instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline long object_common1(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, zend_class_entry *ce)
{
long elements;
elements = parse_iv2((*p) + 2, p);
(*p) += 2;
if (ce->serialize == NULL) {
object_init_ex(*rval, ce);
} else {
/* If this class implements Serializable, it should not land here but in object_custom(). The passed string
obviously doesn't descend from the regular serializer. */
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Erroneous data format for unserializing '%s'", ce->name);
return 0;
}
return elements;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73825 - Heap out of bounds read on unserialize in finish_nested_data()
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static inline long object_common1(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, zend_class_entry *ce)
{
long elements;
if( *p >= max - 2) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Bad unserialize data");
return -1;
}
elements = parse_iv2((*p) + 2, p);
(*p) += 2;
if (ce->serialize == NULL) {
object_init_ex(*rval, ce);
} else {
/* If this class implements Serializable, it should not land here but in object_custom(). The passed string
obviously doesn't descend from the regular serializer. */
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Erroneous data format for unserializing '%s'", ce->name);
return -1;
}
return elements;
}
| 168,514 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XdmcpGenerateKey (XdmAuthKeyPtr key)
{
#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
long lowbits, highbits;
srandom ((int)getpid() ^ time((Time_t *)0));
highbits = random ();
highbits = random ();
getbits (lowbits, key->data);
getbits (highbits, key->data + 4);
#else
arc4random_buf(key->data, 8);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-320 | XdmcpGenerateKey (XdmAuthKeyPtr key)
#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
static void
emulate_getrandom_buf (char *auth, int len)
{
long lowbits, highbits;
srandom ((int)getpid() ^ time((Time_t *)0));
highbits = random ();
highbits = random ();
getbits (lowbits, key->data);
getbits (highbits, key->data + 4);
}
static void
arc4random_buf (void *auth, int len)
{
int ret;
#if HAVE_GETENTROPY
/* weak emulation of arc4random through the getentropy libc call */
ret = getentropy (auth, len);
if (ret == 0)
return;
#endif /* HAVE_GETENTROPY */
emulate_getrandom_buf (auth, len);
}
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) */
void
XdmcpGenerateKey (XdmAuthKeyPtr key)
{
arc4random_buf(key->data, 8);
}
| 165,472 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: fpAcc(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count = cc;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
assert((cc%(bps*stride))==0);
if (!tmp)
return;
while (count > stride) {
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] =
(unsigned char) ((cp[stride] + cp[0]) & 0xff); cp++)
count -= stride;
}
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[bps * count + byte] = tmp[byte * wc + count];
#else
cp[bps * count + byte] =
tmp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | fpAcc(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count = cc;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
if(cc%(bps*stride)!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "fpAcc",
"%s", "cc%(bps*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
if (!tmp)
return 0;
while (count > stride) {
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] =
(unsigned char) ((cp[stride] + cp[0]) & 0xff); cp++)
count -= stride;
}
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[bps * count + byte] = tmp[byte * wc + count];
#else
cp[bps * count + byte] =
tmp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
return 1;
}
| 166,880 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fgets)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_read(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->u.file.current_line, intern->u.file.current_line_len, 1);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto string SplFileObject::current()
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fgets)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_read(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->u.file.current_line, intern->u.file.current_line_len, 1);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto string SplFileObject::current()
| 167,054 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SQLWCHAR* _single_string_alloc_and_expand( LPCSTR in )
{
SQLWCHAR *chr;
int len = 0;
if ( !in )
{
return in;
}
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
len ++;
}
chr = malloc( sizeof( SQLWCHAR ) * ( len + 1 ));
len = 0;
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
chr[ len ] = in[ len ];
len ++;
}
chr[ len ++ ] = 0;
return chr;
}
Commit Message: New Pre Source
CWE ID: CWE-119 | SQLWCHAR* _single_string_alloc_and_expand( LPCSTR in )
{
SQLWCHAR *chr;
int len = 0;
if ( !in )
{
return NULL;
}
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
len ++;
}
chr = malloc( sizeof( SQLWCHAR ) * ( len + 1 ));
len = 0;
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
chr[ len ] = in[ len ];
len ++;
}
chr[ len ++ ] = 0;
return chr;
}
| 169,316 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jp2_cdef_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_cdef_t *cdef = &box->data.cdef;
jp2_cdefchan_t *chan;
unsigned int channo;
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &cdef->numchans)) {
return -1;
}
if (!(cdef->ents = jas_alloc2(cdef->numchans, sizeof(jp2_cdefchan_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (channo = 0; channo < cdef->numchans; ++channo) {
chan = &cdef->ents[channo];
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &chan->channo) || jp2_getuint16(in, &chan->type) ||
jp2_getuint16(in, &chan->assoc)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int jp2_cdef_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_cdef_t *cdef = &box->data.cdef;
jp2_cdefchan_t *chan;
unsigned int channo;
cdef->ents = 0;
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &cdef->numchans)) {
return -1;
}
if (!(cdef->ents = jas_alloc2(cdef->numchans, sizeof(jp2_cdefchan_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (channo = 0; channo < cdef->numchans; ++channo) {
chan = &cdef->ents[channo];
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &chan->channo) || jp2_getuint16(in, &chan->type) ||
jp2_getuint16(in, &chan->assoc)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 168,321 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::SetPinCode(const std::string& pincode) {
if (!agent_.get() || pincode_callback_.is_null())
return;
pincode_callback_.Run(SUCCESS, pincode);
pincode_callback_.Reset();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::SetPinCode(const std::string& pincode) {
if (!pairing_context_.get())
return;
pairing_context_->SetPinCode(pincode);
}
| 171,240 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: HostCache::HostCache(size_t max_entries)
: max_entries_(max_entries), network_changes_(0) {}
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
CWE ID: | HostCache::HostCache(size_t max_entries)
| 172,007 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterMPCImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("CACHE");
entry->description=ConstantString("Magick Persistent Cache image format");
entry->module=ConstantString("MPC");
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->stealth=MagickTrue;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("MPC");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadMPCImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteMPCImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsMPC;
entry->description=ConstantString("Magick Persistent Cache image format");
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->module=ConstantString("MPC");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ModuleExport size_t RegisterMPCImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("CACHE");
entry->description=ConstantString("Magick Persistent Cache image format");
entry->module=ConstantString("MPC");
entry->stealth=MagickTrue;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("MPC");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadMPCImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteMPCImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsMPC;
entry->description=ConstantString("Magick Persistent Cache image format");
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->module=ConstantString("MPC");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
| 170,040 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl::set_error(const std::string& error) {
error_ = error;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl::set_error(const std::string& error) {
| 170,395 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Chapters::Atom::Clear()
{
delete[] m_string_uid;
m_string_uid = NULL;
while (m_displays_count > 0)
{
Display& d = m_displays[--m_displays_count];
d.Clear();
}
delete[] m_displays;
m_displays = NULL;
m_displays_size = 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Chapters::Atom::Clear()
| 174,245 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ehci_advance_state(EHCIState *ehci, int async)
{
EHCIQueue *q = NULL;
int again;
do {
case EST_WAITLISTHEAD:
again = ehci_state_waitlisthead(ehci, async);
break;
case EST_FETCHENTRY:
again = ehci_state_fetchentry(ehci, async);
break;
case EST_FETCHQH:
q = ehci_state_fetchqh(ehci, async);
if (q != NULL) {
assert(q->async == async);
again = 1;
} else {
again = 0;
}
break;
case EST_FETCHITD:
again = ehci_state_fetchitd(ehci, async);
break;
case EST_FETCHSITD:
again = ehci_state_fetchsitd(ehci, async);
break;
case EST_ADVANCEQUEUE:
case EST_FETCHQTD:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_fetchqtd(q);
break;
case EST_HORIZONTALQH:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_horizqh(q);
break;
case EST_EXECUTE:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_execute(q);
if (async) {
ehci->async_stepdown = 0;
}
break;
case EST_EXECUTING:
assert(q != NULL);
if (async) {
ehci->async_stepdown = 0;
}
again = ehci_state_executing(q);
break;
case EST_WRITEBACK:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_writeback(q);
if (!async) {
ehci->periodic_sched_active = PERIODIC_ACTIVE;
}
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Bad state!\n");
again = -1;
g_assert_not_reached();
break;
}
break;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void ehci_advance_state(EHCIState *ehci, int async)
{
EHCIQueue *q = NULL;
int itd_count = 0;
int again;
do {
case EST_WAITLISTHEAD:
again = ehci_state_waitlisthead(ehci, async);
break;
case EST_FETCHENTRY:
again = ehci_state_fetchentry(ehci, async);
break;
case EST_FETCHQH:
q = ehci_state_fetchqh(ehci, async);
if (q != NULL) {
assert(q->async == async);
again = 1;
} else {
again = 0;
}
break;
case EST_FETCHITD:
again = ehci_state_fetchitd(ehci, async);
itd_count++;
break;
case EST_FETCHSITD:
again = ehci_state_fetchsitd(ehci, async);
itd_count++;
break;
case EST_ADVANCEQUEUE:
case EST_FETCHQTD:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_fetchqtd(q);
break;
case EST_HORIZONTALQH:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_horizqh(q);
break;
case EST_EXECUTE:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_execute(q);
if (async) {
ehci->async_stepdown = 0;
}
break;
case EST_EXECUTING:
assert(q != NULL);
if (async) {
ehci->async_stepdown = 0;
}
again = ehci_state_executing(q);
break;
case EST_WRITEBACK:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_writeback(q);
if (!async) {
ehci->periodic_sched_active = PERIODIC_ACTIVE;
}
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Bad state!\n");
again = -1;
g_assert_not_reached();
break;
}
break;
}
| 165,075 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void StopCastCallback(
CastConfigDelegate* cast_config,
const CastConfigDelegate::ReceiversAndActivites& receivers_activities) {
for (auto& item : receivers_activities) {
CastConfigDelegate::Activity activity = item.second.activity;
if (activity.allow_stop && activity.id.empty() == false)
cast_config->StopCasting(activity.id);
}
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void StopCastCallback(
| 171,626 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnDatabaseOpened(const string16& origin_identifier,
const string16& database_name,
const string16& description,
int64 estimated_size) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
int64 database_size = 0;
db_tracker_->DatabaseOpened(origin_identifier, database_name, description,
estimated_size, &database_size);
database_connections_.AddConnection(origin_identifier, database_name);
Send(new DatabaseMsg_UpdateSize(origin_identifier, database_name,
database_size));
}
Commit Message: WebDatabase: check path traversal in origin_identifier
BUG=172264
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12212091
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@183141 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnDatabaseOpened(const string16& origin_identifier,
const string16& database_name,
const string16& description,
int64 estimated_size) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
if (!DatabaseUtil::IsValidOriginIdentifier(origin_identifier)) {
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BadMessageTerminate_DBMF"));
BadMessageReceived();
return;
}
int64 database_size = 0;
db_tracker_->DatabaseOpened(origin_identifier, database_name, description,
estimated_size, &database_size);
database_connections_.AddConnection(origin_identifier, database_name);
Send(new DatabaseMsg_UpdateSize(origin_identifier, database_name,
database_size));
}
| 171,477 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::fill_this_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
unsigned nPortIndex = 0;
if (dynamic_buf_mode) {
private_handle_t *handle = NULL;
struct VideoDecoderOutputMetaData *meta;
unsigned int nPortIndex = 0;
if (!buffer || !buffer->pBuffer) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: invalid params: %p", __FUNCTION__, buffer);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
meta = (struct VideoDecoderOutputMetaData *)buffer->pBuffer;
