instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateFalse( void )
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item();
if ( item )
item->type = cJSON_False;
return item;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cJSON *cJSON_CreateFalse( void )
| 167,271 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPair(
const base::Closure& callback,
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback) {
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Paired";
if (!pairing_delegate_used_)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_NONE,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
UnregisterAgent();
SetTrusted();
ConnectInternal(true, callback, error_callback);
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPair(
const base::Closure& callback,
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback) {
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Paired";
pairing_context_.reset();
SetTrusted();
ConnectInternal(true, callback, error_callback);
}
| 171,227 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PixarLogClose(TIFF* tif)
{
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
/* In a really sneaky (and really incorrect, and untruthful, and
* troublesome, and error-prone) maneuver that completely goes against
* the spirit of TIFF, and breaks TIFF, on close, we covertly
* modify both bitspersample and sampleformat in the directory to
* indicate 8-bit linear. This way, the decode "just works" even for
* readers that don't know about PixarLog, or how to set
* the PIXARLOGDATFMT pseudo-tag.
*/
td->td_bitspersample = 8;
td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125 | PixarLogClose(TIFF* tif)
{
PixarLogState* sp = (PixarLogState*) tif->tif_data;
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
assert(sp != 0);
/* In a really sneaky (and really incorrect, and untruthful, and
* troublesome, and error-prone) maneuver that completely goes against
* the spirit of TIFF, and breaks TIFF, on close, we covertly
* modify both bitspersample and sampleformat in the directory to
* indicate 8-bit linear. This way, the decode "just works" even for
* readers that don't know about PixarLog, or how to set
* the PIXARLOGDATFMT pseudo-tag.
*/
if (sp->state&PLSTATE_INIT) {
/* We test the state to avoid an issue such as in
* http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
* What appends in that case is that the bitspersample is 1 and
* a TransferFunction is set. The size of the TransferFunction
* depends on 1<<bitspersample. So if we increase it, an access
* out of the buffer will happen at directory flushing.
* Another option would be to clear those targs.
*/
td->td_bitspersample = 8;
td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT;
}
}
| 168,466 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IW_IMPL(int) iw_get_i32le(const iw_byte *b)
{
return (iw_int32)(iw_uint32)(b[0] | (b[1]<<8) | (b[2]<<16) | (b[3]<<24));
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682 | IW_IMPL(int) iw_get_i32le(const iw_byte *b)
{
return (iw_int32)(iw_uint32)((unsigned int)b[0] | ((unsigned int)b[1]<<8) |
((unsigned int)b[2]<<16) | ((unsigned int)b[3]<<24));
}
| 168,196 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
int i, j, bl;
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
i = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl);
if (i < 0)
return 0;
else
*outl = i;
return 1;
}
if (inl <= 0) {
*outl = 0;
return inl == 0;
}
if (ctx->buf_len == 0 && (inl & (ctx->block_mask)) == 0) {
if (ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl)) {
*outl = inl;
return 1;
} else {
*outl = 0;
return 0;
}
}
i = ctx->buf_len;
bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
OPENSSL_assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
if (i != 0) {
if (i + inl < bl) {
memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, inl);
ctx->buf_len += inl;
*outl = 0;
return 1;
} else {
j = bl - i;
memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, j);
if (!ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, ctx->buf, bl))
return 0;
inl -= j;
in += j;
out += bl;
*outl = bl;
}
} else
*outl = 0;
i = inl & (bl - 1);
inl -= i;
if (inl > 0) {
if (!ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl))
return 0;
*outl += inl;
}
if (i != 0)
memcpy(ctx->buf, &(in[inl]), i);
ctx->buf_len = i;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
int i, j, bl;
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
i = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl);
if (i < 0)
return 0;
else
*outl = i;
return 1;
}
if (inl <= 0) {
*outl = 0;
return inl == 0;
}
if (ctx->buf_len == 0 && (inl & (ctx->block_mask)) == 0) {
if (ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl)) {
*outl = inl;
return 1;
} else {
*outl = 0;
return 0;
}
}
i = ctx->buf_len;
bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
OPENSSL_assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
if (i != 0) {
if (bl - i > inl) {
memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, inl);
ctx->buf_len += inl;
*outl = 0;
return 1;
} else {
j = bl - i;
memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, j);
if (!ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, ctx->buf, bl))
return 0;
inl -= j;
in += j;
out += bl;
*outl = bl;
}
} else
*outl = 0;
i = inl & (bl - 1);
inl -= i;
if (inl > 0) {
if (!ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl))
return 0;
*outl += inl;
}
if (i != 0)
memcpy(ctx->buf, &(in[inl]), i);
ctx->buf_len = i;
return 1;
}
| 165,216 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: UpdateLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetUpdateLibrary() {
return update_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | UpdateLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetUpdateLibrary() {
| 170,634 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gimp_write_and_read_file (Gimp *gimp,
gboolean with_unusual_stuff,
gboolean compat_paths,
gboolean use_gimp_2_8_features)
{
GimpImage *image;
GimpImage *loaded_image;
GimpPlugInProcedure *proc;
gchar *filename;
GFile *file;
/* Create the image */
image = gimp_create_mainimage (gimp,
with_unusual_stuff,
compat_paths,
use_gimp_2_8_features);
/* Assert valid state */
gimp_assert_mainimage (image,
with_unusual_stuff,
compat_paths,
use_gimp_2_8_features);
/* Write to file */
filename = g_build_filename (g_get_tmp_dir (), "gimp-test.xcf", NULL);
file = g_file_new_for_path (filename);
g_free (filename);
proc = gimp_plug_in_manager_file_procedure_find (image->gimp->plug_in_manager,
GIMP_FILE_PROCEDURE_GROUP_SAVE,
file,
NULL /*error*/);
file_save (gimp,
image,
NULL /*progress*/,
file,
proc,
GIMP_RUN_NONINTERACTIVE,
FALSE /*change_saved_state*/,
FALSE /*export_backward*/,
FALSE /*export_forward*/,
NULL /*error*/);
/* Load from file */
loaded_image = gimp_test_load_image (image->gimp, file);
/* Assert on the loaded file. If success, it means that there is no
* significant information loss when we wrote the image to a file
* and loaded it again
*/
gimp_assert_mainimage (loaded_image,
with_unusual_stuff,
compat_paths,
use_gimp_2_8_features);
g_file_delete (file, NULL, NULL);
g_object_unref (file);
}
Commit Message: Issue #1689: create unique temporary file with g_file_open_tmp().
Not sure this is really solving the issue reported, which is that
`g_get_tmp_dir()` uses environment variables (yet as g_file_open_tmp()
uses g_get_tmp_dir()…). But at least g_file_open_tmp() should create
unique temporary files, which prevents overriding existing files (which
is most likely the only real attack possible here, or at least the only
one I can think of unless some weird vulnerabilities exist in glib).
CWE ID: CWE-20 | gimp_write_and_read_file (Gimp *gimp,
gboolean with_unusual_stuff,
gboolean compat_paths,
gboolean use_gimp_2_8_features)
{
GimpImage *image;
GimpImage *loaded_image;
GimpPlugInProcedure *proc;
gchar *filename = NULL;
gint file_handle;
GFile *file;
/* Create the image */
image = gimp_create_mainimage (gimp,
with_unusual_stuff,
compat_paths,
use_gimp_2_8_features);
/* Assert valid state */
gimp_assert_mainimage (image,
with_unusual_stuff,
compat_paths,
use_gimp_2_8_features);
/* Write to file */
file_handle = g_file_open_tmp ("gimp-test-XXXXXX.xcf", &filename, NULL);
g_assert (file_handle != -1);
close (file_handle);
file = g_file_new_for_path (filename);
g_free (filename);
proc = gimp_plug_in_manager_file_procedure_find (image->gimp->plug_in_manager,
GIMP_FILE_PROCEDURE_GROUP_SAVE,
file,
NULL /*error*/);
file_save (gimp,
image,
NULL /*progress*/,
file,
proc,
GIMP_RUN_NONINTERACTIVE,
FALSE /*change_saved_state*/,
FALSE /*export_backward*/,
FALSE /*export_forward*/,
NULL /*error*/);
/* Load from file */
loaded_image = gimp_test_load_image (image->gimp, file);
/* Assert on the loaded file. If success, it means that there is no
* significant information loss when we wrote the image to a file
* and loaded it again
*/
gimp_assert_mainimage (loaded_image,
with_unusual_stuff,
compat_paths,
use_gimp_2_8_features);
g_file_delete (file, NULL, NULL);
g_object_unref (file);
}
| 169,187 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int php_wddx_deserialize_ex(char *value, int vallen, zval *return_value)
{
wddx_stack stack;
XML_Parser parser;
st_entry *ent;
int retval;
wddx_stack_init(&stack);
parser = XML_ParserCreate("UTF-8");
XML_SetUserData(parser, &stack);
XML_SetElementHandler(parser, php_wddx_push_element, php_wddx_pop_element);
XML_SetCharacterDataHandler(parser, php_wddx_process_data);
XML_Parse(parser, value, vallen, 1);
XML_ParserFree(parser);
if (stack.top == 1) {
wddx_stack_top(&stack, (void**)&ent);
*return_value = *(ent->data);
zval_copy_ctor(return_value);
retval = SUCCESS;
} else {
retval = FAILURE;
}
wddx_stack_destroy(&stack);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fix for bug #72790 and bug #72799
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int php_wddx_deserialize_ex(char *value, int vallen, zval *return_value)
{
wddx_stack stack;
XML_Parser parser;
st_entry *ent;
int retval;
wddx_stack_init(&stack);
parser = XML_ParserCreate("UTF-8");
XML_SetUserData(parser, &stack);
XML_SetElementHandler(parser, php_wddx_push_element, php_wddx_pop_element);
XML_SetCharacterDataHandler(parser, php_wddx_process_data);
XML_Parse(parser, value, vallen, 1);
XML_ParserFree(parser);
if (stack.top == 1) {
wddx_stack_top(&stack, (void**)&ent);
if(ent->data == NULL) {
retval = FAILURE;
} else {
*return_value = *(ent->data);
zval_copy_ctor(return_value);
retval = SUCCESS;
}
} else {
retval = FAILURE;
}
wddx_stack_destroy(&stack);
return retval;
}
| 166,948 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int send_full_color_rect(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
{
int stream = 0;
ssize_t bytes;
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_PNG
if (tight_can_send_png_rect(vs, w, h)) {
return send_png_rect(vs, x, y, w, h, NULL);
}
#endif
tight_pack24(vs, vs->tight.tight.buffer, w * h, &vs->tight.tight.offset);
bytes = 3;
} else {
bytes = vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int send_full_color_rect(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
{
int stream = 0;
ssize_t bytes;
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_PNG
if (tight_can_send_png_rect(vs, w, h)) {
return send_png_rect(vs, x, y, w, h, NULL);
}
#endif
tight_pack24(vs, vs->tight.tight.buffer, w * h, &vs->tight.tight.offset);
bytes = 3;
} else {
bytes = vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel;
}
| 165,461 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: validate_entries( bool ignore_invalid_entry ) {
HASHITER it = hash_iter_begin( ConfigTab, TABLESIZE );
unsigned int invalid_entries = 0;
MyString tmp;
MyString output = "The following configuration macros appear to contain default values that must be changed before Condor will run. These macros are:\n";
while( ! hash_iter_done(it) ) {
char * val = hash_iter_value(it);
if( strstr(val, FORBIDDEN_CONFIG_VAL) ) {
char * name = hash_iter_key(it);
MyString filename;
int line_number;
param_get_location(name, filename, line_number);
tmp.sprintf(" %s (found on line %d of %s)\n", name, line_number, filename.Value());
output += tmp;
invalid_entries++;
}
hash_iter_next(it);
}
hash_iter_delete(&it);
if(invalid_entries > 0) {
if(ignore_invalid_entry) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "%s", output.Value());
} else {
EXCEPT(output.Value());
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | validate_entries( bool ignore_invalid_entry ) {
HASHITER it = hash_iter_begin( ConfigTab, TABLESIZE );
unsigned int invalid_entries = 0;
MyString tmp;
MyString output = "The following configuration macros appear to contain default values that must be changed before Condor will run. These macros are:\n";
while( ! hash_iter_done(it) ) {
char * val = hash_iter_value(it);
if( strstr(val, FORBIDDEN_CONFIG_VAL) ) {
char * name = hash_iter_key(it);
MyString filename;
int line_number;
param_get_location(name, filename, line_number);
tmp.sprintf(" %s (found on line %d of %s)\n", name, line_number, filename.Value());
output += tmp;
invalid_entries++;
}
hash_iter_next(it);
}
hash_iter_delete(&it);
if(invalid_entries > 0) {
if(ignore_invalid_entry) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "%s", output.Value());
} else {
EXCEPT("%s", output.Value());
}
}
}
| 165,382 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int getSingletonPos(const char* str)
{
int result =-1;
int i=0;
int len = 0;
if( str && ((len=strlen(str))>0) ){
for( i=0; i<len ; i++){
if( isIDSeparator(*(str+i)) ){
if( i==1){
/* string is of the form x-avy or a-prv1 */
result =0;
break;
} else {
/* delimiter found; check for singleton */
if( isIDSeparator(*(str+i+2)) ){
/* a singleton; so send the position of separator before singleton */
result = i+1;
break;
}
}
}
}/* end of for */
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int getSingletonPos(const char* str)
{
int result =-1;
int i=0;
int len = 0;
if( str && ((len=strlen(str))>0) ){
for( i=0; i<len ; i++){
if( isIDSeparator(*(str+i)) ){
if( i==1){
/* string is of the form x-avy or a-prv1 */
result =0;
break;
} else {
/* delimiter found; check for singleton */
if( isIDSeparator(*(str+i+2)) ){
/* a singleton; so send the position of separator before singleton */
result = i+1;
break;
}
}
}
}/* end of for */
}
return result;
}
| 167,202 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport void CatchException(ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register const ExceptionInfo
*p;
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
if (exception->exceptions == (void *) NULL)
return;
LockSemaphoreInfo(exception->semaphore);
ResetLinkedListIterator((LinkedListInfo *) exception->exceptions);
p=(const ExceptionInfo *) GetNextValueInLinkedList((LinkedListInfo *)
exception->exceptions);
while (p != (const ExceptionInfo *) NULL)
{
if ((p->severity >= WarningException) && (p->severity < ErrorException))
MagickWarning(p->severity,p->reason,p->description);
if ((p->severity >= ErrorException) && (p->severity < FatalErrorException))
MagickError(p->severity,p->reason,p->description);
if (p->severity >= FatalErrorException)
MagickFatalError(p->severity,p->reason,p->description);
p=(const ExceptionInfo *) GetNextValueInLinkedList((LinkedListInfo *)
exception->exceptions);
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(exception->semaphore);
ClearMagickException(exception);
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119 | MagickExport void CatchException(ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register const ExceptionInfo
*p;
ssize_t
i;
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
if (exception->exceptions == (void *) NULL)
return;
LockSemaphoreInfo(exception->semaphore);
ResetLinkedListIterator((LinkedListInfo *) exception->exceptions);
p=(const ExceptionInfo *) GetNextValueInLinkedList((LinkedListInfo *)
exception->exceptions);
for (i=0; p != (const ExceptionInfo *) NULL; i++)
{
if (p->severity >= FatalErrorException)
MagickFatalError(p->severity,p->reason,p->description);
if (i < MaxExceptions)
{
if ((p->severity >= ErrorException) &&
(p->severity < FatalErrorException))
MagickError(p->severity,p->reason,p->description);
if ((p->severity >= WarningException) && (p->severity < ErrorException))
MagickWarning(p->severity,p->reason,p->description);
}
else
if (i == MaxExceptions)
MagickError(ResourceLimitError,"too many exceptions",
"exception processing suspended");
p=(const ExceptionInfo *) GetNextValueInLinkedList((LinkedListInfo *)
exception->exceptions);
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(exception->semaphore);
ClearMagickException(exception);
}
| 168,541 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::clearBrowserCache()
{
m_client->clearBrowserCache();
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::clearBrowserCache()
| 171,348 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::Connect(
BluetoothDevice::PairingDelegate* pairing_delegate,
const base::Closure& callback,
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback) {
if (num_connecting_calls_++ == 0)
adapter_->NotifyDeviceChanged(this);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Connecting, " << num_connecting_calls_
<< " in progress";
if (IsPaired() || !pairing_delegate || !IsPairable()) {
ConnectInternal(false, callback, error_callback);
} else {
DCHECK(!pairing_delegate_);
DCHECK(agent_.get() == NULL);
pairing_delegate_ = pairing_delegate;
pairing_delegate_used_ = false;
dbus::Bus* system_bus = DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetSystemBus();
agent_.reset(BluetoothAgentServiceProvider::Create(
system_bus, dbus::ObjectPath(kAgentPath), this));
DCHECK(agent_.get());
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Registering agent for pairing";
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothAgentManagerClient()->
RegisterAgent(
dbus::ObjectPath(kAgentPath),
bluetooth_agent_manager::kKeyboardDisplayCapability,
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnRegisterAgent,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
callback,
error_callback),
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnRegisterAgentError,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
error_callback));
}
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::Connect(
BluetoothDevice::PairingDelegate* pairing_delegate,
const base::Closure& callback,
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback) {
if (num_connecting_calls_++ == 0)
adapter_->NotifyDeviceChanged(this);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Connecting, " << num_connecting_calls_
<< " in progress";
if (IsPaired() || !pairing_delegate || !IsPairable()) {
ConnectInternal(false, callback, error_callback);
} else {
DCHECK(!pairing_context_);
pairing_context_.reset(
new BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::PairingContext(pairing_delegate));
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->
Pair(object_path_,
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPair,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
callback, error_callback),
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPairError,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
error_callback));
}
}
| 171,221 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cdf_read_short_sector_chain(const cdf_header_t *h,
const cdf_sat_t *ssat, const cdf_stream_t *sst,
cdf_secid_t sid, size_t len, cdf_stream_t *scn)
{
size_t ss = CDF_SEC_SIZE(h), i, j;
scn->sst_len = cdf_count_chain(ssat, sid, CDF_SEC_SIZE(h));
scn->sst_dirlen = len;
if (sst->sst_tab == NULL || scn->sst_len == (size_t)-1)
return -1;
scn->sst_tab = calloc(scn->sst_len, ss);
if (scn->sst_tab == NULL)
return -1;
for (j = i = 0; sid >= 0; i++, j++) {
if (j >= CDF_LOOP_LIMIT) {
DPRINTF(("Read short sector chain loop limit"));
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
if (i >= scn->sst_len) {
DPRINTF(("Out of bounds reading short sector chain "
"%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u > %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
i, scn->sst_len));
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
if (cdf_read_short_sector(sst, scn->sst_tab, i * ss, ss, h,
sid) != (ssize_t)ss) {
DPRINTF(("Reading short sector chain %d", sid));
goto out;
}
sid = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)ssat->sat_tab[sid]);
}
return 0;
out:
free(scn->sst_tab);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Fix bounds checks again.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cdf_read_short_sector_chain(const cdf_header_t *h,
const cdf_sat_t *ssat, const cdf_stream_t *sst,
cdf_secid_t sid, size_t len, cdf_stream_t *scn)
{
size_t ss = CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(h), i, j;
scn->sst_len = cdf_count_chain(ssat, sid, CDF_SEC_SIZE(h));
scn->sst_dirlen = len;
if (sst->sst_tab == NULL || scn->sst_len == (size_t)-1)
return -1;
scn->sst_tab = calloc(scn->sst_len, ss);
if (scn->sst_tab == NULL)
return -1;
for (j = i = 0; sid >= 0; i++, j++) {
if (j >= CDF_LOOP_LIMIT) {
DPRINTF(("Read short sector chain loop limit"));
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
if (i >= scn->sst_len) {
DPRINTF(("Out of bounds reading short sector chain "
"%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u > %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
i, scn->sst_len));
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
if (cdf_read_short_sector(sst, scn->sst_tab, i * ss, ss, h,
sid) != (ssize_t)ss) {
DPRINTF(("Reading short sector chain %d", sid));
goto out;
}
sid = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)ssat->sat_tab[sid]);
}
return 0;
out:
free(scn->sst_tab);
return -1;
}
| 165,625 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int Track::Info::CopyStr(char* Info::*str, Info& dst_) const {
if (str == static_cast<char * Info::*>(NULL))
return -1;
char*& dst = dst_.*str;
if (dst) // should be NULL already
return -1;
const char* const src = this->*str;
if (src == NULL)
return 0;
const size_t len = strlen(src);
dst = new (std::nothrow) char[len + 1];
if (dst == NULL)
return -1;
strcpy(dst, src);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int Track::Info::CopyStr(char* Info::*str, Info& dst_) const {
if (str == static_cast<char * Info::*>(NULL))
return -1;
char*& dst = dst_.*str;
if (dst) // should be NULL already
return -1;
const char* const src = this->*str;
if (src == NULL)
return 0;
const size_t len = strlen(src);
dst = SafeArrayAlloc<char>(1, len + 1);
if (dst == NULL)
return -1;
strcpy(dst, src);
return 0;
}
| 173,803 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: lexer_process_char_literal (parser_context_t *context_p, /**< context */
const uint8_t *char_p, /**< characters */
size_t length, /**< length of string */
uint8_t literal_type, /**< final literal type */
bool has_escape) /**< has escape sequences */
{
parser_list_iterator_t literal_iterator;
lexer_literal_t *literal_p;
uint32_t literal_index = 0;
JERRY_ASSERT (literal_type == LEXER_IDENT_LITERAL
|| literal_type == LEXER_STRING_LITERAL);
JERRY_ASSERT (literal_type != LEXER_IDENT_LITERAL || length <= PARSER_MAXIMUM_IDENT_LENGTH);
JERRY_ASSERT (literal_type != LEXER_STRING_LITERAL || length <= PARSER_MAXIMUM_STRING_LENGTH);
parser_list_iterator_init (&context_p->literal_pool, &literal_iterator);
while ((literal_p = (lexer_literal_t *) parser_list_iterator_next (&literal_iterator)) != NULL)
{
if (literal_p->type == literal_type
&& literal_p->prop.length == length
&& memcmp (literal_p->u.char_p, char_p, length) == 0)
{
context_p->lit_object.literal_p = literal_p;
context_p->lit_object.index = (uint16_t) literal_index;
literal_p->status_flags = (uint8_t) (literal_p->status_flags & ~LEXER_FLAG_UNUSED_IDENT);
return;
}
literal_index++;
}
JERRY_ASSERT (literal_index == context_p->literal_count);
if (literal_index >= PARSER_MAXIMUM_NUMBER_OF_LITERALS)
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_LITERAL_LIMIT_REACHED);
}
literal_p = (lexer_literal_t *) parser_list_append (context_p, &context_p->literal_pool);
literal_p->prop.length = (uint16_t) length;
literal_p->type = literal_type;
literal_p->status_flags = has_escape ? 0 : LEXER_FLAG_SOURCE_PTR;
if (has_escape)
{
literal_p->u.char_p = (uint8_t *) jmem_heap_alloc_block (length);
memcpy ((uint8_t *) literal_p->u.char_p, char_p, length);
}
else
{
literal_p->u.char_p = char_p;
}
context_p->lit_object.literal_p = literal_p;
context_p->lit_object.index = (uint16_t) literal_index;
context_p->literal_count++;
} /* lexer_process_char_literal */
Commit Message: Do not allocate memory for zero length strings.
