instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int virtio_gpu_object_create(struct virtio_gpu_device *vgdev,
unsigned long size, bool kernel, bool pinned,
struct virtio_gpu_object **bo_ptr)
{
struct virtio_gpu_object *bo;
enum ttm_bo_type type;
size_t acc_size;
int ret;
if (kernel)
type = ttm_bo_type_kernel;
else
type = ttm_bo_type_device;
*bo_ptr = NULL;
acc_size = ttm_bo_dma_acc_size(&vgdev->mman.bdev, size,
sizeof(struct virtio_gpu_object));
bo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct virtio_gpu_object), GFP_KERNEL);
if (bo == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
size = roundup(size, PAGE_SIZE);
ret = drm_gem_object_init(vgdev->ddev, &bo->gem_base, size);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
bo->dumb = false;
virtio_gpu_init_ttm_placement(bo, pinned);
ret = ttm_bo_init(&vgdev->mman.bdev, &bo->tbo, size, type,
&bo->placement, 0, !kernel, NULL, acc_size,
NULL, NULL, &virtio_gpu_ttm_bo_destroy);
/* ttm_bo_init failure will call the destroy */
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
*bo_ptr = bo;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: drm/virtio: don't leak bo on drm_gem_object_init failure
Reported-by: 李强 <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20170406155941.458-1-kraxel@redhat.com
CWE ID: CWE-772 | int virtio_gpu_object_create(struct virtio_gpu_device *vgdev,
unsigned long size, bool kernel, bool pinned,
struct virtio_gpu_object **bo_ptr)
{
struct virtio_gpu_object *bo;
enum ttm_bo_type type;
size_t acc_size;
int ret;
if (kernel)
type = ttm_bo_type_kernel;
else
type = ttm_bo_type_device;
*bo_ptr = NULL;
acc_size = ttm_bo_dma_acc_size(&vgdev->mman.bdev, size,
sizeof(struct virtio_gpu_object));
bo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct virtio_gpu_object), GFP_KERNEL);
if (bo == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
size = roundup(size, PAGE_SIZE);
ret = drm_gem_object_init(vgdev->ddev, &bo->gem_base, size);
if (ret != 0) {
kfree(bo);
return ret;
}
bo->dumb = false;
virtio_gpu_init_ttm_placement(bo, pinned);
ret = ttm_bo_init(&vgdev->mman.bdev, &bo->tbo, size, type,
&bo->placement, 0, !kernel, NULL, acc_size,
NULL, NULL, &virtio_gpu_ttm_bo_destroy);
/* ttm_bo_init failure will call the destroy */
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
*bo_ptr = bo;
return 0;
}
| 168,060 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FetchContext::DispatchWillSendRequest(unsigned long,
ResourceRequest&,
const ResourceResponse&,
const FetchInitiatorInfo&) {}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void FetchContext::DispatchWillSendRequest(unsigned long,
ResourceRequest&,
const ResourceResponse&,
Resource::Type,
const FetchInitiatorInfo&) {}
| 172,477 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GCInfoTable::Resize() {
static const int kGcInfoZapValue = 0x33;
const size_t kInitialSize = 512;
size_t new_size =
gc_info_table_size_ ? 2 * gc_info_table_size_ : kInitialSize;
DCHECK(new_size < GCInfoTable::kMaxIndex);
g_gc_info_table =
reinterpret_cast<GCInfo const**>(WTF::Partitions::FastRealloc(
g_gc_info_table, new_size * sizeof(GCInfo), "GCInfo"));
DCHECK(g_gc_info_table);
memset(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(g_gc_info_table) +
gc_info_table_size_ * sizeof(GCInfo),
kGcInfoZapValue, (new_size - gc_info_table_size_) * sizeof(GCInfo));
gc_info_table_size_ = new_size;
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void GCInfoTable::Resize() {
const size_t new_limit = (limit_) ? 2 * limit_ : ComputeInitialTableLimit();
const size_t old_committed_size = limit_ * kEntrySize;
const size_t new_committed_size = new_limit * kEntrySize;
CHECK(table_);
CHECK_EQ(0u, new_committed_size % base::kPageAllocationGranularity);
CHECK_GE(MaxTableSize(), limit_ * kEntrySize);
// Recommitting and zapping assumes byte-addressable storage.
uint8_t* const current_table_end =
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(table_) + old_committed_size;
const size_t table_size_delta = new_committed_size - old_committed_size;
// Commit the new size and allow read/write.
// TODO(ajwong): SetSystemPagesAccess should be part of RecommitSystemPages to
// avoid having two calls here.
bool ok = base::SetSystemPagesAccess(current_table_end, table_size_delta,
base::PageReadWrite);
CHECK(ok);
ok = base::RecommitSystemPages(current_table_end, table_size_delta,
base::PageReadWrite);
CHECK(ok);
// Zap unused values.,
memset(current_table_end, kGcInfoZapValue, table_size_delta);
limit_ = new_limit;
}
| 173,136 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::update_portdef(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDefn)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
struct v4l2_format fmt;
if (!portDefn) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("omx_vdec::update_portdef");
portDefn->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
portDefn->nSize = sizeof(portDefn);
portDefn->eDomain = OMX_PortDomainVideo;
if (drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator > 0)
portDefn->format.video.xFramerate = (drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator /
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator) << 16; //Q16 format
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error: Divide by zero");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
if (0 == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
portDefn->eDir = OMX_DirInput;
portDefn->nBufferCountActual = drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount;
portDefn->nBufferCountMin = drv_ctx.ip_buf.mincount;
portDefn->nBufferSize = drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size;
portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused;
portDefn->format.video.eCompressionFormat = eCompressionFormat;
portDefn->bEnabled = m_inp_bEnabled;
portDefn->bPopulated = m_inp_bPopulated;
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = output_capability;
} else if (1 == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
unsigned int buf_size = 0;
if (!client_buffers.update_buffer_req()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("client_buffers.update_buffer_req Failed");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
if (!client_buffers.get_buffer_req(buf_size)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("update buffer requirements");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
portDefn->nBufferSize = buf_size;
portDefn->eDir = OMX_DirOutput;
portDefn->nBufferCountActual = drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount;
portDefn->nBufferCountMin = drv_ctx.op_buf.mincount;
portDefn->format.video.eCompressionFormat = OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused;
portDefn->bEnabled = m_out_bEnabled;
portDefn->bPopulated = m_out_bPopulated;
if (!client_buffers.get_color_format(portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error in getting color format");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = capture_capability;
} else {
portDefn->eDir = OMX_DirMax;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW(" get_parameter: Bad Port idx %d",
(int)portDefn->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (is_down_scalar_enabled) {
int ret = 0;
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_G_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("update_portdef : Error in getting port resolution");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
} else {
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth = fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width;
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight = fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height;
portDefn->format.video.nStride = fmt.fmt.pix_mp.plane_fmt[0].bytesperline;
portDefn->format.video.nSliceHeight = fmt.fmt.pix_mp.plane_fmt[0].reserved[0];
}
} else {
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width;
portDefn->format.video.nStride = drv_ctx.video_resolution.stride;
portDefn->format.video.nSliceHeight = drv_ctx.video_resolution.scan_lines;
}
if ((portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar) ||
(portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar)) {
portDefn->format.video.nStride = ALIGN(drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width, 16);
portDefn->format.video.nSliceHeight = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("update_portdef(%u): Width = %u Height = %u Stride = %d "
"SliceHeight = %u eColorFormat = %d nBufSize %u nBufCnt %u",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nPortIndex,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
(int)portDefn->format.video.nStride,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nSliceHeight,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat,
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize,
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
return eRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vidc: validate omx param/config data
Check the sanity of config/param strcuture objects
passed to get/set _ config()/parameter() methods.
Bug: 27533317
Security Vulnerability in MediaServer
omx_vdec::get_config() Can lead to arbitrary write
Change-Id: I6c3243afe12055ab94f1a1ecf758c10e88231809
Conflicts:
mm-core/inc/OMX_QCOMExtns.h
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_base.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_encoder.cpp
CWE ID: CWE-20 | OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::update_portdef(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDefn)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
struct v4l2_format fmt;
if (!portDefn) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("omx_vdec::update_portdef");
portDefn->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
portDefn->nSize = sizeof(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE);
portDefn->eDomain = OMX_PortDomainVideo;
if (drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator > 0)
portDefn->format.video.xFramerate = (drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator /
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator) << 16; //Q16 format
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error: Divide by zero");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
if (0 == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
portDefn->eDir = OMX_DirInput;
portDefn->nBufferCountActual = drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount;
portDefn->nBufferCountMin = drv_ctx.ip_buf.mincount;
portDefn->nBufferSize = drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size;
portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused;
portDefn->format.video.eCompressionFormat = eCompressionFormat;
portDefn->bEnabled = m_inp_bEnabled;
portDefn->bPopulated = m_inp_bPopulated;
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = output_capability;
} else if (1 == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
unsigned int buf_size = 0;
if (!client_buffers.update_buffer_req()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("client_buffers.update_buffer_req Failed");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
if (!client_buffers.get_buffer_req(buf_size)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("update buffer requirements");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
portDefn->nBufferSize = buf_size;
portDefn->eDir = OMX_DirOutput;
portDefn->nBufferCountActual = drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount;
portDefn->nBufferCountMin = drv_ctx.op_buf.mincount;
portDefn->format.video.eCompressionFormat = OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused;
portDefn->bEnabled = m_out_bEnabled;
portDefn->bPopulated = m_out_bPopulated;
if (!client_buffers.get_color_format(portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error in getting color format");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = capture_capability;
} else {
portDefn->eDir = OMX_DirMax;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW(" get_parameter: Bad Port idx %d",
(int)portDefn->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (is_down_scalar_enabled) {
int ret = 0;
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_G_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("update_portdef : Error in getting port resolution");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
} else {
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth = fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width;
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight = fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height;
portDefn->format.video.nStride = fmt.fmt.pix_mp.plane_fmt[0].bytesperline;
portDefn->format.video.nSliceHeight = fmt.fmt.pix_mp.plane_fmt[0].reserved[0];
}
} else {
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width;
portDefn->format.video.nStride = drv_ctx.video_resolution.stride;
portDefn->format.video.nSliceHeight = drv_ctx.video_resolution.scan_lines;
}
if ((portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar) ||
(portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar)) {
portDefn->format.video.nStride = ALIGN(drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width, 16);
portDefn->format.video.nSliceHeight = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("update_portdef(%u): Width = %u Height = %u Stride = %d "
"SliceHeight = %u eColorFormat = %d nBufSize %u nBufCnt %u",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nPortIndex,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
(int)portDefn->format.video.nStride,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nSliceHeight,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat,
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize,
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
return eRet;
}
| 173,792 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cmd_handle_untagged(struct ImapData *idata)
{
unsigned int count = 0;
char *s = imap_next_word(idata->buf);
char *pn = imap_next_word(s);
if ((idata->state >= IMAP_SELECTED) && isdigit((unsigned char) *s))
{
pn = s;
s = imap_next_word(s);
/* EXISTS and EXPUNGE are always related to the SELECTED mailbox for the
* connection, so update that one.
*/
if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("EXISTS", s, 6) == 0)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Handling EXISTS\n");
/* new mail arrived */
if (mutt_str_atoui(pn, &count) < 0)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Malformed EXISTS: '%s'\n", pn);
}
if (!(idata->reopen & IMAP_EXPUNGE_PENDING) && count < idata->max_msn)
{
/* Notes 6.0.3 has a tendency to report fewer messages exist than
* it should. */
mutt_debug(1, "Message count is out of sync\n");
return 0;
}
/* at least the InterChange server sends EXISTS messages freely,
* even when there is no new mail */
else if (count == idata->max_msn)
mutt_debug(3, "superfluous EXISTS message.\n");
else
{
if (!(idata->reopen & IMAP_EXPUNGE_PENDING))
{
mutt_debug(2, "New mail in %s - %d messages total.\n", idata->mailbox, count);
idata->reopen |= IMAP_NEWMAIL_PENDING;
}
idata->new_mail_count = count;
}
}
/* pn vs. s: need initial seqno */
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("EXPUNGE", s, 7) == 0)
cmd_parse_expunge(idata, pn);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("FETCH", s, 5) == 0)
cmd_parse_fetch(idata, pn);
}
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("CAPABILITY", s, 10) == 0)
cmd_parse_capability(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("OK [CAPABILITY", s, 14) == 0)
cmd_parse_capability(idata, pn);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("OK [CAPABILITY", pn, 14) == 0)
cmd_parse_capability(idata, imap_next_word(pn));
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("LIST", s, 4) == 0)
cmd_parse_list(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("LSUB", s, 4) == 0)
cmd_parse_lsub(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("MYRIGHTS", s, 8) == 0)
cmd_parse_myrights(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("SEARCH", s, 6) == 0)
cmd_parse_search(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("STATUS", s, 6) == 0)
cmd_parse_status(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("ENABLED", s, 7) == 0)
cmd_parse_enabled(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("BYE", s, 3) == 0)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Handling BYE\n");
/* check if we're logging out */
if (idata->status == IMAP_BYE)
return 0;
/* server shut down our connection */
s += 3;
SKIPWS(s);
mutt_error("%s", s);
cmd_handle_fatal(idata);
return -1;
}
else if (ImapServernoise && (mutt_str_strncasecmp("NO", s, 2) == 0))
{
mutt_debug(2, "Handling untagged NO\n");
/* Display the warning message from the server */
mutt_error("%s", s + 3);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Handle NO response without message properly
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int cmd_handle_untagged(struct ImapData *idata)
{
unsigned int count = 0;
char *s = imap_next_word(idata->buf);
char *pn = imap_next_word(s);
if ((idata->state >= IMAP_SELECTED) && isdigit((unsigned char) *s))
{
pn = s;
s = imap_next_word(s);
/* EXISTS and EXPUNGE are always related to the SELECTED mailbox for the
* connection, so update that one.
*/
if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("EXISTS", s, 6) == 0)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Handling EXISTS\n");
/* new mail arrived */
if (mutt_str_atoui(pn, &count) < 0)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Malformed EXISTS: '%s'\n", pn);
}
if (!(idata->reopen & IMAP_EXPUNGE_PENDING) && count < idata->max_msn)
{
/* Notes 6.0.3 has a tendency to report fewer messages exist than
* it should. */
mutt_debug(1, "Message count is out of sync\n");
return 0;
}
/* at least the InterChange server sends EXISTS messages freely,
* even when there is no new mail */
else if (count == idata->max_msn)
mutt_debug(3, "superfluous EXISTS message.\n");
else
{
if (!(idata->reopen & IMAP_EXPUNGE_PENDING))
{
mutt_debug(2, "New mail in %s - %d messages total.\n", idata->mailbox, count);
idata->reopen |= IMAP_NEWMAIL_PENDING;
}
idata->new_mail_count = count;
}
}
/* pn vs. s: need initial seqno */
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("EXPUNGE", s, 7) == 0)
cmd_parse_expunge(idata, pn);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("FETCH", s, 5) == 0)
cmd_parse_fetch(idata, pn);
}
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("CAPABILITY", s, 10) == 0)
cmd_parse_capability(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("OK [CAPABILITY", s, 14) == 0)
cmd_parse_capability(idata, pn);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("OK [CAPABILITY", pn, 14) == 0)
cmd_parse_capability(idata, imap_next_word(pn));
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("LIST", s, 4) == 0)
cmd_parse_list(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("LSUB", s, 4) == 0)
cmd_parse_lsub(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("MYRIGHTS", s, 8) == 0)
cmd_parse_myrights(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("SEARCH", s, 6) == 0)
cmd_parse_search(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("STATUS", s, 6) == 0)
cmd_parse_status(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("ENABLED", s, 7) == 0)
cmd_parse_enabled(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("BYE", s, 3) == 0)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Handling BYE\n");
/* check if we're logging out */
if (idata->status == IMAP_BYE)
return 0;
/* server shut down our connection */
s += 3;
SKIPWS(s);
mutt_error("%s", s);
cmd_handle_fatal(idata);
return -1;
}
else if (ImapServernoise && (mutt_str_strncasecmp("NO", s, 2) == 0))
{
mutt_debug(2, "Handling untagged NO\n");
/* Display the warning message from the server */
mutt_error("%s", s + 2);
}
return 0;
}
| 169,139 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionWebContentsObserver::RenderViewCreated(
content::RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
const Extension* extension = GetExtension(render_view_host);
if (!extension)
return;
content::RenderProcessHost* process = render_view_host->GetProcess();
if (type == Manifest::TYPE_EXTENSION ||
type == Manifest::TYPE_LEGACY_PACKAGED_APP ||
(type == Manifest::TYPE_PLATFORM_APP &&
extension->location() == Manifest::COMPONENT)) {
content::ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance()->GrantScheme(
process->GetID(), content::kChromeUIScheme);
}
if (type == Manifest::TYPE_EXTENSION ||
type == Manifest::TYPE_LEGACY_PACKAGED_APP) {
ExtensionPrefs* prefs = ExtensionPrefs::Get(browser_context_);
if (prefs->AllowFileAccess(extension->id())) {
content::ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance()->GrantScheme(
process->GetID(), url::kFileScheme);
}
}
render_view_host->Send(new ExtensionMsg_ActivateExtension(extension->id()));
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void ExtensionWebContentsObserver::RenderViewCreated(
content::RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
const Extension* extension = GetExtension(render_view_host);
if (!extension)
return;
if (type == Manifest::TYPE_EXTENSION ||
type == Manifest::TYPE_LEGACY_PACKAGED_APP) {
ExtensionPrefs* prefs = ExtensionPrefs::Get(browser_context_);
if (prefs->AllowFileAccess(extension->id())) {
content::ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance()->GrantScheme(
render_view_host->GetProcess()->GetID(), url::kFileScheme);
}
}
render_view_host->Send(new ExtensionMsg_ActivateExtension(extension->id()));
}
| 171,776 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void qemu_spice_create_host_primary(SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd)
{
QXLDevSurfaceCreate surface;
memset(&surface, 0, sizeof(surface));
dprint(1, "%s/%d: %dx%d\n", __func__, ssd->qxl.id,
surface_width(ssd->ds), surface_height(ssd->ds));
surface.format = SPICE_SURFACE_FMT_32_xRGB;
surface.width = surface_width(ssd->ds);
{
dprint(1, "%s/%d:\n", __func__, ssd->qxl.id);
qemu_spice_destroy_primary_surface(ssd, 0, QXL_SYNC);
}
void qemu_spice_display_init_common(SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd)
{
qemu_mutex_init(&ssd->lock);
QTAILQ_INIT(&ssd->updates);
ssd->mouse_x = -1;
ssd->mouse_y = -1;
if (ssd->num_surfaces == 0) {
ssd->num_surfaces = 1024;
}
ssd->bufsize = (16 * 1024 * 1024);
ssd->buf = g_malloc(ssd->bufsize);
}
/* display listener callbacks */
void qemu_spice_display_update(SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd,
int x, int y, int w, int h)
{
if (ssd->num_surfaces == 0) {
ssd->num_surfaces = 1024;
}
ssd->bufsize = (16 * 1024 * 1024);
ssd->buf = g_malloc(ssd->bufsize);
}
/* display listener callbacks */
update_area.top = y;
update_area.bottom = y + h;
if (qemu_spice_rect_is_empty(&ssd->dirty)) {
ssd->notify++;
}
qemu_spice_rect_union(&ssd->dirty, &update_area);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void qemu_spice_create_host_primary(SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd)
{
QXLDevSurfaceCreate surface;
uint64_t surface_size;
memset(&surface, 0, sizeof(surface));
surface_size = (uint64_t) surface_width(ssd->ds) *
surface_height(ssd->ds) * 4;
assert(surface_size > 0);
assert(surface_size < INT_MAX);
if (ssd->bufsize < surface_size) {
ssd->bufsize = surface_size;
g_free(ssd->buf);
ssd->buf = g_malloc(ssd->bufsize);
}
dprint(1, "%s/%d: %ux%u (size %" PRIu64 "/%d)\n", __func__, ssd->qxl.id,
surface_width(ssd->ds), surface_height(ssd->ds),
surface_size, ssd->bufsize);
surface.format = SPICE_SURFACE_FMT_32_xRGB;
surface.width = surface_width(ssd->ds);
{
dprint(1, "%s/%d:\n", __func__, ssd->qxl.id);
qemu_spice_destroy_primary_surface(ssd, 0, QXL_SYNC);
}
void qemu_spice_display_init_common(SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd)
{
qemu_mutex_init(&ssd->lock);
QTAILQ_INIT(&ssd->updates);
ssd->mouse_x = -1;
ssd->mouse_y = -1;
if (ssd->num_surfaces == 0) {
ssd->num_surfaces = 1024;
}
ssd->bufsize = (16 * 1024 * 1024);
ssd->buf = g_malloc(ssd->bufsize);
}
/* display listener callbacks */
void qemu_spice_display_update(SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd,
int x, int y, int w, int h)
{
if (ssd->num_surfaces == 0) {
ssd->num_surfaces = 1024;
}
}
/* display listener callbacks */
update_area.top = y;
update_area.bottom = y + h;
if (qemu_spice_rect_is_empty(&ssd->dirty)) {
ssd->notify++;
}
qemu_spice_rect_union(&ssd->dirty, &update_area);
}
| 165,151 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ImageLoader::updateFromElement()
{
Document* document = m_element->document();
if (!document->renderer())
return;
AtomicString attr = m_element->imageSourceURL();
if (attr == m_failedLoadURL)
return;
CachedResourceHandle<CachedImage> newImage = 0;
if (!attr.isNull() && !stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(attr).isEmpty()) {
CachedResourceRequest request(ResourceRequest(document->completeURL(sourceURI(attr))));
request.setInitiator(element());
String crossOriginMode = m_element->fastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::crossoriginAttr);
if (!crossOriginMode.isNull()) {
StoredCredentials allowCredentials = equalIgnoringCase(crossOriginMode, "use-credentials") ? AllowStoredCredentials : DoNotAllowStoredCredentials;
updateRequestForAccessControl(request.mutableResourceRequest(), document->securityOrigin(), allowCredentials);
}
if (m_loadManually) {
bool autoLoadOtherImages = document->cachedResourceLoader()->autoLoadImages();
document->cachedResourceLoader()->setAutoLoadImages(false);
newImage = new CachedImage(request.resourceRequest());
newImage->setLoading(true);
newImage->setOwningCachedResourceLoader(document->cachedResourceLoader());
document->cachedResourceLoader()->m_documentResources.set(newImage->url(), newImage.get());
document->cachedResourceLoader()->setAutoLoadImages(autoLoadOtherImages);
} else
newImage = document->cachedResourceLoader()->requestImage(request);
if (!newImage && !pageIsBeingDismissed(document)) {
m_failedLoadURL = attr;
m_hasPendingErrorEvent = true;
errorEventSender().dispatchEventSoon(this);
} else
clearFailedLoadURL();
} else if (!attr.isNull()) {
m_element->dispatchEvent(Event::create(eventNames().errorEvent, false, false));
}
CachedImage* oldImage = m_image.get();
if (newImage != oldImage) {
if (m_hasPendingBeforeLoadEvent) {
beforeLoadEventSender().cancelEvent(this);
m_hasPendingBeforeLoadEvent = false;
}
if (m_hasPendingLoadEvent) {
loadEventSender().cancelEvent(this);
m_hasPendingLoadEvent = false;
}
if (m_hasPendingErrorEvent && newImage) {
errorEventSender().cancelEvent(this);
m_hasPendingErrorEvent = false;
}
m_image = newImage;
m_hasPendingBeforeLoadEvent = !m_element->document()->isImageDocument() && newImage;
m_hasPendingLoadEvent = newImage;
m_imageComplete = !newImage;
if (newImage) {
if (!m_element->document()->isImageDocument()) {
if (!m_element->document()->hasListenerType(Document::BEFORELOAD_LISTENER))
dispatchPendingBeforeLoadEvent();
else
beforeLoadEventSender().dispatchEventSoon(this);
} else
updateRenderer();
newImage->addClient(this);
}
if (oldImage)
oldImage->removeClient(this);
}
if (RenderImageResource* imageResource = renderImageResource())
imageResource->resetAnimation();
updatedHasPendingEvent();
}
Commit Message: Error event was fired synchronously blowing away the input element from underneath. Remove the FIXME and fire it asynchronously using errorEventSender().
