instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void xhci_kick_ep(XHCIState *xhci, unsigned int slotid,
unsigned int epid, unsigned int streamid)
{
XHCIEPContext *epctx;
assert(slotid >= 1 && slotid <= xhci->numslots);
assert(epid >= 1 && epid <= 31);
if (!xhci->slots[slotid-1].enabled) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled slot %d\n", slotid);
return;
}
epctx = xhci->slots[slotid-1].eps[epid-1];
if (!epctx) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled endpoint %d,%d\n",
epid, slotid);
return;
return;
}
xhci_kick_epctx(epctx, streamid);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | static void xhci_kick_ep(XHCIState *xhci, unsigned int slotid,
unsigned int epid, unsigned int streamid)
{
XHCIEPContext *epctx;
assert(slotid >= 1 && slotid <= xhci->numslots);
assert(epid >= 1 && epid <= 31);
if (!xhci->slots[slotid-1].enabled) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled slot %d\n", slotid);
return;
}
epctx = xhci->slots[slotid-1].eps[epid-1];
if (!epctx) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled endpoint %d,%d\n",
epid, slotid);
return;
return;
}
if (epctx->kick_active) {
return;
}
xhci_kick_epctx(epctx, streamid);
}
| 164,795 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (state_ == WORKER_READY) {
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SetDevToolsAttachedOnIO,
context_weak_, version_id_, true));
}
session->SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost::FromID(worker_process_id_),
nullptr);
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
}
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (state_ == WORKER_READY) {
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SetDevToolsAttachedOnIO,
context_weak_, version_id_, true));
}
session->SetRenderer(worker_process_id_, nullptr);
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
}
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
}
| 172,783 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char *cJSON_Print( cJSON *item )
{
return print_value( item, 0, 1 );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | char *cJSON_Print( cJSON *item )
| 167,293 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int _nfs4_do_open(struct inode *dir, struct path *path, int flags, struct iattr *sattr, struct rpc_cred *cred, struct nfs4_state **res)
{
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp;
struct nfs4_state *state = NULL;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs4_opendata *opendata;
int status;
/* Protect against reboot recovery conflicts */
status = -ENOMEM;
if (!(sp = nfs4_get_state_owner(server, cred))) {
dprintk("nfs4_do_open: nfs4_get_state_owner failed!\n");
goto out_err;
}
status = nfs4_recover_expired_lease(server);
if (status != 0)
goto err_put_state_owner;
if (path->dentry->d_inode != NULL)
nfs4_return_incompatible_delegation(path->dentry->d_inode, flags & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE));
status = -ENOMEM;
opendata = nfs4_opendata_alloc(path, sp, flags, sattr);
if (opendata == NULL)
goto err_put_state_owner;
if (path->dentry->d_inode != NULL)
opendata->state = nfs4_get_open_state(path->dentry->d_inode, sp);
status = _nfs4_proc_open(opendata);
if (status != 0)
goto err_opendata_put;
if (opendata->o_arg.open_flags & O_EXCL)
nfs4_exclusive_attrset(opendata, sattr);
state = nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(opendata);
status = PTR_ERR(state);
if (IS_ERR(state))
goto err_opendata_put;
nfs4_opendata_put(opendata);
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
*res = state;
return 0;
err_opendata_put:
nfs4_opendata_put(opendata);
err_put_state_owner:
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
out_err:
*res = NULL;
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | static int _nfs4_do_open(struct inode *dir, struct path *path, int flags, struct iattr *sattr, struct rpc_cred *cred, struct nfs4_state **res)
static int _nfs4_do_open(struct inode *dir, struct path *path, fmode_t fmode, int flags, struct iattr *sattr, struct rpc_cred *cred, struct nfs4_state **res)
{
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp;
struct nfs4_state *state = NULL;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs4_opendata *opendata;
int status;
/* Protect against reboot recovery conflicts */
status = -ENOMEM;
if (!(sp = nfs4_get_state_owner(server, cred))) {
dprintk("nfs4_do_open: nfs4_get_state_owner failed!\n");
goto out_err;
}
status = nfs4_recover_expired_lease(server);
if (status != 0)
goto err_put_state_owner;
if (path->dentry->d_inode != NULL)
nfs4_return_incompatible_delegation(path->dentry->d_inode, fmode);
status = -ENOMEM;
opendata = nfs4_opendata_alloc(path, sp, fmode, flags, sattr);
if (opendata == NULL)
goto err_put_state_owner;
if (path->dentry->d_inode != NULL)
opendata->state = nfs4_get_open_state(path->dentry->d_inode, sp);
status = _nfs4_proc_open(opendata);
if (status != 0)
goto err_opendata_put;
if (opendata->o_arg.open_flags & O_EXCL)
nfs4_exclusive_attrset(opendata, sattr);
state = nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(opendata);
status = PTR_ERR(state);
if (IS_ERR(state))
goto err_opendata_put;
nfs4_opendata_put(opendata);
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
*res = state;
return 0;
err_opendata_put:
nfs4_opendata_put(opendata);
err_put_state_owner:
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
out_err:
*res = NULL;
return status;
}
| 165,684 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CreateFileResult> create()
{
return adoptRefWillBeNoop(new CreateFileResult());
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CreateFileResult> create()
static CreateFileResult* create()
{
return new CreateFileResult();
}
| 171,413 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct kex *kex;
int r;
debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(child_state);
child_state = NULL;
if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) {
/* XXX set callbacks */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
#endif
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
}
/* Update with new address */
if (options.compression) {
ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib,
(ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
(ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct kex *kex;
int r;
debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(child_state);
child_state = NULL;
if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) {
/* XXX set callbacks */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
#endif
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
}
}
| 168,648 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int UDPSocketLibevent::InternalConnect(const IPEndPoint& address) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(!is_connected());
DCHECK(!remote_address_.get());
int addr_family = address.GetSockAddrFamily();
int rv = CreateSocket(addr_family);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
if (bind_type_ == DatagramSocket::RANDOM_BIND) {
size_t addr_size =
addr_family == AF_INET ? kIPv4AddressSize : kIPv6AddressSize;
IPAddressNumber addr_any(addr_size);
rv = RandomBind(addr_any);
}
if (rv < 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Net.UdpSocketRandomBindErrorCode", rv);
Close();
return rv;
}
SockaddrStorage storage;
if (!address.ToSockAddr(storage.addr, &storage.addr_len)) {
Close();
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
}
rv = HANDLE_EINTR(connect(socket_, storage.addr, storage.addr_len));
if (rv < 0) {
int result = MapSystemError(errno);
Close();
return result;
}
remote_address_.reset(new IPEndPoint(address));
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | int UDPSocketLibevent::InternalConnect(const IPEndPoint& address) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(!is_connected());
DCHECK(!remote_address_.get());
int addr_family = address.GetSockAddrFamily();
int rv = CreateSocket(addr_family);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
if (bind_type_ == DatagramSocket::RANDOM_BIND) {
size_t addr_size =
addr_family == AF_INET ? kIPv4AddressSize : kIPv6AddressSize;
IPAddressNumber addr_any(addr_size);
rv = RandomBind(addr_any);
}
if (rv < 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Net.UdpSocketRandomBindErrorCode", -rv);
Close();
return rv;
}
SockaddrStorage storage;
if (!address.ToSockAddr(storage.addr, &storage.addr_len)) {
Close();
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
}
rv = HANDLE_EINTR(connect(socket_, storage.addr, storage.addr_len));
if (rv < 0) {
int result = MapSystemError(errno);
Close();
return result;
}
remote_address_.reset(new IPEndPoint(address));
return rv;
}
| 171,316 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_mod(const image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
const transform_display *display)
{
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
| 173,639 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void TabStrip::ChangeTabGroup(int model_index,
base::Optional<int> old_group,
base::Optional<int> new_group) {
if (new_group.has_value() && !group_headers_[new_group.value()]) {
const TabGroupData* group_data =
controller_->GetDataForGroup(new_group.value());
auto header = std::make_unique<TabGroupHeader>(group_data->title());
header->set_owned_by_client();
AddChildView(header.get());
group_headers_[new_group.value()] = std::move(header);
}
if (old_group.has_value() &&
controller_->ListTabsInGroup(old_group.value()).size() == 0) {
group_headers_.erase(old_group.value());
}
UpdateIdealBounds();
AnimateToIdealBounds();
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void TabStrip::ChangeTabGroup(int model_index,
base::Optional<int> old_group,
base::Optional<int> new_group) {
tab_at(model_index)->SetGroup(new_group);
if (new_group.has_value() && !group_headers_[new_group.value()]) {
auto header = std::make_unique<TabGroupHeader>(this, new_group.value());
header->set_owned_by_client();
AddChildView(header.get());
group_headers_[new_group.value()] = std::move(header);
}
if (old_group.has_value() &&
controller_->ListTabsInGroup(old_group.value()).size() == 0) {
group_headers_.erase(old_group.value());
}
UpdateIdealBounds();
AnimateToIdealBounds();
}
| 172,520 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void umount_tree(struct mount *mnt, enum umount_tree_flags how)
{
LIST_HEAD(tmp_list);
struct mount *p;
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_mount_unlock(mnt);
/* Gather the mounts to umount */
for (p = mnt; p; p = next_mnt(p, mnt)) {
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_UMOUNT;
list_move(&p->mnt_list, &tmp_list);
}
/* Hide the mounts from mnt_mounts */
list_for_each_entry(p, &tmp_list, mnt_list) {
list_del_init(&p->mnt_child);
}
/* Add propogated mounts to the tmp_list */
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_umount(&tmp_list);
while (!list_empty(&tmp_list)) {
bool disconnect;
p = list_first_entry(&tmp_list, struct mount, mnt_list);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_expire);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_list);
__touch_mnt_namespace(p->mnt_ns);
p->mnt_ns = NULL;
if (how & UMOUNT_SYNC)
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT;
disconnect = !IS_MNT_LOCKED_AND_LAZY(p);
pin_insert_group(&p->mnt_umount, &p->mnt_parent->mnt,
disconnect ? &unmounted : NULL);
if (mnt_has_parent(p)) {
mnt_add_count(p->mnt_parent, -1);
if (!disconnect) {
/* Don't forget about p */
list_add_tail(&p->mnt_child, &p->mnt_parent->mnt_mounts);
} else {
umount_mnt(p);
}
}
change_mnt_propagation(p, MS_PRIVATE);
}
}
Commit Message: mnt: Update detach_mounts to leave mounts connected
Now that it is possible to lazily unmount an entire mount tree and
leave the individual mounts connected to each other add a new flag
UMOUNT_CONNECTED to umount_tree to force this behavior and use
this flag in detach_mounts.
This closes a bug where the deletion of a file or directory could
trigger an unmount and reveal data under a mount point.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void umount_tree(struct mount *mnt, enum umount_tree_flags how)
{
LIST_HEAD(tmp_list);
struct mount *p;
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_mount_unlock(mnt);
/* Gather the mounts to umount */
for (p = mnt; p; p = next_mnt(p, mnt)) {
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_UMOUNT;
list_move(&p->mnt_list, &tmp_list);
}
/* Hide the mounts from mnt_mounts */
list_for_each_entry(p, &tmp_list, mnt_list) {
list_del_init(&p->mnt_child);
}
/* Add propogated mounts to the tmp_list */
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_umount(&tmp_list);
while (!list_empty(&tmp_list)) {
bool disconnect;
p = list_first_entry(&tmp_list, struct mount, mnt_list);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_expire);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_list);
__touch_mnt_namespace(p->mnt_ns);
p->mnt_ns = NULL;
if (how & UMOUNT_SYNC)
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT;
disconnect = !(((how & UMOUNT_CONNECTED) &&
mnt_has_parent(p) &&
(p->mnt_parent->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_UMOUNT)) ||
IS_MNT_LOCKED_AND_LAZY(p));
pin_insert_group(&p->mnt_umount, &p->mnt_parent->mnt,
disconnect ? &unmounted : NULL);
if (mnt_has_parent(p)) {
mnt_add_count(p->mnt_parent, -1);
if (!disconnect) {
/* Don't forget about p */
list_add_tail(&p->mnt_child, &p->mnt_parent->mnt_mounts);
} else {
umount_mnt(p);
}
}
change_mnt_propagation(p, MS_PRIVATE);
}
}
| 167,565 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OnWriteTcmallocHeapProfile(
const FilePath::StringType& filepath,
const std::string& output) {
VLOG(0) << "Writing renderer heap profile dump to: " << filepath;
file_util::WriteFile(FilePath(filepath), output.c_str(), output.size());
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OnWriteTcmallocHeapProfile(
| 170,664 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bgp_nlri_parse_vpnv4 (struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr,
struct bgp_nlri *packet)
{
u_char *pnt;
u_char *lim;
struct prefix p;
int psize;
int prefixlen;
u_int16_t type;
struct rd_as rd_as;
struct rd_ip rd_ip;
struct prefix_rd prd;
u_char *tagpnt;
/* Check peer status. */
if (peer->status != Established)
return 0;
/* Make prefix_rd */
prd.family = AF_UNSPEC;
prd.prefixlen = 64;
pnt = packet->nlri;
lim = pnt + packet->length;
for (; pnt < lim; pnt += psize)
{
/* Clear prefix structure. */
/* Fetch prefix length. */
prefixlen = *pnt++;
p.family = AF_INET;
psize = PSIZE (prefixlen);
if (prefixlen < 88)
{
zlog_err ("prefix length is less than 88: %d", prefixlen);
return -1;
}
/* Copyr label to prefix. */
tagpnt = pnt;;
/* Copy routing distinguisher to rd. */
memcpy (&prd.val, pnt + 3, 8);
else if (type == RD_TYPE_IP)
zlog_info ("prefix %ld:%s:%ld:%s/%d", label, inet_ntoa (rd_ip.ip),
rd_ip.val, inet_ntoa (p.u.prefix4), p.prefixlen);
#endif /* 0 */
if (pnt + psize > lim)
return -1;
if (attr)
bgp_update (peer, &p, attr, AFI_IP, SAFI_MPLS_VPN,
ZEBRA_ROUTE_BGP, BGP_ROUTE_NORMAL, &prd, tagpnt, 0);
else
return -1;
}
p.prefixlen = prefixlen - 88;
memcpy (&p.u.prefix, pnt + 11, psize - 11);
#if 0
if (type == RD_TYPE_AS)
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bgp_nlri_parse_vpnv4 (struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr,
struct bgp_nlri *packet)
{
u_char *pnt;
u_char *lim;
struct prefix p;
int psize;
int prefixlen;
u_int16_t type;
struct rd_as rd_as;
struct rd_ip rd_ip;
struct prefix_rd prd;
u_char *tagpnt;
/* Check peer status. */
if (peer->status != Established)
return 0;
/* Make prefix_rd */
prd.family = AF_UNSPEC;
prd.prefixlen = 64;
pnt = packet->nlri;
lim = pnt + packet->length;
#define VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES (3 + 8) /* label + RD */
for (; pnt < lim; pnt += psize)
{
/* Clear prefix structure. */
/* Fetch prefix length. */
prefixlen = *pnt++;
p.family = afi2family (packet->afi);
psize = PSIZE (prefixlen);
/* sanity check against packet data */
if (prefixlen < VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES*8 || (pnt + psize) > lim)
{
zlog_err ("prefix length (%d) is less than 88"
" or larger than received (%u)",
prefixlen, (uint)(lim-pnt));
return -1;
}
/* sanity check against storage for the IP address portion */
if ((psize - VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES) > (ssize_t) sizeof(p.u))
{
zlog_err ("prefix length (%d) exceeds prefix storage (%zu)",
prefixlen - VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES*8, sizeof(p.u));
return -1;
}
/* Sanity check against max bitlen of the address family */
if ((psize - VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES) > prefix_blen (&p))
{
zlog_err ("prefix length (%d) exceeds family (%u) max byte length (%u)",
prefixlen - VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES*8,
p.family, prefix_blen (&p));
return -1;
}
/* Copyr label to prefix. */
tagpnt = pnt;
/* Copy routing distinguisher to rd. */
memcpy (&prd.val, pnt + 3, 8);
else if (type == RD_TYPE_IP)
zlog_info ("prefix %ld:%s:%ld:%s/%d", label, inet_ntoa (rd_ip.ip),
rd_ip.val, inet_ntoa (p.u.prefix4), p.prefixlen);
#endif /* 0 */
if (pnt + psize > lim)
return -1;
if (attr)
bgp_update (peer, &p, attr, AFI_IP, SAFI_MPLS_VPN,
ZEBRA_ROUTE_BGP, BGP_ROUTE_NORMAL, &prd, tagpnt, 0);
else
return -1;
}
p.prefixlen = prefixlen - VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES*8;
memcpy (&p.u.prefix, pnt + VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES,
psize - VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES);
#if 0
if (type == RD_TYPE_AS)
}
| 165,189 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void IBusBusDisconnectedCallback(IBusBus* bus, gpointer user_data) {
LOG(WARNING) << "IBus connection is terminated.";
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->MaybeDestroyIBusConfig();
if (self->connection_change_handler_) {
LOG(INFO) << "Notifying Chrome that IBus is terminated.";
self->connection_change_handler_(self->language_library_, false);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void IBusBusDisconnectedCallback(IBusBus* bus, gpointer user_data) {
void IBusBusDisconnected(IBusBus* bus) {
LOG(WARNING) << "IBus connection is terminated.";
MaybeDestroyIBusConfig();
VLOG(1) << "Notifying Chrome that IBus is terminated.";
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_, OnConnectionChange(false));
}
| 170,537 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
const GetVmRegionsForHeapProfilerCallback& callback) {
RequestGlobalMemoryDump(
MemoryDumpType::EXPLICITLY_TRIGGERED,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::VM_REGIONS_ONLY_FOR_HEAP_PROFILER, {}, callback);
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269 | void CoordinatorImpl::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
const GetVmRegionsForHeapProfilerCallback& callback) {
// This merely strips out the |dump_guid| argument.