Fixes #1821.
JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Zoltan Herczeg zherczeg.u-szeged@partner.samsung.com
CWE ID: CWE-476 | lexer_process_char_literal (parser_context_t *context_p, /**< context */
const uint8_t *char_p, /**< characters */
size_t length, /**< length of string */
uint8_t literal_type, /**< final literal type */
bool has_escape) /**< has escape sequences */
{
parser_list_iterator_t literal_iterator;
lexer_literal_t *literal_p;
uint32_t literal_index = 0;
JERRY_ASSERT (literal_type == LEXER_IDENT_LITERAL
|| literal_type == LEXER_STRING_LITERAL);
JERRY_ASSERT (literal_type != LEXER_IDENT_LITERAL || length <= PARSER_MAXIMUM_IDENT_LENGTH);
JERRY_ASSERT (literal_type != LEXER_STRING_LITERAL || length <= PARSER_MAXIMUM_STRING_LENGTH);
parser_list_iterator_init (&context_p->literal_pool, &literal_iterator);
while ((literal_p = (lexer_literal_t *) parser_list_iterator_next (&literal_iterator)) != NULL)
{
if (literal_p->type == literal_type
&& literal_p->prop.length == length
&& memcmp (literal_p->u.char_p, char_p, length) == 0)
{
context_p->lit_object.literal_p = literal_p;
context_p->lit_object.index = (uint16_t) literal_index;
literal_p->status_flags = (uint8_t) (literal_p->status_flags & ~LEXER_FLAG_UNUSED_IDENT);
return;
}
literal_index++;
}
JERRY_ASSERT (literal_index == context_p->literal_count);
if (literal_index >= PARSER_MAXIMUM_NUMBER_OF_LITERALS)
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_LITERAL_LIMIT_REACHED);
}
if (length == 0)
{
has_escape = false;
}
literal_p = (lexer_literal_t *) parser_list_append (context_p, &context_p->literal_pool);
literal_p->prop.length = (uint16_t) length;
literal_p->type = literal_type;
literal_p->status_flags = has_escape ? 0 : LEXER_FLAG_SOURCE_PTR;
if (has_escape)
{
literal_p->u.char_p = (uint8_t *) jmem_heap_alloc_block (length);
memcpy ((uint8_t *) literal_p->u.char_p, char_p, length);
}
else
{
literal_p->u.char_p = char_p;
}
context_p->lit_object.literal_p = literal_p;
context_p->lit_object.index = (uint16_t) literal_index;
context_p->literal_count++;
} /* lexer_process_char_literal */
| 168,105 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int php_stream_temp_close(php_stream *stream, int close_handle TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
int ret;
assert(ts != NULL);
if (ts->innerstream) {
ret = php_stream_free_enclosed(ts->innerstream, PHP_STREAM_FREE_CLOSE | (close_handle ? 0 : PHP_STREAM_FREE_PRESERVE_HANDLE));
} else {
ret = 0;
}
if (ts->meta) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ts->meta);
}
efree(ts);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int php_stream_temp_close(php_stream *stream, int close_handle TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
int ret;
assert(ts != NULL);
if (ts->innerstream) {
ret = php_stream_free_enclosed(ts->innerstream, PHP_STREAM_FREE_CLOSE | (close_handle ? 0 : PHP_STREAM_FREE_PRESERVE_HANDLE));
} else {
ret = 0;
}
if (ts->meta) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ts->meta);
}
efree(ts);
return ret;
}
| 165,479 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltReverseCompMatch(xsltParserContextPtr ctxt, xsltCompMatchPtr comp) {
int i = 0;
int j = comp->nbStep - 1;
while (j > i) {
register xmlChar *tmp;
register xsltOp op;
register xmlXPathCompExprPtr expr;
register int t;
tmp = comp->steps[i].value;
comp->steps[i].value = comp->steps[j].value;
comp->steps[j].value = tmp;
tmp = comp->steps[i].value2;
comp->steps[i].value2 = comp->steps[j].value2;
comp->steps[j].value2 = tmp;
tmp = comp->steps[i].value3;
comp->steps[i].value3 = comp->steps[j].value3;
comp->steps[j].value3 = tmp;
op = comp->steps[i].op;
comp->steps[i].op = comp->steps[j].op;
comp->steps[j].op = op;
expr = comp->steps[i].comp;
comp->steps[i].comp = comp->steps[j].comp;
comp->steps[j].comp = expr;
t = comp->steps[i].previousExtra;
comp->steps[i].previousExtra = comp->steps[j].previousExtra;
comp->steps[j].previousExtra = t;
t = comp->steps[i].indexExtra;
comp->steps[i].indexExtra = comp->steps[j].indexExtra;
comp->steps[j].indexExtra = t;
t = comp->steps[i].lenExtra;
comp->steps[i].lenExtra = comp->steps[j].lenExtra;
comp->steps[j].lenExtra = t;
j--;
i++;
}
xsltCompMatchAdd(ctxt, comp, XSLT_OP_END, NULL, NULL, 0);
/*
* detect consecutive XSLT_OP_PREDICATE indicating a direct
* matching should be done.
*/
for (i = 0;i < comp->nbStep - 1;i++) {
if ((comp->steps[i].op == XSLT_OP_PREDICATE) &&
(comp->steps[i + 1].op == XSLT_OP_PREDICATE)) {
comp->direct = 1;
if (comp->pattern[0] != '/') {
xmlChar *query;
query = xmlStrdup((const xmlChar *)"//");
query = xmlStrcat(query, comp->pattern);
xmlFree((xmlChar *) comp->pattern);
comp->pattern = query;
}
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xsltReverseCompMatch(xsltParserContextPtr ctxt, xsltCompMatchPtr comp) {
int i = 0;
int j = comp->nbStep - 1;
while (j > i) {
register xmlChar *tmp;
register xsltOp op;
register xmlXPathCompExprPtr expr;
register int t;
tmp = comp->steps[i].value;
comp->steps[i].value = comp->steps[j].value;
comp->steps[j].value = tmp;
tmp = comp->steps[i].value2;
comp->steps[i].value2 = comp->steps[j].value2;
comp->steps[j].value2 = tmp;
tmp = comp->steps[i].value3;
comp->steps[i].value3 = comp->steps[j].value3;
comp->steps[j].value3 = tmp;
op = comp->steps[i].op;
comp->steps[i].op = comp->steps[j].op;
comp->steps[j].op = op;
expr = comp->steps[i].comp;
comp->steps[i].comp = comp->steps[j].comp;
comp->steps[j].comp = expr;
t = comp->steps[i].previousExtra;
comp->steps[i].previousExtra = comp->steps[j].previousExtra;
comp->steps[j].previousExtra = t;
t = comp->steps[i].indexExtra;
comp->steps[i].indexExtra = comp->steps[j].indexExtra;
comp->steps[j].indexExtra = t;
t = comp->steps[i].lenExtra;
comp->steps[i].lenExtra = comp->steps[j].lenExtra;
comp->steps[j].lenExtra = t;
j--;
i++;
}
xsltCompMatchAdd(ctxt, comp, XSLT_OP_END, NULL, NULL, 0);
/*
* Detect consecutive XSLT_OP_PREDICATE and predicates on ops which
* haven't been optimized yet indicating a direct matching should be done.
*/
for (i = 0;i < comp->nbStep - 1;i++) {
xsltOp op = comp->steps[i].op;
if ((op != XSLT_OP_ELEM) &&
(op != XSLT_OP_ALL) &&
(comp->steps[i + 1].op == XSLT_OP_PREDICATE)) {
comp->direct = 1;
if (comp->pattern[0] != '/') {
xmlChar *query;
query = xmlStrdup((const xmlChar *)"//");
query = xmlStrcat(query, comp->pattern);
xmlFree((xmlChar *) comp->pattern);
comp->pattern = query;
}
break;
}
}
}
| 173,313 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetSupportedInputMethods() {
return GetInputMethodDescriptorsForTesting();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetSupportedInputMethods() {
virtual input_method::InputMethodDescriptors* GetSupportedInputMethods() {
return GetInputMethodDescriptorsForTesting();
}
| 170,493 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void AddObserver(Observer* observer) {
if (!observers_.size()) {
observer->FirstObserverIsAdded(this);
}
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual void AddObserver(Observer* observer) {
virtual void AddObserver(InputMethodLibrary::Observer* observer) {
if (!observers_.size()) {
observer->FirstObserverIsAdded(this);
}
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
| 170,476 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: check_acl(pam_handle_t *pamh,
const char *sense, const char *this_user, const char *other_user,
int noent_code, int debug)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
FILE *fp;
int i, save_errno;
uid_t fsuid;
/* Check this user's <sense> file. */
pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, this_user);
if (pwd == NULL) {
}
/* Figure out what that file is really named. */
i = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/.xauth/%s", pwd->pw_dir, sense);
if ((i >= (int)sizeof(path)) || (i < 0)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"name of user's home directory is too long");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
fp = fopen(path, "r");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
fp = fopen(path, "r");
save_errno = errno;
setfsuid(fsuid);
if (fp != NULL) {
char buf[LINE_MAX], *tmp;
/* Scan the file for a list of specs of users to "trust". */
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) != NULL) {
other_user, path);
}
fclose(fp);
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
} else {
/* Default to okay if the file doesn't exist. */
errno = save_errno;
switch (errno) {
case ENOENT:
if (noent_code == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, ignoring",
path);
}
} else {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, failing",
path);
}
}
return noent_code;
default:
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"error opening %s: %m", path);
}
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | check_acl(pam_handle_t *pamh,
const char *sense, const char *this_user, const char *other_user,
int noent_code, int debug)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
FILE *fp = NULL;
int i, fd = -1, save_errno;
uid_t fsuid;
struct stat st;
/* Check this user's <sense> file. */
pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, this_user);
if (pwd == NULL) {
}
/* Figure out what that file is really named. */
i = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/.xauth/%s", pwd->pw_dir, sense);
if ((i >= (int)sizeof(path)) || (i < 0)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"name of user's home directory is too long");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
fp = fopen(path, "r");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
if (!stat(path, &st)) {
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
errno = EINVAL;
else
fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_NOCTTY);
}
save_errno = errno;
setfsuid(fsuid);
if (fd >= 0) {
if (!fstat(fd, &st)) {
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
errno = EINVAL;
else
fp = fdopen(fd, "r");
}
if (!fp) {
save_errno = errno;
close(fd);
}
}
if (fp) {
char buf[LINE_MAX], *tmp;
/* Scan the file for a list of specs of users to "trust". */
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) != NULL) {
other_user, path);
}
fclose(fp);
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
} else {
/* Default to okay if the file doesn't exist. */
errno = save_errno;
switch (errno) {
case ENOENT:
if (noent_code == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, ignoring",
path);
}
} else {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, failing",
path);
}
}
return noent_code;
default:
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"error opening %s: %m", path);
}
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
}
}
}
| 164,788 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(mcrypt) /* {{{ */
{
char **modules;
char mcrypt_api_no[16];
int i, count;
smart_str tmp1 = {0};
smart_str tmp2 = {0};
modules = mcrypt_list_algorithms(MCG(algorithms_dir), &count);
if (count == 0) {
smart_str_appends(&tmp1, "none");
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
smart_str_appends(&tmp1, modules[i]);
smart_str_appendc(&tmp1, ' ');
}
smart_str_0(&tmp1);
mcrypt_free_p(modules, count);
modules = mcrypt_list_modes(MCG(modes_dir), &count);
if (count == 0) {
smart_str_appends(&tmp2, "none");
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
smart_str_appends(&tmp2, modules[i]);
smart_str_appendc(&tmp2, ' ');
}
smart_str_0 (&tmp2);
mcrypt_free_p (modules, count);
snprintf (mcrypt_api_no, 16, "%d", MCRYPT_API_VERSION);
php_info_print_table_start();
php_info_print_table_header(2, "mcrypt support", "enabled");
php_info_print_table_header(2, "mcrypt_filter support", "enabled");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Version", LIBMCRYPT_VERSION);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Api No", mcrypt_api_no);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Supported ciphers", tmp1.c);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Supported modes", tmp2.c);
smart_str_free(&tmp1);
smart_str_free(&tmp2);
php_info_print_table_end();
DISPLAY_INI_ENTRIES();
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(mcrypt) /* {{{ */
{
char **modules;
char mcrypt_api_no[16];
int i, count;
smart_str tmp1 = {0};
smart_str tmp2 = {0};
modules = mcrypt_list_algorithms(MCG(algorithms_dir), &count);
if (count == 0) {
smart_str_appends(&tmp1, "none");
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
smart_str_appends(&tmp1, modules[i]);
smart_str_appendc(&tmp1, ' ');
}
smart_str_0(&tmp1);
mcrypt_free_p(modules, count);
modules = mcrypt_list_modes(MCG(modes_dir), &count);
if (count == 0) {
smart_str_appends(&tmp2, "none");
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
smart_str_appends(&tmp2, modules[i]);
smart_str_appendc(&tmp2, ' ');
}
smart_str_0 (&tmp2);
mcrypt_free_p (modules, count);
snprintf (mcrypt_api_no, 16, "%d", MCRYPT_API_VERSION);
php_info_print_table_start();
php_info_print_table_header(2, "mcrypt support", "enabled");
php_info_print_table_header(2, "mcrypt_filter support", "enabled");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Version", LIBMCRYPT_VERSION);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Api No", mcrypt_api_no);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Supported ciphers", tmp1.c);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Supported modes", tmp2.c);
smart_str_free(&tmp1);
smart_str_free(&tmp2);
php_info_print_table_end();
DISPLAY_INI_ENTRIES();
}
/* }}} */
| 167,112 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebPluginDelegateProxy::SendUpdateGeometry(
bool bitmaps_changed) {
PluginMsg_UpdateGeometry_Param param;
param.window_rect = plugin_rect_;
param.clip_rect = clip_rect_;
param.windowless_buffer0 = TransportDIB::DefaultHandleValue();
param.windowless_buffer1 = TransportDIB::DefaultHandleValue();
param.windowless_buffer_index = back_buffer_index();
param.background_buffer = TransportDIB::DefaultHandleValue();
param.transparent = transparent_;
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
if (bitmaps_changed)
#endif
{
if (transport_stores_[0].dib.get())
CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(transport_stores_[0].dib->handle(),
¶m.windowless_buffer0);
if (transport_stores_[1].dib.get())
CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(transport_stores_[1].dib->handle(),
¶m.windowless_buffer1);
if (background_store_.dib.get())
CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(background_store_.dib->handle(),
¶m.background_buffer);
}
IPC::Message* msg;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (UseSynchronousGeometryUpdates()) {
msg = new PluginMsg_UpdateGeometrySync(instance_id_, param);
} else // NOLINT
#endif
{
msg = new PluginMsg_UpdateGeometry(instance_id_, param);
msg->set_unblock(true);
}
Send(msg);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void WebPluginDelegateProxy::SendUpdateGeometry(
bool bitmaps_changed) {
PluginMsg_UpdateGeometry_Param param;
param.window_rect = plugin_rect_;
param.clip_rect = clip_rect_;
param.windowless_buffer0 = TransportDIB::DefaultHandleValue();
param.windowless_buffer1 = TransportDIB::DefaultHandleValue();
param.windowless_buffer_index = back_buffer_index();
param.background_buffer = TransportDIB::DefaultHandleValue();
param.transparent = transparent_;
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
if (bitmaps_changed)
#endif
{
if (transport_stores_[0].dib.get())
CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(transport_stores_[0].dib->handle(),
¶m.windowless_buffer0,
channel_host_->peer_pid());
if (transport_stores_[1].dib.get())
CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(transport_stores_[1].dib->handle(),
¶m.windowless_buffer1,
channel_host_->peer_pid());
if (background_store_.dib.get())
CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(background_store_.dib->handle(),
¶m.background_buffer,
channel_host_->peer_pid());
}
IPC::Message* msg;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (UseSynchronousGeometryUpdates()) {
msg = new PluginMsg_UpdateGeometrySync(instance_id_, param);
} else // NOLINT
#endif
{
msg = new PluginMsg_UpdateGeometry(instance_id_, param);
msg->set_unblock(true);
}
Send(msg);
}
| 170,956 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::GetIndex() const
{
return m_index;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Cluster::GetIndex() const
Cluster::Cluster(Segment* pSegment, long idx, long long element_start
/* long long element_size */)
: m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_index(idx),
m_pos(element_start),
m_element_size(-1 /* element_size */),
m_timecode(-1),
m_entries(NULL),
m_entries_size(0),
m_entries_count(-1) // means "has not been parsed yet"
{}
Cluster::~Cluster() {
if (m_entries_count <= 0)
return;
BlockEntry** i = m_entries;
BlockEntry** const j = m_entries + m_entries_count;
while (i != j) {
BlockEntry* p = *i++;
assert(p);
delete p;
}
delete[] m_entries;
}
| 174,328 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int encode_open_downgrade(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs_closeargs *arg)
{
__be32 *p;
RESERVE_SPACE(4+NFS4_STATEID_SIZE+4);
WRITE32(OP_OPEN_DOWNGRADE);
WRITEMEM(arg->stateid->data, NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
WRITE32(arg->seqid->sequence->counter);
encode_share_access(xdr, arg->open_flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | static int encode_open_downgrade(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs_closeargs *arg)
{
__be32 *p;
RESERVE_SPACE(4+NFS4_STATEID_SIZE+4);
WRITE32(OP_OPEN_DOWNGRADE);
WRITEMEM(arg->stateid->data, NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
WRITE32(arg->seqid->sequence->counter);
encode_share_access(xdr, arg->fmode);
return 0;
}
| 165,713 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Cluster::~Cluster()
{
if (m_entries_count <= 0)
return;
BlockEntry** i = m_entries;
BlockEntry** const j = m_entries + m_entries_count;
while (i != j)
{
BlockEntry* p = *i++;
assert(p);
delete p;
}
delete[] m_entries;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Cluster::~Cluster()
if (status < 0) { // error or underflow
len = 1;
return status;
}
++pos; // consume flags byte
assert(pos <= avail);
if (pos >= block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const int lacing = int(flags & 0x06) >> 1;
if ((lacing != 0) && (block_stop > avail)) {
len = static_cast<long>(block_stop - pos);
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
pos = block_stop; // consume block-part of block group
assert(pos <= payload_stop);
}
assert(pos == payload_stop);
status = CreateBlock(0x20, // BlockGroup ID
payload_start, payload_size, discard_padding);
if (status != 0)
return status;
m_pos = payload_stop;
return 0; // success
}
| 174,458 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PepperMediaDeviceManager* PepperPlatformAudioInput::GetMediaDeviceManager() {
DCHECK(main_message_loop_proxy_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
RenderFrameImpl* const render_frame =
RenderFrameImpl::FromRoutingID(render_frame_id_);
return render_frame ?
