instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xfs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int error = 0;
if (!acl)
goto set_acl;
error = -E2BIG;
if (acl->a_count > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES(XFS_M(inode->i_sb)))
return error;
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
if (error <= 0) {
acl = NULL;
if (error < 0)
return error;
}
error = xfs_set_mode(inode, mode);
if (error)
return error;
}
set_acl:
return __xfs_set_acl(inode, type, acl);
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | xfs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int error = 0;
if (!acl)
goto set_acl;
error = -E2BIG;
if (acl->a_count > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES(XFS_M(inode->i_sb)))
return error;
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
umode_t mode;
error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &mode, &acl);
if (error)
return error;
error = xfs_set_mode(inode, mode);
if (error)
return error;
}
set_acl:
return __xfs_set_acl(inode, type, acl);
}
| 166,979 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool PPB_ImageData_Impl::Init(PP_ImageDataFormat format,
int width, int height,
bool init_to_zero) {
if (!IsImageDataFormatSupported(format))
return false; // Only support this one format for now.
if (width <= 0 || height <= 0)
return false;
if (static_cast<int64>(width) * static_cast<int64>(height) * 4 >=
std::numeric_limits<int32>::max())
return false; // Prevent overflow of signed 32-bit ints.
format_ = format;
width_ = width;
height_ = height;
return backend_->Init(this, format, width, height, init_to_zero);
}
Commit Message: Security fix: integer overflow on checking image size
Test is left in another CL (codereview.chromiu,.org/11274036) to avoid conflict there. Hope it's fine.
BUG=160926
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11410081
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167882 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-190 | bool PPB_ImageData_Impl::Init(PP_ImageDataFormat format,
int width, int height,
bool init_to_zero) {
if (!IsImageDataFormatSupported(format))
return false; // Only support this one format for now.
if (width <= 0 || height <= 0)
return false;
if (static_cast<int64>(width) * static_cast<int64>(height) >=
std::numeric_limits<int32>::max() / 4)
return false; // Prevent overflow of signed 32-bit ints.
format_ = format;
width_ = width;
height_ = height;
return backend_->Init(this, format, width, height, init_to_zero);
}
| 170,672 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: test_size(png_modifier* PNG_CONST pm, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
int bdlo, int PNG_CONST bdhi)
{
/* Run the tests on each combination.
*
* NOTE: on my 32 bit x86 each of the following blocks takes
* a total of 3.5 seconds if done across every combo of bit depth
* width and height. This is a waste of time in practice, hence the
* hinc and winc stuff:
*/
static PNG_CONST png_byte hinc[] = {1, 3, 11, 1, 5};
static PNG_CONST png_byte winc[] = {1, 9, 5, 7, 1};
for (; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo)
{
png_uint_32 h, w;
for (h=1; h<=16; h+=hinc[bdlo]) for (w=1; w<=16; w+=winc[bdlo])
{
/* First test all the 'size' images against the sequential
* reader using libpng to deinterlace (where required.) This
* validates the write side of libpng. There are four possibilities
* to validate.
*/
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, w, h, 0), 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, w, h, 1), 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 0), 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 1), 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
# endif
/* Now validate the interlaced read side - do_interlace true,
* in the progressive case this does actually make a difference
* to the code used in the non-interlaced case too.
*/
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, w, h, 0), 1/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 0), 1/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
# endif
}
}
return 1; /* keep going */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | test_size(png_modifier* PNG_CONST pm, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
test_size(png_modifier* const pm, png_byte const colour_type,
int bdlo, int const bdhi)
{
/* Run the tests on each combination.
*
* NOTE: on my 32 bit x86 each of the following blocks takes
* a total of 3.5 seconds if done across every combo of bit depth
* width and height. This is a waste of time in practice, hence the
* hinc and winc stuff:
*/
static const png_byte hinc[] = {1, 3, 11, 1, 5};
static const png_byte winc[] = {1, 9, 5, 7, 1};
const int save_bdlo = bdlo;
for (; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo)
{
png_uint_32 h, w;
for (h=1; h<=16; h+=hinc[bdlo]) for (w=1; w<=16; w+=winc[bdlo])
{
/* First test all the 'size' images against the sequential
* reader using libpng to deinterlace (where required.) This
* validates the write side of libpng. There are four possibilities
* to validate.
*/
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, w, h, 0), 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, w, h, 1), 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
/* Now validate the interlaced read side - do_interlace true,
* in the progressive case this does actually make a difference
* to the code used in the non-interlaced case too.
*/
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, w, h, 0), 1/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
# if CAN_WRITE_INTERLACE
/* Validate the pngvalid code itself: */
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 1), 1/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
# endif
}
}
/* Now do the tests of libpng interlace handling, after we have made sure
* that the pngvalid version works:
*/
for (bdlo = save_bdlo; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo)
{
png_uint_32 h, w;
for (h=1; h<=16; h+=hinc[bdlo]) for (w=1; w<=16; w+=winc[bdlo])
{
# ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* Test with pngvalid generated interlaced images first; we have
* already verify these are ok (unless pngvalid has self-consistent
* read/write errors, which is unlikely), so this detects errors in the
* read side first:
*/
# if CAN_WRITE_INTERLACE
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 1), 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
# endif
# endif /* READ_INTERLACING */
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* Test the libpng write side against the pngvalid read side: */
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 0), 1/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
# endif
# ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* Test both together: */
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 0), 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
# endif
# endif /* READ_INTERLACING */
}
}
return 1; /* keep going */
}
| 173,709 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct inode *ext4_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext4_inode_info *ei;
ei = kmem_cache_alloc(ext4_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ei)
return NULL;
ei->vfs_inode.i_version = 1;
ei->vfs_inode.i_data.writeback_index = 0;
memset(&ei->i_cached_extent, 0, sizeof(struct ext4_ext_cache));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_prealloc_list);
spin_lock_init(&ei->i_prealloc_lock);
/*
* Note: We can be called before EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal is set,
* therefore it can be null here. Don't check it, just initialize
* jinode.
*/
jbd2_journal_init_jbd_inode(&ei->jinode, &ei->vfs_inode);
ei->i_reserved_data_blocks = 0;
ei->i_reserved_meta_blocks = 0;
ei->i_allocated_meta_blocks = 0;
ei->i_da_metadata_calc_len = 0;
ei->i_delalloc_reserved_flag = 0;
spin_lock_init(&(ei->i_block_reservation_lock));
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
ei->i_reserved_quota = 0;
#endif
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_completed_io_list);
ei->cur_aio_dio = NULL;
ei->i_sync_tid = 0;
ei->i_datasync_tid = 0;
return &ei->vfs_inode;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | static struct inode *ext4_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext4_inode_info *ei;
ei = kmem_cache_alloc(ext4_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ei)
return NULL;
ei->vfs_inode.i_version = 1;
ei->vfs_inode.i_data.writeback_index = 0;
memset(&ei->i_cached_extent, 0, sizeof(struct ext4_ext_cache));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_prealloc_list);
spin_lock_init(&ei->i_prealloc_lock);
/*
* Note: We can be called before EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal is set,
* therefore it can be null here. Don't check it, just initialize
* jinode.
*/
jbd2_journal_init_jbd_inode(&ei->jinode, &ei->vfs_inode);
ei->i_reserved_data_blocks = 0;
ei->i_reserved_meta_blocks = 0;
ei->i_allocated_meta_blocks = 0;
ei->i_da_metadata_calc_len = 0;
ei->i_delalloc_reserved_flag = 0;
spin_lock_init(&(ei->i_block_reservation_lock));
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
ei->i_reserved_quota = 0;
#endif
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_completed_io_list);
spin_lock_init(&ei->i_completed_io_lock);
ei->cur_aio_dio = NULL;
ei->i_sync_tid = 0;
ei->i_datasync_tid = 0;
return &ei->vfs_inode;
}
| 167,554 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: scoped_refptr<BrowserContext> BrowserContextImpl::GetOffTheRecordContext() {
if (!otr_context_) {
OTRBrowserContextImpl* context = new OTRBrowserContextImpl(
this,
static_cast<BrowserContextIODataImpl *>(io_data()));
otr_context_ = context->GetWeakPtr();
}
return make_scoped_refptr(otr_context_.get());
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | scoped_refptr<BrowserContext> BrowserContextImpl::GetOffTheRecordContext() {
BrowserContext* BrowserContextImpl::GetOffTheRecordContext() {
if (!otr_context_) {
otr_context_ =
base::MakeUnique<OTRBrowserContextImpl>(
this,
static_cast<BrowserContextIODataImpl*>(io_data()));
}
return otr_context_.get();
}
BrowserContextImpl::~BrowserContextImpl() {
CHECK(!otr_context_);
}
| 165,413 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int bdrv_check_request(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t sector_num,
int nb_sectors)
{
return bdrv_check_byte_request(bs, sector_num * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE,
nb_sectors * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int bdrv_check_request(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t sector_num,
int nb_sectors)
{
if (nb_sectors > INT_MAX / BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE) {
return -EIO;
}
return bdrv_check_byte_request(bs, sector_num * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE,
nb_sectors * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
}
| 165,408 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CheckFakeData(uint8* audio_data, int frames_written,
double playback_rate) {
size_t length =
(frames_written * algorithm_.bytes_per_frame())
/ algorithm_.bytes_per_channel();
switch (algorithm_.bytes_per_channel()) {
case 4:
DoCheckFakeData<int32>(audio_data, length);
break;
case 2:
DoCheckFakeData<int16>(audio_data, length);
break;
case 1:
DoCheckFakeData<uint8>(audio_data, length);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Unsupported audio bit depth in crossfade.";
}
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void CheckFakeData(uint8* audio_data, int frames_written,
| 171,530 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: activate_desktop_file (ActivateParameters *parameters,
NautilusFile *file)
{
ActivateParametersDesktop *parameters_desktop;
char *primary, *secondary, *display_name;
GtkWidget *dialog;
GdkScreen *screen;
char *uri;
screen = gtk_widget_get_screen (GTK_WIDGET (parameters->parent_window));
if (!nautilus_file_is_trusted_link (file))
{
/* copy the parts of parameters we are interested in as the orignal will be freed */
parameters_desktop = g_new0 (ActivateParametersDesktop, 1);
if (parameters->parent_window)
{
parameters_desktop->parent_window = parameters->parent_window;
g_object_add_weak_pointer (G_OBJECT (parameters_desktop->parent_window), (gpointer *) ¶meters_desktop->parent_window);
}
parameters_desktop->file = nautilus_file_ref (file);
primary = _("Untrusted application launcher");
display_name = nautilus_file_get_display_name (file);
secondary =
g_strdup_printf (_("The application launcher “%s” has not been marked as trusted. "
"If you do not know the source of this file, launching it may be unsafe."
),
display_name);
dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new (parameters->parent_window,
0,
GTK_MESSAGE_WARNING,
GTK_BUTTONS_NONE,
NULL);
g_object_set (dialog,
"text", primary,
"secondary-text", secondary,
NULL);
gtk_dialog_add_button (GTK_DIALOG (dialog),
_("_Launch Anyway"), RESPONSE_RUN);
if (nautilus_file_can_set_permissions (file))
{
gtk_dialog_add_button (GTK_DIALOG (dialog),
_("Mark as _Trusted"), RESPONSE_MARK_TRUSTED);
}
gtk_dialog_add_button (GTK_DIALOG (dialog),
_("_Cancel"), GTK_RESPONSE_CANCEL);
gtk_dialog_set_default_response (GTK_DIALOG (dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_CANCEL);
g_signal_connect (dialog, "response",
G_CALLBACK (untrusted_launcher_response_callback),
parameters_desktop);
gtk_widget_show (dialog);
g_free (display_name);
g_free (secondary);
return;
}
uri = nautilus_file_get_uri (file);
DEBUG ("Launching trusted launcher %s", uri);
nautilus_launch_desktop_file (screen, uri, NULL,
parameters->parent_window);
g_free (uri);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | activate_desktop_file (ActivateParameters *parameters,
NautilusFile *file)
{
ActivateParametersDesktop *parameters_desktop;
char *primary, *secondary, *display_name;
GtkWidget *dialog;
GdkScreen *screen;
char *uri;
screen = gtk_widget_get_screen (GTK_WIDGET (parameters->parent_window));
if (!nautilus_file_is_trusted_link (file))
{
/* copy the parts of parameters we are interested in as the orignal will be freed */
parameters_desktop = g_new0 (ActivateParametersDesktop, 1);
if (parameters->parent_window)
{
parameters_desktop->parent_window = parameters->parent_window;
g_object_add_weak_pointer (G_OBJECT (parameters_desktop->parent_window), (gpointer *) ¶meters_desktop->parent_window);
}
parameters_desktop->file = nautilus_file_ref (file);
primary = _("Untrusted application launcher");
display_name = nautilus_file_get_display_name (file);
secondary =
g_strdup_printf (_("The application launcher “%s” has not been marked as trusted. "
"If you do not know the source of this file, launching it may be unsafe."
),
display_name);
dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new (parameters->parent_window,
0,
GTK_MESSAGE_WARNING,
GTK_BUTTONS_NONE,
NULL);
g_object_set (dialog,
"text", primary,
"secondary-text", secondary,
NULL);
gtk_dialog_add_button (GTK_DIALOG (dialog),
_("_Cancel"), GTK_RESPONSE_CANCEL);
gtk_dialog_set_default_response (GTK_DIALOG (dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_CANCEL);
if (nautilus_file_can_set_permissions (file))
{
gtk_dialog_add_button (GTK_DIALOG (dialog),
_("Trust and _Launch"), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
}
g_signal_connect (dialog, "response",
G_CALLBACK (untrusted_launcher_response_callback),
parameters_desktop);
gtk_widget_show (dialog);
g_free (display_name);
g_free (secondary);
return;
}
uri = nautilus_file_get_uri (file);
DEBUG ("Launching trusted launcher %s", uri);
nautilus_launch_desktop_file (screen, uri, NULL,
parameters->parent_window);
g_free (uri);
}
| 167,752 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SvcTest()
: codec_iface_(0),
test_file_name_("hantro_collage_w352h288.yuv"),
stats_file_name_("hantro_collage_w352h288.stat"),
codec_initialized_(false),
decoder_(0) {
memset(&svc_, 0, sizeof(svc_));
memset(&codec_, 0, sizeof(codec_));
memset(&codec_enc_, 0, sizeof(codec_enc_));
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | SvcTest()
: codec_iface_(0),
test_file_name_("hantro_collage_w352h288.yuv"),
codec_initialized_(false),
decoder_(0) {
memset(&svc_, 0, sizeof(svc_));
memset(&codec_, 0, sizeof(codec_));
memset(&codec_enc_, 0, sizeof(codec_enc_));
}
| 174,581 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Document::detach(const AttachContext& context)
{
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "Document::detach");
ASSERT(!m_frame || m_frame->tree().childCount() == 0);
if (!isActive())
return;
FrameNavigationDisabler navigationDisabler(*m_frame);
HTMLFrameOwnerElement::UpdateSuspendScope suspendWidgetHierarchyUpdates;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbidScript;
view()->dispose();
m_markers->prepareForDestruction();
if (LocalDOMWindow* window = this->domWindow())
window->willDetachDocumentFromFrame();
m_lifecycle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Stopping);
if (page())
page()->documentDetached(this);
InspectorInstrumentation::documentDetached(this);
if (m_frame->loader().client()->sharedWorkerRepositoryClient())
m_frame->loader().client()->sharedWorkerRepositoryClient()->documentDetached(this);
stopActiveDOMObjects();
if (m_scriptedAnimationController)
m_scriptedAnimationController->clearDocumentPointer();
m_scriptedAnimationController.clear();
m_scriptedIdleTaskController.clear();
if (svgExtensions())
accessSVGExtensions().pauseAnimations();
if (m_domWindow)
m_domWindow->clearEventQueue();
if (m_layoutView)
m_layoutView->setIsInWindow(false);
if (registrationContext())
registrationContext()->documentWasDetached();
m_hoverNode = nullptr;
m_activeHoverElement = nullptr;
m_autofocusElement = nullptr;
if (m_focusedElement.get()) {
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Element> oldFocusedElement = m_focusedElement;
m_focusedElement = nullptr;
if (frameHost())
frameHost()->chromeClient().focusedNodeChanged(oldFocusedElement.get(), nullptr);
}
if (this == &axObjectCacheOwner())
clearAXObjectCache();
m_layoutView = nullptr;
ContainerNode::detach(context);
if (this != &axObjectCacheOwner()) {
if (AXObjectCache* cache = existingAXObjectCache()) {
for (Node& node : NodeTraversal::descendantsOf(*this)) {
cache->remove(&node);
}
}
}
styleEngine().didDetach();
frameHost()->eventHandlerRegistry().documentDetached(*this);
m_frame->inputMethodController().documentDetached();
if (!loader())
m_fetcher->clearContext();
if (m_importsController)
HTMLImportsController::removeFrom(*this);
m_timers.setTimerTaskRunner(
Platform::current()->currentThread()->scheduler()->timerTaskRunner()->adoptClone());
m_frame = nullptr;
if (m_mediaQueryMatcher)
m_mediaQueryMatcher->documentDetached();
DocumentLifecycleNotifier::notifyDocumentWasDetached();
m_lifecycle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Stopped);
DocumentLifecycleNotifier::notifyContextDestroyed();
ExecutionContext::notifyContextDestroyed();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void Document::detach(const AttachContext& context)
{
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "Document::detach");
RELEASE_ASSERT(!m_frame || m_frame->tree().childCount() == 0);
if (!isActive())
return;
FrameNavigationDisabler navigationDisabler(*m_frame);
HTMLFrameOwnerElement::UpdateSuspendScope suspendWidgetHierarchyUpdates;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbidScript;
view()->dispose();
m_markers->prepareForDestruction();
if (LocalDOMWindow* window = this->domWindow())
window->willDetachDocumentFromFrame();
m_lifecycle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Stopping);
if (page())
page()->documentDetached(this);
InspectorInstrumentation::documentDetached(this);
if (m_frame->loader().client()->sharedWorkerRepositoryClient())
m_frame->loader().client()->sharedWorkerRepositoryClient()->documentDetached(this);
stopActiveDOMObjects();
if (m_scriptedAnimationController)
m_scriptedAnimationController->clearDocumentPointer();
m_scriptedAnimationController.clear();
m_scriptedIdleTaskController.clear();
if (svgExtensions())
accessSVGExtensions().pauseAnimations();
if (m_domWindow)
m_domWindow->clearEventQueue();
if (m_layoutView)
m_layoutView->setIsInWindow(false);
if (registrationContext())
registrationContext()->documentWasDetached();
m_hoverNode = nullptr;
m_activeHoverElement = nullptr;
m_autofocusElement = nullptr;
if (m_focusedElement.get()) {
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Element> oldFocusedElement = m_focusedElement;
m_focusedElement = nullptr;
if (frameHost())
frameHost()->chromeClient().focusedNodeChanged(oldFocusedElement.get(), nullptr);
}
if (this == &axObjectCacheOwner())
clearAXObjectCache();
m_layoutView = nullptr;
ContainerNode::detach(context);
if (this != &axObjectCacheOwner()) {
if (AXObjectCache* cache = existingAXObjectCache()) {
for (Node& node : NodeTraversal::descendantsOf(*this)) {
cache->remove(&node);
}
}
}
styleEngine().didDetach();
frameHost()->eventHandlerRegistry().documentDetached(*this);
m_frame->inputMethodController().documentDetached();
if (!loader())
m_fetcher->clearContext();
if (m_importsController)
HTMLImportsController::removeFrom(*this);
m_timers.setTimerTaskRunner(
Platform::current()->currentThread()->scheduler()->timerTaskRunner()->adoptClone());
m_frame = nullptr;
if (m_mediaQueryMatcher)
m_mediaQueryMatcher->documentDetached();
DocumentLifecycleNotifier::notifyDocumentWasDetached();
m_lifecycle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Stopped);
DocumentLifecycleNotifier::notifyContextDestroyed();
ExecutionContext::notifyContextDestroyed();
}
| 171,746 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PPB_Buffer_Proxy::OnMsgCreate(
PP_Instance instance,
uint32_t size,
HostResource* result_resource,
ppapi::proxy::SerializedHandle* result_shm_handle) {
result_shm_handle->set_null_shmem();
HostDispatcher* dispatcher = HostDispatcher::GetForInstance(instance);
if (!dispatcher)
return;
thunk::EnterResourceCreation enter(instance);
if (enter.failed())
return;
PP_Resource local_buffer_resource = enter.functions()->CreateBuffer(instance,
size);
if (local_buffer_resource == 0)
return;
thunk::EnterResourceNoLock<thunk::PPB_BufferTrusted_API> trusted_buffer(
local_buffer_resource, false);
if (trusted_buffer.failed())
return;
int local_fd;
if (trusted_buffer.object()->GetSharedMemory(&local_fd) != PP_OK)
return;
result_resource->SetHostResource(instance, local_buffer_resource);
base::PlatformFile platform_file =
#if defined(OS_WIN)
reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(static_cast<intptr_t>(local_fd));
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
local_fd;
#else
#error Not implemented.
#endif
result_shm_handle->set_shmem(
dispatcher->ShareHandleWithRemote(platform_file, false), size);
}
Commit Message: Add permission checks for PPB_Buffer.
BUG=116317
TEST=browser_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11446075
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171951 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void PPB_Buffer_Proxy::OnMsgCreate(
PP_Instance instance,
uint32_t size,
HostResource* result_resource,
ppapi::proxy::SerializedHandle* result_shm_handle) {
result_shm_handle->set_null_shmem();
HostDispatcher* dispatcher = HostDispatcher::GetForInstance(instance);
if (!dispatcher)
return;
if (!dispatcher->permissions().HasPermission(ppapi::PERMISSION_DEV))
return;
thunk::EnterResourceCreation enter(instance);
if (enter.failed())
return;
PP_Resource local_buffer_resource = enter.functions()->CreateBuffer(instance,
size);
if (local_buffer_resource == 0)
return;
thunk::EnterResourceNoLock<thunk::PPB_BufferTrusted_API> trusted_buffer(
local_buffer_resource, false);
if (trusted_buffer.failed())
return;
int local_fd;
if (trusted_buffer.object()->GetSharedMemory(&local_fd) != PP_OK)
return;
result_resource->SetHostResource(instance, local_buffer_resource);
base::PlatformFile platform_file =
#if defined(OS_WIN)
reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(static_cast<intptr_t>(local_fd));
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
local_fd;
#else
#error Not implemented.
#endif
result_shm_handle->set_shmem(
dispatcher->ShareHandleWithRemote(platform_file, false), size);
}
| 171,341 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AddPolicyForRenderer(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
sandbox::ResultCode result;
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
L"Section");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
L"Event");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0);
sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
}
policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
bool use_winsta = !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableAltWinstation);
if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != policy->SetAlternateDesktop(use_winsta)) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
}
AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | bool AddPolicyForRenderer(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
sandbox::ResultCode result;
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
L"Section");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
L"Event");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0);
sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
}
policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
// Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
bool use_winsta = !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableAltWinstation);
if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != policy->SetAlternateDesktop(use_winsta)) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
}
AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
return true;
}
| 170,912 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int create_problem_dir(GHashTable *problem_info, unsigned pid)
{
/* Exit if free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location))
exit(1);
}
/* Create temp directory with the problem data.