auto adapter = [](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t dump_guid,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr global_memory_dump) {
callback.Run(success, std::move(global_memory_dump));
};
QueuedRequest::Args args(
MemoryDumpType::EXPLICITLY_TRIGGERED,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::VM_REGIONS_ONLY_FOR_HEAP_PROFILER, {},
false /* add_to_trace */, base::kNullProcessId);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
| 172,914 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IPV6BuildTestPacket(uint32_t id, uint16_t off, int mf, const char content,
int content_len)
{
Packet *p = NULL;
uint8_t *pcontent;
IPV6Hdr ip6h;
p = SCCalloc(1, sizeof(*p) + default_packet_size);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return NULL;
PACKET_INITIALIZE(p);
gettimeofday(&p->ts, NULL);
ip6h.s_ip6_nxt = 44;
ip6h.s_ip6_hlim = 2;
/* Source and dest address - very bogus addresses. */
ip6h.s_ip6_src[0] = 0x01010101;
ip6h.s_ip6_src[1] = 0x01010101;
ip6h.s_ip6_src[2] = 0x01010101;
ip6h.s_ip6_src[3] = 0x01010101;
ip6h.s_ip6_dst[0] = 0x02020202;
ip6h.s_ip6_dst[1] = 0x02020202;
ip6h.s_ip6_dst[2] = 0x02020202;
ip6h.s_ip6_dst[3] = 0x02020202;
/* copy content_len crap, we need full length */
PacketCopyData(p, (uint8_t *)&ip6h, sizeof(IPV6Hdr));
p->ip6h = (IPV6Hdr *)GET_PKT_DATA(p);
IPV6_SET_RAW_VER(p->ip6h, 6);
/* Fragmentation header. */
IPV6FragHdr *fh = (IPV6FragHdr *)(GET_PKT_DATA(p) + sizeof(IPV6Hdr));
fh->ip6fh_nxt = IPPROTO_ICMP;
fh->ip6fh_ident = htonl(id);
fh->ip6fh_offlg = htons((off << 3) | mf);
DecodeIPV6FragHeader(p, (uint8_t *)fh, 8, 8 + content_len, 0);
pcontent = SCCalloc(1, content_len);
if (unlikely(pcontent == NULL))
return NULL;
memset(pcontent, content, content_len);
PacketCopyDataOffset(p, sizeof(IPV6Hdr) + sizeof(IPV6FragHdr), pcontent, content_len);
SET_PKT_LEN(p, sizeof(IPV6Hdr) + sizeof(IPV6FragHdr) + content_len);
SCFree(pcontent);
p->ip6h->s_ip6_plen = htons(sizeof(IPV6FragHdr) + content_len);
SET_IPV6_SRC_ADDR(p, &p->src);
SET_IPV6_DST_ADDR(p, &p->dst);
/* Self test. */
if (IPV6_GET_VER(p) != 6)
goto error;
if (IPV6_GET_NH(p) != 44)
goto error;
if (IPV6_GET_PLEN(p) != sizeof(IPV6FragHdr) + content_len)
goto error;
return p;
error:
fprintf(stderr, "Error building test packet.\n");
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | IPV6BuildTestPacket(uint32_t id, uint16_t off, int mf, const char content,
IPV6BuildTestPacket(uint8_t proto, uint32_t id, uint16_t off, int mf,
const char content, int content_len)
{
Packet *p = NULL;
uint8_t *pcontent;
IPV6Hdr ip6h;
p = SCCalloc(1, sizeof(*p) + default_packet_size);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return NULL;
PACKET_INITIALIZE(p);
gettimeofday(&p->ts, NULL);
ip6h.s_ip6_nxt = 44;
ip6h.s_ip6_hlim = 2;
/* Source and dest address - very bogus addresses. */
ip6h.s_ip6_src[0] = 0x01010101;
ip6h.s_ip6_src[1] = 0x01010101;
ip6h.s_ip6_src[2] = 0x01010101;
ip6h.s_ip6_src[3] = 0x01010101;
ip6h.s_ip6_dst[0] = 0x02020202;
ip6h.s_ip6_dst[1] = 0x02020202;
ip6h.s_ip6_dst[2] = 0x02020202;
ip6h.s_ip6_dst[3] = 0x02020202;
/* copy content_len crap, we need full length */
PacketCopyData(p, (uint8_t *)&ip6h, sizeof(IPV6Hdr));
p->ip6h = (IPV6Hdr *)GET_PKT_DATA(p);
IPV6_SET_RAW_VER(p->ip6h, 6);
/* Fragmentation header. */
IPV6FragHdr *fh = (IPV6FragHdr *)(GET_PKT_DATA(p) + sizeof(IPV6Hdr));
fh->ip6fh_nxt = proto;
fh->ip6fh_ident = htonl(id);
fh->ip6fh_offlg = htons((off << 3) | mf);
DecodeIPV6FragHeader(p, (uint8_t *)fh, 8, 8 + content_len, 0);
pcontent = SCCalloc(1, content_len);
if (unlikely(pcontent == NULL))
return NULL;
memset(pcontent, content, content_len);
PacketCopyDataOffset(p, sizeof(IPV6Hdr) + sizeof(IPV6FragHdr), pcontent, content_len);
SET_PKT_LEN(p, sizeof(IPV6Hdr) + sizeof(IPV6FragHdr) + content_len);
SCFree(pcontent);
p->ip6h->s_ip6_plen = htons(sizeof(IPV6FragHdr) + content_len);
SET_IPV6_SRC_ADDR(p, &p->src);
SET_IPV6_DST_ADDR(p, &p->dst);
/* Self test. */
if (IPV6_GET_VER(p) != 6)
goto error;
if (IPV6_GET_NH(p) != 44)
goto error;
if (IPV6_GET_PLEN(p) != sizeof(IPV6FragHdr) + content_len)
goto error;
return p;
error:
fprintf(stderr, "Error building test packet.\n");
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
return NULL;
}
| 168,307 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void jpc_qmfb_split_colgrp(jpc_fix_t *a, int numrows, int stride,
int parity)
{
int bufsize = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(numrows, 1);
jpc_fix_t splitbuf[QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE * JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE];
jpc_fix_t *buf = splitbuf;
jpc_fix_t *srcptr;
jpc_fix_t *dstptr;
register jpc_fix_t *srcptr2;
register jpc_fix_t *dstptr2;
register int n;
register int i;
int m;
int hstartcol;
/* Get a buffer. */
if (bufsize > QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE) {
if (!(buf = jas_alloc2(bufsize, sizeof(jpc_fix_t)))) {
/* We have no choice but to commit suicide in this case. */
abort();
}
}
if (numrows >= 2) {
hstartcol = (numrows + 1 - parity) >> 1;
m = numrows - hstartcol;
/* Save the samples destined for the highpass channel. */
n = m;
dstptr = buf;
srcptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
srcptr += stride << 1;
}
/* Copy the appropriate samples into the lowpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
srcptr = &a[(2 - parity) * stride];
n = numrows - m - (!parity);
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += stride;
srcptr += stride << 1;
}
/* Copy the saved samples into the highpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[hstartcol * stride];
srcptr = buf;
n = m;
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += stride;
srcptr += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
}
}
/* If the split buffer was allocated on the heap, free this memory. */
if (buf != splitbuf) {
jas_free(buf);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void jpc_qmfb_split_colgrp(jpc_fix_t *a, int numrows, int stride,
int parity)
{
int bufsize = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(numrows, 1);
jpc_fix_t splitbuf[QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE * JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE];
jpc_fix_t *buf = splitbuf;
jpc_fix_t *srcptr;
jpc_fix_t *dstptr;
register jpc_fix_t *srcptr2;
register jpc_fix_t *dstptr2;
register int n;
register int i;
int m;
int hstartrow;
/* Get a buffer. */
if (bufsize > QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE) {
if (!(buf = jas_alloc3(bufsize, JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE,
sizeof(jpc_fix_t)))) {
/* We have no choice but to commit suicide in this case. */
abort();
}
}
if (numrows >= 2) {
hstartrow = (numrows + 1 - parity) >> 1;
// ORIGINAL (WRONG): m = (parity) ? hstartrow : (numrows - hstartrow);
m = numrows - hstartrow;
/* Save the samples destined for the highpass channel. */
n = m;
dstptr = buf;
srcptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
srcptr += stride << 1;
}
/* Copy the appropriate samples into the lowpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
srcptr = &a[(2 - parity) * stride];
n = numrows - m - (!parity);
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += stride;
srcptr += stride << 1;
}
/* Copy the saved samples into the highpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[hstartrow * stride];
srcptr = buf;
n = m;
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += stride;
srcptr += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
}
}
/* If the split buffer was allocated on the heap, free this memory. */
if (buf != splitbuf) {
jas_free(buf);
}
}
| 169,446 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: logger_get_mask_expanded (struct t_gui_buffer *buffer, const char *mask)
{
char *mask2, *mask_decoded, *mask_decoded2, *mask_decoded3, *mask_decoded4;
char *mask_decoded5;
const char *dir_separator;
int length;
time_t seconds;
struct tm *date_tmp;
mask2 = NULL;
mask_decoded = NULL;
mask_decoded2 = NULL;
mask_decoded3 = NULL;
mask_decoded4 = NULL;
mask_decoded5 = NULL;
dir_separator = weechat_info_get ("dir_separator", "");
if (!dir_separator)
return NULL;
/*
* we first replace directory separator (commonly '/') by \01 because
* buffer mask can contain this char, and will be replaced by replacement
* char ('_' by default)
*/
mask2 = weechat_string_replace (mask, dir_separator, "\01");
if (!mask2)
goto end;
mask_decoded = weechat_buffer_string_replace_local_var (buffer, mask2);
if (!mask_decoded)
goto end;
mask_decoded2 = weechat_string_replace (mask_decoded,
dir_separator,
weechat_config_string (logger_config_file_replacement_char));
if (!mask_decoded2)
goto end;
#ifdef __CYGWIN__
mask_decoded3 = weechat_string_replace (mask_decoded2, "\\",
weechat_config_string (logger_config_file_replacement_char));
#else
mask_decoded3 = strdup (mask_decoded2);
#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
if (!mask_decoded3)
goto end;
/* restore directory separator */
mask_decoded4 = weechat_string_replace (mask_decoded3,
"\01", dir_separator);
if (!mask_decoded4)
goto end;
/* replace date/time specifiers in mask */
length = strlen (mask_decoded4) + 256 + 1;
mask_decoded5 = malloc (length);
if (!mask_decoded5)
goto end;
seconds = time (NULL);
date_tmp = localtime (&seconds);
mask_decoded5[0] = '\0';
strftime (mask_decoded5, length - 1, mask_decoded4, date_tmp);
/* convert to lower case? */
if (weechat_config_boolean (logger_config_file_name_lower_case))
weechat_string_tolower (mask_decoded5);
if (weechat_logger_plugin->debug)
{
weechat_printf_date_tags (NULL, 0, "no_log",
"%s: buffer = \"%s\", mask = \"%s\", "
"decoded mask = \"%s\"",
LOGGER_PLUGIN_NAME,
weechat_buffer_get_string (buffer, "name"),
mask, mask_decoded5);
}
end:
if (mask2)
free (mask2);
if (mask_decoded)
free (mask_decoded);
if (mask_decoded2)
free (mask_decoded2);
if (mask_decoded3)
free (mask_decoded3);
if (mask_decoded4)
free (mask_decoded4);
return mask_decoded5;
}
Commit Message: logger: call strftime before replacing buffer local variables
CWE ID: CWE-119 | logger_get_mask_expanded (struct t_gui_buffer *buffer, const char *mask)
{
char *mask2, *mask3, *mask4, *mask5, *mask6, *mask7;
const char *dir_separator;
int length;
time_t seconds;
struct tm *date_tmp;
mask2 = NULL;
mask3 = NULL;
mask4 = NULL;
mask5 = NULL;
mask6 = NULL;
mask7 = NULL;
dir_separator = weechat_info_get ("dir_separator", "");
if (!dir_separator)
return NULL;
/* replace date/time specifiers in mask */
length = strlen (mask) + 256 + 1;
mask2 = malloc (length);
if (!mask2)
goto end;
seconds = time (NULL);
date_tmp = localtime (&seconds);
mask2[0] = '\0';
if (strftime (mask2, length - 1, mask, date_tmp) == 0)
mask2[0] = '\0';
/*
* we first replace directory separator (commonly '/') by \01 because
* buffer mask can contain this char, and will be replaced by replacement
* char ('_' by default)
*/
mask3 = weechat_string_replace (mask2, dir_separator, "\01");
if (!mask3)
goto end;
mask4 = weechat_buffer_string_replace_local_var (buffer, mask3);
if (!mask4)
goto end;
mask5 = weechat_string_replace (mask4,
dir_separator,
weechat_config_string (logger_config_file_replacement_char));
if (!mask5)
goto end;
#ifdef __CYGWIN__
mask6 = weechat_string_replace (mask5, "\\",
weechat_config_string (logger_config_file_replacement_char));
#else
mask6 = strdup (mask5);
#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
if (!mask6)
goto end;
/* restore directory separator */
mask7 = weechat_string_replace (mask6,
"\01", dir_separator);
if (!mask7)
goto end;
/* convert to lower case? */
if (weechat_config_boolean (logger_config_file_name_lower_case))
weechat_string_tolower (mask7);
if (weechat_logger_plugin->debug)
{
weechat_printf_date_tags (NULL, 0, "no_log",
"%s: buffer = \"%s\", mask = \"%s\", "
"decoded mask = \"%s\"",
LOGGER_PLUGIN_NAME,
weechat_buffer_get_string (buffer, "name"),
mask, mask7);
}
end:
if (mask2)
free (mask2);
if (mask3)
free (mask3);
if (mask4)
free (mask4);
if (mask5)
free (mask5);
if (mask6)
free (mask6);
return mask7;
}
| 167,745 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: selaGetCombName(SELA *sela,
l_int32 size,
l_int32 direction)
{
char *selname;
char combname[L_BUF_SIZE];
l_int32 i, nsels, sx, sy, found;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selaGetCombName");
if (!sela)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sela not defined", procName, NULL);
if (direction != L_HORIZ && direction != L_VERT)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("invalid direction", procName, NULL);
/* Derive the comb name we're looking for */
if (direction == L_HORIZ)
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dh", size);
else /* direction == L_VERT */
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dv", size);
found = FALSE;
nsels = selaGetCount(sela);
for (i = 0; i < nsels; i++) {
sel = selaGetSel(sela, i);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, NULL, NULL);
if (sy != 1 && sx != 1) /* 2-D; not a comb */
continue;
selname = selGetName(sel);
if (!strcmp(selname, combname)) {
found = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (found)
return stringNew(selname);
else
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sel not found", procName, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | selaGetCombName(SELA *sela,
l_int32 size,
l_int32 direction)
{
char *selname;
char combname[L_BUFSIZE];
l_int32 i, nsels, sx, sy, found;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selaGetCombName");
if (!sela)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sela not defined", procName, NULL);
if (direction != L_HORIZ && direction != L_VERT)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("invalid direction", procName, NULL);
/* Derive the comb name we're looking for */
if (direction == L_HORIZ)
snprintf(combname, L_BUFSIZE, "sel_comb_%dh", size);
else /* direction == L_VERT */
snprintf(combname, L_BUFSIZE, "sel_comb_%dv", size);
found = FALSE;
nsels = selaGetCount(sela);
for (i = 0; i < nsels; i++) {
sel = selaGetSel(sela, i);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, NULL, NULL);
if (sy != 1 && sx != 1) /* 2-D; not a comb */
continue;
selname = selGetName(sel);
if (!strcmp(selname, combname)) {
found = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (found)
return stringNew(selname);
else
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sel not found", procName, NULL);
}
| 169,330 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ShellSurface::OnSurfaceCommit() {
surface_->CheckIfSurfaceHierarchyNeedsCommitToNewSurfaces();
surface_->CommitSurfaceHierarchy();
if (enabled() && !widget_)
CreateShellSurfaceWidget(ui::SHOW_STATE_NORMAL);
origin_ += pending_origin_offset_;
pending_origin_offset_ = gfx::Vector2d();
resize_component_ = pending_resize_component_;
if (widget_) {
geometry_ = pending_geometry_;
UpdateWidgetBounds();
gfx::Point surface_origin = GetSurfaceOrigin();
gfx::Rect hit_test_bounds =
surface_->GetHitTestBounds() + surface_origin.OffsetFromOrigin();
bool activatable = activatable_ && !hit_test_bounds.IsEmpty();
if (activatable != CanActivate()) {
set_can_activate(activatable);
aura::client::ActivationClient* activation_client =
ash::Shell::GetInstance()->activation_client();
if (activatable)
activation_client->ActivateWindow(widget_->GetNativeWindow());
else if (widget_->IsActive())
activation_client->DeactivateWindow(widget_->GetNativeWindow());
}
surface_->window()->SetBounds(
gfx::Rect(surface_origin, surface_->window()->layer()->size()));
if (pending_scale_ != scale_) {
gfx::Transform transform;
DCHECK_NE(pending_scale_, 0.0);
transform.Scale(1.0 / pending_scale_, 1.0 / pending_scale_);
surface_->window()->SetTransform(transform);
scale_ = pending_scale_;
}
if (pending_show_widget_) {
DCHECK(!widget_->IsClosed());
DCHECK(!widget_->IsVisible());
pending_show_widget_ = false;
widget_->Show();
}
}
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void ShellSurface::OnSurfaceCommit() {
surface_->CheckIfSurfaceHierarchyNeedsCommitToNewSurfaces();
surface_->CommitSurfaceHierarchy();
if (enabled() && !widget_)
CreateShellSurfaceWidget(ui::SHOW_STATE_NORMAL);
origin_ += pending_origin_offset_;
pending_origin_offset_ = gfx::Vector2d();
resize_component_ = pending_resize_component_;
if (widget_) {
geometry_ = pending_geometry_;
UpdateWidgetBounds();
gfx::Point surface_origin = GetSurfaceOrigin();
// System modal container is used by clients to implement client side
// managed system modal dialogs using a single ShellSurface instance.
// Hit-test region will be non-empty when at least one dialog exists on
// the client side. Here we detect the transition between no client side
// dialog and at least one dialog so activatable state is properly
// updated.
if (container_ == ash::kShellWindowId_SystemModalContainer) {
gfx::Rect hit_test_bounds =
surface_->GetHitTestBounds() + surface_origin.OffsetFromOrigin();
// Prevent window from being activated when hit test bounds are empty.
bool activatable = activatable_ && !hit_test_bounds.IsEmpty();
if (activatable != CanActivate()) {
set_can_activate(activatable);
// Activate or deactivate window if activation state changed.
aura::client::ActivationClient* activation_client =
ash::Shell::GetInstance()->activation_client();
if (activatable)
activation_client->ActivateWindow(widget_->GetNativeWindow());
else if (widget_->IsActive())
activation_client->DeactivateWindow(widget_->GetNativeWindow());
}
}
surface_->window()->SetBounds(
gfx::Rect(surface_origin, surface_->window()->layer()->size()));
if (pending_scale_ != scale_) {
gfx::Transform transform;
DCHECK_NE(pending_scale_, 0.0);
transform.Scale(1.0 / pending_scale_, 1.0 / pending_scale_);
surface_->window()->SetTransform(transform);
scale_ = pending_scale_;
}
if (pending_show_widget_) {
DCHECK(!widget_->IsClosed());
DCHECK(!widget_->IsVisible());
pending_show_widget_ = false;
widget_->Show();
}
}
}
| 171,639 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: display_log(struct display *dp, error_level level, const char *fmt, ...)
/* 'level' is as above, fmt is a stdio style format string. This routine
* does not return if level is above LIBPNG_WARNING
*/
{
dp->results |= 1U << level;
if (level > (error_level)(dp->options & LEVEL_MASK))
{
const char *lp;
va_list ap;
switch (level)
{
case INFORMATION: lp = "information"; break;
case LIBPNG_WARNING: lp = "warning(libpng)"; break;
case APP_WARNING: lp = "warning(pngimage)"; break;
case APP_FAIL: lp = "error(continuable)"; break;
case LIBPNG_ERROR: lp = "error(libpng)"; break;
case LIBPNG_BUG: lp = "bug(libpng)"; break;
case APP_ERROR: lp = "error(pngimage)"; break;
case USER_ERROR: lp = "error(user)"; break;
case INTERNAL_ERROR: /* anything unexpected is an internal error: */
case VERBOSE: case WARNINGS: case ERRORS: case QUIET:
default: lp = "bug(pngimage)"; break;
}
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: %s",
dp->filename != NULL ? dp->filename : "<stdin>", lp, dp->operation);
if (dp->transforms != 0)
{
int tr = dp->transforms;
if (is_combo(tr))
fprintf(stderr, "(0x%x)", tr);
else
fprintf(stderr, "(%s)", transform_name(tr));
}
fprintf(stderr, ": ");
va_start(ap, fmt);
vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
fputc('\n', stderr);
}
/* else do not output any message */
/* Errors cause this routine to exit to the fail code */
if (level > APP_FAIL || (level > ERRORS && !(dp->options & CONTINUE)))
longjmp(dp->error_return, level);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | display_log(struct display *dp, error_level level, const char *fmt, ...)