BUG=240124
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14741011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150232 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void ImageLoader::updateFromElement()
{
Document* document = m_element->document();
if (!document->renderer())
return;
AtomicString attr = m_element->imageSourceURL();
if (attr == m_failedLoadURL)
return;
CachedResourceHandle<CachedImage> newImage = 0;
if (!attr.isNull() && !stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(attr).isEmpty()) {
CachedResourceRequest request(ResourceRequest(document->completeURL(sourceURI(attr))));
request.setInitiator(element());
String crossOriginMode = m_element->fastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::crossoriginAttr);
if (!crossOriginMode.isNull()) {
StoredCredentials allowCredentials = equalIgnoringCase(crossOriginMode, "use-credentials") ? AllowStoredCredentials : DoNotAllowStoredCredentials;
updateRequestForAccessControl(request.mutableResourceRequest(), document->securityOrigin(), allowCredentials);
}
if (m_loadManually) {
bool autoLoadOtherImages = document->cachedResourceLoader()->autoLoadImages();
document->cachedResourceLoader()->setAutoLoadImages(false);
newImage = new CachedImage(request.resourceRequest());
newImage->setLoading(true);
newImage->setOwningCachedResourceLoader(document->cachedResourceLoader());
document->cachedResourceLoader()->m_documentResources.set(newImage->url(), newImage.get());
document->cachedResourceLoader()->setAutoLoadImages(autoLoadOtherImages);
} else
newImage = document->cachedResourceLoader()->requestImage(request);
if (!newImage && !pageIsBeingDismissed(document)) {
m_failedLoadURL = attr;
m_hasPendingErrorEvent = true;
errorEventSender().dispatchEventSoon(this);
} else
clearFailedLoadURL();
} else if (!attr.isNull()) {
m_hasPendingErrorEvent = true;
errorEventSender().dispatchEventSoon(this);
}
CachedImage* oldImage = m_image.get();
if (newImage != oldImage) {
if (m_hasPendingBeforeLoadEvent) {
beforeLoadEventSender().cancelEvent(this);
m_hasPendingBeforeLoadEvent = false;
}
if (m_hasPendingLoadEvent) {
loadEventSender().cancelEvent(this);
m_hasPendingLoadEvent = false;
}
if (m_hasPendingErrorEvent && newImage) {
errorEventSender().cancelEvent(this);
m_hasPendingErrorEvent = false;
}
m_image = newImage;
m_hasPendingBeforeLoadEvent = !m_element->document()->isImageDocument() && newImage;
m_hasPendingLoadEvent = newImage;
m_imageComplete = !newImage;
if (newImage) {
if (!m_element->document()->isImageDocument()) {
if (!m_element->document()->hasListenerType(Document::BEFORELOAD_LISTENER))
dispatchPendingBeforeLoadEvent();
else
beforeLoadEventSender().dispatchEventSoon(this);
} else
updateRenderer();
newImage->addClient(this);
}
if (oldImage)
oldImage->removeClient(this);
}
if (RenderImageResource* imageResource = renderImageResource())
imageResource->resetAnimation();
updatedHasPendingEvent();
}
| 171,319 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void fanout_release(struct sock *sk)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_fanout *f;
f = po->fanout;
if (!f)
return;
mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
po->fanout = NULL;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&f->sk_ref)) {
list_del(&f->list);
dev_remove_pack(&f->prot_hook);
fanout_release_data(f);
kfree(f);
}
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
if (po->rollover)
kfree_rcu(po->rollover, rcu);
}
Commit Message: packet: fix races in fanout_add()
Multiple threads can call fanout_add() at the same time.
We need to grab fanout_mutex earlier to avoid races that could
lead to one thread freeing po->rollover that was set by another thread.
Do the same in fanout_release(), for peace of mind, and to help us
finding lockdep issues earlier.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Fixes: 0648ab70afe6 ("packet: rollover prepare: per-socket state")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static void fanout_release(struct sock *sk)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_fanout *f;
mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
f = po->fanout;
if (f) {
po->fanout = NULL;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&f->sk_ref)) {
list_del(&f->list);
dev_remove_pack(&f->prot_hook);
fanout_release_data(f);
kfree(f);
}
if (po->rollover)
kfree_rcu(po->rollover, rcu);
}
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
}
| 168,347 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebGLRenderingContextBase::WebGLRenderingContextBase(
CanvasRenderingContextHost* host,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner,
std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider,
bool using_gpu_compositing,
const CanvasContextCreationAttributesCore& requested_attributes,
Platform::ContextType context_type)
: CanvasRenderingContext(host, requested_attributes),
context_group_(MakeGarbageCollected<WebGLContextGroup>()),
dispatch_context_lost_event_timer_(
task_runner,
this,
&WebGLRenderingContextBase::DispatchContextLostEvent),
restore_timer_(task_runner,
this,
&WebGLRenderingContextBase::MaybeRestoreContext),
task_runner_(task_runner),
num_gl_errors_to_console_allowed_(kMaxGLErrorsAllowedToConsole),
context_type_(context_type) {
DCHECK(context_provider);
xr_compatible_ = requested_attributes.xr_compatible;
context_group_->AddContext(this);
max_viewport_dims_[0] = max_viewport_dims_[1] = 0;
context_provider->ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VIEWPORT_DIMS,
max_viewport_dims_);
InitializeWebGLContextLimits(context_provider.get());
scoped_refptr<DrawingBuffer> buffer;
buffer =
CreateDrawingBuffer(std::move(context_provider), using_gpu_compositing);
if (!buffer) {
context_lost_mode_ = kSyntheticLostContext;
return;
}
drawing_buffer_ = std::move(buffer);
GetDrawingBuffer()->Bind(GL_FRAMEBUFFER);
SetupFlags();
String disabled_webgl_extensions(GetDrawingBuffer()
->ContextProvider()
->GetGpuFeatureInfo()
.disabled_webgl_extensions.c_str());
Vector<String> disabled_extension_list;
disabled_webgl_extensions.Split(' ', disabled_extension_list);
for (const auto& entry : disabled_extension_list) {
disabled_extensions_.insert(entry);
}
#define ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(set, values) \
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(values); ++i) { \
set.insert(values[i]); \
}
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_internal_formats_,
kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_copy_tex_image_,
kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_types_, kSupportedTypesES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_types_, kSupportedTypesES2);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | WebGLRenderingContextBase::WebGLRenderingContextBase(
CanvasRenderingContextHost* host,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner,
std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider,
bool using_gpu_compositing,
const CanvasContextCreationAttributesCore& requested_attributes,
Platform::ContextType context_type)
: CanvasRenderingContext(host, requested_attributes),
context_group_(MakeGarbageCollected<WebGLContextGroup>()),
dispatch_context_lost_event_timer_(
task_runner,
this,
&WebGLRenderingContextBase::DispatchContextLostEvent),
restore_timer_(task_runner,
this,
&WebGLRenderingContextBase::MaybeRestoreContext),
task_runner_(task_runner),
num_gl_errors_to_console_allowed_(kMaxGLErrorsAllowedToConsole),
context_type_(context_type),
program_completion_queries_(
base::MRUCache<WebGLProgram*, GLuint>::NO_AUTO_EVICT) {
DCHECK(context_provider);
xr_compatible_ = requested_attributes.xr_compatible;
context_group_->AddContext(this);
max_viewport_dims_[0] = max_viewport_dims_[1] = 0;
context_provider->ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VIEWPORT_DIMS,
max_viewport_dims_);
InitializeWebGLContextLimits(context_provider.get());
scoped_refptr<DrawingBuffer> buffer;
buffer =
CreateDrawingBuffer(std::move(context_provider), using_gpu_compositing);
if (!buffer) {
context_lost_mode_ = kSyntheticLostContext;
return;
}
drawing_buffer_ = std::move(buffer);
GetDrawingBuffer()->Bind(GL_FRAMEBUFFER);
SetupFlags();
String disabled_webgl_extensions(GetDrawingBuffer()
->ContextProvider()
->GetGpuFeatureInfo()
.disabled_webgl_extensions.c_str());
Vector<String> disabled_extension_list;
disabled_webgl_extensions.Split(' ', disabled_extension_list);
for (const auto& entry : disabled_extension_list) {
disabled_extensions_.insert(entry);
}
#define ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(set, values) \
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(values); ++i) { \
set.insert(values[i]); \
}
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_internal_formats_,
kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_copy_tex_image_,
kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_types_, kSupportedTypesES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_types_, kSupportedTypesES2);
}
| 172,535 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChangeInputMethod(const char* name) {
if (!IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ChangeInputMethod: IBus connection is not alive";
return false;
}
if (!name) {
return false;
}
if (!InputMethodIdIsWhitelisted(name)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Input method '" << name << "' is not supported";
return false;
}
RegisterProperties(NULL);
ibus_bus_set_global_engine_async(ibus_,
name,
-1, // use the default ibus timeout
NULL, // cancellable
NULL, // callback
NULL); // user_data
return true;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool ChangeInputMethod(const char* name) {
// IBusController override.
virtual bool ChangeInputMethod(const std::string& name) {
if (!IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ChangeInputMethod: IBus connection is not alive";
return false;
}
if (name.empty()) {
return false;
}
if (!InputMethodIdIsWhitelisted(name)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Input method '" << name << "' is not supported";
return false;
}
DoRegisterProperties(NULL);
ibus_bus_set_global_engine_async(ibus_,
name.c_str(),
-1, // use the default ibus timeout
NULL, // cancellable
NULL, // callback
NULL); // user_data
return true;
}
| 170,519 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: chpass_principal_2_svc(chpass_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = chpass_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
FALSE, 0, NULL, arg->pass);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_chpass_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->pass);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if (ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | chpass_principal_2_svc(chpass_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = chpass_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
FALSE, 0, NULL, arg->pass);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_chpass_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->pass);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if (ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,505 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintViewManager::OnShowScriptedPrintPreview(content::RenderFrameHost* rfh,
bool source_is_modifiable) {
DCHECK(print_preview_rfh_);
if (rfh != print_preview_rfh_)
return;
PrintPreviewDialogController* dialog_controller =
PrintPreviewDialogController::GetInstance();
if (!dialog_controller) {
PrintPreviewDone();
return;
}
dialog_controller->PrintPreview(web_contents());
PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview_Params params;
params.is_modifiable = source_is_modifiable;
PrintPreviewUI::SetInitialParams(
dialog_controller->GetPrintPreviewForContents(web_contents()), params);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void PrintViewManager::OnShowScriptedPrintPreview(content::RenderFrameHost* rfh,
bool source_is_modifiable) {
DCHECK(print_preview_rfh_);
if (rfh != print_preview_rfh_)
return;
PrintPreviewDialogController* dialog_controller =
PrintPreviewDialogController::GetInstance();
if (!dialog_controller) {
PrintPreviewDone();
return;
}
// Running a dialog causes an exit to webpage-initiated fullscreen.
// http://crbug.com/728276
if (web_contents()->IsFullscreenForCurrentTab())
web_contents()->ExitFullscreen(true);
dialog_controller->PrintPreview(web_contents());
PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview_Params params;
params.is_modifiable = source_is_modifiable;
PrintPreviewUI::SetInitialParams(
dialog_controller->GetPrintPreviewForContents(web_contents()), params);
}
| 172,314 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: l2tp_result_code_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr))); ptr++; /* Result Code */
if (length > 2) { /* Error Code (opt) */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr))); ptr++;
}
if (length > 4) { /* Error Message (opt) */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
print_string(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr, length - 4);
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | l2tp_result_code_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
/* Result Code */
if (length < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr)));
ptr++;
length -= 2;
/* Error Code (opt) */
if (length == 0)
return;
if (length < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AVP too short"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr)));
ptr++;
length -= 2;
/* Error Message (opt) */
if (length == 0)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
print_string(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr, length);
}
| 167,902 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
const EVP_MD *type;
unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
int ret= -1,i,inl;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm);
type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i));
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
if (buf_in == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl);
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data,
(unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
/* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked
* public information */
/* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
ret=1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
const EVP_MD *type;
unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
int ret= -1,i,inl;
if (!pkey)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return -1;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm);
type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i));
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
if (buf_in == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl);
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data,
(unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
/* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked
* public information */
/* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
ret=1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
| 164,792 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> V8Console::createCommandLineAPI(InspectedContext* inspectedContext)
{
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = inspectedContext->context();
v8::Isolate* isolate = context->GetIsolate();
v8::MicrotasksScope microtasksScope(isolate, v8::MicrotasksScope::kDoNotRunMicrotasks);
v8::Local<v8::Object> commandLineAPI = v8::Object::New(isolate);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "dir", V8Console::dirCallback, "function dir(value) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "dirxml", V8Console::dirxmlCallback, "function dirxml(value) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "profile", V8Console::profileCallback, "function profile(title) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "profileEnd", V8Console::profileEndCallback, "function profileEnd(title) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "clear", V8Console::clearCallback, "function clear() { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "table", V8Console::tableCallback, "function table(data, [columns]) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "keys", V8Console::keysCallback, "function keys(object) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "values", V8Console::valuesCallback, "function values(object) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "debug", V8Console::debugFunctionCallback, "function debug(function) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "undebug", V8Console::undebugFunctionCallback, "function undebug(function) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "monitor", V8Console::monitorFunctionCallback, "function monitor(function) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "unmonitor", V8Console::unmonitorFunctionCallback, "function unmonitor(function) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "inspect", V8Console::inspectCallback, "function inspect(object) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "copy", V8Console::copyCallback, "function copy(value) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$_", V8Console::lastEvaluationResultCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$0", V8Console::inspectedObject0);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$1", V8Console::inspectedObject1);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$2", V8Console::inspectedObject2);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$3", V8Console::inspectedObject3);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$4", V8Console::inspectedObject4);
inspectedContext->inspector()->client()->installAdditionalCommandLineAPI(context, commandLineAPI);
commandLineAPI->SetPrivate(context, inspectedContextPrivateKey(isolate), v8::External::New(isolate, inspectedContext));
return commandLineAPI;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | v8::Local<v8::Object> V8Console::createCommandLineAPI(InspectedContext* inspectedContext)
{
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = inspectedContext->context();
v8::Isolate* isolate = context->GetIsolate();
v8::MicrotasksScope microtasksScope(isolate, v8::MicrotasksScope::kDoNotRunMicrotasks);
v8::Local<v8::Object> commandLineAPI = v8::Object::New(isolate);
bool success = commandLineAPI->SetPrototype(context, v8::Null(isolate)).FromMaybe(false);
DCHECK(success);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "dir", V8Console::dirCallback, "function dir(value) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "dirxml", V8Console::dirxmlCallback, "function dirxml(value) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "profile", V8Console::profileCallback, "function profile(title) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "profileEnd", V8Console::profileEndCallback, "function profileEnd(title) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "clear", V8Console::clearCallback, "function clear() { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "table", V8Console::tableCallback, "function table(data, [columns]) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "keys", V8Console::keysCallback, "function keys(object) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "values", V8Console::valuesCallback, "function values(object) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "debug", V8Console::debugFunctionCallback, "function debug(function) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "undebug", V8Console::undebugFunctionCallback, "function undebug(function) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "monitor", V8Console::monitorFunctionCallback, "function monitor(function) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "unmonitor", V8Console::unmonitorFunctionCallback, "function unmonitor(function) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "inspect", V8Console::inspectCallback, "function inspect(object) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "copy", V8Console::copyCallback, "function copy(value) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$_", V8Console::lastEvaluationResultCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$0", V8Console::inspectedObject0);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$1", V8Console::inspectedObject1);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$2", V8Console::inspectedObject2);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$3", V8Console::inspectedObject3);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$4", V8Console::inspectedObject4);
inspectedContext->inspector()->client()->installAdditionalCommandLineAPI(context, commandLineAPI);
commandLineAPI->SetPrivate(context, inspectedContextPrivateKey(isolate), v8::External::New(isolate, inspectedContext));
return commandLineAPI;
}
| 172,062 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> UnpackPermissionSet(
const Permissions& permissions, std::string* error) {
APIPermissionSet apis;
std::vector<std::string>* permissions_list = permissions.permissions.get();
if (permissions_list) {
PermissionsInfo* info = PermissionsInfo::GetInstance();
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = permissions_list->begin();
it != permissions_list->end(); ++it) {
if (it->find(kDelimiter) != std::string::npos) {
size_t delimiter = it->find(kDelimiter);
std::string permission_name = it->substr(0, delimiter);
std::string permission_arg = it->substr(delimiter + 1);
scoped_ptr<base::Value> permission_json(
base::JSONReader::Read(permission_arg));
if (!permission_json.get()) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(kInvalidParameter, *it);
return NULL;
}
APIPermission* permission = NULL;
const APIPermissionInfo* bluetooth_device_permission_info =
info->GetByID(APIPermission::kBluetoothDevice);
const APIPermissionInfo* usb_device_permission_info =
info->GetByID(APIPermission::kUsbDevice);
if (permission_name == bluetooth_device_permission_info->name()) {
permission = new BluetoothDevicePermission(
bluetooth_device_permission_info);
} else if (permission_name == usb_device_permission_info->name()) {
permission = new UsbDevicePermission(usb_device_permission_info);
} else {
*error = kUnsupportedPermissionId;
return NULL;
}
CHECK(permission);
if (!permission->FromValue(permission_json.get())) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(kInvalidParameter, *it);
return NULL;
}
apis.insert(permission);
} else {
const APIPermissionInfo* permission_info = info->GetByName(*it);
if (!permission_info) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kUnknownPermissionError, *it);
return NULL;
}
apis.insert(permission_info->id());
}
}
}
URLPatternSet origins;
if (permissions.origins.get()) {
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = permissions.origins->begin();
it != permissions.origins->end(); ++it) {
URLPattern origin(Extension::kValidHostPermissionSchemes);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = origin.Parse(*it);
if (URLPattern::PARSE_SUCCESS != parse_result) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kInvalidOrigin,
*it,
URLPattern::GetParseResultString(parse_result));
return NULL;
}
origins.AddPattern(origin);
}
}
return scoped_refptr<PermissionSet>(
new PermissionSet(apis, origins, URLPatternSet()));
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> UnpackPermissionSet(
const Permissions& permissions,
bool allow_file_access,
std::string* error) {
APIPermissionSet apis;
std::vector<std::string>* permissions_list = permissions.permissions.get();
if (permissions_list) {
PermissionsInfo* info = PermissionsInfo::GetInstance();
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = permissions_list->begin();
it != permissions_list->end(); ++it) {
if (it->find(kDelimiter) != std::string::npos) {
size_t delimiter = it->find(kDelimiter);
std::string permission_name = it->substr(0, delimiter);
std::string permission_arg = it->substr(delimiter + 1);
scoped_ptr<base::Value> permission_json(
base::JSONReader::Read(permission_arg));
if (!permission_json.get()) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(kInvalidParameter, *it);
return NULL;
}
APIPermission* permission = NULL;
const APIPermissionInfo* bluetooth_device_permission_info =
info->GetByID(APIPermission::kBluetoothDevice);
const APIPermissionInfo* usb_device_permission_info =
info->GetByID(APIPermission::kUsbDevice);
if (permission_name == bluetooth_device_permission_info->name()) {
permission = new BluetoothDevicePermission(
bluetooth_device_permission_info);
} else if (permission_name == usb_device_permission_info->name()) {
permission = new UsbDevicePermission(usb_device_permission_info);
} else {
*error = kUnsupportedPermissionId;
return NULL;
}
CHECK(permission);
if (!permission->FromValue(permission_json.get())) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(kInvalidParameter, *it);
return NULL;
}
apis.insert(permission);
} else {
const APIPermissionInfo* permission_info = info->GetByName(*it);
if (!permission_info) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kUnknownPermissionError, *it);
return NULL;
}
apis.insert(permission_info->id());
}
}
}
URLPatternSet origins;
if (permissions.origins.get()) {
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = permissions.origins->begin();
it != permissions.origins->end(); ++it) {
int allowed_schemes = Extension::kValidHostPermissionSchemes;
if (!allow_file_access)
allowed_schemes &= ~URLPattern::SCHEME_FILE;
URLPattern origin(allowed_schemes);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = origin.Parse(*it);
if (URLPattern::PARSE_SUCCESS != parse_result) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kInvalidOrigin,
*it,
URLPattern::GetParseResultString(parse_result));
return NULL;
}
origins.AddPattern(origin);
}
}
return scoped_refptr<PermissionSet>(
new PermissionSet(apis, origins, URLPatternSet()));
}
| 171,445 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: header_put_le_int (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 4)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
} ;
} /* header_put_le_int */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | header_put_le_int (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = x ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 24) ;
} /* header_put_le_int */
| 170,057 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: recv_and_process_client_pkt(void /*int fd*/)
{
ssize_t size;
len_and_sockaddr *to;
struct sockaddr *from;
msg_t msg;
uint8_t query_status;
l_fixedpt_t query_xmttime;
to = get_sock_lsa(G_listen_fd);
from = xzalloc(to->len);
size = recv_from_to(G_listen_fd, &msg, sizeof(msg), MSG_DONTWAIT, from, &to->u.sa, to->len);
if (size != NTP_MSGSIZE_NOAUTH && size != NTP_MSGSIZE) {
char *addr;
if (size < 0) {
if (errno == EAGAIN)
goto bail;
bb_perror_msg_and_die("recv");
}
addr = xmalloc_sockaddr2dotted_noport(from);
bb_error_msg("malformed packet received from %s: size %u", addr, (int)size);
free(addr);
goto bail;
}
query_status = msg.m_status;
query_xmttime = msg.m_xmttime;
msg.m_ppoll = G.poll_exp;
msg.m_precision_exp = G_precision_exp;
/* this time was obtained between poll() and recv() */
msg.m_rectime = d_to_lfp(G.cur_time);
msg.m_xmttime = d_to_lfp(gettime1900d()); /* this instant */
if (G.peer_cnt == 0) {
/* we have no peers: "stratum 1 server" mode. reftime = our own time */
G.reftime = G.cur_time;
}
msg.m_reftime = d_to_lfp(G.reftime);
msg.m_orgtime = query_xmttime;
msg.m_rootdelay = d_to_sfp(G.rootdelay);
msg.m_rootdisp = d_to_sfp(G.rootdisp);
msg.m_refid = G.refid; // (version > (3 << VERSION_SHIFT)) ? G.refid : G.refid3;
/* We reply from the local address packet was sent to,
* this makes to/from look swapped here: */
do_sendto(G_listen_fd,
/*from:*/ &to->u.sa, /*to:*/ from, /*addrlen:*/ to->len,
&msg, size);
bail:
free(to);
free(from);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | recv_and_process_client_pkt(void /*int fd*/)
{
ssize_t size;
len_and_sockaddr *to;
struct sockaddr *from;
msg_t msg;
uint8_t query_status;
l_fixedpt_t query_xmttime;
to = get_sock_lsa(G_listen_fd);
from = xzalloc(to->len);
size = recv_from_to(G_listen_fd, &msg, sizeof(msg), MSG_DONTWAIT, from, &to->u.sa, to->len);
if (size != NTP_MSGSIZE_NOAUTH && size != NTP_MSGSIZE) {
char *addr;
if (size < 0) {
if (errno == EAGAIN)
goto bail;
bb_perror_msg_and_die("recv");
}
addr = xmalloc_sockaddr2dotted_noport(from);
bb_error_msg("malformed packet received from %s: size %u", addr, (int)size);
free(addr);
goto bail;
}
/* Respond only to client and symmetric active packets */
if ((msg.m_status & MODE_MASK) != MODE_CLIENT
&& (msg.m_status & MODE_MASK) != MODE_SYM_ACT
) {
goto bail;
}
query_status = msg.m_status;
query_xmttime = msg.m_xmttime;
msg.m_ppoll = G.poll_exp;
msg.m_precision_exp = G_precision_exp;
/* this time was obtained between poll() and recv() */
msg.m_rectime = d_to_lfp(G.cur_time);
msg.m_xmttime = d_to_lfp(gettime1900d()); /* this instant */
if (G.peer_cnt == 0) {
/* we have no peers: "stratum 1 server" mode. reftime = our own time */
G.reftime = G.cur_time;
}
msg.m_reftime = d_to_lfp(G.reftime);
msg.m_orgtime = query_xmttime;
msg.m_rootdelay = d_to_sfp(G.rootdelay);
msg.m_rootdisp = d_to_sfp(G.rootdisp);
msg.m_refid = G.refid; // (version > (3 << VERSION_SHIFT)) ? G.refid : G.refid3;
/* We reply from the local address packet was sent to,
* this makes to/from look swapped here: */
do_sendto(G_listen_fd,
/*from:*/ &to->u.sa, /*to:*/ from, /*addrlen:*/ to->len,
&msg, size);
bail:
free(to);
free(from);
}
| 164,967 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static sent_status_t send_data_to_app(int fd, BT_HDR *p_buf) {
if (p_buf->len == 0)
return SENT_ALL;
ssize_t sent = send(fd, p_buf->data + p_buf->offset, p_buf->len, MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (sent == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)
return SENT_NONE;
LOG_ERROR("%s error writing RFCOMM data back to app: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return SENT_FAILED;
}
if (sent == 0)
return SENT_FAILED;
if (sent == p_buf->len)
return SENT_ALL;
p_buf->offset += sent;
p_buf->len -= sent;
return SENT_PARTIAL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static sent_status_t send_data_to_app(int fd, BT_HDR *p_buf) {
if (p_buf->len == 0)
return SENT_ALL;
ssize_t sent = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(fd, p_buf->data + p_buf->offset, p_buf->len, MSG_DONTWAIT));
if (sent == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)
return SENT_NONE;
LOG_ERROR("%s error writing RFCOMM data back to app: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return SENT_FAILED;
}
if (sent == 0)
return SENT_FAILED;
if (sent == p_buf->len)
return SENT_ALL;
p_buf->offset += sent;
p_buf->len -= sent;
return SENT_PARTIAL;
}
| 173,458 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ResetScreenHandler::Show() {
if (!page_is_ready()) {
show_on_init_ = true;
return;
}
PrefService* prefs = g_browser_process->local_state();
restart_required_ = !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kFirstExecAfterBoot);
reboot_was_requested_ = false;
rollback_available_ = false;
if (!restart_required_) // First exec after boot.
reboot_was_requested_ = prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kFactoryResetRequested);
if (!restart_required_ && reboot_was_requested_) {
rollback_available_ = prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kRollbackRequested);
ShowWithParams();
} else {
chromeos::DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetUpdateEngineClient()->
CanRollbackCheck(base::Bind(&ResetScreenHandler::OnRollbackCheck,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
}
Commit Message: Rollback option put behind the flag.