* This directory is renamed to final directory name after
* all files have been stored into it.
*/
gchar *dir_basename = g_hash_table_lookup(problem_info, "basename");
if (!dir_basename)
dir_basename = g_hash_table_lookup(problem_info, FILENAME_TYPE);
char *path = xasprintf("%s/%s-%s-%u.new",
g_settings_dump_location,
dir_basename,
iso_date_string(NULL),
pid);
/* This item is useless, don't save it */
g_hash_table_remove(problem_info, "basename");
/* No need to check the path length, as all variables used are limited,
* and dd_create() fails if the path is too long.
*/
struct dump_dir *dd = dd_create(path, client_uid, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
if (!dd)
{
error_msg_and_die("Error creating problem directory '%s'", path);
}
dd_create_basic_files(dd, client_uid, NULL);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
gpointer gpkey = g_hash_table_lookup(problem_info, FILENAME_CMDLINE);
if (!gpkey)
{
/* Obtain and save the command line. */
char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid);
if (cmdline)
{
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline);
free(cmdline);
}
}
/* Store id of the user whose application crashed. */
char uid_str[sizeof(long) * 3 + 2];
sprintf(uid_str, "%lu", (long)client_uid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_UID, uid_str);
GHashTableIter iter;
gpointer gpvalue;
g_hash_table_iter_init(&iter, problem_info);
while (g_hash_table_iter_next(&iter, &gpkey, &gpvalue))
{
dd_save_text(dd, (gchar *) gpkey, (gchar *) gpvalue);
}
dd_close(dd);
/* Not needing it anymore */
g_hash_table_destroy(problem_info);
/* Move the completely created problem directory
* to final directory.
*/
char *newpath = xstrndup(path, strlen(path) - strlen(".new"));
if (rename(path, newpath) == 0)
strcpy(path, newpath);
free(newpath);
log_notice("Saved problem directory of pid %u to '%s'", pid, path);
/* We let the peer know that problem dir was created successfully
* _before_ we run potentially long-running post-create.
*/
printf("HTTP/1.1 201 Created\r\n\r\n");
fflush(NULL);
close(STDOUT_FILENO);
xdup2(STDERR_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO); /* paranoia: don't leave stdout fd closed */
/* Trim old problem directories if necessary */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize * (double)(1024*1024), path);
}
run_post_create(path);
/* free(path); */
exit(0);
}
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int create_problem_dir(GHashTable *problem_info, unsigned pid)
{
/* Exit if free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location))
exit(1);
}
/* Create temp directory with the problem data.
* This directory is renamed to final directory name after
* all files have been stored into it.
*/
gchar *dir_basename = g_hash_table_lookup(problem_info, "basename");
if (!dir_basename)
dir_basename = g_hash_table_lookup(problem_info, FILENAME_TYPE);
char *path = xasprintf("%s/%s-%s-%u.new",
g_settings_dump_location,
dir_basename,
iso_date_string(NULL),
pid);
/* This item is useless, don't save it */
g_hash_table_remove(problem_info, "basename");
/* No need to check the path length, as all variables used are limited,
* and dd_create() fails if the path is too long.
*/
struct dump_dir *dd = dd_create(path, g_settings_privatereports ? 0 : client_uid, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
if (!dd)
{
error_msg_and_die("Error creating problem directory '%s'", path);
}
dd_create_basic_files(dd, client_uid, NULL);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
gpointer gpkey = g_hash_table_lookup(problem_info, FILENAME_CMDLINE);
if (!gpkey)
{
/* Obtain and save the command line. */
char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid);
if (cmdline)
{
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline);
free(cmdline);
}
}
/* Store id of the user whose application crashed. */
char uid_str[sizeof(long) * 3 + 2];
sprintf(uid_str, "%lu", (long)client_uid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_UID, uid_str);
GHashTableIter iter;
gpointer gpvalue;
g_hash_table_iter_init(&iter, problem_info);
while (g_hash_table_iter_next(&iter, &gpkey, &gpvalue))
{
dd_save_text(dd, (gchar *) gpkey, (gchar *) gpvalue);
}
dd_close(dd);
/* Not needing it anymore */
g_hash_table_destroy(problem_info);
/* Move the completely created problem directory
* to final directory.
*/
char *newpath = xstrndup(path, strlen(path) - strlen(".new"));
if (rename(path, newpath) == 0)
strcpy(path, newpath);
free(newpath);
log_notice("Saved problem directory of pid %u to '%s'", pid, path);
/* We let the peer know that problem dir was created successfully
* _before_ we run potentially long-running post-create.
*/
printf("HTTP/1.1 201 Created\r\n\r\n");
fflush(NULL);
close(STDOUT_FILENO);
xdup2(STDERR_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO); /* paranoia: don't leave stdout fd closed */
/* Trim old problem directories if necessary */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize * (double)(1024*1024), path);
}
run_post_create(path);
/* free(path); */
exit(0);
}
| 170,147 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool xmp_init()
{
RESET_ERROR;
try {
bool result = SXMPFiles::Initialize(kXMPFiles_IgnoreLocalText);
SXMPMeta::SetDefaultErrorCallback(&_xmp_error_callback, nullptr, 1);
return result;
SXMPMeta::SetDefaultErrorCallback(&_xmp_error_callback, nullptr, 1);
return result;
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | bool xmp_init()
{
RESET_ERROR;
try {
// XMP SDK 5.1.2 needs this because it has been stripped off local
// text conversion the one that was done in Exempi with libiconv.
bool result = SXMPFiles::Initialize(kXMPFiles_IgnoreLocalText);
SXMPMeta::SetDefaultErrorCallback(&_xmp_error_callback, nullptr, 1);
return result;
SXMPMeta::SetDefaultErrorCallback(&_xmp_error_callback, nullptr, 1);
return result;
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
return false;
}
| 165,368 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
{
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
pitem *item = NULL;
int i = -1, is_complete;
unsigned char seq64be[8];
unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
goto err;
/* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
* maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
*/
if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
max_len = s->max_cert_list;
else
max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
goto err;
/* Try to find item in queue */
memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
if (item == NULL)
{
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
if ( frag == NULL)
goto err;
memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
}
else
frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
* retransmit and can be dropped.
frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
if (i<=0) goto err;
frag_len -= i;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
{
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
pitem *item = NULL;
int i = -1, is_complete;
unsigned char seq64be[8];
unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
goto err;
/* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
* maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
*/
if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
max_len = s->max_cert_list;
else
max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
goto err;
/* Try to find item in queue */
memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
if (item == NULL)
{
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
if ( frag == NULL)
goto err;
memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
}
else
{
frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
{
item = NULL;
frag = NULL;
goto err;
}
}
/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
* retransmit and can be dropped.
frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
if (i<=0) goto err;
frag_len -= i;
}
| 165,284 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppListControllerDelegate::DoShowAppInfoFlow(
Profile* profile,
const std::string& extension_id) {
DCHECK(CanDoShowAppInfoFlow());
ExtensionService* service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->extension_service();
DCHECK(service);
const extensions::Extension* extension = service->GetInstalledExtension(
extension_id);
DCHECK(extension);
OnShowChildDialog();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Apps.AppInfoDialog.Launches",
AppInfoLaunchSource::FROM_APP_LIST,
AppInfoLaunchSource::NUM_LAUNCH_SOURCES);
ShowAppInfoInAppList(
GetAppListWindow(),
GetAppListBounds(),
profile,
extension,
base::Bind(&AppListControllerDelegate::OnCloseChildDialog,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | void AppListControllerDelegate::DoShowAppInfoFlow(
Profile* profile,
const std::string& extension_id) {
DCHECK(CanDoShowAppInfoFlow());
const extensions::Extension* extension = GetExtension(profile, extension_id);
DCHECK(extension);
OnShowChildDialog();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Apps.AppInfoDialog.Launches",
AppInfoLaunchSource::FROM_APP_LIST,
AppInfoLaunchSource::NUM_LAUNCH_SOURCES);
ShowAppInfoInAppList(
GetAppListWindow(),
GetAppListBounds(),
profile,
extension,
base::Bind(&AppListControllerDelegate::OnCloseChildDialog,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 171,719 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ntlm_write_message_fields_buffer(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (fields->Len > 0)
{
Stream_SetPosition(s, fields->BufferOffset);
Stream_Write(s, fields->Buffer, fields->Len);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void ntlm_write_message_fields_buffer(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
static void ntlm_write_message_fields_buffer(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (fields->Len > 0)
{
Stream_SetPosition(s, fields->BufferOffset);
Stream_Write(s, fields->Buffer, fields->Len);
}
}
| 169,280 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_set_enum_print)
{
long a1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &a1) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
netsnmp_ds_set_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM, (int) a1);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_set_enum_print)
{
long a1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &a1) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
netsnmp_ds_set_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM, (int) a1);
RETURN_TRUE;
| 164,970 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int MSG_ReadBits( msg_t *msg, int bits ) {
int value;
int get;
qboolean sgn;
int i, nbits;
value = 0;
if ( bits < 0 ) {
bits = -bits;
sgn = qtrue;
} else {
sgn = qfalse;
}
if (msg->oob) {
if(bits==8)
{
value = msg->data[msg->readcount];
msg->readcount += 1;
msg->bit += 8;
}
else if(bits==16)
{
short temp;
CopyLittleShort(&temp, &msg->data[msg->readcount]);
value = temp;
msg->readcount += 2;
msg->bit += 16;
}
else if(bits==32)
{
CopyLittleLong(&value, &msg->data[msg->readcount]);
msg->readcount += 4;
msg->bit += 32;
}
else
Com_Error(ERR_DROP, "can't read %d bits", bits);
} else {
nbits = 0;
if (bits&7) {
nbits = bits&7;
for(i=0;i<nbits;i++) {
value |= (Huff_getBit(msg->data, &msg->bit)<<i);
}
bits = bits - nbits;
}
if (bits) {
for(i=0;i<bits;i+=8) {
Huff_offsetReceive (msgHuff.decompressor.tree, &get, msg->data, &msg->bit);
value |= (get<<(i+nbits));
}
}
msg->readcount = (msg->bit>>3)+1;
}
if ( sgn && bits > 0 && bits < 32 ) {
if ( value & ( 1 << ( bits - 1 ) ) ) {
value |= -1 ^ ( ( 1 << bits ) - 1 );
}
}
return value;
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int MSG_ReadBits( msg_t *msg, int bits ) {
int value;
int get;
qboolean sgn;
int i, nbits;
if ( msg->readcount > msg->cursize ) {
return 0;
}
value = 0;
if ( bits < 0 ) {
bits = -bits;
sgn = qtrue;
} else {
sgn = qfalse;
}
if (msg->oob) {
if (msg->readcount + (bits>>3) > msg->cursize) {
msg->readcount = msg->cursize + 1;
return 0;
}
if(bits==8)
{
value = msg->data[msg->readcount];
msg->readcount += 1;
msg->bit += 8;
}
else if(bits==16)
{
short temp;
CopyLittleShort(&temp, &msg->data[msg->readcount]);
value = temp;
msg->readcount += 2;
msg->bit += 16;
}
else if(bits==32)
{
CopyLittleLong(&value, &msg->data[msg->readcount]);
msg->readcount += 4;
msg->bit += 32;
}
else
Com_Error(ERR_DROP, "can't read %d bits", bits);
} else {
nbits = 0;
if (bits&7) {
nbits = bits&7;
if (msg->bit + nbits > msg->cursize << 3) {
msg->readcount = msg->cursize + 1;
return 0;
}
for(i=0;i<nbits;i++) {
value |= (Huff_getBit(msg->data, &msg->bit)<<i);
}
bits = bits - nbits;
}
if (bits) {
for(i=0;i<bits;i+=8) {
Huff_offsetReceive (msgHuff.decompressor.tree, &get, msg->data, &msg->bit, msg->cursize<<3);
value |= (get<<(i+nbits));
if (msg->bit > msg->cursize<<3) {
msg->readcount = msg->cursize + 1;
return 0;
}
}
}
msg->readcount = (msg->bit>>3)+1;
}
if ( sgn && bits > 0 && bits < 32 ) {
if ( value & ( 1 << ( bits - 1 ) ) ) {
value |= -1 ^ ( ( 1 << bits ) - 1 );
}
}
return value;
}
| 167,998 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void Ins_MDRP( INS_ARG )
{
Int point;
TT_F26Dot6 distance,
org_dist;
point = (Int)args[0];
if ( BOUNDS( args[0], CUR.zp1.n_points ) )
{
/* Current version of FreeType silently ignores this out of bounds error
* and drops the instruction, see bug #691121
return;
}
/* XXX: Is there some undocumented feature while in the */
/* twilight zone? */
org_dist = CUR_Func_dualproj( CUR.zp1.org_x[point] -
CUR.zp0.org_x[CUR.GS.rp0],
CUR.zp1.org_y[point] -
CUR.zp0.org_y[CUR.GS.rp0] );
/* single width cutin test */
if ( ABS(org_dist) < CUR.GS.single_width_cutin )
{
if ( org_dist >= 0 )
org_dist = CUR.GS.single_width_value;
else
org_dist = -CUR.GS.single_width_value;
}
/* round flag */
if ( (CUR.opcode & 4) != 0 )
distance = CUR_Func_round( org_dist,
CUR.metrics.compensations[CUR.opcode & 3] );
else
distance = Round_None( EXEC_ARGS
org_dist,
CUR.metrics.compensations[CUR.opcode & 3] );
/* minimum distance flag */
if ( (CUR.opcode & 8) != 0 )
{
if ( org_dist >= 0 )
{
if ( distance < CUR.GS.minimum_distance )
distance = CUR.GS.minimum_distance;
}
else
{
if ( distance > -CUR.GS.minimum_distance )
distance = -CUR.GS.minimum_distance;
}
}
/* now move the point */
org_dist = CUR_Func_project( CUR.zp1.cur_x[point] -
CUR.zp0.cur_x[CUR.GS.rp0],
CUR.zp1.cur_y[point] -
CUR.zp0.cur_y[CUR.GS.rp0] );
CUR_Func_move( &CUR.zp1, point, distance - org_dist );
CUR.GS.rp1 = CUR.GS.rp0;
CUR.GS.rp2 = point;
if ( (CUR.opcode & 16) != 0 )
CUR.GS.rp0 = point;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void Ins_MDRP( INS_ARG )
{
Int point;
TT_F26Dot6 distance,
org_dist;
point = (Int)args[0];
if ( BOUNDS( args[0], CUR.zp1.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( CUR.GS.rp0, CUR.zp0.n_points) )
{
/* Current version of FreeType silently ignores this out of bounds error
* and drops the instruction, see bug #691121
return;
}
/* XXX: Is there some undocumented feature while in the */
/* twilight zone? */
org_dist = CUR_Func_dualproj( CUR.zp1.org_x[point] -
CUR.zp0.org_x[CUR.GS.rp0],
CUR.zp1.org_y[point] -
CUR.zp0.org_y[CUR.GS.rp0] );
/* single width cutin test */
if ( ABS(org_dist) < CUR.GS.single_width_cutin )
{
if ( org_dist >= 0 )
org_dist = CUR.GS.single_width_value;
else
org_dist = -CUR.GS.single_width_value;
}
/* round flag */
if ( (CUR.opcode & 4) != 0 )
distance = CUR_Func_round( org_dist,
CUR.metrics.compensations[CUR.opcode & 3] );
else
distance = Round_None( EXEC_ARGS
org_dist,
CUR.metrics.compensations[CUR.opcode & 3] );
/* minimum distance flag */
if ( (CUR.opcode & 8) != 0 )
{
if ( org_dist >= 0 )
{
if ( distance < CUR.GS.minimum_distance )
distance = CUR.GS.minimum_distance;
}
else
{
if ( distance > -CUR.GS.minimum_distance )
distance = -CUR.GS.minimum_distance;
}
}
/* now move the point */
org_dist = CUR_Func_project( CUR.zp1.cur_x[point] -
CUR.zp0.cur_x[CUR.GS.rp0],
CUR.zp1.cur_y[point] -
CUR.zp0.cur_y[CUR.GS.rp0] );
CUR_Func_move( &CUR.zp1, point, distance - org_dist );
CUR.GS.rp1 = CUR.GS.rp0;
CUR.GS.rp2 = point;
if ( (CUR.opcode & 16) != 0 )
CUR.GS.rp0 = point;
}
| 164,780 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TabsCustomBindings::TabsCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction("OpenChannelToTab",
base::Bind(&TabsCustomBindings::OpenChannelToTab,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | TabsCustomBindings::TabsCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction("OpenChannelToTab", "tabs",
base::Bind(&TabsCustomBindings::OpenChannelToTab,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,244 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char *auth_server(int f_in, int f_out, int module, const char *host,
const char *addr, const char *leader)
{
char *users = lp_auth_users(module);
char challenge[MAX_DIGEST_LEN*2];
char line[BIGPATHBUFLEN];
char **auth_uid_groups = NULL;
int auth_uid_groups_cnt = -1;
const char *err = NULL;
int group_match = -1;
char *tok, *pass;
char opt_ch = '\0';
/* if no auth list then allow anyone in! */
if (!users || !*users)
if (!users || !*users)
return "";
gen_challenge(addr, challenge);
io_printf(f_out, "%s%s\n", leader, challenge);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-354 | char *auth_server(int f_in, int f_out, int module, const char *host,
const char *addr, const char *leader)
{
char *users = lp_auth_users(module);
char challenge[MAX_DIGEST_LEN*2];
char line[BIGPATHBUFLEN];
char **auth_uid_groups = NULL;
int auth_uid_groups_cnt = -1;
const char *err = NULL;
int group_match = -1;
char *tok, *pass;
char opt_ch = '\0';
/* if no auth list then allow anyone in! */
if (!users || !*users)
if (!users || !*users)
return "";
if (protocol_version < 21) { /* Don't allow a weak checksum for the password. */
rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: protocol version is too old!\n");
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
gen_challenge(addr, challenge);
io_printf(f_out, "%s%s\n", leader, challenge);
return NULL;
}
| 164,641 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void TreeNodesAdded(TreeModel* model, TreeModelNode* parent,
int start, int count) {
added_count_++;
}
Commit Message: Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
R=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void TreeNodesAdded(TreeModel* model, TreeModelNode* parent,
virtual void TreeNodesAdded(TreeModel* model,
TreeModelNode* parent,
int start,
int count) OVERRIDE {
added_count_++;
}
| 170,470 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool HeapAllocator::backingExpand(void* address, size_t newSize) {
if (!address)
return false;
ThreadState* state = ThreadState::current();
if (state->sweepForbidden())
return false;
ASSERT(!state->isInGC());
ASSERT(state->isAllocationAllowed());
DCHECK_EQ(&state->heap(), &ThreadState::fromObject(address)->heap());
BasePage* page = pageFromObject(address);
if (page->isLargeObjectPage() || page->arena()->getThreadState() != state)
return false;
HeapObjectHeader* header = HeapObjectHeader::fromPayload(address);
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
NormalPageArena* arena = static_cast<NormalPage*>(page)->arenaForNormalPage();
bool succeed = arena->expandObject(header, newSize);
if (succeed)
state->allocationPointAdjusted(arena->arenaIndex());
return succeed;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool HeapAllocator::backingExpand(void* address, size_t newSize) {
if (!address)
return false;
ThreadState* state = ThreadState::current();
if (state->sweepForbidden())
return false;
ASSERT(!state->isInGC());
ASSERT(state->isAllocationAllowed());
DCHECK_EQ(&state->heap(), &ThreadState::fromObject(address)->heap());
BasePage* page = pageFromObject(address);
if (page->isLargeObjectPage() || page->arena()->getThreadState() != state)
return false;
HeapObjectHeader* header = HeapObjectHeader::fromPayload(address);
header->checkHeader();
NormalPageArena* arena = static_cast<NormalPage*>(page)->arenaForNormalPage();
bool succeed = arena->expandObject(header, newSize);
if (succeed)
state->allocationPointAdjusted(arena->arenaIndex());
return succeed;
}
| 172,705 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(stream_resolve_include_path)
{
char *filename, *resolved_path;
int filename_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &filename, &filename_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
resolved_path = zend_resolve_path(filename, filename_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (resolved_path) {
RETURN_STRING(resolved_path, 0);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | PHP_FUNCTION(stream_resolve_include_path)
{
char *filename, *resolved_path;
int filename_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p", &filename, &filename_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
resolved_path = zend_resolve_path(filename, filename_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (resolved_path) {
RETURN_STRING(resolved_path, 0);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
| 165,317 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void pdo_stmt_init(TSRMLS_D)
{
zend_class_entry ce;
INIT_CLASS_ENTRY(ce, "PDOStatement", pdo_dbstmt_functions);
pdo_dbstmt_ce = zend_register_internal_class(&ce TSRMLS_CC);
pdo_dbstmt_ce->get_iterator = pdo_stmt_iter_get;
pdo_dbstmt_ce->create_object = pdo_dbstmt_new;
zend_class_implements(pdo_dbstmt_ce TSRMLS_CC, 1, zend_ce_traversable);
zend_declare_property_null(pdo_dbstmt_ce, "queryString", sizeof("queryString")-1, ZEND_ACC_PUBLIC TSRMLS_CC);
memcpy(&pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers, &std_object_handlers, sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers.write_property = dbstmt_prop_write;
pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers.unset_property = dbstmt_prop_delete;
pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers.get_method = dbstmt_method_get;
pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers.compare_objects = dbstmt_compare;
pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers.clone_obj = dbstmt_clone_obj;
INIT_CLASS_ENTRY(ce, "PDORow", pdo_row_functions);
pdo_row_ce = zend_register_internal_class(&ce TSRMLS_CC);
pdo_row_ce->ce_flags |= ZEND_ACC_FINAL_CLASS; /* when removing this a lot of handlers need to be redone */
pdo_row_ce->create_object = pdo_row_new;
pdo_row_ce->serialize = pdo_row_serialize;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | void pdo_stmt_init(TSRMLS_D)
{
zend_class_entry ce;
INIT_CLASS_ENTRY(ce, "PDOStatement", pdo_dbstmt_functions);
pdo_dbstmt_ce = zend_register_internal_class(&ce TSRMLS_CC);
pdo_dbstmt_ce->get_iterator = pdo_stmt_iter_get;
pdo_dbstmt_ce->create_object = pdo_dbstmt_new;
zend_class_implements(pdo_dbstmt_ce TSRMLS_CC, 1, zend_ce_traversable);
zend_declare_property_null(pdo_dbstmt_ce, "queryString", sizeof("queryString")-1, ZEND_ACC_PUBLIC TSRMLS_CC);
memcpy(&pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers, &std_object_handlers, sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers.write_property = dbstmt_prop_write;
pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers.unset_property = dbstmt_prop_delete;
pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers.get_method = dbstmt_method_get;
pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers.compare_objects = dbstmt_compare;
pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers.clone_obj = dbstmt_clone_obj;
INIT_CLASS_ENTRY(ce, "PDORow", pdo_row_functions);
pdo_row_ce = zend_register_internal_class(&ce TSRMLS_CC);
pdo_row_ce->ce_flags |= ZEND_ACC_FINAL_CLASS; /* when removing this a lot of handlers need to be redone */
pdo_row_ce->create_object = pdo_row_new;
pdo_row_ce->serialize = pdo_row_serialize;
pdo_row_ce->unserialize = zend_class_unserialize_deny;
}
| 168,668 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void close_all_sockets(atransport* t) {
asocket* s;
/* this is a little gross, but since s->close() *will* modify
** the list out from under you, your options are limited.
*/
adb_mutex_lock(&socket_list_lock);
restart:
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->transport == t || (s->peer && s->peer->transport == t)) {
local_socket_close_locked(s);
goto restart;
}
}
adb_mutex_unlock(&socket_list_lock);
}
Commit Message: adb: switch the socket list mutex to a recursive_mutex.
sockets.cpp was branching on whether a socket close function was
local_socket_close in order to avoid a potential deadlock if the socket
list lock was held while closing a peer socket.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I5e56f17fa54275284787f0f1dc150d1960256ab3
(cherry picked from commit 9b587dec6d0a57c8fe1083c1c543fbeb163d65fa)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void close_all_sockets(atransport* t) {
asocket* s;
/* this is a little gross, but since s->close() *will* modify
** the list out from under you, your options are limited.
*/
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> lock(local_socket_list_lock);
restart:
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->transport == t || (s->peer && s->peer->transport == t)) {
local_socket_close(s);
goto restart;
}
}
}
| 174,150 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int timer_start(Unit *u) {
Timer *t = TIMER(u);
TimerValue *v;
assert(t);
assert(t->state == TIMER_DEAD || t->state == TIMER_FAILED);
if (UNIT_TRIGGER(u)->load_state != UNIT_LOADED)
return -ENOENT;
t->last_trigger = DUAL_TIMESTAMP_NULL;
/* Reenable all timers that depend on unit activation time */
LIST_FOREACH(value, v, t->values)
if (v->base == TIMER_ACTIVE)
v->disabled = false;
if (t->stamp_path) {
struct stat st;
if (stat(t->stamp_path, &st) >= 0)
t->last_trigger.realtime = timespec_load(&st.st_atim);
else if (errno == ENOENT)
/* The timer has never run before,
* make sure a stamp file exists.