/* 'level' is as above, fmt is a stdio style format string. This routine
* does not return if level is above LIBPNG_WARNING
*/
{
dp->results |= 1U << level;
if (level > (error_level)(dp->options & LEVEL_MASK))
{
const char *lp;
va_list ap;
switch (level)
{
case INFORMATION: lp = "information"; break;
case LIBPNG_WARNING: lp = "warning(libpng)"; break;
case APP_WARNING: lp = "warning(pngimage)"; break;
case APP_FAIL: lp = "error(continuable)"; break;
case LIBPNG_ERROR: lp = "error(libpng)"; break;
case LIBPNG_BUG: lp = "bug(libpng)"; break;
case APP_ERROR: lp = "error(pngimage)"; break;
case USER_ERROR: lp = "error(user)"; break;
case INTERNAL_ERROR: /* anything unexpected is an internal error: */
case VERBOSE: case WARNINGS: case ERRORS: case QUIET:
default: lp = "bug(pngimage)"; break;
}
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: %s",
dp->filename != NULL ? dp->filename : "<stdin>", lp, dp->operation);
if (dp->transforms != 0)
{
int tr = dp->transforms;
if (is_combo(tr))
{
if (dp->options & LIST_COMBOS)
{
int trx = tr;
fprintf(stderr, "(");
if (trx)
{
int start = 0;
while (trx)
{
int trz = trx & -trx;
if (start) fprintf(stderr, "+");
fprintf(stderr, "%s", transform_name(trz));
start = 1;
trx &= ~trz;
}
}
else
fprintf(stderr, "-");
fprintf(stderr, ")");
}
else
fprintf(stderr, "(0x%x)", tr);
}
else
fprintf(stderr, "(%s)", transform_name(tr));
}
fprintf(stderr, ": ");
va_start(ap, fmt);
vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
fputc('\n', stderr);
}
/* else do not output any message */
/* Errors cause this routine to exit to the fail code */
if (level > APP_FAIL || (level > ERRORS && !(dp->options & CONTINUE)))
longjmp(dp->error_return, level);
}
| 173,588 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void XMLHttpRequest::didFailRedirectCheck()
{
networkError();
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void XMLHttpRequest::didFailRedirectCheck()
{
handleNetworkError();
}
| 171,166 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int nfs_readlink_req(struct nfs_priv *npriv, struct nfs_fh *fh,
char **target)
{
uint32_t data[1024];
uint32_t *p;
uint32_t len;
struct packet *nfs_packet;
/*
* struct READLINK3args {
* nfs_fh3 symlink;
* };
*
* struct READLINK3resok {
* post_op_attr symlink_attributes;
* nfspath3 data;
* };
*
* struct READLINK3resfail {
* post_op_attr symlink_attributes;
* }
*
* union READLINK3res switch (nfsstat3 status) {
* case NFS3_OK:
* READLINK3resok resok;
* default:
* READLINK3resfail resfail;
* };
*/
p = &(data[0]);
p = rpc_add_credentials(p);
p = nfs_add_fh3(p, fh);
len = p - &(data[0]);
nfs_packet = rpc_req(npriv, PROG_NFS, NFSPROC3_READLINK, data, len);
if (IS_ERR(nfs_packet))
return PTR_ERR(nfs_packet);
p = (void *)nfs_packet->data + sizeof(struct rpc_reply) + 4;
p = nfs_read_post_op_attr(p, NULL);
len = ntoh32(net_read_uint32(p)); /* new path length */
p++;
*target = xzalloc(len + 1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int nfs_readlink_req(struct nfs_priv *npriv, struct nfs_fh *fh,
char **target)
{
uint32_t data[1024];
uint32_t *p;
uint32_t len;
struct packet *nfs_packet;
/*
* struct READLINK3args {
* nfs_fh3 symlink;
* };
*
* struct READLINK3resok {
* post_op_attr symlink_attributes;
* nfspath3 data;
* };
*
* struct READLINK3resfail {
* post_op_attr symlink_attributes;
* }
*
* union READLINK3res switch (nfsstat3 status) {
* case NFS3_OK:
* READLINK3resok resok;
* default:
* READLINK3resfail resfail;
* };
*/
p = &(data[0]);
p = rpc_add_credentials(p);
p = nfs_add_fh3(p, fh);
len = p - &(data[0]);
nfs_packet = rpc_req(npriv, PROG_NFS, NFSPROC3_READLINK, data, len);
if (IS_ERR(nfs_packet))
return PTR_ERR(nfs_packet);
p = (void *)nfs_packet->data + sizeof(struct rpc_reply) + 4;
p = nfs_read_post_op_attr(p, NULL);
len = ntoh32(net_read_uint32(p)); /* new path length */
len = max_t(unsigned int, len,
nfs_packet->len - sizeof(struct rpc_reply) - sizeof(uint32_t));
p++;
*target = xzalloc(len + 1);
return 0;
}
| 164,624 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GIOChannel *net_connect_ip_ssl(IPADDR *ip, int port, IPADDR *my_ip, const char *cert, const char *pkey, const char *cafile, const char *capath, gboolean verify)
{
GIOChannel *handle, *ssl_handle;
handle = net_connect_ip(ip, port, my_ip);
if (handle == NULL)
return NULL;
ssl_handle = irssi_ssl_get_iochannel(handle, cert, pkey, cafile, capath, verify);
if (ssl_handle == NULL)
g_io_channel_unref(handle);
return ssl_handle;
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20 | GIOChannel *net_connect_ip_ssl(IPADDR *ip, int port, IPADDR *my_ip, const char *cert, const char *pkey, const char *cafile, const char *capath, gboolean verify)
GIOChannel *net_connect_ip_ssl(IPADDR *ip, int port, const char* hostname, IPADDR *my_ip, const char *cert, const char *pkey, const char *cafile, const char *capath, gboolean verify)
{
GIOChannel *handle, *ssl_handle;
handle = net_connect_ip(ip, port, my_ip);
if (handle == NULL)
return NULL;
ssl_handle = irssi_ssl_get_iochannel(handle, hostname, cert, pkey, cafile, capath, verify);
if (ssl_handle == NULL)
g_io_channel_unref(handle);
return ssl_handle;
}
| 165,519 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void upnp_event_prepare(struct upnp_event_notify * obj)
{
static const char notifymsg[] =
"NOTIFY %s HTTP/1.1\r\n"
"Host: %s%s\r\n"
#if (UPNP_VERSION_MAJOR == 1) && (UPNP_VERSION_MINOR == 0)
"Content-Type: text/xml\r\n" /* UDA v1.0 */
#else
"Content-Type: text/xml; charset=\"utf-8\"\r\n" /* UDA v1.1 or later */
#endif
"Content-Length: %d\r\n"
"NT: upnp:event\r\n"
"NTS: upnp:propchange\r\n"
"SID: %s\r\n"
"SEQ: %u\r\n"
"Connection: close\r\n"
"Cache-Control: no-cache\r\n"
"\r\n"
"%.*s\r\n";
char * xml;
int l;
if(obj->sub == NULL) {
obj->state = EError;
return;
}
switch(obj->sub->service) {
case EWanCFG:
xml = getVarsWANCfg(&l);
break;
case EWanIPC:
xml = getVarsWANIPCn(&l);
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_L3F_SERVICE
case EL3F:
xml = getVarsL3F(&l);
break;
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_6FC_SERVICE
case E6FC:
xml = getVars6FC(&l);
break;
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_DP_SERVICE
case EDP:
xml = getVarsDP(&l);
break;
#endif
default:
xml = NULL;
l = 0;
}
obj->buffersize = 1024;
obj->buffer = malloc(obj->buffersize);
if(!obj->buffer) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: malloc returned NULL", "upnp_event_prepare");
if(xml) {
free(xml);
}
obj->state = EError;
return;
}
obj->tosend = snprintf(obj->buffer, obj->buffersize, notifymsg,
obj->path, obj->addrstr, obj->portstr, l+2,
obj->sub->uuid, obj->sub->seq,
l, xml);
if(xml) {
free(xml);
xml = NULL;
}
obj->state = ESending;
}
Commit Message: upnp_event_prepare(): check the return value of snprintf()
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void upnp_event_prepare(struct upnp_event_notify * obj)
{
static const char notifymsg[] =
"NOTIFY %s HTTP/1.1\r\n"
"Host: %s%s\r\n"
#if (UPNP_VERSION_MAJOR == 1) && (UPNP_VERSION_MINOR == 0)
"Content-Type: text/xml\r\n" /* UDA v1.0 */
#else
"Content-Type: text/xml; charset=\"utf-8\"\r\n" /* UDA v1.1 or later */
#endif
"Content-Length: %d\r\n"
"NT: upnp:event\r\n"
"NTS: upnp:propchange\r\n"
"SID: %s\r\n"
"SEQ: %u\r\n"
"Connection: close\r\n"
"Cache-Control: no-cache\r\n"
"\r\n"
"%.*s\r\n";
char * xml;
int l;
if(obj->sub == NULL) {
obj->state = EError;
return;
}
switch(obj->sub->service) {
case EWanCFG:
xml = getVarsWANCfg(&l);
break;
case EWanIPC:
xml = getVarsWANIPCn(&l);
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_L3F_SERVICE
case EL3F:
xml = getVarsL3F(&l);
break;
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_6FC_SERVICE
case E6FC:
xml = getVars6FC(&l);
break;
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_DP_SERVICE
case EDP:
xml = getVarsDP(&l);
break;
#endif
default:
xml = NULL;
l = 0;
}
obj->buffersize = 1024;
for (;;) {
obj->buffer = malloc(obj->buffersize);
if(!obj->buffer) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: malloc returned NULL", "upnp_event_prepare");
if(xml) {
free(xml);
}
obj->state = EError;
return;
}
obj->tosend = snprintf(obj->buffer, obj->buffersize, notifymsg,
obj->path, obj->addrstr, obj->portstr, l+2,
obj->sub->uuid, obj->sub->seq,
l, xml);
if (obj->tosend < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: snprintf() failed", "upnp_event_prepare");
if(xml) {
free(xml);
}
obj->state = EError;
return;
} else if (obj->tosend < obj->buffersize) {
break; /* the buffer was large enough */
}
/* Try again with a buffer big enough */
free(obj->buffer);
obj->buffersize = obj->tosend + 1; /* reserve space for the final 0 */
}
if(xml) {
free(xml);
xml = NULL;
}
obj->state = ESending;
}
| 169,668 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: __be32 ipv6_proxy_select_ident(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
static u32 ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd __read_mostly;
struct in6_addr buf[2];
struct in6_addr *addrs;
u32 id;
addrs = skb_header_pointer(skb,
skb_network_offset(skb) +
offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, saddr),
sizeof(buf), buf);
if (!addrs)
return 0;
net_get_random_once(&ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd,
sizeof(ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd));
id = __ipv6_select_ident(net, ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd,
&addrs[1], &addrs[0]);
return htonl(id);
}
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | __be32 ipv6_proxy_select_ident(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct in6_addr buf[2];
struct in6_addr *addrs;
u32 id;
addrs = skb_header_pointer(skb,
skb_network_offset(skb) +
offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, saddr),
sizeof(buf), buf);
if (!addrs)
return 0;
id = __ipv6_select_ident(net, &addrs[1], &addrs[0]);
return htonl(id);
}
| 169,718 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: print_ccp_config_options(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, int length)
{
int len, opt;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
len = p[1];
opt = p[0];
if (length < len)
return 0;
if (len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u (length bogus, should be >= 2)",
tok2str(ccpconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
opt,
len));
return 0;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u",
tok2str(ccpconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
opt,
len));
switch (opt) {
case CCPOPT_BSDCOMP:
if (len < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 3)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Version: %u, Dictionary Bits: %u",
p[2] >> 5, p[2] & 0x1f));
break;
case CCPOPT_MVRCA:
if (len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 4)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Features: %u, PxP: %s, History: %u, #CTX-ID: %u",
(p[2] & 0xc0) >> 6,
(p[2] & 0x20) ? "Enabled" : "Disabled",
p[2] & 0x1f, p[3]));
break;
case CCPOPT_DEFLATE:
if (len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 4)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Window: %uK, Method: %s (0x%x), MBZ: %u, CHK: %u",
(p[2] & 0xf0) >> 4,
((p[2] & 0x0f) == 8) ? "zlib" : "unknown",
p[2] & 0x0f, (p[3] & 0xfc) >> 2, p[3] & 0x03));
break;
/* XXX: to be supported */
#if 0
case CCPOPT_OUI:
case CCPOPT_PRED1:
case CCPOPT_PRED2:
case CCPOPT_PJUMP:
case CCPOPT_HPPPC:
case CCPOPT_STACLZS:
case CCPOPT_MPPC:
case CCPOPT_GFZA:
case CCPOPT_V42BIS:
case CCPOPT_LZSDCP:
case CCPOPT_DEC:
case CCPOPT_RESV:
break;
#endif
default:
/*
* Unknown option; dump it as raw bytes now if we're
* not going to do so below.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2); /* exclude TLV header */
return len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ccp]"));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13029/PPP: Fix a bounds check, and clean up other bounds checks.
For configuration protocol options, use ND_TCHECK() and
ND_TCHECK_nBITS() macros, passing them the appropriate pointer argument.
This fixes one case where the ND_TCHECK2() call they replace was not
checking enough bytes.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | print_ccp_config_options(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, int length)
{
int len, opt;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
len = p[1];
opt = p[0];
if (length < len)
return 0;
if (len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u (length bogus, should be >= 2)",
tok2str(ccpconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
opt,
len));
return 0;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u",
tok2str(ccpconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
opt,
len));
switch (opt) {
case CCPOPT_BSDCOMP:
if (len < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 3)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK(p[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Version: %u, Dictionary Bits: %u",
p[2] >> 5, p[2] & 0x1f));
break;
case CCPOPT_MVRCA:
if (len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 4)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK(p[3]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Features: %u, PxP: %s, History: %u, #CTX-ID: %u",
(p[2] & 0xc0) >> 6,
(p[2] & 0x20) ? "Enabled" : "Disabled",
p[2] & 0x1f, p[3]));
break;
case CCPOPT_DEFLATE:
if (len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 4)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK(p[3]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Window: %uK, Method: %s (0x%x), MBZ: %u, CHK: %u",
(p[2] & 0xf0) >> 4,
((p[2] & 0x0f) == 8) ? "zlib" : "unknown",
p[2] & 0x0f, (p[3] & 0xfc) >> 2, p[3] & 0x03));
break;
/* XXX: to be supported */
#if 0
case CCPOPT_OUI:
case CCPOPT_PRED1:
case CCPOPT_PRED2:
case CCPOPT_PJUMP:
case CCPOPT_HPPPC:
case CCPOPT_STACLZS:
case CCPOPT_MPPC:
case CCPOPT_GFZA:
case CCPOPT_V42BIS:
case CCPOPT_LZSDCP:
case CCPOPT_DEC:
case CCPOPT_RESV:
break;
#endif
default:
/*
* Unknown option; dump it as raw bytes now if we're
* not going to do so below.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2); /* exclude TLV header */
return len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ccp]"));
return 0;
}
| 167,860 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int object_custom(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, zend_class_entry *ce)
{
long datalen;
datalen = parse_iv2((*p) + 2, p);
(*p) += 2;
if (datalen < 0 || (*p) + datalen >= max) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Insufficient data for unserializing - %ld required, %ld present", datalen, (long)(max - (*p)));
return 0;
}
if (ce->unserialize == NULL) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Class %s has no unserializer", ce->name);
object_init_ex(*rval, ce);
} else if (ce->unserialize(rval, ce, (const unsigned char*)*p, datalen, (zend_unserialize_data *)var_hash TSRMLS_CC) != SUCCESS) {
return 0;
}
(*p) += datalen;
return finish_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static inline int object_custom(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, zend_class_entry *ce)
{
long datalen;
datalen = parse_iv2((*p) + 2, p);
(*p) += 2;
if (datalen < 0 || (max - (*p)) <= datalen) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Insufficient data for unserializing - %ld required, %ld present", datalen, (long)(max - (*p)));
return 0;
}
if (ce->unserialize == NULL) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Class %s has no unserializer", ce->name);
object_init_ex(*rval, ce);
} else if (ce->unserialize(rval, ce, (const unsigned char*)*p, datalen, (zend_unserialize_data *)var_hash TSRMLS_CC) != SUCCESS) {
return 0;
}
(*p) += datalen;
return finish_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU);
}
| 165,149 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int kvm_read_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, void *data, int offset,
int len)
{
int r;
unsigned long addr;
addr = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gfn);
if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
return -EFAULT;
r = copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)addr + offset, len);
if (r)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Validate userspace_addr of memslot when registered
This way, we can avoid checking the user space address many times when
we read the guest memory.
Although we can do the same for write if we check which slots are
writable, we do not care write now: reading the guest memory happens
more often than writing.
[avi: change VERIFY_READ to VERIFY_WRITE]
Signed-off-by: Takuya Yoshikawa <yoshikawa.takuya@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int kvm_read_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, void *data, int offset,
int len)
{
int r;
unsigned long addr;
addr = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gfn);
if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
return -EFAULT;
r = __copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)addr + offset, len);
if (r)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
| 166,100 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static __forceinline void draw_line(float *output, int x0, int y0, int x1, int y1, int n)
{
int dy = y1 - y0;
int adx = x1 - x0;
int ady = abs(dy);
int base;
int x=x0,y=y0;
int err = 0;
int sy;
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDE_TABLE
if (adx < DIVTAB_DENOM && ady < DIVTAB_NUMER) {
if (dy < 0) {
base = -integer_divide_table[ady][adx];
sy = base-1;
} else {
base = integer_divide_table[ady][adx];
sy = base+1;
}
} else {
base = dy / adx;
if (dy < 0)
sy = base - 1;
else
sy = base+1;
}
#else
base = dy / adx;
if (dy < 0)
sy = base - 1;
else
sy = base+1;
#endif
ady -= abs(base) * adx;
if (x1 > n) x1 = n;
if (x < x1) {
LINE_OP(output[x], inverse_db_table[y]);
for (++x; x < x1; ++x) {
err += ady;
if (err >= adx) {
err -= adx;
y += sy;
} else
y += base;
LINE_OP(output[x], inverse_db_table[y]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point()
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static __forceinline void draw_line(float *output, int x0, int y0, int x1, int y1, int n)
{
int dy = y1 - y0;
int adx = x1 - x0;
int ady = abs(dy);
int base;
int x=x0,y=y0;
int err = 0;
int sy;
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDE_TABLE
if (adx < DIVTAB_DENOM && ady < DIVTAB_NUMER) {
if (dy < 0) {
base = -integer_divide_table[ady][adx];
sy = base-1;
} else {
base = integer_divide_table[ady][adx];
sy = base+1;
}
} else {
base = dy / adx;
if (dy < 0)
sy = base - 1;
else
sy = base+1;
}
#else
base = dy / adx;
if (dy < 0)
sy = base - 1;
else
sy = base+1;
#endif
ady -= abs(base) * adx;
if (x1 > n) x1 = n;
if (x < x1) {
LINE_OP(output[x], inverse_db_table[y&255]);
for (++x; x < x1; ++x) {
err += ady;
if (err >= adx) {
err -= adx;
y += sy;
} else
y += base;
LINE_OP(output[x], inverse_db_table[y&255]);
}
}
}
| 169,614 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
const std::vector<base::ProcessId>& pids,
GetVmRegionsForHeapProfilerCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
uint64_t dump_guid = ++next_dump_id_;
std::unique_ptr<QueuedVmRegionRequest> request =
std::make_unique<QueuedVmRegionRequest>(dump_guid, std::move(callback));
in_progress_vm_region_requests_[dump_guid] = std::move(request);
std::vector<QueuedRequestDispatcher::ClientInfo> clients;
for (const auto& kv : clients_) {
auto client_identity = kv.second->identity;
const base::ProcessId pid = GetProcessIdForClientIdentity(client_identity);
clients.emplace_back(kv.second->client.get(), pid, kv.second->process_type);
}
QueuedVmRegionRequest* request_ptr =
in_progress_vm_region_requests_[dump_guid].get();
auto os_callback =
base::BindRepeating(&CoordinatorImpl::OnOSMemoryDumpForVMRegions,
base::Unretained(this), dump_guid);
QueuedRequestDispatcher::SetUpAndDispatchVmRegionRequest(request_ptr, clients,
pids, os_callback);
FinalizeVmRegionDumpIfAllManagersReplied(dump_guid);
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void CoordinatorImpl::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
const std::vector<base::ProcessId>& pids,
GetVmRegionsForHeapProfilerCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
uint64_t dump_guid = ++next_dump_id_;
std::unique_ptr<QueuedVmRegionRequest> request =
std::make_unique<QueuedVmRegionRequest>(dump_guid, std::move(callback));
in_progress_vm_region_requests_[dump_guid] = std::move(request);
std::vector<QueuedRequestDispatcher::ClientInfo> clients;
for (const auto& kv : clients_) {
auto client_identity = kv.second->identity;
const base::ProcessId pid = GetProcessIdForClientIdentity(client_identity);
clients.emplace_back(kv.second->client.get(), pid, kv.second->process_type);
}
QueuedVmRegionRequest* request_ptr =
in_progress_vm_region_requests_[dump_guid].get();
auto os_callback =
base::BindRepeating(&CoordinatorImpl::OnOSMemoryDumpForVMRegions,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), dump_guid);
QueuedRequestDispatcher::SetUpAndDispatchVmRegionRequest(request_ptr, clients,
pids, os_callback);
FinalizeVmRegionDumpIfAllManagersReplied(dump_guid);
}
| 173,213 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Start() {
DVLOG(2) << "Starting SafeBrowsing download check for: "
<< item_->DebugString(true);
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DownloadCheckResultReason reason = REASON_MAX;
if (!IsSupportedDownload(
*item_, item_->GetTargetFilePath(), &reason, &type_)) {
switch (reason) {
case REASON_EMPTY_URL_CHAIN:
case REASON_INVALID_URL:
case REASON_UNSUPPORTED_URL_SCHEME:
PostFinishTask(UNKNOWN, reason);
return;
case REASON_NOT_BINARY_FILE:
RecordFileExtensionType(item_->GetTargetFilePath());
PostFinishTask(UNKNOWN, reason);
return;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
RecordFileExtensionType(item_->GetTargetFilePath());
if (item_->GetTargetFilePath().MatchesExtension(
FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".zip"))) {
StartExtractZipFeatures();
} else {
DCHECK(!download_protection_util::IsArchiveFile(
item_->GetTargetFilePath()));
StartExtractFileFeatures();
}
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID: | void Start() {
DVLOG(2) << "Starting SafeBrowsing download check for: "
<< item_->DebugString(true);
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DownloadCheckResultReason reason = REASON_MAX;
if (!IsSupportedDownload(
*item_, item_->GetTargetFilePath(), &reason, &type_)) {
switch (reason) {
case REASON_EMPTY_URL_CHAIN:
case REASON_INVALID_URL:
case REASON_UNSUPPORTED_URL_SCHEME:
PostFinishTask(UNKNOWN, reason);
return;
case REASON_NOT_BINARY_FILE:
RecordFileExtensionType(item_->GetTargetFilePath());
PostFinishTask(UNKNOWN, reason);
return;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
RecordFileExtensionType(item_->GetTargetFilePath());
if (item_->GetTargetFilePath().MatchesExtension(
FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".zip"))) {
StartExtractZipFeatures();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
} else if (item_->GetTargetFilePath().MatchesExtension(
FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".dmg"))) {
StartExtractDmgFeatures();
#endif
} else {
DCHECK(!download_protection_util::IsArchiveFile(
item_->GetTargetFilePath()));
StartExtractFileFeatures();
}
}
| 171,715 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ext4_page_mkwrite(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct page *page = vmf->page;
loff_t size;
unsigned long len;
int ret;
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
handle_t *handle;
get_block_t *get_block;
int retries = 0;
sb_start_pagefault(inode->i_sb);
file_update_time(vma->vm_file);
/* Delalloc case is easy... */
if (test_opt(inode->i_sb, DELALLOC) &&
!ext4_should_journal_data(inode) &&
!ext4_nonda_switch(inode->i_sb)) {
do {
ret = block_page_mkwrite(vma, vmf,
ext4_da_get_block_prep);
} while (ret == -ENOSPC &&
ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries));
goto out_ret;
}
lock_page(page);
size = i_size_read(inode);
/* Page got truncated from under us? */
if (page->mapping != mapping || page_offset(page) > size) {
unlock_page(page);
ret = VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
goto out;
}
if (page->index == size >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT)
len = size & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK;
else
len = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
/*
* Return if we have all the buffers mapped. This avoids the need to do
* journal_start/journal_stop which can block and take a long time
*/
if (page_has_buffers(page)) {
if (!ext4_walk_page_buffers(NULL, page_buffers(page),
0, len, NULL,
ext4_bh_unmapped)) {
/* Wait so that we don't change page under IO */
wait_for_stable_page(page);
ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
goto out;
}
}
unlock_page(page);
/* OK, we need to fill the hole... */
if (ext4_should_dioread_nolock(inode))
get_block = ext4_get_block_write;
else
get_block = ext4_get_block;
retry_alloc:
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_WRITE_PAGE,
ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode));
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
goto out;
}
ret = block_page_mkwrite(vma, vmf, get_block);
if (!ret && ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
if (ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, page_buffers(page), 0,
PAGE_CACHE_SIZE, NULL, do_journal_get_write_access)) {
unlock_page(page);
ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
goto out;
}
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_JDATA);
}
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (ret == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries))
goto retry_alloc;
out_ret:
ret = block_page_mkwrite_return(ret);
out:
sb_end_pagefault(inode->i_sb);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | int ext4_page_mkwrite(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct page *page = vmf->page;
loff_t size;
unsigned long len;
int ret;
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
handle_t *handle;
get_block_t *get_block;
int retries = 0;
sb_start_pagefault(inode->i_sb);
file_update_time(vma->vm_file);
down_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
/* Delalloc case is easy... */
if (test_opt(inode->i_sb, DELALLOC) &&
!ext4_should_journal_data(inode) &&
!ext4_nonda_switch(inode->i_sb)) {
do {
ret = block_page_mkwrite(vma, vmf,
ext4_da_get_block_prep);
} while (ret == -ENOSPC &&
ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries));
goto out_ret;
}
lock_page(page);
size = i_size_read(inode);
/* Page got truncated from under us? */
if (page->mapping != mapping || page_offset(page) > size) {
unlock_page(page);
ret = VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
goto out;
}
if (page->index == size >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT)
len = size & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK;
else
len = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
/*
* Return if we have all the buffers mapped. This avoids the need to do
* journal_start/journal_stop which can block and take a long time
*/
if (page_has_buffers(page)) {
if (!ext4_walk_page_buffers(NULL, page_buffers(page),
0, len, NULL,
ext4_bh_unmapped)) {
/* Wait so that we don't change page under IO */
wait_for_stable_page(page);
ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
goto out;
}
}
unlock_page(page);
/* OK, we need to fill the hole... */
if (ext4_should_dioread_nolock(inode))
get_block = ext4_get_block_write;
else
get_block = ext4_get_block;
retry_alloc:
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_WRITE_PAGE,
ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode));
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
goto out;
}
ret = block_page_mkwrite(vma, vmf, get_block);
if (!ret && ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
if (ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, page_buffers(page), 0,
PAGE_CACHE_SIZE, NULL, do_journal_get_write_access)) {
unlock_page(page);
ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
goto out;
}
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_JDATA);
}
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (ret == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries))
goto retry_alloc;
out_ret:
ret = block_page_mkwrite_return(ret);
out:
up_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
sb_end_pagefault(inode->i_sb);
return ret;
}
| 167,489 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int caif_seqpkt_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *m, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int ret;
int copylen;
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (m->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
goto read_error;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, 0 , &ret);
if (!skb)
goto read_error;
copylen = skb->len;
if (len < copylen) {
m->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copylen = len;
}
ret = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, m->msg_iov, copylen);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
ret = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : copylen;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
caif_check_flow_release(sk);
return ret;
read_error:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: caif: Fix missing msg_namelen update in caif_seqpkt_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about caif_seqpkt_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Sjur Braendeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int caif_seqpkt_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *m, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int ret;
int copylen;
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (m->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
goto read_error;
m->msg_namelen = 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, 0 , &ret);
if (!skb)
goto read_error;
copylen = skb->len;
if (len < copylen) {
m->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copylen = len;
}
ret = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, m->msg_iov, copylen);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
ret = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : copylen;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
caif_check_flow_release(sk);
return ret;
read_error:
return ret;
}
| 166,040 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *OMXNodeInstance::findBufferHeader(OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
if (buffer == 0) {
return NULL;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mBufferIDLock);
ssize_t index = mBufferIDToBufferHeader.indexOfKey(buffer);
if (index < 0) {
CLOGW("findBufferHeader: buffer %u not found", buffer);
return NULL;
}
return mBufferIDToBufferHeader.valueAt(index);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *OMXNodeInstance::findBufferHeader(OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *OMXNodeInstance::findBufferHeader(
OMX::buffer_id buffer, OMX_U32 portIndex) {
if (buffer == 0) {
return NULL;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mBufferIDLock);
ssize_t index = mBufferIDToBufferHeader.indexOfKey(buffer);
if (index < 0) {
CLOGW("findBufferHeader: buffer %u not found", buffer);
return NULL;
}
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = mBufferIDToBufferHeader.valueAt(index);
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
if (buffer_meta->getPortIndex() != portIndex) {
CLOGW("findBufferHeader: buffer %u found but with incorrect port index.", buffer);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "28816827");
return NULL;
}
return header;
}
| 173,528 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item = NULL;
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL)
{
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
if (rdata->rbuf.buf)
{
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
}
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL)
{
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
if (rdata->rbuf.buf)
{
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
}
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL)
{
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
OPENSSL_free(frag);
pitem_free(item);
}
while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL)
{
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
OPENSSL_free(frag);
pitem_free(item);
}
while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL)
{
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
OPENSSL_free(frag);
pitem_free(item);
}
}
Commit Message: Free up s->d1->buffered_app_data.q properly.
