleUnit* first_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* second_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &first_lifecycle_unit,
&second_lifecycle_unit);
ExpectCanDiscardTrueAllReasons(first_lifecycle_unit);
std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> owned_contents =
tab_strip_model_->DetachWebContentsAt(0);
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivialAllReasons(first_lifecycle_unit);
NoUnloadListenerTabStripModelDelegate other_tab_strip_model_delegate;
TabStripModel other_tab_strip_model(&other_tab_strip_model_delegate,
profile());
other_tab_strip_model.AddObserver(source_);
EXPECT_CALL(source_observer_, OnLifecycleUnitCreated(testing::_));
other_tab_strip_model.AppendWebContents(CreateTestWebContents(),
/*foreground=*/true);
other_tab_strip_model.AppendWebContents(std::move(owned_contents), false);
ExpectCanDiscardTrueAllReasons(first_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE, first_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, true));
first_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
first_lifecycle_unit);
CloseTabsAndExpectNotifications(&other_tab_strip_model,
{first_lifecycle_unit});
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | void DetachWebContentsTest(DiscardReason reason) {
LifecycleUnit* first_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* second_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &first_lifecycle_unit,
&second_lifecycle_unit);
ExpectCanDiscardTrueAllReasons(first_lifecycle_unit);
std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> owned_contents =
tab_strip_model_->DetachWebContentsAt(0);
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivialAllReasons(first_lifecycle_unit);
NoUnloadListenerTabStripModelDelegate other_tab_strip_model_delegate;
TabStripModel other_tab_strip_model(&other_tab_strip_model_delegate,
profile());
other_tab_strip_model.AddObserver(source_);
EXPECT_CALL(source_observer_, OnLifecycleUnitCreated(::testing::_));
other_tab_strip_model.AppendWebContents(CreateTestWebContents(),
/*foreground=*/true);
other_tab_strip_model.AppendWebContents(std::move(owned_contents), false);
ExpectCanDiscardTrueAllReasons(first_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE, first_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(::testing::_, true));
first_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
::testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
first_lifecycle_unit);
CloseTabsAndExpectNotifications(&other_tab_strip_model,
{first_lifecycle_unit});
}
| 172,223 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int _server_handle_vCont(libgdbr_t *g, int (*cmd_cb) (void*, const char*, char*, size_t), void *core_ptr) {
char *action = NULL;
if (send_ack (g) < 0) {
return -1;
}
g->data[g->data_len] = '\0';
if (g->data[5] == '?') {
return send_msg (g, "vCont;c;s");
}
if (!(action = strtok (g->data, ";"))) {
return send_msg (g, "E01");
}
while (action = strtok (NULL, ";")) {
eprintf ("action: %s\n", action);
switch (action[0]) {
case 's':
if (cmd_cb (core_ptr, "ds", NULL, 0) < 0) {
send_msg (g, "E01");
return -1;
}
return send_msg (g, "OK");
case 'c':
if (cmd_cb (core_ptr, "dc", NULL, 0) < 0) {
send_msg (g, "E01");
return -1;
}
return send_msg (g, "OK");
default:
return send_msg (g, "E01");
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static int _server_handle_vCont(libgdbr_t *g, int (*cmd_cb) (void*, const char*, char*, size_t), void *core_ptr) {
char *action = NULL;
if (send_ack (g) < 0) {
return -1;
}
g->data[g->data_len] = '\0';
if (g->data[5] == '?') {
return send_msg (g, "vCont;c;s");
}
if (!(action = strtok (g->data, ";"))) {
return send_msg (g, "E01");
}
while (action = strtok (NULL, ";")) {
eprintf ("action: %s\n", action);
switch (action[0]) {
case 's':
if (cmd_cb (core_ptr, "ds", NULL, 0) < 0) {
send_msg (g, "E01");
return -1;
}
return send_msg (g, "OK");
case 'c':
if (cmd_cb (core_ptr, "dc", NULL, 0) < 0) {
send_msg (g, "E01");
return -1;
}
return send_msg (g, "OK");
default:
return send_msg (g, "E01");
}
}
return -1;
}
| 168,081 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gfx::Rect ShellWindowFrameView::GetWindowBoundsForClientBounds(
const gfx::Rect& client_bounds) const {
int closeButtonOffsetX =
(kCaptionHeight - close_button_->height()) / 2;
int header_width = close_button_->width() + closeButtonOffsetX * 2;
return gfx::Rect(client_bounds.x(),
std::max(0, client_bounds.y() - kCaptionHeight),
std::max(header_width, client_bounds.width()),
client_bounds.height() + kCaptionHeight);
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | gfx::Rect ShellWindowFrameView::GetWindowBoundsForClientBounds(
const gfx::Rect& client_bounds) const {
if (is_frameless_)
return client_bounds;
int closeButtonOffsetX =
(kCaptionHeight - close_button_->height()) / 2;
int header_width = close_button_->width() + closeButtonOffsetX * 2;
return gfx::Rect(client_bounds.x(),
std::max(0, client_bounds.y() - kCaptionHeight),
std::max(header_width, client_bounds.width()),
client_bounds.height() + kCaptionHeight);
}
| 170,714 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebGLObject::WebGLObject(WebGLRenderingContext* context)
: m_object(0)
, m_attachmentCount(0)
, m_deleted(false)
{
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, build fix for unused argument warning after r104954.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75906
Also fixed up somebody's bad merge in Source/WebCore/ChangeLog.