handle = (private_handle_t *)meta->pHandle;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FTB: metabuf: %p buftype: %d bufhndl: %p ", meta, meta->eType, meta->pHandle);
if (!handle) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("FTB: Error: IL client passed an invalid buf handle - %p", handle);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
nPortIndex = buffer-((OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *)client_buffers.get_il_buf_hdr());
drv_ctx.ptr_outputbuffer[nPortIndex].pmem_fd = handle->fd;
drv_ctx.ptr_outputbuffer[nPortIndex].bufferaddr = (OMX_U8*) buffer;
native_buffer[nPortIndex].privatehandle = handle;
native_buffer[nPortIndex].nativehandle = handle;
buffer->nFilledLen = 0;
buffer->nAllocLen = handle->size;
}
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("FTB in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (!m_out_bEnabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:FTB incorrect state operation, output port is disabled.");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
nPortIndex = buffer - client_buffers.get_il_buf_hdr();
if (buffer == NULL ||
(nPortIndex >= drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("FTB: ERROR: invalid buffer index, nPortIndex %u bufCount %u",
nPortIndex, drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (buffer->nOutputPortIndex != OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:FTB invalid port in header %u", (unsigned int)buffer->nOutputPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("[FTB] bufhdr = %p, bufhdr->pBuffer = %p", buffer, buffer->pBuffer);
post_event((unsigned long) hComp, (unsigned long)buffer, m_fill_output_msg);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::fill_this_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
if (m_state != OMX_StateExecuting &&
m_state != OMX_StatePause &&
m_state != OMX_StateIdle) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("FTB in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (!m_out_bEnabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:FTB incorrect state operation, output port is disabled.");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
unsigned nPortIndex = 0;
if (dynamic_buf_mode) {
private_handle_t *handle = NULL;
struct VideoDecoderOutputMetaData *meta;
unsigned int nPortIndex = 0;
if (!buffer || !buffer->pBuffer) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: invalid params: %p", __FUNCTION__, buffer);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
meta = (struct VideoDecoderOutputMetaData *)buffer->pBuffer;
handle = (private_handle_t *)meta->pHandle;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FTB: metabuf: %p buftype: %d bufhndl: %p ", meta, meta->eType, meta->pHandle);
if (!handle) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("FTB: Error: IL client passed an invalid buf handle - %p", handle);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
nPortIndex = buffer-((OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *)client_buffers.get_il_buf_hdr());
drv_ctx.ptr_outputbuffer[nPortIndex].pmem_fd = handle->fd;
drv_ctx.ptr_outputbuffer[nPortIndex].bufferaddr = (OMX_U8*) buffer;
native_buffer[nPortIndex].privatehandle = handle;
native_buffer[nPortIndex].nativehandle = handle;
buffer->nFilledLen = 0;
buffer->nAllocLen = handle->size;
}
nPortIndex = buffer - client_buffers.get_il_buf_hdr();
if (buffer == NULL ||
(nPortIndex >= drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("FTB: ERROR: invalid buffer index, nPortIndex %u bufCount %u",
nPortIndex, drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (buffer->nOutputPortIndex != OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:FTB invalid port in header %u", (unsigned int)buffer->nOutputPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("[FTB] bufhdr = %p, bufhdr->pBuffer = %p", buffer, buffer->pBuffer);
post_event((unsigned long) hComp, (unsigned long)buffer, m_fill_output_msg);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
| 173,751 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InspectorController::initializeDeferredAgents()
{
if (m_deferredAgentsInitialized)
return;
m_deferredAgentsInitialized = true;
InjectedScriptManager* injectedScriptManager = m_injectedScriptManager.get();
InspectorOverlay* overlay = m_overlay.get();
OwnPtr<InspectorResourceAgent> resourceAgentPtr(InspectorResourceAgent::create(m_pageAgent, m_inspectorClient));
InspectorResourceAgent* resourceAgent = resourceAgentPtr.get();
m_agents.append(resourceAgentPtr.release());
m_agents.append(InspectorCSSAgent::create(m_domAgent, m_pageAgent, resourceAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorDOMStorageAgent::create(m_pageAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorMemoryAgent::create());
m_agents.append(InspectorApplicationCacheAgent::create(m_pageAgent));
PageScriptDebugServer* pageScriptDebugServer = &PageScriptDebugServer::shared();
OwnPtr<InspectorDebuggerAgent> debuggerAgentPtr(PageDebuggerAgent::create(pageScriptDebugServer, m_pageAgent, injectedScriptManager, overlay));
InspectorDebuggerAgent* debuggerAgent = debuggerAgentPtr.get();
m_agents.append(debuggerAgentPtr.release());
m_agents.append(InspectorDOMDebuggerAgent::create(m_domAgent, debuggerAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorProfilerAgent::create(injectedScriptManager, overlay));
m_agents.append(InspectorHeapProfilerAgent::create(injectedScriptManager));
m_agents.append(InspectorCanvasAgent::create(m_pageAgent, injectedScriptManager));
m_agents.append(InspectorInputAgent::create(m_page, m_inspectorClient));
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void InspectorController::initializeDeferredAgents()
{
if (m_deferredAgentsInitialized)
return;
m_deferredAgentsInitialized = true;
InjectedScriptManager* injectedScriptManager = m_injectedScriptManager.get();
InspectorOverlay* overlay = m_overlay.get();
OwnPtr<InspectorResourceAgent> resourceAgentPtr(InspectorResourceAgent::create(m_pageAgent));
InspectorResourceAgent* resourceAgent = resourceAgentPtr.get();
m_agents.append(resourceAgentPtr.release());
m_agents.append(InspectorCSSAgent::create(m_domAgent, m_pageAgent, resourceAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorDOMStorageAgent::create(m_pageAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorMemoryAgent::create());
m_agents.append(InspectorApplicationCacheAgent::create(m_pageAgent));
PageScriptDebugServer* pageScriptDebugServer = &PageScriptDebugServer::shared();
OwnPtr<InspectorDebuggerAgent> debuggerAgentPtr(PageDebuggerAgent::create(pageScriptDebugServer, m_pageAgent, injectedScriptManager, overlay));
InspectorDebuggerAgent* debuggerAgent = debuggerAgentPtr.get();
m_agents.append(debuggerAgentPtr.release());
m_agents.append(InspectorDOMDebuggerAgent::create(m_domAgent, debuggerAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorProfilerAgent::create(injectedScriptManager, overlay));
m_agents.append(InspectorHeapProfilerAgent::create(injectedScriptManager));
m_agents.append(InspectorCanvasAgent::create(m_pageAgent, injectedScriptManager));
m_agents.append(InspectorInputAgent::create(m_page, m_inspectorClient));
}
| 171,344 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key,
const struct key_match_data *match_data)
{
const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
const char *description = match_data->raw_data;
const char *spec = description;
const char *id;
ptrdiff_t speclen;
if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec)
return 0;
/* See if the full key description matches as is */
if (key->description && strcmp(key->description, description) == 0)
return 1;
/* All tests from here on break the criterion description into a
* specifier, a colon and then an identifier.
*/
id = strchr(spec, ':');
if (!id)
return 0;
speclen = id - spec;
id++;
if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id);
if (speclen == subtype->name_len &&
memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key,
static int asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
const struct key_match_data *match_data)
{
const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
const char *description = match_data->raw_data;
const char *spec = description;
const char *id;
ptrdiff_t speclen;
if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec)
return 0;
/* See if the full key description matches as is */
if (key->description && strcmp(key->description, description) == 0)
return 1;
/* All tests from here on break the criterion description into a
* specifier, a colon and then an identifier.
*/
id = strchr(spec, ':');
if (!id)
return 0;
speclen = id - spec;
id++;
if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id);
if (speclen == subtype->name_len &&
memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
| 168,436 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int msg_cache_check(const char *id, struct BodyCache *bcache, void *data)
{
struct Context *ctx = (struct Context *) data;
if (!ctx)
return -1;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
if (!pop_data)
return -1;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
/* keep hcache file if hcache == bcache */
if (strcmp(HC_FNAME "." HC_FEXT, id) == 0)
return 0;
#endif
for (int i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
{
/* if the id we get is known for a header: done (i.e. keep in cache) */
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->data && (mutt_str_strcmp(ctx->hdrs[i]->data, id) == 0))
return 0;
}
/* message not found in context -> remove it from cache
* return the result of bcache, so we stop upon its first error
*/
return mutt_bcache_del(bcache, id);
}
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-22 | static int msg_cache_check(const char *id, struct BodyCache *bcache, void *data)
{
struct Context *ctx = (struct Context *) data;
if (!ctx)
return -1;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
if (!pop_data)
return -1;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
/* keep hcache file if hcache == bcache */
if (strcmp(HC_FNAME "." HC_FEXT, id) == 0)
return 0;
#endif
for (int i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
{
/* if the id we get is known for a header: done (i.e. keep in cache) */
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->data && (mutt_str_strcmp(ctx->hdrs[i]->data, id) == 0))
return 0;
}
/* message not found in context -> remove it from cache
* return the result of bcache, so we stop upon its first error
*/
return mutt_bcache_del(bcache, cache_id(id));
}
| 169,120 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ShellBrowserMain(const content::MainFunctionParams& parameters) {
bool layout_test_mode =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kDumpRenderTree);
base::ScopedTempDir browser_context_path_for_layout_tests;
if (layout_test_mode) {
CHECK(browser_context_path_for_layout_tests.CreateUniqueTempDir());
CHECK(!browser_context_path_for_layout_tests.path().MaybeAsASCII().empty());
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kContentShellDataPath,
browser_context_path_for_layout_tests.path().MaybeAsASCII());
}
scoped_ptr<content::BrowserMainRunner> main_runner_(
content::BrowserMainRunner::Create());
int exit_code = main_runner_->Initialize(parameters);
if (exit_code >= 0)
return exit_code;
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kCheckLayoutTestSysDeps)) {
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, MessageLoop::QuitClosure());
main_runner_->Run();
main_runner_->Shutdown();
return 0;
}
if (layout_test_mode) {
content::WebKitTestController test_controller;
std::string test_string;
CommandLine::StringVector args =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetArgs();
size_t command_line_position = 0;
bool ran_at_least_once = false;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
std::cout << "#READY\n";
std::cout.flush();
#endif
while (GetNextTest(args, &command_line_position, &test_string)) {
if (test_string.empty())
continue;
if (test_string == "QUIT")
break;
bool enable_pixel_dumps;
std::string pixel_hash;
FilePath cwd;
GURL test_url = GetURLForLayoutTest(
test_string, &cwd, &enable_pixel_dumps, &pixel_hash);
if (!content::WebKitTestController::Get()->PrepareForLayoutTest(
test_url, cwd, enable_pixel_dumps, pixel_hash)) {
break;
}
ran_at_least_once = true;
main_runner_->Run();
if (!content::WebKitTestController::Get()->ResetAfterLayoutTest())
break;
}
if (!ran_at_least_once) {
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, MessageLoop::QuitClosure());
main_runner_->Run();
}
exit_code = 0;
} else {
exit_code = main_runner_->Run();
}
main_runner_->Shutdown();
return exit_code;
}
Commit Message: [content shell] reset the CWD after each layout test
BUG=111316
R=marja@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11633017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173906 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | int ShellBrowserMain(const content::MainFunctionParams& parameters) {
bool layout_test_mode =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kDumpRenderTree);
base::ScopedTempDir browser_context_path_for_layout_tests;
if (layout_test_mode) {
CHECK(browser_context_path_for_layout_tests.CreateUniqueTempDir());
CHECK(!browser_context_path_for_layout_tests.path().MaybeAsASCII().empty());
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kContentShellDataPath,
browser_context_path_for_layout_tests.path().MaybeAsASCII());
}
scoped_ptr<content::BrowserMainRunner> main_runner_(
content::BrowserMainRunner::Create());
int exit_code = main_runner_->Initialize(parameters);
if (exit_code >= 0)
return exit_code;
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kCheckLayoutTestSysDeps)) {
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, MessageLoop::QuitClosure());
main_runner_->Run();
main_runner_->Shutdown();
return 0;
}
if (layout_test_mode) {
content::WebKitTestController test_controller;
std::string test_string;
CommandLine::StringVector args =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetArgs();
size_t command_line_position = 0;
bool ran_at_least_once = false;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
std::cout << "#READY\n";
std::cout.flush();
#endif
FilePath original_cwd;
{
// We're outside of the message loop here, and this is a test.