PR#3286
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item = NULL;
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL)
{
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
if (rdata->rbuf.buf)
{
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
}
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL)
{
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
if (rdata->rbuf.buf)
{
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
}
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL)
{
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
OPENSSL_free(frag);
pitem_free(item);
}
while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL)
{
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
OPENSSL_free(frag);
pitem_free(item);
}
while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL)
{
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
if (rdata->rbuf.buf)
{
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
}
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
}
| 166,794 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: socket_t *socket_accept(const socket_t *socket) {
assert(socket != NULL);
int fd = accept(socket->fd, NULL, NULL);
if (fd == INVALID_FD) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to accept socket: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
socket_t *ret = (socket_t *)osi_calloc(sizeof(socket_t));
if (!ret) {
close(fd);
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to allocate memory for socket.", __func__);
return NULL;
}
ret->fd = fd;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | socket_t *socket_accept(const socket_t *socket) {
assert(socket != NULL);
int fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(accept(socket->fd, NULL, NULL));
if (fd == INVALID_FD) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to accept socket: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
socket_t *ret = (socket_t *)osi_calloc(sizeof(socket_t));
if (!ret) {
close(fd);
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to allocate memory for socket.", __func__);
return NULL;
}
ret->fd = fd;
return ret;
}
| 173,484 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static lba512_t lba512_muldiv(lba512_t block_count, lba512_t mul_by, int div_by)
{
lba512_t bc_quot, bc_rem;
/* x * m / d == x / d * m + (x % d) * m / d */
bc_quot = block_count >> div_by;
bc_rem = block_count - (bc_quot << div_by);
return bc_quot * mul_by + ((bc_rem * mul_by) >> div_by);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static lba512_t lba512_muldiv(lba512_t block_count, lba512_t mul_by, int div_by)
static lba512_t lba512_muldiv(lba512_t block_count, lba512_t mul_by,
int right_shift)
{
lba512_t bc_quot, bc_rem;
/* x * m / d == x / d * m + (x % d) * m / d */
bc_quot = block_count >> right_shift;
bc_rem = block_count - (bc_quot << right_shift);
return bc_quot * mul_by + ((bc_rem * mul_by) >> right_shift);
}
| 169,641 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Part::slotOpenExtractedEntry(KJob *job)
{
if (!job->error()) {
OpenJob *openJob = qobject_cast<OpenJob*>(job);
Q_ASSERT(openJob);
m_tmpExtractDirList << openJob->tempDir();
const QString fullName = openJob->validatedFilePath();
bool isWritable = m_model->archive() && !m_model->archive()->isReadOnly();
if (!isWritable) {
QFile::setPermissions(fullName, QFileDevice::ReadOwner | QFileDevice::ReadGroup | QFileDevice::ReadOther);
}
if (isWritable) {
m_fileWatcher = new QFileSystemWatcher;
connect(m_fileWatcher, &QFileSystemWatcher::fileChanged, this, &Part::slotWatchedFileModified);
m_fileWatcher->addPath(fullName);
}
if (qobject_cast<OpenWithJob*>(job)) {
const QList<QUrl> urls = {QUrl::fromUserInput(fullName, QString(), QUrl::AssumeLocalFile)};
KRun::displayOpenWithDialog(urls, widget());
} else {
KRun::runUrl(QUrl::fromUserInput(fullName, QString(), QUrl::AssumeLocalFile),
QMimeDatabase().mimeTypeForFile(fullName).name(),
widget());
}
} else if (job->error() != KJob::KilledJobError) {
KMessageBox::error(widget(), job->errorString());
}
setReadyGui();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | void Part::slotOpenExtractedEntry(KJob *job)
{
if (!job->error()) {
OpenJob *openJob = qobject_cast<OpenJob*>(job);
Q_ASSERT(openJob);
m_tmpExtractDirList << openJob->tempDir();
const QString fullName = openJob->validatedFilePath();
bool isWritable = m_model->archive() && !m_model->archive()->isReadOnly();
if (!isWritable) {
QFile::setPermissions(fullName, QFileDevice::ReadOwner | QFileDevice::ReadGroup | QFileDevice::ReadOther);
}
if (isWritable) {
m_fileWatcher = new QFileSystemWatcher;
connect(m_fileWatcher, &QFileSystemWatcher::fileChanged, this, &Part::slotWatchedFileModified);
m_fileWatcher->addPath(fullName);
}
if (qobject_cast<OpenWithJob*>(job)) {
const QList<QUrl> urls = {QUrl::fromUserInput(fullName, QString(), QUrl::AssumeLocalFile)};
KRun::displayOpenWithDialog(urls, widget());
} else {
KRun::runUrl(QUrl::fromUserInput(fullName, QString(), QUrl::AssumeLocalFile),
QMimeDatabase().mimeTypeForFile(fullName).name(),
widget(), false, false);
}
} else if (job->error() != KJob::KilledJobError) {
KMessageBox::error(widget(), job->errorString());
}
setReadyGui();
}
| 164,992 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::Core(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> main_task_runner,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> io_task_runner,
const FilePath& binary_path,
bool launch_elevated,
const std::string& channel_security)
: main_task_runner_(main_task_runner),
io_task_runner_(io_task_runner),
binary_path_(binary_path),
channel_security_(channel_security),
launch_elevated_(launch_elevated),
stopping_(false) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::Core(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> main_task_runner,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> io_task_runner,
const FilePath& binary_path,
bool launch_elevated,
const std::string& channel_security)
: main_task_runner_(main_task_runner),
io_task_runner_(io_task_runner),
binary_path_(binary_path),
channel_security_(channel_security),
get_named_pipe_client_pid_(NULL),
launch_elevated_(launch_elevated),
stopping_(false) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
}
| 171,555 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ZEND_API void zend_objects_store_del_ref_by_handle_ex(zend_object_handle handle, const zend_object_handlers *handlers TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
struct _store_object *obj;
int failure = 0;
if (!EG(objects_store).object_buckets) {
return;
}
obj = &EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].bucket.obj;
/* Make sure we hold a reference count during the destructor call
otherwise, when the destructor ends the storage might be freed
when the refcount reaches 0 a second time
*/
if (EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].valid) {
if (obj->refcount == 1) {
if (!EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].destructor_called) {
EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].destructor_called = 1;
if (obj->dtor) {
if (handlers && !obj->handlers) {
obj->handlers = handlers;
}
zend_try {
obj->dtor(obj->object, handle TSRMLS_CC);
} zend_catch {
failure = 1;
} zend_end_try();
}
}
/* re-read the object from the object store as the store might have been reallocated in the dtor */
obj = &EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].bucket.obj;
if (obj->refcount == 1) {
GC_REMOVE_ZOBJ_FROM_BUFFER(obj);
if (obj->free_storage) {
zend_try {
obj->free_storage(obj->object TSRMLS_CC);
} zend_catch {
failure = 1;
} zend_end_try();
}
ZEND_OBJECTS_STORE_ADD_TO_FREE_LIST();
}
}
}
obj->refcount--;
#if ZEND_DEBUG_OBJECTS
if (obj->refcount == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Deallocated object id #%d\n", handle);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Decreased refcount of object id #%d\n", handle);
}
#endif
if (failure) {
zend_bailout();
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ZEND_API void zend_objects_store_del_ref_by_handle_ex(zend_object_handle handle, const zend_object_handlers *handlers TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
struct _store_object *obj;
int failure = 0;
if (!EG(objects_store).object_buckets) {
return;
}
obj = &EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].bucket.obj;
/* Make sure we hold a reference count during the destructor call
otherwise, when the destructor ends the storage might be freed
when the refcount reaches 0 a second time
*/
if (EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].valid) {
if (obj->refcount == 1) {
if (!EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].destructor_called) {
EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].destructor_called = 1;
if (obj->dtor) {
if (handlers && !obj->handlers) {
obj->handlers = handlers;
}
zend_try {
obj->dtor(obj->object, handle TSRMLS_CC);
} zend_catch {
failure = 1;
} zend_end_try();
}
}
/* re-read the object from the object store as the store might have been reallocated in the dtor */
obj = &EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].bucket.obj;
if (obj->refcount == 1) {
GC_REMOVE_ZOBJ_FROM_BUFFER(obj);
if (obj->free_storage) {
zend_try {
obj->free_storage(obj->object TSRMLS_CC);
} zend_catch {
failure = 1;
} zend_end_try();
}
ZEND_OBJECTS_STORE_ADD_TO_FREE_LIST();
}
}
}
obj->refcount--;
#if ZEND_DEBUG_OBJECTS
if (obj->refcount == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Deallocated object id #%d\n", handle);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Decreased refcount of object id #%d\n", handle);
}
#endif
if (failure) {
zend_bailout();
}
}
/* }}} */
| 166,939 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Session* SessionManager::GetSession(const std::string& id) const {
std::map<std::string, Session*>::const_iterator it;
base::AutoLock lock(map_lock_);
it = map_.find(id);
if (it == map_.end()) {
VLOG(1) << "No such session with ID " << id;
return NULL;
}
return it->second;
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | Session* SessionManager::GetSession(const std::string& id) const {
std::map<std::string, Session*>::const_iterator it;
base::AutoLock lock(map_lock_);
it = map_.find(id);
if (it == map_.end())
return NULL;
return it->second;
}
| 170,463 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jas_malloc(sizeof(jp2_box_t)))) {
goto error;
}
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
box->len = len;
if (box->len == 1) {
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that resulted in the destruction of JP2 box data that had never
been constructed in the first place.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jas_malloc(sizeof(jp2_box_t)))) {
goto error;
}
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
box->len = len;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"preliminary processing of JP2 box: type=%c%s%c (0x%08x); length=%d\n",
'"', boxinfo->name, '"', box->type, box->len
));
if (box->len == 1) {
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
// Mark the box data as never having been constructed
// so that we will not errantly attempt to destroy it later.
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
| 168,753 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MediaRecorder::MediaRecorder(ExecutionContext* context,
MediaStream* stream,
const MediaRecorderOptions* options,
ExceptionState& exception_state)
: PausableObject(context),
stream_(stream),
mime_type_(options->hasMimeType() ? options->mimeType()
: kDefaultMimeType),
stopped_(true),
audio_bits_per_second_(0),
video_bits_per_second_(0),
state_(State::kInactive),
dispatch_scheduled_event_runner_(AsyncMethodRunner<MediaRecorder>::Create(
this,
&MediaRecorder::DispatchScheduledEvent,
context->GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kDOMManipulation))) {
DCHECK(stream_->getTracks().size());
recorder_handler_ = Platform::Current()->CreateMediaRecorderHandler(
context->GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalMediaRealTime));
DCHECK(recorder_handler_);
if (!recorder_handler_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"No MediaRecorder handler can be created.");
return;
}
AllocateVideoAndAudioBitrates(exception_state, context, options, stream,
&audio_bits_per_second_,
&video_bits_per_second_);
const ContentType content_type(mime_type_);
if (!recorder_handler_->Initialize(
this, stream->Descriptor(), content_type.GetType(),
content_type.Parameter("codecs"), audio_bits_per_second_,
video_bits_per_second_)) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"Failed to initialize native MediaRecorder the type provided (" +
mime_type_ + ") is not supported.");
return;
}
if (options->mimeType().IsEmpty()) {
const String actual_mime_type = recorder_handler_->ActualMimeType();
if (!actual_mime_type.IsEmpty())
mime_type_ = actual_mime_type;
}
stopped_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | MediaRecorder::MediaRecorder(ExecutionContext* context,
MediaStream* stream,
const MediaRecorderOptions* options,
ExceptionState& exception_state)
: PausableObject(context),
stream_(stream),
mime_type_(options->hasMimeType() ? options->mimeType()
: kDefaultMimeType),
stopped_(true),
audio_bits_per_second_(0),
video_bits_per_second_(0),
state_(State::kInactive),
dispatch_scheduled_event_runner_(AsyncMethodRunner<MediaRecorder>::Create(
this,
&MediaRecorder::DispatchScheduledEvent,
context->GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kDOMManipulation))) {
if (context->IsContextDestroyed()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(DOMExceptionCode::kNotAllowedError,
"Execution context is detached.");
return;
}
DCHECK(stream_->getTracks().size());
recorder_handler_ = Platform::Current()->CreateMediaRecorderHandler(
context->GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalMediaRealTime));
DCHECK(recorder_handler_);
if (!recorder_handler_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"No MediaRecorder handler can be created.");
return;
}
AllocateVideoAndAudioBitrates(exception_state, context, options, stream,
&audio_bits_per_second_,
&video_bits_per_second_);
const ContentType content_type(mime_type_);
if (!recorder_handler_->Initialize(
this, stream->Descriptor(), content_type.GetType(),
content_type.Parameter("codecs"), audio_bits_per_second_,
video_bits_per_second_)) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"Failed to initialize native MediaRecorder the type provided (" +
mime_type_ + ") is not supported.");
return;
}
if (options->mimeType().IsEmpty()) {
const String actual_mime_type = recorder_handler_->ActualMimeType();
if (!actual_mime_type.IsEmpty())
mime_type_ = actual_mime_type;
}
stopped_ = false;
}
| 172,605 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int mxf_read_primer_pack(void *arg, AVIOContext *pb, int tag, int size, UID uid, int64_t klv_offset)
{
MXFContext *mxf = arg;
int item_num = avio_rb32(pb);
int item_len = avio_rb32(pb);
if (item_len != 18) {
avpriv_request_sample(pb, "Primer pack item length %d", item_len);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (item_num > 65536) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "item_num %d is too large\n", item_num);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (mxf->local_tags)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Multiple primer packs\n");
av_free(mxf->local_tags);
mxf->local_tags_count = 0;
mxf->local_tags = av_calloc(item_num, item_len);
if (!mxf->local_tags)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
mxf->local_tags_count = item_num;
avio_read(pb, mxf->local_tags, item_num*item_len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix Sign error in mxf_read_primer_pack()
Fixes: 20170829B.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int mxf_read_primer_pack(void *arg, AVIOContext *pb, int tag, int size, UID uid, int64_t klv_offset)
{
MXFContext *mxf = arg;
int item_num = avio_rb32(pb);
int item_len = avio_rb32(pb);
if (item_len != 18) {
avpriv_request_sample(pb, "Primer pack item length %d", item_len);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (item_num > 65536 || item_num < 0) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "item_num %d is too large\n", item_num);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (mxf->local_tags)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Multiple primer packs\n");
av_free(mxf->local_tags);
mxf->local_tags_count = 0;
mxf->local_tags = av_calloc(item_num, item_len);
if (!mxf->local_tags)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
mxf->local_tags_count = item_num;
avio_read(pb, mxf->local_tags, item_num*item_len);
return 0;
}
| 167,766 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static uint32_t readU16(const uint8_t* data, size_t offset) {
return data[offset] << 8 | data[offset + 1];
}
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in parsing fonts
A malformed TTF can cause size calculations to overflow. This patch
checks the maximum reasonable value so that the total size fits in 32
bits. It also adds some explicit casting to avoid possible technical
undefined behavior when parsing sized unsigned values.
Bug: 25645298
Change-Id: Id4716132041a6f4f1fbb73ec4e445391cf7d9616
(cherry picked from commit 183c9ec2800baa2ce099ee260c6cbc6121cf1274)
CWE ID: CWE-19 | static uint32_t readU16(const uint8_t* data, size_t offset) {
return ((uint32_t)data[offset]) << 8 | ((uint32_t)data[offset + 1]);
}
| 173,966 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool isUserInteractionEventForSlider(Event* event, LayoutObject* layoutObject) {
if (isUserInteractionEvent(event))
return true;
LayoutSliderItem slider = LayoutSliderItem(toLayoutSlider(layoutObject));
if (!slider.isNull() && !slider.inDragMode())
return false;
const AtomicString& type = event->type();
return type == EventTypeNames::mouseover ||
type == EventTypeNames::mouseout || type == EventTypeNames::mousemove;
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool isUserInteractionEventForSlider(Event* event, LayoutObject* layoutObject) {
if (isUserInteractionEvent(event))
return true;
LayoutSliderItem slider = LayoutSliderItem(toLayoutSlider(layoutObject));
if (!slider.isNull() && !slider.inDragMode())
return false;
const AtomicString& type = event->type();
return type == EventTypeNames::mouseover ||
type == EventTypeNames::mouseout ||
type == EventTypeNames::mousemove ||
type == EventTypeNames::pointerover ||
type == EventTypeNames::pointerout ||
type == EventTypeNames::pointermove;
}
| 171,900 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const SeekHead* Segment::GetSeekHead() const
{
return m_pSeekHead;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const SeekHead* Segment::GetSeekHead() const
| 174,353 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: atm_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int length = h->len;
uint32_t llchdr;
u_int hdrlen = 0;
if (caplen < 1 || length < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
/* Cisco Style NLPID ? */
if (*p == LLC_UI) {
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CNLPID "));
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1, caplen - 1);
return hdrlen;
}
/*
* Must have at least a DSAP, an SSAP, and the first byte of the
* control field.
*/
if (caplen < 3 || length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
/*
* Extract the presumed LLC header into a variable, for quick
* testing.
* Then check for a header that's neither a header for a SNAP
* packet nor an RFC 2684 routed NLPID-formatted PDU nor
* an 802.2-but-no-SNAP IP packet.
*/
llchdr = EXTRACT_24BITS(p);
if (llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_SNAP) &&
llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_ISONS) &&
llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_IP)) {
/*
* XXX - assume 802.6 MAC header from Fore driver.
*
* Unfortunately, the above list doesn't check for
* all known SAPs, doesn't check for headers where
* the source and destination SAP aren't the same,
* and doesn't check for non-UI frames. It also
* runs the risk of an 802.6 MAC header that happens
* to begin with one of those values being
* incorrectly treated as an 802.2 header.
*
* So is that Fore driver still around? And, if so,
* is it still putting 802.6 MAC headers on ATM
* packets? If so, could it be changed to use a
* new DLT_IEEE802_6 value if we added it?
*/
if (caplen < 20 || length < 20) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%08x%08x %08x%08x ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(p),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+12)));
p += 20;
length -= 20;
caplen -= 20;
hdrlen += 20;
}
hdrlen += atm_llc_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (hdrlen);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | atm_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int length = h->len;
uint32_t llchdr;
u_int hdrlen = 0;
if (caplen < 1 || length < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
/* Cisco Style NLPID ? */
if (*p == LLC_UI) {
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CNLPID "));
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
return hdrlen;
}
/*
* Must have at least a DSAP, an SSAP, and the first byte of the
* control field.
*/
if (caplen < 3 || length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
/*
* Extract the presumed LLC header into a variable, for quick
* testing.
* Then check for a header that's neither a header for a SNAP
* packet nor an RFC 2684 routed NLPID-formatted PDU nor
* an 802.2-but-no-SNAP IP packet.
*/
llchdr = EXTRACT_24BITS(p);
if (llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_SNAP) &&
llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_ISONS) &&
llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_IP)) {
/*
* XXX - assume 802.6 MAC header from Fore driver.
*
* Unfortunately, the above list doesn't check for
* all known SAPs, doesn't check for headers where
* the source and destination SAP aren't the same,
* and doesn't check for non-UI frames. It also
* runs the risk of an 802.6 MAC header that happens
* to begin with one of those values being
* incorrectly treated as an 802.2 header.
*
* So is that Fore driver still around? And, if so,
* is it still putting 802.6 MAC headers on ATM
* packets? If so, could it be changed to use a
* new DLT_IEEE802_6 value if we added it?