BUG=368860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/267393011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269753 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void ResetScreenHandler::Show() {
if (!page_is_ready()) {
show_on_init_ = true;
return;
}
PrefService* prefs = g_browser_process->local_state();
restart_required_ = !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kFirstExecAfterBoot);
reboot_was_requested_ = false;
rollback_available_ = false;
if (!restart_required_) // First exec after boot.
reboot_was_requested_ = prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kFactoryResetRequested);
if (!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableRollbackOption)) {
rollback_available_ = false;
ShowWithParams();
} else if (!restart_required_ && reboot_was_requested_) {
rollback_available_ = prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kRollbackRequested);
ShowWithParams();
} else {
chromeos::DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetUpdateEngineClient()->
CanRollbackCheck(base::Bind(&ResetScreenHandler::OnRollbackCheck,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
}
| 171,181 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: JBIG2Bitmap::JBIG2Bitmap(Guint segNumA, JBIG2Bitmap *bitmap):
JBIG2Segment(segNumA)
{
w = bitmap->w;
h = bitmap->h;
line = bitmap->line;
if (w <= 0 || h <= 0 || line <= 0 || h >= (INT_MAX - 1) / line) {
error(-1, "invalid width/height");
data = NULL;
return;
}
data = (Guchar *)gmalloc(h * line + 1);
memcpy(data, bitmap->data, h * line);
data[h * line] = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | JBIG2Bitmap::JBIG2Bitmap(Guint segNumA, JBIG2Bitmap *bitmap):
JBIG2Segment(segNumA)
{
w = bitmap->w;
h = bitmap->h;
line = bitmap->line;
if (w <= 0 || h <= 0 || line <= 0 || h >= (INT_MAX - 1) / line) {
error(-1, "invalid width/height");
data = NULL;
return;
}
data = (Guchar *)gmallocn(h, line + 1);
memcpy(data, bitmap->data, h * line);
data[h * line] = 0;
}
| 164,613 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t *
p_code_block)
{
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_size;
/* The +1 is needed for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/835 */
l_data_size = 1 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) *
(p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) {
if (p_code_block->data) {
/* We refer to data - 1 since below we incremented it */
opj_free(p_code_block->data - 1);
}
p_code_block->data = (OPJ_BYTE*) opj_malloc(l_data_size + 1);
if (! p_code_block->data) {
p_code_block->data_size = 0U;
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
p_code_block->data_size = l_data_size;
/* We reserve the initial byte as a fake byte to a non-FF value */
/* and increment the data pointer, so that opj_mqc_init_enc() */
/* can do bp = data - 1, and opj_mqc_byteout() can safely dereference */
/* it. */
p_code_block->data[0] = 0;
p_code_block->data += 1; /*why +1 ?*/
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Encoder: grow buffer size in opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data() to avoid write heap buffer overflow in opj_mqc_flush (#982)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t *
p_code_block)
{
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_size;
/* +1 is needed for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/835 */
/* and actually +2 required for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/982 */
/* TODO: is there a theoretical upper-bound for the compressed code */
/* block size ? */
l_data_size = 2 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) *
(p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) {
if (p_code_block->data) {
/* We refer to data - 1 since below we incremented it */
opj_free(p_code_block->data - 1);
}
p_code_block->data = (OPJ_BYTE*) opj_malloc(l_data_size + 1);
if (! p_code_block->data) {
p_code_block->data_size = 0U;
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
p_code_block->data_size = l_data_size;
/* We reserve the initial byte as a fake byte to a non-FF value */
/* and increment the data pointer, so that opj_mqc_init_enc() */
/* can do bp = data - 1, and opj_mqc_byteout() can safely dereference */
/* it. */
p_code_block->data[0] = 0;
p_code_block->data += 1; /*why +1 ?*/
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
| 167,769 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserEventRouter::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
if (!GetTabEntry(contents->web_contents())) {
return;
}
scoped_ptr<ListValue> args(new ListValue());
args->Append(Value::CreateIntegerValue(
ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabId(contents->web_contents())));
DictionaryValue* object_args = new DictionaryValue();
object_args->Set(tab_keys::kOldWindowIdKey, Value::CreateIntegerValue(
ExtensionTabUtil::GetWindowIdOfTab(contents->web_contents())));
object_args->Set(tab_keys::kOldPositionKey, Value::CreateIntegerValue(
index));
args->Append(object_args);
DispatchEvent(contents->profile(), events::kOnTabDetached, args.Pass(),
EventRouter::USER_GESTURE_UNKNOWN);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void BrowserEventRouter::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
void BrowserEventRouter::TabDetachedAt(WebContents* contents, int index) {
if (!GetTabEntry(contents)) {
return;
}
scoped_ptr<ListValue> args(new ListValue());
args->Append(Value::CreateIntegerValue(ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabId(contents)));
DictionaryValue* object_args = new DictionaryValue();
object_args->Set(tab_keys::kOldWindowIdKey, Value::CreateIntegerValue(
ExtensionTabUtil::GetWindowIdOfTab(contents)));
object_args->Set(tab_keys::kOldPositionKey, Value::CreateIntegerValue(
index));
args->Append(object_args);
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(contents->GetBrowserContext());
DispatchEvent(profile, events::kOnTabDetached, args.Pass(),
EventRouter::USER_GESTURE_UNKNOWN);
}
| 171,505 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::ClearAllPreviewData() {
print_preview_data_service()->RemoveEntry(preview_ui_addr_str_);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void PrintPreviewUI::ClearAllPreviewData() {
print_preview_data_service()->RemoveEntry(id_);
}
| 170,829 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Chapters::Edition::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x36) { // Atom ID
status = ParseAtom(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long Chapters::Edition::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x36) { // Atom ID
status = ParseAtom(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
| 173,839 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TestJavaScriptDialogManager()
: is_fullscreen_(false), message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner) {}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | TestJavaScriptDialogManager()
TestWCDelegateForDialogsAndFullscreen()
: is_fullscreen_(false), message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner) {}
| 172,951 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ParamTraits<FilePath>::Read(const Message* m,
PickleIterator* iter,
param_type* r) {
FilePath::StringType value;
if (!ParamTraits<FilePath::StringType>::Read(m, iter, &value))
return false;
*r = FilePath(value);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | bool ParamTraits<FilePath>::Read(const Message* m,
PickleIterator* iter,
param_type* r) {
FilePath::StringType value;
if (!ParamTraits<FilePath::StringType>::Read(m, iter, &value))
return false;
// Reject embedded NULs as they can cause security checks to go awry.
if (value.find(FILE_PATH_LITERAL('\0')) != FilePath::StringType::npos)
return false;
*r = FilePath(value);
return true;
}
| 171,501 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeExtensionsDispatcherDelegate::RegisterNativeHandlers(
extensions::Dispatcher* dispatcher,
extensions::ModuleSystem* module_system,
extensions::ScriptContext* context) {
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"app", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::AppBindings(dispatcher, context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"sync_file_system",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::SyncFileSystemCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"file_browser_handler",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"file_manager_private",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"notifications_private",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::NotificationsNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"mediaGalleries",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::MediaGalleriesCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"page_capture", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::PageCaptureCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"platform_keys_natives",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::PlatformKeysNatives(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"tabs", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::TabsCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"webstore", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::WebstoreBindings(context)));
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"cast_streaming_natives",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::CastStreamingNativeHandler(context)));
#endif
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"automationInternal",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::AutomationInternalCustomBindings(context)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void ChromeExtensionsDispatcherDelegate::RegisterNativeHandlers(
extensions::Dispatcher* dispatcher,
extensions::ModuleSystem* module_system,
extensions::ScriptContext* context) {
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"app", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::AppBindings(dispatcher, context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"sync_file_system",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::SyncFileSystemCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"file_browser_handler",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"file_manager_private",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"notifications_private",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::NotificationsNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"mediaGalleries",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::MediaGalleriesCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"page_capture", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::PageCaptureCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"platform_keys_natives",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::PlatformKeysNatives(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"tabs", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::TabsCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"webstore", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::WebstoreBindings(context)));
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"cast_streaming_natives",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::CastStreamingNativeHandler(context)));
#endif
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"automationInternal",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::AutomationInternalCustomBindings(context)));
// The following are native handlers that are defined in //extensions, but
// are only used for APIs defined in Chrome.
// TODO(devlin): We should clean this up. If an API is defined in Chrome,
// there's no reason to have its native handlers residing and being compiled
// in //extensions.
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"i18n",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new extensions::I18NCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"lazy_background_page",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler(context)));
}
| 172,243 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetMultipleIntegervCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::GetMultipleIntegervCHROMIUM& c) {
GLuint count = c.count;
uint32 pnames_size;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(count, sizeof(GLenum), &pnames_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
const GLenum* pnames = GetSharedMemoryAs<const GLenum*>(
c.pnames_shm_id, c.pnames_shm_offset, pnames_size);
if (pnames == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
scoped_array<GLenum> enums(new GLenum[count]);
memcpy(enums.get(), pnames, pnames_size);
uint32 num_results = 0;
for (GLuint ii = 0; ii < count; ++ii) {
uint32 num = util_.GLGetNumValuesReturned(enums[ii]);
if (num == 0) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glGetMulitpleCHROMIUM", enums[ii], "pname");
return error::kNoError;
}
DCHECK_LE(num, 4u);
if (!SafeAdd(num_results, num, &num_results)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
}
uint32 result_size = 0;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(num_results, sizeof(GLint), &result_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (result_size != static_cast<uint32>(c.size)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glGetMulitpleCHROMIUM", "bad size GL_INVALID_VALUE");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLint* results = GetSharedMemoryAs<GLint*>(
c.results_shm_id, c.results_shm_offset, result_size);
if (results == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
for (uint32 ii = 0; ii < num_results; ++ii) {
if (results[ii]) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
}
GLint* start = results;
for (GLuint ii = 0; ii < count; ++ii) {
GLsizei num_written = 0;
if (!GetHelper(enums[ii], results, &num_written)) {
glGetIntegerv(enums[ii], results);
}
results += num_written;
}
if (static_cast<uint32>(results - start) != num_results) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetMultipleIntegervCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::GetMultipleIntegervCHROMIUM& c) {
GLuint count = c.count;
uint32 pnames_size;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(count, sizeof(GLenum), &pnames_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
const GLenum* pnames = GetSharedMemoryAs<const GLenum*>(
c.pnames_shm_id, c.pnames_shm_offset, pnames_size);
if (pnames == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
scoped_array<GLenum> enums(new GLenum[count]);
memcpy(enums.get(), pnames, pnames_size);
uint32 num_results = 0;
for (GLuint ii = 0; ii < count; ++ii) {
uint32 num = util_.GLGetNumValuesReturned(enums[ii]);
if (num == 0) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glGetMulitpleCHROMIUM", enums[ii], "pname");
return error::kNoError;
}
DCHECK_LE(num, 4u);
if (!SafeAddUint32(num_results, num, &num_results)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
}
uint32 result_size = 0;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(num_results, sizeof(GLint), &result_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (result_size != static_cast<uint32>(c.size)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glGetMulitpleCHROMIUM", "bad size GL_INVALID_VALUE");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLint* results = GetSharedMemoryAs<GLint*>(
c.results_shm_id, c.results_shm_offset, result_size);
if (results == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
for (uint32 ii = 0; ii < num_results; ++ii) {
if (results[ii]) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
}
GLint* start = results;
for (GLuint ii = 0; ii < count; ++ii) {
GLsizei num_written = 0;
if (!GetHelper(enums[ii], results, &num_written)) {
glGetIntegerv(enums[ii], results);
}
results += num_written;
}
if (static_cast<uint32>(results - start) != num_results) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
return error::kNoError;
}
| 170,748 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int use_conf(char *test_path)
{
int ret;
size_t flags = 0;
char filename[1024], errstr[1024];
char *buffer;
FILE *infile, *conffile;
json_t *json;
json_error_t error;
sprintf(filename, "%s%cinput", test_path, dir_sep);
if (!(infile = fopen(filename, "rb"))) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not open \"%s\"\n", filename);
return 2;
}
sprintf(filename, "%s%cenv", test_path, dir_sep);
conffile = fopen(filename, "rb");
if (conffile) {
read_conf(conffile);
fclose(conffile);
}
if (conf.indent < 0 || conf.indent > 255) {
fprintf(stderr, "invalid value for JSON_INDENT: %d\n", conf.indent);
return 2;
}
if (conf.indent)
flags |= JSON_INDENT(conf.indent);
if (conf.compact)
flags |= JSON_COMPACT;
if (conf.ensure_ascii)
flags |= JSON_ENSURE_ASCII;
if (conf.preserve_order)
flags |= JSON_PRESERVE_ORDER;
if (conf.sort_keys)
flags |= JSON_SORT_KEYS;
if (conf.strip) {
/* Load to memory, strip leading and trailing whitespace */
buffer = loadfile(infile);
json = json_loads(strip(buffer), 0, &error);
free(buffer);
}
else
json = json_loadf(infile, 0, &error);
fclose(infile);
if (!json) {
sprintf(errstr, "%d %d %d\n%s\n",
error.line, error.column, error.position,
error.text);
ret = cmpfile(errstr, test_path, "error");
return ret;
}
buffer = json_dumps(json, flags);
ret = cmpfile(buffer, test_path, "output");
free(buffer);
json_decref(json);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | int use_conf(char *test_path)
{
int ret;
size_t flags = 0;
char filename[1024], errstr[1024];
char *buffer;
FILE *infile, *conffile;
json_t *json;
json_error_t error;
sprintf(filename, "%s%cinput", test_path, dir_sep);
if (!(infile = fopen(filename, "rb"))) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not open \"%s\"\n", filename);
return 2;
}
sprintf(filename, "%s%cenv", test_path, dir_sep);
conffile = fopen(filename, "rb");
if (conffile) {
read_conf(conffile);
fclose(conffile);
}
if (conf.indent < 0 || conf.indent > 255) {
fprintf(stderr, "invalid value for JSON_INDENT: %d\n", conf.indent);
return 2;
}
if (conf.indent)
flags |= JSON_INDENT(conf.indent);
if (conf.compact)
flags |= JSON_COMPACT;
if (conf.ensure_ascii)
flags |= JSON_ENSURE_ASCII;
if (conf.preserve_order)
flags |= JSON_PRESERVE_ORDER;
if (conf.sort_keys)
flags |= JSON_SORT_KEYS;
if (conf.have_hashseed)
json_object_seed(conf.hashseed);
if (conf.strip) {
/* Load to memory, strip leading and trailing whitespace */
buffer = loadfile(infile);
json = json_loads(strip(buffer), 0, &error);
free(buffer);
}
else
json = json_loadf(infile, 0, &error);
fclose(infile);
if (!json) {
sprintf(errstr, "%d %d %d\n%s\n",
error.line, error.column, error.position,
error.text);
ret = cmpfile(errstr, test_path, "error");
return ret;
}
buffer = json_dumps(json, flags);
ret = cmpfile(buffer, test_path, "output");
free(buffer);
json_decref(json);
return ret;
}
| 166,537 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int verify_source_vc(char **ret_path, const char *src_vc) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
char *path;
int r;
fd = open_terminal(src_vc, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
if (fd < 0)
return log_error_errno(fd, "Failed to open %s: %m", src_vc);
r = verify_vc_device(fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Device %s is not a virtual console: %m", src_vc);
r = verify_vc_allocation_byfd(fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Virtual console %s is not allocated: %m", src_vc);
r = verify_vc_kbmode(fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Virtual console %s is not in K_XLATE or K_UNICODE: %m", src_vc);
path = strdup(src_vc);
if (!path)
return log_oom();
*ret_path = path;
return TAKE_FD(fd);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | static int verify_source_vc(char **ret_path, const char *src_vc) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
char *path;
int r;
fd = open_terminal(src_vc, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
if (fd < 0)
return log_error_errno(fd, "Failed to open %s: %m", src_vc);
r = verify_vc_device(fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Device %s is not a virtual console: %m", src_vc);
r = verify_vc_allocation_byfd(fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Virtual console %s is not allocated: %m", src_vc);
r = vt_verify_kbmode(fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Virtual console %s is not in K_XLATE or K_UNICODE: %m", src_vc);
path = strdup(src_vc);
if (!path)
return log_oom();
*ret_path = path;
return TAKE_FD(fd);
}
| 169,780 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, getFlags)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(intern->flags & (SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_MODE_MASK | SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_MODE_MASK | SPL_FILE_DIR_OTHERS_MASK));
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void FilesystemIterator::setFlags(long $flags)
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, getFlags)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(intern->flags & (SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_MODE_MASK | SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_MODE_MASK | SPL_FILE_DIR_OTHERS_MASK));
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void FilesystemIterator::setFlags(long $flags)
| 167,044 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
/* Point after session ID in client hello */
const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
unsigned short i;
*ret = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
/*
* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
* resumption.
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
return 0;
if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
return 0;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
i = *(p++);
p += i;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
}
/* Skip past cipher list */
n2s(p, i);
p += i;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
i = *(p++);
p += i;
if (p > limit)
return -1;
/* Now at start of extensions */
if ((p + 2) >= limit)
return 0;
n2s(p, i);
while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
unsigned short type, size;
n2s(p, type);
n2s(p, size);
if (p + size > limit)
return 0;
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
int r;
*/
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 1;
}
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
/*
* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
* generating the session from ticket now, trigger
* abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
* calculate the master secret later.
*/
return 2;
}
r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
switch (r) {
case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 2;
case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
return r;
case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 3;
default: /* fatal error */
return -1;
}
}
p += size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
/* Point after session ID in client hello */
const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
unsigned short i;
*ret = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
/*
* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
* resumption.
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
return 0;
if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
return 0;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
i = *(p++);
if (limit - p <= i)
return -1;
p += i;
}
/* Skip past cipher list */
n2s(p, i);
if (limit - p <= i)
return -1;
p += i;
/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
i = *(p++);
if (limit - p < i)
return -1;
p += i;
/* Now at start of extensions */
if (limit - p <= 2)
return 0;
n2s(p, i);
while (limit - p >= 4) {
unsigned short type, size;
n2s(p, type);
n2s(p, size);
if (limit - p < size)
return 0;
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
int r;
*/
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 1;
}
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
/*
* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
* generating the session from ticket now, trigger
* abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
* calculate the master secret later.