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
file_util::GetCurrentDirectory(&original_cwd);
}
while (GetNextTest(args, &command_line_position, &test_string)) {
if (test_string.empty())
continue;
if (test_string == "QUIT")
break;
bool enable_pixel_dumps;
std::string pixel_hash;
FilePath cwd;
GURL test_url = GetURLForLayoutTest(
test_string, &cwd, &enable_pixel_dumps, &pixel_hash);
if (!content::WebKitTestController::Get()->PrepareForLayoutTest(
test_url, cwd, enable_pixel_dumps, pixel_hash)) {
break;
}
ran_at_least_once = true;
main_runner_->Run();
{
// We're outside of the message loop here, and this is a test.
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
file_util::SetCurrentDirectory(original_cwd);
}
if (!content::WebKitTestController::Get()->ResetAfterLayoutTest())
break;
}
if (!ran_at_least_once) {
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, MessageLoop::QuitClosure());
main_runner_->Run();
}
exit_code = 0;
} else {
exit_code = main_runner_->Run();
}
main_runner_->Shutdown();
return exit_code;
}
| 171,469 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Block::SetKey(bool bKey)
{
if (bKey)
m_flags |= static_cast<unsigned char>(1 << 7);
else
m_flags &= 0x7F;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Block::SetKey(bool bKey)
Block::Lacing Block::GetLacing() const {
const int value = int(m_flags & 0x06) >> 1;
return static_cast<Lacing>(value);
}
| 174,440 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ref_param_read_signal_error(gs_param_list * plist, gs_param_name pkey, int code)
{
iparam_list *const iplist = (iparam_list *) plist;
iparam_loc loc;
ref_param_read(iplist, pkey, &loc, -1); /* can't fail */
*loc.presult = code;
switch (ref_param_read_get_policy(plist, pkey)) {
case gs_param_policy_ignore:
return 0;
return_error(gs_error_configurationerror);
default:
return code;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | ref_param_read_signal_error(gs_param_list * plist, gs_param_name pkey, int code)
{
iparam_list *const iplist = (iparam_list *) plist;
iparam_loc loc = {0};
ref_param_read(iplist, pkey, &loc, -1);
if (loc.presult)
*loc.presult = code;
switch (ref_param_read_get_policy(plist, pkey)) {
case gs_param_policy_ignore:
return 0;
return_error(gs_error_configurationerror);
default:
return code;
}
}
| 164,705 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: print_pixel(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_const_bytep row,
png_uint_32 x)
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int bit_depth = png_get_bit_depth(png_ptr, info_ptr);
switch (png_get_color_type(png_ptr, info_ptr))
{
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY:
printf("GRAY %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 1));
return;
/* The palette case is slightly more difficult - the palette and, if
* present, the tRNS ('transparency', though the values are really
* opacity) data must be read to give the full picture:
*/
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE:
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int index = component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 1);
png_colorp palette = NULL;
int num_palette = 0;
if ((png_get_PLTE(png_ptr, info_ptr, &palette, &num_palette) &
PNG_INFO_PLTE) && num_palette > 0 && palette != NULL)
{
png_bytep trans_alpha = NULL;
int num_trans = 0;
if ((png_get_tRNS(png_ptr, info_ptr, &trans_alpha, &num_trans,
NULL) & PNG_INFO_tRNS) && num_trans > 0 &&
trans_alpha != NULL)
printf("INDEXED %u = %d %d %d %d\n", index,
palette[index].red, palette[index].green,
palette[index].blue,
index < num_trans ? trans_alpha[index] : 255);
else /* no transparency */
printf("INDEXED %u = %d %d %d\n", index,
palette[index].red, palette[index].green,
palette[index].blue);
}
else
printf("INDEXED %u = invalid index\n", index);
}
return;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB:
printf("RGB %u %u %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 3),
component(row, x, 1, bit_depth, 3),
component(row, x, 2, bit_depth, 3));
return;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA:
printf("GRAY+ALPHA %u %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 2),
component(row, x, 1, bit_depth, 2));
return;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA:
printf("RGBA %u %u %u %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 4),
component(row, x, 1, bit_depth, 4),
component(row, x, 2, bit_depth, 4),
component(row, x, 3, bit_depth, 4));
return;
default:
png_error(png_ptr, "pngpixel: invalid color type");
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | print_pixel(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_const_bytep row,
png_uint_32 x)
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int bit_depth = png_get_bit_depth(png_ptr, info_ptr);
switch (png_get_color_type(png_ptr, info_ptr))
{
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY:
printf("GRAY %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 1));
return;
/* The palette case is slightly more difficult - the palette and, if
* present, the tRNS ('transparency', though the values are really
* opacity) data must be read to give the full picture:
*/
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE:
{
PNG_CONST int index = component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 1);
png_colorp palette = NULL;
int num_palette = 0;
if ((png_get_PLTE(png_ptr, info_ptr, &palette, &num_palette) &
PNG_INFO_PLTE) && num_palette > 0 && palette != NULL)
{
png_bytep trans_alpha = NULL;
int num_trans = 0;
if ((png_get_tRNS(png_ptr, info_ptr, &trans_alpha, &num_trans,
NULL) & PNG_INFO_tRNS) && num_trans > 0 &&
trans_alpha != NULL)
printf("INDEXED %u = %d %d %d %d\n", index,
palette[index].red, palette[index].green,
palette[index].blue,
index < num_trans ? trans_alpha[index] : 255);
else /* no transparency */
printf("INDEXED %u = %d %d %d\n", index,
palette[index].red, palette[index].green,
palette[index].blue);
}
else
printf("INDEXED %u = invalid index\n", index);
}
return;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB:
printf("RGB %u %u %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 3),
component(row, x, 1, bit_depth, 3),
component(row, x, 2, bit_depth, 3));
return;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA:
printf("GRAY+ALPHA %u %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 2),
component(row, x, 1, bit_depth, 2));
return;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA:
printf("RGBA %u %u %u %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 4),
component(row, x, 1, bit_depth, 4),
component(row, x, 2, bit_depth, 4),
component(row, x, 3, bit_depth, 4));
return;
default:
png_error(png_ptr, "pngpixel: invalid color type");
}
}
| 173,566 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: parse_array(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem)
{
/*
* an array is a possibly empty sequence of array elements, separated by
* commas and surrounded by square brackets.
*/
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
if (astart != NULL)
(*astart) (sem->semstate);
* array end.
*/
lex->lex_level++;
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_START, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_START);
if (lex_peek(lex) != JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END)
{
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
while (lex_accept(lex, JSON_TOKEN_COMMA, NULL))
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
}
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_NEXT, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END);
lex->lex_level--;
if (aend != NULL)
(*aend) (sem->semstate);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | parse_array(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem)
{
/*
* an array is a possibly empty sequence of array elements, separated by
* commas and surrounded by square brackets.
*/
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
check_stack_depth();
if (astart != NULL)
(*astart) (sem->semstate);
* array end.
*/
lex->lex_level++;
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_START, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_START);
if (lex_peek(lex) != JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END)
{
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
while (lex_accept(lex, JSON_TOKEN_COMMA, NULL))
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
}
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_NEXT, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END);
lex->lex_level--;
if (aend != NULL)
(*aend) (sem->semstate);
}
| 164,679 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WT_NoiseGenerator (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 nInterpolatedSample;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* get last two samples generated */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp0 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->phaseAccum) >> 18;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
/* generate a buffer of noise */
while (numSamples--) {
nInterpolatedSample = MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp0, (PHASE_ONE - pWTVoice->phaseFrac));
nInterpolatedSample += MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp1, pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_PCM) nInterpolatedSample;
/* update PRNG */
pWTVoice->phaseFrac += (EAS_U32) phaseInc;
if (GET_PHASE_INT_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac)) {
tmp0 = tmp1;
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = pWTVoice->loopEnd;
pWTVoice->loopEnd = (5 * pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1);
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = GET_PHASE_FRAC_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void WT_NoiseGenerator (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 nInterpolatedSample;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* get last two samples generated */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp0 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->phaseAccum) >> 18;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
/* generate a buffer of noise */
while (numSamples--) {
nInterpolatedSample = MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp0, (PHASE_ONE - pWTVoice->phaseFrac));
nInterpolatedSample += MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp1, pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_PCM) nInterpolatedSample;
/* update PRNG */
pWTVoice->phaseFrac += (EAS_U32) phaseInc;
if (GET_PHASE_INT_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac)) {
tmp0 = tmp1;
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = pWTVoice->loopEnd;
pWTVoice->loopEnd = (5 * pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1);
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = GET_PHASE_FRAC_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
}
}
}
| 174,604 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool PasswordAutofillAgent::TryToShowTouchToFill(
const WebFormControlElement& control_element) {
const WebInputElement* element = ToWebInputElement(&control_element);
if (!element || (!base::Contains(web_input_to_password_info_, *element) &&
!base::Contains(password_to_username_, *element))) {
return false;
}
if (was_touch_to_fill_ui_shown_)
return false;
was_touch_to_fill_ui_shown_ = true;
GetPasswordManagerDriver()->ShowTouchToFill();
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | bool PasswordAutofillAgent::TryToShowTouchToFill(
const WebFormControlElement& control_element) {
const WebInputElement* element = ToWebInputElement(&control_element);
WebInputElement username_element;
WebInputElement password_element;
PasswordInfo* password_info = nullptr;
if (!element ||
!FindPasswordInfoForElement(*element, &username_element,
&password_element, &password_info)) {
return false;
}
if (was_touch_to_fill_ui_shown_)
return false;
was_touch_to_fill_ui_shown_ = true;
GetPasswordManagerDriver()->ShowTouchToFill();
return true;
}
| 172,407 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int SocketStream::HandleCertificateError(int result) {
DCHECK(IsCertificateError(result));
SSLClientSocket* ssl_socket = static_cast<SSLClientSocket*>(socket_.get());
DCHECK(ssl_socket);
if (!context_.get())
return result;
if (SSLClientSocket::IgnoreCertError(result, LOAD_IGNORE_ALL_CERT_ERRORS)) {
const HttpNetworkSession::Params* session_params =
context_->GetNetworkSessionParams();
if (session_params && session_params->ignore_certificate_errors)
return OK;
}
if (!delegate_)
return result;
SSLInfo ssl_info;
ssl_socket->GetSSLInfo(&ssl_info);
TransportSecurityState::DomainState domain_state;
const bool fatal = context_->transport_security_state() &&
context_->transport_security_state()->GetDomainState(url_.host(),
SSLConfigService::IsSNIAvailable(context_->ssl_config_service()),
&domain_state) &&
domain_state.ShouldSSLErrorsBeFatal();
delegate_->OnSSLCertificateError(this, ssl_info, fatal);
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | int SocketStream::HandleCertificateError(int result) {
DCHECK(IsCertificateError(result));
SSLClientSocket* ssl_socket = static_cast<SSLClientSocket*>(socket_.get());
DCHECK(ssl_socket);
if (!context_)
return result;
if (SSLClientSocket::IgnoreCertError(result, LOAD_IGNORE_ALL_CERT_ERRORS)) {
const HttpNetworkSession::Params* session_params =
context_->GetNetworkSessionParams();
if (session_params && session_params->ignore_certificate_errors)
return OK;
}
if (!delegate_)
return result;
SSLInfo ssl_info;
ssl_socket->GetSSLInfo(&ssl_info);
TransportSecurityState::DomainState domain_state;
const bool fatal = context_->transport_security_state() &&
context_->transport_security_state()->GetDomainState(url_.host(),
SSLConfigService::IsSNIAvailable(context_->ssl_config_service()),
&domain_state) &&
domain_state.ShouldSSLErrorsBeFatal();
delegate_->OnSSLCertificateError(this, ssl_info, fatal);
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
| 171,255 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void ChangeInputMethod(const std::string& input_method_id) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_ = input_method_id;
if (ibus_daemon_process_handle_ == base::kNullProcessHandle &&
chromeos::input_method::IsKeyboardLayout(input_method_id)) {
ChangeCurrentInputMethodFromId(input_method_id);
} else {
StartInputMethodDaemon();
if (!ChangeInputMethodViaIBus(input_method_id)) {
VLOG(1) << "Failed to change the input method to " << input_method_id
<< " (deferring)";
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual void ChangeInputMethod(const std::string& input_method_id) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_ = input_method_id;
if (ibus_daemon_process_handle_ == base::kNullProcessHandle &&
input_method::IsKeyboardLayout(input_method_id)) {
ChangeCurrentInputMethodFromId(input_method_id);
} else {
StartInputMethodDaemon();