*/
if (caplen < 20 || length < 20) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%08x%08x %08x%08x ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(p),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+12)));
p += 20;
length -= 20;
caplen -= 20;
hdrlen += 20;
}
hdrlen += atm_llc_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (hdrlen);
}
| 167,942 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ReceiverWasAdded(const RtpTransceiverState& transceiver_state) {
uintptr_t receiver_id = RTCRtpReceiver::getId(
transceiver_state.receiver_state()->webrtc_receiver().get());
for (const auto& receiver : handler_->rtp_receivers_) {
if (receiver->Id() == receiver_id)
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | bool ReceiverWasAdded(const RtpTransceiverState& transceiver_state) {
DCHECK(handler_);
uintptr_t receiver_id = RTCRtpReceiver::getId(
transceiver_state.receiver_state()->webrtc_receiver().get());
for (const auto& receiver : handler_->rtp_receivers_) {
if (receiver->Id() == receiver_id)
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 173,076 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const BlockEntry* Cues::GetBlock(const CuePoint* pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition* pTP) const {
if (pCP == NULL)
return NULL;
if (pTP == NULL)
return NULL;
return m_pSegment->GetBlock(*pCP, *pTP);
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | const BlockEntry* Cues::GetBlock(const CuePoint* pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition* pTP) const {
if (pCP == NULL || pTP == NULL)
return NULL;
return m_pSegment->GetBlock(*pCP, *pTP);
}
| 173,813 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int mainloop(CLIENT *client) {
struct nbd_request request;
struct nbd_reply reply;
gboolean go_on=TRUE;
#ifdef DODBG
int i = 0;
#endif
negotiate(client->net, client, NULL);
DEBUG("Entering request loop!\n");
reply.magic = htonl(NBD_REPLY_MAGIC);
reply.error = 0;
while (go_on) {
char buf[BUFSIZE];
size_t len;
#ifdef DODBG
i++;
printf("%d: ", i);
#endif
readit(client->net, &request, sizeof(request));
request.from = ntohll(request.from);
request.type = ntohl(request.type);
if (request.type==NBD_CMD_DISC) {
msg2(LOG_INFO, "Disconnect request received.");
if (client->server->flags & F_COPYONWRITE) {
if (client->difmap) g_free(client->difmap) ;
close(client->difffile);
unlink(client->difffilename);
free(client->difffilename);
}
go_on=FALSE;
continue;
}
len = ntohl(request.len);
if (request.magic != htonl(NBD_REQUEST_MAGIC))
err("Not enough magic.");
if (len > BUFSIZE + sizeof(struct nbd_reply))
err("Request too big!");
#ifdef DODBG
printf("%s from %llu (%llu) len %d, ", request.type ? "WRITE" :
"READ", (unsigned long long)request.from,
(unsigned long long)request.from / 512, len);
#endif
memcpy(reply.handle, request.handle, sizeof(reply.handle));
if ((request.from + len) > (OFFT_MAX)) {
DEBUG("[Number too large!]");
ERROR(client, reply, EINVAL);
continue;
}
if (((ssize_t)((off_t)request.from + len) > client->exportsize)) {
DEBUG("[RANGE!]");
ERROR(client, reply, EINVAL);
continue;
}
if (request.type==NBD_CMD_WRITE) {
DEBUG("wr: net->buf, ");
readit(client->net, buf, len);
DEBUG("buf->exp, ");
if ((client->server->flags & F_READONLY) ||
(client->server->flags & F_AUTOREADONLY)) {
DEBUG("[WRITE to READONLY!]");
ERROR(client, reply, EPERM);
continue;
}
if (expwrite(request.from, buf, len, client)) {
DEBUG("Write failed: %m" );
ERROR(client, reply, errno);
continue;
}
SEND(client->net, reply);
DEBUG("OK!\n");
continue;
}
/* READ */
DEBUG("exp->buf, ");
if (expread(request.from, buf + sizeof(struct nbd_reply), len, client)) {
DEBUG("Read failed: %m");
ERROR(client, reply, errno);
continue;
}
DEBUG("buf->net, ");
memcpy(buf, &reply, sizeof(struct nbd_reply));
writeit(client->net, buf, len + sizeof(struct nbd_reply));
DEBUG("OK!\n");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int mainloop(CLIENT *client) {
struct nbd_request request;
struct nbd_reply reply;
gboolean go_on=TRUE;
#ifdef DODBG
int i = 0;
#endif
negotiate(client->net, client, NULL);
DEBUG("Entering request loop!\n");
reply.magic = htonl(NBD_REPLY_MAGIC);
reply.error = 0;
while (go_on) {
char buf[BUFSIZE];
size_t len;
#ifdef DODBG
i++;
printf("%d: ", i);
#endif
readit(client->net, &request, sizeof(request));
request.from = ntohll(request.from);
request.type = ntohl(request.type);
if (request.type==NBD_CMD_DISC) {
msg2(LOG_INFO, "Disconnect request received.");
if (client->server->flags & F_COPYONWRITE) {
if (client->difmap) g_free(client->difmap) ;
close(client->difffile);
unlink(client->difffilename);
free(client->difffilename);
}
go_on=FALSE;
continue;
}
len = ntohl(request.len);
if (request.magic != htonl(NBD_REQUEST_MAGIC))
err("Not enough magic.");
if (len > BUFSIZE - sizeof(struct nbd_reply))
err("Request too big!");
#ifdef DODBG
printf("%s from %llu (%llu) len %d, ", request.type ? "WRITE" :
"READ", (unsigned long long)request.from,
(unsigned long long)request.from / 512, len);
#endif
memcpy(reply.handle, request.handle, sizeof(reply.handle));
if ((request.from + len) > (OFFT_MAX)) {
DEBUG("[Number too large!]");
ERROR(client, reply, EINVAL);
continue;
}
if (((ssize_t)((off_t)request.from + len) > client->exportsize)) {
DEBUG("[RANGE!]");
ERROR(client, reply, EINVAL);
continue;
}
if (request.type==NBD_CMD_WRITE) {
DEBUG("wr: net->buf, ");
readit(client->net, buf, len);
DEBUG("buf->exp, ");
if ((client->server->flags & F_READONLY) ||
(client->server->flags & F_AUTOREADONLY)) {
DEBUG("[WRITE to READONLY!]");
ERROR(client, reply, EPERM);
continue;
}
if (expwrite(request.from, buf, len, client)) {
DEBUG("Write failed: %m" );
ERROR(client, reply, errno);
continue;
}
SEND(client->net, reply);
DEBUG("OK!\n");
continue;
}
/* READ */
DEBUG("exp->buf, ");
if (expread(request.from, buf + sizeof(struct nbd_reply), len, client)) {
DEBUG("Read failed: %m");
ERROR(client, reply, errno);
continue;
}
DEBUG("buf->net, ");
memcpy(buf, &reply, sizeof(struct nbd_reply));
writeit(client->net, buf, len + sizeof(struct nbd_reply));
DEBUG("OK!\n");
}
return 0;
}
| 165,527 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int multipath_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct multipath *m = (struct multipath *) ti->private;
struct block_device *bdev = NULL;
fmode_t mode = 0;
unsigned long flags;
int r = 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
if (!m->current_pgpath)
__choose_pgpath(m, 0);
if (m->current_pgpath) {
bdev = m->current_pgpath->path.dev->bdev;
mode = m->current_pgpath->path.dev->mode;
}
if (m->queue_io)
r = -EAGAIN;
else if (!bdev)
r = -EIO;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
return r ? : __blkdev_driver_ioctl(bdev, mode, cmd, arg);
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int multipath_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct multipath *m = (struct multipath *) ti->private;
struct block_device *bdev = NULL;
fmode_t mode = 0;
unsigned long flags;
int r = 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
if (!m->current_pgpath)
__choose_pgpath(m, 0);
if (m->current_pgpath) {
bdev = m->current_pgpath->path.dev->bdev;
mode = m->current_pgpath->path.dev->mode;
}
if (m->queue_io)
r = -EAGAIN;
else if (!bdev)
r = -EIO;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
/*
* Only pass ioctls through if the device sizes match exactly.
*/
if (!r && ti->len != i_size_read(bdev->bd_inode) >> SECTOR_SHIFT)
r = scsi_verify_blk_ioctl(NULL, cmd);
return r ? : __blkdev_driver_ioctl(bdev, mode, cmd, arg);
}
| 165,724 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _archive_write_data(struct archive *_a, const void *buff, size_t s)
{
struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_DATA, "archive_write_data");
archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
return ((a->format_write_data)(a, buff, s));
}
Commit Message: Limit write requests to at most INT_MAX.
This prevents a certain common programming error (passing -1 to write)
from leading to other problems deeper in the library.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | _archive_write_data(struct archive *_a, const void *buff, size_t s)
{
struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
const size_t max_write = INT_MAX;
archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_DATA, "archive_write_data");
/* In particular, this catches attempts to pass negative values. */
if (s > max_write)
s = max_write;
archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
return ((a->format_write_data)(a, buff, s));
}
| 166,176 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RuntimeCustomBindings::RuntimeCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetManifest",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::GetManifest, base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("OpenChannelToExtension",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::OpenChannelToExtension,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("OpenChannelToNativeApp",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::OpenChannelToNativeApp,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetExtensionViews",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::GetExtensionViews,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | RuntimeCustomBindings::RuntimeCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetManifest",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::GetManifest, base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("OpenChannelToExtension", "runtime.connect",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::OpenChannelToExtension,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("OpenChannelToNativeApp", "runtime.connectNative",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::OpenChannelToNativeApp,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetExtensionViews",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::GetExtensionViews,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,253 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int qcow2_grow_l1_table(BlockDriverState *bs, uint64_t min_size,
bool exact_size)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int new_l1_size2, ret, i;
uint64_t *new_l1_table;
int64_t old_l1_table_offset, old_l1_size;
int64_t new_l1_table_offset, new_l1_size;
uint8_t data[12];
if (min_size <= s->l1_size)
return 0;
if (exact_size) {
new_l1_size = min_size;
} else {
/* Bump size up to reduce the number of times we have to grow */
new_l1_size = s->l1_size;
if (new_l1_size == 0) {
new_l1_size = 1;
}
while (min_size > new_l1_size) {
new_l1_size = (new_l1_size * 3 + 1) / 2;
}
}
if (new_l1_size > INT_MAX) {
return -EFBIG;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ALLOC2
fprintf(stderr, "grow l1_table from %d to %" PRId64 "\n",
s->l1_size, new_l1_size);
#endif
new_l1_size2 = sizeof(uint64_t) * new_l1_size;
new_l1_table = g_malloc0(align_offset(new_l1_size2, 512));
memcpy(new_l1_table, s->l1_table, s->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t));
/* write new table (align to cluster) */
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_L1_GROW_ALLOC_TABLE);
new_l1_table_offset = qcow2_alloc_clusters(bs, new_l1_size2);
if (new_l1_table_offset < 0) {
g_free(new_l1_table);
return new_l1_table_offset;
}
ret = qcow2_cache_flush(bs, s->refcount_block_cache);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
/* the L1 position has not yet been updated, so these clusters must
* indeed be completely free */
ret = qcow2_pre_write_overlap_check(bs, 0, new_l1_table_offset,
new_l1_size2);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_L1_GROW_WRITE_TABLE);
for(i = 0; i < s->l1_size; i++)
new_l1_table[i] = cpu_to_be64(new_l1_table[i]);
ret = bdrv_pwrite_sync(bs->file, new_l1_table_offset, new_l1_table, new_l1_size2);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
for(i = 0; i < s->l1_size; i++)
new_l1_table[i] = be64_to_cpu(new_l1_table[i]);
/* set new table */
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_L1_GROW_ACTIVATE_TABLE);
cpu_to_be32w((uint32_t*)data, new_l1_size);
stq_be_p(data + 4, new_l1_table_offset);
ret = bdrv_pwrite_sync(bs->file, offsetof(QCowHeader, l1_size), data,sizeof(data));
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
g_free(s->l1_table);
old_l1_table_offset = s->l1_table_offset;
s->l1_table_offset = new_l1_table_offset;
s->l1_table = new_l1_table;
old_l1_size = s->l1_size;
s->l1_size = new_l1_size;
qcow2_free_clusters(bs, old_l1_table_offset, old_l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t),
QCOW2_DISCARD_OTHER);
return 0;
fail:
g_free(new_l1_table);
qcow2_free_clusters(bs, new_l1_table_offset, new_l1_size2,
QCOW2_DISCARD_OTHER);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | int qcow2_grow_l1_table(BlockDriverState *bs, uint64_t min_size,
bool exact_size)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int new_l1_size2, ret, i;
uint64_t *new_l1_table;
int64_t old_l1_table_offset, old_l1_size;
int64_t new_l1_table_offset, new_l1_size;
uint8_t data[12];
if (min_size <= s->l1_size)
return 0;
if (exact_size) {
new_l1_size = min_size;
} else {
/* Bump size up to reduce the number of times we have to grow */
new_l1_size = s->l1_size;
if (new_l1_size == 0) {
new_l1_size = 1;
}
while (min_size > new_l1_size) {
new_l1_size = (new_l1_size * 3 + 1) / 2;
}
}
if (new_l1_size > INT_MAX / sizeof(uint64_t)) {
return -EFBIG;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ALLOC2
fprintf(stderr, "grow l1_table from %d to %" PRId64 "\n",
s->l1_size, new_l1_size);
#endif
new_l1_size2 = sizeof(uint64_t) * new_l1_size;
new_l1_table = g_malloc0(align_offset(new_l1_size2, 512));
memcpy(new_l1_table, s->l1_table, s->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t));
/* write new table (align to cluster) */
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_L1_GROW_ALLOC_TABLE);
new_l1_table_offset = qcow2_alloc_clusters(bs, new_l1_size2);
if (new_l1_table_offset < 0) {
g_free(new_l1_table);
return new_l1_table_offset;
}
ret = qcow2_cache_flush(bs, s->refcount_block_cache);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
/* the L1 position has not yet been updated, so these clusters must
* indeed be completely free */
ret = qcow2_pre_write_overlap_check(bs, 0, new_l1_table_offset,
new_l1_size2);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_L1_GROW_WRITE_TABLE);
for(i = 0; i < s->l1_size; i++)
new_l1_table[i] = cpu_to_be64(new_l1_table[i]);
ret = bdrv_pwrite_sync(bs->file, new_l1_table_offset, new_l1_table, new_l1_size2);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
for(i = 0; i < s->l1_size; i++)
new_l1_table[i] = be64_to_cpu(new_l1_table[i]);
/* set new table */
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_L1_GROW_ACTIVATE_TABLE);
cpu_to_be32w((uint32_t*)data, new_l1_size);
stq_be_p(data + 4, new_l1_table_offset);
ret = bdrv_pwrite_sync(bs->file, offsetof(QCowHeader, l1_size), data,sizeof(data));
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
g_free(s->l1_table);
old_l1_table_offset = s->l1_table_offset;
s->l1_table_offset = new_l1_table_offset;
s->l1_table = new_l1_table;
old_l1_size = s->l1_size;
s->l1_size = new_l1_size;
qcow2_free_clusters(bs, old_l1_table_offset, old_l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t),
QCOW2_DISCARD_OTHER);
return 0;
fail:
g_free(new_l1_table);
qcow2_free_clusters(bs, new_l1_table_offset, new_l1_size2,
QCOW2_DISCARD_OTHER);
return ret;
}
| 165,409 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::setBuffers(
bool audio, Vector<MediaBuffer *> &buffers) {
if (mIsSecure && !audio) {
return mVideoTrack.mSource->setBuffers(buffers);
}
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::setBuffers(
bool audio, Vector<MediaBuffer *> &buffers) {
if (mIsWidevine && !audio && mVideoTrack.mSource != NULL) {
return mVideoTrack.mSource->setBuffers(buffers);
}
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
| 173,763 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int __glXDispSwap_CreateContext(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
xGLXCreateContextReq *req = (xGLXCreateContextReq *) pc;
__GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES;
__GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length);
__GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->context);
__GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->visual);
return __glXDisp_CreateContext(cl, pc);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int __glXDispSwap_CreateContext(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
ClientPtr client = cl->client;
xGLXCreateContextReq *req = (xGLXCreateContextReq *) pc;
__GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGLXCreateContextReq);
__GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length);
__GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->context);
__GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->visual);
return __glXDisp_CreateContext(cl, pc);
}
| 165,269 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int file_list_cpu(struct file *file)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
return file->f_sb_list_cpu;
#else
return smp_processor_id();
#endif
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | static inline int file_list_cpu(struct file *file)
| 166,797 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int do_session_handshake (lua_State *L, int status, lua_KContext ctx) {
int rc;
struct ssh_userdata *sshu = NULL;
assert(lua_gettop(L) == 4);
sshu = (struct ssh_userdata *) nseU_checkudata(L, 3, SSH2_UDATA, "ssh2");
while ((rc = libssh2_session_handshake(sshu->session, sshu->sp[0])) == LIBSSH2_ERROR_EAGAIN) {
luaL_getmetafield(L, 3, "filter");
lua_pushvalue(L, 3);
assert(lua_status(L) == LUA_OK);
lua_callk(L, 1, 0, 0, do_session_handshake);
}
if (rc) {
libssh2_session_free(sshu->session);
return luaL_error(L, "Unable to complete libssh2 handshake.");
}
lua_settop(L, 3);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Avoid a crash (double-free) when SSH connection fails
CWE ID: CWE-415 | static int do_session_handshake (lua_State *L, int status, lua_KContext ctx) {
int rc;
struct ssh_userdata *sshu = NULL;
assert(lua_gettop(L) == 4);
sshu = (struct ssh_userdata *) nseU_checkudata(L, 3, SSH2_UDATA, "ssh2");
while ((rc = libssh2_session_handshake(sshu->session, sshu->sp[0])) == LIBSSH2_ERROR_EAGAIN) {
luaL_getmetafield(L, 3, "filter");
lua_pushvalue(L, 3);
assert(lua_status(L) == LUA_OK);
lua_callk(L, 1, 0, 0, do_session_handshake);
}
if (rc) {
libssh2_session_free(sshu->session);
sshu->session = NULL;
return luaL_error(L, "Unable to complete libssh2 handshake.");
}
lua_settop(L, 3);
return 1;
}
| 169,856 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void unmarshallAudioAttributes(const Parcel& parcel, audio_attributes_t *attributes)
{
attributes->usage = (audio_usage_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->content_type = (audio_content_type_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->source = (audio_source_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->flags = (audio_flags_mask_t) parcel.readInt32();
const bool hasFlattenedTag = (parcel.readInt32() == kAudioAttributesMarshallTagFlattenTags);
if (hasFlattenedTag) {
String16 tags = parcel.readString16();
ssize_t realTagSize = utf16_to_utf8_length(tags.string(), tags.size());
if (realTagSize <= 0) {
strcpy(attributes->tags, "");
} else {
size_t tagSize = realTagSize > AUDIO_ATTRIBUTES_TAGS_MAX_SIZE - 1 ?
AUDIO_ATTRIBUTES_TAGS_MAX_SIZE - 1 : realTagSize;
utf16_to_utf8(tags.string(), tagSize, attributes->tags);
}
} else {
ALOGE("unmarshallAudioAttributes() received unflattened tags, ignoring tag values");
strcpy(attributes->tags, "");
}
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I3518416e89ed901021970958fb6005fd69129f7c
(cherry picked from commit 1d3f4278b2666d1a145af2f54782c993aa07d1d9)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void unmarshallAudioAttributes(const Parcel& parcel, audio_attributes_t *attributes)
{
attributes->usage = (audio_usage_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->content_type = (audio_content_type_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->source = (audio_source_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->flags = (audio_flags_mask_t) parcel.readInt32();
const bool hasFlattenedTag = (parcel.readInt32() == kAudioAttributesMarshallTagFlattenTags);
if (hasFlattenedTag) {
String16 tags = parcel.readString16();
ssize_t realTagSize = utf16_to_utf8_length(tags.string(), tags.size());
if (realTagSize <= 0) {
strcpy(attributes->tags, "");
} else {
size_t tagSize = realTagSize > AUDIO_ATTRIBUTES_TAGS_MAX_SIZE - 1 ?
AUDIO_ATTRIBUTES_TAGS_MAX_SIZE - 1 : realTagSize;
utf16_to_utf8(tags.string(), tagSize, attributes->tags,
sizeof(attributes->tags) / sizeof(attributes->tags[0]));
}
} else {
ALOGE("unmarshallAudioAttributes() received unflattened tags, ignoring tag values");
strcpy(attributes->tags, "");
}
}
| 174,159 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: process_bitmap_updates(STREAM s)
{
uint16 num_updates;
uint16 left, top, right, bottom, width, height;
uint16 cx, cy, bpp, Bpp, compress, bufsize, size;
uint8 *data, *bmpdata;
int i;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "%s()", __func__);
in_uint16_le(s, num_updates);
for (i = 0; i < num_updates; i++)
{
in_uint16_le(s, left);
in_uint16_le(s, top);
in_uint16_le(s, right);
in_uint16_le(s, bottom);
in_uint16_le(s, width);
in_uint16_le(s, height);
in_uint16_le(s, bpp);
Bpp = (bpp + 7) / 8;
in_uint16_le(s, compress);
in_uint16_le(s, bufsize);
cx = right - left + 1;
cy = bottom - top + 1;
logger(Graphics, Debug,
"process_bitmap_updates(), [%d,%d,%d,%d], [%d,%d], bpp=%d, compression=%d",
left, top, right, bottom, width, height, Bpp, compress);
if (!compress)
{
int y;
bmpdata = (uint8 *) xmalloc(width * height * Bpp);
for (y = 0; y < height; y++)
{
in_uint8a(s, &bmpdata[(height - y - 1) * (width * Bpp)],
width * Bpp);
}
ui_paint_bitmap(left, top, cx, cy, width, height, bmpdata);
xfree(bmpdata);
continue;
}
if (compress & 0x400)
{
size = bufsize;
}
else
{
in_uint8s(s, 2); /* pad */
in_uint16_le(s, size);
in_uint8s(s, 4); /* line_size, final_size */
}
in_uint8p(s, data, size);
bmpdata = (uint8 *) xmalloc(width * height * Bpp);
if (bitmap_decompress(bmpdata, width, height, data, size, Bpp))
{
ui_paint_bitmap(left, top, cx, cy, width, height, bmpdata);
}
else
{
logger(Graphics, Warning,
"process_bitmap_updates(), failed to decompress bitmap");
}
xfree(bmpdata);
}
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | process_bitmap_updates(STREAM s)
/* Process TS_BITMAP_DATA */
static void
process_bitmap_data(STREAM s)
{
uint16 left, top, right, bottom, width, height;
uint16 cx, cy, bpp, Bpp, flags, bufsize, size;
uint8 *data, *bmpdata;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "%s()", __func__);
struct stream packet = *s;
in_uint16_le(s, left); /* destLeft */
in_uint16_le(s, top); /* destTop */
in_uint16_le(s, right); /* destRight */
in_uint16_le(s, bottom); /* destBottom */
in_uint16_le(s, width); /* width */
in_uint16_le(s, height); /* height */
in_uint16_le(s, bpp); /*bitsPerPixel */
Bpp = (bpp + 7) / 8;
in_uint16_le(s, flags); /* flags */
in_uint16_le(s, bufsize); /* bitmapLength */
cx = right - left + 1;
cy = bottom - top + 1;
/* FIXME: There are a assumtion that we do not consider in
this code. The value of bpp is not passed to
ui_paint_bitmap() which relies on g_server_bpp for drawing
the bitmap data.
Does this means that we can sanity check bpp with g_server_bpp ?