PepperMediaDeviceManager::GetForRenderFrame(render_frame) : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | PepperMediaDeviceManager* PepperPlatformAudioInput::GetMediaDeviceManager() {
DCHECK(main_message_loop_proxy_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
RenderFrameImpl* const render_frame =
RenderFrameImpl::FromRoutingID(render_frame_id_);
return render_frame ?
PepperMediaDeviceManager::GetForRenderFrame(render_frame).get() : NULL;
}
| 171,609 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(GlobIterator, count)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (php_stream_is(intern->u.dir.dirp ,&php_glob_stream_ops)) {
RETURN_LONG(php_glob_stream_get_count(intern->u.dir.dirp, NULL));
} else {
/* should not happen */
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_ERROR, "GlobIterator lost glob state");
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(GlobIterator, count)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (php_stream_is(intern->u.dir.dirp ,&php_glob_stream_ops)) {
RETURN_LONG(php_glob_stream_get_count(intern->u.dir.dirp, NULL));
} else {
/* should not happen */
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_ERROR, "GlobIterator lost glob state");
}
}
| 167,048 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RilSapSocket::sendResponse(MsgHeader* hdr) {
size_t encoded_size = 0;
uint32_t written_size;
size_t buffer_size = 0;
pb_ostream_t ostream;
bool success = false;
pthread_mutex_lock(&write_lock);
if ((success = pb_get_encoded_size(&encoded_size, MsgHeader_fields,
hdr)) && encoded_size <= INT32_MAX && commandFd != -1) {
buffer_size = encoded_size + sizeof(uint32_t);
uint8_t buffer[buffer_size];
written_size = htonl((uint32_t) encoded_size);
ostream = pb_ostream_from_buffer(buffer, buffer_size);
pb_write(&ostream, (uint8_t *)&written_size, sizeof(written_size));
success = pb_encode(&ostream, MsgHeader_fields, hdr);
if (success) {
RLOGD("Size: %d (0x%x) Size as written: 0x%x", encoded_size, encoded_size,
written_size);
log_hex("onRequestComplete", &buffer[sizeof(written_size)], encoded_size);
RLOGI("[%d] < SAP RESPONSE type: %d. id: %d. error: %d",
hdr->token, hdr->type, hdr->id,hdr->error );
if ( 0 != blockingWrite_helper(commandFd, buffer, buffer_size)) {
RLOGE("Error %d while writing to fd", errno);
} else {
RLOGD("Write successful");
}
} else {
RLOGE("Error while encoding response of type %d id %d buffer_size: %d: %s.",
hdr->type, hdr->id, buffer_size, PB_GET_ERROR(&ostream));
}
} else {
RLOGE("Not sending response type %d: encoded_size: %u. commandFd: %d. encoded size result: %d",
hdr->type, encoded_size, commandFd, success);
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&write_lock);
}
Commit Message: Replace variable-length arrays on stack with malloc.
Bug: 30202619
Change-Id: Ib95e08a1c009d88a4b4fd8d8fdba0641c6129008
(cherry picked from commit 943905bb9f99e3caa856b42c531e2be752da8834)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void RilSapSocket::sendResponse(MsgHeader* hdr) {
size_t encoded_size = 0;
uint32_t written_size;
size_t buffer_size = 0;
pb_ostream_t ostream;
bool success = false;
pthread_mutex_lock(&write_lock);
if ((success = pb_get_encoded_size(&encoded_size, MsgHeader_fields,
hdr)) && encoded_size <= INT32_MAX && commandFd != -1) {
buffer_size = encoded_size + sizeof(uint32_t);
uint8_t* buffer = (uint8_t*)malloc(buffer_size);
if (!buffer) {
RLOGE("sendResponse: OOM");
pthread_mutex_unlock(&write_lock);
return;
}
written_size = htonl((uint32_t) encoded_size);
ostream = pb_ostream_from_buffer(buffer, buffer_size);
pb_write(&ostream, (uint8_t *)&written_size, sizeof(written_size));
success = pb_encode(&ostream, MsgHeader_fields, hdr);
if (success) {
RLOGD("Size: %d (0x%x) Size as written: 0x%x", encoded_size, encoded_size,
written_size);
log_hex("onRequestComplete", &buffer[sizeof(written_size)], encoded_size);
RLOGI("[%d] < SAP RESPONSE type: %d. id: %d. error: %d",
hdr->token, hdr->type, hdr->id,hdr->error );
if ( 0 != blockingWrite_helper(commandFd, buffer, buffer_size)) {
RLOGE("Error %d while writing to fd", errno);
} else {
RLOGD("Write successful");
}
} else {
RLOGE("Error while encoding response of type %d id %d buffer_size: %d: %s.",
hdr->type, hdr->id, buffer_size, PB_GET_ERROR(&ostream));
}
free(buffer);
} else {
RLOGE("Not sending response type %d: encoded_size: %u. commandFd: %d. encoded size result: %d",
hdr->type, encoded_size, commandFd, success);
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&write_lock);
}
| 173,389 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IsSmartVirtualKeyboardEnabled() {
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
keyboard::switches::kEnableVirtualKeyboard)) {
return false;
}
return !base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
keyboard::switches::kDisableSmartVirtualKeyboard);
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool IsSmartVirtualKeyboardEnabled() {
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
keyboard::switches::kEnableVirtualKeyboard)) {
return false;
}
return keyboard::IsSmartDeployEnabled();
}
| 171,699 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pimv2_addr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, enum pimv2_addrtype at, int silent)
{
int af;
int len, hdrlen;
ND_TCHECK(bp[0]);
if (pimv2_addr_len == 0) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[1]);
switch (bp[0]) {
case 1:
af = AF_INET;
len = sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case 2:
af = AF_INET6;
len = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
return -1;
}
if (bp[1] != 0)
return -1;
hdrlen = 2;
} else {
switch (pimv2_addr_len) {
case sizeof(struct in_addr):
af = AF_INET;
break;
case sizeof(struct in6_addr):
af = AF_INET6;
break;
default:
return -1;
break;
}
len = pimv2_addr_len;
hdrlen = 0;
}
bp += hdrlen;
switch (at) {
case pimv2_unicast:
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], len);
if (af == AF_INET) {
if (!silent)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, bp)));
}
else if (af == AF_INET6) {
if (!silent)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, bp)));
}
return hdrlen + len;
case pimv2_group:
case pimv2_source:
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], len + 2);
if (af == AF_INET) {
if (!silent) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, bp + 2)));
if (bp[1] != 32)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/%u", bp[1]));
}
}
else if (af == AF_INET6) {
if (!silent) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, bp + 2)));
if (bp[1] != 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/%u", bp[1]));
}
}
if (bp[0] && !silent) {
if (at == pimv2_group) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(0x%02x)", bp[0]));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%s%s%s",
bp[0] & 0x04 ? "S" : "",
bp[0] & 0x02 ? "W" : "",
bp[0] & 0x01 ? "R" : ""));
if (bp[0] & 0xf8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+0x%02x", bp[0] & 0xf8));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
}
}
return hdrlen + 2 + len;
default:
return -1;
}
trunc:
return -1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13030/PIM: Redo bounds checks and add length checks.
Use ND_TCHECK macros to do bounds checking, and add length checks before
the bounds checks.
Add a bounds check that the review process found was missing.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update one test output file to reflect the changes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | pimv2_addr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int len, enum pimv2_addrtype at,
u_int addr_len, int silent)
{
int af;
int hdrlen;
if (addr_len == 0) {
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(bp[1]);
switch (bp[0]) {
case 1:
af = AF_INET;
addr_len = (u_int)sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case 2:
af = AF_INET6;
addr_len = (u_int)sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
return -1;
}
if (bp[1] != 0)
return -1;
hdrlen = 2;
} else {
switch (addr_len) {
case sizeof(struct in_addr):
af = AF_INET;
break;
case sizeof(struct in6_addr):
af = AF_INET6;
break;
default:
return -1;
break;
}
hdrlen = 0;
}
bp += hdrlen;
len -= hdrlen;
switch (at) {
case pimv2_unicast:
if (len < addr_len)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], addr_len);
if (af == AF_INET) {
if (!silent)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, bp)));
}
else if (af == AF_INET6) {
if (!silent)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, bp)));
}
return hdrlen + addr_len;
case pimv2_group:
case pimv2_source:
if (len < addr_len + 2)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], addr_len + 2);
if (af == AF_INET) {
if (!silent) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, bp + 2)));
if (bp[1] != 32)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/%u", bp[1]));
}
}
else if (af == AF_INET6) {
if (!silent) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, bp + 2)));
if (bp[1] != 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/%u", bp[1]));
}
}
if (bp[0] && !silent) {
if (at == pimv2_group) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(0x%02x)", bp[0]));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%s%s%s",
bp[0] & 0x04 ? "S" : "",
bp[0] & 0x02 ? "W" : "",
bp[0] & 0x01 ? "R" : ""));
if (bp[0] & 0xf8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+0x%02x", bp[0] & 0xf8));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
}
}
return hdrlen + 2 + addr_len;
default:
return -1;
}
trunc:
return -1;
}
| 167,857 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cdf_count_chain(const cdf_sat_t *sat, cdf_secid_t sid, size_t size)
{
size_t i, j;
cdf_secid_t maxsector = (cdf_secid_t)(sat->sat_len * size);
DPRINTF(("Chain:"));
for (j = i = 0; sid >= 0; i++, j++) {
DPRINTF((" %d", sid));
if (j >= CDF_LOOP_LIMIT) {
DPRINTF(("Counting chain loop limit"));
errno = EFTYPE;
return (size_t)-1;
}
if (sid > maxsector) {
DPRINTF(("Sector %d > %d\n", sid, maxsector));
errno = EFTYPE;
return (size_t)-1;
}
sid = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)sat->sat_tab[sid]);
}
if (i == 0) {
DPRINTF((" none, sid: %d\n", sid));
return (size_t)-1;
}
DPRINTF(("\n"));
return i;
}
Commit Message: Fix incorrect bounds check for sector count. (Francisco Alonso and Jan Kaluza
at RedHat)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | cdf_count_chain(const cdf_sat_t *sat, cdf_secid_t sid, size_t size)
{
size_t i, j;
cdf_secid_t maxsector = (cdf_secid_t)((sat->sat_len * size)
/ sizeof(maxsector));
DPRINTF(("Chain:"));
for (j = i = 0; sid >= 0; i++, j++) {
DPRINTF((" %d", sid));
if (j >= CDF_LOOP_LIMIT) {
DPRINTF(("Counting chain loop limit"));
errno = EFTYPE;
return (size_t)-1;
}
if (sid >= maxsector) {
DPRINTF(("Sector %d >= %d\n", sid, maxsector));
errno = EFTYPE;
return (size_t)-1;
}
sid = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)sat->sat_tab[sid]);
}
if (i == 0) {
DPRINTF((" none, sid: %d\n", sid));
return (size_t)-1;
}
DPRINTF(("\n"));
return i;
}
| 166,365 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Node::InsertionNotificationRequest HTMLLinkElement::InsertedInto(
ContainerNode& insertion_point) {
HTMLElement::InsertedInto(insertion_point);
LogAddElementIfIsolatedWorldAndInDocument("link", relAttr, hrefAttr);
if (!insertion_point.isConnected())
return kInsertionDone;
DCHECK(isConnected());
if (!ShouldLoadLink() && IsInShadowTree()) {
String message = "HTML element <link> is ignored in shadow tree.";
GetDocument().AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kJSMessageSource, kWarningMessageLevel, message));
return kInsertionDone;
}
GetDocument().GetStyleEngine().AddStyleSheetCandidateNode(*this);
Process();
if (link_)
link_->OwnerInserted();
return kInsertionDone;
}
Commit Message: Avoid crash when setting rel=stylesheet on <link> in shadow root.
Link elements in shadow roots without rel=stylesheet are currently not
added as stylesheet candidates upon insertion. This causes a crash if
rel=stylesheet is set (and then loaded) later.
R=futhark@chromium.org
Bug: 886753
Change-Id: Ia0de2c1edf43407950f973982ee1c262a909d220
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1242463
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#593907}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | Node::InsertionNotificationRequest HTMLLinkElement::InsertedInto(
ContainerNode& insertion_point) {
HTMLElement::InsertedInto(insertion_point);
LogAddElementIfIsolatedWorldAndInDocument("link", relAttr, hrefAttr);
if (!insertion_point.isConnected())
return kInsertionDone;
DCHECK(isConnected());
GetDocument().GetStyleEngine().AddStyleSheetCandidateNode(*this);
if (!ShouldLoadLink() && IsInShadowTree()) {
String message = "HTML element <link> is ignored in shadow tree.";
GetDocument().AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kJSMessageSource, kWarningMessageLevel, message));
return kInsertionDone;
}
Process();
if (link_)
link_->OwnerInserted();
return kInsertionDone;
}
| 172,586 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserMainParts::PostMainMessageLoopRun() {
CompositorUtils::GetInstance()->Shutdown();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void BrowserMainParts::PostMainMessageLoopRun() {
WebContentsUnloader::GetInstance()->Shutdown();
BrowserContextDestroyer::Shutdown();
BrowserContext::AssertNoContextsExist();
CompositorUtils::GetInstance()->Shutdown();
}
| 165,423 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int NsSetParameter (preproc_effect_t *effect, void *pParam, void *pValue)
{
int status = 0;
return status;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int NsSetParameter (preproc_effect_t *effect, void *pParam, void *pValue)
int NsSetParameter (preproc_effect_t *effect __unused,
void *pParam __unused,
void *pValue __unused)
{
int status = 0;
return status;
}
| 173,352 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool CustomButton::AcceleratorPressed(const ui::Accelerator& accelerator) {
SetState(STATE_NORMAL);
ui::MouseEvent synthetic_event(
ui::ET_MOUSE_RELEASED, gfx::Point(), gfx::Point(), ui::EventTimeForNow(),
ui::EF_LEFT_MOUSE_BUTTON, ui::EF_LEFT_MOUSE_BUTTON);
NotifyClick(synthetic_event);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Custom buttons should only handle accelerators when focused.
BUG=541415
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1437523005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360130}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool CustomButton::AcceleratorPressed(const ui::Accelerator& accelerator) {
// Should only handle accelerators when active. However, only top level
// widgets can be active, so for child widgets check if they are focused
// instead.
if ((IsChildWidget() && !FocusInChildWidget()) ||
(!IsChildWidget() && !GetWidget()->IsActive())) {
return false;
}
SetState(STATE_NORMAL);
ui::MouseEvent synthetic_event(
ui::ET_MOUSE_RELEASED, gfx::Point(), gfx::Point(), ui::EventTimeForNow(),
ui::EF_LEFT_MOUSE_BUTTON, ui::EF_LEFT_MOUSE_BUTTON);
NotifyClick(synthetic_event);
return true;
}
| 172,236 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void XMLHttpRequest::didFail(const ResourceError& error)
{
if (m_error)
return;
if (error.isCancellation()) {
m_exceptionCode = AbortError;
abortError();
return;
}
if (error.isTimeout()) {
didTimeout();
return;
}
if (error.domain() == errorDomainWebKitInternal)
logConsoleError(scriptExecutionContext(), "XMLHttpRequest cannot load " + error.failingURL() + ". " + error.localizedDescription());
m_exceptionCode = NetworkError;
networkError();
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void XMLHttpRequest::didFail(const ResourceError& error)
{
if (m_error)
return;
if (error.isCancellation()) {
handleDidCancel();
return;
}
if (error.isTimeout()) {
handleDidTimeout();
return;
}
if (error.domain() == errorDomainWebKitInternal)
logConsoleError(scriptExecutionContext(), "XMLHttpRequest cannot load " + error.failingURL() + ". " + error.localizedDescription());
handleNetworkError();
}
| 171,165 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int clie_5_attach(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port;
unsigned int pipe;
int j;
/* TH55 registers 2 ports.
Communication in from the UX50/TH55 uses bulk_in_endpointAddress
from port 0. Communication out to the UX50/TH55 uses
bulk_out_endpointAddress from port 1
Lets do a quick and dirty mapping
*/
/* some sanity check */
if (serial->num_ports < 2)
return -1;
/* port 0 now uses the modified endpoint Address */
port = serial->port[0];
port->bulk_out_endpointAddress =
serial->port[1]->bulk_out_endpointAddress;
pipe = usb_sndbulkpipe(serial->dev, port->bulk_out_endpointAddress);
for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(port->write_urbs); ++j)
port->write_urbs[j]->pipe = pipe;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: visor: fix crash on detecting device without write_urbs
The visor driver crashes in clie_5_attach() when a specially crafted USB
device without bulk-out endpoint is detected. This fix adds a check that
the device has proper configuration expected by the driver.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Fixes: cfb8da8f69b8 ("USB: visor: fix initialisation of UX50/TH55 devices")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: | static int clie_5_attach(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port;
unsigned int pipe;
int j;
/* TH55 registers 2 ports.
Communication in from the UX50/TH55 uses bulk_in_endpointAddress
from port 0. Communication out to the UX50/TH55 uses
bulk_out_endpointAddress from port 1
Lets do a quick and dirty mapping
*/
/* some sanity check */
if (serial->num_bulk_out < 2) {
dev_err(&serial->interface->dev, "missing bulk out endpoints\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
/* port 0 now uses the modified endpoint Address */
port = serial->port[0];
port->bulk_out_endpointAddress =
serial->port[1]->bulk_out_endpointAddress;
pipe = usb_sndbulkpipe(serial->dev, port->bulk_out_endpointAddress);
for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(port->write_urbs); ++j)
port->write_urbs[j]->pipe = pipe;
return 0;
}
| 167,557 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gs_heap_alloc_bytes(gs_memory_t * mem, uint size, client_name_t cname)
{
gs_malloc_memory_t *mmem = (gs_malloc_memory_t *) mem;
byte *ptr = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
const char *msg;
static const char *const ok_msg = "OK";
# define set_msg(str) (msg = (str))
#else
# define set_msg(str) DO_NOTHING
#endif
/* Exclusive acces so our decisions and changes are 'atomic' */
if (mmem->monitor)
gx_monitor_enter(mmem->monitor);
if (size > mmem->limit - sizeof(gs_malloc_block_t)) {
/* Definitely too large to allocate; also avoids overflow. */
set_msg("exceeded limit");
} else {
uint added = size + sizeof(gs_malloc_block_t);
if (mmem->limit - added < mmem->used)
set_msg("exceeded limit");
else if ((ptr = (byte *) Memento_label(malloc(added), cname)) == 0)
set_msg("failed");
else {
gs_malloc_block_t *bp = (gs_malloc_block_t *) ptr;
/*
* We would like to check that malloc aligns blocks at least as
* strictly as the compiler (as defined by ARCH_ALIGN_MEMORY_MOD).