*/
return 2;
}
r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
switch (r) {
case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 2;
case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
return r;
case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 3;
default: /* fatal error */
return -1;
}
}
p += size;
}
| 165,206 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ScreenLayoutObserver::GetDisplayMessageForNotification(
const ScreenLayoutObserver::DisplayInfoMap& old_info,
base::string16* out_message,
base::string16* out_additional_message) {
if (old_display_mode_ != current_display_mode_) {
if (current_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::MIRRORING) {
*out_message = GetEnterMirrorModeMessage();
return true;
}
if (old_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::MIRRORING &&
GetExitMirrorModeMessage(out_message, out_additional_message)) {
return true;
}
if (current_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::UNIFIED) {
*out_message = GetEnterUnifiedModeMessage();
return true;
}
if (old_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::UNIFIED) {
*out_message = GetExitUnifiedModeMessage();
return true;
}
if (current_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::DOCKED ||
old_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::DOCKED) {
return false;
}
}
if (display_info_.size() < old_info.size()) {
for (const auto& iter : old_info) {
if (display_info_.count(iter.first))
continue;
*out_message =
GetDisplayRemovedMessage(iter.second, out_additional_message);
return true;
}
} else if (display_info_.size() > old_info.size()) {
for (const auto& iter : display_info_) {
if (old_info.count(iter.first))
continue;
*out_message = GetDisplayAddedMessage(iter.first, out_additional_message);
return true;
}
}
for (const auto& iter : display_info_) {
DisplayInfoMap::const_iterator old_iter = old_info.find(iter.first);
if (old_iter == old_info.end()) {
NOTREACHED() << "A display mode transition that should have been handled"
"earlier.";
return false;
}
if (iter.second.configured_ui_scale() !=
old_iter->second.configured_ui_scale()) {
*out_additional_message = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_RESOLUTION_CHANGED,
GetDisplayName(iter.first), GetDisplaySize(iter.first));
return true;
}
if (iter.second.GetActiveRotation() !=
old_iter->second.GetActiveRotation()) {
int rotation_text_id = 0;
switch (iter.second.GetActiveRotation()) {
case display::Display::ROTATE_0:
rotation_text_id = IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_STANDARD_ORIENTATION;
break;
case display::Display::ROTATE_90:
rotation_text_id = IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_ORIENTATION_90;
break;
case display::Display::ROTATE_180:
rotation_text_id = IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_ORIENTATION_180;
break;
case display::Display::ROTATE_270:
rotation_text_id = IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_ORIENTATION_270;
break;
}
*out_additional_message = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_ROTATED, GetDisplayName(iter.first),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(rotation_text_id));
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Avoid Showing rotation change notification when source is accelerometer
BUG=717252
TEST=Manually rotate device with accelerometer and observe there's no notification
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2853113005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469058}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | bool ScreenLayoutObserver::GetDisplayMessageForNotification(
const ScreenLayoutObserver::DisplayInfoMap& old_info,
base::string16* out_message,
base::string16* out_additional_message) {
if (old_display_mode_ != current_display_mode_) {
if (current_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::MIRRORING) {
*out_message = GetEnterMirrorModeMessage();
return true;
}
if (old_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::MIRRORING &&
GetExitMirrorModeMessage(out_message, out_additional_message)) {
return true;
}
if (current_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::UNIFIED) {
*out_message = GetEnterUnifiedModeMessage();
return true;
}
if (old_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::UNIFIED) {
*out_message = GetExitUnifiedModeMessage();
return true;
}
if (current_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::DOCKED ||
old_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::DOCKED) {
return false;
}
}
if (display_info_.size() < old_info.size()) {
for (const auto& iter : old_info) {
if (display_info_.count(iter.first))
continue;
*out_message =
GetDisplayRemovedMessage(iter.second, out_additional_message);
return true;
}
} else if (display_info_.size() > old_info.size()) {
for (const auto& iter : display_info_) {
if (old_info.count(iter.first))
continue;
*out_message = GetDisplayAddedMessage(iter.first, out_additional_message);
return true;
}
}
for (const auto& iter : display_info_) {
DisplayInfoMap::const_iterator old_iter = old_info.find(iter.first);
if (old_iter == old_info.end()) {
NOTREACHED() << "A display mode transition that should have been handled"
"earlier.";
return false;
}
if (iter.second.configured_ui_scale() !=
old_iter->second.configured_ui_scale()) {
*out_additional_message = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_RESOLUTION_CHANGED,
GetDisplayName(iter.first), GetDisplaySize(iter.first));
return true;
}
// We don't show rotation change notification when the rotation source is
// the accelerometer.
if (iter.second.active_rotation_source() !=
display::Display::ROTATION_SOURCE_ACCELEROMETER &&
iter.second.GetActiveRotation() !=
old_iter->second.GetActiveRotation()) {
int rotation_text_id = 0;
switch (iter.second.GetActiveRotation()) {
case display::Display::ROTATE_0:
rotation_text_id = IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_STANDARD_ORIENTATION;
break;
case display::Display::ROTATE_90:
rotation_text_id = IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_ORIENTATION_90;
break;
case display::Display::ROTATE_180:
rotation_text_id = IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_ORIENTATION_180;
break;
case display::Display::ROTATE_270:
rotation_text_id = IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_ORIENTATION_270;
break;
}
*out_additional_message = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_ROTATED, GetDisplayName(iter.first),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(rotation_text_id));
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
| 172,043 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FrameLoader::startLoad(FrameLoadRequest& frameLoadRequest, FrameLoadType type, NavigationPolicy navigationPolicy)
{
ASSERT(client()->hasWebView());
if (m_frame->document()->pageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() != Document::NoDismissal)
return;
NavigationType navigationType = determineNavigationType(type, frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest().httpBody() || frameLoadRequest.form(), frameLoadRequest.triggeringEvent());
frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest().setRequestContext(determineRequestContextFromNavigationType(navigationType));
frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest().setFrameType(m_frame->isMainFrame() ? WebURLRequest::FrameTypeTopLevel : WebURLRequest::FrameTypeNested);
ResourceRequest& request = frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest();
if (!shouldContinueForNavigationPolicy(request, frameLoadRequest.substituteData(), nullptr, frameLoadRequest.shouldCheckMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy(), navigationType, navigationPolicy, type == FrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem, frameLoadRequest.clientRedirect() == ClientRedirectPolicy::ClientRedirect))
return;
if (!shouldClose(navigationType == NavigationTypeReload))
return;
m_frame->document()->cancelParsing();
detachDocumentLoader(m_provisionalDocumentLoader);
if (!m_frame->host())
return;
m_provisionalDocumentLoader = client()->createDocumentLoader(m_frame, request, frameLoadRequest.substituteData().isValid() ? frameLoadRequest.substituteData() : defaultSubstituteDataForURL(request.url()));
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->setNavigationType(navigationType);
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->setReplacesCurrentHistoryItem(type == FrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem);
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->setIsClientRedirect(frameLoadRequest.clientRedirect() == ClientRedirectPolicy::ClientRedirect);
InspectorInstrumentation::didStartProvisionalLoad(m_frame);
m_frame->navigationScheduler().cancel();
m_checkTimer.stop();
m_loadType = type;
if (frameLoadRequest.form())
client()->dispatchWillSubmitForm(frameLoadRequest.form());
m_progressTracker->progressStarted();
if (m_provisionalDocumentLoader->isClientRedirect())
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->appendRedirect(m_frame->document()->url());
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->appendRedirect(m_provisionalDocumentLoader->request().url());
double triggeringEventTime = frameLoadRequest.triggeringEvent() ? frameLoadRequest.triggeringEvent()->platformTimeStamp() : 0;
client()->dispatchDidStartProvisionalLoad(triggeringEventTime);
ASSERT(m_provisionalDocumentLoader);
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->startLoadingMainResource();
takeObjectSnapshot();
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void FrameLoader::startLoad(FrameLoadRequest& frameLoadRequest, FrameLoadType type, NavigationPolicy navigationPolicy)
{
ASSERT(client()->hasWebView());
if (m_frame->document()->pageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() != Document::NoDismissal)
return;
NavigationType navigationType = determineNavigationType(type, frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest().httpBody() || frameLoadRequest.form(), frameLoadRequest.triggeringEvent());
frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest().setRequestContext(determineRequestContextFromNavigationType(navigationType));
frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest().setFrameType(m_frame->isMainFrame() ? WebURLRequest::FrameTypeTopLevel : WebURLRequest::FrameTypeNested);
ResourceRequest& request = frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest();
if (!shouldContinueForNavigationPolicy(request, frameLoadRequest.substituteData(), nullptr, frameLoadRequest.shouldCheckMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy(), navigationType, navigationPolicy, type == FrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem, frameLoadRequest.clientRedirect() == ClientRedirectPolicy::ClientRedirect))
return;
if (!shouldClose(navigationType == NavigationTypeReload))
return;
m_frame->document()->cancelParsing();
if (m_provisionalDocumentLoader) {
FrameNavigationDisabler navigationDisabler(*m_frame);
detachDocumentLoader(m_provisionalDocumentLoader);
}
if (!m_frame->host())
return;
m_provisionalDocumentLoader = client()->createDocumentLoader(m_frame, request, frameLoadRequest.substituteData().isValid() ? frameLoadRequest.substituteData() : defaultSubstituteDataForURL(request.url()));
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->setNavigationType(navigationType);
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->setReplacesCurrentHistoryItem(type == FrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem);
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->setIsClientRedirect(frameLoadRequest.clientRedirect() == ClientRedirectPolicy::ClientRedirect);
InspectorInstrumentation::didStartProvisionalLoad(m_frame);
m_frame->navigationScheduler().cancel();
m_checkTimer.stop();
m_loadType = type;
if (frameLoadRequest.form())
client()->dispatchWillSubmitForm(frameLoadRequest.form());
m_progressTracker->progressStarted();
if (m_provisionalDocumentLoader->isClientRedirect())
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->appendRedirect(m_frame->document()->url());
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->appendRedirect(m_provisionalDocumentLoader->request().url());
double triggeringEventTime = frameLoadRequest.triggeringEvent() ? frameLoadRequest.triggeringEvent()->platformTimeStamp() : 0;
client()->dispatchDidStartProvisionalLoad(triggeringEventTime);
ASSERT(m_provisionalDocumentLoader);
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->startLoadingMainResource();
takeObjectSnapshot();
}
| 172,258 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ScriptPromise ImageBitmapFactories::createImageBitmap(EventTarget& eventTarget, HTMLCanvasElement* canvas, int sx, int sy, int sw, int sh, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
ASSERT(eventTarget.toDOMWindow());
if (!canvas) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError("The canvas element provided is invalid.");
return ScriptPromise();
}
if (!canvas->originClean()) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("The canvas element provided is tainted with cross-origin data.");
return ScriptPromise();
}
if (!sw || !sh) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(IndexSizeError, String::format("The source %s provided is 0.", sw ? "height" : "width"));
return ScriptPromise();
}
return fulfillImageBitmap(eventTarget.executionContext(), ImageBitmap::create(canvas, IntRect(sx, sy, sw, sh)));
}
Commit Message: Fix crash when creating an ImageBitmap from an invalid canvas
BUG=354356
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/211313003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169973 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ScriptPromise ImageBitmapFactories::createImageBitmap(EventTarget& eventTarget, HTMLCanvasElement* canvas, int sx, int sy, int sw, int sh, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
ASSERT(eventTarget.toDOMWindow());
if (!canvas) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError("The canvas element provided is invalid.");
return ScriptPromise();
}
if (!canvas->originClean()) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("The canvas element provided is tainted with cross-origin data.");
return ScriptPromise();
}
if (!sw || !sh) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(IndexSizeError, String::format("The source %s provided is 0.", sw ? "height" : "width"));
return ScriptPromise();
}
return fulfillImageBitmap(eventTarget.executionContext(), canvas->buffer() ? ImageBitmap::create(canvas, IntRect(sx, sy, sw, sh)) : nullptr);
}
| 171,394 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int rfcomm_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_rc *sa = (struct sockaddr_rc *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int chan = sa->rc_channel;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p %pMR", sk, &sa->rc_bdaddr);
if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
write_lock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
if (chan && __rfcomm_get_listen_sock_by_addr(chan, &sa->rc_bdaddr)) {
err = -EADDRINUSE;
} else {
/* Save source address */
bacpy(&rfcomm_pi(sk)->src, &sa->rc_bdaddr);
rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel = chan;
sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND;
}
write_unlock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Fix potential NULL dereference in RFCOMM bind callback
addr can be NULL and it should not be dereferenced before NULL checking.
Signed-off-by: Jaganath Kanakkassery <jaganath.k@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int rfcomm_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_rc sa;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int len, err = 0;
if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH)
return -EINVAL;
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(sa), addr_len);
memcpy(&sa, addr, len);
BT_DBG("sk %p %pMR", sk, &sa.rc_bdaddr);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
write_lock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
if (sa.rc_channel &&
__rfcomm_get_listen_sock_by_addr(sa.rc_channel, &sa.rc_bdaddr)) {
err = -EADDRINUSE;
} else {
/* Save source address */
bacpy(&rfcomm_pi(sk)->src, &sa.rc_bdaddr);
rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel = sa.rc_channel;
sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND;
}
write_unlock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
| 167,466 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dwarf_elf_object_access_load_section(void* obj_in,
Dwarf_Half section_index,
Dwarf_Small** section_data,
int* error)
{
dwarf_elf_object_access_internals_t*obj =
(dwarf_elf_object_access_internals_t*)obj_in;
if (section_index == 0) {
return DW_DLV_NO_ENTRY;
}
{
Elf_Scn *scn = 0;
Elf_Data *data = 0;
scn = elf_getscn(obj->elf, section_index);
if (scn == NULL) {
*error = DW_DLE_MDE;
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
}
/* When using libelf as a producer, section data may be stored
in multiple buffers. In libdwarf however, we only use libelf
as a consumer (there is a dwarf producer API, but it doesn't
use libelf). Because of this, this single call to elf_getdata
will retrieve the entire section in a single contiguous
buffer. */
data = elf_getdata(scn, NULL);
if (data == NULL) {
*error = DW_DLE_MDE;
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
}
*section_data = data->d_buf;
}
return DW_DLV_OK;
}
Commit Message: A DWARF related section marked SHT_NOBITS (elf section type)
is an error in the elf object. Now detected.
dwarf_elf_access.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | dwarf_elf_object_access_load_section(void* obj_in,
Dwarf_Half section_index,
Dwarf_Small** section_data,
int* error)
{
dwarf_elf_object_access_internals_t*obj =
(dwarf_elf_object_access_internals_t*)obj_in;
if (section_index == 0) {
return DW_DLV_NO_ENTRY;
}
{
Elf_Scn *scn = 0;
Elf_Data *data = 0;
scn = elf_getscn(obj->elf, section_index);
if (scn == NULL) {
*error = DW_DLE_MDE;
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
}
/* When using libelf as a producer, section data may be stored
in multiple buffers. In libdwarf however, we only use libelf
as a consumer (there is a dwarf producer API, but it doesn't
use libelf). Because of this, this single call to elf_getdata
will retrieve the entire section in a single contiguous
buffer. */
data = elf_getdata(scn, NULL);
if (data == NULL) {
*error = DW_DLE_MDE;
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
}
if (!data->d_buf) {
/* If NULL it means 'the section has no data'
according to libelf documentation.
No DWARF-related section should ever have
'no data'. Happens if a section type is
SHT_NOBITS and no section libdwarf
wants to look at should be SHT_NOBITS. */
*error = DW_DLE_MDE;
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
}
*section_data = data->d_buf;
}
return DW_DLV_OK;
}
| 168,866 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cdf_read_short_sector(const cdf_stream_t *sst, void *buf, size_t offs,
size_t len, const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
assert((size_t)CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(h) == len);
(void)memcpy(((char *)buf) + offs,
((const char *)sst->sst_tab) + CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id), len);
return len;
}
Commit Message: add more check found by cert's fuzzer.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cdf_read_short_sector(const cdf_stream_t *sst, void *buf, size_t offs,
size_t len, const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
size_t ss = CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(h);
size_t pos = CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id);
assert(ss == len);
if (sst->sst_len < (size_t)id) {
DPRINTF(("bad sector id %d > %d\n", id, sst->sst_len));
return -1;
}
(void)memcpy(((char *)buf) + offs,
((const char *)sst->sst_tab) + pos, len);
return len;
}
| 169,884 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::string ChromeOSGetKeyboardOverlayId(const std::string& input_method_id) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kKeyboardOverlayMap); ++i) {
if (kKeyboardOverlayMap[i].input_method_id == input_method_id) {
return kKeyboardOverlayMap[i].keyboard_overlay_id;
}
}
return "";
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | std::string ChromeOSGetKeyboardOverlayId(const std::string& input_method_id) {
virtual bool SetImeConfig(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
return true;
}
| 170,522 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PageHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (host_ == frame_host)
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host =
host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Remove(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
host_ = frame_host;
widget_host = host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Add(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void PageHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
void PageHandler::SetRenderer(int process_host_id,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (host_ == frame_host)
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host =
host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Remove(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
host_ = frame_host;
widget_host = host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Add(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
}
| 172,764 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) ||
ns_capable(current->nsproxy->pid_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
Commit Message: net: Check the correct namespace when spoofing pid over SCM_RIGHTS
This is a security bug.
The follow-up will fix nsproxy to discourage this type of issue from
happening again.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) ||
ns_capable(task_active_pid_ns(current)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
| 165,991 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct block_device *ext3_blkdev_get(dev_t dev, struct super_block *sb)
{
struct block_device *bdev;
char b[BDEVNAME_SIZE];
bdev = blkdev_get_by_dev(dev, FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE|FMODE_EXCL, sb);
if (IS_ERR(bdev))
goto fail;
return bdev;
fail:
ext3_msg(sb, "error: failed to open journal device %s: %ld",
__bdevname(dev, b), PTR_ERR(bdev));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static struct block_device *ext3_blkdev_get(dev_t dev, struct super_block *sb)
{
struct block_device *bdev;
char b[BDEVNAME_SIZE];
bdev = blkdev_get_by_dev(dev, FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE|FMODE_EXCL, sb);
if (IS_ERR(bdev))
goto fail;
return bdev;
fail:
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: failed to open journal device %s: %ld",
__bdevname(dev, b), PTR_ERR(bdev));
return NULL;
}
| 166,109 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> V8SchemaRegistry::GetSchema(const std::string& api) {
if (schema_cache_ != NULL) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> cached_schema = schema_cache_->Get(api);
if (!cached_schema.IsEmpty()) {
return cached_schema;
}
}
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = GetOrCreateContext(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context);
const base::DictionaryValue* schema =
ExtensionAPI::GetSharedInstance()->GetSchema(api);
CHECK(schema) << api;
std::unique_ptr<V8ValueConverter> v8_value_converter(
V8ValueConverter::create());
v8::Local<v8::Value> value = v8_value_converter->ToV8Value(schema, context);
CHECK(!value.IsEmpty());
v8::Local<v8::Object> v8_schema(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value));
v8_schema->SetIntegrityLevel(context, v8::IntegrityLevel::kFrozen);
schema_cache_->Set(api, v8_schema);
return handle_scope.Escape(v8_schema);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Finish freezing schema
BUG=604901
BUG=603725
BUG=591164
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1906593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#388945}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | v8::Local<v8::Object> V8SchemaRegistry::GetSchema(const std::string& api) {
if (schema_cache_ != NULL) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> cached_schema = schema_cache_->Get(api);
if (!cached_schema.IsEmpty()) {
return cached_schema;
}
}
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = GetOrCreateContext(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context);
const base::DictionaryValue* schema =
ExtensionAPI::GetSharedInstance()->GetSchema(api);
CHECK(schema) << api;
std::unique_ptr<V8ValueConverter> v8_value_converter(
V8ValueConverter::create());
v8::Local<v8::Value> value = v8_value_converter->ToV8Value(schema, context);
CHECK(!value.IsEmpty());
v8::Local<v8::Object> v8_schema(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value));
DeepFreeze(v8_schema, context);
schema_cache_->Set(api, v8_schema);
return handle_scope.Escape(v8_schema);
}
| 172,259 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int store_asoundrc(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
/* coverity[toctou] */
char* rp = realpath(src, NULL);
if (!rp) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: Cannot access %s\n", src);
exit(1);
}
if (strncmp(rp, cfg.homedir, strlen(cfg.homedir)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: .asoundrc is a symbolic link pointing to a file outside home directory\n");
exit(1);
}
free(rp);
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .asoundrc in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: replace copy_file with copy_file_as_user
CWE ID: CWE-269 | static int store_asoundrc(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
/* coverity[toctou] */
char* rp = realpath(src, NULL);
if (!rp) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: Cannot access %s\n", src);
exit(1);
}
if (strncmp(rp, cfg.homedir, strlen(cfg.homedir)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: .asoundrc is a symbolic link pointing to a file outside home directory\n");
exit(1);
}
free(rp);
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
| 170,094 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ProxyChannelDelegate::~ProxyChannelDelegate() {
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | ProxyChannelDelegate::~ProxyChannelDelegate() {
| 170,740 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dbus_g_proxy_manager_filter (DBusConnection *connection,
DBusMessage *message,
void *user_data)
{
DBusGProxyManager *manager;
if (dbus_message_get_type (message) != DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_SIGNAL)
return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET_HANDLED;
manager = user_data;
dbus_g_proxy_manager_ref (manager);
LOCK_MANAGER (manager);
if (dbus_message_is_signal (message,
DBUS_INTERFACE_LOCAL,
"Disconnected"))
{
/* Destroy all the proxies, quite possibly resulting in unreferencing
* the proxy manager and the connection as well.
*/
GSList *all;
GSList *tmp;
all = dbus_g_proxy_manager_list_all (manager);
tmp = all;
while (tmp != NULL)
{
DBusGProxy *proxy;
proxy = DBUS_G_PROXY (tmp->data);
UNLOCK_MANAGER (manager);
dbus_g_proxy_destroy (proxy);
g_object_unref (G_OBJECT (proxy));
LOCK_MANAGER (manager);
tmp = tmp->next;
}
g_slist_free (all);
#ifndef G_DISABLE_CHECKS
if (manager->proxy_lists != NULL)
g_warning ("Disconnection emitted \"destroy\" on all DBusGProxy, but somehow new proxies were created in response to one of those destroy signals. This will cause a memory leak.");
#endif
}
else
{
char *tri;
GSList *full_list;
GSList *owned_names;
GSList *tmp;
const char *sender;
/* First we handle NameOwnerChanged internally */
if (dbus_message_is_signal (message,
DBUS_INTERFACE_DBUS,
"NameOwnerChanged"))
{
DBusError derr;
dbus_error_init (&derr);
if (!dbus_message_get_args (message,
&derr,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&name,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&prev_owner,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&new_owner,
DBUS_TYPE_INVALID))
{
/* Ignore this error */
dbus_error_free (&derr);
}
else if (manager->owner_names != NULL)
{
dbus_g_proxy_manager_replace_name_owner (manager, name, prev_owner, new_owner);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | dbus_g_proxy_manager_filter (DBusConnection *connection,
DBusMessage *message,
void *user_data)
{
DBusGProxyManager *manager;
if (dbus_message_get_type (message) != DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_SIGNAL)
return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET_HANDLED;
manager = user_data;
dbus_g_proxy_manager_ref (manager);
LOCK_MANAGER (manager);
if (dbus_message_is_signal (message,
DBUS_INTERFACE_LOCAL,
"Disconnected"))
{
/* Destroy all the proxies, quite possibly resulting in unreferencing
* the proxy manager and the connection as well.