if (!ChangeInputMethodViaIBus(input_method_id)) {
VLOG(1) << "Failed to change the input method to " << input_method_id
<< " (deferring)";
}
}
}
| 170,480 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: sf_open_fd (int fd, int mode, SF_INFO *sfinfo, int close_desc)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
if ((SF_CONTAINER (sfinfo->format)) == SF_FORMAT_SD2)
{ sf_errno = SFE_SD2_FD_DISALLOWED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
if ((psf = calloc (1, sizeof (SF_PRIVATE))) == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
psf_init_files (psf) ;
copy_filename (psf, "") ;
psf->file.mode = mode ;
psf_set_file (psf, fd) ;
psf->is_pipe = psf_is_pipe (psf) ;
psf->fileoffset = psf_ftell (psf) ;
if (! close_desc)
psf->file.do_not_close_descriptor = SF_TRUE ;
return psf_open_file (psf, sfinfo) ;
} /* sf_open_fd */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | sf_open_fd (int fd, int mode, SF_INFO *sfinfo, int close_desc)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
if ((SF_CONTAINER (sfinfo->format)) == SF_FORMAT_SD2)
{ sf_errno = SFE_SD2_FD_DISALLOWED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
if ((psf = psf_allocate ()) == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
psf_init_files (psf) ;
copy_filename (psf, "") ;
psf->file.mode = mode ;
psf_set_file (psf, fd) ;
psf->is_pipe = psf_is_pipe (psf) ;
psf->fileoffset = psf_ftell (psf) ;
if (! close_desc)
psf->file.do_not_close_descriptor = SF_TRUE ;
return psf_open_file (psf, sfinfo) ;
} /* sf_open_fd */
| 170,068 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SoftAVC::drainOneOutputBuffer(int32_t picId, uint8_t* data) {
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = mPicToHeaderMap.valueFor(picId);
outHeader->nTimeStamp = header->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nFlags = header->nFlags;
outHeader->nFilledLen = mWidth * mHeight * 3 / 2;
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset;
const uint8_t *srcY = data;
const uint8_t *srcU = srcY + mWidth * mHeight;
const uint8_t *srcV = srcU + mWidth * mHeight / 4;
size_t srcYStride = mWidth;
size_t srcUStride = mWidth / 2;
size_t srcVStride = srcUStride;
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
mPicToHeaderMap.removeItem(picId);
delete header;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (h263|h264)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I0fd599b3da431425d89236ffdd9df423c11947c0
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void SoftAVC::drainOneOutputBuffer(int32_t picId, uint8_t* data) {
bool SoftAVC::drainOneOutputBuffer(int32_t picId, uint8_t* data) {
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
OMX_U32 frameSize = mWidth * mHeight * 3 / 2;
if (outHeader->nAllocLen - outHeader->nOffset < frameSize) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27833616");
return false;
}
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = mPicToHeaderMap.valueFor(picId);
outHeader->nTimeStamp = header->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nFlags = header->nFlags;
outHeader->nFilledLen = frameSize;
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset;
const uint8_t *srcY = data;
const uint8_t *srcU = srcY + mWidth * mHeight;
const uint8_t *srcV = srcU + mWidth * mHeight / 4;
size_t srcYStride = mWidth;
size_t srcUStride = mWidth / 2;
size_t srcVStride = srcUStride;
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
mPicToHeaderMap.removeItem(picId);
delete header;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return true;
}
| 174,177 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jbig2_sd_new(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, int n_symbols)
{
Jbig2SymbolDict *new = NULL;
if (n_symbols < 0) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "Negative number of symbols in symbol dict: %d", n_symbols);
return NULL;
}
new = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2SymbolDict, 1);
if (new != NULL) {
new->glyphs = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2Image *, n_symbols);
new->n_symbols = n_symbols;
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "unable to allocate new empty symbol dict");
return NULL;
}
if (new->glyphs != NULL) {
memset(new->glyphs, 0, n_symbols * sizeof(Jbig2Image *));
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "unable to allocate glyphs for new empty symbol dict");
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, new);
return NULL;
}
return new;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | jbig2_sd_new(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, int n_symbols)
jbig2_sd_new(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, uint32_t n_symbols)
{
Jbig2SymbolDict *new_dict = NULL;
if (n_symbols < 0) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "Negative number of symbols in symbol dict: %d", n_symbols);
return NULL;
}
new_dict = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2SymbolDict, 1);
if (new_dict != NULL) {
new_dict->glyphs = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2Image *, n_symbols);
new_dict->n_symbols = n_symbols;
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "unable to allocate new empty symbol dict");
return NULL;
}
if (new_dict->glyphs != NULL) {
memset(new_dict->glyphs, 0, n_symbols * sizeof(Jbig2Image *));
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "unable to allocate glyphs for new empty symbol dict");
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, new_dict);
return NULL;
}
return new_dict;
}
| 165,502 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int xfrm_dump_policy_done(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk = (struct xfrm_policy_walk *) &cb->args[1];
struct net *net = sock_net(cb->skb->sk);
xfrm_policy_walk_done(walk, net);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int xfrm_dump_policy_done(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk = (struct xfrm_policy_walk *)cb->args;
struct net *net = sock_net(cb->skb->sk);
xfrm_policy_walk_done(walk, net);
return 0;
}
| 167,663 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Block::~Block()
{
delete[] m_frames;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Block::~Block()
| 174,455 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
unsigned int j;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
return -EINVAL;
ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e,
e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name, &e->ipv6, &off);
if (ret != 0)
goto release_matches;
++j;
}
t = compat_ip6t_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_IPV6, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto release_matches;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(AF_INET6, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
out:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
release_matches:
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
module_put(ematch->u.kernel.match->me);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
unsigned int j;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
return -EINVAL;
ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems,
e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name, &e->ipv6, &off);
if (ret != 0)
goto release_matches;
++j;
}
t = compat_ip6t_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_IPV6, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto release_matches;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(AF_INET6, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
out:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
release_matches:
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
module_put(ematch->u.kernel.match->me);
}
return ret;
}
| 167,219 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnError(PipelineStatus status) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK_NE(status, PIPELINE_OK);
if (suppress_destruction_errors_)
return;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (status == PipelineStatus::DEMUXER_ERROR_DETECTED_HLS) {
renderer_factory_selector_->SetUseMediaPlayer(true);
pipeline_controller_.Stop();
SetMemoryReportingState(false);
main_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&WebMediaPlayerImpl::StartPipeline, AsWeakPtr()));
return;
}
#endif
ReportPipelineError(load_type_, status, media_log_.get());
media_log_->AddEvent(media_log_->CreatePipelineErrorEvent(status));
media_metrics_provider_->OnError(status);
if (watch_time_reporter_)
watch_time_reporter_->OnError(status);
if (ready_state_ == WebMediaPlayer::kReadyStateHaveNothing) {
SetNetworkState(WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError);
} else {
SetNetworkState(PipelineErrorToNetworkState(status));
}
pipeline_controller_.Stop();
UpdatePlayState();
}
Commit Message: Fix HasSingleSecurityOrigin for HLS
HLS manifests can request segments from a different origin than the
original manifest's origin. We do not inspect HLS manifests within
Chromium, and instead delegate to Android's MediaPlayer. This means we
need to be conservative, and always assume segments might come from a
different origin. HasSingleSecurityOrigin should always return false
when decoding HLS.
Bug: 864283
Change-Id: Ie16849ac6f29ae7eaa9caf342ad0509a226228ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142691
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Thomas Guilbert <tguilbert@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576378}
CWE ID: CWE-346 | void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnError(PipelineStatus status) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK_NE(status, PIPELINE_OK);
if (suppress_destruction_errors_)
return;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (status == PipelineStatus::DEMUXER_ERROR_DETECTED_HLS) {
demuxer_found_hls_ = true;
renderer_factory_selector_->SetUseMediaPlayer(true);
pipeline_controller_.Stop();
SetMemoryReportingState(false);
main_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&WebMediaPlayerImpl::StartPipeline, AsWeakPtr()));
return;
}
#endif
ReportPipelineError(load_type_, status, media_log_.get());
media_log_->AddEvent(media_log_->CreatePipelineErrorEvent(status));
media_metrics_provider_->OnError(status);
if (watch_time_reporter_)
watch_time_reporter_->OnError(status);
if (ready_state_ == WebMediaPlayer::kReadyStateHaveNothing) {
SetNetworkState(WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError);
} else {
SetNetworkState(PipelineErrorToNetworkState(status));
}
pipeline_controller_.Stop();
UpdatePlayState();
}
| 173,179 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static double calcerr(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* Error in the linear composition arithmetic - only relevant when
* composition actually happens (0 < alpha < 1).
*/
if ((pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
return pm->maxcalc16;
else if (pm->assume_16_bit_calculations)
return pm->maxcalcG;
else
return pm->maxcalc8;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | static double calcerr(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
static double calcerr(const png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* Error in the linear composition arithmetic - only relevant when
* composition actually happens (0 < alpha < 1).
*/
if ((pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
return pm->maxcalc16;
else if (pm->assume_16_bit_calculations)
return pm->maxcalcG;
else
return pm->maxcalc8;
}
| 173,604 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool DebuggerFunction::InitTabContents() {
Value* debuggee;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->Get(0, &debuggee));
DictionaryValue* dict = static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(debuggee);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(dict->GetInteger(keys::kTabIdKey, &tab_id_));
contents_ = NULL;
TabContentsWrapper* wrapper = NULL;
bool result = ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabById(
tab_id_, profile(), include_incognito(), NULL, NULL, &wrapper, NULL);
if (!result || !wrapper) {
error_ = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kNoTabError,
base::IntToString(tab_id_));
return false;
}
contents_ = wrapper->web_contents();
if (ChromeWebUIControllerFactory::GetInstance()->HasWebUIScheme(
contents_->GetURL())) {
error_ = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kAttachToWebUIError,
contents_->GetURL().scheme());
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool DebuggerFunction::InitTabContents() {
Value* debuggee;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->Get(0, &debuggee));
DictionaryValue* dict = static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(debuggee);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(dict->GetInteger(keys::kTabIdKey, &tab_id_));
contents_ = NULL;
TabContentsWrapper* wrapper = NULL;
bool result = ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabById(
tab_id_, profile(), include_incognito(), NULL, NULL, &wrapper, NULL);
if (!result || !wrapper) {
error_ = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kNoTabError,
base::IntToString(tab_id_));
return false;
}
contents_ = wrapper->web_contents();
if (content::GetContentClient()->HasWebUIScheme(
contents_->GetURL())) {
error_ = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kAttachToWebUIError,
contents_->GetURL().scheme());
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 171,006 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ssize_t socket_bytes_available(const socket_t *socket) {
assert(socket != NULL);
int size = 0;
if (ioctl(socket->fd, FIONREAD, &size) == -1)
return -1;
return size;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | ssize_t socket_bytes_available(const socket_t *socket) {
assert(socket != NULL);
int size = 0;
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(ioctl(socket->fd, FIONREAD, &size)) == -1)
return -1;
return size;
}
| 173,485 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RequestSender::OnNetworkFetcherComplete(
const GURL& original_url,
std::unique_ptr<std::string> response_body,
int net_error,
const std::string& header_etag,
int64_t xheader_retry_after_sec) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
VLOG(1) << "request completed from url: " << original_url.spec();
int error = -1;
if (response_body && response_code_ == 200) {
DCHECK_EQ(0, net_error);
error = 0;
} else if (response_code_ != -1) {
error = response_code_;
} else {
error = net_error;
}
int retry_after_sec = -1;
if (original_url.SchemeIsCryptographic() && error > 0)
retry_after_sec = base::saturated_cast<int>(xheader_retry_after_sec);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&RequestSender::SendInternalComplete,
base::Unretained(this), error,
response_body ? *response_body : std::string(),
header_etag, retry_after_sec));
}
Commit Message: Fix error handling in the request sender and url fetcher downloader.