*/
if (Bpp == 0 || width == 0 || height == 0)
{
logger(Protocol, Warning, "%s(), [%d,%d,%d,%d], [%d,%d], bpp=%d, flags=%x", __func__,
left, top, right, bottom, width, height, bpp, flags);
rdp_protocol_error("TS_BITMAP_DATA, unsafe size of bitmap data received from server", &packet);
}
if ((RD_UINT32_MAX / Bpp) <= (width * height))
{
logger(Protocol, Warning, "%s(), [%d,%d,%d,%d], [%d,%d], bpp=%d, flags=%x", __func__,
left, top, right, bottom, width, height, bpp, flags);
rdp_protocol_error("TS_BITMAP_DATA, unsafe size of bitmap data received from server", &packet);
}
if (flags == 0)
{
/* read uncompressed bitmap data */
int y;
bmpdata = (uint8 *) xmalloc(width * height * Bpp);
for (y = 0; y < height; y++)
{
in_uint8a(s, &bmpdata[(height - y - 1) * (width * Bpp)], width * Bpp);
}
ui_paint_bitmap(left, top, cx, cy, width, height, bmpdata);
xfree(bmpdata);
return;
}
if (flags & NO_BITMAP_COMPRESSION_HDR)
{
size = bufsize;
}
else
{
/* Read TS_CD_HEADER */
in_uint8s(s, 2); /* skip cbCompFirstRowSize (must be 0x0000) */
in_uint16_le(s, size); /* cbCompMainBodySize */
in_uint8s(s, 2); /* skip cbScanWidth */
in_uint8s(s, 2); /* skip cbUncompressedSize */
}
/* read compressed bitmap data */
if (!s_check_rem(s, size))
{
rdp_protocol_error("process_bitmap_data(), consume of bitmap data from stream would overrun", &packet);
}
in_uint8p(s, data, size);
bmpdata = (uint8 *) xmalloc(width * height * Bpp);
if (bitmap_decompress(bmpdata, width, height, data, size, Bpp))
{
ui_paint_bitmap(left, top, cx, cy, width, height, bmpdata);
}
else
{
logger(Protocol, Warning, "%s(), failed to decompress bitmap", __func__);
}
xfree(bmpdata);
}
/* Process TS_UPDATE_BITMAP_DATA */
void
process_bitmap_updates(STREAM s)
{
int i;
uint16 num_updates;
in_uint16_le(s, num_updates); /* rectangles */
for (i = 0; i < num_updates; i++)
{
process_bitmap_data(s);
}
}
| 169,802 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_send_car (MyObject *obj, GValueArray *invals, GValueArray **outvals, GError **error)
{
if (invals->n_values != 3
|| G_VALUE_TYPE (g_value_array_get_nth (invals, 0)) != G_TYPE_STRING
|| G_VALUE_TYPE (g_value_array_get_nth (invals, 1)) != G_TYPE_UINT
|| G_VALUE_TYPE (g_value_array_get_nth (invals, 2)) != G_TYPE_VALUE)
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid incoming values");
return FALSE;
}
*outvals = g_value_array_new (2);
g_value_array_append (*outvals, NULL);
g_value_init (g_value_array_get_nth (*outvals, (*outvals)->n_values - 1), G_TYPE_UINT);
g_value_set_uint (g_value_array_get_nth (*outvals, (*outvals)->n_values - 1),
g_value_get_uint (g_value_array_get_nth (invals, 1)) + 1);
g_value_array_append (*outvals, NULL);
g_value_init (g_value_array_get_nth (*outvals, (*outvals)->n_values - 1), DBUS_TYPE_G_OBJECT_PATH);
g_value_set_boxed (g_value_array_get_nth (*outvals, (*outvals)->n_values - 1),
g_strdup ("/org/freedesktop/DBus/GLib/Tests/MyTestObject2"));
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_send_car (MyObject *obj, GValueArray *invals, GValueArray **outvals, GError **error)
| 165,119 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WorkerFetchContext::DispatchDidBlockRequest(
const ResourceRequest& resource_request,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& fetch_initiator_info,
ResourceRequestBlockedReason blocked_reason) const {
probe::didBlockRequest(global_scope_, resource_request, nullptr,
fetch_initiator_info, blocked_reason);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void WorkerFetchContext::DispatchDidBlockRequest(
const ResourceRequest& resource_request,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& fetch_initiator_info,
ResourceRequestBlockedReason blocked_reason,
Resource::Type resource_type) const {
probe::didBlockRequest(global_scope_, resource_request, nullptr,
fetch_initiator_info, blocked_reason, resource_type);
}
| 172,475 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PageCaptureCustomBindings::PageCaptureCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction("CreateBlob",
base::Bind(&PageCaptureCustomBindings::CreateBlob,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("SendResponseAck",
base::Bind(&PageCaptureCustomBindings::SendResponseAck,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | PageCaptureCustomBindings::PageCaptureCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction("CreateBlob", "pageCapture",
base::Bind(&PageCaptureCustomBindings::CreateBlob,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("SendResponseAck", "pageCapture",
base::Bind(&PageCaptureCustomBindings::SendResponseAck,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 173,277 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetSurfaceNotInUseByCompositor(ui::Compositor*) {
if (current_surface_ || !host_->is_hidden())
return;
current_surface_in_use_by_compositor_ = false;
AdjustSurfaceProtection();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetSurfaceNotInUseByCompositor(ui::Compositor*) {
| 171,385 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual std::string GetKeyboardOverlayId(const std::string& input_method_id) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return "";
return chromeos::GetKeyboardOverlayId(input_method_id);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual std::string GetKeyboardOverlayId(const std::string& input_method_id) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return "";
return input_method::GetKeyboardOverlayId(input_method_id);
}
| 170,489 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BrightnessLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetBrightnessLibrary() {
return brightness_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | BrightnessLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetBrightnessLibrary() {
| 170,620 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dotraplinkage void notrace do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
/*
* ftrace must be first, everything else may cause a recursive crash.
* See note by declaration of modifying_ftrace_code in ftrace.c
*/
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&modifying_ftrace_code)) &&
ftrace_int3_handler(regs))
return;
#endif
if (poke_int3_handler(regs))
return;
ist_enter(regs);
RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't wake RCU");
#ifdef CONFIG_KGDB_LOW_LEVEL_TRAP
if (kgdb_ll_trap(DIE_INT3, "int3", regs, error_code, X86_TRAP_BP,
SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
goto exit;
#endif /* CONFIG_KGDB_LOW_LEVEL_TRAP */
#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES
if (kprobe_int3_handler(regs))
goto exit;
#endif
if (notify_die(DIE_INT3, "int3", regs, error_code, X86_TRAP_BP,
SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
goto exit;
/*
* Let others (NMI) know that the debug stack is in use
* as we may switch to the interrupt stack.
*/
debug_stack_usage_inc();
cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
do_trap(X86_TRAP_BP, SIGTRAP, "int3", regs, error_code, NULL);
cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
debug_stack_usage_dec();
exit:
ist_exit(regs);
}
Commit Message: x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stack
There's nothing IST-worthy about #BP/int3. We don't allow kprobes
in the small handful of places in the kernel that run at CPL0 with
an invalid stack, and 32-bit kernels have used normal interrupt
gates for #BP forever.
Furthermore, we don't allow kprobes in places that have usergs while
in kernel mode, so "paranoid" is also unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | dotraplinkage void notrace do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
/*
* ftrace must be first, everything else may cause a recursive crash.
* See note by declaration of modifying_ftrace_code in ftrace.c
*/
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&modifying_ftrace_code)) &&
ftrace_int3_handler(regs))
return;
#endif
if (poke_int3_handler(regs))
return;
/*
* Use ist_enter despite the fact that we don't use an IST stack.
* We can be called from a kprobe in non-CONTEXT_KERNEL kernel
* mode or even during context tracking state changes.
*
* This means that we can't schedule. That's okay.
*/
ist_enter(regs);
RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't wake RCU");
#ifdef CONFIG_KGDB_LOW_LEVEL_TRAP
if (kgdb_ll_trap(DIE_INT3, "int3", regs, error_code, X86_TRAP_BP,
SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
goto exit;
#endif /* CONFIG_KGDB_LOW_LEVEL_TRAP */
#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES
if (kprobe_int3_handler(regs))
goto exit;
#endif
if (notify_die(DIE_INT3, "int3", regs, error_code, X86_TRAP_BP,
SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
goto exit;
cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
do_trap(X86_TRAP_BP, SIGTRAP, "int3", regs, error_code, NULL);
cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
exit:
ist_exit(regs);
}
| 169,270 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION( locale_get_keywords )
{
UEnumeration* e = NULL;
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
const char* kw_key = NULL;
int32_t kw_key_len = 0;
const char* loc_name = NULL;
int loc_name_len = 0;
/*
ICU expects the buffer to be allocated before calling the function
and so the buffer size has been explicitly specified
ICU uloc.h #define ULOC_KEYWORD_AND_VALUES_CAPACITY 100
hence the kw_value buffer size is 100
*/
char* kw_value = NULL;
int32_t kw_value_len = 100;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&loc_name, &loc_name_len ) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_get_keywords: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_name_len == 0) {
loc_name = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
/* Get the keywords */
e = uloc_openKeywords( loc_name, &status );
if( e != NULL )
{
/* Traverse it, filling the return array. */
array_init( return_value );
while( ( kw_key = uenum_next( e, &kw_key_len, &status ) ) != NULL ){
kw_value = ecalloc( 1 , kw_value_len );
/* Get the keyword value for each keyword */
kw_value_len=uloc_getKeywordValue( loc_name,kw_key, kw_value, kw_value_len , &status );
if (status == U_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR) {
status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
kw_value = erealloc( kw_value , kw_value_len+1);
kw_value_len=uloc_getKeywordValue( loc_name,kw_key, kw_value, kw_value_len+1 , &status );
} else if(!U_FAILURE(status)) {
kw_value = erealloc( kw_value , kw_value_len+1);
}
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "locale_get_keywords: Error encountered while getting the keyword value for the keyword", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
if( kw_value){
efree( kw_value );
}
zval_dtor(return_value);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
add_assoc_stringl( return_value, (char *)kw_key, kw_value , kw_value_len, 0);
} /* end of while */
} /* end of if e!=NULL */
uenum_close( e );
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | PHP_FUNCTION( locale_get_keywords )
{
UEnumeration* e = NULL;
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
const char* kw_key = NULL;
int32_t kw_key_len = 0;
const char* loc_name = NULL;
int loc_name_len = 0;
/*
ICU expects the buffer to be allocated before calling the function
and so the buffer size has been explicitly specified
ICU uloc.h #define ULOC_KEYWORD_AND_VALUES_CAPACITY 100
hence the kw_value buffer size is 100
*/
char* kw_value = NULL;
int32_t kw_value_len = 100;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&loc_name, &loc_name_len ) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_get_keywords: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_name_len == 0) {
loc_name = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
/* Get the keywords */
e = uloc_openKeywords( loc_name, &status );
if( e != NULL )
{
/* Traverse it, filling the return array. */
array_init( return_value );
while( ( kw_key = uenum_next( e, &kw_key_len, &status ) ) != NULL ){
kw_value = ecalloc( 1 , kw_value_len );
/* Get the keyword value for each keyword */
kw_value_len=uloc_getKeywordValue( loc_name,kw_key, kw_value, kw_value_len , &status );
if (status == U_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR) {
status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
kw_value = erealloc( kw_value , kw_value_len+1);
kw_value_len=uloc_getKeywordValue( loc_name,kw_key, kw_value, kw_value_len+1 , &status );
} else if(!U_FAILURE(status)) {
kw_value = erealloc( kw_value , kw_value_len+1);
}
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "locale_get_keywords: Error encountered while getting the keyword value for the keyword", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
if( kw_value){
efree( kw_value );
}
zval_dtor(return_value);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
add_assoc_stringl( return_value, (char *)kw_key, kw_value , kw_value_len, 0);
} /* end of while */
} /* end of if e!=NULL */
uenum_close( e );
}
| 167,190 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void v9fs_attach(void *opaque)
{
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
int32_t fid, afid, n_uname;
V9fsString uname, aname;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsQID qid;
ssize_t err;
v9fs_string_init(&uname);
v9fs_string_init(&aname);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "ddssd", &fid,
&afid, &uname, &aname, &n_uname);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_attach(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, afid, uname.data, aname.data);
fidp = alloc_fid(s, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp->uid = n_uname;
err = v9fs_co_name_to_path(pdu, NULL, "/", &fidp->path);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err = fid_to_qid(pdu, fidp, &qid);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "Q", &qid);
if (err < 0) {
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err += offset;
trace_v9fs_attach_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id,
qid.type, qid.version, qid.path);
/*
* attach could get called multiple times for the same export.
*/
if (!s->migration_blocker) {
s->root_fid = fid;
error_setg(&s->migration_blocker,
"Migration is disabled when VirtFS export path '%s' is mounted in the guest using mount_tag '%s'",
s->ctx.fs_root ? s->ctx.fs_root : "NULL", s->tag);
migrate_add_blocker(s->migration_blocker);
}
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&uname);
v9fs_string_free(&aname);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | static void v9fs_attach(void *opaque)
{
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
int32_t fid, afid, n_uname;
V9fsString uname, aname;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsQID qid;
ssize_t err;
v9fs_string_init(&uname);
v9fs_string_init(&aname);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "ddssd", &fid,
&afid, &uname, &aname, &n_uname);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_attach(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, afid, uname.data, aname.data);
fidp = alloc_fid(s, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp->uid = n_uname;
err = v9fs_co_name_to_path(pdu, NULL, "/", &fidp->path);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err = fid_to_qid(pdu, fidp, &qid);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "Q", &qid);
if (err < 0) {
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err += offset;
memcpy(&s->root_qid, &qid, sizeof(qid));
trace_v9fs_attach_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id,
qid.type, qid.version, qid.path);
/*
* attach could get called multiple times for the same export.
*/
if (!s->migration_blocker) {
s->root_fid = fid;
error_setg(&s->migration_blocker,
"Migration is disabled when VirtFS export path '%s' is mounted in the guest using mount_tag '%s'",
s->ctx.fs_root ? s->ctx.fs_root : "NULL", s->tag);
migrate_add_blocker(s->migration_blocker);
}
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&uname);
v9fs_string_free(&aname);
}
| 164,938 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GfxIndexedColorSpace::getRGBLine(Guchar *in, unsigned int *out, int length) {
Guchar *line;
int i, j, n;
n = base->getNComps();
line = (Guchar *) gmalloc (length * n);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
line[i * n + j] = lookup[in[i] * n + j];
base->getRGBLine(line, out, length);
gfree (line);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void GfxIndexedColorSpace::getRGBLine(Guchar *in, unsigned int *out, int length) {
Guchar *line;
int i, j, n;
n = base->getNComps();
line = (Guchar *) gmallocn (length, n);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
line[i * n + j] = lookup[in[i] * n + j];
base->getRGBLine(line, out, length);
gfree (line);
}
| 164,610 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeOSSetImePropertyActivated(
InputMethodStatusConnection* connection, const char* key, bool activated) {
DLOG(INFO) << "SetImePropertyeActivated: " << key << ": " << activated;
DCHECK(key);
g_return_if_fail(connection);
connection->SetImePropertyActivated(key, activated);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void ChromeOSSetImePropertyActivated(
| 170,527 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: rdpdr_process(STREAM s)
{
uint32 handle;
uint16 vmin;
uint16 component;
uint16 pakid;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "rdpdr_process()");
/* hexdump(s->p, s->end - s->p); */
in_uint16(s, component);
in_uint16(s, pakid);
if (component == RDPDR_CTYP_CORE)
{
switch (pakid)
{
case PAKID_CORE_DEVICE_IOREQUEST:
rdpdr_process_irp(s);
break;
case PAKID_CORE_SERVER_ANNOUNCE:
/* DR_CORE_SERVER_ANNOUNCE_REQ */
in_uint8s(s, 2); /* skip versionMajor */
in_uint16_le(s, vmin); /* VersionMinor */
in_uint32_le(s, g_client_id); /* ClientID */
/* The RDP client is responsibility to provide a random client id
if server version is < 12 */
if (vmin < 0x000c)
g_client_id = 0x815ed39d; /* IP address (use 127.0.0.1) 0x815ed39d */
g_epoch++;
#if WITH_SCARD
/*
* We need to release all SCARD contexts to end all
* current transactions and pending calls
*/
scard_release_all_contexts();
/*
* According to [MS-RDPEFS] 3.2.5.1.2:
*
* If this packet appears after a sequence of other packets,
* it is a signal that the server has reconnected to a new session
* and the whole sequence has been reset. The client MUST treat
* this packet as the beginning of a new sequence.
* The client MUST also cancel all outstanding requests and release
* previous references to all devices.
*
* If any problem arises in the future, please, pay attention to the
* "If this packet appears after a sequence of other packets" part
*
*/
#endif
rdpdr_send_client_announce_reply();
rdpdr_send_client_name_request();
break;
case PAKID_CORE_CLIENTID_CONFIRM:
rdpdr_send_client_device_list_announce();
break;
case PAKID_CORE_DEVICE_REPLY:
in_uint32(s, handle);
logger(Protocol, Debug,
"rdpdr_process(), server connected to resource %d", handle);
break;
case PAKID_CORE_SERVER_CAPABILITY:
rdpdr_send_client_capability_response();
break;
default:
logger(Protocol, Debug,
"rdpdr_process(), pakid 0x%x of component 0x%x", pakid,
component);
break;
}
}
else if (component == RDPDR_CTYP_PRN)
{
if (pakid == PAKID_PRN_CACHE_DATA)
printercache_process(s);
}
else
logger(Protocol, Warning, "rdpdr_process(), unhandled component 0x%x", component);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | rdpdr_process(STREAM s)
{
uint32 handle;
uint16 vmin;
uint16 component;
uint16 pakid;
struct stream packet = *s;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "rdpdr_process()");
/* hexdump(s->p, s->end - s->p); */
in_uint16(s, component);
in_uint16(s, pakid);
if (component == RDPDR_CTYP_CORE)
{
switch (pakid)
{
case PAKID_CORE_DEVICE_IOREQUEST:
rdpdr_process_irp(s);
break;
case PAKID_CORE_SERVER_ANNOUNCE:
/* DR_CORE_SERVER_ANNOUNCE_REQ */
in_uint8s(s, 2); /* skip versionMajor */
in_uint16_le(s, vmin); /* VersionMinor */
in_uint32_le(s, g_client_id); /* ClientID */
/* g_client_id is sent back to server,
so lets check that we actually got
valid data from stream to prevent
that we leak back data to server */
if (!s_check(s))
{
rdp_protocol_error("rdpdr_process(), consume of g_client_id from stream did overrun", &packet);
}
/* The RDP client is responsibility to provide a random client id
if server version is < 12 */
if (vmin < 0x000c)
g_client_id = 0x815ed39d; /* IP address (use 127.0.0.1) 0x815ed39d */
g_epoch++;
#if WITH_SCARD
/*
* We need to release all SCARD contexts to end all
* current transactions and pending calls
*/
scard_release_all_contexts();
/*
* According to [MS-RDPEFS] 3.2.5.1.2:
*
* If this packet appears after a sequence of other packets,
* it is a signal that the server has reconnected to a new session
* and the whole sequence has been reset. The client MUST treat
* this packet as the beginning of a new sequence.
* The client MUST also cancel all outstanding requests and release
* previous references to all devices.