*/
GSList *all;
GSList *tmp;
all = dbus_g_proxy_manager_list_all (manager);
tmp = all;
while (tmp != NULL)
{
DBusGProxy *proxy;
proxy = DBUS_G_PROXY (tmp->data);
UNLOCK_MANAGER (manager);
dbus_g_proxy_destroy (proxy);
g_object_unref (G_OBJECT (proxy));
LOCK_MANAGER (manager);
tmp = tmp->next;
}
g_slist_free (all);
#ifndef G_DISABLE_CHECKS
if (manager->proxy_lists != NULL)
g_warning ("Disconnection emitted \"destroy\" on all DBusGProxy, but somehow new proxies were created in response to one of those destroy signals. This will cause a memory leak.");
#endif
}
else
{
char *tri;
GSList *full_list;
GSList *owned_names;
GSList *tmp;
const char *sender;
sender = dbus_message_get_sender (message);
/* First we handle NameOwnerChanged internally */
if (g_strcmp0 (sender, DBUS_SERVICE_DBUS) == 0 &&
dbus_message_is_signal (message,
DBUS_INTERFACE_DBUS,
"NameOwnerChanged"))
{
DBusError derr;
dbus_error_init (&derr);
if (!dbus_message_get_args (message,
&derr,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&name,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&prev_owner,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&new_owner,
DBUS_TYPE_INVALID))
{
/* Ignore this error */
dbus_error_free (&derr);
}
else if (manager->owner_names != NULL)
{
dbus_g_proxy_manager_replace_name_owner (manager, name, prev_owner, new_owner);
}
}
}
}
| 164,781 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: NavigationPolicy EffectiveNavigationPolicy(NavigationPolicy policy,
const WebInputEvent* current_event,
const WebWindowFeatures& features) {
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyIgnore)
return GetNavigationPolicy(current_event, features);
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
GetNavigationPolicy(current_event, features) !=
kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
!UIEventWithKeyState::NewTabModifierSetFromIsolatedWorld()) {
return kNavigationPolicyNewForegroundTab;
}
return policy;
}
Commit Message: Only allow downloading in response to real keyboard modifiers
BUG=848531
Change-Id: I97554c8d312243b55647f1376945aee32dbd95bf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1082216
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564051}
CWE ID: | NavigationPolicy EffectiveNavigationPolicy(NavigationPolicy policy,
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
user_policy != kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
!UIEventWithKeyState::NewTabModifierSetFromIsolatedWorld()) {
// Don't allow background tabs to be opened via script setting the
// event modifiers.
return kNavigationPolicyNewForegroundTab;
}
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyDownload &&
user_policy != kNavigationPolicyDownload) {
// Don't allow downloads to be triggered via script setting the event
// modifiers.
return kNavigationPolicyNewForegroundTab;
}
return policy;
}
| 173,192 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: exsltCryptoPopString (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs,
xmlChar ** str) {
int str_len = 0;
if ((nargs < 1) || (nargs > 2)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError (ctxt);
return 0;
}
*str = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (*str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (*str);
return 0;
}
return str_len;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | exsltCryptoPopString (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs,
xmlChar ** str) {
int str_len = 0;
if ((nargs < 1) || (nargs > 2)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError (ctxt);
return 0;
}
*str = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
str_len = xmlStrlen (*str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (*str);
return 0;
}
return str_len;
}
| 173,286 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: append_quoted (struct stringbuf *sb, const unsigned char *value, size_t length,
int skip)
{
unsigned char tmp[4];
const unsigned char *s = value;
size_t n = 0;
for (;;)
{
for (value = s; n+skip < length; n++, s++)
{
s += skip;
n += skip;
if (*s < ' ' || *s > 126 || strchr (",+\"\\<>;", *s) )
break;
}
if (s != value)
put_stringbuf_mem_skip (sb, value, s-value, skip);
if (n+skip >= length)
return; /* ready */
s += skip;
n += skip;
if ( *s < ' ' || *s > 126 )
{
sprintf (tmp, "\\%02X", *s);
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, 3);
}
else
{
tmp[0] = '\\';
tmp[1] = *s;
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, 2);
}
n++; s++;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | append_quoted (struct stringbuf *sb, const unsigned char *value, size_t length,
int skip)
{
unsigned char tmp[4];
const unsigned char *s = value;
size_t n = 0;
for (;;)
{
for (value = s; n+skip < length; n++, s++)
{
s += skip;
n += skip;
if (*s < ' ' || *s > 126 || strchr (",+\"\\<>;", *s) )
break;
}
if (s != value)
put_stringbuf_mem_skip (sb, value, s-value, skip);
if (n+skip >= length)
return; /* ready */
s += skip;
n += skip;
if ( *s < ' ' || *s > 126 )
{
snprintf (tmp, sizeof tmp, "\\%02X", *s);
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, 3);
}
else
{
tmp[0] = '\\';
tmp[1] = *s;
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, 2);
}
n++; s++;
}
}
| 165,049 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ExtensionTtsPlatformImplWin::Speak(
const std::string& src_utterance,
const std::string& language,
const std::string& gender,
double rate,
double pitch,
double volume) {
std::wstring utterance = UTF8ToUTF16(src_utterance);
if (!speech_synthesizer_)
return false;
if (rate >= 0.0) {
speech_synthesizer_->SetRate(static_cast<int32>(rate * 20 - 10));
}
if (pitch >= 0.0) {
std::wstring pitch_value =
base::IntToString16(static_cast<int>(pitch * 20 - 10));
utterance = L"<pitch absmiddle=\"" + pitch_value + L"\">" +
utterance + L"</pitch>";
}
if (volume >= 0.0) {
speech_synthesizer_->SetVolume(static_cast<uint16>(volume * 100));
}
if (paused_) {
speech_synthesizer_->Resume();
paused_ = false;
}
speech_synthesizer_->Speak(
utterance.c_str(), SPF_ASYNC | SPF_PURGEBEFORESPEAK, NULL);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool ExtensionTtsPlatformImplWin::Speak(
int utterance_id,
const std::string& src_utterance,
const std::string& lang,
const UtteranceContinuousParameters& params) {
std::wstring prefix;
std::wstring suffix;
if (!speech_synthesizer_)
return false;
// TODO(dmazzoni): support languages other than the default: crbug.com/88059
if (params.rate >= 0.0) {
// Map our multiplicative range of 0.1x to 10.0x onto Microsoft's
// linear range of -10 to 10:
// 0.1 -> -10
// 1.0 -> 0
// 10.0 -> 10
speech_synthesizer_->SetRate(static_cast<int32>(10 * log10(params.rate)));
}
if (params.pitch >= 0.0) {
std::wstring pitch_value =
base::IntToString16(static_cast<int>(params.pitch * 10 - 10));
prefix = L"<pitch absmiddle=\"" + pitch_value + L"\">";
suffix = L"</pitch>";
}
if (params.volume >= 0.0) {
speech_synthesizer_->SetVolume(static_cast<uint16>(params.volume * 100));
}
if (paused_) {
speech_synthesizer_->Resume();
paused_ = false;
}
// TODO(dmazzoni): convert SSML to SAPI xml. http://crbug.com/88072
utterance_ = UTF8ToWide(src_utterance);
utterance_id_ = utterance_id;
char_position_ = 0;
std::wstring merged_utterance = prefix + utterance_ + suffix;
prefix_len_ = prefix.size();
HRESULT result = speech_synthesizer_->Speak(
merged_utterance.c_str(),
SPF_ASYNC | SPF_PURGEBEFORESPEAK,
&stream_number_);
return (result == S_OK);
}
| 170,402 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool SerializeNotificationDatabaseData(const NotificationDatabaseData& input,
std::string* output) {
DCHECK(output);
scoped_ptr<NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData> payload(
new NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData());
const PlatformNotificationData& notification_data = input.notification_data;
payload->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.title));
switch (notification_data.direction) {
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_LEFT_TO_RIGHT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::LEFT_TO_RIGHT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_RIGHT_TO_LEFT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::RIGHT_TO_LEFT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_AUTO:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::AUTO);
break;
}
payload->set_lang(notification_data.lang);
payload->set_body(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.body));
payload->set_tag(notification_data.tag);
payload->set_icon(notification_data.icon.spec());
for (size_t i = 0; i < notification_data.vibration_pattern.size(); ++i)
payload->add_vibration_pattern(notification_data.vibration_pattern[i]);
payload->set_timestamp(notification_data.timestamp.ToInternalValue());
payload->set_silent(notification_data.silent);
payload->set_require_interaction(notification_data.require_interaction);
if (notification_data.data.size()) {
payload->set_data(¬ification_data.data.front(),
notification_data.data.size());
}
for (const PlatformNotificationAction& action : notification_data.actions) {
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationAction* payload_action =
payload->add_actions();
payload_action->set_action(action.action);
payload_action->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(action.title));
}
NotificationDatabaseDataProto message;
message.set_notification_id(input.notification_id);
message.set_origin(input.origin.spec());
message.set_service_worker_registration_id(
input.service_worker_registration_id);
message.set_allocated_notification_data(payload.release());
return message.SerializeToString(output);
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID: | bool SerializeNotificationDatabaseData(const NotificationDatabaseData& input,
std::string* output) {
DCHECK(output);
scoped_ptr<NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData> payload(
new NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData());
const PlatformNotificationData& notification_data = input.notification_data;
payload->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.title));
switch (notification_data.direction) {
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_LEFT_TO_RIGHT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::LEFT_TO_RIGHT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_RIGHT_TO_LEFT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::RIGHT_TO_LEFT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_AUTO:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::AUTO);
break;
}
payload->set_lang(notification_data.lang);
payload->set_body(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.body));
payload->set_tag(notification_data.tag);
payload->set_icon(notification_data.icon.spec());
for (size_t i = 0; i < notification_data.vibration_pattern.size(); ++i)
payload->add_vibration_pattern(notification_data.vibration_pattern[i]);
payload->set_timestamp(notification_data.timestamp.ToInternalValue());
payload->set_silent(notification_data.silent);
payload->set_require_interaction(notification_data.require_interaction);
if (notification_data.data.size()) {
payload->set_data(¬ification_data.data.front(),
notification_data.data.size());
}
for (const PlatformNotificationAction& action : notification_data.actions) {
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationAction* payload_action =
payload->add_actions();
payload_action->set_action(action.action);
payload_action->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(action.title));
payload_action->set_icon(action.icon.spec());
}
NotificationDatabaseDataProto message;
message.set_notification_id(input.notification_id);
message.set_origin(input.origin.spec());
message.set_service_worker_registration_id(
input.service_worker_registration_id);
message.set_allocated_notification_data(payload.release());
return message.SerializeToString(output);
}
| 171,630 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int rose_parse_national(unsigned char *p, struct rose_facilities_struct *facilities, int len)
{
unsigned char *pt;
unsigned char l, lg, n = 0;
int fac_national_digis_received = 0;
do {
switch (*p & 0xC0) {
case 0x00:
p += 2;
n += 2;
len -= 2;
break;
case 0x40:
if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_RAND)
facilities->rand = ((p[1] << 8) & 0xFF00) + ((p[2] << 0) & 0x00FF);
p += 3;
n += 3;
len -= 3;
break;
case 0x80:
p += 4;
n += 4;
len -= 4;
break;
case 0xC0:
l = p[1];
if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DEST_DIGI) {
if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
facilities->source_ndigis = 1;
}
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_SRC_DIGI) {
if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
facilities->dest_ndigis = 1;
}
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_CALL) {
memcpy(&facilities->fail_call, p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_ADD) {
memcpy(&facilities->fail_addr, p + 3, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS) {
fac_national_digis_received = 1;
facilities->source_ndigis = 0;
facilities->dest_ndigis = 0;
for (pt = p + 2, lg = 0 ; lg < l ; pt += AX25_ADDR_LEN, lg += AX25_ADDR_LEN) {
if (pt[6] & AX25_HBIT)
memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[facilities->dest_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
else
memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[facilities->source_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
}
p += l + 2;
n += l + 2;
len -= l + 2;
break;
}
} while (*p != 0x00 && len > 0);
return n;
}
Commit Message: ROSE: prevent heap corruption with bad facilities
When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's possible for
a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected, resulting in
heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent overflows, and
abort facilities parsing on failure.
Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and
FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide a length
of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy size, causing a
kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length of greater than
20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign array. Abort facilities
parsing on these invalid length values.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int rose_parse_national(unsigned char *p, struct rose_facilities_struct *facilities, int len)
{
unsigned char *pt;
unsigned char l, lg, n = 0;
int fac_national_digis_received = 0;
do {
switch (*p & 0xC0) {
case 0x00:
p += 2;
n += 2;
len -= 2;
break;
case 0x40:
if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_RAND)
facilities->rand = ((p[1] << 8) & 0xFF00) + ((p[2] << 0) & 0x00FF);
p += 3;
n += 3;
len -= 3;
break;
case 0x80:
p += 4;
n += 4;
len -= 4;
break;
case 0xC0:
l = p[1];
if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DEST_DIGI) {
if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
facilities->source_ndigis = 1;
}
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_SRC_DIGI) {
if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
facilities->dest_ndigis = 1;
}
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_CALL) {
memcpy(&facilities->fail_call, p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_ADD) {
memcpy(&facilities->fail_addr, p + 3, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS) {
fac_national_digis_received = 1;
facilities->source_ndigis = 0;
facilities->dest_ndigis = 0;
for (pt = p + 2, lg = 0 ; lg < l ; pt += AX25_ADDR_LEN, lg += AX25_ADDR_LEN) {
if (pt[6] & AX25_HBIT) {
if (facilities->dest_ndigis >= ROSE_MAX_DIGIS)
return -1;
memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[facilities->dest_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
} else {
if (facilities->source_ndigis >= ROSE_MAX_DIGIS)
return -1;
memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[facilities->source_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
}
}
p += l + 2;
n += l + 2;
len -= l + 2;
break;
}
} while (*p != 0x00 && len > 0);
return n;
}
| 165,673 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void local_socket_close_locked(asocket* s) {
D("entered local_socket_close_locked. LS(%d) fd=%d", s->id, s->fd);
if (s->peer) {
D("LS(%d): closing peer. peer->id=%d peer->fd=%d", s->id, s->peer->id, s->peer->fd);
/* Note: it's important to call shutdown before disconnecting from
* the peer, this ensures that remote sockets can still get the id
* of the local socket they're connected to, to send a CLOSE()
* protocol event. */
if (s->peer->shutdown) {
s->peer->shutdown(s->peer);
}
s->peer->peer = 0;
if (s->peer->close == local_socket_close) {
local_socket_close_locked(s->peer);
} else {
s->peer->close(s->peer);
}
s->peer = 0;
}
/* If we are already closing, or if there are no
** pending packets, destroy immediately
*/
if (s->closing || s->has_write_error || s->pkt_first == NULL) {
int id = s->id;
local_socket_destroy(s);
D("LS(%d): closed", id);
return;
}
/* otherwise, put on the closing list
*/
D("LS(%d): closing", s->id);
s->closing = 1;
fdevent_del(&s->fde, FDE_READ);
remove_socket(s);
D("LS(%d): put on socket_closing_list fd=%d", s->id, s->fd);
insert_local_socket(s, &local_socket_closing_list);
CHECK_EQ(FDE_WRITE, s->fde.state & FDE_WRITE);
}
Commit Message: adb: switch the socket list mutex to a recursive_mutex.
sockets.cpp was branching on whether a socket close function was
local_socket_close in order to avoid a potential deadlock if the socket
list lock was held while closing a peer socket.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I5e56f17fa54275284787f0f1dc150d1960256ab3
(cherry picked from commit 9b587dec6d0a57c8fe1083c1c543fbeb163d65fa)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void local_socket_close_locked(asocket* s) {
static void local_socket_close(asocket* s) {
D("entered local_socket_close. LS(%d) fd=%d", s->id, s->fd);
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> lock(local_socket_list_lock);
if (s->peer) {
D("LS(%d): closing peer. peer->id=%d peer->fd=%d", s->id, s->peer->id, s->peer->fd);
/* Note: it's important to call shutdown before disconnecting from
* the peer, this ensures that remote sockets can still get the id
* of the local socket they're connected to, to send a CLOSE()
* protocol event. */
if (s->peer->shutdown) {
s->peer->shutdown(s->peer);
}
s->peer->peer = nullptr;
s->peer->close(s->peer);
s->peer = nullptr;
}
/* If we are already closing, or if there are no
** pending packets, destroy immediately
*/
if (s->closing || s->has_write_error || s->pkt_first == NULL) {
int id = s->id;
local_socket_destroy(s);
D("LS(%d): closed", id);
return;
}
/* otherwise, put on the closing list
*/
D("LS(%d): closing", s->id);
s->closing = 1;
fdevent_del(&s->fde, FDE_READ);
remove_socket(s);
D("LS(%d): put on socket_closing_list fd=%d", s->id, s->fd);
insert_local_socket(s, &local_socket_closing_list);
CHECK_EQ(FDE_WRITE, s->fde.state & FDE_WRITE);
}
| 174,154 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintTab(gfx::Canvas* canvas, const SkPath& clip) const {
int active_tab_fill_id = 0;
int active_tab_y_inset = 0;
if (tab_->GetThemeProvider()->HasCustomImage(IDR_THEME_TOOLBAR)) {
active_tab_fill_id = IDR_THEME_TOOLBAR;
active_tab_y_inset = GetStrokeThickness(true);
}
if (tab_->IsActive()) {
PaintTabBackground(canvas, true /* active */, active_tab_fill_id,
active_tab_y_inset, nullptr /* clip */);
} else {
PaintInactiveTabBackground(canvas, clip);
const float throb_value = GetThrobValue();
if (throb_value > 0) {
canvas->SaveLayerAlpha(gfx::ToRoundedInt(throb_value * 0xff),
tab_->GetLocalBounds());
PaintTabBackground(canvas, true /* active */, active_tab_fill_id,
active_tab_y_inset, nullptr /* clip */);
canvas->Restore();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void GM2TabStyle::PaintTab(gfx::Canvas* canvas, const SkPath& clip) const {
int active_tab_fill_id = 0;
int active_tab_y_inset = 0;
if (tab_->GetThemeProvider()->HasCustomImage(IDR_THEME_TOOLBAR)) {
active_tab_fill_id = IDR_THEME_TOOLBAR;
active_tab_y_inset = GetStrokeThickness(true);
}
if (tab_->IsActive()) {
PaintTabBackground(canvas, TAB_ACTIVE, active_tab_fill_id,
active_tab_y_inset, nullptr /* clip */);
} else {
PaintInactiveTabBackground(canvas, clip);
const float throb_value = GetThrobValue();
if (throb_value > 0) {
canvas->SaveLayerAlpha(gfx::ToRoundedInt(throb_value * 0xff),
tab_->GetLocalBounds());
PaintTabBackground(canvas, TAB_ACTIVE, active_tab_fill_id,
active_tab_y_inset, nullptr /* clip */);
canvas->Restore();
}
}
}
| 172,524 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool DoResolveRelativeHost(const char* base_url,
const url_parse::Parsed& base_parsed,
const CHAR* relative_url,
const url_parse::Component& relative_component,
CharsetConverter* query_converter,
CanonOutput* output,
url_parse::Parsed* out_parsed) {
url_parse::Parsed relative_parsed; // Everything but the scheme is valid.
url_parse::ParseAfterScheme(&relative_url[relative_component.begin],
relative_component.len, relative_component.begin,
&relative_parsed);
Replacements<CHAR> replacements;
replacements.SetUsername(relative_url, relative_parsed.username);
replacements.SetPassword(relative_url, relative_parsed.password);
replacements.SetHost(relative_url, relative_parsed.host);
replacements.SetPort(relative_url, relative_parsed.port);
replacements.SetPath(relative_url, relative_parsed.path);
replacements.SetQuery(relative_url, relative_parsed.query);
replacements.SetRef(relative_url, relative_parsed.ref);
return ReplaceStandardURL(base_url, base_parsed, replacements,
query_converter, output, out_parsed);
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB read when parsing protocol-relative URLs
BUG=285742
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23902014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@223735 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool DoResolveRelativeHost(const char* base_url,
const url_parse::Parsed& base_parsed,
const CHAR* relative_url,
const url_parse::Component& relative_component,
CharsetConverter* query_converter,
CanonOutput* output,
url_parse::Parsed* out_parsed) {
url_parse::Parsed relative_parsed; // Everything but the scheme is valid.
url_parse::ParseAfterScheme(relative_url, relative_component.end(),
relative_component.begin, &relative_parsed);
Replacements<CHAR> replacements;
replacements.SetUsername(relative_url, relative_parsed.username);
replacements.SetPassword(relative_url, relative_parsed.password);
replacements.SetHost(relative_url, relative_parsed.host);
replacements.SetPort(relative_url, relative_parsed.port);
replacements.SetPath(relative_url, relative_parsed.path);
replacements.SetQuery(relative_url, relative_parsed.query);
replacements.SetRef(relative_url, relative_parsed.ref);
return ReplaceStandardURL(base_url, base_parsed, replacements,
query_converter, output, out_parsed);
}
| 171,192 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: CoordinatorImpl::CoordinatorImpl(service_manager::Connector* connector)
: next_dump_id_(0),
client_process_timeout_(base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(15)) {
process_map_ = std::make_unique<ProcessMap>(connector);
DCHECK(!g_coordinator_impl);
g_coordinator_impl = this;
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpManager::GetInstance()->set_tracing_process_id(
mojom::kServiceTracingProcessId);
tracing_observer_ = std::make_unique<TracingObserver>(
base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance(), nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | CoordinatorImpl::CoordinatorImpl(service_manager::Connector* connector)
: next_dump_id_(0),
client_process_timeout_(base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(15)),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
process_map_ = std::make_unique<ProcessMap>(connector);
DCHECK(!g_coordinator_impl);
g_coordinator_impl = this;
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpManager::GetInstance()->set_tracing_process_id(
mojom::kServiceTracingProcessId);
tracing_observer_ = std::make_unique<TracingObserver>(
base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance(), nullptr);
}
| 173,211 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: lib_file_open(gs_file_path_ptr lib_path, const gs_memory_t *mem, i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p,
const char *fname, uint flen, char *buffer, int blen, uint *pclen, ref *pfile)
{ /* i_ctx_p is NULL running arg (@) files.
* lib_path and mem are never NULL
*/
bool starting_arg_file = (i_ctx_p == NULL) ? true : i_ctx_p->starting_arg_file;
bool search_with_no_combine = false;
bool search_with_combine = false;
char fmode[2] = { 'r', 0};
gx_io_device *iodev = iodev_default(mem);
gs_main_instance *minst = get_minst_from_memory(mem);
int code;
/* when starting arg files (@ files) iodev_default is not yet set */
if (iodev == 0)
iodev = (gx_io_device *)gx_io_device_table[0];
search_with_combine = false;
} else {
search_with_no_combine = starting_arg_file;
search_with_combine = true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | lib_file_open(gs_file_path_ptr lib_path, const gs_memory_t *mem, i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p,
const char *fname, uint flen, char *buffer, int blen, uint *pclen, ref *pfile)
{ /* i_ctx_p is NULL running arg (@) files.