* html/canvas/WebGLObject.cpp:
(WebCore::WebGLObject::WebGLObject):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104959 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | WebGLObject::WebGLObject(WebGLRenderingContext* context)
WebGLObject::WebGLObject(WebGLRenderingContext*)
: m_object(0)
, m_attachmentCount(0)
, m_deleted(false)
{
}
| 170,251 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void setup_token_decoder(VP8D_COMP *pbi,
const unsigned char* token_part_sizes)
{
vp8_reader *bool_decoder = &pbi->mbc[0];
unsigned int partition_idx;
unsigned int fragment_idx;
unsigned int num_token_partitions;
const unsigned char *first_fragment_end = pbi->fragments.ptrs[0] +
pbi->fragments.sizes[0];
TOKEN_PARTITION multi_token_partition =
(TOKEN_PARTITION)vp8_read_literal(&pbi->mbc[8], 2);
if (!vp8dx_bool_error(&pbi->mbc[8]))
pbi->common.multi_token_partition = multi_token_partition;
num_token_partitions = 1 << pbi->common.multi_token_partition;
/* Check for partitions within the fragments and unpack the fragments
* so that each fragment pointer points to its corresponding partition. */
for (fragment_idx = 0; fragment_idx < pbi->fragments.count; ++fragment_idx)
{
unsigned int fragment_size = pbi->fragments.sizes[fragment_idx];
const unsigned char *fragment_end = pbi->fragments.ptrs[fragment_idx] +
fragment_size;
/* Special case for handling the first partition since we have already
* read its size. */
if (fragment_idx == 0)
{
/* Size of first partition + token partition sizes element */
ptrdiff_t ext_first_part_size = token_part_sizes -
pbi->fragments.ptrs[0] + 3 * (num_token_partitions - 1);
fragment_size -= (unsigned int)ext_first_part_size;
if (fragment_size > 0)
{
pbi->fragments.sizes[0] = (unsigned int)ext_first_part_size;
/* The fragment contains an additional partition. Move to
* next. */
fragment_idx++;
pbi->fragments.ptrs[fragment_idx] = pbi->fragments.ptrs[0] +
pbi->fragments.sizes[0];
}
}
/* Split the chunk into partitions read from the bitstream */
while (fragment_size > 0)
{
ptrdiff_t partition_size = read_available_partition_size(
pbi,
token_part_sizes,
pbi->fragments.ptrs[fragment_idx],
first_fragment_end,
fragment_end,
fragment_idx - 1,
num_token_partitions);
pbi->fragments.sizes[fragment_idx] = (unsigned int)partition_size;
fragment_size -= (unsigned int)partition_size;
assert(fragment_idx <= num_token_partitions);
if (fragment_size > 0)
{
/* The fragment contains an additional partition.