That means handling the network errors by primarily looking at net_error.
Bug: 1028369
Change-Id: I8181bced25f8b56144ea336a03883d0dceea5108
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1935428
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sorin Jianu <sorin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#719199}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void RequestSender::OnNetworkFetcherComplete(
const GURL& original_url,
std::unique_ptr<std::string> response_body,
int net_error,
const std::string& header_etag,
int64_t xheader_retry_after_sec) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
VLOG(1) << "request completed from url: " << original_url.spec();
int error = -1;
if (!net_error && response_code_ == 200)
error = 0;
else if (response_code_ != -1)
error = response_code_;
else
error = net_error;
int retry_after_sec = -1;
if (original_url.SchemeIsCryptographic() && error > 0)
retry_after_sec = base::saturated_cast<int>(xheader_retry_after_sec);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&RequestSender::SendInternalComplete,
base::Unretained(this), error,
response_body ? *response_body : std::string(),
header_etag, retry_after_sec));
}
| 172,364 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_terminate (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
{
g_main_loop_quit (loop);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_terminate (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
| 165,123 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pch_write_line (lin line, FILE *file)
{
bool after_newline = p_line[line][p_len[line] - 1] == '\n';
if (! fwrite (p_line[line], sizeof (*p_line[line]), p_len[line], file))
write_fatal ();
return after_newline;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | pch_write_line (lin line, FILE *file)
{
bool after_newline = (p_len[line] > 0) && (p_line[line][p_len[line] - 1] == '\n');
if (! fwrite (p_line[line], sizeof (*p_line[line]), p_len[line], file))
write_fatal ();
return after_newline;
}
| 165,473 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mcs_parse_domain_params(STREAM s)
{
int length;
ber_parse_header(s, MCS_TAG_DOMAIN_PARAMS, &length);
in_uint8s(s, length);
return s_check(s);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | mcs_parse_domain_params(STREAM s)
{
uint32 length;
struct stream packet = *s;
ber_parse_header(s, MCS_TAG_DOMAIN_PARAMS, &length);
if (!s_check_rem(s, length))
{
rdp_protocol_error("mcs_parse_domain_params(), consume domain params from stream would overrun", &packet);
}
in_uint8s(s, length);
return s_check(s);
}
| 169,799 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintViewManagerBase::OnDidPrintPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPrintPage_Params& params) {
if (!OpportunisticallyCreatePrintJob(params.document_cookie))
return;
PrintedDocument* document = print_job_->document();
if (!document || params.document_cookie != document->cookie()) {
return;
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
const bool metafile_must_be_valid = true;
#else
const bool metafile_must_be_valid = expecting_first_page_;
expecting_first_page_ = false;
#endif
std::unique_ptr<base::SharedMemory> shared_buf;
if (metafile_must_be_valid) {
if (!base::SharedMemory::IsHandleValid(params.metafile_data_handle)) {
NOTREACHED() << "invalid memory handle";
web_contents()->Stop();
return;
}
shared_buf =
base::MakeUnique<base::SharedMemory>(params.metafile_data_handle, true);
if (!shared_buf->Map(params.data_size)) {
NOTREACHED() << "couldn't map";
web_contents()->Stop();
return;
}
} else {
if (base::SharedMemory::IsHandleValid(params.metafile_data_handle)) {
NOTREACHED() << "unexpected valid memory handle";
web_contents()->Stop();
base::SharedMemory::CloseHandle(params.metafile_data_handle);
return;
}
}
std::unique_ptr<PdfMetafileSkia> metafile(
new PdfMetafileSkia(SkiaDocumentType::PDF));
if (metafile_must_be_valid) {
if (!metafile->InitFromData(shared_buf->memory(), params.data_size)) {
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid metafile header";
web_contents()->Stop();
return;
}
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
print_job_->AppendPrintedPage(params.page_number);
if (metafile_must_be_valid) {
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> bytes = new base::RefCountedBytes(
reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(shared_buf->memory()),
params.data_size);
document->DebugDumpData(bytes.get(), FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".pdf"));
const auto& settings = document->settings();
if (settings.printer_is_textonly()) {
print_job_->StartPdfToTextConversion(bytes, params.page_size);
} else if ((settings.printer_is_ps2() || settings.printer_is_ps3()) &&
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kDisablePostScriptPrinting)) {
print_job_->StartPdfToPostScriptConversion(bytes, params.content_area,
params.physical_offsets,
settings.printer_is_ps2());
} else {
bool print_text_with_gdi = settings.print_text_with_gdi() &&
!settings.printer_is_xps() &&
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kGdiTextPrinting);
print_job_->StartPdfToEmfConversion(
bytes, params.page_size, params.content_area, print_text_with_gdi);
}
}
#else
document->SetPage(params.page_number,
std::move(metafile),
#if defined(OS_WIN)
0.0f /* dummy shrink_factor */,
#endif
params.page_size,
params.content_area);
ShouldQuitFromInnerMessageLoop();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void PrintViewManagerBase::OnDidPrintPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPrintPage_Params& params) {
// Ready to composite. Starting a print job.
if (!OpportunisticallyCreatePrintJob(params.document_cookie))
return;
PrintedDocument* document = print_job_->document();
if (!document || params.document_cookie != document->cookie()) {
return;
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
const bool metafile_must_be_valid = true;
#else
const bool metafile_must_be_valid = expecting_first_page_;
expecting_first_page_ = false;
#endif
std::unique_ptr<base::SharedMemory> shared_buf;
if (metafile_must_be_valid) {
if (!base::SharedMemory::IsHandleValid(params.metafile_data_handle)) {
NOTREACHED() << "invalid memory handle";
web_contents()->Stop();
return;
}
auto* client = PrintCompositeClient::FromWebContents(web_contents());
if (IsOopifEnabled() && !client->for_preview() &&
!document->settings().is_modifiable()) {
client->DoComposite(
params.metafile_data_handle, params.data_size,
base::BindOnce(&PrintViewManagerBase::OnComposePdfDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), params));
return;
}
shared_buf =
std::make_unique<base::SharedMemory>(params.metafile_data_handle, true);
if (!shared_buf->Map(params.data_size)) {
NOTREACHED() << "couldn't map";
web_contents()->Stop();
return;
}
} else {
if (base::SharedMemory::IsHandleValid(params.metafile_data_handle)) {
NOTREACHED() << "unexpected valid memory handle";
web_contents()->Stop();
base::SharedMemory::CloseHandle(params.metafile_data_handle);
return;
}
}
UpdateForPrintedPage(params, metafile_must_be_valid, std::move(shared_buf));
}
void PrintViewManagerBase::UpdateForPrintedPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPrintPage_Params& params,
bool has_valid_page_data,
std::unique_ptr<base::SharedMemory> shared_buf) {
PrintedDocument* document = print_job_->document();
if (!document)
return;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
print_job_->AppendPrintedPage(params.page_number);
if (has_valid_page_data) {
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> bytes(new base::RefCountedBytes(
reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(shared_buf->memory()),
shared_buf->mapped_size()));
document->DebugDumpData(bytes.get(), FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".pdf"));
const auto& settings = document->settings();
if (settings.printer_is_textonly()) {
print_job_->StartPdfToTextConversion(bytes, params.page_size);
} else if ((settings.printer_is_ps2() || settings.printer_is_ps3()) &&
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kDisablePostScriptPrinting)) {
print_job_->StartPdfToPostScriptConversion(bytes, params.content_area,
params.physical_offsets,
settings.printer_is_ps2());
} else {
bool print_text_with_gdi =
settings.print_text_with_gdi() && !settings.printer_is_xps() &&
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kGdiTextPrinting);
print_job_->StartPdfToEmfConversion(
bytes, params.page_size, params.content_area, print_text_with_gdi);
}
}
#else
std::unique_ptr<PdfMetafileSkia> metafile =
std::make_unique<PdfMetafileSkia>(SkiaDocumentType::PDF);
if (has_valid_page_data) {
if (!metafile->InitFromData(shared_buf->memory(),
shared_buf->mapped_size())) {
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid metafile header";
web_contents()->Stop();
return;
}
}
document->SetPage(params.page_number, std::move(metafile), params.page_size,
params.content_area);
ShouldQuitFromInnerMessageLoop();
#endif
}
| 171,892 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool GesturePoint::IsInsideManhattanSquare(const TouchEvent& event) const {
int manhattanDistance = abs(event.x() - first_touch_position_.x()) +
abs(event.y() - first_touch_position_.y());
return manhattanDistance < kMaximumTouchMoveInPixelsForClick;
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool GesturePoint::IsInsideManhattanSquare(const TouchEvent& event) const {
int manhattanDistance = abs(event.x() - first_touch_position_.x()) +
abs(event.y() - first_touch_position_.y());
return manhattanDistance <
GestureConfiguration::max_touch_move_in_pixels_for_click();
}
| 171,044 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_increment_val (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
{
obj->val++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_increment_val (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
| 165,108 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void spl_filesystem_object_free_storage(void *object TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)object;
if (intern->oth_handler && intern->oth_handler->dtor) {
intern->oth_handler->dtor(intern TSRMLS_CC);
}
zend_object_std_dtor(&intern->std TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->_path) {
efree(intern->_path);
}
if (intern->file_name) {
efree(intern->file_name);
}
switch(intern->type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
if (intern->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_close(intern->u.dir.dirp);
intern->u.dir.dirp = NULL;
}
if (intern->u.dir.sub_path) {
efree(intern->u.dir.sub_path);
}
break;
case SPL_FS_FILE:
if (intern->u.file.stream) {
if (intern->u.file.zcontext) {
/* zend_list_delref(Z_RESVAL_P(intern->zcontext));*/
}
if (!intern->u.file.stream->is_persistent) {
php_stream_free(intern->u.file.stream, PHP_STREAM_FREE_CLOSE);
} else {
php_stream_free(intern->u.file.stream, PHP_STREAM_FREE_CLOSE_PERSISTENT);
}
if (intern->u.file.open_mode) {
efree(intern->u.file.open_mode);
}
if (intern->orig_path) {
efree(intern->orig_path);
}
}
spl_filesystem_file_free_line(intern TSRMLS_CC);
break;
}
{
zend_object_iterator *iterator;
iterator = (zend_object_iterator*)
spl_filesystem_object_to_iterator(intern);
if (iterator->data != NULL) {
iterator->data = NULL;
iterator->funcs->dtor(iterator TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
efree(object);
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static void spl_filesystem_object_free_storage(void *object TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)object;
if (intern->oth_handler && intern->oth_handler->dtor) {
intern->oth_handler->dtor(intern TSRMLS_CC);
}
zend_object_std_dtor(&intern->std TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->_path) {
efree(intern->_path);
}
if (intern->file_name) {
efree(intern->file_name);
}
switch(intern->type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
if (intern->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_close(intern->u.dir.dirp);
intern->u.dir.dirp = NULL;
}
if (intern->u.dir.sub_path) {
efree(intern->u.dir.sub_path);
}
break;
case SPL_FS_FILE:
if (intern->u.file.stream) {
if (intern->u.file.zcontext) {
/* zend_list_delref(Z_RESVAL_P(intern->zcontext));*/
}
if (!intern->u.file.stream->is_persistent) {
php_stream_free(intern->u.file.stream, PHP_STREAM_FREE_CLOSE);
} else {
php_stream_free(intern->u.file.stream, PHP_STREAM_FREE_CLOSE_PERSISTENT);
}
if (intern->u.file.open_mode) {
efree(intern->u.file.open_mode);
}
if (intern->orig_path) {
efree(intern->orig_path);
}
}
spl_filesystem_file_free_line(intern TSRMLS_CC);
break;
}
{
zend_object_iterator *iterator;
iterator = (zend_object_iterator*)
spl_filesystem_object_to_iterator(intern);
if (iterator->data != NULL) {
iterator->data = NULL;
iterator->funcs->dtor(iterator TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
efree(object);
} /* }}} */
| 167,083 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Encoder::Flush() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_encode(&encoder_, NULL, 0, 0, 0,
deadline_);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Encoder::Flush() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_encode(&encoder_, NULL, 0, 0, 0,
deadline_);
if (!encoder_.priv)
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_ERROR, res) << EncoderError();
else
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
| 174,537 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: EntrySync* EntrySync::moveTo(DirectoryEntrySync* parent, const String& name, ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
RefPtr<EntrySyncCallbackHelper> helper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->move(this, parent, name, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | EntrySync* EntrySync::moveTo(DirectoryEntrySync* parent, const String& name, ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
EntrySyncCallbackHelper* helper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->move(this, parent, name, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
| 171,422 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebResourceService::StartFetch() {
ScheduleFetch(cache_update_delay_ms_);
prefs_->SetString(last_update_time_pref_name_,
base::DoubleToString(base::Time::Now().ToDoubleT()));
if (in_fetch_)
return;
in_fetch_ = true;
GURL web_resource_server =
application_locale_.empty()
? web_resource_server_
: google_util::AppendGoogleLocaleParam(web_resource_server_,
application_locale_);