*/
touch_file(t->stamp_path, true, USEC_INFINITY, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID, 0);
}
t->result = TIMER_SUCCESS;
timer_enter_waiting(t, true);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: util-lib: use MODE_INVALID as invalid value for mode_t everywhere
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int timer_start(Unit *u) {
Timer *t = TIMER(u);
TimerValue *v;
assert(t);
assert(t->state == TIMER_DEAD || t->state == TIMER_FAILED);
if (UNIT_TRIGGER(u)->load_state != UNIT_LOADED)
return -ENOENT;
t->last_trigger = DUAL_TIMESTAMP_NULL;
/* Reenable all timers that depend on unit activation time */
LIST_FOREACH(value, v, t->values)
if (v->base == TIMER_ACTIVE)
v->disabled = false;
if (t->stamp_path) {
struct stat st;
if (stat(t->stamp_path, &st) >= 0)
t->last_trigger.realtime = timespec_load(&st.st_atim);
else if (errno == ENOENT)
/* The timer has never run before,
* make sure a stamp file exists.
*/
touch_file(t->stamp_path, true, USEC_INFINITY, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID, MODE_INVALID);
}
t->result = TIMER_SUCCESS;
timer_enter_waiting(t, true);
return 1;
}
| 170,107 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void snd_pcm_period_elapsed(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
unsigned long flags;
if (PCM_RUNTIME_CHECK(substream))
return;
runtime = substream->runtime;
snd_pcm_stream_lock_irqsave(substream, flags);
if (!snd_pcm_running(substream) ||
snd_pcm_update_hw_ptr0(substream, 1) < 0)
goto _end;
#ifdef CONFIG_SND_PCM_TIMER
if (substream->timer_running)
snd_timer_interrupt(substream->timer, 1);
#endif
_end:
snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irqrestore(substream, flags);
kill_fasync(&runtime->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void snd_pcm_period_elapsed(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
unsigned long flags;
if (PCM_RUNTIME_CHECK(substream))
return;
runtime = substream->runtime;
snd_pcm_stream_lock_irqsave(substream, flags);
if (!snd_pcm_running(substream) ||
snd_pcm_update_hw_ptr0(substream, 1) < 0)
goto _end;
#ifdef CONFIG_SND_PCM_TIMER
if (substream->timer_running)
snd_timer_interrupt(substream->timer, 1);
#endif
_end:
kill_fasync(&runtime->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irqrestore(substream, flags);
}
| 166,845 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void close_all_sockets(atransport* t) {
asocket* s;
/* this is a little gross, but since s->close() *will* modify
** the list out from under you, your options are limited.
*/
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> lock(local_socket_list_lock);
restart:
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->transport == t || (s->peer && s->peer->transport == t)) {
local_socket_close(s);
goto restart;
}
}
}
Commit Message: adb: use asocket's close function when closing.
close_all_sockets was assuming that all registered local sockets used
local_socket_close as their close function. However, this is not true
for JDWP sockets.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I40a1174845cd33f15f30ce70828a7081cd5a087e
(cherry picked from commit 53eb31d87cb84a4212f4850bf745646e1fb12814)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void close_all_sockets(atransport* t) {
asocket* s;
/* this is a little gross, but since s->close() *will* modify
** the list out from under you, your options are limited.
*/
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> lock(local_socket_list_lock);
restart:
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->transport == t || (s->peer && s->peer->transport == t)) {
s->close(s);
goto restart;
}
}
}
| 173,405 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HostPortAllocatorSession::SendSessionRequest(const std::string& host,
int port) {
GURL url("https://" + host + ":" + base::IntToString(port) +
GetSessionRequestUrl() + "&sn=1");
scoped_ptr<UrlFetcher> url_fetcher(new UrlFetcher(url, UrlFetcher::GET));
url_fetcher->SetRequestContext(url_context_);
url_fetcher->SetHeader("X-Talk-Google-Relay-Auth", relay_token());
url_fetcher->SetHeader("X-Google-Relay-Auth", relay_token());
url_fetcher->SetHeader("X-Stream-Type", "chromoting");
url_fetcher->Start(base::Bind(&HostPortAllocatorSession::OnSessionRequestDone,
base::Unretained(this), url_fetcher.get()));
url_fetchers_.insert(url_fetcher.release());
}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void HostPortAllocatorSession::SendSessionRequest(const std::string& host,
int port) {
GURL url("https://" + host + ":" + base::IntToString(port) +
GetSessionRequestUrl() + "&sn=1");
scoped_ptr<net::URLFetcher> url_fetcher(
net::URLFetcher::Create(url, net::URLFetcher::GET, this));
url_fetcher->SetRequestContext(url_context_);
url_fetcher->AddExtraRequestHeader(
"X-Talk-Google-Relay-Auth: " + relay_token());
url_fetcher->AddExtraRequestHeader("X-Google-Relay-Auth: " + relay_token());
url_fetcher->AddExtraRequestHeader("X-Stream-Type: chromoting");
url_fetcher->Start();
url_fetchers_.insert(url_fetcher.release());
}
| 170,811 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
#if ARCH_X86 || ARCH_X86_64
const int simd_caps = x86_simd_caps();
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_MMX))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":MMX/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE2))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE2/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE3))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE3/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSSE3))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSSE3/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE4_1))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE4_1/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_AVX))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":AVX/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_AVX2))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":AVX2/*");
#endif
#if !CONFIG_SHARED
#if CONFIG_VP8
vp8_rtcd();
#endif
#if CONFIG_VP9
vp9_rtcd();
#endif
#endif
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int main(int argc, char **argv) {
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
#if ARCH_X86 || ARCH_X86_64
const int simd_caps = x86_simd_caps();
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_MMX))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":MMX.*:MMX/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE.*:SSE/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE2))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE2.*:SSE2/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE3))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE3.*:SSE3/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSSE3))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSSE3.*:SSSE3/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE4_1))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE4_1.*:SSE4_1/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_AVX))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":AVX.*:AVX/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_AVX2))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":AVX2.*:AVX2/*");
#endif
#if !CONFIG_SHARED
#if CONFIG_VP8
vp8_rtcd();
#endif // CONFIG_VP8
#if CONFIG_VP9
vp9_rtcd();
#endif // CONFIG_VP9
vpx_dsp_rtcd();
vpx_scale_rtcd();
#endif // !CONFIG_SHARED
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
}
| 174,583 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool V8DOMWindow::namedSecurityCheckCustom(v8::Local<v8::Object> host, v8::Local<v8::Value> key, v8::AccessType type, v8::Local<v8::Value>)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::Handle<v8::Object> window = host->FindInstanceInPrototypeChain(V8DOMWindow::GetTemplate(isolate, worldTypeInMainThread(isolate)));
if (window.IsEmpty())
return false; // the frame is gone.
DOMWindow* targetWindow = V8DOMWindow::toNative(window);
ASSERT(targetWindow);
Frame* target = targetWindow->frame();
if (!target)
return false;
if (target->loader()->stateMachine()->isDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument())
target->loader()->didAccessInitialDocument();
if (key->IsString()) {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, nameOfProtoProperty, ("__proto__", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
String name = toWebCoreString(key);
Frame* childFrame = target->tree()->scopedChild(name);
if (type == v8::ACCESS_HAS && childFrame)
return true;
if (type == v8::ACCESS_GET && childFrame && !host->HasRealNamedProperty(key->ToString()) && name != nameOfProtoProperty)
return true;
}
return BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame(target, DoNotReportSecurityError);
}
Commit Message: Named access checks on DOMWindow miss navigator
The design of the named access check is very fragile. Instead of doing the
access check at the same time as the access, we need to check access in a
separate operation using different parameters. Worse, we need to implement a
part of the access check as a blacklist of dangerous properties.
This CL expands the blacklist slightly by adding in the real named properties
from the DOMWindow instance to the current list (which included the real named
properties of the shadow object).
In the longer term, we should investigate whether we can change the V8 API to
let us do the access check in the same callback as the property access itself.
BUG=237022
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15346002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150616 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | bool V8DOMWindow::namedSecurityCheckCustom(v8::Local<v8::Object> host, v8::Local<v8::Value> key, v8::AccessType type, v8::Local<v8::Value>)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::Handle<v8::Object> window = host->FindInstanceInPrototypeChain(V8DOMWindow::GetTemplate(isolate, worldTypeInMainThread(isolate)));
if (window.IsEmpty())
return false; // the frame is gone.
DOMWindow* targetWindow = V8DOMWindow::toNative(window);
ASSERT(targetWindow);
Frame* target = targetWindow->frame();
if (!target)
return false;
if (target->loader()->stateMachine()->isDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument())
target->loader()->didAccessInitialDocument();
if (key->IsString()) {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, nameOfProtoProperty, ("__proto__", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
String name = toWebCoreString(key);
Frame* childFrame = target->tree()->scopedChild(name);
if (type == v8::ACCESS_HAS && childFrame)
return true;
v8::Handle<v8::String> keyString = key->ToString();
if (type == v8::ACCESS_GET
&& childFrame
&& !host->HasRealNamedProperty(keyString)
&& !window->HasRealNamedProperty(keyString)
&& name != nameOfProtoProperty)
return true;
}
return BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame(target, DoNotReportSecurityError);
}
| 171,335 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int orangefs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
struct orangefs_inode_s *orangefs_inode = ORANGEFS_I(inode);
int error = 0;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
const char *name = NULL;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
/*
* can we represent this with the traditional file
* mode permission bits?
*/
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
if (error < 0) {
gossip_err("%s: posix_acl_equiv_mode err: %d\n",
__func__,
error);
return error;
}
if (inode->i_mode != mode)
SetModeFlag(orangefs_inode);
inode->i_mode = mode;
mark_inode_dirty_sync(inode);
if (error == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
gossip_err("%s: invalid type %d!\n", __func__, type);
return -EINVAL;
}
gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
"%s: inode %pU, key %s type %d\n",
__func__, get_khandle_from_ino(inode),
name,
type);
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
value = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return -ENOMEM;
error = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (error < 0)
goto out;
}
gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
"%s: name %s, value %p, size %zd, acl %p\n",
__func__, name, value, size, acl);
/*
* Go ahead and set the extended attribute now. NOTE: Suppose acl
* was NULL, then value will be NULL and size will be 0 and that
* will xlate to a removexattr. However, we don't want removexattr
* complain if attributes does not exist.
*/
error = orangefs_inode_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0);
out:
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | int orangefs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
struct orangefs_inode_s *orangefs_inode = ORANGEFS_I(inode);
int error = 0;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
const char *name = NULL;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
umode_t mode;
error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &mode, &acl);
if (error) {
gossip_err("%s: posix_acl_update_mode err: %d\n",
__func__,
error);
return error;
}
if (inode->i_mode != mode)
SetModeFlag(orangefs_inode);
inode->i_mode = mode;
mark_inode_dirty_sync(inode);
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
gossip_err("%s: invalid type %d!\n", __func__, type);
return -EINVAL;
}
gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
"%s: inode %pU, key %s type %d\n",
__func__, get_khandle_from_ino(inode),
name,
type);
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
value = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return -ENOMEM;
error = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (error < 0)
goto out;
}
gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
"%s: name %s, value %p, size %zd, acl %p\n",
__func__, name, value, size, acl);
/*
* Go ahead and set the extended attribute now. NOTE: Suppose acl
* was NULL, then value will be NULL and size will be 0 and that
* will xlate to a removexattr. However, we don't want removexattr
* complain if attributes does not exist.
*/
error = orangefs_inode_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0);
out:
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
| 166,977 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
fwd_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(0);
inv_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(1);
version_ = GET_PARAM(2); // 0: high precision forward transform
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void SetUp() {
fwd_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(0);
inv_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(1);
version_ = GET_PARAM(2); // 0: high precision forward transform
bit_depth_ = GET_PARAM(3);
mask_ = (1 << bit_depth_) - 1;
}
| 174,531 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WT_VoiceGain (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_I32 *pMixBuffer;
EAS_PCM *pInputBuffer;
EAS_I32 gain;
EAS_I32 gainIncrement;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 tmp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
EAS_I32 gainLeft, gainRight;
#endif
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pMixBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pMixBuffer;
pInputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
/*lint -e{703} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
gainIncrement = (pWTIntFrame->frame.gainTarget - pWTIntFrame->prevGain) << (16 - SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
if (gainIncrement < 0)
gainIncrement++;
/*lint -e{703} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
gain = pWTIntFrame->prevGain << 16;
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
gainLeft = pWTVoice->gainLeft;
gainRight = pWTVoice->gainRight;
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* incremental gain step to prevent zipper noise */
tmp0 = *pInputBuffer++;
gain += gainIncrement;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = gain >> 16;
/* scale sample by gain */
tmp2 *= tmp0;
/* stereo output */
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = tmp2 >> 14;
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/* left channel */
tmp0 = tmp2 * gainLeft;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp0 = tmp0 >> NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS;
tmp1 += tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/* right channel */
tmp0 = tmp2 * gainRight;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp0 = tmp0 >> NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS;
tmp1 += tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
/* mono output */
#else
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = tmp2 >> (NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS - 1);
tmp1 += tmp2;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void WT_VoiceGain (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_I32 *pMixBuffer;
EAS_PCM *pInputBuffer;
EAS_I32 gain;
EAS_I32 gainIncrement;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 tmp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
EAS_I32 gainLeft, gainRight;
#endif
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26366256");
return;
}
pMixBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pMixBuffer;
pInputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
/*lint -e{703} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
gainIncrement = (pWTIntFrame->frame.gainTarget - pWTIntFrame->prevGain) << (16 - SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
if (gainIncrement < 0)
gainIncrement++;
/*lint -e{703} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
gain = pWTIntFrame->prevGain << 16;
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
gainLeft = pWTVoice->gainLeft;
gainRight = pWTVoice->gainRight;
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* incremental gain step to prevent zipper noise */
tmp0 = *pInputBuffer++;
gain += gainIncrement;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = gain >> 16;
/* scale sample by gain */
tmp2 *= tmp0;
/* stereo output */
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = tmp2 >> 14;
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/* left channel */
tmp0 = tmp2 * gainLeft;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp0 = tmp0 >> NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS;
tmp1 += tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/* right channel */
tmp0 = tmp2 * gainRight;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp0 = tmp0 >> NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS;
tmp1 += tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
/* mono output */
#else
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = tmp2 >> (NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS - 1);
tmp1 += tmp2;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
#endif
}
}
| 174,606 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void start_auth_request(PgSocket *client, const char *username)
{
int res;
PktBuf *buf;
client->auth_user = client->db->auth_user;
/* have to fetch user info from db */
client->pool = get_pool(client->db, client->db->auth_user);
if (!find_server(client)) {
client->wait_for_user_conn = true;
return;
}
slog_noise(client, "Doing auth_conn query");
client->wait_for_user_conn = false;
client->wait_for_user = true;
if (!sbuf_pause(&client->sbuf)) {
release_server(client->link);
disconnect_client(client, true, "pause failed");
return;
}
client->link->ready = 0;
res = 0;
buf = pktbuf_dynamic(512);
if (buf) {
pktbuf_write_ExtQuery(buf, cf_auth_query, 1, username);
res = pktbuf_send_immediate(buf, client->link);
pktbuf_free(buf);
/*
* Should do instead:
* res = pktbuf_send_queued(buf, client->link);
* but that needs better integration with SBuf.
*/
}
if (!res)
disconnect_server(client->link, false, "unable to send login query");
}
Commit Message: Remove too early set of auth_user
When query returns 0 rows (user not found),
this user stays as login user...
Should fix #69.
CWE ID: CWE-287 | static void start_auth_request(PgSocket *client, const char *username)
{
int res;
PktBuf *buf;
/* have to fetch user info from db */
client->pool = get_pool(client->db, client->db->auth_user);
if (!find_server(client)) {
client->wait_for_user_conn = true;
return;
}
slog_noise(client, "Doing auth_conn query");
client->wait_for_user_conn = false;
client->wait_for_user = true;
if (!sbuf_pause(&client->sbuf)) {
release_server(client->link);
disconnect_client(client, true, "pause failed");
return;
}
client->link->ready = 0;
res = 0;
buf = pktbuf_dynamic(512);
if (buf) {
pktbuf_write_ExtQuery(buf, cf_auth_query, 1, username);
res = pktbuf_send_immediate(buf, client->link);
pktbuf_free(buf);
/*
* Should do instead:
* res = pktbuf_send_queued(buf, client->link);
* but that needs better integration with SBuf.
*/
}
if (!res)
disconnect_server(client->link, false, "unable to send login query");
}
| 168,871 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int spl_filesystem_file_read_line(zval * this_ptr, spl_filesystem_object *intern, int silent TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
int ret = spl_filesystem_file_read_line_ex(this_ptr, intern, silent TSRMLS_CC);
while (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_SKIP_EMPTY) && ret == SUCCESS && spl_filesystem_file_is_empty_line(intern TSRMLS_CC)) {
spl_filesystem_file_free_line(intern TSRMLS_CC);
ret = spl_filesystem_file_read_line_ex(this_ptr, intern, silent TSRMLS_CC);
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int spl_filesystem_file_read_line(zval * this_ptr, spl_filesystem_object *intern, int silent TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
int ret = spl_filesystem_file_read_line_ex(this_ptr, intern, silent TSRMLS_CC);
while (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_SKIP_EMPTY) && ret == SUCCESS && spl_filesystem_file_is_empty_line(intern TSRMLS_CC)) {
spl_filesystem_file_free_line(intern TSRMLS_CC);
ret = spl_filesystem_file_read_line_ex(this_ptr, intern, silent TSRMLS_CC);
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
| 167,078 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SampleTable::SampleTable(const sp<DataSource> &source)
: mDataSource(source),
mChunkOffsetOffset(-1),
mChunkOffsetType(0),
mNumChunkOffsets(0),
mSampleToChunkOffset(-1),
mNumSampleToChunkOffsets(0),
mSampleSizeOffset(-1),
mSampleSizeFieldSize(0),
mDefaultSampleSize(0),
mNumSampleSizes(0),
mTimeToSampleCount(0),
mTimeToSample(),
mSampleTimeEntries(NULL),
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries(NULL),
mNumCompositionTimeDeltaEntries(0),
mCompositionDeltaLookup(new CompositionDeltaLookup),
mSyncSampleOffset(-1),
mNumSyncSamples(0),
mSyncSamples(NULL),
mLastSyncSampleIndex(0),
mSampleToChunkEntries(NULL) {
mSampleIterator = new SampleIterator(this);
}
Commit Message: SampleTable.cpp: Fixed a regression caused by a fix for bug
28076789.
Detail: Before the original fix
(Id207f369ab7b27787d83f5d8fc48dc53ed9fcdc9) for 28076789, the
code allowed a time-to-sample table size to be 0. The change
made in that fix disallowed such situation, which in fact should
be allowed. This current patch allows it again while maintaining
the security of the previous fix.
Bug: 28288202
Bug: 28076789
Change-Id: I1c9a60c7f0cfcbd3d908f24998dde15d5136a295
CWE ID: CWE-20 | SampleTable::SampleTable(const sp<DataSource> &source)
: mDataSource(source),
mChunkOffsetOffset(-1),
mChunkOffsetType(0),
mNumChunkOffsets(0),
mSampleToChunkOffset(-1),
mNumSampleToChunkOffsets(0),
mSampleSizeOffset(-1),
mSampleSizeFieldSize(0),
mDefaultSampleSize(0),
mNumSampleSizes(0),
mHasTimeToSample(false),
mTimeToSampleCount(0),
mTimeToSample(),
mSampleTimeEntries(NULL),
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries(NULL),
mNumCompositionTimeDeltaEntries(0),
mCompositionDeltaLookup(new CompositionDeltaLookup),
mSyncSampleOffset(-1),
mNumSyncSamples(0),
mSyncSamples(NULL),
mLastSyncSampleIndex(0),
mSampleToChunkEntries(NULL) {
mSampleIterator = new SampleIterator(this);
}
| 173,771 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: swabHorAcc16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
TIFFSwabArrayOfShort(wp, wc);
horAcc16(tif, cp0, cc);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | swabHorAcc16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
TIFFSwabArrayOfShort(wp, wc);
return horAcc16(tif, cp0, cc);
}
| 166,888 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouter::OnDangerousDeepScanningResult(
const GURL& url,
const std::string& file_name,
const std::string& download_digest_sha256) {
if (client_) {
base::Value event(base::Value::Type::DICTIONARY);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyUrl, url.spec());
event.SetStringKey(kKeyFileName, file_name);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyDownloadDigestSha256, download_digest_sha256);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyProfileUserName, GetProfileUserName());
ReportRealtimeEvent(kKeyDangerousDownloadEvent, std::move(event));
}
}
Commit Message: Add reporting for DLP deep scanning
For each triggered rule in the DLP response, we report the download as
violating that rule.