* lib_path and mem are never NULL
*/
bool starting_arg_file = (i_ctx_p == NULL) ? true : i_ctx_p->starting_arg_file;
bool search_with_no_combine = false;
bool search_with_combine = false;
char fmode[2] = { 'r', 0};
gx_io_device *iodev = iodev_default(mem);
gs_main_instance *minst = get_minst_from_memory(mem);
int code;
if (i_ctx_p && starting_arg_file)
i_ctx_p->starting_arg_file = false;
/* when starting arg files (@ files) iodev_default is not yet set */
if (iodev == 0)
iodev = (gx_io_device *)gx_io_device_table[0];
search_with_combine = false;
} else {
search_with_no_combine = starting_arg_file;
search_with_combine = true;
}
| 165,264 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pdf_read_new_xref_section(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, fz_stream *stm, int64_t i0, int i1, int w0, int w1, int w2)
{
pdf_xref_entry *table;
pdf_xref_entry *table;
int i, n;
if (i0 < 0 || i1 < 0 || i0 > INT_MAX - i1)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "negative xref stream entry index");
table = pdf_xref_find_subsection(ctx, doc, i0, i1);
for (i = i0; i < i0 + i1; i++)
for (i = i0; i < i0 + i1; i++)
{
pdf_xref_entry *entry = &table[i-i0];
int a = 0;
int64_t b = 0;
int c = 0;
if (fz_is_eof(ctx, stm))
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "truncated xref stream");
for (n = 0; n < w0; n++)
a = (a << 8) + fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
for (n = 0; n < w1; n++)
b = (b << 8) + fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
for (n = 0; n < w2; n++)
c = (c << 8) + fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
if (!entry->type)
{
int t = w0 ? a : 1;
entry->type = t == 0 ? 'f' : t == 1 ? 'n' : t == 2 ? 'o' : 0;
entry->ofs = w1 ? b : 0;
entry->gen = w2 ? c : 0;
entry->num = i;
}
}
doc->has_xref_streams = 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | pdf_read_new_xref_section(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, fz_stream *stm, int64_t i0, int i1, int w0, int w1, int w2)
{
pdf_xref_entry *table;
pdf_xref_entry *table;
int i, n;
if (i0 < 0 || i0 > PDF_MAX_OBJECT_NUMBER || i1 < 0 || i1 > PDF_MAX_OBJECT_NUMBER || i0 + i1 - 1 > PDF_MAX_OBJECT_NUMBER)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "xref subsection object numbers are out of range");
table = pdf_xref_find_subsection(ctx, doc, i0, i1);
for (i = i0; i < i0 + i1; i++)
for (i = i0; i < i0 + i1; i++)
{
pdf_xref_entry *entry = &table[i-i0];
int a = 0;
int64_t b = 0;
int c = 0;
if (fz_is_eof(ctx, stm))
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "truncated xref stream");
for (n = 0; n < w0; n++)
a = (a << 8) + fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
for (n = 0; n < w1; n++)
b = (b << 8) + fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
for (n = 0; n < w2; n++)
c = (c << 8) + fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
if (!entry->type)
{
int t = w0 ? a : 1;
entry->type = t == 0 ? 'f' : t == 1 ? 'n' : t == 2 ? 'o' : 0;
entry->ofs = w1 ? b : 0;
entry->gen = w2 ? c : 0;
entry->num = i;
}
}
doc->has_xref_streams = 1;
}
| 165,390 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev2_ke_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct ikev2_ke ke;
const struct ikev2_ke *k;
k = (const struct ikev2_ke *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&ke, ext, sizeof(ke));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), ke.h.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%u group=%s", ntohs(ke.h.len) - 8,
STR_OR_ID(ntohs(ke.ke_group), dh_p_map)));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 8 < ntohs(ke.h.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(k + 1), ntohs(ke.h.len) - 8))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(ke.h.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev2_ke_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct ikev2_ke ke;
const struct ikev2_ke *k;
k = (const struct ikev2_ke *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*k);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&ke, ext, sizeof(ke));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), ke.h.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%u group=%s", ntohs(ke.h.len) - 8,
STR_OR_ID(ntohs(ke.ke_group), dh_p_map)));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 8 < ntohs(ke.h.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(k + 1), ntohs(ke.h.len) - 8))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(ke.h.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,799 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void EncoderTest::MismatchHook(const vpx_image_t *img1,
const vpx_image_t *img2) {
ASSERT_TRUE(0) << "Encode/Decode mismatch found";
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void EncoderTest::MismatchHook(const vpx_image_t *img1,
void EncoderTest::MismatchHook(const vpx_image_t* /*img1*/,
const vpx_image_t* /*img2*/) {
ASSERT_TRUE(0) << "Encode/Decode mismatch found";
}
| 174,539 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GCInfoTable::Init() {
CHECK(!g_gc_info_table);
Resize();
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void GCInfoTable::Init() {
GCInfoTable::GCInfoTable() {
CHECK(!table_);
table_ = reinterpret_cast<GCInfo const**>(base::AllocPages(
nullptr, MaxTableSize(), base::kPageAllocationGranularity,
base::PageInaccessible));
CHECK(table_);
Resize();
}
| 173,135 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GraphicsContext::fillRoundedRect(const IntRect& rect, const IntSize& topLeft, const IntSize& topRight, const IntSize& bottomLeft, const IntSize& bottomRight, const Color& color, ColorSpace colorSpace)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void GraphicsContext::fillRoundedRect(const IntRect& rect, const IntSize& topLeft, const IntSize& topRight, const IntSize& bottomLeft, const IntSize& bottomRight, const Color& color, ColorSpace colorSpace)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
#if USE(WXGC)
Path path;
path.addRoundedRect(rect, topLeft, topRight, bottomLeft, bottomRight);
m_data->context->SetBrush(wxBrush(color));
wxGraphicsContext* gc = m_data->context->GetGraphicsContext();
gc->FillPath(*path.platformPath());
#endif
}
| 170,426 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: user_change_icon_file_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
User *user,
GDBusMethodInvocation *context,
gpointer data)
{
g_autofree gchar *filename = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) file = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFileInfo) info = NULL;
guint32 mode;
GFileType type;
guint64 size;
filename = g_strdup (data);
if (filename == NULL ||
*filename == '\0') {
g_autofree gchar *dest_path = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) dest = NULL;
g_autoptr(GError) error = NULL;
g_clear_pointer (&filename, g_free);
dest_path = g_build_filename (ICONDIR, accounts_user_get_user_name (ACCOUNTS_USER (user)), NULL);
dest = g_file_new_for_path (dest_path);
if (!g_file_delete (dest, NULL, &error) &&
!g_error_matches (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_FOUND)) {
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "failed to remove user icon, %s", error->message);
return;
}
goto icon_saved;
}
file = g_file_new_for_path (filename);
info = g_file_query_info (file, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_SIZE,
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | user_change_icon_file_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
User *user,
GDBusMethodInvocation *context,
gpointer data)
{
g_autofree gchar *filename = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) file = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFileInfo) info = NULL;
guint32 mode;
GFileType type;
guint64 size;
filename = g_strdup (data);
if (filename == NULL ||
*filename == '\0') {
g_autofree gchar *dest_path = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) dest = NULL;
g_autoptr(GError) error = NULL;
g_clear_pointer (&filename, g_free);
dest_path = g_build_filename (ICONDIR, accounts_user_get_user_name (ACCOUNTS_USER (user)), NULL);
dest = g_file_new_for_path (dest_path);
if (!g_file_delete (dest, NULL, &error) &&
!g_error_matches (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_FOUND)) {
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "failed to remove user icon, %s", error->message);
return;
}
goto icon_saved;
}
file = g_file_new_for_path (filename);
g_clear_pointer (&filename, g_free);
/* Canonicalize path so we can call g_str_has_prefix on it
* below without concern for ../ path components moving outside
* the prefix
*/
filename = g_file_get_path (file);
info = g_file_query_info (file, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_SIZE,
return;
}
| 164,759 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SProcXSendExtensionEvent(ClientPtr client)
{
CARD32 *p;
int i;
xEvent eventT;
xEvent *eventP;
EventSwapPtr proc;
REQUEST(xSendExtensionEventReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xSendExtensionEventReq);
swapl(&stuff->destination);
swaps(&stuff->count);
if (stuff->length !=
bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xSendExtensionEventReq)) + stuff->count +
bytes_to_int32(stuff->num_events * sizeof(xEvent)))
return BadLength;
eventP = (xEvent *) &stuff[1];
for (i = 0; i < stuff->num_events; i++, eventP++) {
proc = EventSwapVector[eventP->u.u.type & 0177];
if (proc == NotImplemented) /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
return BadValue;
(*proc) (eventP, &eventT);
*eventP = eventT;
}
p = (CARD32 *) (((xEvent *) &stuff[1]) + stuff->num_events);
SwapLongs(p, stuff->count);
return (ProcXSendExtensionEvent(client));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-665 | SProcXSendExtensionEvent(ClientPtr client)
{
CARD32 *p;
int i;
xEvent eventT = { .u.u.type = 0 };
xEvent *eventP;
EventSwapPtr proc;
REQUEST(xSendExtensionEventReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xSendExtensionEventReq);
swapl(&stuff->destination);
swaps(&stuff->count);
if (stuff->length !=
bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xSendExtensionEventReq)) + stuff->count +
bytes_to_int32(stuff->num_events * sizeof(xEvent)))
return BadLength;
eventP = (xEvent *) &stuff[1];
for (i = 0; i < stuff->num_events; i++, eventP++) {
proc = EventSwapVector[eventP->u.u.type & 0177];
if (proc == NotImplemented) /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
return BadValue;
(*proc) (eventP, &eventT);
*eventP = eventT;
}
p = (CARD32 *) (((xEvent *) &stuff[1]) + stuff->num_events);
SwapLongs(p, stuff->count);
return (ProcXSendExtensionEvent(client));
}
| 164,763 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct nfs4_state *nfs4_try_open_cached(struct nfs4_opendata *opendata)
{
struct nfs4_state *state = opendata->state;
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(state->inode);
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
int open_mode = opendata->o_arg.open_flags & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE|O_EXCL);
nfs4_stateid stateid;
int ret = -EAGAIN;
for (;;) {
if (can_open_cached(state, open_mode)) {
spin_lock(&state->owner->so_lock);
if (can_open_cached(state, open_mode)) {
update_open_stateflags(state, open_mode);
spin_unlock(&state->owner->so_lock);
goto out_return_state;
}
spin_unlock(&state->owner->so_lock);
}
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(nfsi->delegation);
if (delegation == NULL ||
!can_open_delegated(delegation, open_mode)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
break;
}
/* Save the delegation */
memcpy(stateid.data, delegation->stateid.data, sizeof(stateid.data));
rcu_read_unlock();
ret = nfs_may_open(state->inode, state->owner->so_cred, open_mode);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
ret = -EAGAIN;
/* Try to update the stateid using the delegation */
if (update_open_stateid(state, NULL, &stateid, open_mode))
goto out_return_state;
}
out:
return ERR_PTR(ret);
out_return_state:
atomic_inc(&state->count);
return state;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | static struct nfs4_state *nfs4_try_open_cached(struct nfs4_opendata *opendata)
{
struct nfs4_state *state = opendata->state;
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(state->inode);
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
int open_mode = opendata->o_arg.open_flags & O_EXCL;
fmode_t fmode = opendata->o_arg.fmode;
nfs4_stateid stateid;
int ret = -EAGAIN;
for (;;) {
if (can_open_cached(state, fmode, open_mode)) {
spin_lock(&state->owner->so_lock);
if (can_open_cached(state, fmode, open_mode)) {
update_open_stateflags(state, fmode);
spin_unlock(&state->owner->so_lock);
goto out_return_state;
}
spin_unlock(&state->owner->so_lock);
}
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(nfsi->delegation);
if (delegation == NULL ||
!can_open_delegated(delegation, fmode)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
break;
}
/* Save the delegation */
memcpy(stateid.data, delegation->stateid.data, sizeof(stateid.data));
rcu_read_unlock();
ret = nfs_may_open(state->inode, state->owner->so_cred, open_mode);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
ret = -EAGAIN;
/* Try to update the stateid using the delegation */
if (update_open_stateid(state, NULL, &stateid, fmode))
goto out_return_state;
}
out:
return ERR_PTR(ret);
out_return_state:
atomic_inc(&state->count);
return state;
}
| 165,704 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static const char *parse_scheme(struct parse_state *state)
{
size_t mb;
const char *tmp = state->ptr;
do {
switch (*state->ptr) {
case ':':
/* scheme delimiter */
state->url.scheme = &state->buffer[0];
state->buffer[state->offset++] = 0;
return ++state->ptr;
case '0': case '1': case '2': case '3': case '4': case '5': case '6':
case '7': case '8': case '9':
case '+': case '-': case '.':
if (state->ptr == tmp) {
return tmp;
}
/* no break */
case 'A': case 'B': case 'C': case 'D': case 'E': case 'F': case 'G':
case 'H': case 'I': case 'J': case 'K': case 'L': case 'M': case 'N':
case 'O': case 'P': case 'Q': case 'R': case 'S': case 'T': case 'U':
case 'V': case 'W': case 'X': case 'Y': case 'Z':
case 'a': case 'b': case 'c': case 'd': case 'e': case 'f': case 'g':
case 'h': case 'i': case 'j': case 'k': case 'l': case 'm': case 'n':
case 'o': case 'p': case 'q': case 'r': case 's': case 't': case 'u':
case 'v': case 'w': case 'x': case 'y': case 'z':
/* scheme part */
state->buffer[state->offset++] = *state->ptr;
break;
default:
if (!(mb = parse_mb(state, PARSE_SCHEME, state->ptr, state->end, tmp, 1))) {
/* soft fail; parse path next */
return tmp;
}
state->ptr += mb - 1;
}
} while (++state->ptr != state->end);
return state->ptr = tmp;
}
Commit Message: fix bug #71719 (Buffer overflow in HTTP url parsing functions)
The parser's offset was not reset when we softfail in scheme
parsing and continue to parse a path.
Thanks to hlt99 at blinkenshell dot org for the report.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static const char *parse_scheme(struct parse_state *state)
{
size_t mb;
const char *tmp = state->ptr;
do {
switch (*state->ptr) {
case ':':
/* scheme delimiter */
state->url.scheme = &state->buffer[0];
state->buffer[state->offset++] = 0;
return ++state->ptr;
case '0': case '1': case '2': case '3': case '4': case '5': case '6':
case '7': case '8': case '9':
case '+': case '-': case '.':
if (state->ptr == tmp) {
goto softfail;
}
/* no break */
case 'A': case 'B': case 'C': case 'D': case 'E': case 'F': case 'G':
case 'H': case 'I': case 'J': case 'K': case 'L': case 'M': case 'N':
case 'O': case 'P': case 'Q': case 'R': case 'S': case 'T': case 'U':
case 'V': case 'W': case 'X': case 'Y': case 'Z':
case 'a': case 'b': case 'c': case 'd': case 'e': case 'f': case 'g':
case 'h': case 'i': case 'j': case 'k': case 'l': case 'm': case 'n':
case 'o': case 'p': case 'q': case 'r': case 's': case 't': case 'u':
case 'v': case 'w': case 'x': case 'y': case 'z':
/* scheme part */
state->buffer[state->offset++] = *state->ptr;
break;
default:
if (!(mb = parse_mb(state, PARSE_SCHEME, state->ptr, state->end, tmp, 1))) {
goto softfail;
}
state->ptr += mb - 1;
}
} while (++state->ptr != state->end);
softfail:
state->offset = 0;
return state->ptr = tmp;
}
| 168,833 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int gup_huge_pud(pud_t orig, pud_t *pudp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
struct page *head, *page;
int refs;
if (!pud_access_permitted(orig, write))
return 0;
if (pud_devmap(orig))
return __gup_device_huge_pud(orig, pudp, addr, end, pages, nr);
refs = 0;
page = pud_page(orig) + ((addr & ~PUD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
do {
pages[*nr] = page;
(*nr)++;
page++;
refs++;
} while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
head = compound_head(pud_page(orig));
if (!page_cache_add_speculative(head, refs)) {
*nr -= refs;
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(pud_val(orig) != pud_val(*pudp))) {
*nr -= refs;
while (refs--)
put_page(head);
return 0;
}
SetPageReferenced(head);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int gup_huge_pud(pud_t orig, pud_t *pudp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
struct page *head, *page;
int refs;
if (!pud_access_permitted(orig, write))
return 0;
if (pud_devmap(orig))
return __gup_device_huge_pud(orig, pudp, addr, end, pages, nr);
refs = 0;
page = pud_page(orig) + ((addr & ~PUD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
do {
pages[*nr] = page;
(*nr)++;
page++;
refs++;
} while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
head = try_get_compound_head(pud_page(orig), refs);
if (!head) {
*nr -= refs;
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(pud_val(orig) != pud_val(*pudp))) {
*nr -= refs;
while (refs--)
put_page(head);
return 0;
}
SetPageReferenced(head);
return 1;
}
| 170,227 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfssvc_decode_readdirargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_readdirargs *args)
{
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
args->cookie = ntohl(*p++);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
args->count = min_t(u32, args->count, PAGE_SIZE);
args->buffer = page_address(*(rqstp->rq_next_page++));
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | nfssvc_decode_readdirargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_readdirargs *args)
{
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
args->cookie = ntohl(*p++);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
args->count = min_t(u32, args->count, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p))
return 0;
args->buffer = page_address(*(rqstp->rq_next_page++));
return 1;
}
| 168,151 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::RejectPairing() {
RunPairingCallbacks(REJECTED);
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::RejectPairing() {
if (!pairing_context_.get())
return;
pairing_context_->RejectPairing();
}
| 171,232 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static enum entity_charset determine_charset(char *charset_hint TSRMLS_DC)
{
int i;
enum entity_charset charset = cs_utf_8;
int len = 0;
const zend_encoding *zenc;
/* Default is now UTF-8 */
if (charset_hint == NULL)
return cs_utf_8;
if ((len = strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
zenc = zend_multibyte_get_internal_encoding(TSRMLS_C);
if (zenc != NULL) {
charset_hint = (char *)zend_multibyte_get_encoding_name(zenc);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
if ((len == 4) /* sizeof (none|auto|pass) */ &&
(!memcmp("pass", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4))) {
charset_hint = NULL;
len = 0;
} else {
goto det_charset;
}
}
}
charset_hint = SG(default_charset);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
/* try to detect the charset for the locale */
#if HAVE_NL_LANGINFO && HAVE_LOCALE_H && defined(CODESET)
charset_hint = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
#endif
#if HAVE_LOCALE_H
/* try to figure out the charset from the locale */
{
char *localename;
char *dot, *at;
/* lang[_territory][.codeset][@modifier] */
localename = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, NULL);
dot = strchr(localename, '.');
if (dot) {
dot++;
/* locale specifies a codeset */
at = strchr(dot, '@');
if (at)
len = at - dot;
else
len = strlen(dot);
charset_hint = dot;
} else {
/* no explicit name; see if the name itself
* is the charset */
charset_hint = localename;
len = strlen(charset_hint);
}
}
#endif
det_charset:
if (charset_hint) {
int found = 0;
/* now walk the charset map and look for the codeset */
for (i = 0; charset_map[i].codeset; i++) {
if (len == strlen(charset_map[i].codeset) && strncasecmp(charset_hint, charset_map[i].codeset, len) == 0) {
charset = charset_map[i].charset;
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "charset `%s' not supported, assuming utf-8",
charset_hint);
}
}
return charset;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static enum entity_charset determine_charset(char *charset_hint TSRMLS_DC)
{
int i;
enum entity_charset charset = cs_utf_8;
int len = 0;
const zend_encoding *zenc;
/* Default is now UTF-8 */
if (charset_hint == NULL)
return cs_utf_8;
if ((len = strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
zenc = zend_multibyte_get_internal_encoding(TSRMLS_C);
if (zenc != NULL) {
charset_hint = (char *)zend_multibyte_get_encoding_name(zenc);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
if ((len == 4) /* sizeof (none|auto|pass) */ &&
(!memcmp("pass", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4))) {
charset_hint = NULL;
len = 0;
} else {
goto det_charset;
}
}
}
charset_hint = SG(default_charset);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
/* try to detect the charset for the locale */
#if HAVE_NL_LANGINFO && HAVE_LOCALE_H && defined(CODESET)
charset_hint = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
#endif
#if HAVE_LOCALE_H
/* try to figure out the charset from the locale */
{
char *localename;
char *dot, *at;
/* lang[_territory][.codeset][@modifier] */
localename = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, NULL);
dot = strchr(localename, '.');
if (dot) {
dot++;
/* locale specifies a codeset */
at = strchr(dot, '@');
if (at)
len = at - dot;
else
len = strlen(dot);
charset_hint = dot;
} else {
/* no explicit name; see if the name itself
* is the charset */
charset_hint = localename;
len = strlen(charset_hint);
}
}
#endif
det_charset:
if (charset_hint) {
int found = 0;
/* now walk the charset map and look for the codeset */
for (i = 0; charset_map[i].codeset; i++) {
if (len == strlen(charset_map[i].codeset) && strncasecmp(charset_hint, charset_map[i].codeset, len) == 0) {
charset = charset_map[i].charset;
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "charset `%s' not supported, assuming utf-8",
charset_hint);
}
}
return charset;
}
| 167,169 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
(void) f_rng;
(void) p_rng;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, md_alg ) );
#else
(void) md_alg;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200 | int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, md_alg,
f_rng, p_rng ) );
#else
(void) md_alg;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
return( ret );
}
| 170,182 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long Block::GetTimeCode(const Cluster* pCluster) const
{
if (pCluster == 0)
return m_timecode;
const long long tc0 = pCluster->GetTimeCode();
assert(tc0 >= 0);
const long long tc = tc0 + m_timecode;
return tc; //unscaled timecode units
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long Block::GetTimeCode(const Cluster* pCluster) const
const long long tc0 = pCluster->GetTimeCode();
assert(tc0 >= 0);
const long long tc = tc0 + m_timecode;
return tc; // unscaled timecode units
}
| 174,366 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::DownloadUrl(
std::unique_ptr<download::DownloadUrlParameters> params,
std::unique_ptr<storage::BlobDataHandle> blob_data_handle,
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> blob_url_loader_factory) {
if (params->post_id() >= 0) {
DCHECK(params->prefer_cache());
DCHECK_EQ("POST", params->method());
}
download::RecordDownloadCountWithSource(
download::DownloadCountTypes::DOWNLOAD_TRIGGERED_COUNT,
params->download_source());
auto* rfh = RenderFrameHost::FromID(params->render_process_host_id(),
params->render_frame_host_routing_id());
BeginDownloadInternal(std::move(params), std::move(blob_data_handle),
std::move(blob_url_loader_factory), true,
rfh ? rfh->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL() : GURL());
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void DownloadManagerImpl::DownloadUrl(
std::unique_ptr<download::DownloadUrlParameters> params,
std::unique_ptr<storage::BlobDataHandle> blob_data_handle,
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> blob_url_loader_factory) {
if (params->post_id() >= 0) {
DCHECK(params->prefer_cache());
DCHECK_EQ("POST", params->method());
}
download::RecordDownloadCountWithSource(
download::DownloadCountTypes::DOWNLOAD_TRIGGERED_COUNT,
params->download_source());
auto* rfh = RenderFrameHost::FromID(params->render_process_host_id(),
params->render_frame_host_routing_id());
if (rfh)
params->set_frame_tree_node_id(rfh->GetFrameTreeNodeId());
BeginDownloadInternal(std::move(params), std::move(blob_data_handle),
std::move(blob_url_loader_factory), true,
rfh ? rfh->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL() : GURL());
}
| 173,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeRenderProcessObserver::OnControlMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(ChromeRenderProcessObserver, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_SetIsIncognitoProcess,
OnSetIsIncognitoProcess)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_SetCacheCapacities, OnSetCacheCapacities)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_ClearCache, OnClearCache)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_SetFieldTrialGroup, OnSetFieldTrialGroup)
#if defined(USE_TCMALLOC)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_SetTcmallocHeapProfiling,
OnSetTcmallocHeapProfiling)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_WriteTcmallocHeapProfile,
OnWriteTcmallocHeapProfile)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_GetV8HeapStats, OnGetV8HeapStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_GetCacheResourceStats,
OnGetCacheResourceStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_PurgeMemory, OnPurgeMemory)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_SetContentSettingRules,
OnSetContentSettingRules)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_ToggleWebKitSharedTimer,
OnToggleWebKitSharedTimer)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool ChromeRenderProcessObserver::OnControlMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(ChromeRenderProcessObserver, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_SetIsIncognitoProcess,
OnSetIsIncognitoProcess)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_SetCacheCapacities, OnSetCacheCapacities)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_ClearCache, OnClearCache)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_SetFieldTrialGroup, OnSetFieldTrialGroup)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_GetV8HeapStats, OnGetV8HeapStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_GetCacheResourceStats,
OnGetCacheResourceStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_PurgeMemory, OnPurgeMemory)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_SetContentSettingRules,
OnSetContentSettingRules)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_ToggleWebKitSharedTimer,
OnToggleWebKitSharedTimer)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
| 170,665 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_decrypt)
{
zval **mode;
char *cipher, *key, *data, *iv = NULL;
int cipher_len, key_len, data_len, iv_len = 0;
MCRYPT_GET_CRYPT_ARGS
convert_to_string_ex(mode);
php_mcrypt_do_crypt(cipher, key, key_len, data, data_len, Z_STRVAL_PP(mode), iv, iv_len, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), MCRYPT_DECRYPT, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_decrypt)
{
zval **mode;
char *cipher, *key, *data, *iv = NULL;
int cipher_len, key_len, data_len, iv_len = 0;
MCRYPT_GET_CRYPT_ARGS
convert_to_string_ex(mode);
php_mcrypt_do_crypt(cipher, key, key_len, data, data_len, Z_STRVAL_PP(mode), iv, iv_len, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), MCRYPT_DECRYPT, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
| 167,107 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int raw_cmd_copyout(int cmd, void __user *param,
struct floppy_raw_cmd *ptr)
{
int ret;
while (ptr) {
ret = copy_to_user(param, ptr, sizeof(*ptr));
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
param += sizeof(struct floppy_raw_cmd);
if ((ptr->flags & FD_RAW_READ) && ptr->buffer_length) {
if (ptr->length >= 0 &&
ptr->length <= ptr->buffer_length) {
long length = ptr->buffer_length - ptr->length;
ret = fd_copyout(ptr->data, ptr->kernel_data,
length);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
ptr = ptr->next;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int raw_cmd_copyout(int cmd, void __user *param,
struct floppy_raw_cmd *ptr)
{
int ret;
while (ptr) {
struct floppy_raw_cmd cmd = *ptr;
cmd.next = NULL;
cmd.kernel_data = NULL;
ret = copy_to_user(param, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
param += sizeof(struct floppy_raw_cmd);
if ((ptr->flags & FD_RAW_READ) && ptr->buffer_length) {
if (ptr->length >= 0 &&
ptr->length <= ptr->buffer_length) {
long length = ptr->buffer_length - ptr->length;
ret = fd_copyout(ptr->data, ptr->kernel_data,
length);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
ptr = ptr->next;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,434 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ProfilingService::DumpProcessesForTracing(
bool keep_small_allocations,
bool strip_path_from_mapped_files,
DumpProcessesForTracingCallback callback) {
memory_instrumentation::MemoryInstrumentation::GetInstance()
->GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(base::Bind(
&ProfilingService::OnGetVmRegionsCompleteForDumpProcessesForTracing,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), keep_small_allocations,
strip_path_from_mapped_files, base::Passed(&callback)));
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269 | void ProfilingService::DumpProcessesForTracing(
bool keep_small_allocations,
bool strip_path_from_mapped_files,
DumpProcessesForTracingCallback callback) {
if (!helper_) {
context()->connector()->BindInterface(
resource_coordinator::mojom::kServiceName, &helper_);
}
helper_->GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(base::Bind(
&ProfilingService::OnGetVmRegionsCompleteForDumpProcessesForTracing,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), keep_small_allocations,
strip_path_from_mapped_files, base::Passed(&callback)));
}
| 172,913 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void *Sys_LoadDll(const char *name, qboolean useSystemLib)
{
void *dllhandle;
if(useSystemLib)
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\"...\n", name);
if(!useSystemLib || !(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(name)))
{
const char *topDir;
char libPath[MAX_OSPATH];
topDir = Sys_BinaryPath();
if(!*topDir)
topDir = ".";
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, topDir);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", topDir, PATH_SEP, name);
if(!(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath)))
{
const char *basePath = Cvar_VariableString("fs_basepath");
if(!basePath || !*basePath)
basePath = ".";
if(FS_FilenameCompare(topDir, basePath))
{
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, basePath);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", basePath, PATH_SEP, name);
dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath);
}
if(!dllhandle)
Com_Printf("Loading \"%s\" failed\n", name);
}
}
return dllhandle;
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | void *Sys_LoadDll(const char *name, qboolean useSystemLib)
{
void *dllhandle;
// Don't load any DLLs that end with the pk3 extension
if (COM_CompareExtension(name, ".pk3"))
{
Com_Printf("Rejecting DLL named \"%s\"", name);
return NULL;
}
if(useSystemLib)
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\"...\n", name);
if(!useSystemLib || !(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(name)))
{
const char *topDir;
char libPath[MAX_OSPATH];
topDir = Sys_BinaryPath();
if(!*topDir)
topDir = ".";
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, topDir);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", topDir, PATH_SEP, name);
if(!(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath)))
{
const char *basePath = Cvar_VariableString("fs_basepath");
if(!basePath || !*basePath)
basePath = ".";
if(FS_FilenameCompare(topDir, basePath))
{
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, basePath);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", basePath, PATH_SEP, name);
dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath);
}
if(!dllhandle)
Com_Printf("Loading \"%s\" failed\n", name);
}
}
return dllhandle;
}
| 170,090 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintInactiveTabBackground(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
const SkPath& clip) const {
bool has_custom_image;
int fill_id = tab_->controller()->GetBackgroundResourceId(&has_custom_image);
if (!has_custom_image)
fill_id = 0;
PaintTabBackground(canvas, false /* active */, fill_id, 0,
tab_->controller()->MaySetClip() ? &clip : nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void GM2TabStyle::PaintInactiveTabBackground(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
const SkPath& clip) const {
bool has_custom_image;
int fill_id = tab_->controller()->GetBackgroundResourceId(&has_custom_image);
if (!has_custom_image)
fill_id = 0;
PaintTabBackground(canvas, TAB_INACTIVE, fill_id, 0,
tab_->controller()->MaySetClip() ? &clip : nullptr);
}
| 172,523 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::RequestPinCode(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
const PinCodeCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(device_path == object_path_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": RequestPinCode";
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_REQUEST_PINCODE,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
DCHECK(pincode_callback_.is_null());
pincode_callback_ = callback;
pairing_delegate_->RequestPinCode(this);
pairing_delegate_used_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::RequestPinCode(
| 171,237 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void sycc420_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
int *d0, *d1, *d2, *r, *g, *b, *nr, *ng, *nb;
const int *y, *cb, *cr, *ny;
unsigned int maxw, maxh, max;
int offset, upb;
unsigned int i, j;
upb = (int)img->comps[0].prec;
offset = 1<<(upb - 1); upb = (1<<upb)-1;
maxw = (unsigned int)img->comps[0].w; maxh = (unsigned int)img->comps[0].h;
max = maxw * maxh;
y = img->comps[0].data;
cb = img->comps[1].data;
cr = img->comps[2].data;
d0 = r = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
d1 = g = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
d2 = b = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
if(r == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) goto fails;
for(i=0U; i < (maxh & ~(unsigned int)1U); i += 2U)
{
ny = y + maxw;
nr = r + maxw; ng = g + maxw; nb = b + maxw;
for(j=0; j < (maxw & ~(unsigned int)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if(j < maxw)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb; ++cb; ++cr;
}
y += maxw; r += maxw; g += maxw; b += maxw;
}
if(i < maxh)
{
for(j=0U; j < (maxw & ~(unsigned int)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if(j < maxw)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
}
}
free(img->comps[0].data); img->comps[0].data = d0;
free(img->comps[1].data); img->comps[1].data = d1;
free(img->comps[2].data); img->comps[2].data = d2;
#if defined(USE_JPWL) || defined(USE_MJ2)
img->comps[1].w = maxw; img->comps[1].h = maxh;
img->comps[2].w = maxw; img->comps[2].h = maxh;
#else
img->comps[1].w = (OPJ_UINT32)maxw; img->comps[1].h = (OPJ_UINT32)maxh;
img->comps[2].w = (OPJ_UINT32)maxw; img->comps[2].h = (OPJ_UINT32)maxh;
#endif
img->comps[1].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[2].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[1].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
img->comps[2].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
return;
fails:
if(r) free(r);
if(g) free(g);
if(b) free(b);
}/* sycc420_to_rgb() */
Commit Message: Fix Out-Of-Bounds Read in sycc42x_to_rgb function (#745)
42x Images with an odd x0/y0 lead to subsampled component starting at the
2nd column/line.