* Move to next. */
fragment_idx++;
pbi->fragments.ptrs[fragment_idx] =
pbi->fragments.ptrs[fragment_idx - 1] + partition_size;
}
}
}
pbi->fragments.count = num_token_partitions + 1;
for (partition_idx = 1; partition_idx < pbi->fragments.count; ++partition_idx)
{
if (vp8dx_start_decode(bool_decoder,
pbi->fragments.ptrs[partition_idx],
pbi->fragments.sizes[partition_idx],
pbi->decrypt_cb, pbi->decrypt_state))
vpx_internal_error(&pbi->common.error, VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR,
"Failed to allocate bool decoder %d",
partition_idx);
bool_decoder++;
}
#if CONFIG_MULTITHREAD
/* Clamp number of decoder threads */
if (pbi->decoding_thread_count > num_token_partitions - 1)
pbi->decoding_thread_count = num_token_partitions - 1;
#endif
}
Commit Message: vp8:fix threading issues
1 - stops de allocating before threads are closed.
2 - limits threads to mb_rows when mb_rows < partitions
BUG=webm:851
Bug: 30436808
Change-Id: Ie017818ed28103ca9d26d57087f31361b642e09b
(cherry picked from commit 70cca742efa20617c70c3209aa614a70f282f90e)
CWE ID: | static void setup_token_decoder(VP8D_COMP *pbi,
const unsigned char* token_part_sizes)
{
vp8_reader *bool_decoder = &pbi->mbc[0];
unsigned int partition_idx;
unsigned int fragment_idx;
unsigned int num_token_partitions;
const unsigned char *first_fragment_end = pbi->fragments.ptrs[0] +
pbi->fragments.sizes[0];
TOKEN_PARTITION multi_token_partition =
(TOKEN_PARTITION)vp8_read_literal(&pbi->mbc[8], 2);
if (!vp8dx_bool_error(&pbi->mbc[8]))
pbi->common.multi_token_partition = multi_token_partition;
num_token_partitions = 1 << pbi->common.multi_token_partition;
/* Check for partitions within the fragments and unpack the fragments
* so that each fragment pointer points to its corresponding partition. */
for (fragment_idx = 0; fragment_idx < pbi->fragments.count; ++fragment_idx)
{
unsigned int fragment_size = pbi->fragments.sizes[fragment_idx];
const unsigned char *fragment_end = pbi->fragments.ptrs[fragment_idx] +
fragment_size;
/* Special case for handling the first partition since we have already
* read its size. */
if (fragment_idx == 0)
{
/* Size of first partition + token partition sizes element */
ptrdiff_t ext_first_part_size = token_part_sizes -
pbi->fragments.ptrs[0] + 3 * (num_token_partitions - 1);
fragment_size -= (unsigned int)ext_first_part_size;
if (fragment_size > 0)
{
pbi->fragments.sizes[0] = (unsigned int)ext_first_part_size;
/* The fragment contains an additional partition. Move to
* next. */
fragment_idx++;
pbi->fragments.ptrs[fragment_idx] = pbi->fragments.ptrs[0] +
pbi->fragments.sizes[0];
}
}
/* Split the chunk into partitions read from the bitstream */
while (fragment_size > 0)
{
ptrdiff_t partition_size = read_available_partition_size(
pbi,
token_part_sizes,
pbi->fragments.ptrs[fragment_idx],
first_fragment_end,
fragment_end,
fragment_idx - 1,
num_token_partitions);
pbi->fragments.sizes[fragment_idx] = (unsigned int)partition_size;
fragment_size -= (unsigned int)partition_size;
assert(fragment_idx <= num_token_partitions);
if (fragment_size > 0)
{
/* The fragment contains an additional partition.