DVLOG(1) << "WebResourceService StartFetch " << web_resource_server;
url_fetcher_ =
net::URLFetcher::Create(web_resource_server, net::URLFetcher::GET, this);
url_fetcher_->SetLoadFlags(net::LOAD_DISABLE_CACHE |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_COOKIES |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SAVE_COOKIES);
url_fetcher_->SetRequestContext(request_context_.get());
url_fetcher_->Start();
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | void WebResourceService::StartFetch() {
ScheduleFetch(cache_update_delay_ms_);
prefs_->SetString(last_update_time_pref_name_,
base::DoubleToString(base::Time::Now().ToDoubleT()));
if (in_fetch_)
return;
in_fetch_ = true;
GURL web_resource_server =
application_locale_.empty()
? web_resource_server_
: google_util::AppendGoogleLocaleParam(web_resource_server_,
application_locale_);
DVLOG(1) << "WebResourceService StartFetch " << web_resource_server;
url_fetcher_ =
net::URLFetcher::Create(web_resource_server, net::URLFetcher::GET, this);
data_use_measurement::DataUseUserData::AttachToFetcher(
url_fetcher_.get(),
data_use_measurement::DataUseUserData::WEB_RESOURCE_SERVICE);
url_fetcher_->SetLoadFlags(net::LOAD_DISABLE_CACHE |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_COOKIES |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SAVE_COOKIES);
url_fetcher_->SetRequestContext(request_context_.get());
url_fetcher_->Start();
}
| 172,020 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NavigateOnUIThread(
const GURL& url,
const std::vector<GURL> url_chain,
const Referrer& referrer,
bool has_user_gesture,
const ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& wc_getter) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
WebContents* web_contents = wc_getter.Run();
if (web_contents) {
NavigationController::LoadURLParams params(url);
params.has_user_gesture = has_user_gesture;
params.referrer = referrer;
params.redirect_chain = url_chain;
web_contents->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(params);
}
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void NavigateOnUIThread(
void NavigateOnUIThread(const GURL& url,
const std::vector<GURL> url_chain,
const Referrer& referrer,
bool has_user_gesture,
const ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& wc_getter,
int frame_tree_node_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
WebContents* web_contents = wc_getter.Run();
if (web_contents) {
NavigationController::LoadURLParams params(url);
params.has_user_gesture = has_user_gesture;
params.referrer = referrer;
params.redirect_chain = url_chain;
params.frame_tree_node_id = frame_tree_node_id;
web_contents->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(params);
}
}
| 173,024 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long VideoTrack::Seek(
long long time_ns,
const BlockEntry*& pResult) const
{
const long status = GetFirst(pResult);
if (status < 0) //buffer underflow, etc
return status;
assert(pResult);
if (pResult->EOS())
return 0;
const Cluster* pCluster = pResult->GetCluster();
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() >= 0);
if (time_ns <= pResult->GetBlock()->GetTime(pCluster))
return 0;
Cluster** const clusters = m_pSegment->m_clusters;
assert(clusters);
const long count = m_pSegment->GetCount(); //loaded only, not pre-loaded
assert(count > 0);
Cluster** const i = clusters + pCluster->GetIndex();
assert(i);
assert(*i == pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
Cluster** const j = clusters + count;
Cluster** lo = i;
Cluster** hi = j;
while (lo < hi)
{
Cluster** const mid = lo + (hi - lo) / 2;
assert(mid < hi);
pCluster = *mid;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() >= 0);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() == long(mid - m_pSegment->m_clusters));
const long long t = pCluster->GetTime();
if (t <= time_ns)
lo = mid + 1;
else
hi = mid;
assert(lo <= hi);
}
assert(lo == hi);
assert(lo > i);
assert(lo <= j);
pCluster = *--lo;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
pResult = pCluster->GetEntry(this, time_ns);
if ((pResult != 0) && !pResult->EOS()) //found a keyframe
return 0;
while (lo != i)
{
pCluster = *--lo;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
#if 0
pResult = pCluster->GetMaxKey(this);
#else
pResult = pCluster->GetEntry(this, time_ns);
#endif
if ((pResult != 0) && !pResult->EOS())
return 0;
}
pResult = GetEOS();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long VideoTrack::Seek(
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (rate <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
VideoTrack* const pTrack =
new (std::nothrow) VideoTrack(pSegment, element_start, element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; // generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status) { // error
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pTrack->m_width = width;
pTrack->m_height = height;
pTrack->m_rate = rate;
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; // success
}
bool VideoTrack::VetEntry(const BlockEntry* pBlockEntry) const {
return Track::VetEntry(pBlockEntry) && pBlockEntry->GetBlock()->IsKey();
}
long VideoTrack::Seek(long long time_ns, const BlockEntry*& pResult) const {
const long status = GetFirst(pResult);
if (status < 0) // buffer underflow, etc
return status;
assert(pResult);
if (pResult->EOS())
return 0;
const Cluster* pCluster = pResult->GetCluster();
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() >= 0);
if (time_ns <= pResult->GetBlock()->GetTime(pCluster))
return 0;
Cluster** const clusters = m_pSegment->m_clusters;
assert(clusters);
const long count = m_pSegment->GetCount(); // loaded only, not pre-loaded
assert(count > 0);
Cluster** const i = clusters + pCluster->GetIndex();
assert(i);
assert(*i == pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
Cluster** const j = clusters + count;
Cluster** lo = i;
Cluster** hi = j;
while (lo < hi) {
// INVARIANT:
//[i, lo) <= time_ns
//[lo, hi) ?
//[hi, j) > time_ns
Cluster** const mid = lo + (hi - lo) / 2;
assert(mid < hi);
pCluster = *mid;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() >= 0);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() == long(mid - m_pSegment->m_clusters));
const long long t = pCluster->GetTime();
if (t <= time_ns)
lo = mid + 1;
else
hi = mid;
assert(lo <= hi);
}
assert(lo == hi);
assert(lo > i);
assert(lo <= j);
pCluster = *--lo;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
pResult = pCluster->GetEntry(this, time_ns);
if ((pResult != 0) && !pResult->EOS()) // found a keyframe
return 0;
while (lo != i) {
pCluster = *--lo;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
#if 0
pResult = pCluster->GetMaxKey(this);
#else
pResult = pCluster->GetEntry(this, time_ns);
#endif
if ((pResult != 0) && !pResult->EOS())
return 0;
}
// weird: we're on the first cluster, but no keyframe found
// should never happen but we must return something anyway
pResult = GetEOS();
return 0;
}
long long VideoTrack::GetWidth() const { return m_width; }
long long VideoTrack::GetHeight() const { return m_height; }
double VideoTrack::GetFrameRate() const { return m_rate; }
AudioTrack::AudioTrack(Segment* pSegment, long long element_start,
long long element_size)
: Track(pSegment, element_start, element_size) {}
long AudioTrack::Parse(Segment* pSegment, const Info& info,
long long element_start, long long element_size,
AudioTrack*& pResult) {
if (pResult)
return -1;
if (info.type != Track::kAudio)
return -1;
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
const Settings& s = info.settings;
assert(s.start >= 0);
assert(s.size >= 0);
long long pos = s.start;
assert(pos >= 0);
const long long stop = pos + s.size;
double rate = 8000.0; // MKV default
long long channels = 1;
long long bit_depth = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x35) { // Sample Rate
status = UnserializeFloat(pReader, pos, size, rate);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (rate <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x1F) { // Channel Count
channels = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (channels <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x2264) { // Bit Depth
bit_depth = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (bit_depth <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
AudioTrack* const pTrack =
new (std::nothrow) AudioTrack(pSegment, element_start, element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; // generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status) {
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pTrack->m_rate = rate;
pTrack->m_channels = channels;
pTrack->m_bitDepth = bit_depth;
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; // success
}
| 174,436 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const CuePoint* Cues::GetNext(const CuePoint* pCurr) const
{
if (pCurr == NULL)
return NULL;
assert(pCurr->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
assert(m_cue_points);
assert(m_count >= 1);
#if 0
const size_t count = m_count + m_preload_count;
size_t index = pCurr->m_index;
assert(index < count);
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
assert(pp[index] == pCurr);
++index;
if (index >= count)
return NULL;
CuePoint* const pNext = pp[index];
assert(pNext);
pNext->Load(m_pSegment->m_pReader);
#else
long index = pCurr->m_index;
assert(index < m_count);
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
assert(pp[index] == pCurr);
++index;
if (index >= m_count)
return NULL;
CuePoint* const pNext = pp[index];
assert(pNext);
assert(pNext->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
#endif
return pNext;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const CuePoint* Cues::GetNext(const CuePoint* pCurr) const
assert(pCurr->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
assert(m_cue_points);
assert(m_count >= 1);
#if 0
const size_t count = m_count + m_preload_count;
size_t index = pCurr->m_index;
assert(index < count);
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
assert(pp[index] == pCurr);
++index;
if (index >= count)
return NULL;
CuePoint* const pNext = pp[index];
assert(pNext);
pNext->Load(m_pSegment->m_pReader);
#else
long index = pCurr->m_index;
assert(index < m_count);
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
assert(pp[index] == pCurr);
++index;
if (index >= m_count)
return NULL;
CuePoint* const pNext = pp[index];
assert(pNext);
assert(pNext->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
#endif
return pNext;
}
| 174,346 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int __btrfs_set_acl(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int ret, size = 0;
const char *name;
char *value = NULL;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
ret = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
ret = 0;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EINVAL : 0;
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
value = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
}
ret = __btrfs_setxattr(trans, inode, name, value, size, 0);
out:
kfree(value);
if (!ret)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | static int __btrfs_set_acl(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int ret, size = 0;
const char *name;
char *value = NULL;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
ret = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
ret = 0;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EINVAL : 0;
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
value = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
}
ret = __btrfs_setxattr(trans, inode, name, value, size, 0);
out:
kfree(value);
if (!ret)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return ret;
}
| 166,967 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::WorkerRestarted(
SharedWorkerHost* worker_host) {
DCHECK_EQ(WORKER_TERMINATED, state_);
DCHECK(!worker_host_);
state_ = WORKER_NOT_READY;
worker_host_ = worker_host;
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions())
session->SetRenderer(GetProcess(), nullptr);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::WorkerRestarted(
SharedWorkerHost* worker_host) {
DCHECK_EQ(WORKER_TERMINATED, state_);
DCHECK(!worker_host_);
state_ = WORKER_NOT_READY;
worker_host_ = worker_host;
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions())
session->SetRenderer(worker_host_->process_id(), nullptr);
}
| 172,791 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AudioRendererAlgorithm::OutputFasterPlayback(uint8* dest) {
DCHECK_LT(index_into_window_, window_size_);
DCHECK_GT(playback_rate_, 1.0);
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
int input_step = window_size_;
int output_step = ceil(window_size_ / playback_rate_);
AlignToFrameBoundary(&output_step);
DCHECK_GT(input_step, output_step);
int bytes_to_crossfade = bytes_in_crossfade_;
if (muted_ || bytes_to_crossfade > output_step)
bytes_to_crossfade = 0;
int outtro_crossfade_begin = output_step - bytes_to_crossfade;
int outtro_crossfade_end = output_step;
int intro_crossfade_begin = input_step - bytes_to_crossfade;
if (index_into_window_ < outtro_crossfade_begin) {
CopyWithAdvance(dest);
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
return true;
}
while (index_into_window_ < outtro_crossfade_end) {
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
DCHECK_GT(bytes_to_crossfade, 0);
uint8* place_to_copy = crossfade_buffer_.get() +
(index_into_window_ - outtro_crossfade_begin);
CopyWithAdvance(place_to_copy);
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
}
while (index_into_window_ < intro_crossfade_begin) {
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
DropFrame();
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
}
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
if (bytes_to_crossfade == 0) {
DCHECK_EQ(index_into_window_, window_size_);
return false;
}
DCHECK_LT(index_into_window_, window_size_);
int offset_into_buffer = index_into_window_ - intro_crossfade_begin;
memcpy(dest, crossfade_buffer_.get() + offset_into_buffer,
bytes_per_frame_);
scoped_array<uint8> intro_frame_ptr(new uint8[bytes_per_frame_]);
audio_buffer_.Read(intro_frame_ptr.get(), bytes_per_frame_);
OutputCrossfadedFrame(dest, intro_frame_ptr.get());
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool AudioRendererAlgorithm::OutputFasterPlayback(uint8* dest) {
bool AudioRendererAlgorithm::OutputFasterPlayback(uint8* dest,
int input_step,
int output_step) {
// Ensure we don't run into OOB read/write situation.