That is offset = comp->dx * comp->x0 - image->x0 = 1
Fix #726
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void sycc420_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
int *d0, *d1, *d2, *r, *g, *b, *nr, *ng, *nb;
const int *y, *cb, *cr, *ny;
size_t maxw, maxh, max, offx, loopmaxw, offy, loopmaxh;
int offset, upb;
size_t i;
upb = (int)img->comps[0].prec;
offset = 1<<(upb - 1); upb = (1<<upb)-1;
maxw = (size_t)img->comps[0].w; maxh = (size_t)img->comps[0].h;
max = maxw * maxh;
y = img->comps[0].data;
cb = img->comps[1].data;
cr = img->comps[2].data;
d0 = r = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d1 = g = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d2 = b = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
if (r == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) goto fails;
/* if img->x0 is odd, then first column shall use Cb/Cr = 0 */
offx = img->x0 & 1U;
loopmaxw = maxw - offx;
/* if img->y0 is odd, then first line shall use Cb/Cr = 0 */
offy = img->y0 & 1U;
loopmaxh = maxh - offy;
if (offy > 0U) {
size_t j;
for(j=0; j < maxw; ++j)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, 0, 0, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
}
}
for(i=0U; i < (loopmaxh & ~(size_t)1U); i += 2U)
{
size_t j;
ny = y + maxw;
nr = r + maxw; ng = g + maxw; nb = b + maxw;
if (offx > 0U) {
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, 0, 0, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb;
}
for(j=0; j < (loopmaxw & ~(size_t)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if(j < loopmaxw)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb; ++cb; ++cr;
}
y += maxw; r += maxw; g += maxw; b += maxw;
}
if(i < loopmaxh)
{
size_t j;
for(j=0U; j < (maxw & ~(size_t)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if(j < maxw)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
}
}
free(img->comps[0].data); img->comps[0].data = d0;
free(img->comps[1].data); img->comps[1].data = d1;
free(img->comps[2].data); img->comps[2].data = d2;
img->comps[1].w = img->comps[2].w = img->comps[0].w;
img->comps[1].h = img->comps[2].h = img->comps[0].h;
img->comps[1].dx = img->comps[2].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[1].dy = img->comps[2].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
img->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
return;
fails:
free(r);
free(g);
free(b);
}/* sycc420_to_rgb() */
| 168,839 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void numtostr(js_State *J, const char *fmt, int w, double n)
{
char buf[32], *e;
sprintf(buf, fmt, w, n);
e = strchr(buf, 'e');
if (e) {
int exp = atoi(e+1);
sprintf(e, "e%+d", exp);
}
js_pushstring(J, buf);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700938: Fix stack overflow in numtostr as used by Number#toFixed().
32 is not enough to fit sprintf("%.20f", 1e20).
We need at least 43 bytes to fit that format.
Bump the static buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void numtostr(js_State *J, const char *fmt, int w, double n)
{
/* buf needs to fit printf("%.20f", 1e20) */
char buf[50], *e;
sprintf(buf, fmt, w, n);
e = strchr(buf, 'e');
if (e) {
int exp = atoi(e+1);
sprintf(e, "e%+d", exp);
}
js_pushstring(J, buf);
}
| 169,704 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Cluster* Cluster::Create(
Segment* pSegment,
long idx,
long long off)
{
assert(pSegment);
assert(off >= 0);
const long long element_start = pSegment->m_start + off;
Cluster* const pCluster = new Cluster(pSegment,
idx,
element_start);
assert(pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Cluster* Cluster::Create(
| 174,256 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Cues::~Cues()
{
const long n = m_count + m_preload_count;
CuePoint** p = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** const q = p + n;
while (p != q)
{
CuePoint* const pCP = *p++;
assert(pCP);
delete pCP;
}
delete[] m_cue_points;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Cues::~Cues()
return m_count; // TODO: really ignore preload count?
}
bool Cues::DoneParsing() const {
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
return (m_pos >= stop);
}
void Cues::Init() const {
if (m_cue_points)
return;
assert(m_count == 0);
assert(m_preload_count == 0);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
long long pos = m_start;
long cue_points_size = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
const long long idpos = pos;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x3B) // CuePoint ID
PreloadCuePoint(cue_points_size, idpos);
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
}
void Cues::PreloadCuePoint(long& cue_points_size, long long pos) const {
assert(m_count == 0);
if (m_preload_count >= cue_points_size) {
const long n = (cue_points_size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2 * cue_points_size;
CuePoint** const qq = new CuePoint* [n];
CuePoint** q = qq; // beginning of target
CuePoint** p = m_cue_points; // beginning of source
CuePoint** const pp = p + m_preload_count; // end of source
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_cue_points;
m_cue_points = qq;
cue_points_size = n;
}
CuePoint* const pCP = new CuePoint(m_preload_count, pos);
m_cue_points[m_preload_count++] = pCP;
}
| 174,463 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: atol8(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
{
int64_t l;
int digit;
l = 0;
while (char_cnt-- > 0) {
if (*p >= '0' && *p <= '7')
digit = *p - '0';
else
break;
p++;
l <<= 3;
l |= digit;
}
return (l);
}
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | atol8(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
{
int64_t l;
int digit;
if (char_cnt == 0)
return (0);
l = 0;
while (char_cnt-- > 0) {
if (*p >= '0' && *p <= '7')
digit = *p - '0';
else
break;
p++;
l <<= 3;
l |= digit;
}
return (l);
}
| 167,768 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ParseRequestInfo(const struct mg_request_info* const request_info,
std::string* method,
std::vector<std::string>* path_segments,
DictionaryValue** parameters,
Response* const response) {
*method = request_info->request_method;
if (*method == "HEAD")
*method = "GET";
else if (*method == "PUT")
*method = "POST";
std::string uri(request_info->uri);
SessionManager* manager = SessionManager::GetInstance();
uri = uri.substr(manager->url_base().length());
base::SplitString(uri, '/', path_segments);
if (*method == "POST" && request_info->post_data_len > 0) {
VLOG(1) << "...parsing request body";
std::string json(request_info->post_data, request_info->post_data_len);
std::string error;
if (!ParseJSONDictionary(json, parameters, &error)) {
response->SetError(new Error(
kBadRequest,
"Failed to parse command data: " + error + "\n Data: " + json));
return false;
}
}
VLOG(1) << "Parsed " << method << " " << uri
<< std::string(request_info->post_data, request_info->post_data_len);
return true;
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool ParseRequestInfo(const struct mg_request_info* const request_info,
std::string* method,
std::vector<std::string>* path_segments,
DictionaryValue** parameters,
Response* const response) {
*method = request_info->request_method;
if (*method == "HEAD")
*method = "GET";
else if (*method == "PUT")
*method = "POST";
std::string uri(request_info->uri);
SessionManager* manager = SessionManager::GetInstance();
uri = uri.substr(manager->url_base().length());
base::SplitString(uri, '/', path_segments);
if (*method == "POST" && request_info->post_data_len > 0) {
std::string json(request_info->post_data, request_info->post_data_len);
std::string error_msg;
scoped_ptr<Value> params(base::JSONReader::ReadAndReturnError(
json, true, NULL, &error_msg));
if (!params.get()) {
response->SetError(new Error(
kBadRequest,
"Failed to parse command data: " + error_msg + "\n Data: " + json));
return false;
}
if (!params->IsType(Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY)) {
response->SetError(new Error(
kBadRequest,
"Data passed in URL must be a dictionary. Data: " + json));
return false;
}
*parameters = static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(params.release());
}
return true;
}
| 170,456 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(spl_directory)
{
REGISTER_SPL_STD_CLASS_EX(SplFileInfo, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_SplFileInfo_functions);
memcpy(&spl_filesystem_object_handlers, zend_get_std_object_handlers(), sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
spl_filesystem_object_handlers.clone_obj = spl_filesystem_object_clone;
spl_filesystem_object_handlers.cast_object = spl_filesystem_object_cast;
spl_filesystem_object_handlers.get_debug_info = spl_filesystem_object_get_debug_info;
spl_ce_SplFileInfo->serialize = zend_class_serialize_deny;
spl_ce_SplFileInfo->unserialize = zend_class_unserialize_deny;
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(DirectoryIterator, SplFileInfo, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_DirectoryIterator_functions);
zend_class_implements(spl_ce_DirectoryIterator TSRMLS_CC, 1, zend_ce_iterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(DirectoryIterator, SeekableIterator);
spl_ce_DirectoryIterator->get_iterator = spl_filesystem_dir_get_iterator;
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(FilesystemIterator, DirectoryIterator, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_FilesystemIterator_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_MODE_MASK", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_MODE_MASK);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_AS_SELF", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_SELF);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "KEY_MODE_MASK", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_MODE_MASK);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "KEY_AS_PATHNAME", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_PATHNAME);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "FOLLOW_SYMLINKS", SPL_FILE_DIR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "KEY_AS_FILENAME", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_FILENAME);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "NEW_CURRENT_AND_KEY", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_FILENAME|SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "OTHER_MODE_MASK", SPL_FILE_DIR_OTHERS_MASK);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "SKIP_DOTS", SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "UNIX_PATHS", SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS);
spl_ce_FilesystemIterator->get_iterator = spl_filesystem_tree_get_iterator;
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(RecursiveDirectoryIterator, FilesystemIterator, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_RecursiveDirectoryIterator_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(RecursiveDirectoryIterator, RecursiveIterator);
memcpy(&spl_filesystem_object_check_handlers, &spl_filesystem_object_handlers, sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
spl_filesystem_object_check_handlers.get_method = spl_filesystem_object_get_method_check;
#ifdef HAVE_GLOB
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(GlobIterator, FilesystemIterator, spl_filesystem_object_new_check, spl_GlobIterator_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(GlobIterator, Countable);
#endif
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(SplFileObject, SplFileInfo, spl_filesystem_object_new_check, spl_SplFileObject_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(SplFileObject, RecursiveIterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(SplFileObject, SeekableIterator);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "DROP_NEW_LINE", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_DROP_NEW_LINE);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "READ_AHEAD", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_AHEAD);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "SKIP_EMPTY", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_SKIP_EMPTY);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "READ_CSV", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_CSV);
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(SplTempFileObject, SplFileObject, spl_filesystem_object_new_check, spl_SplTempFileObject_functions);
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(spl_directory)
{
REGISTER_SPL_STD_CLASS_EX(SplFileInfo, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_SplFileInfo_functions);
memcpy(&spl_filesystem_object_handlers, zend_get_std_object_handlers(), sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
spl_filesystem_object_handlers.clone_obj = spl_filesystem_object_clone;
spl_filesystem_object_handlers.cast_object = spl_filesystem_object_cast;
spl_filesystem_object_handlers.get_debug_info = spl_filesystem_object_get_debug_info;
spl_ce_SplFileInfo->serialize = zend_class_serialize_deny;
spl_ce_SplFileInfo->unserialize = zend_class_unserialize_deny;
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(DirectoryIterator, SplFileInfo, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_DirectoryIterator_functions);
zend_class_implements(spl_ce_DirectoryIterator TSRMLS_CC, 1, zend_ce_iterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(DirectoryIterator, SeekableIterator);
spl_ce_DirectoryIterator->get_iterator = spl_filesystem_dir_get_iterator;
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(FilesystemIterator, DirectoryIterator, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_FilesystemIterator_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_MODE_MASK", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_MODE_MASK);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_AS_SELF", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_SELF);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "KEY_MODE_MASK", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_MODE_MASK);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "KEY_AS_PATHNAME", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_PATHNAME);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "FOLLOW_SYMLINKS", SPL_FILE_DIR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "KEY_AS_FILENAME", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_FILENAME);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "NEW_CURRENT_AND_KEY", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_FILENAME|SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "OTHER_MODE_MASK", SPL_FILE_DIR_OTHERS_MASK);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "SKIP_DOTS", SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "UNIX_PATHS", SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS);
spl_ce_FilesystemIterator->get_iterator = spl_filesystem_tree_get_iterator;
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(RecursiveDirectoryIterator, FilesystemIterator, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_RecursiveDirectoryIterator_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(RecursiveDirectoryIterator, RecursiveIterator);
memcpy(&spl_filesystem_object_check_handlers, &spl_filesystem_object_handlers, sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
spl_filesystem_object_check_handlers.get_method = spl_filesystem_object_get_method_check;
#ifdef HAVE_GLOB
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(GlobIterator, FilesystemIterator, spl_filesystem_object_new_check, spl_GlobIterator_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(GlobIterator, Countable);
#endif
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(SplFileObject, SplFileInfo, spl_filesystem_object_new_check, spl_SplFileObject_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(SplFileObject, RecursiveIterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(SplFileObject, SeekableIterator);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "DROP_NEW_LINE", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_DROP_NEW_LINE);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "READ_AHEAD", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_AHEAD);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "SKIP_EMPTY", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_SKIP_EMPTY);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "READ_CSV", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_CSV);
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(SplTempFileObject, SplFileObject, spl_filesystem_object_new_check, spl_SplTempFileObject_functions);
return SUCCESS;
}
| 167,026 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: u32 h264bsdInitDpb(
dpbStorage_t *dpb,
u32 picSizeInMbs,
u32 dpbSize,
u32 maxRefFrames,
u32 maxFrameNum,
u32 noReordering)
{
/* Variables */
u32 i;
/* Code */
ASSERT(picSizeInMbs);
ASSERT(maxRefFrames <= MAX_NUM_REF_PICS);
ASSERT(maxRefFrames <= dpbSize);
ASSERT(maxFrameNum);
ASSERT(dpbSize);
dpb->maxLongTermFrameIdx = NO_LONG_TERM_FRAME_INDICES;
dpb->maxRefFrames = MAX(maxRefFrames, 1);
if (noReordering)
dpb->dpbSize = dpb->maxRefFrames;
else
dpb->dpbSize = dpbSize;
dpb->maxFrameNum = maxFrameNum;
dpb->noReordering = noReordering;
dpb->fullness = 0;
dpb->numRefFrames = 0;
dpb->prevRefFrameNum = 0;
ALLOCATE(dpb->buffer, MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1, dpbPicture_t);
if (dpb->buffer == NULL)
return(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR);
H264SwDecMemset(dpb->buffer, 0,
(MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1)*sizeof(dpbPicture_t));
for (i = 0; i < dpb->dpbSize + 1; i++)
{
/* Allocate needed amount of memory, which is:
* image size + 32 + 15, where 32 cames from the fact that in ARM OpenMax
* DL implementation Functions may read beyond the end of an array,
* by a maximum of 32 bytes. And +15 cames for the need to align memory
* to 16-byte boundary */
ALLOCATE(dpb->buffer[i].pAllocatedData, (picSizeInMbs*384 + 32+15), u8);
if (dpb->buffer[i].pAllocatedData == NULL)
return(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR);
dpb->buffer[i].data = ALIGN(dpb->buffer[i].pAllocatedData, 16);
}
ALLOCATE(dpb->list, MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1, dpbPicture_t*);
ALLOCATE(dpb->outBuf, dpb->dpbSize+1, dpbOutPicture_t);
if (dpb->list == NULL || dpb->outBuf == NULL)
return(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR);
H264SwDecMemset(dpb->list, 0,
((MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1) * sizeof(dpbPicture_t*)) );
dpb->numOut = dpb->outIndex = 0;
return(HANTRO_OK);
}
Commit Message: Fix potential overflow
Bug: 28533562
Change-Id: I798ab24caa4c81f3ba564cad7c9ee019284fb702
CWE ID: CWE-119 | u32 h264bsdInitDpb(
dpbStorage_t *dpb,
u32 picSizeInMbs,
u32 dpbSize,
u32 maxRefFrames,
u32 maxFrameNum,
u32 noReordering)
{
/* Variables */
u32 i;
/* Code */
ASSERT(picSizeInMbs);
ASSERT(maxRefFrames <= MAX_NUM_REF_PICS);
ASSERT(maxRefFrames <= dpbSize);
ASSERT(maxFrameNum);
ASSERT(dpbSize);
// see comment in loop below about size calculation
if (picSizeInMbs > (UINT32_MAX - 32 - 15) / 384) {
ALOGE("b/28533562");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "28533562");
return(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR);
}
dpb->maxLongTermFrameIdx = NO_LONG_TERM_FRAME_INDICES;
dpb->maxRefFrames = MAX(maxRefFrames, 1);
if (noReordering)
dpb->dpbSize = dpb->maxRefFrames;
else
dpb->dpbSize = dpbSize;
dpb->maxFrameNum = maxFrameNum;
dpb->noReordering = noReordering;
dpb->fullness = 0;
dpb->numRefFrames = 0;
dpb->prevRefFrameNum = 0;
ALLOCATE(dpb->buffer, MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1, dpbPicture_t);
if (dpb->buffer == NULL)
return(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR);
H264SwDecMemset(dpb->buffer, 0,
(MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1)*sizeof(dpbPicture_t));
for (i = 0; i < dpb->dpbSize + 1; i++)
{
/* Allocate needed amount of memory, which is:
* image size + 32 + 15, where 32 cames from the fact that in ARM OpenMax
* DL implementation Functions may read beyond the end of an array,
* by a maximum of 32 bytes. And +15 cames for the need to align memory
* to 16-byte boundary */
ALLOCATE(dpb->buffer[i].pAllocatedData, (picSizeInMbs*384 + 32+15), u8);
if (dpb->buffer[i].pAllocatedData == NULL)
return(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR);
dpb->buffer[i].data = ALIGN(dpb->buffer[i].pAllocatedData, 16);
}
ALLOCATE(dpb->list, MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1, dpbPicture_t*);
ALLOCATE(dpb->outBuf, dpb->dpbSize+1, dpbOutPicture_t);
if (dpb->list == NULL || dpb->outBuf == NULL)
return(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR);
H264SwDecMemset(dpb->list, 0,
((MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1) * sizeof(dpbPicture_t*)) );
dpb->numOut = dpb->outIndex = 0;
return(HANTRO_OK);
}
| 173,546 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void xgroupCommand(client *c) {
const char *help[] = {
"CREATE <key> <groupname> <id or $> -- Create a new consumer group.",
"SETID <key> <groupname> <id or $> -- Set the current group ID.",
"DELGROUP <key> <groupname> -- Remove the specified group.",
"DELCONSUMER <key> <groupname> <consumer> -- Remove the specified conusmer.",
"HELP -- Prints this help.",
NULL
};
stream *s = NULL;
sds grpname = NULL;
streamCG *cg = NULL;
char *opt = c->argv[1]->ptr; /* Subcommand name. */
/* Lookup the key now, this is common for all the subcommands but HELP. */
if (c->argc >= 4) {
robj *o = lookupKeyWriteOrReply(c,c->argv[2],shared.nokeyerr);
if (o == NULL) return;
s = o->ptr;
grpname = c->argv[3]->ptr;
/* Certain subcommands require the group to exist. */
if ((cg = streamLookupCG(s,grpname)) == NULL &&
(!strcasecmp(opt,"SETID") ||
!strcasecmp(opt,"DELCONSUMER")))
{
addReplyErrorFormat(c, "-NOGROUP No such consumer group '%s' "
"for key name '%s'",
(char*)grpname, (char*)c->argv[2]->ptr);
return;
}
}
/* Dispatch the different subcommands. */
if (!strcasecmp(opt,"CREATE") && c->argc == 5) {
streamID id;
if (!strcmp(c->argv[4]->ptr,"$")) {
id = s->last_id;
} else if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[4],&id,0) != C_OK) {
return;
}
streamCG *cg = streamCreateCG(s,grpname,sdslen(grpname),&id);
if (cg) {
addReply(c,shared.ok);
server.dirty++;
} else {
addReplySds(c,
sdsnew("-BUSYGROUP Consumer Group name already exists\r\n"));
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"SETID") && c->argc == 5) {
streamID id;
if (!strcmp(c->argv[4]->ptr,"$")) {
id = s->last_id;