* Move to next. */
fragment_idx++;
pbi->fragments.ptrs[fragment_idx] =
pbi->fragments.ptrs[fragment_idx - 1] + partition_size;
}
}
}
pbi->fragments.count = num_token_partitions + 1;
for (partition_idx = 1; partition_idx < pbi->fragments.count; ++partition_idx)
{
if (vp8dx_start_decode(bool_decoder,
pbi->fragments.ptrs[partition_idx],
pbi->fragments.sizes[partition_idx],
pbi->decrypt_cb, pbi->decrypt_state))
vpx_internal_error(&pbi->common.error, VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR,
"Failed to allocate bool decoder %d",
partition_idx);
bool_decoder++;
}
#if CONFIG_MULTITHREAD
/* Clamp number of decoder threads */
if (pbi->decoding_thread_count > num_token_partitions - 1) {
pbi->decoding_thread_count = num_token_partitions - 1;
}
if (pbi->decoding_thread_count > pbi->common.mb_rows - 1) {
pbi->decoding_thread_count = pbi->common.mb_rows - 1;
}
#endif
}
| 174,064 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void GetLoadTimes(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
WebLocalFrame* frame = WebLocalFrame::frameForCurrentContext();
if (frame) {
WebDataSource* data_source = frame->dataSource();
if (data_source) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(data_source);
v8::Isolate* isolate = args.GetIsolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> load_times = v8::Object::New(isolate);
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "requestTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate,
document_state->request_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "startLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate,
document_state->start_load_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "commitLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate,
document_state->commit_load_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "finishDocumentLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(
isolate,
document_state->finish_document_load_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "finishLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate,
document_state->finish_load_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "firstPaintTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate,
document_state->first_paint_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "firstPaintAfterLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(
isolate,
document_state->first_paint_after_load_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "navigationType"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate, GetNavigationType(data_source->navigationType())));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasFetchedViaSpdy"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, document_state->was_fetched_via_spdy()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasNpnNegotiated"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, document_state->was_npn_negotiated()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "npnNegotiatedProtocol"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate, document_state->npn_negotiated_protocol().c_str()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasAlternateProtocolAvailable"),
v8::Boolean::New(
isolate, document_state->was_alternate_protocol_available()));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "connectionInfo"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate,
net::HttpResponseInfo::ConnectionInfoToString(
document_state->connection_info()).c_str()));
args.GetReturnValue().Set(load_times);
return;
}
}
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
}
Commit Message: Cache all chrome.loadTimes info before passing them to setters.
The setters can invalidate the pointers frame, data_source and document_state.
BUG=549251
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1422753007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#357201}
CWE ID: | static void GetLoadTimes(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
WebLocalFrame* frame = WebLocalFrame::frameForCurrentContext();
if (!frame) {
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
return;
}
WebDataSource* data_source = frame->dataSource();
if (!data_source) {
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
return;
}
DocumentState* document_state = DocumentState::FromDataSource(data_source);
if (!document_state) {
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
return;
}
double request_time = document_state->request_time().ToDoubleT();
double start_load_time = document_state->start_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double commit_load_time = document_state->commit_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double finish_document_load_time =
document_state->finish_document_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double finish_load_time = document_state->finish_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double first_paint_time = document_state->first_paint_time().ToDoubleT();
double first_paint_after_load_time =
document_state->first_paint_after_load_time().ToDoubleT();
std::string navigation_type =
GetNavigationType(data_source->navigationType());
bool was_fetched_via_spdy = document_state->was_fetched_via_spdy();
bool was_npn_negotiated = document_state->was_npn_negotiated();
std::string npn_negotiated_protocol =
document_state->npn_negotiated_protocol();
bool was_alternate_protocol_available =
document_state->was_alternate_protocol_available();
std::string connection_info = net::HttpResponseInfo::ConnectionInfoToString(
document_state->connection_info());
// Important: |frame|, |data_source| and |document_state| should not be
// referred to below this line, as JS setters below can invalidate these
// pointers.