* However, Microsoft VC 6 does not satisfy this requirement.
* See gsmemory.h for more explanation.
*/
set_msg(ok_msg);
if (mmem->allocated)
mmem->allocated->prev = bp;
bp->next = mmem->allocated;
bp->prev = 0;
bp->size = size;
bp->type = &st_bytes;
bp->cname = cname;
mmem->allocated = bp;
ptr = (byte *) (bp + 1);
mmem->used += size + sizeof(gs_malloc_block_t);
if (mmem->used > mmem->max_used)
mmem->max_used = mmem->used;
}
}
if (mmem->monitor)
gx_monitor_leave(mmem->monitor); /* Done with exclusive access */
/* We don't want to 'fill' under mutex to keep the window smaller */
if (ptr)
gs_alloc_fill(ptr, gs_alloc_fill_alloc, size);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (gs_debug_c('a') || msg != ok_msg)
dmlprintf6(mem, "[a+]gs_malloc(%s)(%u) = 0x%lx: %s, used=%ld, max=%ld\n",
client_name_string(cname), size, (ulong) ptr, msg, mmem->used, mmem->max_used);
#endif
return ptr;
#undef set_msg
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | gs_heap_alloc_bytes(gs_memory_t * mem, uint size, client_name_t cname)
{
gs_malloc_memory_t *mmem = (gs_malloc_memory_t *) mem;
byte *ptr = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
const char *msg;
static const char *const ok_msg = "OK";
# define set_msg(str) (msg = (str))
#else
# define set_msg(str) DO_NOTHING
#endif
/* Exclusive acces so our decisions and changes are 'atomic' */
if (mmem->monitor)
gx_monitor_enter(mmem->monitor);
if (size > mmem->limit - sizeof(gs_malloc_block_t)) {
/* Definitely too large to allocate; also avoids overflow. */
set_msg("exceeded limit");
} else {
uint added = size + sizeof(gs_malloc_block_t);
if (added <= size || mmem->limit - added < mmem->used)
set_msg("exceeded limit");
else if ((ptr = (byte *) Memento_label(malloc(added), cname)) == 0)
set_msg("failed");
else {
gs_malloc_block_t *bp = (gs_malloc_block_t *) ptr;
/*
* We would like to check that malloc aligns blocks at least as
* strictly as the compiler (as defined by ARCH_ALIGN_MEMORY_MOD).
* However, Microsoft VC 6 does not satisfy this requirement.
* See gsmemory.h for more explanation.
*/
set_msg(ok_msg);
if (mmem->allocated)
mmem->allocated->prev = bp;
bp->next = mmem->allocated;
bp->prev = 0;
bp->size = size;
bp->type = &st_bytes;
bp->cname = cname;
mmem->allocated = bp;
ptr = (byte *) (bp + 1);
mmem->used += size + sizeof(gs_malloc_block_t);
if (mmem->used > mmem->max_used)
mmem->max_used = mmem->used;
}
}
if (mmem->monitor)
gx_monitor_leave(mmem->monitor); /* Done with exclusive access */
/* We don't want to 'fill' under mutex to keep the window smaller */
if (ptr)
gs_alloc_fill(ptr, gs_alloc_fill_alloc, size);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (gs_debug_c('a') || msg != ok_msg)
dmlprintf6(mem, "[a+]gs_malloc(%s)(%u) = 0x%lx: %s, used=%ld, max=%ld\n",
client_name_string(cname), size, (ulong) ptr, msg, mmem->used, mmem->max_used);
#endif
return ptr;
#undef set_msg
}
| 164,715 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void *hashtable_iter_at(hashtable_t *hashtable, const char *key)
{
pair_t *pair;
size_t hash;
bucket_t *bucket;
hash = hash_str(key);
bucket = &hashtable->buckets[hash % num_buckets(hashtable)];
pair = hashtable_find_pair(hashtable, bucket, key, hash);
if(!pair)
return NULL;
return &pair->list;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | void *hashtable_iter_at(hashtable_t *hashtable, const char *key)
{
pair_t *pair;
size_t hash;
bucket_t *bucket;
hash = hash_str(key);
bucket = &hashtable->buckets[hash & hashmask(hashtable->order)];
pair = hashtable_find_pair(hashtable, bucket, key, hash);
if(!pair)
return NULL;
return &pair->list;
}
| 166,532 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jpc_pi_nextrpcl(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
int rlvlno;
jpc_pirlvl_t *pirlvl;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int prchind;
int prcvind;
int *prclyrno;
int compno;
jpc_picomp_t *picomp;
int xstep;
int ystep;
uint_fast32_t r;
uint_fast32_t rpx;
uint_fast32_t rpy;
uint_fast32_t trx0;
uint_fast32_t try0;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
goto skip;
} else {
pi->xstep = 0;
pi->ystep = 0;
for (compno = 0, picomp = pi->picomps; compno < pi->numcomps;
++compno, ++picomp) {
for (rlvlno = 0, pirlvl = picomp->pirlvls; rlvlno <
picomp->numrlvls; ++rlvlno, ++pirlvl) {
xstep = picomp->hsamp * (1 << (pirlvl->prcwidthexpn +
picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1));
ystep = picomp->vsamp * (1 << (pirlvl->prcheightexpn +
picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1));
pi->xstep = (!pi->xstep) ? xstep : JAS_MIN(pi->xstep, xstep);
pi->ystep = (!pi->ystep) ? ystep : JAS_MIN(pi->ystep, ystep);
}
}
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart; pi->rlvlno < pchg->rlvlnoend &&
pi->rlvlno < pi->maxrlvls; ++pi->rlvlno) {
for (pi->y = pi->ystart; pi->y < pi->yend; pi->y +=
pi->ystep - (pi->y % pi->ystep)) {
for (pi->x = pi->xstart; pi->x < pi->xend; pi->x +=
pi->xstep - (pi->x % pi->xstep)) {
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart,
pi->picomp = &pi->picomps[pi->compno];
pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend) && pi->compno <
pi->numcomps; ++pi->compno, ++pi->picomp) {
if (pi->rlvlno >= pi->picomp->numrlvls) {
continue;
}
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
if (pi->pirlvl->numprcs == 0) {
continue;
}
r = pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1 - pi->rlvlno;
rpx = r + pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rpy = r + pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn;
trx0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->xstart, pi->picomp->hsamp << r);
try0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->ystart, pi->picomp->vsamp << r);
if (((pi->x == pi->xstart && ((trx0 << r) % (1 << rpx)))
|| !(pi->x % (1 << rpx))) &&
((pi->y == pi->ystart && ((try0 << r) % (1 << rpy)))
|| !(pi->y % (1 << rpy)))) {
prchind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->x, pi->picomp->hsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(trx0,
pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn);
prcvind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->y, pi->picomp->vsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(try0,
pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn);
pi->prcno = prcvind * pi->pirlvl->numhprcs + prchind;
assert(pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno <
pi->numlyrs && pi->lyrno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->lyrnoend); ++pi->lyrno) {
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed numerous integer overflow problems in the code for packet iterators
in the JPC decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int jpc_pi_nextrpcl(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
int rlvlno;
jpc_pirlvl_t *pirlvl;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int prchind;
int prcvind;
int *prclyrno;
int compno;
jpc_picomp_t *picomp;
int xstep;
int ystep;
uint_fast32_t r;
uint_fast32_t rpx;
uint_fast32_t rpy;
uint_fast32_t trx0;
uint_fast32_t try0;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
goto skip;
} else {
pi->xstep = 0;
pi->ystep = 0;
for (compno = 0, picomp = pi->picomps; compno < pi->numcomps;
++compno, ++picomp) {
for (rlvlno = 0, pirlvl = picomp->pirlvls; rlvlno <
picomp->numrlvls; ++rlvlno, ++pirlvl) {
// Check for the potential for overflow problems.
if (pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls >
JAS_UINTFAST32_NUMBITS - 2 ||
pirlvl->prcheightexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls >
JAS_UINTFAST32_NUMBITS - 2) {
return -1;
}
xstep = picomp->hsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1));
ystep = picomp->vsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcheightexpn + picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1));
pi->xstep = (!pi->xstep) ? xstep : JAS_MIN(pi->xstep, xstep);
pi->ystep = (!pi->ystep) ? ystep : JAS_MIN(pi->ystep, ystep);
}
}
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart; pi->rlvlno < pchg->rlvlnoend &&
pi->rlvlno < pi->maxrlvls; ++pi->rlvlno) {
for (pi->y = pi->ystart; pi->y < pi->yend; pi->y +=
pi->ystep - (pi->y % pi->ystep)) {
for (pi->x = pi->xstart; pi->x < pi->xend; pi->x +=
pi->xstep - (pi->x % pi->xstep)) {
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart,
pi->picomp = &pi->picomps[pi->compno];
pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend) && pi->compno <
pi->numcomps; ++pi->compno, ++pi->picomp) {
if (pi->rlvlno >= pi->picomp->numrlvls) {
continue;
}
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
if (pi->pirlvl->numprcs == 0) {
continue;
}
r = pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1 - pi->rlvlno;
rpx = r + pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rpy = r + pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn;
trx0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->xstart, pi->picomp->hsamp << r);
try0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->ystart, pi->picomp->vsamp << r);
if (((pi->x == pi->xstart &&
((trx0 << r) % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpx)))
|| !(pi->x % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpx))) &&
((pi->y == pi->ystart &&
((try0 << r) % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpy)))
|| !(pi->y % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpy)))) {
prchind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->x,
pi->picomp->hsamp << r), pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn) -
JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(trx0, pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn);
prcvind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->y,
pi->picomp->vsamp << r), pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn) -
JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(try0, pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn);
pi->prcno = prcvind * pi->pirlvl->numhprcs + prchind;
assert(pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno <
pi->numlyrs && pi->lyrno < JAS_CAST(int,
pchg->lyrnoend); ++pi->lyrno) {
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
| 169,442 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool check_allocations(ASS_Shaper *shaper, size_t new_size)
{
if (new_size > shaper->n_glyphs) {
if (!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->event_text, new_size) ||
!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->ctypes, new_size) ||
!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->emblevels, new_size) ||
!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->cmap, new_size))
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: shaper: fix reallocation
Update the variable that tracks the allocated size. This potentially
improves performance and avoid some side effects, which lead to
undefined behavior in some cases.
Fixes fuzzer test case id:000051,sig:11,sync:fuzzer3,src:004221.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static bool check_allocations(ASS_Shaper *shaper, size_t new_size)
{
if (new_size > shaper->n_glyphs) {
if (!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->event_text, new_size) ||
!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->ctypes, new_size) ||
!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->emblevels, new_size) ||
!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->cmap, new_size))
return false;
shaper->n_glyphs = new_size;
}
return true;
}
| 168,774 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SocketStream::set_context(URLRequestContext* context) {
const URLRequestContext* prev_context = context_.get();
if (context) {
context_ = context->AsWeakPtr();
} else {
context_.reset();
}
if (prev_context != context) {
if (prev_context && pac_request_) {
prev_context->proxy_service()->CancelPacRequest(pac_request_);
pac_request_ = NULL;
}
net_log_.EndEvent(NetLog::TYPE_REQUEST_ALIVE);
net_log_ = BoundNetLog();
if (context) {
net_log_ = BoundNetLog::Make(
context->net_log(),
NetLog::SOURCE_SOCKET_STREAM);
net_log_.BeginEvent(NetLog::TYPE_REQUEST_ALIVE);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void SocketStream::set_context(URLRequestContext* context) {
const URLRequestContext* prev_context = context_;
context_ = context;
if (prev_context != context) {
if (prev_context && pac_request_) {
prev_context->proxy_service()->CancelPacRequest(pac_request_);
pac_request_ = NULL;
}
net_log_.EndEvent(NetLog::TYPE_REQUEST_ALIVE);
net_log_ = BoundNetLog();
if (context) {
net_log_ = BoundNetLog::Make(
context->net_log(),
NetLog::SOURCE_SOCKET_STREAM);
net_log_.BeginEvent(NetLog::TYPE_REQUEST_ALIVE);
}
}
}
| 171,257 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PrintPreviewMessageHandler::PrintPreviewMessageHandler(
WebContents* web_contents)
: content::WebContentsObserver(web_contents) {
DCHECK(web_contents);
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | PrintPreviewMessageHandler::PrintPreviewMessageHandler(
WebContents* web_contents)
: content::WebContentsObserver(web_contents), weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(web_contents);
}
| 171,891 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InProcessBrowserTest::PrepareTestCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) {
test_launcher_utils::PrepareBrowserCommandLineForTests(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kTestType, kBrowserTestType);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAshBrowserTests)) {
command_line->AppendSwitchNative(switches::kViewerLaunchViaAppId,
win8::test::kDefaultTestAppUserModelId);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kSilentLaunch);
}
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::FilePath subprocess_path;
PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &subprocess_path);
subprocess_path = subprocess_path.DirName().DirName();
DCHECK_EQ(subprocess_path.BaseName().value(), "Contents");
subprocess_path =
subprocess_path.Append("Versions").Append(chrome::kChromeVersion);
subprocess_path =
subprocess_path.Append(chrome::kHelperProcessExecutablePath);
command_line->AppendSwitchPath(switches::kBrowserSubprocessPath,
subprocess_path);
#endif
if (exit_when_last_browser_closes_)
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableZeroBrowsersOpenForTests);
if (command_line->GetArgs().empty())
command_line->AppendArg(url::kAboutBlankURL);
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void InProcessBrowserTest::PrepareTestCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) {
test_launcher_utils::PrepareBrowserCommandLineForTests(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kTestType, kBrowserTestType);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAshBrowserTests)) {
command_line->AppendSwitchNative(switches::kViewerLaunchViaAppId,
win8::test::kDefaultTestAppUserModelId);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kSilentLaunch);
}
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::FilePath subprocess_path;
PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &subprocess_path);
subprocess_path = subprocess_path.DirName().DirName();
DCHECK_EQ(subprocess_path.BaseName().value(), "Contents");
subprocess_path =
subprocess_path.Append("Versions").Append(chrome::kChromeVersion);
subprocess_path =
subprocess_path.Append(chrome::kHelperProcessExecutablePath);
command_line->AppendSwitchPath(switches::kBrowserSubprocessPath,
subprocess_path);
#endif
if (exit_when_last_browser_closes_)
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableZeroBrowsersOpenForTests);
if (open_about_blank_on_browser_launch_ && command_line->GetArgs().empty())
command_line->AppendArg(url::kAboutBlankURL);
}
| 171,152 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int readpng2_init(mainprog_info *mainprog_ptr)
{
png_structp png_ptr; /* note: temporary variables! */
png_infop info_ptr;
/* could also replace libpng warning-handler (final NULL), but no need: */
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, mainprog_ptr,
readpng2_error_handler, readpng2_warning_handler);
if (!png_ptr)
return 4; /* out of memory */
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
return 4; /* out of memory */
}
/* we could create a second info struct here (end_info), but it's only
* useful if we want to keep pre- and post-IDAT chunk info separated
* (mainly for PNG-aware image editors and converters) */
/* setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a PNG-reading
* libpng function, unless an alternate error handler was installed--
* but compatible error handlers must either use longjmp() themselves
* (as in this program) or exit immediately, so here we are: */
if (setjmp(mainprog_ptr->jmpbuf)) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return 2;
}
#ifdef PNG_HANDLE_AS_UNKNOWN_SUPPORTED
/* prepare the reader to ignore all recognized chunks whose data won't be
* used, i.e., all chunks recognized by libpng except for IHDR, PLTE, IDAT,
* IEND, tRNS, bKGD, gAMA, and sRGB (small performance improvement) */
{
/* These byte strings were copied from png.h. If a future version
* of readpng2.c recognizes more chunks, add them to this list.
*/
static PNG_CONST png_byte chunks_to_process[] = {
98, 75, 71, 68, '\0', /* bKGD */
103, 65, 77, 65, '\0', /* gAMA */
115, 82, 71, 66, '\0', /* sRGB */
};
/* Ignore all chunks except for IHDR, PLTE, tRNS, IDAT, and IEND */
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_ptr, -1 /* PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_NEVER */,
NULL, -1);
/* But do not ignore chunks in the "chunks_to_process" list */
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_ptr,
0 /* PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_AS_DEFAULT */, chunks_to_process,
sizeof(chunks_to_process)/5);
}
#endif /* PNG_HANDLE_AS_UNKNOWN_SUPPORTED */
/* instead of doing png_init_io() here, now we set up our callback
* functions for progressive decoding */
png_set_progressive_read_fn(png_ptr, mainprog_ptr,
readpng2_info_callback, readpng2_row_callback, readpng2_end_callback);
/* make sure we save our pointers for use in readpng2_decode_data() */
mainprog_ptr->png_ptr = png_ptr;
mainprog_ptr->info_ptr = info_ptr;
/* and that's all there is to initialization */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | int readpng2_init(mainprog_info *mainprog_ptr)
{
png_structp png_ptr; /* note: temporary variables! */
png_infop info_ptr;
/* could also replace libpng warning-handler (final NULL), but no need: */
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(png_get_libpng_ver(NULL), mainprog_ptr,
readpng2_error_handler, readpng2_warning_handler);
if (!png_ptr)
return 4; /* out of memory */
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
return 4; /* out of memory */
}
/* we could create a second info struct here (end_info), but it's only
* useful if we want to keep pre- and post-IDAT chunk info separated
* (mainly for PNG-aware image editors and converters) */
/* setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a PNG-reading
* libpng function, unless an alternate error handler was installed--
* but compatible error handlers must either use longjmp() themselves
* (as in this program) or exit immediately, so here we are: */
if (setjmp(mainprog_ptr->jmpbuf)) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return 2;
}
#ifdef PNG_HANDLE_AS_UNKNOWN_SUPPORTED
/* prepare the reader to ignore all recognized chunks whose data won't be
* used, i.e., all chunks recognized by libpng except for IHDR, PLTE, IDAT,
* IEND, tRNS, bKGD, gAMA, and sRGB (small performance improvement) */
{
/* These byte strings were copied from png.h. If a future version
* of readpng2.c recognizes more chunks, add them to this list.
*/
static PNG_CONST png_byte chunks_to_process[] = {
98, 75, 71, 68, '\0', /* bKGD */
103, 65, 77, 65, '\0', /* gAMA */
115, 82, 71, 66, '\0', /* sRGB */
};
/* Ignore all chunks except for IHDR, PLTE, tRNS, IDAT, and IEND */
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_ptr, -1 /* PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_NEVER */,
NULL, -1);
/* But do not ignore chunks in the "chunks_to_process" list */
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_ptr,
0 /* PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_AS_DEFAULT */, chunks_to_process,
sizeof(chunks_to_process)/5);
}
#endif /* PNG_HANDLE_AS_UNKNOWN_SUPPORTED */
/* instead of doing png_init_io() here, now we set up our callback
* functions for progressive decoding */
png_set_progressive_read_fn(png_ptr, mainprog_ptr,
readpng2_info_callback, readpng2_row_callback, readpng2_end_callback);
/* make sure we save our pointers for use in readpng2_decode_data() */
mainprog_ptr->png_ptr = png_ptr;
mainprog_ptr->info_ptr = info_ptr;
/* and that's all there is to initialization */
return 0;
}
| 173,570 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int store_asoundrc(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
/* coverity[toctou] */
char* rp = realpath(src, NULL);
if (!rp) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: Cannot access %s\n", src);
exit(1);
}
if (strncmp(rp, cfg.homedir, strlen(cfg.homedir)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: .asoundrc is a symbolic link pointing to a file outside home directory\n");
exit(1);
}
free(rp);
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | static int store_asoundrc(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE;
// create an empty file as root, and change ownership to user
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
/* coverity[toctou] */
char* rp = realpath(src, NULL);
if (!rp) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: Cannot access %s\n", src);
exit(1);
}
if (strncmp(rp, cfg.homedir, strlen(cfg.homedir)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: .asoundrc is a symbolic link pointing to a file outside home directory\n");
exit(1);
}
free(rp);
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
| 168,372 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateDevToolsForContents(WebContents* contents) {
TRACE_EVENT0("ui::gtk", "BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateDevToolsForContents");
DevToolsWindow* new_devtools_window = contents ?