This also implements the UnsafeReportingEnabled enterprise policy, which
controls whether or not we do any reporting.
Bug: 980777
Change-Id: I48100cfb4dd5aa92ed80da1f34e64a6e393be2fa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1772381
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691371}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouter::OnDangerousDeepScanningResult(
const GURL& url,
const std::string& file_name,
const std::string& download_digest_sha256) {
if (client_) {
// Create a real-time event dictionary from the arguments and report it.
base::Value event(base::Value::Type::DICTIONARY);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyUrl, url.spec());
event.SetStringKey(kKeyFileName, file_name);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyDownloadDigestSha256, download_digest_sha256);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyProfileUserName, GetProfileUserName());
ReportRealtimeEvent(kKeyDangerousDownloadEvent, std::move(event));
}
}
| 172,412 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SSLManager::OnSSLCertificateError(
base::WeakPtr<SSLErrorHandler::Delegate> delegate,
const content::GlobalRequestID& id,
const ResourceType::Type resource_type,
const GURL& url,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const net::SSLInfo& ssl_info,
bool fatal) {
DCHECK(delegate);
DVLOG(1) << "OnSSLCertificateError() cert_error: "
<< net::MapCertStatusToNetError(ssl_info.cert_status)
<< " id: " << id.child_id << "," << id.request_id
<< " resource_type: " << resource_type
<< " url: " << url.spec()
<< " render_process_id: " << render_process_id
<< " render_view_id: " << render_view_id
<< " cert_status: " << std::hex << ssl_info.cert_status;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SSLCertErrorHandler::Dispatch,
new SSLCertErrorHandler(delegate,
id,
resource_type,
url,
render_process_id,
render_view_id,
ssl_info,
fatal)));
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void SSLManager::OnSSLCertificateError(
const base::WeakPtr<SSLErrorHandler::Delegate>& delegate,
const content::GlobalRequestID& id,
const ResourceType::Type resource_type,
const GURL& url,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const net::SSLInfo& ssl_info,
bool fatal) {
DCHECK(delegate);
DVLOG(1) << "OnSSLCertificateError() cert_error: "
<< net::MapCertStatusToNetError(ssl_info.cert_status)
<< " id: " << id.child_id << "," << id.request_id
<< " resource_type: " << resource_type
<< " url: " << url.spec()
<< " render_process_id: " << render_process_id
<< " render_view_id: " << render_view_id
<< " cert_status: " << std::hex << ssl_info.cert_status;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SSLCertErrorHandler::Dispatch,
new SSLCertErrorHandler(delegate,
id,
resource_type,
url,
render_process_id,
render_view_id,
ssl_info,
fatal)));
}
| 170,996 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RunExtremalCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
int max_error = 0;
int total_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 100000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_input_block, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_temp_block, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, 64);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8() % 2 ? 255 : 0;
dst[j] = src[j] > 0 ? 0 : 255;
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block, test_temp_block, pitch_));
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
const int diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const int error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
}
EXPECT_GE(1, max_error)
<< "Error: Extremal 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has"
<< "an individual roundtrip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE(count_test_block/5, total_error)
<< "Error: Extremal 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has average"
<< " roundtrip error > 1/5 per block";
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void RunExtremalCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
int max_error = 0;
int total_error = 0;
int total_coeff_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 100000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, int16_t, test_input_block[64]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, test_temp_block[64]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, ref_temp_block[64]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint8_t, dst[64]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint8_t, src[64]);
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint16_t, dst16[64]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint16_t, src16[64]);
#endif
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
// Initialize a test block with input range [-mask_, mask_].
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
if (bit_depth_ == VPX_BITS_8) {
if (i == 0) {
src[j] = 255;
dst[j] = 0;
} else if (i == 1) {
src[j] = 0;
dst[j] = 255;
} else {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8() % 2 ? 255 : 0;
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8() % 2 ? 255 : 0;
}
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
if (i == 0) {
src16[j] = mask_;
dst16[j] = 0;
} else if (i == 1) {
src16[j] = 0;
dst16[j] = mask_;
} else {
src16[j] = rnd.Rand8() % 2 ? mask_ : 0;
dst16[j] = rnd.Rand8() % 2 ? mask_ : 0;
}
test_input_block[j] = src16[j] - dst16[j];
#endif
}
}
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block, test_temp_block, pitch_));
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
fwd_txfm_ref(test_input_block, ref_temp_block, pitch_, tx_type_));
if (bit_depth_ == VPX_BITS_8) {
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(dst16), pitch_));
#endif
}
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
const int diff =
bit_depth_ == VPX_BITS_8 ? dst[j] - src[j] : dst16[j] - src16[j];
#else
const int diff = dst[j] - src[j];
#endif
const int error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
const int coeff_diff = test_temp_block[j] - ref_temp_block[j];
total_coeff_error += abs(coeff_diff);
}
EXPECT_GE(1 << 2 * (bit_depth_ - 8), max_error)
<< "Error: Extremal 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has"
<< "an individual roundtrip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE((count_test_block << 2 * (bit_depth_ - 8))/5, total_error)
<< "Error: Extremal 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has average"
<< " roundtrip error > 1/5 per block";
EXPECT_EQ(0, total_coeff_error)
<< "Error: Extremal 8x8 FDCT/FHT has"
<< "overflow issues in the intermediate steps > 1";
}
}
| 174,559 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ikev2_parent_inR1outI2_continue(struct pluto_crypto_req_cont *pcrc,
struct pluto_crypto_req *r,
err_t ugh)
{
struct dh_continuation *dh = (struct dh_continuation *)pcrc;
struct msg_digest *md = dh->md;
struct state *const st = md->st;
stf_status e;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("ikev2 parent inR1outI2: calculating g^{xy}, sending I2"));
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"%s: Request was disconnected from state",
__FUNCTION__);
if (dh->md)
release_md(dh->md);
return;
}
/* XXX should check out ugh */
passert(ugh == NULL);
passert(cur_state == NULL);
passert(st != NULL);
passert(st->st_suspended_md == dh->md);
set_suspended(st, NULL); /* no longer connected or suspended */
set_cur_state(st);
st->st_calculating = FALSE;
e = ikev2_parent_inR1outI2_tail(pcrc, r);
if (dh->md != NULL) {
complete_v2_state_transition(&dh->md, e);
if (dh->md)
release_md(dh->md);
}
reset_globals();
passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void ikev2_parent_inR1outI2_continue(struct pluto_crypto_req_cont *pcrc,
struct pluto_crypto_req *r,
err_t ugh)
{
struct dh_continuation *dh = (struct dh_continuation *)pcrc;
struct msg_digest *md = dh->md;
struct state *const st = md->st;
stf_status e;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("ikev2 parent inR1outI2: calculating g^{xy}, sending I2"));
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"%s: Request was disconnected from state",
__FUNCTION__);
if (dh->md)
release_md(dh->md);
return;
}
/* XXX should check out ugh */
passert(ugh == NULL);
passert(cur_state == NULL);
passert(st != NULL);
passert(st->st_suspended_md == dh->md);
set_suspended(st, NULL); /* no longer connected or suspended */
set_cur_state(st);
st->st_calculating = FALSE;
e = ikev2_parent_inR1outI2_tail(pcrc, r);
if (dh->md != NULL) {
complete_v2_state_transition(&dh->md, e);
if (dh->md)
release_md(dh->md);
}
reset_globals();
}
| 166,472 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TPM_RC tpm_kdfa(TSS2_SYS_CONTEXT *sapi_context, TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg,
TPM2B *key, char *label, TPM2B *contextU, TPM2B *contextV, UINT16 bits,
TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *resultKey )
{
TPM2B_DIGEST tmpResult;
TPM2B_DIGEST tpm2bLabel, tpm2bBits, tpm2b_i_2;
UINT8 *tpm2bBitsPtr = &tpm2bBits.t.buffer[0];
UINT8 *tpm2b_i_2Ptr = &tpm2b_i_2.t.buffer[0];
TPM2B_DIGEST *bufferList[8];
UINT32 bitsSwizzled, i_Swizzled;
TPM_RC rval;
int i, j;
UINT16 bytes = bits / 8;
resultKey->t .size = 0;
tpm2b_i_2.t.size = 4;
tpm2bBits.t.size = 4;
bitsSwizzled = string_bytes_endian_convert_32( bits );
*(UINT32 *)tpm2bBitsPtr = bitsSwizzled;
for(i = 0; label[i] != 0 ;i++ );
tpm2bLabel.t.size = i+1;
for( i = 0; i < tpm2bLabel.t.size; i++ )
{
tpm2bLabel.t.buffer[i] = label[i];
}
resultKey->t.size = 0;
i = 1;
while( resultKey->t.size < bytes )
{
i_Swizzled = string_bytes_endian_convert_32( i );
*(UINT32 *)tpm2b_i_2Ptr = i_Swizzled;
j = 0;
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)&(tpm2b_i_2.b);
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)&(tpm2bLabel.b);
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)contextU;
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)contextV;
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)&(tpm2bBits.b);
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)0;
rval = tpm_hmac(sapi_context, hashAlg, key, (TPM2B **)&( bufferList[0] ), &tmpResult );
if( rval != TPM_RC_SUCCESS )
{
return( rval );
}
bool res = string_bytes_concat_buffer(resultKey, &(tmpResult.b));
if (!res) {
return TSS2_SYS_RC_BAD_VALUE;
}
}
resultKey->t.size = bytes;
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: kdfa: use openssl for hmac not tpm
While not reachable in the current code base tools, a potential
security bug lurked in tpm_kdfa().
If using that routine for an hmac authorization, the hmac was
calculated using the tpm. A user of an object wishing to
authenticate via hmac, would expect that the password is never
sent to the tpm. However, since the hmac calculation relies on
password, and is performed by the tpm, the password ends up
being sent in plain text to the tpm.
The fix is to use openssl to generate the hmac on the host.
Fixes: CVE-2017-7524
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-522 | TPM_RC tpm_kdfa(TSS2_SYS_CONTEXT *sapi_context, TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg,
TPM_RC tpm_kdfa(TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg,
TPM2B *key, char *label, TPM2B *contextU, TPM2B *contextV, UINT16 bits,
TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *resultKey )
{
TPM2B_DIGEST tpm2bLabel, tpm2bBits, tpm2b_i_2;
UINT8 *tpm2bBitsPtr = &tpm2bBits.t.buffer[0];
UINT8 *tpm2b_i_2Ptr = &tpm2b_i_2.t.buffer[0];
TPM2B_DIGEST *bufferList[8];
UINT32 bitsSwizzled, i_Swizzled;
TPM_RC rval = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
int i, j;
UINT16 bytes = bits / 8;
resultKey->t .size = 0;
tpm2b_i_2.t.size = 4;
tpm2bBits.t.size = 4;
bitsSwizzled = string_bytes_endian_convert_32( bits );
*(UINT32 *)tpm2bBitsPtr = bitsSwizzled;
for(i = 0; label[i] != 0 ;i++ );
tpm2bLabel.t.size = i+1;
for( i = 0; i < tpm2bLabel.t.size; i++ )
{
tpm2bLabel.t.buffer[i] = label[i];
}
resultKey->t.size = 0;
i = 1;
const EVP_MD *md = tpm_algorithm_to_openssl_digest(hashAlg);
if (!md) {
LOG_ERR("Algorithm not supported for hmac: %x", hashAlg);
return TPM_RC_HASH;
}
HMAC_CTX ctx;
HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
int rc = HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, key->buffer, key->size, md, NULL);
if (!rc) {
LOG_ERR("HMAC Init failed: %s", ERR_error_string(rc, NULL));
return TPM_RC_MEMORY;
}
// TODO Why is this a loop? It appears to only execute once.
while( resultKey->t.size < bytes )
{
TPM2B_DIGEST tmpResult;
i_Swizzled = string_bytes_endian_convert_32( i );
*(UINT32 *)tpm2b_i_2Ptr = i_Swizzled;
j = 0;
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)&(tpm2b_i_2.b);
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)&(tpm2bLabel.b);
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)contextU;
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)contextV;
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)&(tpm2bBits.b);
bufferList[j] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)0;
int c;
for(c=0; c < j; c++) {
TPM2B_DIGEST *digest = bufferList[c];
int rc = HMAC_Update(&ctx, digest->b.buffer, digest->b.size);
if (!rc) {
LOG_ERR("HMAC Update failed: %s", ERR_error_string(rc, NULL));
rval = TPM_RC_MEMORY;
goto err;
}
}
unsigned size = sizeof(tmpResult.t.buffer);
int rc = HMAC_Final(&ctx, tmpResult.t.buffer, &size);
if (!rc) {
LOG_ERR("HMAC Final failed: %s", ERR_error_string(rc, NULL));
rval = TPM_RC_MEMORY;
goto err;
}
tmpResult.t.size = size;
bool res = string_bytes_concat_buffer(resultKey, &(tmpResult.b));
if (!res) {
rval = TSS2_SYS_RC_BAD_VALUE;
goto err;
}
}
resultKey->t.size = bytes;
err:
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return rval;
}
| 168,265 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MakeUsernameForAccount(const base::DictionaryValue* result,
base::string16* gaia_id,
wchar_t* username,
DWORD username_length,
wchar_t* domain,
DWORD domain_length,
wchar_t* sid,
DWORD sid_length) {
DCHECK(gaia_id);
DCHECK(username);
DCHECK(domain);
DCHECK(sid);
*gaia_id = GetDictString(result, kKeyId);
HRESULT hr = GetSidFromId(*gaia_id, sid, sid_length);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) {
hr = OSUserManager::Get()->FindUserBySID(sid, username, username_length,
domain, domain_length);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr))
return;
}
LOGFN(INFO) << "No existing user found associated to gaia id:" << *gaia_id;
wcscpy_s(domain, domain_length, OSUserManager::GetLocalDomain().c_str());
username[0] = 0;
sid[0] = 0;
base::string16 os_username = GetDictString(result, kKeyEmail);
std::transform(os_username.begin(), os_username.end(), os_username.begin(),
::tolower);
base::string16::size_type at = os_username.find(L"@gmail.com");
if (at == base::string16::npos)
at = os_username.find(L"@googlemail.com");
if (at != base::string16::npos) {
os_username.resize(at);
} else {
std::string username_utf8 =
gaia::SanitizeEmail(base::UTF16ToUTF8(os_username));
size_t tld_length =
net::registry_controlled_domains::GetCanonicalHostRegistryLength(
gaia::ExtractDomainName(username_utf8),
net::registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES,
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
if (tld_length > 0) {
username_utf8.resize(username_utf8.length() - tld_length - 1);
os_username = base::UTF8ToUTF16(username_utf8);
}
}
if (os_username.size() > kWindowsUsernameBufferLength - 1)
os_username.resize(kWindowsUsernameBufferLength - 1);
for (auto& c : os_username) {
if (wcschr(L"@\\[]:|<>+=;?*", c) != nullptr || c < 32)
c = L'_';
}
wcscpy_s(username, username_length, os_username.c_str());
}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void MakeUsernameForAccount(const base::DictionaryValue* result,
base::string16* gaia_id,
wchar_t* username,
DWORD username_length,
wchar_t* domain,
DWORD domain_length,
wchar_t* sid,
DWORD sid_length,
bool* is_consumer_account) {
DCHECK(gaia_id);
DCHECK(username);
DCHECK(domain);
DCHECK(sid);
DCHECK(is_consumer_account);
// Determine if the email is a consumer domain (gmail.com or googlemail.com).
base::string16 email = GetDictString(result, kKeyEmail);
std::transform(email.begin(), email.end(), email.begin(), ::tolower);
base::string16::size_type consumer_domain_pos = email.find(L"@gmail.com");
if (consumer_domain_pos == base::string16::npos)
consumer_domain_pos = email.find(L"@googlemail.com");
*is_consumer_account = consumer_domain_pos != base::string16::npos;
*gaia_id = GetDictString(result, kKeyId);
HRESULT hr = GetSidFromId(*gaia_id, sid, sid_length);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) {
hr = OSUserManager::Get()->FindUserBySID(sid, username, username_length,
domain, domain_length);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr))
return;
}
LOGFN(INFO) << "No existing user found associated to gaia id:" << *gaia_id;
wcscpy_s(domain, domain_length, OSUserManager::GetLocalDomain().c_str());
username[0] = 0;
sid[0] = 0;
base::string16 os_username = email;
// If the email is a consumer domain, strip it.
if (consumer_domain_pos != base::string16::npos) {
os_username.resize(consumer_domain_pos);
} else {
std::string username_utf8 =
gaia::SanitizeEmail(base::UTF16ToUTF8(os_username));
size_t tld_length =
net::registry_controlled_domains::GetCanonicalHostRegistryLength(
gaia::ExtractDomainName(username_utf8),
net::registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES,
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
if (tld_length > 0) {
username_utf8.resize(username_utf8.length() - tld_length - 1);
os_username = base::UTF8ToUTF16(username_utf8);
}
}
if (os_username.size() > kWindowsUsernameBufferLength - 1)
os_username.resize(kWindowsUsernameBufferLength - 1);
for (auto& c : os_username) {
if (wcschr(L"@\\[]:|<>+=;?*", c) != nullptr || c < 32)
c = L'_';
}
wcscpy_s(username, username_length, os_username.c_str());
}
| 172,100 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
int ok = 0;
BIGNUM *q = NULL;
*ret = 0;
q = BN_new();
if (q == NULL)
goto err;
BN_set_word(q, 1);
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
BN_copy(q, dh->p);
BN_sub_word(q, 1);
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) >= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
ok = 1;
err:
if (q != NULL)
BN_free(q);
return (ok);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
int ok = 0;
BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
*ret = 0;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto err;
BN_set_word(tmp, 1);
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
BN_copy(tmp, dh->p);
BN_sub_word(tmp, 1);
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) >= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
if (dh->q != NULL) {
/* Check pub_key^q == 1 mod p */
if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_is_one(tmp))
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return (ok);
}
| 165,258 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION( msgfmt_format_message )
{
zval *args;
UChar *spattern = NULL;
int spattern_len = 0;
char *pattern = NULL;
int pattern_len = 0;
const char *slocale = NULL;
int slocale_len = 0;
MessageFormatter_object mf = {0};
MessageFormatter_object *mfo = &mf;
/* Parse parameters. */
if( zend_parse_method_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "ssa",
&slocale, &slocale_len, &pattern, &pattern_len, &args ) == FAILURE )
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"msgfmt_format_message: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
msgformat_data_init(&mfo->mf_data TSRMLS_CC);
if(pattern && pattern_len) {
intl_convert_utf8_to_utf16(&spattern, &spattern_len, pattern, pattern_len, &INTL_DATA_ERROR_CODE(mfo));
if( U_FAILURE(INTL_DATA_ERROR_CODE((mfo))) )
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"msgfmt_format_message: error converting pattern to UTF-16", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
spattern_len = 0;
spattern = NULL;
}
if(slocale_len == 0) {
slocale = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
#ifdef MSG_FORMAT_QUOTE_APOS
if(msgformat_fix_quotes(&spattern, &spattern_len, &INTL_DATA_ERROR_CODE(mfo)) != SUCCESS) {
intl_error_set( NULL, U_INVALID_FORMAT_ERROR,
"msgfmt_format_message: error converting pattern to quote-friendly format", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#endif
/* Create an ICU message formatter. */
MSG_FORMAT_OBJECT(mfo) = umsg_open(spattern, spattern_len, slocale, NULL, &INTL_DATA_ERROR_CODE(mfo));
if(spattern && spattern_len) {
efree(spattern);
}
INTL_METHOD_CHECK_STATUS(mfo, "Creating message formatter failed");
msgfmt_do_format(mfo, args, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
/* drop the temporary formatter */
msgformat_data_free(&mfo->mf_data TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73007: add locale length check
CWE ID: CWE-119 | PHP_FUNCTION( msgfmt_format_message )
{
zval *args;
UChar *spattern = NULL;
int spattern_len = 0;
char *pattern = NULL;
int pattern_len = 0;
const char *slocale = NULL;
int slocale_len = 0;
MessageFormatter_object mf = {0};
MessageFormatter_object *mfo = &mf;
/* Parse parameters. */
if( zend_parse_method_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "ssa",
&slocale, &slocale_len, &pattern, &pattern_len, &args ) == FAILURE )
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"msgfmt_format_message: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
INTL_CHECK_LOCALE_LEN(slocale_len);
msgformat_data_init(&mfo->mf_data TSRMLS_CC);
if(pattern && pattern_len) {
intl_convert_utf8_to_utf16(&spattern, &spattern_len, pattern, pattern_len, &INTL_DATA_ERROR_CODE(mfo));
if( U_FAILURE(INTL_DATA_ERROR_CODE((mfo))) )
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"msgfmt_format_message: error converting pattern to UTF-16", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
spattern_len = 0;
spattern = NULL;
}
if(slocale_len == 0) {
slocale = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
#ifdef MSG_FORMAT_QUOTE_APOS
if(msgformat_fix_quotes(&spattern, &spattern_len, &INTL_DATA_ERROR_CODE(mfo)) != SUCCESS) {
intl_error_set( NULL, U_INVALID_FORMAT_ERROR,
"msgfmt_format_message: error converting pattern to quote-friendly format", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#endif
/* Create an ICU message formatter. */
MSG_FORMAT_OBJECT(mfo) = umsg_open(spattern, spattern_len, slocale, NULL, &INTL_DATA_ERROR_CODE(mfo));
if(spattern && spattern_len) {
efree(spattern);
}
INTL_METHOD_CHECK_STATUS(mfo, "Creating message formatter failed");
msgfmt_do_format(mfo, args, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
/* drop the temporary formatter */
msgformat_data_free(&mfo->mf_data TSRMLS_CC);
}
| 166,933 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MediaElementAudioSourceNode::OnCurrentSrcChanged(const KURL& current_src) {
GetMediaElementAudioSourceHandler().OnCurrentSrcChanged(current_src);
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void MediaElementAudioSourceNode::OnCurrentSrcChanged(const KURL& current_src) {
| 173,146 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void OMXNodeInstance::onEvent(
OMX_EVENTTYPE event, OMX_U32 arg1, OMX_U32 arg2) {
const char *arg1String = "??";
const char *arg2String = "??";
ADebug::Level level = ADebug::kDebugInternalState;
switch (event) {
case OMX_EventCmdComplete:
arg1String = asString((OMX_COMMANDTYPE)arg1);
switch (arg1) {
case OMX_CommandStateSet:
arg2String = asString((OMX_STATETYPE)arg2);
level = ADebug::kDebugState;
break;
case OMX_CommandFlush:
case OMX_CommandPortEnable:
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
bumpDebugLevel_l(2 /* numInputBuffers */, 2 /* numOutputBuffers */);
}
default:
arg2String = portString(arg2);
}
break;
case OMX_EventError:
arg1String = asString((OMX_ERRORTYPE)arg1);
level = ADebug::kDebugLifeCycle;
break;
case OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged:
arg2String = asString((OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)arg2);
default:
arg1String = portString(arg1);
}
CLOGI_(level, onEvent, "%s(%x), %s(%x), %s(%x)",
asString(event), event, arg1String, arg1, arg2String, arg2);
const sp<GraphicBufferSource>& bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL
&& event == OMX_EventCmdComplete
&& arg1 == OMX_CommandStateSet
&& arg2 == OMX_StateExecuting) {
bufferSource->omxExecuting();
}
}
Commit Message: IOMX: allow configuration after going to loaded state
This was disallowed recently but we still use it as MediaCodcec.stop
only goes to loaded state, and does not free component.