*
* If any problem arises in the future, please, pay attention to the
* "If this packet appears after a sequence of other packets" part
*
*/
#endif
rdpdr_send_client_announce_reply();
rdpdr_send_client_name_request();
break;
case PAKID_CORE_CLIENTID_CONFIRM:
rdpdr_send_client_device_list_announce();
break;
case PAKID_CORE_DEVICE_REPLY:
in_uint32(s, handle);
logger(Protocol, Debug,
"rdpdr_process(), server connected to resource %d", handle);
break;
case PAKID_CORE_SERVER_CAPABILITY:
rdpdr_send_client_capability_response();
break;
default:
logger(Protocol, Debug,
"rdpdr_process(), pakid 0x%x of component 0x%x", pakid,
component);
break;
}
}
else if (component == RDPDR_CTYP_PRN)
{
if (pakid == PAKID_PRN_CACHE_DATA)
printercache_process(s);
}
else
logger(Protocol, Warning, "rdpdr_process(), unhandled component 0x%x", component);
}
| 169,805 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void TaskManagerView::Init() {
table_model_.reset(new TaskManagerTableModel(model_));
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_TASK_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::LEFT, -1, 1));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PROFILE_NAME_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::LEFT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PHYSICAL_MEM_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_SHARED_MEM_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PRIVATE_MEM_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_CPU_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_NET_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PROCESS_ID_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(
IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_IMAGE_CACHE_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(
IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_SCRIPTS_CACHE_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_CSS_CACHE_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_FPS_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_SQLITE_MEMORY_USED_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(
ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_JAVASCRIPT_MEMORY_ALLOCATED_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
tab_table_ = new BackgroundColorGroupTableView(
table_model_.get(), columns_, highlight_background_resources_);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PROFILE_NAME_COLUMN, false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PROCESS_ID_COLUMN, false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_SHARED_MEM_COLUMN, false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PRIVATE_MEM_COLUMN, false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_IMAGE_CACHE_COLUMN,
false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_SCRIPTS_CACHE_COLUMN,
false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_CSS_CACHE_COLUMN,
false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_SQLITE_MEMORY_USED_COLUMN,
false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(
IDS_TASK_MANAGER_JAVASCRIPT_MEMORY_ALLOCATED_COLUMN, false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_GOATS_TELEPORTED_COLUMN,
false);
UpdateStatsCounters();
tab_table_->SetObserver(this);
tab_table_->set_context_menu_controller(this);
set_context_menu_controller(this);
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kPurgeMemoryButton)) {
purge_memory_button_ = new views::NativeTextButton(this,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PURGE_MEMORY));
}
kill_button_ = new views::NativeTextButton(
this, l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_KILL));
kill_button_->AddAccelerator(ui::Accelerator(ui::VKEY_E, false, false,
false));
kill_button_->SetAccessibleKeyboardShortcut(L"E");
kill_button_->set_prefix_type(views::TextButtonBase::PREFIX_SHOW);
about_memory_link_ = new views::Link(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_ABOUT_MEMORY_LINK));
about_memory_link_->set_listener(this);
OnSelectionChanged();
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void TaskManagerView::Init() {
table_model_.reset(new TaskManagerTableModel(model_));
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_TASK_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::LEFT, -1, 1));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PROFILE_NAME_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::LEFT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PHYSICAL_MEM_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_SHARED_MEM_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PRIVATE_MEM_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_CPU_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_NET_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PROCESS_ID_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(
IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_IMAGE_CACHE_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(
IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_SCRIPTS_CACHE_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_CSS_CACHE_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_FPS_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_SQLITE_MEMORY_USED_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(
ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_JAVASCRIPT_MEMORY_ALLOCATED_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
tab_table_ = new BackgroundColorGroupTableView(
table_model_.get(), columns_, highlight_background_resources_);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PROFILE_NAME_COLUMN, false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PROCESS_ID_COLUMN, false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_SHARED_MEM_COLUMN, false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PRIVATE_MEM_COLUMN, false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_IMAGE_CACHE_COLUMN,
false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_SCRIPTS_CACHE_COLUMN,
false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_CSS_CACHE_COLUMN,
false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_SQLITE_MEMORY_USED_COLUMN,
false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(
IDS_TASK_MANAGER_JAVASCRIPT_MEMORY_ALLOCATED_COLUMN, false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_GOATS_TELEPORTED_COLUMN,
false);
UpdateStatsCounters();
tab_table_->SetObserver(this);
tab_table_->set_context_menu_controller(this);
set_context_menu_controller(this);
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kPurgeMemoryButton)) {
purge_memory_button_ = new views::NativeTextButton(this,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PURGE_MEMORY));
}
kill_button_ = new views::NativeTextButton(
this, l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_KILL));
kill_button_->AddAccelerator(ui::Accelerator(ui::VKEY_E, ui::EF_NONE));
kill_button_->SetAccessibleKeyboardShortcut(L"E");
kill_button_->set_prefix_type(views::TextButtonBase::PREFIX_SHOW);
about_memory_link_ = new views::Link(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_ABOUT_MEMORY_LINK));
about_memory_link_->set_listener(this);
OnSelectionChanged();
}
| 170,906 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::HandleMasterEntryFetchCompleted(
URLFetcher* fetcher) {
DCHECK(internal_state_ == NO_UPDATE || internal_state_ == DOWNLOADING);
net::URLRequest* request = fetcher->request();
const GURL& url = request->original_url();
master_entry_fetches_.erase(url);
++master_entries_completed_;
int response_code = request->status().is_success()
? request->GetResponseCode() : -1;
PendingMasters::iterator found = pending_master_entries_.find(url);
DCHECK(found != pending_master_entries_.end());
PendingHosts& hosts = found->second;
if (response_code / 100 == 2) {
AppCache* cache = inprogress_cache_.get() ? inprogress_cache_.get()
: group_->newest_complete_cache();
DCHECK(fetcher->response_writer());
AppCacheEntry master_entry(AppCacheEntry::MASTER,
fetcher->response_writer()->response_id(),
fetcher->response_writer()->amount_written());
if (cache->AddOrModifyEntry(url, master_entry))
added_master_entries_.push_back(url);
else
duplicate_response_ids_.push_back(master_entry.response_id());
if (!inprogress_cache_.get()) {
DCHECK(cache == group_->newest_complete_cache());
for (PendingHosts::iterator host_it = hosts.begin();
host_it != hosts.end(); ++host_it) {
(*host_it)->AssociateCompleteCache(cache);
}
}
} else {
HostNotifier host_notifier;
for (PendingHosts::iterator host_it = hosts.begin();
host_it != hosts.end(); ++host_it) {
AppCacheHost* host = *host_it;
host_notifier.AddHost(host);
if (inprogress_cache_.get())
host->AssociateNoCache(GURL());
host->RemoveObserver(this);
}
hosts.clear();
const char* kFormatString = "Manifest fetch failed (%d) %s";
std::string message = FormatUrlErrorMessage(
kFormatString, request->url(), fetcher->result(), response_code);
host_notifier.SendErrorNotifications(
AppCacheErrorDetails(message,
APPCACHE_MANIFEST_ERROR,
request->url(),
response_code,
false /*is_cross_origin*/));
if (inprogress_cache_.get()) {
pending_master_entries_.erase(found);
--master_entries_completed_;
if (update_type_ == CACHE_ATTEMPT && pending_master_entries_.empty()) {
HandleCacheFailure(AppCacheErrorDetails(message,
APPCACHE_MANIFEST_ERROR,
request->url(),
response_code,
false /*is_cross_origin*/),
fetcher->result(),
GURL());
return;
}
}
}
DCHECK(internal_state_ != CACHE_FAILURE);
FetchMasterEntries();
MaybeCompleteUpdate();
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID: | void AppCacheUpdateJob::HandleMasterEntryFetchCompleted(
URLFetcher* fetcher) {
DCHECK(internal_state_ == NO_UPDATE || internal_state_ == DOWNLOADING);
net::URLRequest* request = fetcher->request();
const GURL& url = request->original_url();
master_entry_fetches_.erase(url);
++master_entries_completed_;
int response_code = request->status().is_success()
? request->GetResponseCode() : -1;
PendingMasters::iterator found = pending_master_entries_.find(url);
DCHECK(found != pending_master_entries_.end());
PendingHosts& hosts = found->second;
if (response_code / 100 == 2) {
AppCache* cache = inprogress_cache_.get() ? inprogress_cache_.get()
: group_->newest_complete_cache();
DCHECK(fetcher->response_writer());
AppCacheEntry master_entry(AppCacheEntry::MASTER,
fetcher->response_writer()->response_id(),
fetcher->response_writer()->amount_written());
if (cache->AddOrModifyEntry(url, master_entry))
added_master_entries_.push_back(url);
else
duplicate_response_ids_.push_back(master_entry.response_id());
if (!inprogress_cache_.get()) {
DCHECK(cache == group_->newest_complete_cache());
for (PendingHosts::iterator host_it = hosts.begin();
host_it != hosts.end(); ++host_it) {
(*host_it)->AssociateCompleteCache(cache);
}
}
} else {
HostNotifier host_notifier;
for (PendingHosts::iterator host_it = hosts.begin();
host_it != hosts.end(); ++host_it) {
AppCacheHost* host = *host_it;
host_notifier.AddHost(host);
if (inprogress_cache_.get())
host->AssociateNoCache(GURL());
host->RemoveObserver(this);
}
hosts.clear();
failed_master_entries_.insert(url);
const char* kFormatString = "Manifest fetch failed (%d) %s";
std::string message = FormatUrlErrorMessage(
kFormatString, request->url(), fetcher->result(), response_code);
host_notifier.SendErrorNotifications(
AppCacheErrorDetails(message,
APPCACHE_MANIFEST_ERROR,
request->url(),
response_code,
false /*is_cross_origin*/));
if (inprogress_cache_.get()) {
pending_master_entries_.erase(found);
--master_entries_completed_;
if (update_type_ == CACHE_ATTEMPT && pending_master_entries_.empty()) {
HandleCacheFailure(AppCacheErrorDetails(message,
APPCACHE_MANIFEST_ERROR,
request->url(),
response_code,
false /*is_cross_origin*/),
fetcher->result(),
GURL());
return;
}
}
}
DCHECK(internal_state_ != CACHE_FAILURE);
FetchMasterEntries();
MaybeCompleteUpdate();
}
| 171,732 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: AppCacheDispatcherHost::AppCacheDispatcherHost(
ChromeAppCacheService* appcache_service,
int process_id)
: BrowserMessageFilter(AppCacheMsgStart),
appcache_service_(appcache_service),
frontend_proxy_(this),
process_id_(process_id) {
}
Commit Message: AppCache: Use WeakPtr<> to fix a potential uaf bug.
BUG=554908
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1441683004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359930}
CWE ID: | AppCacheDispatcherHost::AppCacheDispatcherHost(
ChromeAppCacheService* appcache_service,
int process_id)
: BrowserMessageFilter(AppCacheMsgStart),
appcache_service_(appcache_service),
frontend_proxy_(this),
process_id_(process_id),
weak_factory_(this) {
}
| 171,744 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool GetNetworkList(NetworkInterfaceList* networks, int policy) {
if (networks == NULL)
return false;
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
ifaddrs* interfaces;
if (getifaddrs(&interfaces) < 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "getifaddrs";
return false;
}
std::unique_ptr<internal::IPAttributesGetter> ip_attributes_getter;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
ip_attributes_getter = base::MakeUnique<internal::IPAttributesGetterMac>();
#endif
bool result = internal::IfaddrsToNetworkInterfaceList(
policy, interfaces, ip_attributes_getter.get(), networks);
freeifaddrs(interfaces);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | bool GetNetworkList(NetworkInterfaceList* networks, int policy) {
if (networks == NULL)
return false;
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
ifaddrs* interfaces;
if (getifaddrs(&interfaces) < 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "getifaddrs";
return false;
}
std::unique_ptr<internal::IPAttributesGetter> ip_attributes_getter;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
ip_attributes_getter = std::make_unique<internal::IPAttributesGetterMac>();
#endif
bool result = internal::IfaddrsToNetworkInterfaceList(
policy, interfaces, ip_attributes_getter.get(), networks);
freeifaddrs(interfaces);
return result;
}
| 173,265 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
url_util::AddStandardScheme("tabcontentstest");
old_browser_client_ = content::GetContentClient()->browser();
content::GetContentClient()->set_browser(&browser_client_);
RenderViewHostTestHarness::SetUp();
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | virtual void SetUp() {
url_util::AddStandardScheme("tabcontentstest");
old_client_ = content::GetContentClient();
content::SetContentClient(&client_);
old_browser_client_ = content::GetContentClient()->browser();
content::GetContentClient()->set_browser(&browser_client_);
RenderViewHostTestHarness::SetUp();
}
| 171,014 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char **XGetFontPath(
register Display *dpy,
int *npaths) /* RETURN */
{
xGetFontPathReply rep;
unsigned long nbytes = 0;
char **flist = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (GetFontPath, req);
(void) _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse);
if (rep.nPaths) {
flist = Xmalloc(rep.nPaths * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
nbytes = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (nbytes + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((! flist) || (! ch)) {
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, nbytes);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + nbytes;
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nPaths; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
flist[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
flist[i] = NULL;
}
}
*npaths = count;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (flist);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | char **XGetFontPath(
register Display *dpy,
int *npaths) /* RETURN */
{
xGetFontPathReply rep;
unsigned long nbytes = 0;
char **flist = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (GetFontPath, req);
(void) _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse);
if (rep.nPaths) {
flist = Xmalloc(rep.nPaths * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
nbytes = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (nbytes + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((! flist) || (! ch)) {
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, nbytes);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + nbytes;
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nPaths; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
flist[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
flist[i] = NULL;
}
}
*npaths = count;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (flist);
}
| 164,745 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
fwd_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(0);
inv_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(1);
tx_type_ = GET_PARAM(2);
pitch_ = 8;
fwd_txfm_ref = fdct8x8_ref;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void SetUp() {
fwd_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(0);
inv_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(1);
tx_type_ = GET_PARAM(2);
pitch_ = 8;
fwd_txfm_ref = fdct8x8_ref;
bit_depth_ = GET_PARAM(3);
mask_ = (1 << bit_depth_) - 1;
}
| 174,562 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::isMultiSelectable() const {
const AtomicString& ariaMultiSelectable =
getAttribute(aria_multiselectableAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaMultiSelectable, "true"))
return true;
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaMultiSelectable, "false"))
return false;
return isHTMLSelectElement(getNode()) &&
toHTMLSelectElement(*getNode()).isMultiple();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool AXNodeObject::isMultiSelectable() const {
const AtomicString& ariaMultiSelectable =
getAttribute(aria_multiselectableAttr);
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(ariaMultiSelectable, "true"))
return true;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(ariaMultiSelectable, "false"))
return false;
return isHTMLSelectElement(getNode()) &&
toHTMLSelectElement(*getNode()).isMultiple();
}
| 171,917 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WarmupURLFetcher::WarmupURLFetcher(
CreateCustomProxyConfigCallback create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
WarmupURLFetcherCallback callback,
GetHttpRttCallback get_http_rtt_callback,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> ui_task_runner,
const std::string& user_agent)
: is_fetch_in_flight_(false),
previous_attempt_counts_(0),
create_custom_proxy_config_callback_(create_custom_proxy_config_callback),
callback_(callback),
get_http_rtt_callback_(get_http_rtt_callback),
user_agent_(user_agent),
ui_task_runner_(ui_task_runner) {
DCHECK(create_custom_proxy_config_callback);
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | WarmupURLFetcher::WarmupURLFetcher(
CreateCustomProxyConfigCallback create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
WarmupURLFetcherCallback callback,
GetHttpRttCallback get_http_rtt_callback,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> ui_task_runner,
const std::string& user_agent)
: is_fetch_in_flight_(false),
previous_attempt_counts_(0),
create_custom_proxy_config_callback_(create_custom_proxy_config_callback),
callback_(callback),
get_http_rtt_callback_(get_http_rtt_callback),
user_agent_(user_agent),
ui_task_runner_(ui_task_runner) {
DCHECK(create_custom_proxy_config_callback);
DCHECK(!params::IsIncludedInHoldbackFieldTrial());
}
| 172,426 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK
BUG_ON(task_stack_end_corrupted(prev));
#endif
if (unlikely(in_atomic_preempt_off())) {
__schedule_bug(prev);
preempt_count_set(PREEMPT_DISABLED);
}
rcu_sleep_check();
profile_hit(SCHED_PROFILING, __builtin_return_address(0));
schedstat_inc(this_rq(), sched_count);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK
if (task_stack_end_corrupted(prev))
panic("corrupted stack end detected inside scheduler\n");
#endif
if (unlikely(in_atomic_preempt_off())) {
__schedule_bug(prev);
preempt_count_set(PREEMPT_DISABLED);
}
rcu_sleep_check();
profile_hit(SCHED_PROFILING, __builtin_return_address(0));
schedstat_inc(this_rq(), sched_count);
}
| 167,445 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int find_high_bit(unsigned int x)
{
int i;
for(i=31;i>=0;i--) {
if(x&(1<<i)) return i;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682 | static int find_high_bit(unsigned int x)
{
int i;
for(i=31;i>=0;i--) {
if(x&(1U<<(unsigned int)i)) return i;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,194 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabledModuleSystem(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(args.Length(), 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsFunction());
v8::Local<v8::Value> call_with_args[] = {
context()->module_system()->NewInstance()};
ModuleSystem::NativesEnabledScope natives_enabled(context()->module_system());
context()->CallFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(args[0]), 1,
call_with_args);
}
Commit Message: Add a test that getModuleSystem() doesn't work cross origin
BUG=504011
R=kalman@chromium.org
TBR=fukino@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1241443004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabledModuleSystem(
void V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabled(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(args.Length(), 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsFunction());
ModuleSystem::NativesEnabledScope natives_enabled(context()->module_system());
context()->CallFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(args[0]));
}
| 171,948 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ContextualSearchFieldTrial::IsNowOnTapBarIntegrationEnabled() {
return GetBooleanParam(
switches::kEnableContextualSearchNowOnTapBarIntegration,
&is_now_on_tap_bar_integration_enabled_cached_,
&is_now_on_tap_bar_integration_enabled_);
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | bool ContextualSearchFieldTrial::IsNowOnTapBarIntegrationEnabled() {
bool ContextualSearchFieldTrial::IsContextualCardsBarIntegrationEnabled() {
return GetBooleanParam(
switches::kEnableContextualSearchContextualCardsBarIntegration,
&is_contextual_cards_bar_integration_enabled_cached_,
&is_contextual_cards_bar_integration_enabled_);
}
| 171,644 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bmexec_trans (kwset_t kwset, char const *text, size_t size)
{
unsigned char const *d1;
char const *ep, *sp, *tp;
int d;
int len = kwset->mind;
char const *trans = kwset->trans;
if (len == 0)
return 0;
if (len > size)
return -1;
if (len == 1)
{
tp = memchr_kwset (text, size, kwset);
return tp ? tp - text : -1;
}
d1 = kwset->delta;
sp = kwset->target + len;
tp = text + len;
char gc1 = kwset->gc1;
char gc2 = kwset->gc2;
/* Significance of 12: 1 (initial offset) + 10 (skip loop) + 1 (md2). */
if (size > 12 * len)
/* 11 is not a bug, the initial offset happens only once. */
for (ep = text + size - 11 * len; tp <= ep; )
{
char const *tp0 = tp;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
if (d != 0)
{
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
if (d != 0)
{
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
if (d != 0)
{
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
/* As a heuristic, prefer memchr to seeking by
delta1 when the latter doesn't advance much. */
int advance_heuristic = 16 * sizeof (long);
if (advance_heuristic <= tp - tp0)
goto big_advance;
tp--;
tp = memchr_kwset (tp, text + size - tp, kwset);
if (! tp)
return -1;
tp++;
}
}
}
big_advance:;
}
/* Now we have only a few characters left to search. We
carefully avoid ever producing an out-of-bounds pointer. */
ep = text + size;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])];
while (d <= ep - tp)
{
d = d1[U((tp += d)[-1])];
if (d != 0)
continue;
if (bm_delta2_search (&tp, ep, sp, len, trans, gc1, gc2, NULL, kwset))
return tp - text;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bmexec_trans (kwset_t kwset, char const *text, size_t size)
{
unsigned char const *d1;
char const *ep, *sp, *tp;
int d;
int len = kwset->mind;
char const *trans = kwset->trans;
if (len == 0)
return 0;
if (len > size)
return -1;
if (len == 1)
{
tp = memchr_kwset (text, size, kwset);
return tp ? tp - text : -1;
}
d1 = kwset->delta;
sp = kwset->target + len;
tp = text + len;
char gc1 = kwset->gc1;
char gc2 = kwset->gc2;
/* Significance of 12: 1 (initial offset) + 10 (skip loop) + 1 (md2). */
if (size > 12 * len)
/* 11 is not a bug, the initial offset happens only once. */
for (ep = text + size - 11 * len; tp <= ep; )
{
char const *tp0 = tp;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
if (d != 0)
{
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
if (d != 0)
{
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
if (d != 0)
{
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
/* As a heuristic, prefer memchr to seeking by
delta1 when the latter doesn't advance much. */
int advance_heuristic = 16 * sizeof (long);
if (advance_heuristic <= tp - tp0)
goto big_advance;
tp--;
tp = memchr_kwset (tp, text + size - tp, kwset);
if (! tp)
return -1;
tp++;
if (ep <= tp)
break;
}
}
}
big_advance:;
}
/* Now we have only a few characters left to search. We
carefully avoid ever producing an out-of-bounds pointer. */
ep = text + size;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])];
while (d <= ep - tp)
{
d = d1[U((tp += d)[-1])];
if (d != 0)
continue;
if (bm_delta2_search (&tp, ep, sp, len, trans, gc1, gc2, NULL, kwset))
return tp - text;
}
return -1;
}
| 164,771 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
bitRate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
bitRate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *h263type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *)params;
if (h263type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
h263type->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
h263type->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_H263ProfileBaseline;
h263type->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_H263Level45;
h263type->bPLUSPTYPEAllowed = OMX_FALSE;
h263type->bForceRoundingTypeToZero = OMX_FALSE;
h263type->nPictureHeaderRepetition = 0;
h263type->nGOBHeaderInterval = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *mpeg4type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *)params;
if (mpeg4type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mpeg4type->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileCore;
mpeg4type->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4Level2;
mpeg4type->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
mpeg4type->nBFrames = 0;
mpeg4type->nIDCVLCThreshold = 0;
mpeg4type->bACPred = OMX_TRUE;
mpeg4type->nMaxPacketSize = 256;
mpeg4type->nTimeIncRes = 1000;
mpeg4type->nHeaderExtension = 0;
mpeg4type->bReversibleVLC = OMX_FALSE;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(bitRate)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
bitRate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
bitRate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *h263type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(h263type)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (h263type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
h263type->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
h263type->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_H263ProfileBaseline;
h263type->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_H263Level45;
h263type->bPLUSPTYPEAllowed = OMX_FALSE;
h263type->bForceRoundingTypeToZero = OMX_FALSE;
h263type->nPictureHeaderRepetition = 0;
h263type->nGOBHeaderInterval = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *mpeg4type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(mpeg4type)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (mpeg4type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mpeg4type->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileCore;
mpeg4type->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4Level2;
mpeg4type->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
mpeg4type->nBFrames = 0;
mpeg4type->nIDCVLCThreshold = 0;
mpeg4type->bACPred = OMX_TRUE;
mpeg4type->nMaxPacketSize = 256;
mpeg4type->nTimeIncRes = 1000;
mpeg4type->nHeaderExtension = 0;
mpeg4type->bReversibleVLC = OMX_FALSE;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,209 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: HRESULT WaitForLoginUIAndGetResult(
CGaiaCredentialBase::UIProcessInfo* uiprocinfo,
std::string* json_result,
DWORD* exit_code,
BSTR* status_text) {
LOGFN(INFO);
DCHECK(uiprocinfo);
DCHECK(json_result);
DCHECK(exit_code);
DCHECK(status_text);
const int kBufferSize = 4096;
std::vector<char> output_buffer(kBufferSize, '\0');
base::ScopedClosureRunner zero_buffer_on_exit(
base::BindOnce(base::IgnoreResult(&RtlSecureZeroMemory),
&output_buffer[0], kBufferSize));
HRESULT hr = WaitForProcess(uiprocinfo->procinfo.process_handle(),
uiprocinfo->parent_handles, exit_code,
&output_buffer[0], kBufferSize);
LOGFN(INFO) << "exit_code=" << exit_code;
if (*exit_code == kUiecAbort) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Aborted hr=" << putHR(hr);
return E_ABORT;
} else if (*exit_code != kUiecSuccess) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Error hr=" << putHR(hr);
*status_text =
CGaiaCredentialBase::AllocErrorString(IDS_INVALID_UI_RESPONSE_BASE);
return E_FAIL;
}
*json_result = std::string(&output_buffer[0]);
return S_OK;
}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | HRESULT WaitForLoginUIAndGetResult(
CGaiaCredentialBase::UIProcessInfo* uiprocinfo,
std::string* json_result,
DWORD* exit_code,
BSTR* status_text) {
LOGFN(INFO);
DCHECK(uiprocinfo);
DCHECK(json_result);
DCHECK(exit_code);
DCHECK(status_text);
const int kBufferSize = 4096;
std::vector<char> output_buffer(kBufferSize, '\0');
base::ScopedClosureRunner zero_buffer_on_exit(
base::BindOnce(base::IgnoreResult(&RtlSecureZeroMemory),
&output_buffer[0], kBufferSize));
HRESULT hr = WaitForProcess(uiprocinfo->procinfo.process_handle(),
uiprocinfo->parent_handles, exit_code,
&output_buffer[0], kBufferSize);
LOGFN(INFO) << "exit_code=" << *exit_code;
if (*exit_code == kUiecAbort) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Aborted hr=" << putHR(hr);
return E_ABORT;
} else if (*exit_code != kUiecSuccess) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Error hr=" << putHR(hr);
*status_text =
CGaiaCredentialBase::AllocErrorString(IDS_INVALID_UI_RESPONSE_BASE);
return E_FAIL;
}
*json_result = std::string(&output_buffer[0]);
return S_OK;
}
| 172,102 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ZeroSuggestProvider::Start(const AutocompleteInput& input,
bool minimal_changes) {
TRACE_EVENT0("omnibox", "ZeroSuggestProvider::Start");
matches_.clear();
if (!input.from_omnibox_focus() || client()->IsOffTheRecord() ||
input.type() == metrics::OmniboxInputType::INVALID)
return;
Stop(true, false);
set_field_trial_triggered(false);
set_field_trial_triggered_in_session(false);
results_from_cache_ = false;
permanent_text_ = input.text();
current_query_ = input.current_url().spec();
current_title_ = input.current_title();
current_page_classification_ = input.current_page_classification();
current_url_match_ = MatchForCurrentURL();
std::string url_string = GetContextualSuggestionsUrl();
GURL suggest_url(url_string);
if (!suggest_url.is_valid())
return;
const TemplateURLService* template_url_service =
client()->GetTemplateURLService();
const TemplateURL* default_provider =
template_url_service->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
const bool can_send_current_url =
CanSendURL(input.current_url(), suggest_url, default_provider,
current_page_classification_,
template_url_service->search_terms_data(), client());
GURL arbitrary_insecure_url(kArbitraryInsecureUrlString);
ZeroSuggestEligibility eligibility = ZeroSuggestEligibility::ELIGIBLE;
if (!can_send_current_url) {
const bool can_send_ordinary_url =
CanSendURL(arbitrary_insecure_url, suggest_url, default_provider,
current_page_classification_,
template_url_service->search_terms_data(), client());
eligibility = can_send_ordinary_url
? ZeroSuggestEligibility::URL_INELIGIBLE
: ZeroSuggestEligibility::GENERALLY_INELIGIBLE;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
"Omnibox.ZeroSuggest.Eligible.OnFocus", static_cast<int>(eligibility),
static_cast<int>(ZeroSuggestEligibility::ELIGIBLE_MAX_VALUE));
if (can_send_current_url &&
!OmniboxFieldTrial::InZeroSuggestPersonalizedFieldTrial() &&
!OmniboxFieldTrial::InZeroSuggestMostVisitedFieldTrial()) {
if (OmniboxFieldTrial::InZeroSuggestRedirectToChromeFieldTrial()) {
url_string +=
"/url=" + net::EscapePath(current_query_) +
OmniboxFieldTrial::ZeroSuggestRedirectToChromeAdditionalFields();
suggest_url = GURL(url_string);
} else {
base::string16 prefix;
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs search_term_args(prefix);
search_term_args.current_page_url = current_query_;
suggest_url =
GURL(default_provider->suggestions_url_ref().ReplaceSearchTerms(
search_term_args, template_url_service->search_terms_data()));
}
} else if (!ShouldShowNonContextualZeroSuggest(input.current_url())) {
return;
}
done_ = false;
MaybeUseCachedSuggestions();
Run(suggest_url);
}
Commit Message: Provide experimental contextual suggestions when current URL comes from a google domain.