v8::Isolate* isolate = args.GetIsolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> load_times = v8::Object::New(isolate);
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "requestTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, request_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "startLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, start_load_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "commitLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, commit_load_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "finishDocumentLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, finish_document_load_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "finishLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, finish_load_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "firstPaintTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, first_paint_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "firstPaintAfterLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, first_paint_after_load_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "navigationType"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, navigation_type.c_str()));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasFetchedViaSpdy"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, was_fetched_via_spdy));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasNpnNegotiated"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, was_npn_negotiated));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "npnNegotiatedProtocol"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, npn_negotiated_protocol.c_str()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasAlternateProtocolAvailable"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, was_alternate_protocol_available));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "connectionInfo"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, connection_info.c_str()));
args.GetReturnValue().Set(load_times);
}
| 171,766 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void nsc_encode_sse2(NSC_CONTEXT* context, const BYTE* data,
UINT32 scanline)
{
nsc_encode_argb_to_aycocg_sse2(context, data, scanline);
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel > 0)
{
nsc_encode_subsampling_sse2(context);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static void nsc_encode_sse2(NSC_CONTEXT* context, const BYTE* data,
static BOOL nsc_encode_sse2(NSC_CONTEXT* context, const BYTE* data,
UINT32 scanline)
{
nsc_encode_argb_to_aycocg_sse2(context, data, scanline);
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel > 0)
{
nsc_encode_subsampling_sse2(context);
}
return TRUE;
}
| 169,291 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void filter_average_block2d_8_c(const uint8_t *src_ptr,
const unsigned int src_stride,
const int16_t *HFilter,
const int16_t *VFilter,
uint8_t *dst_ptr,
unsigned int dst_stride,
unsigned int output_width,
unsigned int output_height) {
uint8_t tmp[64 * 64];
assert(output_width <= 64);
assert(output_height <= 64);
filter_block2d_8_c(src_ptr, src_stride, HFilter, VFilter, tmp, 64,
output_width, output_height);
block2d_average_c(tmp, 64, dst_ptr, dst_stride,
output_width, output_height);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void filter_average_block2d_8_c(const uint8_t *src_ptr,
const unsigned int src_stride,
const int16_t *HFilter,
const int16_t *VFilter,
uint8_t *dst_ptr,
unsigned int dst_stride,
unsigned int output_width,
unsigned int output_height) {
uint8_t tmp[kMaxDimension * kMaxDimension];
assert(output_width <= kMaxDimension);
assert(output_height <= kMaxDimension);
filter_block2d_8_c(src_ptr, src_stride, HFilter, VFilter, tmp, 64,
output_width, output_height);
block2d_average_c(tmp, 64, dst_ptr, dst_stride,
output_width, output_height);
}
| 174,508 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RCMS *r_pkcs7_parse_cms (const ut8 *buffer, ut32 length) {
RASN1Object *object;
RCMS *container;
if (!buffer || !length) {
return NULL;
}
container = R_NEW0 (RCMS);
if (!container) {
return NULL;
}
object = r_asn1_create_object (buffer, length);
if (!object || object->list.length != 2 || !object->list.objects[0] || object->list.objects[1]->list.length != 1) {
r_asn1_free_object (object);
free (container);
return NULL;
}
container->contentType = r_asn1_stringify_oid (object->list.objects[0]->sector, object->list.objects[0]->length);
r_pkcs7_parse_signeddata (&container->signedData, object->list.objects[1]->list.objects[0]);
r_asn1_free_object (object);
return container;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7152 - Null deref in cms
CWE ID: CWE-476 | RCMS *r_pkcs7_parse_cms (const ut8 *buffer, ut32 length) {
RASN1Object *object;
RCMS *container;
if (!buffer || !length) {
return NULL;
}
container = R_NEW0 (RCMS);
if (!container) {
return NULL;
}
object = r_asn1_create_object (buffer, length);
if (!object || object->list.length != 2 || !object->list.objects ||
!object->list.objects[0] || !object->list.objects[1] ||
object->list.objects[1]->list.length != 1) {
r_asn1_free_object (object);
free (container);
return NULL;
}
container->contentType = r_asn1_stringify_oid (object->list.objects[0]->sector, object->list.objects[0]->length);
r_pkcs7_parse_signeddata (&container->signedData, object->list.objects[1]->list.objects[0]);
r_asn1_free_object (object);
return container;
}
| 168,287 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ext4_end_io_dio(struct kiocb *iocb, loff_t offset,
ssize_t size, void *private)
{
ext4_io_end_t *io_end = iocb->private;
struct workqueue_struct *wq;
/* if not async direct IO or dio with 0 bytes write, just return */
if (!io_end || !size)
return;
ext_debug("ext4_end_io_dio(): io_end 0x%p"
"for inode %lu, iocb 0x%p, offset %llu, size %llu\n",
iocb->private, io_end->inode->i_ino, iocb, offset,