CHECK_GT(input_step, output_step);
DCHECK_LT(index_into_window_, window_size_);
DCHECK_GT(playback_rate_, 1.0);
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
int bytes_to_crossfade = bytes_in_crossfade_;
if (muted_ || bytes_to_crossfade > output_step)
bytes_to_crossfade = 0;
int outtro_crossfade_begin = output_step - bytes_to_crossfade;
int outtro_crossfade_end = output_step;
int intro_crossfade_begin = input_step - bytes_to_crossfade;
if (index_into_window_ < outtro_crossfade_begin) {
CopyWithAdvance(dest);
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
return true;
}
while (index_into_window_ < outtro_crossfade_end) {
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
DCHECK_GT(bytes_to_crossfade, 0);
uint8* place_to_copy = crossfade_buffer_.get() +
(index_into_window_ - outtro_crossfade_begin);
CopyWithAdvance(place_to_copy);
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
}
while (index_into_window_ < intro_crossfade_begin) {
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
DropFrame();
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
}
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
if (bytes_to_crossfade == 0) {
DCHECK_EQ(index_into_window_, window_size_);
return false;
}
DCHECK_LT(index_into_window_, window_size_);
int offset_into_buffer = index_into_window_ - intro_crossfade_begin;
memcpy(dest, crossfade_buffer_.get() + offset_into_buffer,
bytes_per_frame_);
scoped_array<uint8> intro_frame_ptr(new uint8[bytes_per_frame_]);
audio_buffer_.Read(intro_frame_ptr.get(), bytes_per_frame_);
OutputCrossfadedFrame(dest, intro_frame_ptr.get());
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
return true;
}
| 171,528 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xfs_acl_from_disk(struct xfs_acl *aclp)
{
struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e;
struct posix_acl *acl;
struct xfs_acl_entry *ace;
int count, i;
count = be32_to_cpu(aclp->acl_cnt);
if (count > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES)
return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
acl = posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
acl_e = &acl->a_entries[i];
ace = &aclp->acl_entry[i];
/*
* The tag is 32 bits on disk and 16 bits in core.
*
* Because every access to it goes through the core
* format first this is not a problem.
*/
acl_e->e_tag = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_tag);
acl_e->e_perm = be16_to_cpu(ace->ae_perm);
switch (acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
case ACL_GROUP:
acl_e->e_id = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_id);
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
acl_e->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
return acl;
fail:
posix_acl_release(acl);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix acl count validation in xfs_acl_from_disk()
Commit fa8b18ed didn't prevent the integer overflow and possible
memory corruption. "count" can go negative and bypass the check.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | xfs_acl_from_disk(struct xfs_acl *aclp)
{
struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e;
struct posix_acl *acl;
struct xfs_acl_entry *ace;
unsigned int count, i;
count = be32_to_cpu(aclp->acl_cnt);
if (count > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES)
return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
acl = posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
acl_e = &acl->a_entries[i];
ace = &aclp->acl_entry[i];
/*
* The tag is 32 bits on disk and 16 bits in core.
*
* Because every access to it goes through the core
* format first this is not a problem.
*/
acl_e->e_tag = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_tag);
acl_e->e_perm = be16_to_cpu(ace->ae_perm);
switch (acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
case ACL_GROUP:
acl_e->e_id = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_id);
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
acl_e->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
return acl;
fail:
posix_acl_release(acl);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
| 169,888 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long Cluster::GetLastTime() const
{
const BlockEntry* pEntry;
const long status = GetLast(pEntry);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (pEntry == NULL) //empty cluster
return GetTime();
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
return pBlock->GetTime(this);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long Cluster::GetLastTime() const
| 174,341 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ff_mms_asf_header_parser(MMSContext *mms)
{
uint8_t *p = mms->asf_header;
uint8_t *end;
int flags, stream_id;
mms->stream_num = 0;
if (mms->asf_header_size < sizeof(ff_asf_guid) * 2 + 22 ||
memcmp(p, ff_asf_header, sizeof(ff_asf_guid))) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Corrupt stream (invalid ASF header, size=%d)\n",
mms->asf_header_size);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
end = mms->asf_header + mms->asf_header_size;
p += sizeof(ff_asf_guid) + 14;
while(end - p >= sizeof(ff_asf_guid) + 8) {
uint64_t chunksize;
if (!memcmp(p, ff_asf_data_header, sizeof(ff_asf_guid))) {
chunksize = 50; // see Reference [2] section 5.1
} else {
chunksize = AV_RL64(p + sizeof(ff_asf_guid));
}
if (!chunksize || chunksize > end - p) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Corrupt stream (header chunksize %"PRId64" is invalid)\n",
chunksize);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (!memcmp(p, ff_asf_file_header, sizeof(ff_asf_guid))) {
/* read packet size */
if (end - p > sizeof(ff_asf_guid) * 2 + 68) {
mms->asf_packet_len = AV_RL32(p + sizeof(ff_asf_guid) * 2 + 64);
if (mms->asf_packet_len <= 0 || mms->asf_packet_len > sizeof(mms->in_buffer)) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Corrupt stream (too large pkt_len %d)\n",
mms->asf_packet_len);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
} else if (!memcmp(p, ff_asf_stream_header, sizeof(ff_asf_guid))) {
flags = AV_RL16(p + sizeof(ff_asf_guid)*3 + 24);
stream_id = flags & 0x7F;
if (mms->stream_num < MMS_MAX_STREAMS &&
46 + mms->stream_num * 6 < sizeof(mms->out_buffer)) {
mms->streams = av_fast_realloc(mms->streams,
&mms->nb_streams_allocated,
(mms->stream_num + 1) * sizeof(MMSStream));
if (!mms->streams)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
mms->streams[mms->stream_num].id = stream_id;
mms->stream_num++;
} else {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Corrupt stream (too many A/V streams)\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
} else if (!memcmp(p, ff_asf_ext_stream_header, sizeof(ff_asf_guid))) {
if (end - p >= 88) {
int stream_count = AV_RL16(p + 84), ext_len_count = AV_RL16(p + 86);
uint64_t skip_bytes = 88;
while (stream_count--) {
if (end - p < skip_bytes + 4) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Corrupt stream (next stream name length is not in the buffer)\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
skip_bytes += 4 + AV_RL16(p + skip_bytes + 2);
}
while (ext_len_count--) {
if (end - p < skip_bytes + 22) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Corrupt stream (next extension system info length is not in the buffer)\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
skip_bytes += 22 + AV_RL32(p + skip_bytes + 18);
}
if (end - p < skip_bytes) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Corrupt stream (the last extension system info length is invalid)\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (chunksize - skip_bytes > 24)
chunksize = skip_bytes;
}
} else if (!memcmp(p, ff_asf_head1_guid, sizeof(ff_asf_guid))) {
chunksize = 46; // see references [2] section 3.4. This should be set 46.
}
p += chunksize;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mms: Add missing chunksize check
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: mms-crash-01b6c5d85f9d9f40f4e879896103e9f5b222816a
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
1st hunk by Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Tested-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int ff_mms_asf_header_parser(MMSContext *mms)
{
uint8_t *p = mms->asf_header;
uint8_t *end;
int flags, stream_id;
mms->stream_num = 0;
if (mms->asf_header_size < sizeof(ff_asf_guid) * 2 + 22 ||
memcmp(p, ff_asf_header, sizeof(ff_asf_guid))) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Corrupt stream (invalid ASF header, size=%d)\n",
mms->asf_header_size);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
end = mms->asf_header + mms->asf_header_size;
p += sizeof(ff_asf_guid) + 14;
while(end - p >= sizeof(ff_asf_guid) + 8) {
uint64_t chunksize;
if (!memcmp(p, ff_asf_data_header, sizeof(ff_asf_guid))) {
chunksize = 50; // see Reference [2] section 5.1
} else {
chunksize = AV_RL64(p + sizeof(ff_asf_guid));
}
if (!chunksize || chunksize > end - p) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Corrupt stream (header chunksize %"PRId64" is invalid)\n",
chunksize);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (!memcmp(p, ff_asf_file_header, sizeof(ff_asf_guid))) {
/* read packet size */
if (end - p > sizeof(ff_asf_guid) * 2 + 68) {
mms->asf_packet_len = AV_RL32(p + sizeof(ff_asf_guid) * 2 + 64);
if (mms->asf_packet_len <= 0 || mms->asf_packet_len > sizeof(mms->in_buffer)) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Corrupt stream (too large pkt_len %d)\n",
mms->asf_packet_len);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
} else if (!memcmp(p, ff_asf_stream_header, sizeof(ff_asf_guid))) {
if (end - p >= (sizeof(ff_asf_guid) * 3 + 26)) {
flags = AV_RL16(p + sizeof(ff_asf_guid)*3 + 24);
stream_id = flags & 0x7F;
//The second condition is for checking CS_PKT_STREAM_ID_REQUEST packet size,
//we can calculate the packet size by stream_num.