The counts for the Omnibox.ZeroSuggestRequests historgram are 35% smaller for groups that are running under the ZeroSuggestRedirectToChrome flag. Note that previous to this CL, a request was not made when the user was visiting an HTTPS page and the domain of the current was different from that of the service providing zero suggestions. This CL addresses this restrictions by making sure that requests are sent to the experimental service when Google is the default search engine AND the same request was validated to be sent to Google.
BUG=692471
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2915163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#476786}
CWE ID: | void ZeroSuggestProvider::Start(const AutocompleteInput& input,
bool minimal_changes) {
TRACE_EVENT0("omnibox", "ZeroSuggestProvider::Start");
matches_.clear();
if (!input.from_omnibox_focus() || client()->IsOffTheRecord() ||
input.type() == metrics::OmniboxInputType::INVALID)
return;
Stop(true, false);
set_field_trial_triggered(false);
set_field_trial_triggered_in_session(false);
results_from_cache_ = false;
permanent_text_ = input.text();
current_query_ = input.current_url().spec();
current_title_ = input.current_title();
current_page_classification_ = input.current_page_classification();
current_url_match_ = MatchForCurrentURL();
GURL suggest_url(GetContextualSuggestionsUrl());
if (!suggest_url.is_valid())
return;
const TemplateURLService* template_url_service =
client()->GetTemplateURLService();
const TemplateURL* default_provider =
template_url_service->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
const bool can_send_current_url =
CanSendURL(input.current_url(), suggest_url, default_provider,
current_page_classification_,
template_url_service->search_terms_data(), client());
GURL arbitrary_insecure_url(kArbitraryInsecureUrlString);
ZeroSuggestEligibility eligibility = ZeroSuggestEligibility::ELIGIBLE;
if (!can_send_current_url) {
const bool can_send_ordinary_url =
CanSendURL(arbitrary_insecure_url, suggest_url, default_provider,
current_page_classification_,
template_url_service->search_terms_data(), client());
eligibility = can_send_ordinary_url
? ZeroSuggestEligibility::URL_INELIGIBLE
: ZeroSuggestEligibility::GENERALLY_INELIGIBLE;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
"Omnibox.ZeroSuggest.Eligible.OnFocus", static_cast<int>(eligibility),
static_cast<int>(ZeroSuggestEligibility::ELIGIBLE_MAX_VALUE));
if (can_send_current_url &&
!OmniboxFieldTrial::InZeroSuggestPersonalizedFieldTrial() &&
!OmniboxFieldTrial::InZeroSuggestMostVisitedFieldTrial()) {
if (UseExperimentalSuggestService(*template_url_service)) {
suggest_url = GURL(
OmniboxFieldTrial::ZeroSuggestRedirectToChromeServerAddress() +
"/url=" + net::EscapePath(current_query_) +
OmniboxFieldTrial::ZeroSuggestRedirectToChromeAdditionalFields());
} else {
base::string16 prefix;
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs search_term_args(prefix);
search_term_args.current_page_url = current_query_;
suggest_url =
GURL(default_provider->suggestions_url_ref().ReplaceSearchTerms(
search_term_args, template_url_service->search_terms_data()));
}
} else if (!ShouldShowNonContextualZeroSuggest(input.current_url())) {
return;
}
done_ = false;
MaybeUseCachedSuggestions();
Run(suggest_url);
}
| 172,013 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ext2_xattr_cache_find(struct inode *inode, struct ext2_xattr_header *header)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(header->h_hash);
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
if (!header->h_hash)
return NULL; /* never share */
ea_idebug(inode, "looking for cached blocks [%x]", (int)hash);
again:
ce = mb_cache_entry_find_first(ext2_xattr_cache, inode->i_sb->s_bdev,
hash);
while (ce) {
struct buffer_head *bh;
if (IS_ERR(ce)) {
if (PTR_ERR(ce) == -EAGAIN)
goto again;
break;
}
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, ce->e_block);
if (!bh) {
ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_cache_find",
"inode %ld: block %ld read error",
inode->i_ino, (unsigned long) ce->e_block);
} else {
lock_buffer(bh);
if (le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount) >
EXT2_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX) {
ea_idebug(inode, "block %ld refcount %d>%d",
(unsigned long) ce->e_block,
le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount),
EXT2_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX);
} else if (!ext2_xattr_cmp(header, HDR(bh))) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)));
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
return bh;
}
unlock_buffer(bh);
brelse(bh);
}
ce = mb_cache_entry_find_next(ce, inode->i_sb->s_bdev, hash);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | ext2_xattr_cache_find(struct inode *inode, struct ext2_xattr_header *header)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(header->h_hash);
struct mb2_cache_entry *ce;
struct mb2_cache *ext2_mb_cache = EXT2_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_mb_cache;
if (!header->h_hash)
return NULL; /* never share */
ea_idebug(inode, "looking for cached blocks [%x]", (int)hash);
again:
ce = mb2_cache_entry_find_first(ext2_mb_cache, hash);
while (ce) {
struct buffer_head *bh;
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, ce->e_block);
if (!bh) {
ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_cache_find",
"inode %ld: block %ld read error",
inode->i_ino, (unsigned long) ce->e_block);
} else {
lock_buffer(bh);
/*
* We have to be careful about races with freeing or
* rehashing of xattr block. Once we hold buffer lock
* xattr block's state is stable so we can check
* whether the block got freed / rehashed or not.
* Since we unhash mbcache entry under buffer lock when
* freeing / rehashing xattr block, checking whether
* entry is still hashed is reliable.
*/
if (hlist_bl_unhashed(&ce->e_hash_list)) {
mb2_cache_entry_put(ext2_mb_cache, ce);
unlock_buffer(bh);
brelse(bh);
goto again;
} else if (le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount) >
EXT2_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX) {
ea_idebug(inode, "block %ld refcount %d>%d",
(unsigned long) ce->e_block,
le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount),
EXT2_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX);
} else if (!ext2_xattr_cmp(header, HDR(bh))) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)));
mb2_cache_entry_touch(ext2_mb_cache, ce);
mb2_cache_entry_put(ext2_mb_cache, ce);
return bh;
}
unlock_buffer(bh);
brelse(bh);
}
ce = mb2_cache_entry_find_next(ext2_mb_cache, ce);
}
return NULL;
}
| 169,977 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
int i, j;
unsigned int total = 0;
*outl = 0;
if (inl <= 0)
return;
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
if ((ctx->num + inl) < ctx->length) {
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, inl);
ctx->num += inl;
return;
}
if (ctx->num != 0) {
i = ctx->length - ctx->num;
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, i);
in += i;
inl -= i;
j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->length);
ctx->num = 0;
out += j;
*(out++) = '\n';
*out = '\0';
total = j + 1;
}
while (inl >= ctx->length) {
j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, in, ctx->length);
in += ctx->length;
inl -= ctx->length;
out += j;
*(out++) = '\n';
*out = '\0';
total += j + 1;
}
if (inl != 0)
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[0]), in, inl);
ctx->num = inl;
*outl = total;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
int i, j;
unsigned int total = 0;
*outl = 0;
if (inl <= 0)
return;
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
if (ctx->length - ctx->num > inl) {
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, inl);
ctx->num += inl;
return;
}
if (ctx->num != 0) {
i = ctx->length - ctx->num;
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, i);
in += i;
inl -= i;
j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->length);
ctx->num = 0;
out += j;
*(out++) = '\n';
*out = '\0';
total = j + 1;
}
while (inl >= ctx->length) {
j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, in, ctx->length);
in += ctx->length;
inl -= ctx->length;
out += j;
*(out++) = '\n';
*out = '\0';
total += j + 1;
}
if (inl != 0)
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[0]), in, inl);
ctx->num = inl;
*outl = total;
}
| 165,217 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserTabStripController::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents,
int model_index) {
hover_tab_selector_.CancelTabTransition();
tabstrip_->RemoveTabAt(model_index);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void BrowserTabStripController::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents,
void BrowserTabStripController::TabDetachedAt(WebContents* contents,
int model_index) {
hover_tab_selector_.CancelTabTransition();
tabstrip_->RemoveTabAt(model_index);
}
| 171,523 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void UpdatePropertyHandler(
void* object, const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->UpdateProperty(prop_list);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void UpdatePropertyHandler(
// IBusController override.
virtual void OnUpdateImeProperty(
const input_method::ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
UpdateProperty(prop_list);
}
| 170,510 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: prep_reprocess_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_principal *krbtgt_princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
char **realms, **cpp, *temp_buf=NULL;
krb5_data *comp1 = NULL, *comp2 = NULL;
char *comp1_str = NULL;
/* By now we know that server principal name is unknown.
* If CANONICALIZE flag is set in the request
* If req is not U2U authn. req
* the requested server princ. has exactly two components
* either
* the name type is NT-SRV-HST
* or name type is NT-UNKNOWN and
* the 1st component is listed in conf file under host_based_services
* the 1st component is not in a list in conf under "no_host_referral"
* the 2d component looks like fully-qualified domain name (FQDN)
* If all of these conditions are satisfied - try mapping the FQDN and
* re-process the request as if client had asked for cross-realm TGT.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE) &&
!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) &&
krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
comp1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 0);
comp2 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1);
comp1_str = calloc(1,comp1->length+1);
if (!comp1_str) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
strlcpy(comp1_str,comp1->data,comp1->length+1);
if ((krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_HST ||
krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_INST ||
(krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN &&
kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services != NULL &&
(krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services,
comp1_str) == TRUE ||
krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services,
KRB5_CONF_ASTERISK) == TRUE))) &&
(kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral == NULL ||
(krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral,
KRB5_CONF_ASTERISK) == FALSE &&
krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral,
comp1_str) == FALSE))) {
if (memchr(comp2->data, '.', comp2->length) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
temp_buf = calloc(1, comp2->length+1);
if (!temp_buf) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
strlcpy(temp_buf, comp2->data,comp2->length+1);
retval = krb5int_get_domain_realm_mapping(kdc_context, temp_buf, &realms);
free(temp_buf);
if (retval) {
/* no match found */
kdc_err(kdc_context, retval, "unable to find realm of host");
goto cleanup;
}
if (realms == 0) {
retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Don't return a referral to the null realm or the service
* realm. */
if (realms[0] == 0 ||
data_eq_string(request->server->realm, realms[0])) {
free(realms[0]);
free(realms);
retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Modify request.
* Construct cross-realm tgt : krbtgt/REMOTE_REALM@LOCAL_REALM
* and use it as a principal in this req.
*/
retval = krb5_build_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ,
(*request->server).realm.length,
(*request->server).realm.data,
"krbtgt", realms[0], (char *)0);
for (cpp = realms; *cpp; cpp++)
free(*cpp);
}
}
cleanup:
free(comp1_str);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: KDC TGS-REQ null deref [CVE-2013-1416]
By sending an unusual but valid TGS-REQ, an authenticated remote
attacker can cause the KDC process to crash by dereferencing a null
pointer.
prep_reprocess_req() can cause a null pointer dereference when
processing a service principal name. Code in this function can
inappropriately pass a null pointer to strlcpy(). Unmodified client
software can trivially trigger this vulnerability, but the attacker
must have already authenticated and received a valid Kerberos ticket.
The vulnerable code was introduced by the implementation of new
service principal realm referral functionality in krb5-1.7, but was
corrected as a side effect of the KDC refactoring in krb5-1.11.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 7600 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.5
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-119 | prep_reprocess_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_principal *krbtgt_princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
char **realms, **cpp, *temp_buf=NULL;
krb5_data *comp1 = NULL, *comp2 = NULL;
char *comp1_str = NULL;
/* By now we know that server principal name is unknown.
* If CANONICALIZE flag is set in the request
* If req is not U2U authn. req
* the requested server princ. has exactly two components
* either
* the name type is NT-SRV-HST
* or name type is NT-UNKNOWN and
* the 1st component is listed in conf file under host_based_services
* the 1st component is not in a list in conf under "no_host_referral"
* the 2d component looks like fully-qualified domain name (FQDN)
* If all of these conditions are satisfied - try mapping the FQDN and
* re-process the request as if client had asked for cross-realm TGT.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE) &&
!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) &&
krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
comp1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 0);
comp2 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1);
comp1_str = calloc(1,comp1->length+1);
if (!comp1_str) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if (comp1->data != NULL)
memcpy(comp1_str, comp1->data, comp1->length);
if ((krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_HST ||
krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_INST ||
(krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN &&
kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services != NULL &&
(krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services,
comp1_str) == TRUE ||
krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services,
KRB5_CONF_ASTERISK) == TRUE))) &&
(kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral == NULL ||
(krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral,
KRB5_CONF_ASTERISK) == FALSE &&
krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral,
comp1_str) == FALSE))) {
if (memchr(comp2->data, '.', comp2->length) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
temp_buf = calloc(1, comp2->length+1);
if (!temp_buf) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if (comp2->data != NULL)
memcpy(temp_buf, comp2->data, comp2->length);
retval = krb5int_get_domain_realm_mapping(kdc_context, temp_buf, &realms);
free(temp_buf);
if (retval) {
/* no match found */
kdc_err(kdc_context, retval, "unable to find realm of host");
goto cleanup;
}
if (realms == 0) {
retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Don't return a referral to the null realm or the service
* realm. */
if (realms[0] == 0 ||
data_eq_string(request->server->realm, realms[0])) {
free(realms[0]);
free(realms);
retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Modify request.
* Construct cross-realm tgt : krbtgt/REMOTE_REALM@LOCAL_REALM
* and use it as a principal in this req.
*/
retval = krb5_build_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ,
(*request->server).realm.length,
(*request->server).realm.data,
"krbtgt", realms[0], (char *)0);
for (cpp = realms; *cpp; cpp++)
free(*cpp);
}
}
cleanup:
free(comp1_str);
return retval;
}
| 166,132 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void comps_rtree_unite(COMPS_RTree *rt1, COMPS_RTree *rt2) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it;
struct Pair {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
char * key;
char added;
} *pair, *parent_pair;
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = rt2->subnodes;
pair->key = NULL;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, &free);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = ((struct Pair*)it->data)->subnodes;
parent_pair = (struct Pair*) it->data;
free(it);
for (it = tmp_subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
if (parent_pair->key != NULL) {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)
* (strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key)
+ strlen(parent_pair->key) + 1));
memcpy(pair->key, parent_pair->key,
sizeof(char) * strlen(parent_pair->key));
memcpy(pair->key + strlen(parent_pair->key),
((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
} else {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)*
(strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key) +1));
memcpy(pair->key, ((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
}
/* current node has data */
if (((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->data != NULL) {
comps_rtree_set(rt1,
pair->key,
rt2->data_cloner(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->data));
}
if (((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
}
free(parent_pair->key);
free(parent_pair);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void comps_rtree_unite(COMPS_RTree *rt1, COMPS_RTree *rt2) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it;
struct Pair {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
char * key;
} *pair, *parent_pair;
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = rt2->subnodes;
pair->key = NULL;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, &free);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = ((struct Pair*)it->data)->subnodes;
parent_pair = (struct Pair*) it->data;
free(it);
for (it = tmp_subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
if (parent_pair->key != NULL) {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)
* (strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key)
+ strlen(parent_pair->key) + 1));
memcpy(pair->key, parent_pair->key,
sizeof(char) * strlen(parent_pair->key));
memcpy(pair->key + strlen(parent_pair->key),
((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
} else {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)*
(strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key) +1));
memcpy(pair->key, ((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
}
/* current node has data */
if (((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->data != NULL) {
comps_rtree_set(rt1,
pair->key,
rt2->data_cloner(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->data));
}
if (((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
}
free(parent_pair->key);
free(parent_pair);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
}
| 169,753 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static unsigned HuffmanTree_makeFromFrequencies(HuffmanTree* tree, const unsigned* frequencies,
size_t mincodes, size_t numcodes, unsigned maxbitlen)
{
unsigned error = 0;
while(!frequencies[numcodes - 1] && numcodes > mincodes) numcodes--; /*trim zeroes*/
tree->maxbitlen = maxbitlen;
tree->numcodes = (unsigned)numcodes; /*number of symbols*/
tree->lengths = (unsigned*)realloc(tree->lengths, numcodes * sizeof(unsigned));
if(!tree->lengths) return 83; /*alloc fail*/
/*initialize all lengths to 0*/
memset(tree->lengths, 0, numcodes * sizeof(unsigned));
error = lodepng_huffman_code_lengths(tree->lengths, frequencies, numcodes, maxbitlen);
if(!error) error = HuffmanTree_makeFromLengths2(tree);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | static unsigned HuffmanTree_makeFromFrequencies(HuffmanTree* tree, const unsigned* frequencies,
size_t mincodes, size_t numcodes, unsigned maxbitlen)
{
unsigned* lengths;
unsigned error = 0;
while(!frequencies[numcodes - 1] && numcodes > mincodes) numcodes--; /*trim zeroes*/
tree->maxbitlen = maxbitlen;
tree->numcodes = (unsigned)numcodes; /*number of symbols*/
lengths = (unsigned*)realloc(tree->lengths, numcodes * sizeof(unsigned));
if (!lengths)
free(tree->lengths);
tree->lengths = lengths;
if(!tree->lengths) return 83; /*alloc fail*/
/*initialize all lengths to 0*/
memset(tree->lengths, 0, numcodes * sizeof(unsigned));
error = lodepng_huffman_code_lengths(tree->lengths, frequencies, numcodes, maxbitlen);
if(!error) error = HuffmanTree_makeFromLengths2(tree);
return error;
}
| 169,499 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dissect_spoolss_keybuffer(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
guint32 size;
int end_offset;
if (di->conformant_run)
return offset;
/* Dissect size and data */
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_keybuffer_size, &size);
end_offset = offset + (size*2);
if (end_offset < offset) {
/*
* Overflow - make the end offset one past the end of
* the packet data, so we throw an exception (as the
* size is almost certainly too big).
*/
end_offset = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) + 1;
}
while (offset < end_offset)
offset = dissect_spoolss_uint16uni(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, drep, NULL, hf_keybuffer);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | dissect_spoolss_keybuffer(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
guint32 size;
int end_offset;
if (di->conformant_run)
return offset;
/* Dissect size and data */
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_keybuffer_size, &size);
end_offset = offset + (size*2);
if (end_offset < offset) {
/*
* Overflow - make the end offset one past the end of
* the packet data, so we throw an exception (as the
* size is almost certainly too big).
*/
end_offset = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) + 1;
}
while (offset > 0 && offset < end_offset) {
offset = dissect_spoolss_uint16uni(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, drep, NULL, hf_keybuffer);
}
return offset;
}
| 167,159 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeMetricsServiceClient::RegisterUKMProviders() {
ukm_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::NetworkMetricsProvider>(
content::CreateNetworkConnectionTrackerAsyncGetter(),
std::make_unique<metrics::NetworkQualityEstimatorProviderImpl>()));
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ukm_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<ChromeOSMetricsProvider>());
#endif // !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ukm_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<variations::FieldTrialsProvider>(nullptr,
kUKMFieldTrialSuffix));
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void ChromeMetricsServiceClient::RegisterUKMProviders() {
ukm_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::NetworkMetricsProvider>(
content::CreateNetworkConnectionTrackerAsyncGetter(),
std::make_unique<metrics::NetworkQualityEstimatorProviderImpl>()));
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ukm_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<ChromeOSMetricsProvider>());
#endif // !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::GPUMetricsProvider>());
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::CPUMetricsProvider>());
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::ScreenInfoMetricsProvider>());
ukm_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<variations::FieldTrialsProvider>(nullptr,
kUKMFieldTrialSuffix));
}
| 172,071 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Value> V8Debugger::functionScopes(v8::Local<v8::Function> function)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Local<v8::Value>::New(m_isolate, v8::Undefined(m_isolate));
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { function };
v8::Local<v8::Value> scopesValue;
if (!callDebuggerMethod("getFunctionScopes", 1, argv).ToLocal(&scopesValue) || !scopesValue->IsArray())
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Value>();
v8::Local<v8::Array> scopes = scopesValue.As<v8::Array>();
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = m_debuggerContext.Get(m_isolate);
if (!markAsInternal(context, scopes, V8InternalValueType::kScopeList))
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Value>();
if (!markArrayEntriesAsInternal(context, scopes, V8InternalValueType::kScope))
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Value>();
if (!scopes->SetPrototype(context, v8::Null(m_isolate)).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
return scopes;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Value> V8Debugger::functionScopes(v8::Local<v8::Function> function)
v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Value> V8Debugger::functionScopes(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Function> function)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Local<v8::Value>::New(m_isolate, v8::Undefined(m_isolate));
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { function };
v8::Local<v8::Value> scopesValue;
if (!callDebuggerMethod("getFunctionScopes", 1, argv).ToLocal(&scopesValue))
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Value>();
v8::Local<v8::Value> copied;
if (!copyValueFromDebuggerContext(m_isolate, debuggerContext(), context, scopesValue).ToLocal(&copied) || !copied->IsArray())
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Value>();
if (!markAsInternal(context, v8::Local<v8::Array>::Cast(copied), V8InternalValueType::kScopeList))
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Value>();
if (!markArrayEntriesAsInternal(context, v8::Local<v8::Array>::Cast(copied), V8InternalValueType::kScope))
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Value>();
return copied;
}
| 172,066 |
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