size);
/* if not aio dio with unwritten extents, just free io and return */
if (io_end->flag != EXT4_IO_UNWRITTEN){
ext4_free_io_end(io_end);
iocb->private = NULL;
return;
}
io_end->offset = offset;
io_end->size = size;
wq = EXT4_SB(io_end->inode->i_sb)->dio_unwritten_wq;
/* queue the work to convert unwritten extents to written */
queue_work(wq, &io_end->work);
/* Add the io_end to per-inode completed aio dio list*/
list_add_tail(&io_end->list,
&EXT4_I(io_end->inode)->i_completed_io_list);
iocb->private = NULL;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | static void ext4_end_io_dio(struct kiocb *iocb, loff_t offset,
ssize_t size, void *private)
{
ext4_io_end_t *io_end = iocb->private;
struct workqueue_struct *wq;
unsigned long flags;
struct ext4_inode_info *ei;
/* if not async direct IO or dio with 0 bytes write, just return */
if (!io_end || !size)
return;
ext_debug("ext4_end_io_dio(): io_end 0x%p"
"for inode %lu, iocb 0x%p, offset %llu, size %llu\n",
iocb->private, io_end->inode->i_ino, iocb, offset,
size);
/* if not aio dio with unwritten extents, just free io and return */
if (io_end->flag != EXT4_IO_UNWRITTEN){
ext4_free_io_end(io_end);
iocb->private = NULL;
return;
}
io_end->offset = offset;
io_end->size = size;
io_end->flag = EXT4_IO_UNWRITTEN;
wq = EXT4_SB(io_end->inode->i_sb)->dio_unwritten_wq;
/* queue the work to convert unwritten extents to written */
queue_work(wq, &io_end->work);
/* Add the io_end to per-inode completed aio dio list*/
ei = EXT4_I(io_end->inode);
spin_lock_irqsave(&ei->i_completed_io_lock, flags);
list_add_tail(&io_end->list, &ei->i_completed_io_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ei->i_completed_io_lock, flags);
iocb->private = NULL;
}
| 167,540 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int spl_filesystem_file_is_empty_line(spl_filesystem_object *intern TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (intern->u.file.current_line) {
return intern->u.file.current_line_len == 0;
} else if (intern->u.file.current_zval) {
switch(Z_TYPE_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)) {
case IS_STRING:
return Z_STRLEN_P(intern->u.file.current_zval) == 0;
case IS_ARRAY:
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_CSV)
&& zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)) == 1) {
zval ** first = Z_ARRVAL_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)->pListHead->pData;
return Z_TYPE_PP(first) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_PP(first) == 0;
}
return zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)) == 0;
case IS_NULL:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
} else {
return 1;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int spl_filesystem_file_is_empty_line(spl_filesystem_object *intern TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (intern->u.file.current_line) {
return intern->u.file.current_line_len == 0;
} else if (intern->u.file.current_zval) {
switch(Z_TYPE_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)) {
case IS_STRING:
return Z_STRLEN_P(intern->u.file.current_zval) == 0;
case IS_ARRAY:
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_CSV)
&& zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)) == 1) {
zval ** first = Z_ARRVAL_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)->pListHead->pData;
return Z_TYPE_PP(first) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_PP(first) == 0;
}
return zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)) == 0;
case IS_NULL:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
} else {
return 1;
}
}
/* }}} */
| 167,074 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeWebUIControllerFactory::HasWebUIScheme(const GURL& url) const {
return url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeDevToolsScheme) ||
url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeInternalScheme) ||
url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeUIScheme);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool ChromeWebUIControllerFactory::HasWebUIScheme(const GURL& url) const {
| 171,008 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TracingControllerImpl::TracingControllerImpl()
: delegate_(GetContentClient()->browser()->GetTracingDelegate()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(!g_tracing_controller);
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
base::FileTracing::SetProvider(new FileTracingProviderImpl);
AddAgents();
base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance()->AddAsyncEnabledStateObserver(
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
g_tracing_controller = this;
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Connect to service on startup
Temporary workaround for flaky tests introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1439082
TBR=eseckler@chromium.org
Bug: 928410, 928363
Change-Id: I0dcf20cbdf91a7beea167a220ba9ef7e0604c1ab
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452767
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Seckler <eseckler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631052}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | TracingControllerImpl::TracingControllerImpl()
: delegate_(GetContentClient()->browser()->GetTracingDelegate()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(!g_tracing_controller);
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
base::FileTracing::SetProvider(new FileTracingProviderImpl);
AddAgents();
base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance()->AddAsyncEnabledStateObserver(
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
g_tracing_controller = this;
// TODO(oysteine): Instead of connecting right away, we should connect
// in StartTracing once this no longer causes test flakiness.