} else if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[4],&id,0) != C_OK) {
return;
}
cg->last_id = id;
addReply(c,shared.ok);
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"DESTROY") && c->argc == 4) {
if (cg) {
raxRemove(s->cgroups,(unsigned char*)grpname,sdslen(grpname),NULL);
streamFreeCG(cg);
addReply(c,shared.cone);
} else {
addReply(c,shared.czero);
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"DELCONSUMER") && c->argc == 5) {
/* Delete the consumer and returns the number of pending messages
* that were yet associated with such a consumer. */
long long pending = streamDelConsumer(cg,c->argv[4]->ptr);
addReplyLongLong(c,pending);
server.dirty++;
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"HELP")) {
addReplyHelp(c, help);
} else {
addReply(c,shared.syntaxerr);
}
}
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
CWE ID: CWE-704 | void xgroupCommand(client *c) {
const char *help[] = {
"CREATE <key> <groupname> <id or $> -- Create a new consumer group.",
"SETID <key> <groupname> <id or $> -- Set the current group ID.",
"DELGROUP <key> <groupname> -- Remove the specified group.",
"DELCONSUMER <key> <groupname> <consumer> -- Remove the specified conusmer.",
"HELP -- Prints this help.",
NULL
};
stream *s = NULL;
sds grpname = NULL;
streamCG *cg = NULL;
char *opt = c->argv[1]->ptr; /* Subcommand name. */
/* Lookup the key now, this is common for all the subcommands but HELP. */
if (c->argc >= 4) {
robj *o = lookupKeyWriteOrReply(c,c->argv[2],shared.nokeyerr);
if (o == NULL || checkType(c,o,OBJ_STREAM)) return;
s = o->ptr;
grpname = c->argv[3]->ptr;
/* Certain subcommands require the group to exist. */
if ((cg = streamLookupCG(s,grpname)) == NULL &&
(!strcasecmp(opt,"SETID") ||
!strcasecmp(opt,"DELCONSUMER")))
{
addReplyErrorFormat(c, "-NOGROUP No such consumer group '%s' "
"for key name '%s'",
(char*)grpname, (char*)c->argv[2]->ptr);
return;
}
}
/* Dispatch the different subcommands. */
if (!strcasecmp(opt,"CREATE") && c->argc == 5) {
streamID id;
if (!strcmp(c->argv[4]->ptr,"$")) {
id = s->last_id;
} else if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[4],&id,0) != C_OK) {
return;
}
streamCG *cg = streamCreateCG(s,grpname,sdslen(grpname),&id);
if (cg) {
addReply(c,shared.ok);
server.dirty++;
} else {
addReplySds(c,
sdsnew("-BUSYGROUP Consumer Group name already exists\r\n"));
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"SETID") && c->argc == 5) {
streamID id;
if (!strcmp(c->argv[4]->ptr,"$")) {
id = s->last_id;
} else if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[4],&id,0) != C_OK) {
return;
}
cg->last_id = id;
addReply(c,shared.ok);
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"DESTROY") && c->argc == 4) {
if (cg) {
raxRemove(s->cgroups,(unsigned char*)grpname,sdslen(grpname),NULL);
streamFreeCG(cg);
addReply(c,shared.cone);
} else {
addReply(c,shared.czero);
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"DELCONSUMER") && c->argc == 5) {
/* Delete the consumer and returns the number of pending messages
* that were yet associated with such a consumer. */
long long pending = streamDelConsumer(cg,c->argv[4]->ptr);
addReplyLongLong(c,pending);
server.dirty++;
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"HELP")) {
addReplyHelp(c, help);
} else {
addReply(c,shared.syntaxerr);
}
}
| 169,193 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual size_t GetNumActiveInputMethods() {
scoped_ptr<InputMethodDescriptors> descriptors(GetActiveInputMethods());
return descriptors->size();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual size_t GetNumActiveInputMethods() {
scoped_ptr<input_method::InputMethodDescriptors> descriptors(
GetActiveInputMethods());
return descriptors->size();
}
| 170,491 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: on_unregister_handler(TCMUService1HandlerManager1 *interface,
GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation,
gchar *subtype,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler = find_handler_by_subtype(subtype);
struct dbus_info *info = handler ? handler->opaque : NULL;
if (!handler) {
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", FALSE,
"unknown subtype"));
return TRUE;
}
dbus_unexport_handler(handler);
tcmur_unregister_handler(handler);
g_bus_unwatch_name(info->watcher_id);
g_free(info);
g_free(handler);
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", TRUE, "succeeded"));
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: only allow dynamic UnregisterHandler for external handlers, thereby fixing DoS
Trying to unregister an internal handler ended up in a SEGFAULT, because
the tcmur_handler->opaque was NULL. Way to reproduce:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:qcow
we use a newly introduced boolean in struct tcmur_handler for keeping
track of external handlers. As suggested by mikechristie adjusting the
public data structure is acceptable.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | on_unregister_handler(TCMUService1HandlerManager1 *interface,
GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation,
gchar *subtype,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler = find_handler_by_subtype(subtype);
struct dbus_info *info = handler ? handler->opaque : NULL;
if (!handler) {
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", FALSE,
"unknown subtype"));
return TRUE;
}
else if (handler->_is_dbus_handler != 1) {
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", FALSE,
"cannot unregister internal handler"));
return TRUE;
}
dbus_unexport_handler(handler);
tcmur_unregister_dbus_handler(handler);
g_bus_unwatch_name(info->watcher_id);
g_free(info);
g_free(handler);
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", TRUE, "succeeded"));
return TRUE;
}
| 167,634 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char *get_object(
FILE *fp,
int obj_id,
const xref_t *xref,
size_t *size,
int *is_stream)
{
static const int blk_sz = 256;
int i, total_sz, read_sz, n_blks, search, stream;
size_t obj_sz;
char *c, *data;
long start;
const xref_entry_t *entry;
if (size)
*size = 0;
if (is_stream)
*is_stream = 0;
start = ftell(fp);
/* Find object */
entry = NULL;
for (i=0; i<xref->n_entries; i++)
if (xref->entries[i].obj_id == obj_id)
{
entry = &xref->entries[i];
break;
}
if (!entry)
return NULL;
/* Jump to object start */
fseek(fp, entry->offset, SEEK_SET);
/* Initial allocate */
obj_sz = 0; /* Bytes in object */
total_sz = 0; /* Bytes read in */
n_blks = 1;
data = malloc(blk_sz * n_blks);
memset(data, 0, blk_sz * n_blks);
/* Suck in data */
stream = 0;
while ((read_sz = fread(data+total_sz, 1, blk_sz-1, fp)) && !ferror(fp))
{
total_sz += read_sz;
*(data + total_sz) = '\0';
if (total_sz + blk_sz >= (blk_sz * n_blks))
data = realloc(data, blk_sz * (++n_blks));
search = total_sz - read_sz;
if (search < 0)
search = 0;
if ((c = strstr(data + search, "endobj")))
{
*(c + strlen("endobj") + 1) = '\0';
obj_sz = (void *)strstr(data + search, "endobj") - (void *)data;
obj_sz += strlen("endobj") + 1;
break;
}
else if (strstr(data, "stream"))
stream = 1;
}
clearerr(fp);
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
if (size)
*size = obj_sz;
if (is_stream)
*is_stream = stream;
return data;
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static char *get_object(
FILE *fp,
int obj_id,
const xref_t *xref,
size_t *size,
int *is_stream)
{
static const int blk_sz = 256;
int i, total_sz, read_sz, n_blks, search, stream;
size_t obj_sz;
char *c, *data;
long start;
const xref_entry_t *entry;
if (size)
*size = 0;
if (is_stream)
*is_stream = 0;
start = ftell(fp);
/* Find object */
entry = NULL;
for (i=0; i<xref->n_entries; i++)
if (xref->entries[i].obj_id == obj_id)
{
entry = &xref->entries[i];
break;
}
if (!entry)
return NULL;
/* Jump to object start */
fseek(fp, entry->offset, SEEK_SET);
/* Initial allocate */
obj_sz = 0; /* Bytes in object */
total_sz = 0; /* Bytes read in */
n_blks = 1;
data = safe_calloc(blk_sz * n_blks);
/* Suck in data */
stream = 0;
while ((read_sz = fread(data+total_sz, 1, blk_sz-1, fp)) && !ferror(fp))
{
total_sz += read_sz;
*(data + total_sz) = '\0';
if (total_sz + blk_sz >= (blk_sz * n_blks))
data = realloc(data, blk_sz * (++n_blks));
search = total_sz - read_sz;
if (search < 0)
search = 0;
if ((c = strstr(data + search, "endobj")))
{
*(c + strlen("endobj") + 1) = '\0';
obj_sz = (void *)strstr(data + search, "endobj") - (void *)data;
obj_sz += strlen("endobj") + 1;
break;
}
else if (strstr(data, "stream"))
stream = 1;
}
clearerr(fp);
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
if (size)
*size = obj_sz;
if (is_stream)
*is_stream = stream;
return data;
}
| 169,568 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_mod(
PNG_CONST image_transform *this, image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
image_transform_png_set_expand_mod(this, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_mod(
const image_transform *this, image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
const transform_display *display)
{
#if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10700
image_transform_png_set_expand_mod(this, that, pp, display);
#else
/* Only expand grayscale of bit depth less than 8: */
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY &&
that->bit_depth < 8)
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 8;
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
#endif /* 1.7 or later */
}
| 173,631 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_background_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_byte colour_type, bit_depth;
png_byte random_bytes[8]; /* 8 bytes - 64 bits - the biggest pixel */
int expand;
png_color_16 back;
/* We need a background colour, because we don't know exactly what transforms
* have been set we have to supply the colour in the original file format and
* so we need to know what that is! The background colour is stored in the
* transform_display.
*/
RANDOMIZE(random_bytes);
/* Read the random value, for colour type 3 the background colour is actually
* expressed as a 24bit rgb, not an index.
*/
colour_type = that->this.colour_type;
if (colour_type == 3)
{
colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
bit_depth = 8;
expand = 0; /* passing in an RGB not a pixel index */
}
else
{
bit_depth = that->this.bit_depth;
expand = 1;
}
image_pixel_init(&data, random_bytes, colour_type,
bit_depth, 0/*x*/, 0/*unused: palette*/);
/* Extract the background colour from this image_pixel, but make sure the
* unused fields of 'back' are garbage.
*/
RANDOMIZE(back);
if (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
{
back.red = (png_uint_16)data.red;
back.green = (png_uint_16)data.green;
back.blue = (png_uint_16)data.blue;
}
else
back.gray = (png_uint_16)data.red;
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
png_set_background(pp, &back, PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_FILE, expand, 0);
# else
png_set_background_fixed(pp, &back, PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_FILE, expand, 0);
# endif
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_background_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_background_set(const image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_byte colour_type, bit_depth;
png_byte random_bytes[8]; /* 8 bytes - 64 bits - the biggest pixel */
int expand;
png_color_16 back;
/* We need a background colour, because we don't know exactly what transforms
* have been set we have to supply the colour in the original file format and
* so we need to know what that is! The background colour is stored in the
* transform_display.
*/
RANDOMIZE(random_bytes);
/* Read the random value, for colour type 3 the background colour is actually
* expressed as a 24bit rgb, not an index.
*/
colour_type = that->this.colour_type;
if (colour_type == 3)
{
colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
bit_depth = 8;
expand = 0; /* passing in an RGB not a pixel index */
}
else
{
if (that->this.has_tRNS)
that->this.is_transparent = 1;
bit_depth = that->this.bit_depth;
expand = 1;
}
image_pixel_init(&data, random_bytes, colour_type,
bit_depth, 0/*x*/, 0/*unused: palette*/, NULL/*format*/);
/* Extract the background colour from this image_pixel, but make sure the
* unused fields of 'back' are garbage.
*/
RANDOMIZE(back);
if (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
{
back.red = (png_uint_16)data.red;
back.green = (png_uint_16)data.green;
back.blue = (png_uint_16)data.blue;
}
else
back.gray = (png_uint_16)data.red;
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
png_set_background(pp, &back, PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_FILE, expand, 0);
# else
png_set_background_fixed(pp, &back, PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_FILE, expand, 0);
# endif
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
| 173,625 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void OneClickSigninHelper::ShowInfoBarIfPossible(net::URLRequest* request,
ProfileIOData* io_data,
int child_id,
int route_id) {
std::string google_chrome_signin_value;
std::string google_accounts_signin_value;
request->GetResponseHeaderByName("Google-Chrome-SignIn",
&google_chrome_signin_value);
request->GetResponseHeaderByName("Google-Accounts-SignIn",
&google_accounts_signin_value);
if (!google_accounts_signin_value.empty() ||
!google_chrome_signin_value.empty()) {
VLOG(1) << "OneClickSigninHelper::ShowInfoBarIfPossible:"
<< " g-a-s='" << google_accounts_signin_value << "'"
<< " g-c-s='" << google_chrome_signin_value << "'";
}
if (!gaia::IsGaiaSignonRealm(request->original_url().GetOrigin()))
return;
std::vector<std::pair<std::string, std::string> > pairs;
base::SplitStringIntoKeyValuePairs(google_accounts_signin_value, '=', ',',
&pairs);
std::string session_index;
std::string email;
for (size_t i = 0; i < pairs.size(); ++i) {
const std::pair<std::string, std::string>& pair = pairs[i];
const std::string& key = pair.first;
const std::string& value = pair.second;
if (key == "email") {
TrimString(value, "\"", &email);
} else if (key == "sessionindex") {
session_index = value;
}
}
if (!email.empty())
io_data->set_reverse_autologin_pending_email(email);
if (!email.empty() || !session_index.empty()) {
VLOG(1) << "OneClickSigninHelper::ShowInfoBarIfPossible:"
<< " email=" << email
<< " sessionindex=" << session_index;
}
AutoAccept auto_accept = AUTO_ACCEPT_NONE;
signin::Source source = signin::SOURCE_UNKNOWN;
GURL continue_url;
std::vector<std::string> tokens;
base::SplitString(google_chrome_signin_value, ',', &tokens);
for (size_t i = 0; i < tokens.size(); ++i) {
const std::string& token = tokens[i];
if (token == "accepted") {
auto_accept = AUTO_ACCEPT_ACCEPTED;
} else if (token == "configure") {
auto_accept = AUTO_ACCEPT_CONFIGURE;
} else if (token == "rejected-for-profile") {
auto_accept = AUTO_ACCEPT_REJECTED_FOR_PROFILE;
}
}
source = GetSigninSource(request->url(), &continue_url);
if (source != signin::SOURCE_UNKNOWN)
auto_accept = AUTO_ACCEPT_EXPLICIT;
if (auto_accept != AUTO_ACCEPT_NONE) {
VLOG(1) << "OneClickSigninHelper::ShowInfoBarIfPossible:"
<< " auto_accept=" << auto_accept;
}
if (session_index.empty() && email.empty() &&
auto_accept == AUTO_ACCEPT_NONE && !continue_url.is_valid()) {
return;
}
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(
content::BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&OneClickSigninHelper::ShowInfoBarUIThread, session_index,
email, auto_accept, source, continue_url, child_id, route_id));
}
Commit Message: During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | void OneClickSigninHelper::ShowInfoBarIfPossible(net::URLRequest* request,
ProfileIOData* io_data,
int child_id,
int route_id) {
std::string google_chrome_signin_value;
std::string google_accounts_signin_value;
request->GetResponseHeaderByName("Google-Chrome-SignIn",
&google_chrome_signin_value);
request->GetResponseHeaderByName("Google-Accounts-SignIn",
&google_accounts_signin_value);
if (!google_accounts_signin_value.empty() ||
!google_chrome_signin_value.empty()) {
VLOG(1) << "OneClickSigninHelper::ShowInfoBarIfPossible:"
<< " g-a-s='" << google_accounts_signin_value << "'"
<< " g-c-s='" << google_chrome_signin_value << "'";
}
if (!gaia::IsGaiaSignonRealm(request->url().GetOrigin()))
return;
std::vector<std::pair<std::string, std::string> > pairs;
base::SplitStringIntoKeyValuePairs(google_accounts_signin_value, '=', ',',
&pairs);
std::string session_index;
std::string email;
for (size_t i = 0; i < pairs.size(); ++i) {
const std::pair<std::string, std::string>& pair = pairs[i];
const std::string& key = pair.first;
const std::string& value = pair.second;
if (key == "email") {
TrimString(value, "\"", &email);
} else if (key == "sessionindex") {
session_index = value;
}
}
if (!email.empty())
io_data->set_reverse_autologin_pending_email(email);
if (!email.empty() || !session_index.empty()) {
VLOG(1) << "OneClickSigninHelper::ShowInfoBarIfPossible:"
<< " email=" << email
<< " sessionindex=" << session_index;
}
AutoAccept auto_accept = AUTO_ACCEPT_NONE;
signin::Source source = signin::SOURCE_UNKNOWN;
GURL continue_url;
std::vector<std::string> tokens;
base::SplitString(google_chrome_signin_value, ',', &tokens);
for (size_t i = 0; i < tokens.size(); ++i) {
const std::string& token = tokens[i];
if (token == "accepted") {
auto_accept = AUTO_ACCEPT_ACCEPTED;
} else if (token == "configure") {
auto_accept = AUTO_ACCEPT_CONFIGURE;
} else if (token == "rejected-for-profile") {
auto_accept = AUTO_ACCEPT_REJECTED_FOR_PROFILE;
}
}
source = GetSigninSource(request->url(), &continue_url);
if (source != signin::SOURCE_UNKNOWN)
auto_accept = AUTO_ACCEPT_EXPLICIT;
if (auto_accept != AUTO_ACCEPT_NONE) {
VLOG(1) << "OneClickSigninHelper::ShowInfoBarIfPossible:"
<< " auto_accept=" << auto_accept;
}
if (session_index.empty() && email.empty() &&
auto_accept == AUTO_ACCEPT_NONE && !continue_url.is_valid()) {
return;
}
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(
content::BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&OneClickSigninHelper::ShowInfoBarUIThread, session_index,
email, auto_accept, source, continue_url, child_id, route_id));
}
| 171,136 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: setPath(JsonbIterator **it, Datum *path_elems,
bool *path_nulls, int path_len,
JsonbParseState **st, int level, Jsonb *newval, bool create)
{
JsonbValue v;
JsonbValue *res = NULL;
int r;
if (path_nulls[level])
elog(ERROR, "path element at the position %d is NULL", level + 1);
switch (r)
{
case WJB_BEGIN_ARRAY:
(void) pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
setPathArray(it, path_elems, path_nulls, path_len, st, level,
newval, v.val.array.nElems, create);
r = JsonbIteratorNext(it, &v, false);
Assert(r == WJB_END_ARRAY);
res = pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
break;
case WJB_BEGIN_OBJECT:
(void) pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
setPathObject(it, path_elems, path_nulls, path_len, st, level,
newval, v.val.object.nPairs, create);
r = JsonbIteratorNext(it, &v, true);
Assert(r == WJB_END_OBJECT);
res = pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
break;
case WJB_ELEM:
case WJB_VALUE:
res = pushJsonbValue(st, r, &v);
break;
default:
elog(ERROR, "impossible state");
}
return res;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | setPath(JsonbIterator **it, Datum *path_elems,
bool *path_nulls, int path_len,
JsonbParseState **st, int level, Jsonb *newval, bool create)
{
JsonbValue v;
JsonbValue *res = NULL;
int r;
check_stack_depth();
if (path_nulls[level])
elog(ERROR, "path element at the position %d is NULL", level + 1);
switch (r)
{
case WJB_BEGIN_ARRAY:
(void) pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
setPathArray(it, path_elems, path_nulls, path_len, st, level,
newval, v.val.array.nElems, create);
r = JsonbIteratorNext(it, &v, false);
Assert(r == WJB_END_ARRAY);
res = pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
break;
case WJB_BEGIN_OBJECT:
(void) pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
setPathObject(it, path_elems, path_nulls, path_len, st, level,
newval, v.val.object.nPairs, create);
r = JsonbIteratorNext(it, &v, true);
Assert(r == WJB_END_OBJECT);
res = pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
break;
case WJB_ELEM:
case WJB_VALUE:
res = pushJsonbValue(st, r, &v);
break;
default:
elog(ERROR, "impossible state");
}
return res;
}
| 164,681 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ParamTraits<SkBitmap>::Log(const SkBitmap& p, std::string* l) {
l->append("<SkBitmap>");
}
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void ParamTraits<SkBitmap>::Log(const SkBitmap& p, std::string* l) {
l->append("<SkBitmap>");
LogParam(p.info(), l);
}
| 172,893 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::InitPrintSettings(WebKit::WebFrame* frame,
WebKit::WebNode* node,
bool is_preview) {
DCHECK(frame);
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params settings;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_GetDefaultPrintSettings(routing_id(),
&settings.params));
bool result = true;
if (PrintMsg_Print_Params_IsEmpty(settings.params)) {
if (!is_preview) {
render_view()->runModalAlertDialog(
frame,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_PRINT_PREVIEW_INVALID_PRINTER_SETTINGS));
}
result = false;
}
if (result &&
(settings.params.dpi < kMinDpi || settings.params.document_cookie == 0)) {
NOTREACHED();
result = false;
}
settings.pages.clear();
print_pages_params_.reset(new PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params(settings));
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool PrintWebViewHelper::InitPrintSettings(WebKit::WebFrame* frame,
bool PrintWebViewHelper::InitPrintSettings(WebKit::WebFrame* frame) {
DCHECK(frame);
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params settings;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_GetDefaultPrintSettings(routing_id(),
&settings.params));
bool result = true;
if (PrintMsg_Print_Params_IsEmpty(settings.params)) {
render_view()->runModalAlertDialog(
frame,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_PRINT_PREVIEW_INVALID_PRINTER_SETTINGS));
result = false;
}
if (result &&
(settings.params.dpi < kMinDpi || settings.params.document_cookie == 0)) {
NOTREACHED();
result = false;
}
settings.pages.clear();
print_pages_params_.reset(new PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params(settings));
return result;
}
| 170,259 |
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