DevToolsWindow::GetDockedInstanceForInspectedTab(contents) : NULL;
if (devtools_window_ == new_devtools_window && (!new_devtools_window ||
new_devtools_window->dock_side() == devtools_dock_side_))
return;
if (devtools_window_ != new_devtools_window) {
if (devtools_window_)
devtools_container_->DetachTab(devtools_window_->tab_contents());
devtools_container_->SetTab(
new_devtools_window ? new_devtools_window->tab_contents() : NULL);
if (new_devtools_window) {
new_devtools_window->tab_contents()->web_contents()->WasShown();
}
}
if (devtools_window_) {
GtkAllocation contents_rect;
gtk_widget_get_allocation(contents_vsplit_, &contents_rect);
if (devtools_dock_side_ == DEVTOOLS_DOCK_SIDE_RIGHT) {
devtools_window_->SetWidth(
contents_rect.width -
gtk_paned_get_position(GTK_PANED(contents_hsplit_)));
} else {
devtools_window_->SetHeight(
contents_rect.height -
gtk_paned_get_position(GTK_PANED(contents_vsplit_)));
}
}
bool should_hide = devtools_window_ && (!new_devtools_window ||
devtools_dock_side_ != new_devtools_window->dock_side());
bool should_show = new_devtools_window && (!devtools_window_ || should_hide);
if (should_hide)
HideDevToolsContainer();
devtools_window_ = new_devtools_window;
if (should_show) {
devtools_dock_side_ = new_devtools_window->dock_side();
ShowDevToolsContainer();
} else if (new_devtools_window) {
UpdateDevToolsSplitPosition();
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateDevToolsForContents(WebContents* contents) {
TRACE_EVENT0("ui::gtk", "BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateDevToolsForContents");
DevToolsWindow* new_devtools_window = contents ?
DevToolsWindow::GetDockedInstanceForInspectedTab(contents) : NULL;
if (devtools_window_ == new_devtools_window && (!new_devtools_window ||
new_devtools_window->dock_side() == devtools_dock_side_))
return;
if (devtools_window_ != new_devtools_window) {
if (devtools_window_) {
devtools_container_->DetachTab(
devtools_window_->tab_contents()->web_contents());
}
devtools_container_->SetTab(
new_devtools_window ? new_devtools_window->tab_contents() : NULL);
if (new_devtools_window) {
new_devtools_window->tab_contents()->web_contents()->WasShown();
}
}
if (devtools_window_) {
GtkAllocation contents_rect;
gtk_widget_get_allocation(contents_vsplit_, &contents_rect);
if (devtools_dock_side_ == DEVTOOLS_DOCK_SIDE_RIGHT) {
devtools_window_->SetWidth(
contents_rect.width -
gtk_paned_get_position(GTK_PANED(contents_hsplit_)));
} else {
devtools_window_->SetHeight(
contents_rect.height -
gtk_paned_get_position(GTK_PANED(contents_vsplit_)));
}
}
bool should_hide = devtools_window_ && (!new_devtools_window ||
devtools_dock_side_ != new_devtools_window->dock_side());
bool should_show = new_devtools_window && (!devtools_window_ || should_hide);
if (should_hide)
HideDevToolsContainer();
devtools_window_ = new_devtools_window;
if (should_show) {
devtools_dock_side_ = new_devtools_window->dock_side();
ShowDevToolsContainer();
} else if (new_devtools_window) {
UpdateDevToolsSplitPosition();
}
}
| 171,514 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool InputWindowInfo::frameContainsPoint(int32_t x, int32_t y) const {
return x >= frameLeft && x <= frameRight
&& y >= frameTop && y <= frameBottom;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool InputWindowInfo::frameContainsPoint(int32_t x, int32_t y) const {
return x >= frameLeft && x < frameRight
&& y >= frameTop && y < frameBottom;
}
| 174,169 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static PHP_GINIT_FUNCTION(libxml)
{
libxml_globals->stream_context = NULL;
libxml_globals->error_buffer.c = NULL;
libxml_globals->error_list = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static PHP_GINIT_FUNCTION(libxml)
{
libxml_globals->stream_context = NULL;
libxml_globals->error_buffer.c = NULL;
libxml_globals->error_list = NULL;
libxml_globals->entity_loader_disabled = 0;
}
| 164,744 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ntlm_print_negotiate_flags(UINT32 flags)
{
int i;
const char* str;
WLog_INFO(TAG, "negotiateFlags \"0x%08"PRIX32"\"", flags);
for (i = 31; i >= 0; i--)
{
if ((flags >> i) & 1)
{
str = NTLM_NEGOTIATE_STRINGS[(31 - i)];
WLog_INFO(TAG, "\t%s (%d),", str, (31 - i));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void ntlm_print_negotiate_flags(UINT32 flags)
static void ntlm_print_negotiate_flags(UINT32 flags)
{
int i;
const char* str;
WLog_INFO(TAG, "negotiateFlags \"0x%08"PRIX32"\"", flags);
for (i = 31; i >= 0; i--)
{
if ((flags >> i) & 1)
{
str = NTLM_NEGOTIATE_STRINGS[(31 - i)];
WLog_INFO(TAG, "\t%s (%d),", str, (31 - i));
}
}
}
| 169,275 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char *create_output_name(unsigned char *fname, unsigned char *dir,
int lower, int isunix, int utf8)
{
unsigned char *p, *name, c, *fe, sep, slash;
unsigned int x;
sep = (isunix) ? '/' : '\\'; /* the path-seperator */
slash = (isunix) ? '\\' : '/'; /* the other slash */
/* length of filename */
x = strlen((char *) fname);
/* UTF8 worst case scenario: tolower() expands all chars from 1 to 3 bytes */
if (utf8) x *= 3;
/* length of output directory */
if (dir) x += strlen((char *) dir);
if (!(name = (unsigned char *) malloc(x + 2))) {
fprintf(stderr, "out of memory!\n");
return NULL;
}
/* start with blank name */
*name = '\0';
/* add output directory if needed */
if (dir) {
strcpy((char *) name, (char *) dir);
strcat((char *) name, "/");
}
/* remove leading slashes */
while (*fname == sep) fname++;
/* copy from fi->filename to new name, converting MS-DOS slashes to UNIX
* slashes as we go. Also lowercases characters if needed.
*/
p = &name[strlen((char *)name)];
fe = &fname[strlen((char *)fname)];
if (utf8) {
/* UTF8 translates two-byte unicode characters into 1, 2 or 3 bytes.
* %000000000xxxxxxx -> %0xxxxxxx
* %00000xxxxxyyyyyy -> %110xxxxx %10yyyyyy
* %xxxxyyyyyyzzzzzz -> %1110xxxx %10yyyyyy %10zzzzzz
*
* Therefore, the inverse is as follows:
* First char:
* 0x00 - 0x7F = one byte char
* 0x80 - 0xBF = invalid
* 0xC0 - 0xDF = 2 byte char (next char only 0x80-0xBF is valid)
* 0xE0 - 0xEF = 3 byte char (next 2 chars only 0x80-0xBF is valid)
* 0xF0 - 0xFF = invalid
*/
do {
if (fname >= fe) {
free(name);
return NULL;
}
/* get next UTF8 char */
if ((c = *fname++) < 0x80) x = c;
else {
if ((c >= 0xC0) && (c < 0xE0)) {
x = (c & 0x1F) << 6;
x |= *fname++ & 0x3F;
}
else if ((c >= 0xE0) && (c < 0xF0)) {
x = (c & 0xF) << 12;
x |= (*fname++ & 0x3F) << 6;
x |= *fname++ & 0x3F;
}
else x = '?';
}
/* whatever is the path seperator -> '/'
* whatever is the other slash -> '\\'
* otherwise, if lower is set, the lowercase version */
if (x == sep) x = '/';
else if (x == slash) x = '\\';
else if (lower) x = (unsigned int) tolower((int) x);
/* integer back to UTF8 */
if (x < 0x80) {
*p++ = (unsigned char) x;
}
else if (x < 0x800) {
*p++ = 0xC0 | (x >> 6);
*p++ = 0x80 | (x & 0x3F);
}
else {
*p++ = 0xE0 | (x >> 12);
*p++ = 0x80 | ((x >> 6) & 0x3F);
*p++ = 0x80 | (x & 0x3F);
}
} while (x);
}
else {
/* regular non-utf8 version */
do {
c = *fname++;
if (c == sep) c = '/';
else if (c == slash) c = '\\';
else if (lower) c = (unsigned char) tolower((int) c);
} while ((*p++ = c));
}
return (char *) name;
}
Commit Message: add anti "../" and leading slash protection to chmextract
CWE ID: CWE-22 | static char *create_output_name(unsigned char *fname, unsigned char *dir,
char *create_output_name(char *fname) {
char *out, *p;
if ((out = malloc(strlen(fname) + 1))) {
/* remove leading slashes */
while (*fname == '/' || *fname == '\\') fname++;
/* if that removes all characters, just call it "x" */
strcpy(out, (*fname) ? fname : "x");
/* change "../" to "xx/" */
for (p = out; *p; p++) {
if (p[0] == '.' && p[1] == '.' && (p[2] == '/' || p[2] == '\\')) {
p[0] = p[1] = 'x';
}
}
}
return out;
}
| 169,001 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DECLAREwriteFunc(writeBufferToContigTiles)
{
uint32 imagew = TIFFScanlineSize(out);
uint32 tilew = TIFFTileRowSize(out);
int iskew = imagew - tilew;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(out);
tdata_t obuf;
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
uint32 tl, tw;
uint32 row;
(void) spp;
obuf = _TIFFmalloc(TIFFTileSize(out));
if (obuf == NULL)
return 0;
_TIFFmemset(obuf, 0, tilesize);
(void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl);
(void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw);
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tilelength) {
uint32 nrow = (row+tl > imagelength) ? imagelength-row : tl;
uint32 colb = 0;
uint32 col;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw) {
/*
* Tile is clipped horizontally. Calculate
* visible portion and skewing factors.
*/
if (colb + tilew > imagew) {
uint32 width = imagew - colb;
int oskew = tilew - width;
cpStripToTile(obuf, bufp + colb, nrow, width,
oskew, oskew + iskew);
} else
cpStripToTile(obuf, bufp + colb, nrow, tilew,
0, iskew);
if (TIFFWriteTile(out, obuf, col, row, 0, 0) < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, can't write tile at %lu %lu",
(unsigned long) col,
(unsigned long) row);
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 0;
}
colb += tilew;
}
bufp += nrow * imagew;
}
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd
tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103
by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | DECLAREwriteFunc(writeBufferToContigTiles)
{
uint32 imagew = TIFFScanlineSize(out);
uint32 tilew = TIFFTileRowSize(out);
int iskew = imagew - tilew;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(out);
tdata_t obuf;
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
uint32 tl, tw;
uint32 row;
(void) spp;
obuf = _TIFFmalloc(TIFFTileSize(out));
if (obuf == NULL)
return 0;
_TIFFmemset(obuf, 0, tilesize);
(void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl);
(void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw);
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tilelength) {
uint32 nrow = (row+tl > imagelength) ? imagelength-row : tl;
uint32 colb = 0;
uint32 col;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth && colb < imagew; col += tw) {
/*
* Tile is clipped horizontally. Calculate
* visible portion and skewing factors.
*/
if (colb + tilew > imagew) {
uint32 width = imagew - colb;
int oskew = tilew - width;
cpStripToTile(obuf, bufp + colb, nrow, width,
oskew, oskew + iskew);
} else
cpStripToTile(obuf, bufp + colb, nrow, tilew,
0, iskew);
if (TIFFWriteTile(out, obuf, col, row, 0, 0) < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, can't write tile at %lu %lu",
(unsigned long) col,
(unsigned long) row);
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 0;
}
colb += tilew;
}
bufp += nrow * imagew;
}
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 1;
}
| 166,863 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void cJSON_AddItemToArray( cJSON *array, cJSON *item )
{
cJSON *c = array->child;
if ( ! item )
return;
if ( ! c ) {
array->child = item;
} else {
while ( c && c->next )
c = c->next;
suffix_object( c, item );
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void cJSON_AddItemToArray( cJSON *array, cJSON *item )
| 167,267 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void mpage_put_bnr_to_bhs(struct mpage_da_data *mpd, sector_t logical,
struct buffer_head *exbh)
{
struct inode *inode = mpd->inode;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
int blocks = exbh->b_size >> inode->i_blkbits;
sector_t pblock = exbh->b_blocknr, cur_logical;
struct buffer_head *head, *bh;
pgoff_t index, end;
struct pagevec pvec;
int nr_pages, i;
index = logical >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
end = (logical + blocks - 1) >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
cur_logical = index << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
pagevec_init(&pvec, 0);
while (index <= end) {
/* XXX: optimize tail */
nr_pages = pagevec_lookup(&pvec, mapping, index, PAGEVEC_SIZE);
if (nr_pages == 0)
break;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
index = page->index;
if (index > end)
break;
index++;
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
BUG_ON(PageWriteback(page));
BUG_ON(!page_has_buffers(page));
bh = page_buffers(page);
head = bh;
/* skip blocks out of the range */
do {
if (cur_logical >= logical)
break;
cur_logical++;
} while ((bh = bh->b_this_page) != head);
do {
if (cur_logical >= logical + blocks)
break;
if (buffer_delay(bh) ||
buffer_unwritten(bh)) {
BUG_ON(bh->b_bdev != inode->i_sb->s_bdev);
if (buffer_delay(bh)) {
clear_buffer_delay(bh);
bh->b_blocknr = pblock;
} else {
/*
* unwritten already should have
* blocknr assigned. Verify that
*/
clear_buffer_unwritten(bh);
BUG_ON(bh->b_blocknr != pblock);
}
} else if (buffer_mapped(bh))
BUG_ON(bh->b_blocknr != pblock);
cur_logical++;
pblock++;
} while ((bh = bh->b_this_page) != head);
}
pagevec_release(&pvec);
}
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | static void mpage_put_bnr_to_bhs(struct mpage_da_data *mpd, sector_t logical,
struct buffer_head *exbh)
{
struct inode *inode = mpd->inode;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
int blocks = exbh->b_size >> inode->i_blkbits;
sector_t pblock = exbh->b_blocknr, cur_logical;
struct buffer_head *head, *bh;
pgoff_t index, end;
struct pagevec pvec;
int nr_pages, i;
index = logical >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
end = (logical + blocks - 1) >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
cur_logical = index << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
pagevec_init(&pvec, 0);
while (index <= end) {
/* XXX: optimize tail */
nr_pages = pagevec_lookup(&pvec, mapping, index, PAGEVEC_SIZE);
if (nr_pages == 0)
break;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
index = page->index;
if (index > end)
break;
index++;
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
BUG_ON(PageWriteback(page));
BUG_ON(!page_has_buffers(page));
bh = page_buffers(page);
head = bh;
/* skip blocks out of the range */
do {
if (cur_logical >= logical)
break;
cur_logical++;
} while ((bh = bh->b_this_page) != head);
do {
if (cur_logical >= logical + blocks)
break;
if (buffer_delay(bh) ||
buffer_unwritten(bh)) {
BUG_ON(bh->b_bdev != inode->i_sb->s_bdev);
if (buffer_delay(bh)) {
clear_buffer_delay(bh);
bh->b_blocknr = pblock;
} else {
/*
* unwritten already should have
* blocknr assigned. Verify that
*/
clear_buffer_unwritten(bh);
BUG_ON(bh->b_blocknr != pblock);
}
} else if (buffer_mapped(bh))
BUG_ON(bh->b_blocknr != pblock);
if (buffer_uninit(exbh))
set_buffer_uninit(bh);
cur_logical++;
pblock++;
} while ((bh = bh->b_this_page) != head);
}
pagevec_release(&pvec);
}
}
| 167,552 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: l2tp_framing_type_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_TYPE_ASYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_TYPE_SYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "S"));
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | l2tp_framing_type_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
l2tp_framing_type_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_TYPE_ASYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_TYPE_SYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "S"));
}
}
| 167,895 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionTtsController::SetPlatformImpl(
ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl* platform_impl) {
platform_impl_ = platform_impl;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ExtensionTtsController::SetPlatformImpl(
| 170,386 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const char* Chapters::Display::GetString() const
{
return m_string;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const char* Chapters::Display::GetString() const
| 174,359 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ShowExtensionInstallDialogImpl(
ExtensionInstallPromptShowParams* show_params,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::Delegate* delegate,
scoped_refptr<ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt> prompt) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
ExtensionInstallDialogView* dialog =
new ExtensionInstallDialogView(show_params->profile(),
show_params->GetParentWebContents(),
delegate,
prompt);
constrained_window::CreateBrowserModalDialogViews(
dialog, show_params->GetParentWindow())->Show();
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | void ShowExtensionInstallDialogImpl(
ExtensionInstallPromptShowParams* show_params,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::Delegate* delegate,
scoped_refptr<ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt> prompt) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
ExtensionInstallDialogView* dialog =
new ExtensionInstallDialogView(show_params->profile(),
show_params->GetParentWebContents(),
delegate,
prompt);
if (prompt->ShouldUseTabModalDialog()) {
content::WebContents* parent_web_contents =
show_params->GetParentWebContents();
if (parent_web_contents)
constrained_window::ShowWebModalDialogViews(dialog, parent_web_contents);
} else {
constrained_window::CreateBrowserModalDialogViews(
dialog, show_params->GetParentWindow())
->Show();
}
}
| 172,208 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: isoclns_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *p, u_int length, u_int caplen)
{
if (caplen <= 1) { /* enough bytes on the wire ? */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "|OSI"));
return;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "OSI NLPID %s (0x%02x): ", tok2str(nlpid_values, "Unknown", *p), *p));
switch (*p) {
case NLPID_CLNP:
if (!clnp_print(ndo, p, length))
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", caplen);
break;
case NLPID_ESIS:
esis_print(ndo, p, length);
return;
case NLPID_ISIS:
if (!isis_print(ndo, p, length))
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", caplen);
break;
case NLPID_NULLNS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength: %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
break;
case NLPID_Q933:
q933_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
case NLPID_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
case NLPID_IP6:
ip6_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
case NLPID_PPP:
ppp_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "OSI NLPID 0x%02x unknown", *p));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength: %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
if (caplen > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", caplen);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | isoclns_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
isoclns_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const uint8_t *p, u_int length)
{
if (!ND_TTEST(*p)) { /* enough bytes on the wire ? */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "|OSI"));
return;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "OSI NLPID %s (0x%02x): ", tok2str(nlpid_values, "Unknown", *p), *p));
switch (*p) {
case NLPID_CLNP:
if (!clnp_print(ndo, p, length))
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", length);
break;
case NLPID_ESIS:
esis_print(ndo, p, length);
return;
case NLPID_ISIS:
if (!isis_print(ndo, p, length))
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", length);
break;
case NLPID_NULLNS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength: %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
break;
case NLPID_Q933:
q933_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
case NLPID_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
case NLPID_IP6:
ip6_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
case NLPID_PPP:
ppp_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "OSI NLPID 0x%02x unknown", *p));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength: %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
if (length > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", length);
break;
}
}
| 167,947 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: create_principal3_2_svc(cprinc3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name, service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->rec.principal, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_ADD,