Bug: 31450460
Change-Id: I72e092e4e55c9f23b1baee3e950d76e84a5ef28d
(cherry picked from commit e03b22839d78c841ce0a1a0a1ee1960932188b0b)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void OMXNodeInstance::onEvent(
OMX_EVENTTYPE event, OMX_U32 arg1, OMX_U32 arg2) {
const char *arg1String = "??";
const char *arg2String = "??";
ADebug::Level level = ADebug::kDebugInternalState;
switch (event) {
case OMX_EventCmdComplete:
arg1String = asString((OMX_COMMANDTYPE)arg1);
switch (arg1) {
case OMX_CommandStateSet:
arg2String = asString((OMX_STATETYPE)arg2);
level = ADebug::kDebugState;
break;
case OMX_CommandFlush:
case OMX_CommandPortEnable:
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
bumpDebugLevel_l(2 /* numInputBuffers */, 2 /* numOutputBuffers */);
}
default:
arg2String = portString(arg2);
}
break;
case OMX_EventError:
arg1String = asString((OMX_ERRORTYPE)arg1);
level = ADebug::kDebugLifeCycle;
break;
case OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged:
arg2String = asString((OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)arg2);
default:
arg1String = portString(arg1);
}
CLOGI_(level, onEvent, "%s(%x), %s(%x), %s(%x)",
asString(event), event, arg1String, arg1, arg2String, arg2);
const sp<GraphicBufferSource>& bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL
&& event == OMX_EventCmdComplete
&& arg1 == OMX_CommandStateSet
&& arg2 == OMX_StateExecuting) {
bufferSource->omxExecuting();
}
// allow configuration if we return to the loaded state
if (event == OMX_EventCmdComplete
&& arg1 == OMX_CommandStateSet
&& arg2 == OMX_StateLoaded) {
mSailed = false;
}
}
| 173,379 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlLoadEntityContent(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlEntityPtr entity) {
xmlParserInputPtr input;
xmlBufferPtr buf;
int l, c;
int count = 0;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (entity == NULL) ||
((entity->etype != XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(entity->etype != XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY)) ||
(entity->content != NULL)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlLoadEntityContent parameter error");
return(-1);
}
if (xmlParserDebugEntities)
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"Reading %s entity content input\n", entity->name);
buf = xmlBufferCreate();
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlLoadEntityContent parameter error");
return(-1);
}
input = xmlNewEntityInputStream(ctxt, entity);
if (input == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlLoadEntityContent input error");
xmlBufferFree(buf);
return(-1);
}
/*
* Push the entity as the current input, read char by char
* saving to the buffer until the end of the entity or an error
*/
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0) {
xmlBufferFree(buf);
return(-1);
}
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while ((ctxt->input == input) && (ctxt->input->cur < ctxt->input->end) &&
(IS_CHAR(c))) {
xmlBufferAdd(buf, ctxt->input->cur, l);
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
if ((ctxt->input == input) && (ctxt->input->cur >= ctxt->input->end)) {
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
} else if (!IS_CHAR(c)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"xmlLoadEntityContent: invalid char value %d\n",
c);
xmlBufferFree(buf);
return(-1);
}
entity->content = buf->content;
buf->content = NULL;
xmlBufferFree(buf);
return(0);
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlLoadEntityContent(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlEntityPtr entity) {
xmlParserInputPtr input;
xmlBufferPtr buf;
int l, c;
int count = 0;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (entity == NULL) ||
((entity->etype != XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(entity->etype != XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY)) ||
(entity->content != NULL)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlLoadEntityContent parameter error");
return(-1);
}
if (xmlParserDebugEntities)
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"Reading %s entity content input\n", entity->name);
buf = xmlBufferCreate();
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlLoadEntityContent parameter error");
return(-1);
}
input = xmlNewEntityInputStream(ctxt, entity);
if (input == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlLoadEntityContent input error");
xmlBufferFree(buf);
return(-1);
}
/*
* Push the entity as the current input, read char by char
* saving to the buffer until the end of the entity or an error
*/
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0) {
xmlBufferFree(buf);
return(-1);
}
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while ((ctxt->input == input) && (ctxt->input->cur < ctxt->input->end) &&
(IS_CHAR(c))) {
xmlBufferAdd(buf, ctxt->input->cur, l);
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlBufferFree(buf);
return(-1);
}
}
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
if ((ctxt->input == input) && (ctxt->input->cur >= ctxt->input->end)) {
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
} else if (!IS_CHAR(c)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"xmlLoadEntityContent: invalid char value %d\n",
c);
xmlBufferFree(buf);
return(-1);
}
entity->content = buf->content;
buf->content = NULL;
xmlBufferFree(buf);
return(0);
}
| 171,269 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PredictorDecodeRow(TIFF* tif, uint8* op0, tmsize_t occ0, uint16 s)
{
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->decoderow != NULL);
assert(sp->decodepfunc != NULL);
if ((*sp->decoderow)(tif, op0, occ0, s)) {
(*sp->decodepfunc)(tif, op0, occ0);
return 1;
} else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | PredictorDecodeRow(TIFF* tif, uint8* op0, tmsize_t occ0, uint16 s)
{
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->decoderow != NULL);
assert(sp->decodepfunc != NULL);
if ((*sp->decoderow)(tif, op0, occ0, s)) {
return (*sp->decodepfunc)(tif, op0, occ0);
} else
return 0;
}
| 166,876 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jpc_pi_nextpcrl(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
int rlvlno;
jpc_pirlvl_t *pirlvl;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int prchind;
int prcvind;
int *prclyrno;
int compno;
jpc_picomp_t *picomp;
int xstep;
int ystep;
uint_fast32_t trx0;
uint_fast32_t try0;
uint_fast32_t r;
uint_fast32_t rpx;
uint_fast32_t rpy;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
goto skip;
} else {
pi->xstep = 0;
pi->ystep = 0;
for (compno = 0, picomp = pi->picomps; compno < pi->numcomps;
++compno, ++picomp) {
for (rlvlno = 0, pirlvl = picomp->pirlvls; rlvlno <
picomp->numrlvls; ++rlvlno, ++pirlvl) {
xstep = picomp->hsamp * (1 <<
(pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + picomp->numrlvls -
rlvlno - 1));
ystep = picomp->vsamp * (1 <<
(pirlvl->prcheightexpn + picomp->numrlvls -
rlvlno - 1));
pi->xstep = (!pi->xstep) ? xstep :
JAS_MIN(pi->xstep, xstep);
pi->ystep = (!pi->ystep) ? ystep :
JAS_MIN(pi->ystep, ystep);
}
}
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->y = pi->ystart; pi->y < pi->yend; pi->y += pi->ystep -
(pi->y % pi->ystep)) {
for (pi->x = pi->xstart; pi->x < pi->xend; pi->x += pi->xstep -
(pi->x % pi->xstep)) {
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart, pi->picomp =
&pi->picomps[pi->compno]; pi->compno < pi->numcomps
&& pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend); ++pi->compno,
++pi->picomp) {
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart,
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
pi->rlvlno < pi->picomp->numrlvls &&
pi->rlvlno < pchg->rlvlnoend; ++pi->rlvlno,
++pi->pirlvl) {
if (pi->pirlvl->numprcs == 0) {
continue;
}
r = pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1 - pi->rlvlno;
trx0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->xstart, pi->picomp->hsamp << r);
try0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->ystart, pi->picomp->vsamp << r);
rpx = r + pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rpy = r + pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn;
if (((pi->x == pi->xstart && ((trx0 << r) % (1 << rpx))) ||
!(pi->x % (pi->picomp->hsamp << rpx))) &&
((pi->y == pi->ystart && ((try0 << r) % (1 << rpy))) ||
!(pi->y % (pi->picomp->vsamp << rpy)))) {
prchind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->x, pi->picomp->hsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(trx0,
pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn);
prcvind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->y, pi->picomp->vsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(try0,
pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn);
pi->prcno = prcvind * pi->pirlvl->numhprcs + prchind;
assert(pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno < pi->numlyrs &&
pi->lyrno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->lyrnoend); ++pi->lyrno) {
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed numerous integer overflow problems in the code for packet iterators
in the JPC decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int jpc_pi_nextpcrl(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
int rlvlno;
jpc_pirlvl_t *pirlvl;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int prchind;
int prcvind;
int *prclyrno;
int compno;
jpc_picomp_t *picomp;
int xstep;
int ystep;
uint_fast32_t trx0;
uint_fast32_t try0;
uint_fast32_t r;
uint_fast32_t rpx;
uint_fast32_t rpy;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
goto skip;
} else {
pi->xstep = 0;
pi->ystep = 0;
for (compno = 0, picomp = pi->picomps; compno < pi->numcomps;
++compno, ++picomp) {
for (rlvlno = 0, pirlvl = picomp->pirlvls; rlvlno <
picomp->numrlvls; ++rlvlno, ++pirlvl) {
// Check for the potential for overflow problems.
if (pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls >
JAS_UINTFAST32_NUMBITS - 2 ||
pirlvl->prcheightexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls >
JAS_UINTFAST32_NUMBITS - 2) {
return -1;
}
xstep = picomp->hsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1));
ystep = picomp->vsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcheightexpn + picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1));
pi->xstep = (!pi->xstep) ? xstep : JAS_MIN(pi->xstep, xstep);
pi->ystep = (!pi->ystep) ? ystep : JAS_MIN(pi->ystep, ystep);
}
}
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->y = pi->ystart; pi->y < pi->yend; pi->y += pi->ystep -
(pi->y % pi->ystep)) {
for (pi->x = pi->xstart; pi->x < pi->xend; pi->x += pi->xstep -
(pi->x % pi->xstep)) {
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart, pi->picomp =
&pi->picomps[pi->compno]; pi->compno < pi->numcomps
&& pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend); ++pi->compno,
++pi->picomp) {
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart,
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
pi->rlvlno < pi->picomp->numrlvls &&
pi->rlvlno < pchg->rlvlnoend; ++pi->rlvlno,
++pi->pirlvl) {
if (pi->pirlvl->numprcs == 0) {
continue;
}
r = pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1 - pi->rlvlno;
trx0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->xstart, pi->picomp->hsamp << r);
try0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->ystart, pi->picomp->vsamp << r);
rpx = r + pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rpy = r + pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn;
if (((pi->x == pi->xstart &&
((trx0 << r) % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpx))) ||
!(pi->x % (pi->picomp->hsamp << rpx))) &&
((pi->y == pi->ystart &&
((try0 << r) % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpy))) ||
!(pi->y % (pi->picomp->vsamp << rpy)))) {
prchind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->x,
pi->picomp->hsamp << r), pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn) -
JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(trx0, pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn);
prcvind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->y,
pi->picomp->vsamp << r), pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn) -
JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(try0, pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn);
pi->prcno = prcvind * pi->pirlvl->numhprcs + prchind;
assert(pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno < pi->numlyrs &&
pi->lyrno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->lyrnoend);
++pi->lyrno) {
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
| 169,440 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Chapters::Atom::Parse(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size)
{
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x00) // Display ID
{
status = ParseDisplay(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x1654) // StringUID ID
{
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_string_uid);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x33C4) // UID ID
{
long long val;
status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, size, val);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
m_uid = val;
}
else if (id == 0x11) // TimeStart ID
{
const long long val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (val < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(val);
m_start_timecode = val;
}
else if (id == 0x12) // TimeEnd ID
{
const long long val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (val < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(val);
m_stop_timecode = val;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Chapters::Atom::Parse(
| 174,402 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mrb_class_real(struct RClass* cl)
{
if (cl == 0)
return NULL;
while ((cl->tt == MRB_TT_SCLASS) || (cl->tt == MRB_TT_ICLASS)) {
cl = cl->super;
}
return cl;
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476 | mrb_class_real(struct RClass* cl)
{
if (cl == 0) return NULL;
while ((cl->tt == MRB_TT_SCLASS) || (cl->tt == MRB_TT_ICLASS)) {
cl = cl->super;
if (cl == 0) return NULL;
}
return cl;
}
| 169,200 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: tt_cmap8_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p = table + 4;
FT_Byte* is32;
FT_UInt32 length;
FT_UInt32 num_groups;
if ( table + 16 + 8192 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
length = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( length > (FT_UInt32)( valid->limit - table ) || length < 8192 + 16 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
is32 = table + 12;
p = is32 + 8192; /* skip `is32' array */
num_groups = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( p + num_groups * 12 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check groups, they must be in increasing order */
FT_UInt32 n, start, end, start_id, count, last = 0;
for ( n = 0; n < num_groups; n++ )
{
FT_UInt hi, lo;
start = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
end = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
start_id = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( start > end )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( n > 0 && start <= last )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
if ( start_id + end - start >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
count = (FT_UInt32)( end - start + 1 );
{
hi = (FT_UInt)( start >> 16 );
lo = (FT_UInt)( start & 0xFFFFU );
if ( (is32[hi >> 3] & ( 0x80 >> ( hi & 7 ) ) ) == 0 )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( (is32[lo >> 3] & ( 0x80 >> ( lo & 7 ) ) ) == 0 )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
}
else
{
/* start_hi == 0; check that is32[i] is 0 for each i in */
/* the range [start..end] */
/* end_hi cannot be != 0! */
if ( end & ~0xFFFFU )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, start++ )
{
lo = (FT_UInt)( start & 0xFFFFU );
if ( (is32[lo >> 3] & ( 0x80 >> ( lo & 7 ) ) ) != 0 )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
}
}
last = end;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | tt_cmap8_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p = table + 4;
FT_Byte* is32;
FT_UInt32 length;
FT_UInt32 num_groups;
if ( table + 16 + 8192 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
length = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( length > (FT_UInt32)( valid->limit - table ) || length < 8192 + 16 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
is32 = table + 12;
p = is32 + 8192; /* skip `is32' array */
num_groups = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
/* p + num_groups * 12 > valid->limit ? */
if ( num_groups > (FT_UInt32)( valid->limit - p ) / 12 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check groups, they must be in increasing order */
FT_UInt32 n, start, end, start_id, count, last = 0;
for ( n = 0; n < num_groups; n++ )
{
FT_UInt hi, lo;
start = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
end = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
start_id = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( start > end )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( n > 0 && start <= last )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
FT_UInt32 d = end - start;
/* start_id + end - start >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) ? */
if ( d > TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) ||
start_id >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) - d )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
count = (FT_UInt32)( end - start + 1 );
{
hi = (FT_UInt)( start >> 16 );
lo = (FT_UInt)( start & 0xFFFFU );
if ( (is32[hi >> 3] & ( 0x80 >> ( hi & 7 ) ) ) == 0 )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( (is32[lo >> 3] & ( 0x80 >> ( lo & 7 ) ) ) == 0 )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
}
else
{
/* start_hi == 0; check that is32[i] is 0 for each i in */
/* the range [start..end] */
/* end_hi cannot be != 0! */
if ( end & ~0xFFFFU )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, start++ )
{
lo = (FT_UInt)( start & 0xFFFFU );
if ( (is32[lo >> 3] & ( 0x80 >> ( lo & 7 ) ) ) != 0 )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
}
}
last = end;
}
| 164,845 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int dynamicGetbuf(gdIOCtxPtr ctx, void *buf, int len)
{
int rlen, remain;
dpIOCtxPtr dctx;
dynamicPtr *dp;
dctx = (dpIOCtxPtr) ctx;
dp = dctx->dp;
remain = dp->logicalSize - dp->pos;
if(remain >= len) {
rlen = len;
} else {
if(remain == 0) {
/* 2.0.34: EOF is incorrect. We use 0 for
* errors and EOF, just like fileGetbuf,
* which is a simple fread() wrapper.
* TBB. Original bug report: Daniel Cowgill. */
return 0; /* NOT EOF */
}
rlen = remain;
}
memcpy(buf, (void *) ((char *)dp->data + dp->pos), rlen);
dp->pos += rlen;
return rlen;
}
Commit Message: Avoid potentially dangerous signed to unsigned conversion
We make sure to never pass a negative `rlen` as size to memcpy(). See
also <https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=73280>.
Patch provided by Emmanuel Law.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int dynamicGetbuf(gdIOCtxPtr ctx, void *buf, int len)
{
int rlen, remain;
dpIOCtxPtr dctx;
dynamicPtr *dp;
dctx = (dpIOCtxPtr) ctx;
dp = dctx->dp;
remain = dp->logicalSize - dp->pos;
if(remain >= len) {
rlen = len;
} else {
if(remain <= 0) {
/* 2.0.34: EOF is incorrect. We use 0 for
* errors and EOF, just like fileGetbuf,
* which is a simple fread() wrapper.
* TBB. Original bug report: Daniel Cowgill. */
return 0; /* NOT EOF */
}
rlen = remain;
}
memcpy(buf, (void *) ((char *)dp->data + dp->pos), rlen);
dp->pos += rlen;
return rlen;
}
| 168,769 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::string Backtrace::GetFunctionName(uintptr_t pc, uintptr_t* offset) {
std::string func_name = GetFunctionNameRaw(pc, offset);
if (!func_name.empty()) {
#if defined(__APPLE__)
if (func_name[0] != '_') {
return func_name;
}
#endif
char* name = __cxa_demangle(func_name.c_str(), 0, 0, 0);
if (name) {
func_name = name;
free(name);
}
}
return func_name;
}
Commit Message: Don't demangle symbol names.
Bug: http://b/27299236
Change-Id: I26ef47f80d4d6048a316ba51e83365ff65d70439
CWE ID: CWE-264 | std::string Backtrace::GetFunctionName(uintptr_t pc, uintptr_t* offset) {
std::string func_name = GetFunctionNameRaw(pc, offset);
return func_name;
}
| 173,887 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gfx::Rect AutofillPopupBaseView::CalculateClippingBounds() const {
if (parent_widget_)
return parent_widget_->GetClientAreaBoundsInScreen();
return PopupViewCommon().GetWindowBounds(delegate_->container_view());
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | gfx::Rect AutofillPopupBaseView::CalculateClippingBounds() const {
| 172,093 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static rsRetVal initZMQ(instanceData* pData) {
DEFiRet;
/* create the context if necessary. */
if (NULL == s_context) {
zsys_handler_set(NULL);
s_context = zctx_new();
if (s_workerThreads > 0) zctx_set_iothreads(s_context, s_workerThreads);
}
pData->socket = zsocket_new(s_context, pData->type);
if (NULL == pData->socket) {
errmsg.LogError(0, RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE,
"omzmq3: zsocket_new failed for %s: %s",
pData->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE);
}
/* use czmq defaults for these, unless set to non-default values */
if(pData->identity) zsocket_set_identity(pData->socket, (char*)pData->identity);
if(pData->sndBuf > -1) zsocket_set_sndbuf(pData->socket, pData->sndBuf);
if(pData->rcvBuf > -1) zsocket_set_sndbuf(pData->socket, pData->rcvBuf);
if(pData->linger > -1) zsocket_set_linger(pData->socket, pData->linger);
if(pData->backlog > -1) zsocket_set_backlog(pData->socket, pData->backlog);
if(pData->sndTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_sndtimeo(pData->socket, pData->sndTimeout);
if(pData->rcvTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_rcvtimeo(pData->socket, pData->rcvTimeout);
if(pData->maxMsgSize > -1) zsocket_set_maxmsgsize(pData->socket, pData->maxMsgSize);
if(pData->rate > -1) zsocket_set_rate(pData->socket, pData->rate);
if(pData->recoveryIVL > -1) zsocket_set_recovery_ivl(pData->socket, pData->recoveryIVL);
if(pData->multicastHops > -1) zsocket_set_multicast_hops(pData->socket, pData->multicastHops);
if(pData->reconnectIVL > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl(pData->socket, pData->reconnectIVL);
if(pData->reconnectIVLMax > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl_max(pData->socket, pData->reconnectIVLMax);
if(pData->ipv4Only > -1) zsocket_set_ipv4only(pData->socket, pData->ipv4Only);
if(pData->affinity != 1) zsocket_set_affinity(pData->socket, pData->affinity);
if(pData->rcvHWM > -1) zsocket_set_rcvhwm(pData->socket, pData->rcvHWM);
if(pData->sndHWM > -1) zsocket_set_sndhwm(pData->socket, pData->sndHWM);
/* bind or connect to it */
if (pData->action == ACTION_BIND) {
/* bind asserts, so no need to test return val here
which isn't the greatest api -- oh well */
if(-1 == zsocket_bind(pData->socket, (char*)pData->description)) {
errmsg.LogError(0, RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE, "omzmq3: bind failed for %s: %s",
pData->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE);
}
DBGPRINTF("omzmq3: bind to %s successful\n",pData->description);
} else {
if(-1 == zsocket_connect(pData->socket, (char*)pData->description)) {
errmsg.LogError(0, RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE, "omzmq3: connect failed for %s: %s",
pData->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE);
}
DBGPRINTF("omzmq3: connect to %s successful", pData->description);
}
finalize_it:
RETiRet;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1565 from Whissi/fix-format-security-issue-in-zmq-modules
Fix format security issue in zmq3 modules
CWE ID: CWE-134 | static rsRetVal initZMQ(instanceData* pData) {
DEFiRet;
/* create the context if necessary. */
if (NULL == s_context) {
zsys_handler_set(NULL);
s_context = zctx_new();
if (s_workerThreads > 0) zctx_set_iothreads(s_context, s_workerThreads);
}
pData->socket = zsocket_new(s_context, pData->type);
if (NULL == pData->socket) {
errmsg.LogError(0, RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE,
"omzmq3: zsocket_new failed for %s: %s",
pData->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE);
}
/* use czmq defaults for these, unless set to non-default values */
if(pData->identity) zsocket_set_identity(pData->socket, (char*)pData->identity);
if(pData->sndBuf > -1) zsocket_set_sndbuf(pData->socket, pData->sndBuf);
if(pData->rcvBuf > -1) zsocket_set_sndbuf(pData->socket, pData->rcvBuf);
if(pData->linger > -1) zsocket_set_linger(pData->socket, pData->linger);
if(pData->backlog > -1) zsocket_set_backlog(pData->socket, pData->backlog);
if(pData->sndTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_sndtimeo(pData->socket, pData->sndTimeout);
if(pData->rcvTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_rcvtimeo(pData->socket, pData->rcvTimeout);
if(pData->maxMsgSize > -1) zsocket_set_maxmsgsize(pData->socket, pData->maxMsgSize);
if(pData->rate > -1) zsocket_set_rate(pData->socket, pData->rate);
if(pData->recoveryIVL > -1) zsocket_set_recovery_ivl(pData->socket, pData->recoveryIVL);
if(pData->multicastHops > -1) zsocket_set_multicast_hops(pData->socket, pData->multicastHops);
if(pData->reconnectIVL > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl(pData->socket, pData->reconnectIVL);
if(pData->reconnectIVLMax > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl_max(pData->socket, pData->reconnectIVLMax);
if(pData->ipv4Only > -1) zsocket_set_ipv4only(pData->socket, pData->ipv4Only);
if(pData->affinity != 1) zsocket_set_affinity(pData->socket, pData->affinity);
if(pData->rcvHWM > -1) zsocket_set_rcvhwm(pData->socket, pData->rcvHWM);
if(pData->sndHWM > -1) zsocket_set_sndhwm(pData->socket, pData->sndHWM);
/* bind or connect to it */
if (pData->action == ACTION_BIND) {
/* bind asserts, so no need to test return val here
which isn't the greatest api -- oh well */
if(-1 == zsocket_bind(pData->socket, "%s", (char*)pData->description)) {
errmsg.LogError(0, RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE, "omzmq3: bind failed for %s: %s",
pData->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE);
}
DBGPRINTF("omzmq3: bind to %s successful\n",pData->description);
} else {
if(-1 == zsocket_connect(pData->socket, "%s", (char*)pData->description)) {
errmsg.LogError(0, RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE, "omzmq3: connect failed for %s: %s",
pData->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE);
}
DBGPRINTF("omzmq3: connect to %s successful", pData->description);
}
finalize_it:
RETiRet;
}
| 167,984 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ExtensionInstallDialogView::ExtensionInstallDialogView(
Profile* profile,
content::PageNavigator* navigator,
const ExtensionInstallPrompt::DoneCallback& done_callback,
std::unique_ptr<ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt> prompt)
: profile_(profile),
navigator_(navigator),
done_callback_(done_callback),
prompt_(std::move(prompt)),
container_(NULL),
scroll_view_(NULL),
handled_result_(false) {
InitView();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions UI] Initially disabled OK button for extension install prompts and enable them after a 500 ms time period.