ConnectToServiceIfNeeded();
}
| 172,057 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void svc_rdma_destroy_maps(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt)
{
while (!list_empty(&xprt->sc_maps)) {
struct svc_rdma_req_map *map;
map = list_first_entry(&xprt->sc_maps,
struct svc_rdma_req_map, free);
list_del(&map->free);
kfree(map);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | static void svc_rdma_destroy_maps(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt)
| 168,180 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RunInvAccuracyCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 1000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, in, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, coeff, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
in[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
fwd_txfm_ref(in, coeff, pitch_, tx_type_);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(coeff, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
const uint32_t diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const uint32_t error = diff * diff;
EXPECT_GE(1u, error)
<< "Error: 16x16 IDCT has error " << error
<< " at index " << j;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void RunInvAccuracyCheck() {
void RunInvAccuracyCheck(int limit) {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 1000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, int16_t, in[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, coeff[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint8_t, dst[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint8_t, src[kNumCoeffs]);
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint16_t, dst16[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint16_t, src16[kNumCoeffs]);
#endif
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
// Initialize a test block with input range [-mask_, mask_].
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
if (bit_depth_ == VPX_BITS_8) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
in[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
src16[j] = rnd.Rand16() & mask_;
dst16[j] = rnd.Rand16() & mask_;
in[j] = src16[j] - dst16[j];
#endif
}
}
fwd_txfm_ref(in, coeff, pitch_, tx_type_);
if (bit_depth_ == VPX_BITS_8) {
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(coeff, dst, pitch_));
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(coeff, CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(dst16),
pitch_));
#endif
}
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
const uint32_t diff =
bit_depth_ == VPX_BITS_8 ? dst[j] - src[j] : dst16[j] - src16[j];
#else
const uint32_t diff = dst[j] - src[j];
#endif
const uint32_t error = diff * diff;
EXPECT_GE(static_cast<uint32_t>(limit), error)
<< "Error: 4x4 IDCT has error " << error
<< " at index " << j;
}
}
}
| 174,551 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static UINT32 nsc_rle_encode(BYTE* in, BYTE* out, UINT32 originalSize)
{
UINT32 left;
UINT32 runlength = 1;
UINT32 planeSize = 0;
left = originalSize;
/**
* We quit the loop if the running compressed size is larger than the original.
* In such cases data will be sent uncompressed.
*/
while (left > 4 && planeSize < originalSize - 4)
{
if (left > 5 && *in == *(in + 1))
{
runlength++;
}
else if (runlength == 1)
{
*out++ = *in;
planeSize++;
}
else if (runlength < 256)
{
*out++ = *in;
*out++ = *in;
*out++ = runlength - 2;
runlength = 1;
planeSize += 3;
}
else
{
*out++ = *in;
*out++ = *in;
*out++ = 0xFF;
*out++ = (runlength & 0x000000FF);
*out++ = (runlength & 0x0000FF00) >> 8;
*out++ = (runlength & 0x00FF0000) >> 16;
*out++ = (runlength & 0xFF000000) >> 24;
runlength = 1;
planeSize += 7;
}
in++;
left--;
}
if (planeSize < originalSize - 4)
CopyMemory(out, in, 4);
planeSize += 4;
return planeSize;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static UINT32 nsc_rle_encode(BYTE* in, BYTE* out, UINT32 originalSize)
static UINT32 nsc_rle_encode(const BYTE* in, BYTE* out, UINT32 originalSize)
{
UINT32 left;
UINT32 runlength = 1;
UINT32 planeSize = 0;
left = originalSize;
/**
* We quit the loop if the running compressed size is larger than the original.
* In such cases data will be sent uncompressed.
*/
while (left > 4 && planeSize < originalSize - 4)
{
if (left > 5 && *in == *(in + 1))
{
runlength++;
}
else if (runlength == 1)
{
*out++ = *in;
planeSize++;
}
else if (runlength < 256)
{
*out++ = *in;
*out++ = *in;
*out++ = runlength - 2;
runlength = 1;
planeSize += 3;
}
else
{
*out++ = *in;
*out++ = *in;
*out++ = 0xFF;
*out++ = (runlength & 0x000000FF);
*out++ = (runlength & 0x0000FF00) >> 8;
*out++ = (runlength & 0x00FF0000) >> 16;
*out++ = (runlength & 0xFF000000) >> 24;
runlength = 1;
planeSize += 7;
}
in++;
left--;
}
if (planeSize < originalSize - 4)
CopyMemory(out, in, 4);
planeSize += 4;
return planeSize;
}
| 169,290 |
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