arg->rec.principal, &rp)
|| kadm5int_acl_impose_restrictions(handle->context,
&arg->rec, &arg->mask, rp)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
log_unauth("kadm5_create_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_create_principal_3((void *)handle,
&arg->rec, arg->mask,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->passwd);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_create_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | create_principal3_2_svc(cprinc3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->rec.principal, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_ADD,
arg->rec.principal, &rp)
|| kadm5int_acl_impose_restrictions(handle->context,
&arg->rec, &arg->mask, rp)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
log_unauth("kadm5_create_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_create_principal_3((void *)handle,
&arg->rec, arg->mask,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->passwd);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_create_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,509 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: hash_foreach_stringify (gpointer key, gpointer val, gpointer user_data)
{
const char *keystr = key;
const GValue *value = val;
GValue *sval;
GHashTable *ret = user_data;
sval = g_new0 (GValue, 1);
g_value_init (sval, G_TYPE_STRING);
if (!g_value_transform (value, sval))
g_assert_not_reached ();
g_hash_table_insert (ret, g_strdup (keystr), sval);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | hash_foreach_stringify (gpointer key, gpointer val, gpointer user_data)
| 165,087 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::GetLast(const BlockEntry*& pLast) const
{
for (;;)
{
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //error
{
pLast = NULL;
return status;
}
if (status > 0) //no new block
break;
}
if (m_entries_count <= 0)
{
pLast = NULL;
return 0;
}
assert(m_entries);
const long idx = m_entries_count - 1;
pLast = m_entries[idx];
assert(pLast);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Cluster::GetLast(const BlockEntry*& pLast) const
if (m_entries_count <= 0) {
pLast = NULL;
return 0;
}
assert(m_entries);
const long idx = m_entries_count - 1;
pLast = m_entries[idx];
assert(pLast);
return 0;
}
| 174,338 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SoftAACEncoder::~SoftAACEncoder() {
delete[] mInputFrame;
mInputFrame = NULL;
if (mEncoderHandle) {
CHECK_EQ(VO_ERR_NONE, mApiHandle->Uninit(mEncoderHandle));
mEncoderHandle = NULL;
}
delete mApiHandle;
mApiHandle = NULL;
delete mMemOperator;
mMemOperator = NULL;
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID: | SoftAACEncoder::~SoftAACEncoder() {
onReset();
if (mEncoderHandle) {
CHECK_EQ(VO_ERR_NONE, mApiHandle->Uninit(mEncoderHandle));
mEncoderHandle = NULL;
}
delete mApiHandle;
mApiHandle = NULL;
delete mMemOperator;
mMemOperator = NULL;
}
| 174,008 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BOOL transport_connect_nla(rdpTransport* transport)
{
freerdp* instance;
rdpSettings* settings;
if (transport->layer == TRANSPORT_LAYER_TSG)
return TRUE;
if (!transport_connect_tls(transport))
return FALSE;
/* Network Level Authentication */
if (transport->settings->Authentication != TRUE)
return TRUE;
settings = transport->settings;
instance = (freerdp*) settings->instance;
if (transport->credssp == NULL)
transport->credssp = credssp_new(instance, transport, settings);
if (credssp_authenticate(transport->credssp) < 0)
{
if (!connectErrorCode)
connectErrorCode = AUTHENTICATIONERROR;
fprintf(stderr, "Authentication failure, check credentials.\n"
"If credentials are valid, the NTLMSSP implementation may be to blame.\n");
credssp_free(transport->credssp);
return FALSE;
}
credssp_free(transport->credssp);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | BOOL transport_connect_nla(rdpTransport* transport)
{
freerdp* instance;
rdpSettings* settings;
if (transport->layer == TRANSPORT_LAYER_TSG)
return TRUE;
if (!transport_connect_tls(transport))
return FALSE;
/* Network Level Authentication */
if (transport->settings->Authentication != TRUE)
return TRUE;
settings = transport->settings;
instance = (freerdp*) settings->instance;
if (transport->credssp == NULL)
transport->credssp = credssp_new(instance, transport, settings);
if (credssp_authenticate(transport->credssp) < 0)
{
if (!connectErrorCode)
connectErrorCode = AUTHENTICATIONERROR;
fprintf(stderr, "Authentication failure, check credentials.\n"
"If credentials are valid, the NTLMSSP implementation may be to blame.\n");
credssp_free(transport->credssp);
transport->credssp = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
credssp_free(transport->credssp);
return TRUE;
}
| 167,602 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, setCsvControl)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char delimiter = ',', enclosure = '"', escape='\\';
char *delim = NULL, *enclo = NULL, *esc = NULL;
int d_len = 0, e_len = 0, esc_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|sss", &delim, &d_len, &enclo, &e_len, &esc, &esc_len) == SUCCESS) {
switch(ZEND_NUM_ARGS())
{
case 3:
if (esc_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "escape must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
escape = esc[0];
/* no break */
case 2:
if (e_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "enclosure must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
enclosure = enclo[0];
/* no break */
case 1:
if (d_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "delimiter must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
delimiter = delim[0];
/* no break */
case 0:
break;
}
intern->u.file.delimiter = delimiter;
intern->u.file.enclosure = enclosure;
intern->u.file.escape = escape;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, setCsvControl)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char delimiter = ',', enclosure = '"', escape='\\';
char *delim = NULL, *enclo = NULL, *esc = NULL;
int d_len = 0, e_len = 0, esc_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|sss", &delim, &d_len, &enclo, &e_len, &esc, &esc_len) == SUCCESS) {
switch(ZEND_NUM_ARGS())
{
case 3:
if (esc_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "escape must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
escape = esc[0];
/* no break */
case 2:
if (e_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "enclosure must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
enclosure = enclo[0];
/* no break */
case 1:
if (d_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "delimiter must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
delimiter = delim[0];
/* no break */
case 0:
break;
}
intern->u.file.delimiter = delimiter;
intern->u.file.enclosure = enclosure;
intern->u.file.escape = escape;
}
}
| 167,063 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_background_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
/* Check for tRNS first: */
if (that->have_tRNS && that->colour_type != PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this);
/* This is only necessary if the alpha value is less than 1. */
if (that->alphaf < 1)
{
/* Now we do the background calculation without any gamma correction. */
if (that->alphaf <= 0)
{
that->redf = data.redf;
that->greenf = data.greenf;
that->bluef = data.bluef;
that->rede = data.rede;
that->greene = data.greene;
that->bluee = data.bluee;
that->red_sBIT= data.red_sBIT;
that->green_sBIT= data.green_sBIT;
that->blue_sBIT= data.blue_sBIT;
}
else /* 0 < alpha < 1 */
{
double alf = 1 - that->alphaf;
that->redf = that->redf * that->alphaf + data.redf * alf;
that->rede = that->rede * that->alphaf + data.rede * alf +
DBL_EPSILON;
that->greenf = that->greenf * that->alphaf + data.greenf * alf;
that->greene = that->greene * that->alphaf + data.greene * alf +
DBL_EPSILON;
that->bluef = that->bluef * that->alphaf + data.bluef * alf;
that->bluee = that->bluee * that->alphaf + data.bluee * alf +
DBL_EPSILON;
}
/* Remove the alpha type and set the alpha (not in that order.) */
that->alphaf = 1;
that->alphae = 0;
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
that->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
else if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
that->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
/* PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE is not changed */
}
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_background_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_background_mod(const image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
const transform_display *display)
{
/* Check for tRNS first: */
if (that->have_tRNS && that->colour_type != PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this, 1/*for background*/);
/* This is only necessary if the alpha value is less than 1. */
if (that->alphaf < 1)
{
/* Now we do the background calculation without any gamma correction. */
if (that->alphaf <= 0)
{
that->redf = data.redf;
that->greenf = data.greenf;
that->bluef = data.bluef;
that->rede = data.rede;
that->greene = data.greene;
that->bluee = data.bluee;
that->red_sBIT= data.red_sBIT;
that->green_sBIT= data.green_sBIT;
that->blue_sBIT= data.blue_sBIT;
}
else /* 0 < alpha < 1 */
{
double alf = 1 - that->alphaf;
that->redf = that->redf * that->alphaf + data.redf * alf;
that->rede = that->rede * that->alphaf + data.rede * alf +
DBL_EPSILON;
that->greenf = that->greenf * that->alphaf + data.greenf * alf;
that->greene = that->greene * that->alphaf + data.greene * alf +
DBL_EPSILON;
that->bluef = that->bluef * that->alphaf + data.bluef * alf;
that->bluee = that->bluee * that->alphaf + data.bluee * alf +
DBL_EPSILON;
}
/* Remove the alpha type and set the alpha (not in that order.) */
that->alphaf = 1;
that->alphae = 0;
}
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
that->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
else if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
that->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
/* PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE is not changed */
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
| 173,624 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void TreeNodesRemoved(TreeModel* model, TreeModelNode* parent,
int start, int count) {
removed_count_++;
}
Commit Message: Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
R=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void TreeNodesRemoved(TreeModel* model, TreeModelNode* parent,
virtual void TreeNodesRemoved(TreeModel* model,
TreeModelNode* parent,
int start,
int count) OVERRIDE {
removed_count_++;
}
| 170,471 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool Cues::LoadCuePoint() const {
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
if (m_pos >= stop)
return false; // nothing else to do
Init();
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
while (m_pos < stop) {
const long long idpos = m_pos;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, m_pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((m_pos + len) <= stop);
m_pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, m_pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((m_pos + len) <= stop);
m_pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((m_pos + size) <= stop);
if (id != 0x3B) { // CuePoint ID
m_pos += size; // consume payload
assert(m_pos <= stop);
continue;
}
assert(m_preload_count > 0);
CuePoint* const pCP = m_cue_points[m_count];
assert(pCP);
assert((pCP->GetTimeCode() >= 0) || (-pCP->GetTimeCode() == idpos));
if (pCP->GetTimeCode() < 0 && (-pCP->GetTimeCode() != idpos))
return false;
pCP->Load(pReader);
++m_count;
--m_preload_count;
m_pos += size; // consume payload
assert(m_pos <= stop);
return true; // yes, we loaded a cue point
}
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool Cues::LoadCuePoint() const {
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
if (m_pos >= stop)
return false; // nothing else to do
if (!Init()) {
m_pos = stop;
return false;
}
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
while (m_pos < stop) {
const long long idpos = m_pos;
long len;
const long long id = ReadID(pReader, m_pos, len);
if (id < 0 || (m_pos + len) > stop)
return false;
m_pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, m_pos, len);
if (size < 0 || (m_pos + len) > stop)
return false;
m_pos += len; // consume Size field
if ((m_pos + size) > stop)
return false;
if (id != 0x3B) { // CuePoint ID
m_pos += size; // consume payload
if (m_pos > stop)
return false;
continue;
}
if (m_preload_count < 1)
return false;
CuePoint* const pCP = m_cue_points[m_count];
if (!pCP || (pCP->GetTimeCode() < 0 && (-pCP->GetTimeCode() != idpos)))
return false;
if (!pCP->Load(pReader)) {
m_pos = stop;
return false;
}
++m_count;
--m_preload_count;
m_pos += size; // consume payload
if (m_pos > stop)
return false;
return true; // yes, we loaded a cue point
}
}
| 173,831 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RemoveActionCallback(const ActionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get());
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
std::vector<ActionCallback>* callbacks = g_callbacks.Pointer();
for (size_t i = 0; i < callbacks->size(); ++i) {
if ((*callbacks)[i].Equals(callback)) {
callbacks->erase(callbacks->begin() + i);
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Convert Uses of base::RepeatingCallback<>::Equals to Use == or != in //base
Staging this change because some conversions will have semantic changes.
BUG=937566
Change-Id: I2d4950624c0fab00e107814421a161e43da965cc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1507245
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#639702}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void RemoveActionCallback(const ActionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get());
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
std::vector<ActionCallback>* callbacks = g_callbacks.Pointer();
for (size_t i = 0; i < callbacks->size(); ++i) {
if ((*callbacks)[i] == callback) {
callbacks->erase(callbacks->begin() + i);
return;
}
}
}
| 172,099 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xps_parse_color(xps_document *doc, char *base_uri, char *string,
fz_colorspace **csp, float *samples)
{
char *p;
int i, n;
char buf[1024];
char *profile;
*csp = fz_device_rgb(doc->ctx);
samples[0] = 1;
samples[1] = 0;
samples[3] = 0;
if (string[0] == '#')
{
if (strlen(string) == 9)
{
samples[0] = unhex(string[1]) * 16 + unhex(string[2]);
samples[1] = unhex(string[3]) * 16 + unhex(string[4]);
samples[2] = unhex(string[5]) * 16 + unhex(string[6]);
samples[3] = unhex(string[7]) * 16 + unhex(string[8]);
}
else
{
samples[0] = 255;
samples[1] = unhex(string[1]) * 16 + unhex(string[2]);
samples[2] = unhex(string[3]) * 16 + unhex(string[4]);
samples[3] = unhex(string[5]) * 16 + unhex(string[6]);
}
samples[0] /= 255;
samples[1] /= 255;
samples[2] /= 255;
samples[3] /= 255;
}
else if (string[0] == 's' && string[1] == 'c' && string[2] == '#')
{
if (count_commas(string) == 2)
sscanf(string, "sc#%g,%g,%g", samples + 1, samples + 2, samples + 3);
if (count_commas(string) == 3)
sscanf(string, "sc#%g,%g,%g,%g", samples, samples + 1, samples + 2, samples + 3);
}
else if (strstr(string, "ContextColor ") == string)
{
/* Crack the string for profile name and sample values */
fz_strlcpy(buf, string, sizeof buf);
profile = strchr(buf, ' ');
profile = strchr(buf, ' ');
if (!profile)
{
fz_warn(doc->ctx, "cannot find icc profile uri in '%s'", string);
return;
}
p = strchr(profile, ' ');
p = strchr(profile, ' ');
if (!p)
{
fz_warn(doc->ctx, "cannot find component values in '%s'", profile);
return;
}
*p++ = 0;
n = count_commas(p) + 1;
i = 0;
while (i < n)
{
p ++;
}
while (i < n)
{
samples[i++] = 0;
}
/* TODO: load ICC profile */
switch (n)
{
case 2: *csp = fz_device_gray(doc->ctx); break;
case 4: *csp = fz_device_rgb(doc->ctx); break;
case 5: *csp = fz_device_cmyk(doc->ctx); break;
/* TODO: load ICC profile */
switch (n)
{
case 2: *csp = fz_device_gray(doc->ctx); break;
case 4: *csp = fz_device_rgb(doc->ctx); break;
case 5: *csp = fz_device_cmyk(doc->ctx); break;
default: *csp = fz_device_gray(doc->ctx); break;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < colorspace->n; i++)
doc->color[i] = samples[i + 1];
doc->alpha = samples[0] * doc->opacity[doc->opacity_top];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xps_parse_color(xps_document *doc, char *base_uri, char *string,
fz_colorspace **csp, float *samples)
{
fz_context *ctx = doc->ctx;
char *p;
int i, n;
char buf[1024];
char *profile;
*csp = fz_device_rgb(ctx);
samples[0] = 1;
samples[1] = 0;
samples[3] = 0;
if (string[0] == '#')
{
if (strlen(string) == 9)
{
samples[0] = unhex(string[1]) * 16 + unhex(string[2]);
samples[1] = unhex(string[3]) * 16 + unhex(string[4]);
samples[2] = unhex(string[5]) * 16 + unhex(string[6]);
samples[3] = unhex(string[7]) * 16 + unhex(string[8]);
}
else
{
samples[0] = 255;
samples[1] = unhex(string[1]) * 16 + unhex(string[2]);
samples[2] = unhex(string[3]) * 16 + unhex(string[4]);
samples[3] = unhex(string[5]) * 16 + unhex(string[6]);
}
samples[0] /= 255;
samples[1] /= 255;
samples[2] /= 255;
samples[3] /= 255;
}
else if (string[0] == 's' && string[1] == 'c' && string[2] == '#')
{
if (count_commas(string) == 2)
sscanf(string, "sc#%g,%g,%g", samples + 1, samples + 2, samples + 3);
if (count_commas(string) == 3)
sscanf(string, "sc#%g,%g,%g,%g", samples, samples + 1, samples + 2, samples + 3);
}
else if (strstr(string, "ContextColor ") == string)
{
/* Crack the string for profile name and sample values */
fz_strlcpy(buf, string, sizeof buf);
profile = strchr(buf, ' ');
profile = strchr(buf, ' ');
if (!profile)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "cannot find icc profile uri in '%s'", string);
return;
}
p = strchr(profile, ' ');
p = strchr(profile, ' ');
if (!p)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "cannot find component values in '%s'", profile);
return;
}
*p++ = 0;
n = count_commas(p) + 1;
if (n > FZ_MAX_COLORS)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "ignoring %d color components (max %d allowed)", n - FZ_MAX_COLORS, FZ_MAX_COLORS);
n = FZ_MAX_COLORS;
}
i = 0;
while (i < n)
{
p ++;
}
while (i < n)
{
samples[i++] = 0;
}
/* TODO: load ICC profile */
switch (n)
{
case 2: *csp = fz_device_gray(doc->ctx); break;
case 4: *csp = fz_device_rgb(doc->ctx); break;
case 5: *csp = fz_device_cmyk(doc->ctx); break;
/* TODO: load ICC profile */
switch (n)
{
case 2: *csp = fz_device_gray(ctx); break;
case 4: *csp = fz_device_rgb(ctx); break;
case 5: *csp = fz_device_cmyk(ctx); break;
default: *csp = fz_device_gray(ctx); break;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < colorspace->n; i++)
doc->color[i] = samples[i + 1];
doc->alpha = samples[0] * doc->opacity[doc->opacity_top];
}
| 165,228 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int serdes_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct phy_provider *provider;
struct serdes_ctrl *ctrl;
unsigned int i;
int ret;
ctrl = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*ctrl), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctrl)
return -ENOMEM;
ctrl->dev = &pdev->dev;
ctrl->regs = syscon_node_to_regmap(pdev->dev.parent->of_node);
if (IS_ERR(ctrl->regs))
return PTR_ERR(ctrl->regs);
for (i = 0; i <= SERDES_MAX; i++) {
ret = serdes_phy_create(ctrl, i, &ctrl->phys[i]);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
dev_set_drvdata(&pdev->dev, ctrl);
provider = devm_of_phy_provider_register(ctrl->dev,
serdes_simple_xlate);
return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(provider);
}
Commit Message: phy: ocelot-serdes: fix out-of-bounds read
Currently, there is an out-of-bounds read on array ctrl->phys,
once variable i reaches the maximum array size of SERDES_MAX
in the for loop.
Fix this by changing the condition in the for loop from
i <= SERDES_MAX to i < SERDES_MAX.