BUG=394518
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2716353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461933}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ExtensionInstallDialogView::ExtensionInstallDialogView(
Profile* profile,
content::PageNavigator* navigator,
const ExtensionInstallPrompt::DoneCallback& done_callback,
std::unique_ptr<ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt> prompt)
: profile_(profile),
navigator_(navigator),
done_callback_(done_callback),
prompt_(std::move(prompt)),
container_(NULL),
scroll_view_(NULL),
handled_result_(false),
install_button_enabled_(false) {
InitView();
}
| 173,159 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DWORD WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::GetExitCode() {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DWORD exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
if (worker_process_.IsValid()) {
if (!::GetExitCodeProcess(worker_process_, &exit_code)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(INFO)
<< "Failed to query the exit code of the worker process";
exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
}
}
return exit_code;
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | DWORD WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::GetExitCode() {
DWORD WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::GetProcessId() const {
DWORD pid = 0;
if (pipe_.IsValid() && get_named_pipe_client_pid_(pipe_, &pid)) {
return pid;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
bool WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::IsPermanentError(
int failure_count) const {
// Get exit code of the worker process if it is available.
DWORD exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
if (worker_process_.IsValid()) {
if (!::GetExitCodeProcess(worker_process_, &exit_code)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(INFO)
<< "Failed to query the exit code of the worker process";
exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
}
}
// Stop trying to restart the worker process if it exited due to
// misconfiguration.
return (kMinPermanentErrorExitCode <= exit_code &&
exit_code <= kMaxPermanentErrorExitCode);
}
| 171,556 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = (struct ext4_inode_info *) foo;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_orphan);
init_rwsem(&ei->xattr_sem);
init_rwsem(&ei->i_data_sem);
inode_init_once(&ei->vfs_inode);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = (struct ext4_inode_info *) foo;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_orphan);
init_rwsem(&ei->xattr_sem);
init_rwsem(&ei->i_data_sem);
init_rwsem(&ei->i_mmap_sem);
inode_init_once(&ei->vfs_inode);
}
| 167,492 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void logi_dj_recv_add_djhid_device(struct dj_receiver_dev *djrcv_dev,
struct dj_report *dj_report)
{
/* Called in delayed work context */
struct hid_device *djrcv_hdev = djrcv_dev->hdev;
struct usb_interface *intf = to_usb_interface(djrcv_hdev->dev.parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
struct hid_device *dj_hiddev;
struct dj_device *dj_dev;
/* Device index goes from 1 to 6, we need 3 bytes to store the
* semicolon, the index, and a null terminator
*/
unsigned char tmpstr[3];
if (dj_report->report_params[DEVICE_PAIRED_PARAM_SPFUNCTION] &
SPFUNCTION_DEVICE_LIST_EMPTY) {
dbg_hid("%s: device list is empty\n", __func__);
djrcv_dev->querying_devices = false;
return;
}
if ((dj_report->device_index < DJ_DEVICE_INDEX_MIN) ||
(dj_report->device_index > DJ_DEVICE_INDEX_MAX)) {
dev_err(&djrcv_hdev->dev, "%s: invalid device index:%d\n",
__func__, dj_report->device_index);
return;
}
if (djrcv_dev->paired_dj_devices[dj_report->device_index]) {
/* The device is already known. No need to reallocate it. */
dbg_hid("%s: device is already known\n", __func__);
return;
}
dj_hiddev = hid_allocate_device();
if (IS_ERR(dj_hiddev)) {
dev_err(&djrcv_hdev->dev, "%s: hid_allocate_device failed\n",
__func__);
return;
}
dj_hiddev->ll_driver = &logi_dj_ll_driver;
dj_hiddev->dev.parent = &djrcv_hdev->dev;
dj_hiddev->bus = BUS_USB;
dj_hiddev->vendor = le16_to_cpu(usbdev->descriptor.idVendor);
dj_hiddev->product = le16_to_cpu(usbdev->descriptor.idProduct);
snprintf(dj_hiddev->name, sizeof(dj_hiddev->name),
"Logitech Unifying Device. Wireless PID:%02x%02x",
dj_report->report_params[DEVICE_PAIRED_PARAM_EQUAD_ID_MSB],
dj_report->report_params[DEVICE_PAIRED_PARAM_EQUAD_ID_LSB]);
usb_make_path(usbdev, dj_hiddev->phys, sizeof(dj_hiddev->phys));
snprintf(tmpstr, sizeof(tmpstr), ":%d", dj_report->device_index);
strlcat(dj_hiddev->phys, tmpstr, sizeof(dj_hiddev->phys));
dj_dev = kzalloc(sizeof(struct dj_device), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dj_dev) {
dev_err(&djrcv_hdev->dev, "%s: failed allocating dj_device\n",
__func__);
goto dj_device_allocate_fail;
}
dj_dev->reports_supported = get_unaligned_le32(
dj_report->report_params + DEVICE_PAIRED_RF_REPORT_TYPE);
dj_dev->hdev = dj_hiddev;
dj_dev->dj_receiver_dev = djrcv_dev;
dj_dev->device_index = dj_report->device_index;
dj_hiddev->driver_data = dj_dev;
djrcv_dev->paired_dj_devices[dj_report->device_index] = dj_dev;
if (hid_add_device(dj_hiddev)) {
dev_err(&djrcv_hdev->dev, "%s: failed adding dj_device\n",
__func__);
goto hid_add_device_fail;
}
return;
hid_add_device_fail:
djrcv_dev->paired_dj_devices[dj_report->device_index] = NULL;
kfree(dj_dev);
dj_device_allocate_fail:
hid_destroy_device(dj_hiddev);
}
Commit Message: HID: logitech: perform bounds checking on device_id early enough
device_index is a char type and the size of paired_dj_deivces is 7
elements, therefore proper bounds checking has to be applied to
device_index before it is used.
We are currently performing the bounds checking in
logi_dj_recv_add_djhid_device(), which is too late, as malicious device
could send REPORT_TYPE_NOTIF_DEVICE_UNPAIRED early enough and trigger the
problem in one of the report forwarding functions called from
logi_dj_raw_event().
Fix this by performing the check at the earliest possible ocasion in
logi_dj_raw_event().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void logi_dj_recv_add_djhid_device(struct dj_receiver_dev *djrcv_dev,
struct dj_report *dj_report)
{
/* Called in delayed work context */
struct hid_device *djrcv_hdev = djrcv_dev->hdev;
struct usb_interface *intf = to_usb_interface(djrcv_hdev->dev.parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
struct hid_device *dj_hiddev;
struct dj_device *dj_dev;
/* Device index goes from 1 to 6, we need 3 bytes to store the
* semicolon, the index, and a null terminator
*/
unsigned char tmpstr[3];
if (dj_report->report_params[DEVICE_PAIRED_PARAM_SPFUNCTION] &
SPFUNCTION_DEVICE_LIST_EMPTY) {
dbg_hid("%s: device list is empty\n", __func__);
djrcv_dev->querying_devices = false;
return;
}
if (djrcv_dev->paired_dj_devices[dj_report->device_index]) {
/* The device is already known. No need to reallocate it. */
dbg_hid("%s: device is already known\n", __func__);
return;
}
dj_hiddev = hid_allocate_device();
if (IS_ERR(dj_hiddev)) {
dev_err(&djrcv_hdev->dev, "%s: hid_allocate_device failed\n",
__func__);
return;
}
dj_hiddev->ll_driver = &logi_dj_ll_driver;
dj_hiddev->dev.parent = &djrcv_hdev->dev;
dj_hiddev->bus = BUS_USB;
dj_hiddev->vendor = le16_to_cpu(usbdev->descriptor.idVendor);
dj_hiddev->product = le16_to_cpu(usbdev->descriptor.idProduct);
snprintf(dj_hiddev->name, sizeof(dj_hiddev->name),
"Logitech Unifying Device. Wireless PID:%02x%02x",
dj_report->report_params[DEVICE_PAIRED_PARAM_EQUAD_ID_MSB],
dj_report->report_params[DEVICE_PAIRED_PARAM_EQUAD_ID_LSB]);
usb_make_path(usbdev, dj_hiddev->phys, sizeof(dj_hiddev->phys));
snprintf(tmpstr, sizeof(tmpstr), ":%d", dj_report->device_index);
strlcat(dj_hiddev->phys, tmpstr, sizeof(dj_hiddev->phys));
dj_dev = kzalloc(sizeof(struct dj_device), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dj_dev) {
dev_err(&djrcv_hdev->dev, "%s: failed allocating dj_device\n",
__func__);
goto dj_device_allocate_fail;
}
dj_dev->reports_supported = get_unaligned_le32(
dj_report->report_params + DEVICE_PAIRED_RF_REPORT_TYPE);
dj_dev->hdev = dj_hiddev;
dj_dev->dj_receiver_dev = djrcv_dev;
dj_dev->device_index = dj_report->device_index;
dj_hiddev->driver_data = dj_dev;
djrcv_dev->paired_dj_devices[dj_report->device_index] = dj_dev;
if (hid_add_device(dj_hiddev)) {
dev_err(&djrcv_hdev->dev, "%s: failed adding dj_device\n",
__func__);
goto hid_add_device_fail;
}
return;
hid_add_device_fail:
djrcv_dev->paired_dj_devices[dj_report->device_index] = NULL;
kfree(dj_dev);
dj_device_allocate_fail:
hid_destroy_device(dj_hiddev);
}
| 166,378 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: l2tp_msgtype_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(l2tp_msgtype2str, "MSGTYPE-#%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr))));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | l2tp_msgtype_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
l2tp_msgtype_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
if (length < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(l2tp_msgtype2str, "MSGTYPE-#%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr))));
}
| 167,896 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: e1000e_ring_empty(E1000ECore *core, const E1000E_RingInfo *r)
{
return core->mac[r->dh] == core->mac[r->dt];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | e1000e_ring_empty(E1000ECore *core, const E1000E_RingInfo *r)
{
return core->mac[r->dh] == core->mac[r->dt] ||
core->mac[r->dt] >= core->mac[r->dlen] / E1000_RING_DESC_LEN;
}
| 164,799 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DisconnectWindowLinux::Show(remoting::ChromotingHost* host,
const std::string& username) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Initial implementation of DisconnectWindow on Linux.
BUG=None
TEST=Manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88889 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void DisconnectWindowLinux::Show(remoting::ChromotingHost* host,
const std::string& username) {
host_ = host;
CreateWindow();
gtk_label_set_text(GTK_LABEL(user_label_), username.c_str());
gtk_window_present(GTK_WINDOW(disconnect_window_));
}
| 170,474 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
{
match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
{
match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
match_data->cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp;
return 0;
}
| 168,437 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static opj_bool pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [MJ2] To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | static opj_bool pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 169,773 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PP_Bool LaunchSelLdr(PP_Instance instance,
const char* alleged_url,
int socket_count,
void* imc_handles) {
std::vector<nacl::FileDescriptor> sockets;
IPC::Sender* sender = content::RenderThread::Get();
if (sender == NULL)
sender = g_background_thread_sender.Pointer()->get();
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
if (!sender->Send(new ChromeViewHostMsg_LaunchNaCl(
GURL(alleged_url), socket_count, &sockets,
&channel_handle))) {
return PP_FALSE;
}
bool invalid_handle = channel_handle.name.empty();
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
if (!invalid_handle)
invalid_handle = (channel_handle.socket.fd == -1);
#endif
if (!invalid_handle)
g_channel_handle_map.Get()[instance] = channel_handle;
CHECK(static_cast<int>(sockets.size()) == socket_count);
for (int i = 0; i < socket_count; i++) {
static_cast<nacl::Handle*>(imc_handles)[i] =
nacl::ToNativeHandle(sockets[i]);
}
return PP_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | PP_Bool LaunchSelLdr(PP_Instance instance,
const char* alleged_url, int socket_count,
void* imc_handles) {
std::vector<nacl::FileDescriptor> sockets;
IPC::Sender* sender = content::RenderThread::Get();
if (sender == NULL)
sender = g_background_thread_sender.Pointer()->get();
if (!sender->Send(new ChromeViewHostMsg_LaunchNaCl(
GURL(alleged_url), socket_count, &sockets)))
return PP_FALSE;
CHECK(static_cast<int>(sockets.size()) == socket_count);
for (int i = 0; i < socket_count; i++) {
static_cast<nacl::Handle*>(imc_handles)[i] =
nacl::ToNativeHandle(sockets[i]);
}
return PP_TRUE;
}
| 170,736 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PushMessagingServiceImpl::DidHandleMessage(
const std::string& app_id,
const base::Closure& message_handled_closure) {
auto in_flight_iterator = in_flight_message_deliveries_.find(app_id);
DCHECK(in_flight_iterator != in_flight_message_deliveries_.end());
in_flight_message_deliveries_.erase(in_flight_iterator);
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_BACKGROUND)
if (in_flight_message_deliveries_.empty())
in_flight_keep_alive_.reset();
#endif
message_handled_closure.Run();
if (push_messaging_service_observer_)
push_messaging_service_observer_->OnMessageHandled();
}
Commit Message: Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void PushMessagingServiceImpl::DidHandleMessage(
const std::string& app_id,
const base::Closure& message_handled_closure) {
auto in_flight_iterator = in_flight_message_deliveries_.find(app_id);
DCHECK(in_flight_iterator != in_flight_message_deliveries_.end());
in_flight_message_deliveries_.erase(in_flight_iterator);
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_BACKGROUND)
if (in_flight_message_deliveries_.empty())
in_flight_keep_alive_.reset();
#endif
message_handled_closure.Run();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
chrome::android::Java_PushMessagingServiceObserver_onMessageHandled(
base::android::AttachCurrentThread());
#endif
}
| 172,941 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"IncrementKeepaliveCount",
base::Bind(&LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::IncrementKeepaliveCount,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction(
"DecrementKeepaliveCount",
base::Bind(&LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::DecrementKeepaliveCount,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"IncrementKeepaliveCount", "tts",
base::Bind(&LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::IncrementKeepaliveCount,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction(
"DecrementKeepaliveCount", "tts",
base::Bind(&LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::DecrementKeepaliveCount,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,250 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int peer_recv_callback(rdpTransport* transport, wStream* s, void* extra)
{
freerdp_peer* client = (freerdp_peer*) extra;
rdpRdp* rdp = client->context->rdp;
switch (rdp->state)
{
case CONNECTION_STATE_INITIAL:
if (!rdp_server_accept_nego(rdp, s))
return -1;
if (rdp->nego->selected_protocol & PROTOCOL_NLA)
{
sspi_CopyAuthIdentity(&client->identity, &(rdp->nego->transport->credssp->identity));
IFCALLRET(client->Logon, client->authenticated, client, &client->identity, TRUE);
credssp_free(rdp->nego->transport->credssp);
}
else
{
IFCALLRET(client->Logon, client->authenticated, client, &client->identity, FALSE);
}
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_NEGO:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_connect_initial(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_CONNECT:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_erect_domain_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_ERECT_DOMAIN:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_attach_user_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_ATTACH_USER:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_channel_join_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_CHANNEL_JOIN:
if (rdp->settings->DisableEncryption)
{
if (!rdp_server_accept_client_keys(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
}
rdp->state = CONNECTION_STATE_ESTABLISH_KEYS;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case CONNECTION_STATE_ESTABLISH_KEYS:
if (!rdp_server_accept_client_info(rdp, s))
return -1;
IFCALL(client->Capabilities, client);
if (!rdp_send_demand_active(rdp))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_LICENSE:
if (!rdp_server_accept_confirm_active(rdp, s))
{
/**
* During reactivation sequence the client might sent some input or channel data
* before receiving the Deactivate All PDU. We need to process them as usual.
*/
Stream_SetPosition(s, 0);
return peer_recv_pdu(client, s);
}
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_ACTIVE:
if (peer_recv_pdu(client, s) < 0)
return -1;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid state %d\n", rdp->state);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int peer_recv_callback(rdpTransport* transport, wStream* s, void* extra)
{
freerdp_peer* client = (freerdp_peer*) extra;
rdpRdp* rdp = client->context->rdp;
switch (rdp->state)
{
case CONNECTION_STATE_INITIAL:
if (!rdp_server_accept_nego(rdp, s))
return -1;
if (rdp->nego->selected_protocol & PROTOCOL_NLA)
{
sspi_CopyAuthIdentity(&client->identity, &(rdp->nego->transport->credssp->identity));
IFCALLRET(client->Logon, client->authenticated, client, &client->identity, TRUE);
credssp_free(rdp->nego->transport->credssp);
rdp->nego->transport->credssp = NULL;
}
else
{
IFCALLRET(client->Logon, client->authenticated, client, &client->identity, FALSE);
}
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_NEGO:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_connect_initial(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_CONNECT:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_erect_domain_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_ERECT_DOMAIN:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_attach_user_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_ATTACH_USER:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_channel_join_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_CHANNEL_JOIN:
if (rdp->settings->DisableEncryption)
{
if (!rdp_server_accept_client_keys(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
}
rdp->state = CONNECTION_STATE_ESTABLISH_KEYS;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case CONNECTION_STATE_ESTABLISH_KEYS:
if (!rdp_server_accept_client_info(rdp, s))
return -1;
IFCALL(client->Capabilities, client);
if (!rdp_send_demand_active(rdp))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_LICENSE:
if (!rdp_server_accept_confirm_active(rdp, s))
{
/**
* During reactivation sequence the client might sent some input or channel data
* before receiving the Deactivate All PDU. We need to process them as usual.
*/
Stream_SetPosition(s, 0);
return peer_recv_pdu(client, s);
}
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_ACTIVE:
if (peer_recv_pdu(client, s) < 0)
return -1;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid state %d\n", rdp->state);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
| 167,600 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int decode_map(codebook *s, oggpack_buffer *b, ogg_int32_t *v, int point){
ogg_uint32_t entry = decode_packed_entry_number(s,b);
int i;
if(oggpack_eop(b))return(-1);
/* 1 used by test file 0 */
/* according to decode type */
switch(s->dec_type){
case 1:{
/* packed vector of values */
int mask=(1<<s->q_bits)-1;
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++){
v[i]=entry&mask;
entry>>=s->q_bits;
}
break;
}
case 2:{
/* packed vector of column offsets */
int mask=(1<<s->q_pack)-1;
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++){
if(s->q_bits<=8)
v[i]=((unsigned char *)(s->q_val))[entry&mask];
else
v[i]=((ogg_uint16_t *)(s->q_val))[entry&mask];
entry>>=s->q_pack;
}
break;
}
case 3:{
/* offset into array */
void *ptr=((char *)s->q_val)+entry*s->q_pack;
if(s->q_bits<=8){
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]=((unsigned char *)ptr)[i];
}else{
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]=((ogg_uint16_t *)ptr)[i];
}
break;
}
default:
return -1;
}
/* we have the unpacked multiplicands; compute final vals */
{
int shiftM = point-s->q_delp;
ogg_int32_t add = point-s->q_minp;
int mul = s->q_del;
if(add>0)
add= s->q_min >> add;
else
add= s->q_min << -add;
if (shiftM<0)
{
mul <<= -shiftM;
shiftM = 0;
}
add <<= shiftM;
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]= ((add + v[i] * mul) >> shiftM);
if(s->q_seq)
for(i=1;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]+=v[i-1];
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int decode_map(codebook *s, oggpack_buffer *b, ogg_int32_t *v, int point){
ogg_uint32_t entry = decode_packed_entry_number(s,b);
int i;
if(oggpack_eop(b))return(-1);
/* 1 used by test file 0 */
/* according to decode type */
switch(s->dec_type){
case 1:{
/* packed vector of values */
int mask=(1<<s->q_bits)-1;
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++){
v[i]=entry&mask;
entry>>=s->q_bits;
}
break;
}
case 2:{
/* packed vector of column offsets */
int mask=(1<<s->q_pack)-1;
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++){
if(s->q_bits<=8)
v[i]=((unsigned char *)(s->q_val))[entry&mask];
else
v[i]=((ogg_uint16_t *)(s->q_val))[entry&mask];
entry>>=s->q_pack;
}
break;
}
case 3:{
/* offset into array */
void *ptr=((char *)s->q_val)+entry*s->q_pack;
if(s->q_bits<=8){
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]=((unsigned char *)ptr)[i];
}else{
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]=((ogg_uint16_t *)ptr)[i];
}
break;
}
default:
return -1;
}
/* we have the unpacked multiplicands; compute final vals */
{
int shiftM = point-s->q_delp;
ogg_int32_t add = point-s->q_minp;
int mul = s->q_del;
if(add>0)
add= s->q_min >> add;
else
add= s->q_min << -add;
if (shiftM<0)
{
mul <<= -shiftM;
shiftM = 0;
}
add <<= shiftM;
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]= ((add + v[i] * mul) >> shiftM);
if(s->q_seq)
for(i=1;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]+=v[i-1];
}
return 0;
}
| 173,983 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void EnqueueData() {
scoped_array<uint8> audio_data(new uint8[kRawDataSize]);
CHECK_EQ(kRawDataSize % algorithm_.bytes_per_channel(), 0u);
CHECK_EQ(kRawDataSize % algorithm_.bytes_per_frame(), 0u);
size_t length = kRawDataSize / algorithm_.bytes_per_channel();
switch (algorithm_.bytes_per_channel()) {
case 4:
WriteFakeData<int32>(audio_data.get(), length);
break;
case 2:
WriteFakeData<int16>(audio_data.get(), length);
break;
case 1:
WriteFakeData<uint8>(audio_data.get(), length);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Unsupported audio bit depth in crossfade.";
}
algorithm_.EnqueueBuffer(new DataBuffer(audio_data.Pass(), kRawDataSize));
bytes_enqueued_ += kRawDataSize;
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void EnqueueData() {
scoped_array<uint8> audio_data(new uint8[kRawDataSize]);
CHECK_EQ(kRawDataSize % algorithm_.bytes_per_channel(), 0u);
CHECK_EQ(kRawDataSize % algorithm_.bytes_per_frame(), 0u);
// The value of the data is meaningless; we just want non-zero data to
// differentiate it from muted data.
memset(audio_data.get(), 1, kRawDataSize);
algorithm_.EnqueueBuffer(new DataBuffer(audio_data.Pass(), kRawDataSize));
bytes_enqueued_ += kRawDataSize;
}
| 171,532 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int send_solid_rect(VncState *vs)
{
size_t bytes;
tight_pack24(vs, vs->tight.tight.buffer, 1, &vs->tight.tight.offset);
bytes = 3;
} else {
bytes = vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int send_solid_rect(VncState *vs)
{
size_t bytes;
tight_pack24(vs, vs->tight.tight.buffer, 1, &vs->tight.tight.offset);
bytes = 3;
} else {
bytes = vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel;
}
| 165,462 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int wddx_stack_destroy(wddx_stack *stack)
{
register int i;
if (stack->elements) {
for (i = 0; i < stack->top; i++) {
if (((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->data) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->data);
}
if (((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->varname) {
efree(((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->varname);
}
efree(stack->elements[i]);
}
efree(stack->elements);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72860: wddx_deserialize use-after-free
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int wddx_stack_destroy(wddx_stack *stack)
{
register int i;
if (stack->elements) {
for (i = 0; i < stack->top; i++) {
if (((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->data
&& ((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->type != ST_FIELD) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->data);
}
if (((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->varname) {
efree(((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->varname);
}
efree(stack->elements[i]);
}
efree(stack->elements);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
| 166,936 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static aura::Window* OpenTestWindow(aura::Window* parent, bool modal) {
DCHECK(!modal || (modal && parent));
views::Widget* widget =
views::Widget::CreateWindowWithParent(new TestWindow(modal), parent);
widget->Show();
return widget->GetNativeView();
}
Commit Message: Removed requirement for ash::Window::transient_parent() presence for system modal dialogs.
BUG=130420
TEST=SystemModalContainerLayoutManagerTest.ModalTransientAndNonTransient
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10514012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@140647 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static aura::Window* OpenTestWindow(aura::Window* parent, bool modal) {
views::Widget* widget =
views::Widget::CreateWindowWithParent(new TestWindow(modal), parent);
widget->Show();
return widget->GetNativeView();
}
| 170,802 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AutofillExternalDelegate::OnSuggestionsReturned(
int query_id,
const std::vector<Suggestion>& input_suggestions,
bool autoselect_first_suggestion,
bool is_all_server_suggestions) {
if (query_id != query_id_)
return;
std::vector<Suggestion> suggestions(input_suggestions);
PossiblyRemoveAutofillWarnings(&suggestions);
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (!suggestions.empty() && !features::ShouldUseNativeViews()) {
suggestions.push_back(Suggestion());
suggestions.back().frontend_id = POPUP_ITEM_ID_SEPARATOR;
}
#endif
if (should_show_scan_credit_card_) {
Suggestion scan_credit_card(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_AUTOFILL_SCAN_CREDIT_CARD));
scan_credit_card.frontend_id = POPUP_ITEM_ID_SCAN_CREDIT_CARD;
scan_credit_card.icon = base::ASCIIToUTF16("scanCreditCardIcon");
suggestions.push_back(scan_credit_card);
}
has_autofill_suggestions_ = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < suggestions.size(); ++i) {
if (suggestions[i].frontend_id > 0) {
has_autofill_suggestions_ = true;
break;
}
}
if (should_show_cards_from_account_option_) {
suggestions.emplace_back(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_AUTOFILL_SHOW_ACCOUNT_CARDS));
suggestions.back().frontend_id = POPUP_ITEM_ID_SHOW_ACCOUNT_CARDS;
suggestions.back().icon = base::ASCIIToUTF16("google");
}
if (has_autofill_suggestions_)
ApplyAutofillOptions(&suggestions, is_all_server_suggestions);
if (suggestions.empty() && should_show_cc_signin_promo_) {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (has_autofill_suggestions_) {
suggestions.push_back(Suggestion());
suggestions.back().frontend_id = POPUP_ITEM_ID_SEPARATOR;
}
#endif
Suggestion signin_promo_suggestion(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_AUTOFILL_CREDIT_CARD_SIGNIN_PROMO));
signin_promo_suggestion.frontend_id =
POPUP_ITEM_ID_CREDIT_CARD_SIGNIN_PROMO;
suggestions.push_back(signin_promo_suggestion);
signin_metrics::RecordSigninImpressionUserActionForAccessPoint(
signin_metrics::AccessPoint::ACCESS_POINT_AUTOFILL_DROPDOWN);
}
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (!suggestions.empty() &&
suggestions.back().frontend_id == POPUP_ITEM_ID_SEPARATOR) {
suggestions.pop_back();
}
#endif
InsertDataListValues(&suggestions);
if (suggestions.empty()) {
manager_->client()->HideAutofillPopup();
return;
}
if (query_field_.is_focusable) {
manager_->client()->ShowAutofillPopup(
element_bounds_, query_field_.text_direction, suggestions,
autoselect_first_suggestion, GetWeakPtr());
}
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void AutofillExternalDelegate::OnSuggestionsReturned(
int query_id,
const std::vector<Suggestion>& input_suggestions,
bool autoselect_first_suggestion,
bool is_all_server_suggestions) {
if (query_id != query_id_)
return;
std::vector<Suggestion> suggestions(input_suggestions);
PossiblyRemoveAutofillWarnings(&suggestions);
if (should_show_scan_credit_card_) {
Suggestion scan_credit_card(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_AUTOFILL_SCAN_CREDIT_CARD));
scan_credit_card.frontend_id = POPUP_ITEM_ID_SCAN_CREDIT_CARD;
scan_credit_card.icon = base::ASCIIToUTF16("scanCreditCardIcon");
suggestions.push_back(scan_credit_card);
}
has_autofill_suggestions_ = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < suggestions.size(); ++i) {
if (suggestions[i].frontend_id > 0) {
has_autofill_suggestions_ = true;
break;
}
}
if (should_show_cards_from_account_option_) {
suggestions.emplace_back(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_AUTOFILL_SHOW_ACCOUNT_CARDS));
suggestions.back().frontend_id = POPUP_ITEM_ID_SHOW_ACCOUNT_CARDS;
suggestions.back().icon = base::ASCIIToUTF16("google");
}
if (has_autofill_suggestions_)
ApplyAutofillOptions(&suggestions, is_all_server_suggestions);
if (suggestions.empty() && should_show_cc_signin_promo_) {
Suggestion signin_promo_suggestion(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_AUTOFILL_CREDIT_CARD_SIGNIN_PROMO));
signin_promo_suggestion.frontend_id =
POPUP_ITEM_ID_CREDIT_CARD_SIGNIN_PROMO;
suggestions.push_back(signin_promo_suggestion);
signin_metrics::RecordSigninImpressionUserActionForAccessPoint(
signin_metrics::AccessPoint::ACCESS_POINT_AUTOFILL_DROPDOWN);
}
InsertDataListValues(&suggestions);
if (suggestions.empty()) {
manager_->client()->HideAutofillPopup();
return;
}
if (query_field_.is_focusable) {
manager_->client()->ShowAutofillPopup(
element_bounds_, query_field_.text_direction, suggestions,
autoselect_first_suggestion, GetWeakPtr());
}
}
| 172,097 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int http_connect(http_subtransport *t)
{
int error;
char *proxy_url;
if (t->connected &&
http_should_keep_alive(&t->parser) &&
t->parse_finished)
return 0;
if (t->io) {
git_stream_close(t->io);
git_stream_free(t->io);
t->io = NULL;
t->connected = 0;
}
if (t->connection_data.use_ssl) {
error = git_tls_stream_new(&t->io, t->connection_data.host, t->connection_data.port);
} else {
#ifdef GIT_CURL
error = git_curl_stream_new(&t->io, t->connection_data.host, t->connection_data.port);
#else
error = git_socket_stream_new(&t->io, t->connection_data.host, t->connection_data.port);
#endif
}
if (error < 0)
return error;
GITERR_CHECK_VERSION(t->io, GIT_STREAM_VERSION, "git_stream");
if (git_stream_supports_proxy(t->io) &&
!git_remote__get_http_proxy(t->owner->owner, !!t->connection_data.use_ssl, &proxy_url)) {
error = git_stream_set_proxy(t->io, proxy_url);
git__free(proxy_url);
if (error < 0)
return error;
}
error = git_stream_connect(t->io);
#if defined(GIT_OPENSSL) || defined(GIT_SECURE_TRANSPORT) || defined(GIT_CURL)
if ((!error || error == GIT_ECERTIFICATE) && t->owner->certificate_check_cb != NULL &&
git_stream_is_encrypted(t->io)) {
git_cert *cert;
int is_valid;
if ((error = git_stream_certificate(&cert, t->io)) < 0)
return error;
giterr_clear();
is_valid = error != GIT_ECERTIFICATE;
error = t->owner->certificate_check_cb(cert, is_valid, t->connection_data.host, t->owner->message_cb_payload);
if (error < 0) {
if (!giterr_last())
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "user cancelled certificate check");
return error;
}
}
#endif
if (error < 0)
return error;
t->connected = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: http: check certificate validity before clobbering the error variable
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static int http_connect(http_subtransport *t)
{
int error;
char *proxy_url;
if (t->connected &&
http_should_keep_alive(&t->parser) &&
t->parse_finished)
return 0;
if (t->io) {
git_stream_close(t->io);
git_stream_free(t->io);
t->io = NULL;
t->connected = 0;
}
if (t->connection_data.use_ssl) {
error = git_tls_stream_new(&t->io, t->connection_data.host, t->connection_data.port);
} else {
#ifdef GIT_CURL
error = git_curl_stream_new(&t->io, t->connection_data.host, t->connection_data.port);
#else
error = git_socket_stream_new(&t->io, t->connection_data.host, t->connection_data.port);
#endif
}
if (error < 0)
return error;
GITERR_CHECK_VERSION(t->io, GIT_STREAM_VERSION, "git_stream");
if (git_stream_supports_proxy(t->io) &&
!git_remote__get_http_proxy(t->owner->owner, !!t->connection_data.use_ssl, &proxy_url)) {
error = git_stream_set_proxy(t->io, proxy_url);
git__free(proxy_url);
if (error < 0)
return error;
}
error = git_stream_connect(t->io);
#if defined(GIT_OPENSSL) || defined(GIT_SECURE_TRANSPORT) || defined(GIT_CURL)
if ((!error || error == GIT_ECERTIFICATE) && t->owner->certificate_check_cb != NULL &&
git_stream_is_encrypted(t->io)) {
git_cert *cert;
int is_valid = (error == GIT_OK);
if ((error = git_stream_certificate(&cert, t->io)) < 0)
return error;
giterr_clear();
error = t->owner->certificate_check_cb(cert, is_valid, t->connection_data.host, t->owner->message_cb_payload);
if (error < 0) {
if (!giterr_last())
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "user cancelled certificate check");
return error;
}
}
#endif
if (error < 0)
return error;
t->connected = 1;
return 0;
}
| 170,109 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void dvb_usbv2_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
const char *name = d->name;
struct device dev = d->udev->dev;
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s: bInterfaceNumber=%d\n", __func__,
intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber);
if (d->props->exit)
d->props->exit(d);
dvb_usbv2_exit(d);
dev_info(&dev, "%s: '%s' successfully deinitialized and disconnected\n",
KBUILD_MODNAME, name);
}
Commit Message: [media] dvb-usb-v2: avoid use-after-free
I ran into a stack frame size warning because of the on-stack copy of
the USB device structure:
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c: In function 'dvb_usbv2_disconnect':
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:1029:1: error: the frame size of 1104 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
Copying a device structure like this is wrong for a number of other reasons
too aside from the possible stack overflow. One of them is that the
dev_info() call will print the name of the device later, but AFAICT
we have only copied a pointer to the name earlier and the actual name
has been freed by the time it gets printed.
This removes the on-stack copy of the device and instead copies the
device name using kstrdup(). I'm ignoring the possible failure here
as both printk() and kfree() are able to deal with NULL pointers.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void dvb_usbv2_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
const char *devname = kstrdup(dev_name(&d->udev->dev), GFP_KERNEL);
const char *drvname = d->name;
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s: bInterfaceNumber=%d\n", __func__,
intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber);
if (d->props->exit)
d->props->exit(d);
dvb_usbv2_exit(d);
pr_info("%s: '%s:%s' successfully deinitialized and disconnected\n",
KBUILD_MODNAME, drvname, devname);
kfree(devname);
}
| 168,222 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev1_t_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_t *p;
struct ikev1_pl_t t;
const u_char *cp;
const char *idstr;
const struct attrmap *map;
size_t nmap;
const u_char *ep2;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_t *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&t, ext, sizeof(t));
switch (proto) {
case 1:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t.t_id, ikev1_p_map);
map = oakley_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(oakley_t_map)/sizeof(oakley_t_map[0]);
break;
case 2:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t.t_id, ah_p_map);
map = ipsec_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(ipsec_t_map)/sizeof(ipsec_t_map[0]);
break;
case 3:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t.t_id, esp_p_map);
map = ipsec_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(ipsec_t_map)/sizeof(ipsec_t_map[0]);
break;
case 4:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t.t_id, ipcomp_p_map);
map = ipsec_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(ipsec_t_map)/sizeof(ipsec_t_map[0]);
break;
default:
idstr = NULL;
map = NULL;
nmap = 0;
break;
}
if (idstr)
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%d id=%s ", t.t_no, idstr));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%d id=%d ", t.t_no, t.t_id));
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1);
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
if (map && nmap) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp, (ep < ep2) ? ep : ep2,
map, nmap);
} else
cp = ikev1_attr_print(ndo, cp, (ep < ep2) ? ep : ep2);
}
if (ep < ep2)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"..."));
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13039/IKEv1: Do more bounds checking.
Have ikev1_attrmap_print() and ikev1_attr_print() do full bounds
checking, and return null on a bounds overflow. Have their callers
check for a null return.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev1_t_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_t *p;
struct ikev1_pl_t t;
const u_char *cp;
const char *idstr;
const struct attrmap *map;
size_t nmap;
const u_char *ep2;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_t *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&t, ext, sizeof(t));
switch (proto) {
case 1:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t.t_id, ikev1_p_map);
map = oakley_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(oakley_t_map)/sizeof(oakley_t_map[0]);
break;
case 2:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t.t_id, ah_p_map);
map = ipsec_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(ipsec_t_map)/sizeof(ipsec_t_map[0]);
break;
case 3:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t.t_id, esp_p_map);
map = ipsec_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(ipsec_t_map)/sizeof(ipsec_t_map[0]);
break;
case 4:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t.t_id, ipcomp_p_map);
map = ipsec_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(ipsec_t_map)/sizeof(ipsec_t_map[0]);
break;
default:
idstr = NULL;
map = NULL;
nmap = 0;
break;
}
if (idstr)
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%d id=%s ", t.t_no, idstr));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%d id=%d ", t.t_no, t.t_id));
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1);
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
if (map && nmap)
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp, ep2, map, nmap);
else
cp = ikev1_attr_print(ndo, cp, ep2);
if (cp == NULL)
goto trunc;
}
if (ep < ep2)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"..."));
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,842 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static cJSON *cJSON_New_Item( void )
{
cJSON* node = (cJSON*) cJSON_malloc( sizeof(cJSON) );
if ( node )
memset( node, 0, sizeof(cJSON) );
return node;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static cJSON *cJSON_New_Item( void )
static cJSON *cJSON_New_Item(void)
{
cJSON* node = (cJSON*)cJSON_malloc(sizeof(cJSON));
if (node) memset(node,0,sizeof(cJSON));
return node;
}
| 167,291 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: double AudioTrack::GetSamplingRate() const
{
return m_rate;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | double AudioTrack::GetSamplingRate() const
while (i != j) {
Track* const pTrack = *i++;
delete pTrack;
}
delete[] m_trackEntries;
}
| 174,352 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RunSignBiasCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_input_block, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_output_block, 64);
int count_sign_block[64][2];
const int count_test_block = 100000;
memset(count_sign_block, 0, sizeof(count_sign_block));
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j)
test_input_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() - rnd.Rand8();
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block, test_output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
if (test_output_block[j] < 0)
++count_sign_block[j][0];
else if (test_output_block[j] > 0)
++count_sign_block[j][1];
}
}
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
const int diff = abs(count_sign_block[j][0] - count_sign_block[j][1]);
const int max_diff = 1125;
EXPECT_LT(diff, max_diff)
<< "Error: 8x8 FDCT/FHT has a sign bias > "
<< 1. * max_diff / count_test_block * 100 << "%"
<< " for input range [-255, 255] at index " << j
<< " count0: " << count_sign_block[j][0]
<< " count1: " << count_sign_block[j][1]
<< " diff: " << diff;
}
memset(count_sign_block, 0, sizeof(count_sign_block));
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j)
test_input_block[j] = (rnd.Rand8() >> 4) - (rnd.Rand8() >> 4);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block, test_output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
if (test_output_block[j] < 0)
++count_sign_block[j][0];
else if (test_output_block[j] > 0)
++count_sign_block[j][1];
}
}
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
const int diff = abs(count_sign_block[j][0] - count_sign_block[j][1]);
const int max_diff = 10000;
EXPECT_LT(diff, max_diff)
<< "Error: 4x4 FDCT/FHT has a sign bias > "
<< 1. * max_diff / count_test_block * 100 << "%"
<< " for input range [-15, 15] at index " << j
<< " count0: " << count_sign_block[j][0]
<< " count1: " << count_sign_block[j][1]
<< " diff: " << diff;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void RunSignBiasCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, int16_t, test_input_block[64]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, test_output_block[64]);
int count_sign_block[64][2];
const int count_test_block = 100000;
memset(count_sign_block, 0, sizeof(count_sign_block));
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j)
test_input_block[j] = ((rnd.Rand16() >> (16 - bit_depth_)) & mask_) -
((rnd.Rand16() >> (16 - bit_depth_)) & mask_);
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block, test_output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
if (test_output_block[j] < 0)
++count_sign_block[j][0];
else if (test_output_block[j] > 0)
++count_sign_block[j][1];
}
}
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
const int diff = abs(count_sign_block[j][0] - count_sign_block[j][1]);
const int max_diff = kSignBiasMaxDiff255;
EXPECT_LT(diff, max_diff << (bit_depth_ - 8))
<< "Error: 8x8 FDCT/FHT has a sign bias > "
<< 1. * max_diff / count_test_block * 100 << "%"
<< " for input range [-255, 255] at index " << j
<< " count0: " << count_sign_block[j][0]
<< " count1: " << count_sign_block[j][1]
<< " diff: " << diff;
}
memset(count_sign_block, 0, sizeof(count_sign_block));
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
// Initialize a test block with input range [-mask_ / 16, mask_ / 16].
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j)
test_input_block[j] = ((rnd.Rand16() & mask_) >> 4) -
((rnd.Rand16() & mask_) >> 4);
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block, test_output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
if (test_output_block[j] < 0)
++count_sign_block[j][0];
else if (test_output_block[j] > 0)
++count_sign_block[j][1];
}
}
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
const int diff = abs(count_sign_block[j][0] - count_sign_block[j][1]);
const int max_diff = kSignBiasMaxDiff15;
EXPECT_LT(diff, max_diff << (bit_depth_ - 8))
<< "Error: 8x8 FDCT/FHT has a sign bias > "
<< 1. * max_diff / count_test_block * 100 << "%"
<< " for input range [-15, 15] at index " << j
<< " count0: " << count_sign_block[j][0]
<< " count1: " << count_sign_block[j][1]
<< " diff: " << diff;
}
}
| 174,561 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int snd_ctl_tlv_ioctl(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_tlv __user *_tlv,
int op_flag)
{
struct snd_card *card = file->card;
struct snd_ctl_tlv tlv;
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct snd_kcontrol_volatile *vd;
unsigned int len;
int err = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&tlv, _tlv, sizeof(tlv)))
return -EFAULT;
if (tlv.length < sizeof(unsigned int) * 2)
return -EINVAL;
down_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
kctl = snd_ctl_find_numid(card, tlv.numid);
if (kctl == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (kctl->tlv.p == NULL) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
vd = &kctl->vd[tlv.numid - kctl->id.numid];
if ((op_flag == 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READ) == 0) ||
(op_flag > 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_WRITE) == 0) ||
(op_flag < 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_COMMAND) == 0)) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_CALLBACK) {
if (vd->owner != NULL && vd->owner != file) {
err = -EPERM;
goto __kctl_end;
}
err = kctl->tlv.c(kctl, op_flag, tlv.length, _tlv->tlv);
if (err > 0) {
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_TLV, &kctl->id);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (op_flag) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
len = kctl->tlv.p[1] + 2 * sizeof(unsigned int);
if (tlv.length < len) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (copy_to_user(_tlv->tlv, kctl->tlv.p, len))
err = -EFAULT;
}
__kctl_end:
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Don't access controls outside of protected regions
A control that is visible on the card->controls list can be freed at any time.