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1473966 ("Out-of-bounds read")
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1473959 ("Out-of-bounds read")
Fixes: 51f6b410fc22 ("phy: add driver for Microsemi Ocelot SerDes muxing")
Reviewed-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int serdes_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct phy_provider *provider;
struct serdes_ctrl *ctrl;
unsigned int i;
int ret;
ctrl = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*ctrl), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctrl)
return -ENOMEM;
ctrl->dev = &pdev->dev;
ctrl->regs = syscon_node_to_regmap(pdev->dev.parent->of_node);
if (IS_ERR(ctrl->regs))
return PTR_ERR(ctrl->regs);
for (i = 0; i < SERDES_MAX; i++) {
ret = serdes_phy_create(ctrl, i, &ctrl->phys[i]);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
dev_set_drvdata(&pdev->dev, ctrl);
provider = devm_of_phy_provider_register(ctrl->dev,
serdes_simple_xlate);
return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(provider);
}
| 169,764 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Track::EOSBlock::EOSBlock() :
BlockEntry(NULL, LONG_MIN)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Track::EOSBlock::EOSBlock() :
| 174,272 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlParseElementMixedContentDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int inputchk) {
xmlElementContentPtr ret = NULL, cur = NULL, n;
const xmlChar *elem = NULL;
GROW;
if (CMP7(CUR_PTR, '#', 'P', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A')) {
SKIP(7);
SKIP_BLANKS;
SHRINK;
if (RAW == ')') {
if ((ctxt->validate) && (ctxt->input->id != inputchk)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Element content declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n",
NULL, NULL);
}
NEXT;
ret = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PCDATA);
if (ret == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (RAW == '*') {
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
NEXT;
}
return(ret);
}
if ((RAW == '(') || (RAW == '|')) {
ret = cur = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PCDATA);
if (ret == NULL) return(NULL);
}
while (RAW == '|') {
NEXT;
if (elem == NULL) {
ret = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR);
if (ret == NULL) return(NULL);
ret->c1 = cur;
if (cur != NULL)
cur->parent = ret;
cur = ret;
} else {
n = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR);
if (n == NULL) return(NULL);
n->c1 = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, elem, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ELEMENT);
if (n->c1 != NULL)
n->c1->parent = n;
cur->c2 = n;
if (n != NULL)
n->parent = cur;
cur = n;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
elem = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (elem == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseElementMixedContentDecl : Name expected\n");
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, cur);
return(NULL);
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
}
if ((RAW == ')') && (NXT(1) == '*')) {
if (elem != NULL) {
cur->c2 = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, elem,
XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ELEMENT);
if (cur->c2 != NULL)
cur->c2->parent = cur;
}
if (ret != NULL)
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
if ((ctxt->validate) && (ctxt->input->id != inputchk)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Element content declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n",
NULL, NULL);
}
SKIP(2);
} else {
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_MIXED_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PCDATA_REQUIRED, NULL);
}
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlParseElementMixedContentDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int inputchk) {
xmlElementContentPtr ret = NULL, cur = NULL, n;
const xmlChar *elem = NULL;
GROW;
if (CMP7(CUR_PTR, '#', 'P', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A')) {
SKIP(7);
SKIP_BLANKS;
SHRINK;
if (RAW == ')') {
if ((ctxt->validate) && (ctxt->input->id != inputchk)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Element content declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n",
NULL, NULL);
}
NEXT;
ret = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PCDATA);
if (ret == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (RAW == '*') {
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
NEXT;
}
return(ret);
}
if ((RAW == '(') || (RAW == '|')) {
ret = cur = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PCDATA);
if (ret == NULL) return(NULL);
}
while ((RAW == '|') && (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
NEXT;
if (elem == NULL) {
ret = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR);
if (ret == NULL) return(NULL);
ret->c1 = cur;
if (cur != NULL)
cur->parent = ret;
cur = ret;
} else {
n = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR);
if (n == NULL) return(NULL);
n->c1 = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, elem, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ELEMENT);
if (n->c1 != NULL)
n->c1->parent = n;
cur->c2 = n;
if (n != NULL)
n->parent = cur;
cur = n;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
elem = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (elem == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseElementMixedContentDecl : Name expected\n");
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, cur);
return(NULL);
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
}
if ((RAW == ')') && (NXT(1) == '*')) {
if (elem != NULL) {
cur->c2 = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, elem,
XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ELEMENT);
if (cur->c2 != NULL)
cur->c2->parent = cur;
}
if (ret != NULL)
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
if ((ctxt->validate) && (ctxt->input->id != inputchk)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Element content declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n",
NULL, NULL);
}
SKIP(2);
} else {
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_MIXED_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PCDATA_REQUIRED, NULL);
}
return(ret);
}
| 171,286 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnRegisterTransferBuffer(
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer,
size_t size,
int32 id_request,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
base::SharedMemory shared_memory(transfer_buffer,
false,
channel_->renderer_process());
#else
#endif
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
int32 id = command_buffer_->RegisterTransferBuffer(&shared_memory,
size,
id_request);
GpuCommandBufferMsg_RegisterTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnRegisterTransferBuffer(
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer,
size_t size,
int32 id_request,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
int32 id = command_buffer_->RegisterTransferBuffer(&shared_memory,
size,
id_request);
GpuCommandBufferMsg_RegisterTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
| 170,938 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnHandleSqliteError(
const string16& origin_identifier,
const string16& database_name,
int error) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
db_tracker_->HandleSqliteError(origin_identifier, database_name, error);
}
Commit Message: WebDatabase: check path traversal in origin_identifier
BUG=172264
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12212091
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@183141 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnHandleSqliteError(
const string16& origin_identifier,
const string16& database_name,
int error) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
if (!DatabaseUtil::IsValidOriginIdentifier(origin_identifier)) {
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BadMessageTerminate_DBMF"));
BadMessageReceived();
return;
}
db_tracker_->HandleSqliteError(origin_identifier, database_name, error);
}
| 171,478 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: download::DownloadItemImpl* DownloadManagerImpl::CreateActiveItem(
uint32_t id,
const download::DownloadCreateInfo& info) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(!base::ContainsKey(downloads_, id));
download::DownloadItemImpl* download =
item_factory_->CreateActiveItem(this, id, info);
downloads_[id] = base::WrapUnique(download);
downloads_by_guid_[download->GetGuid()] = download;
DownloadItemUtils::AttachInfo(
download, GetBrowserContext(),
WebContentsImpl::FromRenderFrameHostID(info.render_process_id,
info.render_frame_id));
return download;
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | download::DownloadItemImpl* DownloadManagerImpl::CreateActiveItem(
uint32_t id,
const download::DownloadCreateInfo& info) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (base::ContainsKey(downloads_, id))
return nullptr;
download::DownloadItemImpl* download =
item_factory_->CreateActiveItem(this, id, info);
downloads_[id] = base::WrapUnique(download);
downloads_by_guid_[download->GetGuid()] = download;
DownloadItemUtils::AttachInfo(
download, GetBrowserContext(),
WebContentsImpl::FromRenderFrameHostID(info.render_process_id,
info.render_frame_id));
return download;
}
| 172,965 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void save_text_if_changed(const char *name, const char *new_value)
{
/* a text value can't be change if the file is not loaded */
/* returns NULL if the name is not found; otherwise nonzero */
if (!g_hash_table_lookup(g_loaded_texts, name))
return;
const char *old_value = g_cd ? problem_data_get_content_or_NULL(g_cd, name) : "";
if (!old_value)
old_value = "";
if (strcmp(new_value, old_value) != 0)
{
struct dump_dir *dd = wizard_open_directory_for_writing(g_dump_dir_name);
if (dd)
dd_save_text(dd, name, new_value);
dd_close(dd);
problem_data_reload_from_dump_dir();
update_gui_state_from_problem_data(/* don't update selected event */ 0);
}
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void save_text_if_changed(const char *name, const char *new_value)
{
/* a text value can't be change if the file is not loaded */
/* returns NULL if the name is not found; otherwise nonzero */
if (!g_hash_table_lookup(g_loaded_texts, name))
return;
const char *old_value = g_cd ? problem_data_get_content_or_NULL(g_cd, name) : "";
if (!old_value)
old_value = "";
if (strcmp(new_value, old_value) != 0)
{
struct dump_dir *dd = wizard_open_directory_for_writing(g_dump_dir_name);
if (dd)
dd_save_text(dd, name, new_value);
dd_close(dd);
}
}
| 166,602 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: run_cmd(int fd, ...)
{
pid_t pid;
sigset_t sigm, sigm_old;
/* block signals, let child establish its own handlers */
sigemptyset(&sigm);
sigaddset(&sigm, SIGTERM);
sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &sigm, &sigm_old);
pid = fork();
if ( pid < 0 ) {
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigm_old, NULL);
fd_printf(STO, "*** cannot fork: %s ***\r\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
} else if ( pid ) {
/* father: picocom */
int status, r;
/* reset the mask */
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigm_old, NULL);
/* wait for child to finish */
do {
r = waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
} while ( r < 0 && errno == EINTR );
/* reset terminal (back to raw mode) */
term_apply(STI);
/* check and report child return status */
if ( WIFEXITED(status) ) {
fd_printf(STO, "\r\n*** exit status: %d ***\r\n",
WEXITSTATUS(status));
return WEXITSTATUS(status);
} else if ( WIFSIGNALED(status) ) {
fd_printf(STO, "\r\n*** killed by signal: %d ***\r\n",
WTERMSIG(status));
return -1;
} else {
fd_printf(STO, "\r\n*** abnormal termination: 0x%x ***\r\n", r);
return -1;
}
} else {
/* child: external program */
long fl;
char cmd[512];
/* unmanage terminal, and reset it to canonical mode */
term_remove(STI);
/* unmanage serial port fd, without reset */
term_erase(fd);
/* set serial port fd to blocking mode */
fl = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
fl &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fl);
/* connect stdin and stdout to serial port */
close(STI);
close(STO);
dup2(fd, STI);
dup2(fd, STO);
{
/* build command-line */
char *c, *ce;
const char *s;
int n;
va_list vls;
strcpy(cmd, EXEC);
c = &cmd[sizeof(EXEC)- 1];
ce = cmd + sizeof(cmd) - 1;
va_start(vls, fd);
while ( (s = va_arg(vls, const char *)) ) {
n = strlen(s);
if ( c + n + 1 >= ce ) break;
memcpy(c, s, n); c += n;
*c++ = ' ';
}
va_end(vls);
*c = '\0';
}
/* run extenral command */
fd_printf(STDERR_FILENO, "%s\n", &cmd[sizeof(EXEC) - 1]);
establish_child_signal_handlers();
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigm_old, NULL);
execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", cmd, NULL);
exit(42);
}
}
Commit Message: Do not use "/bin/sh" to run external commands.
Picocom no longer uses /bin/sh to run external commands for
file-transfer operations. Parsing the command line and spliting it into
arguments is now performed internally by picocom, using quoting rules
very similar to those of the Unix shell. Hopefully, this makes it
impossible to inject shell-commands when supplying filenames or
extra arguments to the send- and receive-file commands.
CWE ID: CWE-77 | run_cmd(int fd, ...)
run_cmd(int fd, const char *cmd, const char *args_extra)
{
pid_t pid;
sigset_t sigm, sigm_old;
/* block signals, let child establish its own handlers */
sigemptyset(&sigm);
sigaddset(&sigm, SIGTERM);
sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &sigm, &sigm_old);
pid = fork();
if ( pid < 0 ) {
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigm_old, NULL);
fd_printf(STO, "*** cannot fork: %s ***\r\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
} else if ( pid ) {
/* father: picocom */
int status, r;
/* reset the mask */
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigm_old, NULL);
/* wait for child to finish */
do {
r = waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
} while ( r < 0 && errno == EINTR );
/* reset terminal (back to raw mode) */
term_apply(STI);
/* check and report child return status */
if ( WIFEXITED(status) ) {
fd_printf(STO, "\r\n*** exit status: %d ***\r\n",
WEXITSTATUS(status));
return WEXITSTATUS(status);
} else if ( WIFSIGNALED(status) ) {
fd_printf(STO, "\r\n*** killed by signal: %d ***\r\n",
WTERMSIG(status));
return -1;
} else {
fd_printf(STO, "\r\n*** abnormal termination: 0x%x ***\r\n", r);
return -1;
}
} else {
/* child: external program */
long fl;
int argc;
char *argv[RUNCMD_ARGS_MAX + 1];
int r;
/* unmanage terminal, and reset it to canonical mode */
term_remove(STI);
/* unmanage serial port fd, without reset */
term_erase(fd);
/* set serial port fd to blocking mode */
fl = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
fl &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fl);
/* connect stdin and stdout to serial port */
close(STI);
close(STO);
dup2(fd, STI);
dup2(fd, STO);
/* build command arguments vector */
argc = 0;
r = split_quoted(cmd, &argc, argv, RUNCMD_ARGS_MAX);
if ( r < 0 ) {
fd_printf(STDERR_FILENO, "Cannot parse command\n");
exit(RUNCMD_EXEC_FAIL);
}
r = split_quoted(args_extra, &argc, argv, RUNCMD_ARGS_MAX);
if ( r < 0 ) {
fd_printf(STDERR_FILENO, "Cannot parse extra args\n");
exit(RUNCMD_EXEC_FAIL);
}
if ( argc < 1 ) {
fd_printf(STDERR_FILENO, "No command given\n");
exit(RUNCMD_EXEC_FAIL);
}
argv[argc] = NULL;
/* run extenral command */
fd_printf(STDERR_FILENO, "$ %s %s\n", cmd, args_extra);
establish_child_signal_handlers();
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigm_old, NULL);
execvp(argv[0], argv);
fd_printf(STDERR_FILENO, "exec: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(RUNCMD_EXEC_FAIL);
}
}
| 168,850 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: StateBase* writeFile(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value, StateBase* next)
{
File* file = V8File::toNative(value.As<v8::Object>());
if (!file)
return 0;
if (file->hasBeenClosed())
return handleError(DataCloneError, "A File object has been closed, and could therefore not be cloned.", next);
int blobIndex = -1;
m_blobDataHandles.add(file->uuid(), file->blobDataHandle());
if (appendFileInfo(file, &blobIndex)) {
ASSERT(blobIndex >= 0);
m_writer.writeFileIndex(blobIndex);
} else {
m_writer.writeFile(*file);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | StateBase* writeFile(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value, StateBase* next)
{
File* file = V8File::toNative(value.As<v8::Object>());
if (!file)
return 0;
if (file->hasBeenClosed())
return handleError(DataCloneError, "A File object has been closed, and could therefore not be cloned.", next);
int blobIndex = -1;
m_blobDataHandles.set(file->uuid(), file->blobDataHandle());
if (appendFileInfo(file, &blobIndex)) {
ASSERT(blobIndex >= 0);
m_writer.writeFileIndex(blobIndex);
} else {
m_writer.writeFile(*file);
}
return 0;
}
| 171,651 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: base::string16 GetAppForProtocolUsingAssocQuery(const GURL& url) {
base::string16 url_scheme = base::ASCIIToUTF16(url.scheme());
if (url_scheme.empty())
return base::string16();
wchar_t out_buffer[1024];
DWORD buffer_size = arraysize(out_buffer);
HRESULT hr = AssocQueryString(ASSOCF_IS_PROTOCOL,
ASSOCSTR_FRIENDLYAPPNAME,
url_scheme.c_str(),
NULL,
out_buffer,
&buffer_size);
if (FAILED(hr)) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "AssocQueryString failed!";
return base::string16();
}
return base::string16(out_buffer);
}
Commit Message: Validate external protocols before launching on Windows
Bug: 889459
Change-Id: Id33ca6444bff1e6dd71b6000823cf6fec09746ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1256208
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597611}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | base::string16 GetAppForProtocolUsingAssocQuery(const GURL& url) {
const base::string16 url_scheme = base::ASCIIToUTF16(url.scheme());
if (!IsValidCustomProtocol(url_scheme))
return base::string16();
wchar_t out_buffer[1024];
DWORD buffer_size = arraysize(out_buffer);
HRESULT hr =
AssocQueryString(ASSOCF_IS_PROTOCOL, ASSOCSTR_FRIENDLYAPPNAME,
url_scheme.c_str(), NULL, out_buffer, &buffer_size);
if (FAILED(hr)) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "AssocQueryString failed!";
return base::string16();
}
return base::string16(out_buffer);
}
| 172,635 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Maybe<int64_t> IndexOfValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> object,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
DCHECK(JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *object));
Handle<Map> original_map = handle(object->map(), isolate);
Handle<FixedArray> parameter_map(FixedArray::cast(object->elements()),
isolate);
for (uint32_t k = start_from; k < length; ++k) {
uint32_t entry = GetEntryForIndexImpl(isolate, *object, *parameter_map, k,
ALL_PROPERTIES);
if (entry == kMaxUInt32) {
continue;
}
Handle<Object> element_k =
Subclass::GetImpl(isolate, *parameter_map, entry);
if (element_k->IsAccessorPair()) {
LookupIterator it(isolate, object, k, LookupIterator::OWN);
DCHECK(it.IsFound());
DCHECK_EQ(it.state(), LookupIterator::ACCESSOR);
ASSIGN_RETURN_ON_EXCEPTION_VALUE(isolate, element_k,
Object::GetPropertyWithAccessor(&it),
Nothing<int64_t>());
if (value->StrictEquals(*element_k)) {
return Just<int64_t>(k);
}
if (object->map() != *original_map) {
return IndexOfValueSlowPath(isolate, object, value, k + 1, length);
}
} else if (value->StrictEquals(*element_k)) {
return Just<int64_t>(k);
}
}
return Just<int64_t>(-1);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | static Maybe<int64_t> IndexOfValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> object,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
DCHECK(JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *object));
Handle<Map> original_map(object->map(), isolate);
Handle<FixedArray> parameter_map(FixedArray::cast(object->elements()),
isolate);
for (uint32_t k = start_from; k < length; ++k) {
DCHECK_EQ(object->map(), *original_map);
uint32_t entry = GetEntryForIndexImpl(isolate, *object, *parameter_map, k,
ALL_PROPERTIES);
if (entry == kMaxUInt32) {
continue;
}
Handle<Object> element_k =
Subclass::GetImpl(isolate, *parameter_map, entry);
if (element_k->IsAccessorPair()) {
LookupIterator it(isolate, object, k, LookupIterator::OWN);
DCHECK(it.IsFound());
DCHECK_EQ(it.state(), LookupIterator::ACCESSOR);
ASSIGN_RETURN_ON_EXCEPTION_VALUE(isolate, element_k,
Object::GetPropertyWithAccessor(&it),
Nothing<int64_t>());
if (value->StrictEquals(*element_k)) {
return Just<int64_t>(k);
}
if (object->map() != *original_map) {
return IndexOfValueSlowPath(isolate, object, value, k + 1, length);
}
} else if (value->StrictEquals(*element_k)) {
return Just<int64_t>(k);
}
}
return Just<int64_t>(-1);
}
| 174,099 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method() const {
if (current_input_method_.id.empty()) {
return input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor();
}
return current_input_method_;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method() const {
virtual input_method::InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method() const {
if (current_input_method_.id.empty()) {
return input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor();
}
return current_input_method_;
}
| 170,512 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool OmniboxViewViews::ShouldShowPlaceholderText() const {
return Textfield::ShouldShowPlaceholderText() &&
!model()->is_caret_visible() && !model()->is_keyword_selected();
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | bool OmniboxViewViews::ShouldShowPlaceholderText() const {
bool show_with_caret = base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
omnibox::kUIExperimentShowPlaceholderWhenCaretShowing);
return Textfield::ShouldShowPlaceholderText() &&
(show_with_caret || !model()->is_caret_visible()) &&
!model()->is_keyword_selected();
}
| 172,543 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool DebugOnStart::FindArgument(wchar_t* command_line, const char* argument_c) {
wchar_t argument[50];
for (int i = 0; argument_c[i]; ++i)
argument[i] = argument_c[i];
int argument_len = lstrlen(argument);
int command_line_len = lstrlen(command_line);
while (command_line_len > argument_len) {
wchar_t first_char = command_line[0];
wchar_t last_char = command_line[argument_len+1];
if ((first_char == L'-' || first_char == L'/') &&
(last_char == L' ' || last_char == 0 || last_char == L'=')) {
command_line[argument_len+1] = 0;
if (lstrcmpi(command_line+1, argument) == 0) {
command_line[argument_len+1] = last_char;
return true;
}
command_line[argument_len+1] = last_char;
}
++command_line;
--command_line_len;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix null-termination on string copy in debug-on-start code.