This means we must not access any of its memory while not holding the
controls_rw_lock. Otherwise we risk a use after free access.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | static int snd_ctl_tlv_ioctl(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_tlv __user *_tlv,
int op_flag)
{
struct snd_card *card = file->card;
struct snd_ctl_tlv tlv;
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct snd_kcontrol_volatile *vd;
unsigned int len;
int err = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&tlv, _tlv, sizeof(tlv)))
return -EFAULT;
if (tlv.length < sizeof(unsigned int) * 2)
return -EINVAL;
down_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
kctl = snd_ctl_find_numid(card, tlv.numid);
if (kctl == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (kctl->tlv.p == NULL) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
vd = &kctl->vd[tlv.numid - kctl->id.numid];
if ((op_flag == 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READ) == 0) ||
(op_flag > 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_WRITE) == 0) ||
(op_flag < 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_COMMAND) == 0)) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_CALLBACK) {
if (vd->owner != NULL && vd->owner != file) {
err = -EPERM;
goto __kctl_end;
}
err = kctl->tlv.c(kctl, op_flag, tlv.length, _tlv->tlv);
if (err > 0) {
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id = kctl->id;
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_TLV, &id);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (op_flag) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
len = kctl->tlv.p[1] + 2 * sizeof(unsigned int);
if (tlv.length < len) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (copy_to_user(_tlv->tlv, kctl->tlv.p, len))
err = -EFAULT;
}
__kctl_end:
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
return err;
}
| 166,295 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::internalGetParameter(OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *)params;
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
bitRate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
bitRate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *avcParams = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *)params;
if (avcParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE omxLevel = OMX_VIDEO_AVCLevel41;
if (OMX_ErrorNone
!= ConvertAvcSpecLevelToOmxAvcLevel(mAVCEncLevel, &omxLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
avcParams->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileBaseline;
avcParams->eLevel = omxLevel;
avcParams->nRefFrames = 1;
avcParams->bUseHadamard = OMX_TRUE;
avcParams->nAllowedPictureTypes = (OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI
| OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeB);
avcParams->nRefIdx10ActiveMinus1 = 0;
avcParams->nRefIdx11ActiveMinus1 = 0;
avcParams->bWeightedPPrediction = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bconstIpred = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bDirect8x8Inference = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bDirectSpatialTemporal = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->nCabacInitIdc = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::internalGetParameter(OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(bitRate)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
bitRate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
bitRate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *avcParams = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(avcParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (avcParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE omxLevel = OMX_VIDEO_AVCLevel41;
if (OMX_ErrorNone
!= ConvertAvcSpecLevelToOmxAvcLevel(mAVCEncLevel, &omxLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
avcParams->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileBaseline;
avcParams->eLevel = omxLevel;
avcParams->nRefFrames = 1;
avcParams->bUseHadamard = OMX_TRUE;
avcParams->nAllowedPictureTypes = (OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI
| OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeB);
avcParams->nRefIdx10ActiveMinus1 = 0;
avcParams->nRefIdx11ActiveMinus1 = 0;
avcParams->bWeightedPPrediction = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bconstIpred = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bDirect8x8Inference = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bDirectSpatialTemporal = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->nCabacInitIdc = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,200 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, ftell)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
long ret = php_stream_tell(intern->u.file.stream);
if (ret == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
RETURN_LONG(ret);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int SplFileObject::fseek(int pos [, int whence = SEEK_SET])
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, ftell)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
long ret = php_stream_tell(intern->u.file.stream);
if (ret == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
RETURN_LONG(ret);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int SplFileObject::fseek(int pos [, int whence = SEEK_SET])
| 167,065 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int find_source_vc(char **ret_path, unsigned *ret_idx) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
int r, err = 0;
unsigned i;
path = new(char, sizeof("/dev/tty63"));
if (!path)
return log_oom();
for (i = 1; i <= 63; i++) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
r = verify_vc_allocation(i);
if (r < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -r;
continue;
}
sprintf(path, "/dev/tty%u", i);
fd = open_terminal(path, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
if (fd < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -fd;
continue;
}
r = verify_vc_kbmode(fd);
if (r < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -r;
continue;
}
/* all checks passed, return this one as a source console */
*ret_idx = i;
*ret_path = TAKE_PTR(path);
return TAKE_FD(fd);
}
return log_error_errno(err, "No usable source console found: %m");
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | static int find_source_vc(char **ret_path, unsigned *ret_idx) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
int r, err = 0;
unsigned i;
path = new(char, sizeof("/dev/tty63"));
if (!path)
return log_oom();
for (i = 1; i <= 63; i++) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
r = verify_vc_allocation(i);
if (r < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -r;
continue;
}
sprintf(path, "/dev/tty%u", i);
fd = open_terminal(path, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
if (fd < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -fd;
continue;
}
r = vt_verify_kbmode(fd);
if (r < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -r;
continue;
}
/* all checks passed, return this one as a source console */
*ret_idx = i;
*ret_path = TAKE_PTR(path);
return TAKE_FD(fd);
}
return log_error_errno(err, "No usable source console found: %m");
}
| 169,777 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
unsigned int mm_flags, unsigned long vm_flags,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int fault;
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
if (unlikely(!vma))
goto out;
if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > addr))
goto check_stack;
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so we can handle
* it.
*/
good_area:
/*
* Check that the permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which
* occurred.
*/
if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
goto out;
}
return handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, addr & PAGE_MASK, mm_flags);
check_stack:
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(vma, addr))
goto good_area;
out:
return fault;
}
Commit Message: Revert "arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions"
This reverts commit bc07c2c6e9ed125d362af0214b6313dca180cb08.
While the aim is increased security for --x memory maps, it does not
protect against kernel level reads. Until SECCOMP is implemented for
arm64, revert this patch to avoid giving a false idea of execute-only
mappings.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | static int __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
unsigned int mm_flags, unsigned long vm_flags,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int fault;
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
if (unlikely(!vma))
goto out;
if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > addr))
goto check_stack;
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so we can handle
* it.
*/
good_area:
/*
* Check that the permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which
* occurred. If we encountered a write or exec fault, we must have
* appropriate permissions, otherwise we allow any permission.
*/
if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
goto out;
}
return handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, addr & PAGE_MASK, mm_flags);
check_stack:
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(vma, addr))
goto good_area;
out:
return fault;
}
| 167,583 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::RunJavaScriptDialog(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
const base::string16& message,
const base::string16& default_prompt,
const GURL& frame_url,
JavaScriptDialogType dialog_type,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
bool suppress_this_message =
ShowingInterstitialPage() || !delegate_ ||
delegate_->ShouldSuppressDialogs(this) ||
!delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
if (!suppress_this_message) {
is_showing_javascript_dialog_ = true;
dialog_manager_ = delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
dialog_manager_->RunJavaScriptDialog(
this, frame_url, dialog_type, message, default_prompt,
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnDialogClosed, base::Unretained(this),
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID(), reply_msg, false),
&suppress_this_message);
}
if (suppress_this_message) {
OnDialogClosed(render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID(), reply_msg,
true, false, base::string16());
}
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void WebContentsImpl::RunJavaScriptDialog(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
const base::string16& message,
const base::string16& default_prompt,
const GURL& frame_url,
JavaScriptDialogType dialog_type,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
// Running a dialog causes an exit to webpage-initiated fullscreen.
// http://crbug.com/728276
if (IsFullscreenForCurrentTab())
ExitFullscreen(true);
bool suppress_this_message =
ShowingInterstitialPage() || !delegate_ ||
delegate_->ShouldSuppressDialogs(this) ||
!delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
if (!suppress_this_message) {
is_showing_javascript_dialog_ = true;
dialog_manager_ = delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
dialog_manager_->RunJavaScriptDialog(
this, frame_url, dialog_type, message, default_prompt,
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnDialogClosed, base::Unretained(this),
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID(), reply_msg, false),
&suppress_this_message);
}
if (suppress_this_message) {
OnDialogClosed(render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID(), reply_msg,
true, false, base::string16());
}
}
| 172,316 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ShelfLayoutManager::AutoHideState ShelfLayoutManager::CalculateAutoHideState(
VisibilityState visibility_state) const {
if (visibility_state != AUTO_HIDE || !launcher_widget())
return AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
Shell* shell = Shell::GetInstance();
if (shell->GetAppListTargetVisibility())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (shell->system_tray() && shell->system_tray()->should_show_launcher())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_ && launcher_->IsShowingMenu())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_widget()->IsActive() || status_->IsActive())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (event_filter_.get() && event_filter_->in_mouse_drag())
return AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
aura::RootWindow* root = launcher_widget()->GetNativeView()->GetRootWindow();
bool mouse_over_launcher =
launcher_widget()->GetWindowScreenBounds().Contains(
root->last_mouse_location());
return mouse_over_launcher ? AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN : AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ShelfLayoutManager::AutoHideState ShelfLayoutManager::CalculateAutoHideState(
VisibilityState visibility_state) const {
if (visibility_state != AUTO_HIDE || !launcher_widget())
return AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
Shell* shell = Shell::GetInstance();
if (shell->GetAppListTargetVisibility())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (shell->system_tray() && shell->system_tray()->should_show_launcher())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_ && launcher_->IsShowingMenu())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_ && launcher_->IsShowingOverflowBubble())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_widget()->IsActive() || status_->IsActive())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (event_filter_.get() && event_filter_->in_mouse_drag())
return AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
aura::RootWindow* root = launcher_widget()->GetNativeView()->GetRootWindow();
bool mouse_over_launcher =
launcher_widget()->GetWindowScreenBounds().Contains(
root->last_mouse_location());
return mouse_over_launcher ? AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN : AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
}
| 170,898 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void TearDown() {
vp9_worker_end(&worker_);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void TearDown() {
vpx_get_worker_interface()->end(&worker_);
}
| 174,600 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int bochs_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
BDRVBochsState *s = bs->opaque;
uint32_t i;
struct bochs_header bochs;
int ret;
bs->read_only = 1; // no write support yet
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 0, &bochs, sizeof(bochs));
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
if (strcmp(bochs.magic, HEADER_MAGIC) ||
strcmp(bochs.type, REDOLOG_TYPE) ||
strcmp(bochs.subtype, GROWING_TYPE) ||
((le32_to_cpu(bochs.version) != HEADER_VERSION) &&
(le32_to_cpu(bochs.version) != HEADER_V1))) {
error_setg(errp, "Image not in Bochs format");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(bochs.version) == HEADER_V1) {
bs->total_sectors = le64_to_cpu(bochs.extra.redolog_v1.disk) / 512;
} else {
bs->total_sectors = le64_to_cpu(bochs.extra.redolog.disk) / 512;
}
s->catalog_size = le32_to_cpu(bochs.catalog);
s->catalog_bitmap = g_malloc(s->catalog_size * 4);
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, le32_to_cpu(bochs.header), s->catalog_bitmap,
s->data_offset = le32_to_cpu(bochs.header) + (s->catalog_size * 4);
s->bitmap_blocks = 1 + (le32_to_cpu(bochs.bitmap) - 1) / 512;
s->extent_blocks = 1 + (le32_to_cpu(bochs.extent) - 1) / 512;
s->extent_size = le32_to_cpu(bochs.extent);
qemu_co_mutex_init(&s->lock);
return 0;
fail:
s->extent_size = le32_to_cpu(bochs.extent);
qemu_co_mutex_init(&s->lock);
return 0;
extent_index = offset / s->extent_size;
extent_offset = (offset % s->extent_size) / 512;
if (s->catalog_bitmap[extent_index] == 0xffffffff) {
return -1; /* not allocated */
}
bitmap_offset = s->data_offset + (512 * s->catalog_bitmap[extent_index] *
(s->extent_blocks + s->bitmap_blocks));
/* read in bitmap for current extent */
if (bdrv_pread(bs->file, bitmap_offset + (extent_offset / 8),
&bitmap_entry, 1) != 1) {
return -1;
}
if (!((bitmap_entry >> (extent_offset % 8)) & 1)) {
return -1; /* not allocated */
}
return bitmap_offset + (512 * (s->bitmap_blocks + extent_offset));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int bochs_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
BDRVBochsState *s = bs->opaque;
uint32_t i;
struct bochs_header bochs;
int ret;
bs->read_only = 1; // no write support yet
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 0, &bochs, sizeof(bochs));
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
if (strcmp(bochs.magic, HEADER_MAGIC) ||
strcmp(bochs.type, REDOLOG_TYPE) ||
strcmp(bochs.subtype, GROWING_TYPE) ||
((le32_to_cpu(bochs.version) != HEADER_VERSION) &&
(le32_to_cpu(bochs.version) != HEADER_V1))) {
error_setg(errp, "Image not in Bochs format");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(bochs.version) == HEADER_V1) {
bs->total_sectors = le64_to_cpu(bochs.extra.redolog_v1.disk) / 512;
} else {
bs->total_sectors = le64_to_cpu(bochs.extra.redolog.disk) / 512;
}
/* Limit to 1M entries to avoid unbounded allocation. This is what is
* needed for the largest image that bximage can create (~8 TB). */
s->catalog_size = le32_to_cpu(bochs.catalog);
if (s->catalog_size > 0x100000) {
error_setg(errp, "Catalog size is too large");
return -EFBIG;
}
s->catalog_bitmap = g_malloc(s->catalog_size * 4);
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, le32_to_cpu(bochs.header), s->catalog_bitmap,
s->data_offset = le32_to_cpu(bochs.header) + (s->catalog_size * 4);
s->bitmap_blocks = 1 + (le32_to_cpu(bochs.bitmap) - 1) / 512;
s->extent_blocks = 1 + (le32_to_cpu(bochs.extent) - 1) / 512;
s->extent_size = le32_to_cpu(bochs.extent);
qemu_co_mutex_init(&s->lock);
return 0;
fail:
s->extent_size = le32_to_cpu(bochs.extent);
if (s->catalog_size < bs->total_sectors / s->extent_size) {
error_setg(errp, "Catalog size is too small for this disk size");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
qemu_co_mutex_init(&s->lock);
return 0;
extent_index = offset / s->extent_size;
extent_offset = (offset % s->extent_size) / 512;
if (s->catalog_bitmap[extent_index] == 0xffffffff) {
return -1; /* not allocated */
}
bitmap_offset = s->data_offset + (512 * s->catalog_bitmap[extent_index] *
(s->extent_blocks + s->bitmap_blocks));
/* read in bitmap for current extent */
if (bdrv_pread(bs->file, bitmap_offset + (extent_offset / 8),
&bitmap_entry, 1) != 1) {
return -1;
}
if (!((bitmap_entry >> (extent_offset % 8)) & 1)) {
return -1; /* not allocated */
}
return bitmap_offset + (512 * (s->bitmap_blocks + extent_offset));
}
| 165,404 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void TargetHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
auto_attacher_.SetRenderFrameHost(frame_host);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void TargetHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
void TargetHandler::SetRenderer(int process_host_id,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
auto_attacher_.SetRenderFrameHost(frame_host);
}
| 172,780 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int php_stream_memory_set_option(php_stream *stream, int option, int value, void *ptrparam TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_stream_memory_data *ms = (php_stream_memory_data*)stream->abstract;
size_t newsize;
switch(option) {
case PHP_STREAM_OPTION_TRUNCATE_API:
switch (value) {
case PHP_STREAM_TRUNCATE_SUPPORTED:
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_OK;
case PHP_STREAM_TRUNCATE_SET_SIZE:
if (ms->mode & TEMP_STREAM_READONLY) {
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_ERR;
}
newsize = *(size_t*)ptrparam;
if (newsize <= ms->fsize) {
if (newsize < ms->fpos) {
ms->fpos = newsize;
}
} else {
ms->data = erealloc(ms->data, newsize);
memset(ms->data+ms->fsize, 0, newsize - ms->fsize);
ms->fsize = newsize;
}
ms->fsize = newsize;
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_OK;
}
default:
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_NOTIMPL;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int php_stream_memory_set_option(php_stream *stream, int option, int value, void *ptrparam TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_stream_memory_data *ms = (php_stream_memory_data*)stream->abstract;
size_t newsize;
switch(option) {
case PHP_STREAM_OPTION_TRUNCATE_API:
switch (value) {
case PHP_STREAM_TRUNCATE_SUPPORTED:
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_OK;
case PHP_STREAM_TRUNCATE_SET_SIZE:
if (ms->mode & TEMP_STREAM_READONLY) {
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_ERR;
}
newsize = *(size_t*)ptrparam;
if (newsize <= ms->fsize) {
if (newsize < ms->fpos) {
ms->fpos = newsize;
}
} else {
ms->data = erealloc(ms->data, newsize);
memset(ms->data+ms->fsize, 0, newsize - ms->fsize);
ms->fsize = newsize;
}
ms->fsize = newsize;
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_OK;
}
default:
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_NOTIMPL;
}
}
/* }}} */
| 165,476 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IW_IMPL(int) iw_get_input_density(struct iw_context *ctx,
double *px, double *py, int *pcode)
{
*px = 1.0;
*py = 1.0;
*pcode = ctx->img1.density_code;
if(ctx->img1.density_code!=IW_DENSITY_UNKNOWN) {
*px = ctx->img1.density_x;
*py = ctx->img1.density_y;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369 | IW_IMPL(int) iw_get_input_density(struct iw_context *ctx,
double *px, double *py, int *pcode)
{
*px = 1.0;
*py = 1.0;
*pcode = IW_DENSITY_UNKNOWN;
if(ctx->img1.density_code==IW_DENSITY_UNKNOWN) {
return 0;
}
if(!iw_is_valid_density(ctx->img1.density_x, ctx->img1.density_y,
ctx->img1.density_code))
{
return 0;
}
*px = ctx->img1.density_x;
*py = ctx->img1.density_y;
*pcode = ctx->img1.density_code;
return 1;
}
| 168,119 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ProcPutImage(ClientPtr client)
{
GC *pGC;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
long length; /* length of scanline server padded */
long lengthProto; /* length of scanline protocol padded */
char *tmpImage;
REQUEST(xPutImageReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xPutImageReq);
VALIDATE_DRAWABLE_AND_GC(stuff->drawable, pDraw, DixWriteAccess);
if (stuff->format == XYBitmap) {
if ((stuff->depth != 1) ||
(stuff->leftPad >= (unsigned int) screenInfo.bitmapScanlinePad))
return BadMatch;
length = BitmapBytePad(stuff->width + stuff->leftPad);
}
else if (stuff->format == XYPixmap) {
if ((pDraw->depth != stuff->depth) ||
(stuff->leftPad >= (unsigned int) screenInfo.bitmapScanlinePad))
return BadMatch;
length = BitmapBytePad(stuff->width + stuff->leftPad);
length *= stuff->depth;
}
else if (stuff->format == ZPixmap) {
if ((pDraw->depth != stuff->depth) || (stuff->leftPad != 0))
return BadMatch;
length = PixmapBytePad(stuff->width, stuff->depth);
}
else {
client->errorValue = stuff->format;
return BadValue;
}
tmpImage = (char *) &stuff[1];
lengthProto = length;
if (lengthProto >= (INT32_MAX / stuff->height))
return BadLength;
if ((bytes_to_int32(lengthProto * stuff->height) +
bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xPutImageReq))) != client->req_len)
return BadLength;
ReformatImage(tmpImage, lengthProto * stuff->height,
stuff->format == ZPixmap ? BitsPerPixel(stuff->depth) : 1,
ClientOrder(client));
(*pGC->ops->PutImage) (pDraw, pGC, stuff->depth, stuff->dstX, stuff->dstY,
stuff->width, stuff->height,
stuff->leftPad, stuff->format, tmpImage);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | ProcPutImage(ClientPtr client)
{
GC *pGC;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
long length; /* length of scanline server padded */
long lengthProto; /* length of scanline protocol padded */
char *tmpImage;
REQUEST(xPutImageReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xPutImageReq);
VALIDATE_DRAWABLE_AND_GC(stuff->drawable, pDraw, DixWriteAccess);
if (stuff->format == XYBitmap) {
if ((stuff->depth != 1) ||
(stuff->leftPad >= (unsigned int) screenInfo.bitmapScanlinePad))
return BadMatch;
length = BitmapBytePad(stuff->width + stuff->leftPad);
}
else if (stuff->format == XYPixmap) {
if ((pDraw->depth != stuff->depth) ||
(stuff->leftPad >= (unsigned int) screenInfo.bitmapScanlinePad))
return BadMatch;
length = BitmapBytePad(stuff->width + stuff->leftPad);
length *= stuff->depth;
}
else if (stuff->format == ZPixmap) {
if ((pDraw->depth != stuff->depth) || (stuff->leftPad != 0))
return BadMatch;
length = PixmapBytePad(stuff->width, stuff->depth);
}
else {
client->errorValue = stuff->format;
return BadValue;
}
tmpImage = (char *) &stuff[1];
lengthProto = length;
if (stuff->height != 0 && lengthProto >= (INT32_MAX / stuff->height))
return BadLength;
if ((bytes_to_int32(lengthProto * stuff->height) +
bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xPutImageReq))) != client->req_len)
return BadLength;
ReformatImage(tmpImage, lengthProto * stuff->height,
stuff->format == ZPixmap ? BitsPerPixel(stuff->depth) : 1,
ClientOrder(client));
(*pGC->ops->PutImage) (pDraw, pGC, stuff->depth, stuff->dstX, stuff->dstY,
stuff->width, stuff->height,
stuff->leftPad, stuff->format, tmpImage);
return Success;
}
| 165,308 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: externalParEntProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
const char *next = s;
int tok;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
if (tok <= 0) {
if (! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer && tok != XML_TOK_INVALID) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_INVALID:
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
return XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
case XML_TOK_NONE: /* start == end */
default:
break;
}
}
/* This would cause the next stage, i.e. doProlog to be passed XML_TOK_BOM.
However, when parsing an external subset, doProlog will not accept a BOM
as valid, and report a syntax error, so we have to skip the BOM
*/
else if (tok == XML_TOK_BOM) {
s = next;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
}
parser->m_processor = prologProcessor;
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | externalParEntProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
const char *next = s;
int tok;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
if (tok <= 0) {
if (! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer && tok != XML_TOK_INVALID) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_INVALID:
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
return XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
case XML_TOK_NONE: /* start == end */
default:
break;
}
}
/* This would cause the next stage, i.e. doProlog to be passed XML_TOK_BOM.
However, when parsing an external subset, doProlog will not accept a BOM
as valid, and report a syntax error, so we have to skip the BOM
*/
else if (tok == XML_TOK_BOM) {
s = next;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
}
parser->m_processor = prologProcessor;
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer, XML_TRUE);
}
| 169,530 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: FileReaderLoader::FileReaderLoader(ReadType read_type,
FileReaderLoaderClient* client)
: read_type_(read_type),
client_(client),
handle_watcher_(FROM_HERE, mojo::SimpleWatcher::ArmingPolicy::AUTOMATIC),
binding_(this) {}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in FileReaderLoader.
Anything that calls out to client_ can cause FileReaderLoader to be
destroyed, so make sure to check for that situation.
Bug: 835639
Change-Id: I57533d41b7118c06da17abec28bbf301e1f50646
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1024450
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552807}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | FileReaderLoader::FileReaderLoader(ReadType read_type,
FileReaderLoaderClient* client)
: read_type_(read_type),
client_(client),
handle_watcher_(FROM_HERE, mojo::SimpleWatcher::ArmingPolicy::AUTOMATIC),
| 173,217 |
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