BUG=73740
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6549019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75629 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool DebugOnStart::FindArgument(wchar_t* command_line, const char* argument_c) {
wchar_t argument[50] = {};
for (int i = 0; argument_c[i]; ++i)
argument[i] = argument_c[i];
int argument_len = lstrlen(argument);
int command_line_len = lstrlen(command_line);
while (command_line_len > argument_len) {
wchar_t first_char = command_line[0];
wchar_t last_char = command_line[argument_len+1];
if ((first_char == L'-' || first_char == L'/') &&
(last_char == L' ' || last_char == 0 || last_char == L'=')) {
command_line[argument_len+1] = 0;
if (lstrcmpi(command_line+1, argument) == 0) {
command_line[argument_len+1] = last_char;
return true;
}
command_line[argument_len+1] = last_char;
}
++command_line;
--command_line_len;
}
return false;
}
| 170,650 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_get_int_32(png_bytep buf)
{
png_int_32 i = ((png_int_32)(*buf) << 24) +
((png_int_32)(*(buf + 1)) << 16) +
((png_int_32)(*(buf + 2)) << 8) +
(png_int_32)(*(buf + 3));
return (i);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | png_get_int_32(png_bytep buf)
{
png_int_32 i = ((png_int_32)((*(buf )) & 0xff) << 24) +
((png_int_32)((*(buf + 1)) & 0xff) << 16) +
((png_int_32)((*(buf + 2)) & 0xff) << 8) +
((png_int_32)((*(buf + 3)) & 0xff) );
return (i);
}
| 172,173 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ftp_genlist(ftpbuf_t *ftp, const char *cmd, const char *path TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream *tmpstream = NULL;
databuf_t *data = NULL;
char *ptr;
int ch, lastch;
size_t size, rcvd;
size_t lines;
char **ret = NULL;
char **entry;
char *text;
if ((tmpstream = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile()) == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to create temporary file. Check permissions in temporary files directory.");
return NULL;
}
if (!ftp_type(ftp, FTPTYPE_ASCII)) {
goto bail;
}
if ((data = ftp_getdata(ftp TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
goto bail;
}
ftp->data = data;
if (!ftp_putcmd(ftp, cmd, path)) {
goto bail;
}
if (!ftp_getresp(ftp) || (ftp->resp != 150 && ftp->resp != 125 && ftp->resp != 226)) {
goto bail;
}
/* some servers don't open a ftp-data connection if the directory is empty */
if (ftp->resp == 226) {
ftp->data = data_close(ftp, data);
php_stream_close(tmpstream);
return ecalloc(1, sizeof(char*));
}
/* pull data buffer into tmpfile */
if ((data = data_accept(data, ftp TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
goto bail;
}
size = 0;
lines = 0;
lastch = 0;
while ((rcvd = my_recv(ftp, data->fd, data->buf, FTP_BUFSIZE))) {
if (rcvd == -1 || rcvd > ((size_t)(-1))-size) {
goto bail;
}
php_stream_write(tmpstream, data->buf, rcvd);
size += rcvd;
for (ptr = data->buf; rcvd; rcvd--, ptr++) {
if (*ptr == '\n' && lastch == '\r') {
lines++;
} else {
size++;
}
lastch = *ptr;
}
lastch = *ptr;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ftp_genlist(ftpbuf_t *ftp, const char *cmd, const char *path TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream *tmpstream = NULL;
databuf_t *data = NULL;
char *ptr;
int ch, lastch;
size_t size, rcvd;
size_t lines;
char **ret = NULL;
char **entry;
char *text;
if ((tmpstream = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile()) == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to create temporary file. Check permissions in temporary files directory.");
return NULL;
}
if (!ftp_type(ftp, FTPTYPE_ASCII)) {
goto bail;
}
if ((data = ftp_getdata(ftp TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
goto bail;
}
ftp->data = data;
if (!ftp_putcmd(ftp, cmd, path)) {
goto bail;
}
if (!ftp_getresp(ftp) || (ftp->resp != 150 && ftp->resp != 125 && ftp->resp != 226)) {
goto bail;
}
/* some servers don't open a ftp-data connection if the directory is empty */
if (ftp->resp == 226) {
ftp->data = data_close(ftp, data);
php_stream_close(tmpstream);
return ecalloc(1, sizeof(char*));
}
/* pull data buffer into tmpfile */
if ((data = data_accept(data, ftp TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
goto bail;
}
size = 0;
lines = 0;
lastch = 0;
while ((rcvd = my_recv(ftp, data->fd, data->buf, FTP_BUFSIZE))) {
if (rcvd == -1 || rcvd > ((size_t)(-1))-size) {
goto bail;
}
php_stream_write(tmpstream, data->buf, rcvd);
size += rcvd;
for (ptr = data->buf; rcvd; rcvd--, ptr++) {
if (*ptr == '\n' && lastch == '\r') {
lines++;
}
lastch = *ptr;
}
lastch = *ptr;
}
}
| 165,301 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::CreateNewWindow(
int route_id,
const ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params& params,
SessionStorageNamespace* session_storage_namespace) {
ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params validated_params(params);
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* policy =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
delegate_->CreateNewWindow(route_id, validated_params,
session_storage_namespace);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderViewHostImpl::CreateNewWindow(
int route_id,
const ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params& params,
SessionStorageNamespace* session_storage_namespace) {
ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params validated_params(params);
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* policy =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
FilterURL(policy, GetProcess(), false, &validated_params.opener_url);
FilterURL(policy, GetProcess(), true,
&validated_params.opener_security_origin);
delegate_->CreateNewWindow(route_id, validated_params,
session_storage_namespace);
}
| 171,498 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CreatePersistentHistogramAllocator() {
allocator_memory_.reset(new char[kAllocatorMemorySize]);
GlobalHistogramAllocator::ReleaseForTesting();
memset(allocator_memory_.get(), 0, kAllocatorMemorySize);
GlobalHistogramAllocator::GetCreateHistogramResultHistogram();
GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithPersistentMemory(
allocator_memory_.get(), kAllocatorMemorySize, 0, 0,
"PersistentHistogramAllocatorTest");
allocator_ = GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get()->memory_allocator();
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void CreatePersistentHistogramAllocator() {
allocator_memory_.reset(new char[kAllocatorMemorySize]);
GlobalHistogramAllocator::ReleaseForTesting();
memset(allocator_memory_.get(), 0, kAllocatorMemorySize);
GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithPersistentMemory(
allocator_memory_.get(), kAllocatorMemorySize, 0, 0,
"PersistentHistogramAllocatorTest");
allocator_ = GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get()->memory_allocator();
}
| 172,137 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc)
{
XcursorChunkHeader chunkHeader;
XcursorImage head;
XcursorImage *image;
int n;
XcursorPixel *p;
if (!file || !fileHeader)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorFileReadChunkHeader (file, fileHeader, toc, &chunkHeader))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.width))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.height))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.xhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.yhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
return NULL;
if (head.width == 0 || head.height == 0)
return NULL;
return NULL;
if (chunkHeader.version < image->version)
image->version = chunkHeader.version;
image->size = chunkHeader.subtype;
image->xhot = head.xhot;
image->yhot = head.yhot;
image->delay = head.delay;
n = image->width * image->height;
p = image->pixels;
while (n--)
{
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, p))
{
XcursorImageDestroy (image);
return NULL;
}
p++;
}
return image;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | _XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc)
{
XcursorChunkHeader chunkHeader;
XcursorImage head;
XcursorImage *image;
int n;
XcursorPixel *p;
if (!file || !fileHeader)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorFileReadChunkHeader (file, fileHeader, toc, &chunkHeader))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.width))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.height))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.xhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.yhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE ||
head.height > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE)
return NULL;
if (head.width == 0 || head.height == 0)
return NULL;
return NULL;
if (chunkHeader.version < image->version)
image->version = chunkHeader.version;
image->size = chunkHeader.subtype;
image->xhot = head.xhot;
image->yhot = head.yhot;
image->delay = head.delay;
n = image->width * image->height;
p = image->pixels;
while (n--)
{
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, p))
{
XcursorImageDestroy (image);
return NULL;
}
p++;
}
return image;
}
| 164,627 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void *SoftMP3::memsetSafe(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader, int c, size_t len) {
if (len > outHeader->nAllocLen) {
ALOGE("memset buffer too small: got %lu, expected %zu", (unsigned long)outHeader->nAllocLen, len);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422022");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return NULL;
}
return memset(outHeader->pBuffer, c, len);
}
Commit Message: Fix build
Change-Id: I48ba34b3df9c9a896d4b18c3f48e41744b7dab54
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void *SoftMP3::memsetSafe(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader, int c, size_t len) {
if (len > outHeader->nAllocLen) {
ALOGE("memset buffer too small: got %u, expected %zu", outHeader->nAllocLen, len);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422022");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return NULL;
}
return memset(outHeader->pBuffer, c, len);
}
| 174,156 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool KeyMap::Press(const scoped_refptr<WindowProxy>& window,
const ui::KeyboardCode key_code,
const wchar_t& key) {
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_SHIFT) {
shift_ = !shift_;
} else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_CONTROL) {
control_ = !control_;
} else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_MENU) { // ALT
alt_ = !alt_;
} else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_COMMAND) {
command_ = !command_;
}
int modifiers = 0;
if (shift_ || shifted_keys_.find(key) != shifted_keys_.end()) {
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_SHIFT_DOWN;
}
if (control_) {
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_CONTROL_DOWN;
}
if (alt_) {
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_ALT_DOWN;
}
if (command_) {
VLOG(1) << "Pressing command key on linux!!";
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_COMMAND_DOWN;
}
window->SimulateOSKeyPress(key_code, modifiers);
return true;
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool KeyMap::Press(const scoped_refptr<WindowProxy>& window,
const ui::KeyboardCode key_code,
const wchar_t& key) {
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_SHIFT) {
shift_ = !shift_;
} else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_CONTROL) {
control_ = !control_;
} else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_MENU) { // ALT
alt_ = !alt_;
} else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_COMMAND) {
command_ = !command_;
}
int modifiers = 0;
if (shift_ || shifted_keys_.find(key) != shifted_keys_.end()) {
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_SHIFT_DOWN;
}
if (control_) {
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_CONTROL_DOWN;
}
if (alt_) {
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_ALT_DOWN;
}
if (command_) {
LOG(INFO) << "Pressing command key on linux!!";
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_COMMAND_DOWN;
}
window->SimulateOSKeyPress(key_code, modifiers);
return true;
}
| 170,459 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport int LocaleUppercase(const int c)
{
if (c < 0)
return(c);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(toupper_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(toupper((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-125 | MagickExport int LocaleUppercase(const int c)
{
if (c == EOF)
return(c);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(toupper_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(toupper((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
| 170,236 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <width> <height> <infile> <outfile> <frame>\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void usage_exit() {
void usage_exit(void) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <width> <height> <infile> <outfile> <frame>\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
| 174,499 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: file_ms_alloc(int flags)
{
struct magic_set *ms;
size_t i, len;
if ((ms = CAST(struct magic_set *, calloc((size_t)1,
sizeof(struct magic_set)))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (magic_setflags(ms, flags) == -1) {
errno = EINVAL;
goto free;
}
ms->o.buf = ms->o.pbuf = NULL;
len = (ms->c.len = 10) * sizeof(*ms->c.li);
if ((ms->c.li = CAST(struct level_info *, malloc(len))) == NULL)
goto free;
ms->event_flags = 0;
ms->error = -1;
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++)
ms->mlist[i] = NULL;
ms->file = "unknown";
ms->line = 0;
ms->indir_max = FILE_INDIR_MAX;
ms->name_max = FILE_NAME_MAX;
ms->elf_shnum_max = FILE_ELF_SHNUM_MAX;
ms->elf_phnum_max = FILE_ELF_PHNUM_MAX;
return ms;
free:
free(ms);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | file_ms_alloc(int flags)
{
struct magic_set *ms;
size_t i, len;
if ((ms = CAST(struct magic_set *, calloc((size_t)1,
sizeof(struct magic_set)))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (magic_setflags(ms, flags) == -1) {
errno = EINVAL;
goto free;
}
ms->o.buf = ms->o.pbuf = NULL;
len = (ms->c.len = 10) * sizeof(*ms->c.li);
if ((ms->c.li = CAST(struct level_info *, malloc(len))) == NULL)
goto free;
ms->event_flags = 0;
ms->error = -1;
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++)
ms->mlist[i] = NULL;
ms->file = "unknown";
ms->line = 0;
ms->indir_max = FILE_INDIR_MAX;
ms->name_max = FILE_NAME_MAX;
ms->elf_shnum_max = FILE_ELF_SHNUM_MAX;
ms->elf_phnum_max = FILE_ELF_PHNUM_MAX;
ms->elf_notes_max = FILE_ELF_NOTES_MAX;
return ms;
free:
free(ms);
return NULL;
}
| 166,773 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_stringify (MyObject *obj, GValue *value, char **ret, GError **error)
{
GValue valstr = {0, };
g_value_init (&valstr, G_TYPE_STRING);
if (!g_value_transform (value, &valstr))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"couldn't transform value");
return FALSE;
}
*ret = g_value_dup_string (&valstr);
g_value_unset (&valstr);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_stringify (MyObject *obj, GValue *value, char **ret, GError **error)
| 165,122 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: sf_open_virtual (SF_VIRTUAL_IO *sfvirtual, int mode, SF_INFO *sfinfo, void *user_data)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
/* Make sure we have a valid set ot virtual pointers. */
if (sfvirtual->get_filelen == NULL || sfvirtual->seek == NULL || sfvirtual->tell == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_BAD_VIRTUAL_IO ;
snprintf (sf_parselog, sizeof (sf_parselog), "Bad vio_get_filelen / vio_seek / vio_tell in SF_VIRTUAL_IO struct.\n") ;
return NULL ;
} ;
if ((mode == SFM_READ || mode == SFM_RDWR) && sfvirtual->read == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_BAD_VIRTUAL_IO ;
snprintf (sf_parselog, sizeof (sf_parselog), "Bad vio_read in SF_VIRTUAL_IO struct.\n") ;
return NULL ;
} ;
if ((mode == SFM_WRITE || mode == SFM_RDWR) && sfvirtual->write == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_BAD_VIRTUAL_IO ;
snprintf (sf_parselog, sizeof (sf_parselog), "Bad vio_write in SF_VIRTUAL_IO struct.\n") ;
return NULL ;
} ;
if ((psf = calloc (1, sizeof (SF_PRIVATE))) == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
psf_init_files (psf) ;
psf->virtual_io = SF_TRUE ;
psf->vio = *sfvirtual ;
psf->vio_user_data = user_data ;
psf->file.mode = mode ;
return psf_open_file (psf, sfinfo) ;
} /* sf_open_virtual */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | sf_open_virtual (SF_VIRTUAL_IO *sfvirtual, int mode, SF_INFO *sfinfo, void *user_data)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
/* Make sure we have a valid set ot virtual pointers. */
if (sfvirtual->get_filelen == NULL || sfvirtual->seek == NULL || sfvirtual->tell == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_BAD_VIRTUAL_IO ;
snprintf (sf_parselog, sizeof (sf_parselog), "Bad vio_get_filelen / vio_seek / vio_tell in SF_VIRTUAL_IO struct.\n") ;
return NULL ;
} ;
if ((mode == SFM_READ || mode == SFM_RDWR) && sfvirtual->read == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_BAD_VIRTUAL_IO ;
snprintf (sf_parselog, sizeof (sf_parselog), "Bad vio_read in SF_VIRTUAL_IO struct.\n") ;
return NULL ;
} ;
if ((mode == SFM_WRITE || mode == SFM_RDWR) && sfvirtual->write == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_BAD_VIRTUAL_IO ;
snprintf (sf_parselog, sizeof (sf_parselog), "Bad vio_write in SF_VIRTUAL_IO struct.\n") ;
return NULL ;
} ;
if ((psf = psf_allocate ()) == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
psf_init_files (psf) ;
psf->virtual_io = SF_TRUE ;
psf->vio = *sfvirtual ;
psf->vio_user_data = user_data ;
psf->file.mode = mode ;
return psf_open_file (psf, sfinfo) ;
} /* sf_open_virtual */
| 170,069 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUpCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) {
GpuFeatureTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableThreadedCompositing);
}
Commit Message: Revert 124346 - Add basic threaded compositor test to gpu_feature_browsertest.cc
BUG=113159
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9509001
TBR=jbates@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9561011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@124356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual void SetUpCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) {
| 170,959 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection(const VisiblePosition& startOfSelection, const VisiblePosition& endOfSelection)
{
Position start = startOfSelection.deepEquivalent().downstream();
if (isAtUnsplittableElement(start)) {
RefPtr<Element> blockquote = createBlockElement();
insertNodeAt(blockquote, start);
RefPtr<Element> placeholder = createBreakElement(document());
appendNode(placeholder, blockquote);
setEndingSelection(VisibleSelection(positionBeforeNode(placeholder.get()), DOWNSTREAM, endingSelection().isDirectional()));
return;
}
RefPtr<Element> blockquoteForNextIndent;
VisiblePosition endOfCurrentParagraph = endOfParagraph(startOfSelection);
VisiblePosition endAfterSelection = endOfParagraph(endOfParagraph(endOfSelection).next());
m_endOfLastParagraph = endOfParagraph(endOfSelection).deepEquivalent();
bool atEnd = false;
Position end;
while (endOfCurrentParagraph != endAfterSelection && !atEnd) {
if (endOfCurrentParagraph.deepEquivalent() == m_endOfLastParagraph)
atEnd = true;
rangeForParagraphSplittingTextNodesIfNeeded(endOfCurrentParagraph, start, end);
endOfCurrentParagraph = end;
Position afterEnd = end.next();
Node* enclosingCell = enclosingNodeOfType(start, &isTableCell);
VisiblePosition endOfNextParagraph = endOfNextParagrahSplittingTextNodesIfNeeded(endOfCurrentParagraph, start, end);
formatRange(start, end, m_endOfLastParagraph, blockquoteForNextIndent);
if (enclosingCell && enclosingCell != enclosingNodeOfType(endOfNextParagraph.deepEquivalent(), &isTableCell))
blockquoteForNextIndent = 0;
if (endAfterSelection.isNotNull() && !endAfterSelection.deepEquivalent().inDocument())
break;
if (endOfNextParagraph.isNotNull() && !endOfNextParagraph.deepEquivalent().inDocument()) {
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return;
}
endOfCurrentParagraph = endOfNextParagraph;
}
}
Commit Message: Remove false assertion in ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection()
Note: This patch is preparation of fixing issue 294456.
This patch removes false assertion in ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection(), when contents of being indent is modified, e.g. mutation event, |endOfNextParagraph| can hold removed contents.
BUG=294456
TEST=n/a
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25657004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158701 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection(const VisiblePosition& startOfSelection, const VisiblePosition& endOfSelection)
{
Position start = startOfSelection.deepEquivalent().downstream();
if (isAtUnsplittableElement(start)) {
RefPtr<Element> blockquote = createBlockElement();
insertNodeAt(blockquote, start);
RefPtr<Element> placeholder = createBreakElement(document());
appendNode(placeholder, blockquote);
setEndingSelection(VisibleSelection(positionBeforeNode(placeholder.get()), DOWNSTREAM, endingSelection().isDirectional()));
return;
}
RefPtr<Element> blockquoteForNextIndent;
VisiblePosition endOfCurrentParagraph = endOfParagraph(startOfSelection);
VisiblePosition endAfterSelection = endOfParagraph(endOfParagraph(endOfSelection).next());
m_endOfLastParagraph = endOfParagraph(endOfSelection).deepEquivalent();
bool atEnd = false;
Position end;
while (endOfCurrentParagraph != endAfterSelection && !atEnd) {
if (endOfCurrentParagraph.deepEquivalent() == m_endOfLastParagraph)
atEnd = true;
rangeForParagraphSplittingTextNodesIfNeeded(endOfCurrentParagraph, start, end);
endOfCurrentParagraph = end;
Position afterEnd = end.next();
Node* enclosingCell = enclosingNodeOfType(start, &isTableCell);
VisiblePosition endOfNextParagraph = endOfNextParagrahSplittingTextNodesIfNeeded(endOfCurrentParagraph, start, end);
formatRange(start, end, m_endOfLastParagraph, blockquoteForNextIndent);
if (enclosingCell && enclosingCell != enclosingNodeOfType(endOfNextParagraph.deepEquivalent(), &isTableCell))
blockquoteForNextIndent = 0;
if (endAfterSelection.isNotNull() && !endAfterSelection.deepEquivalent().inDocument())
break;
// If somehow, e.g. mutation event handler, we did, return to prevent crashes.
if (endOfNextParagraph.isNotNull() && !endOfNextParagraph.deepEquivalent().inDocument())
return;
endOfCurrentParagraph = endOfNextParagraph;
}
}
| 171,170 |
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