//Please see function send_stream_selection_request().
if (mms->stream_num < MMS_MAX_STREAMS &&
46 + mms->stream_num * 6 < sizeof(mms->out_buffer)) {
mms->streams = av_fast_realloc(mms->streams,
&mms->nb_streams_allocated,
(mms->stream_num + 1) * sizeof(MMSStream));
if (!mms->streams)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
mms->streams[mms->stream_num].id = stream_id;
mms->stream_num++;
} else {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Corrupt stream (too many A/V streams)\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
} else if (!memcmp(p, ff_asf_ext_stream_header, sizeof(ff_asf_guid))) {
if (end - p >= 88) {
int stream_count = AV_RL16(p + 84), ext_len_count = AV_RL16(p + 86);
uint64_t skip_bytes = 88;
while (stream_count--) {
if (end - p < skip_bytes + 4) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Corrupt stream (next stream name length is not in the buffer)\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
skip_bytes += 4 + AV_RL16(p + skip_bytes + 2);
}
while (ext_len_count--) {
if (end - p < skip_bytes + 22) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Corrupt stream (next extension system info length is not in the buffer)\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
skip_bytes += 22 + AV_RL32(p + skip_bytes + 18);
}
if (end - p < skip_bytes) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Corrupt stream (the last extension system info length is invalid)\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (chunksize - skip_bytes > 24)
chunksize = skip_bytes;
}
} else if (!memcmp(p, ff_asf_head1_guid, sizeof(ff_asf_guid))) {
chunksize = 46; // see references [2] section 3.4. This should be set 46.
if (chunksize > end - p) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Corrupt stream (header chunksize %"PRId64" is invalid)\n",
chunksize);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
p += chunksize;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,927 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static zend_object_value spl_filesystem_object_clone(zval *zobject TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_value new_obj_val;
zend_object *old_object;
zend_object *new_object;
zend_object_handle handle = Z_OBJ_HANDLE_P(zobject);
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
spl_filesystem_object *source;
int index, skip_dots;
old_object = zend_objects_get_address(zobject TSRMLS_CC);
source = (spl_filesystem_object*)old_object;
new_obj_val = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(old_object->ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
new_object = &intern->std;
intern->flags = source->flags;
switch (source->type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
intern->_path_len = source->_path_len;
intern->_path = estrndup(source->_path, source->_path_len);
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->file_name = estrndup(source->file_name, intern->file_name_len);
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
spl_filesystem_dir_open(intern, source->_path TSRMLS_CC);
/* read until we hit the position in which we were before */
skip_dots = SPL_HAS_FLAG(source->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS);
for(index = 0; index < source->u.dir.index; ++index) {
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(intern TSRMLS_CC);
} while (skip_dots && spl_filesystem_is_dot(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name));
}
intern->u.dir.index = index;
break;
case SPL_FS_FILE:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_ERROR, "An object of class %s cannot be cloned", old_object->ce->name);
break;
}
intern->file_class = source->file_class;
intern->info_class = source->info_class;
intern->oth = source->oth;
intern->oth_handler = source->oth_handler;
zend_objects_clone_members(new_object, new_obj_val, old_object, handle TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->oth_handler && intern->oth_handler->clone) {
intern->oth_handler->clone(source, intern TSRMLS_CC);
}
return new_obj_val;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static zend_object_value spl_filesystem_object_clone(zval *zobject TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_value new_obj_val;
zend_object *old_object;
zend_object *new_object;
zend_object_handle handle = Z_OBJ_HANDLE_P(zobject);
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
spl_filesystem_object *source;
int index, skip_dots;
old_object = zend_objects_get_address(zobject TSRMLS_CC);
source = (spl_filesystem_object*)old_object;
new_obj_val = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(old_object->ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
new_object = &intern->std;
intern->flags = source->flags;
switch (source->type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
intern->_path_len = source->_path_len;
intern->_path = estrndup(source->_path, source->_path_len);
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->file_name = estrndup(source->file_name, intern->file_name_len);
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
spl_filesystem_dir_open(intern, source->_path TSRMLS_CC);
/* read until we hit the position in which we were before */
skip_dots = SPL_HAS_FLAG(source->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS);
for(index = 0; index < source->u.dir.index; ++index) {
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(intern TSRMLS_CC);
} while (skip_dots && spl_filesystem_is_dot(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name));
}
intern->u.dir.index = index;
break;
case SPL_FS_FILE:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_ERROR, "An object of class %s cannot be cloned", old_object->ce->name);
break;
}
intern->file_class = source->file_class;
intern->info_class = source->info_class;
intern->oth = source->oth;
intern->oth_handler = source->oth_handler;
zend_objects_clone_members(new_object, new_obj_val, old_object, handle TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->oth_handler && intern->oth_handler->clone) {
intern->oth_handler->clone(source, intern TSRMLS_CC);
}
return new_obj_val;
}
| 167,080 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void altivec_unavailable_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
#if !defined(CONFIG_ALTIVEC)
if (user_mode(regs)) {
/* A user program has executed an altivec instruction,
but this kernel doesn't support altivec. */
_exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->nip);
return;
}
#endif
printk(KERN_EMERG "Unrecoverable VMX/Altivec Unavailable Exception "
"%lx at %lx\n", regs->trap, regs->nip);
die("Unrecoverable VMX/Altivec Unavailable Exception", regs, SIGABRT);
}
Commit Message: [POWERPC] Never panic when taking altivec exceptions from userspace
At the moment we rely on a cpu feature bit or a firmware property to
detect altivec. If we dont have either of these and the cpu does in fact
support altivec we can cause a panic from userspace.
It seems safer to always send a signal if we manage to get an 0xf20
exception from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | void altivec_unavailable_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (user_mode(regs)) {
/* A user program has executed an altivec instruction,
but this kernel doesn't support altivec. */
_exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->nip);
return;
}
printk(KERN_EMERG "Unrecoverable VMX/Altivec Unavailable Exception "
"%lx at %lx\n", regs->trap, regs->nip);
die("Unrecoverable VMX/Altivec Unavailable Exception", regs, SIGABRT);
}
| 168,920 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AwMainDelegate::BasicStartupComplete(int* exit_code) {
content::SetContentClient(&content_client_);
content::RegisterMediaUrlInterceptor(new AwMediaUrlInterceptor());
BrowserViewRenderer::CalculateTileMemoryPolicy();
ui::GestureConfiguration::GetInstance()
->set_fling_touchscreen_tap_suppression_enabled(false);
base::CommandLine* cl = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
cl->AppendSwitch(cc::switches::kEnableBeginFrameScheduling);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableOverscrollEdgeEffect);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePullToRefreshEffect);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSharedWorkers);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableFileSystem);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableNotifications);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableWebRtcHWDecoding);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedVideoDecode);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableThreadedTextureMailboxes);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableScreenOrientationLock);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSpeechAPI);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePermissionsAPI);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableAggressiveDOMStorageFlushing);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePresentationAPI);
if (cl->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType).empty()) {
#ifdef __LP64__
const char kNativesFileName[] = "assets/natives_blob_64.bin";
const char kSnapshotFileName[] = "assets/snapshot_blob_64.bin";
#else
const char kNativesFileName[] = "assets/natives_blob_32.bin";
const char kSnapshotFileName[] = "assets/snapshot_blob_32.bin";
#endif // __LP64__
CHECK(base::android::RegisterApkAssetWithGlobalDescriptors(
kV8NativesDataDescriptor, kNativesFileName));
CHECK(base::android::RegisterApkAssetWithGlobalDescriptors(
kV8SnapshotDataDescriptor, kSnapshotFileName));
}
if (cl->HasSwitch(switches::kWebViewSanboxedRenderer)) {
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kInProcessGPU);
cl->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kRendererProcessLimit, "1");
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [Android WebView] Fix a couple of typos
Fix a couple of typos in variable names/commentary introduced in:
https://codereview.chromium.org/1315633003/
No functional effect.
BUG=156062
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1331943002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#348175}
CWE ID: | bool AwMainDelegate::BasicStartupComplete(int* exit_code) {
content::SetContentClient(&content_client_);
content::RegisterMediaUrlInterceptor(new AwMediaUrlInterceptor());
BrowserViewRenderer::CalculateTileMemoryPolicy();
ui::GestureConfiguration::GetInstance()
->set_fling_touchscreen_tap_suppression_enabled(false);
base::CommandLine* cl = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
cl->AppendSwitch(cc::switches::kEnableBeginFrameScheduling);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableOverscrollEdgeEffect);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePullToRefreshEffect);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSharedWorkers);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableFileSystem);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableNotifications);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableWebRtcHWDecoding);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedVideoDecode);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableThreadedTextureMailboxes);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableScreenOrientationLock);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSpeechAPI);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePermissionsAPI);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableAggressiveDOMStorageFlushing);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePresentationAPI);
if (cl->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType).empty()) {
#ifdef __LP64__
const char kNativesFileName[] = "assets/natives_blob_64.bin";
const char kSnapshotFileName[] = "assets/snapshot_blob_64.bin";
#else
const char kNativesFileName[] = "assets/natives_blob_32.bin";
const char kSnapshotFileName[] = "assets/snapshot_blob_32.bin";
#endif // __LP64__
CHECK(base::android::RegisterApkAssetWithGlobalDescriptors(
kV8NativesDataDescriptor, kNativesFileName));
CHECK(base::android::RegisterApkAssetWithGlobalDescriptors(
kV8SnapshotDataDescriptor, kSnapshotFileName));
}
if (cl->HasSwitch(switches::kWebViewSandboxedRenderer)) {
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kInProcessGPU);
cl->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kRendererProcessLimit, "1");
}
return false;
}
| 171,710 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int read_escaped_char(
yyscan_t yyscanner,
uint8_t* escaped_char)
{
char text[4] = {0, 0, 0, 0};
text[0] = '\\';
text[1] = RE_YY_INPUT(yyscanner);
if (text[1] == EOF)
return 0;
if (text[1] == 'x')
{
text[2] = RE_YY_INPUT(yyscanner);
if (text[2] == EOF)
return 0;
text[3] = RE_YY_INPUT(yyscanner);
if (text[3] == EOF)
return 0;
}
*escaped_char = escaped_char_value(text);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int read_escaped_char(
yyscan_t yyscanner,
uint8_t* escaped_char)
{
char text[4] = {0, 0, 0, 0};
text[0] = '\\';
text[1] = RE_YY_INPUT(yyscanner);
if (text[1] == EOF || text[1] == 0)
return 0;
if (text[1] == 'x')
{
text[2] = RE_YY_INPUT(yyscanner);
if (!isxdigit(text[2]))
return 0;
text[3] = RE_YY_INPUT(yyscanner);
if (!isxdigit(text[3]))
return 0;
}
*escaped_char = escaped_char_value(text);
return 1;
}
| 168,486 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int vivid_fb_ioctl(struct fb_info *info, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct vivid_dev *dev = (struct vivid_dev *)info->par;
switch (cmd) {
case FBIOGET_VBLANK: {
struct fb_vblank vblank;
vblank.flags = FB_VBLANK_HAVE_COUNT | FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VCOUNT |
FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VSYNC;
vblank.count = 0;
vblank.vcount = 0;
vblank.hcount = 0;
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &vblank, sizeof(vblank)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
default:
dprintk(dev, 1, "Unknown ioctl %08x\n", cmd);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] media/vivid-osd: fix info leak in ioctl
The vivid_fb_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of
struct fb_vblank after the ->hcount member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speirofr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int vivid_fb_ioctl(struct fb_info *info, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct vivid_dev *dev = (struct vivid_dev *)info->par;
switch (cmd) {
case FBIOGET_VBLANK: {
struct fb_vblank vblank;
memset(&vblank, 0, sizeof(vblank));
vblank.flags = FB_VBLANK_HAVE_COUNT | FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VCOUNT |
FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VSYNC;
vblank.count = 0;
vblank.vcount = 0;
vblank.hcount = 0;
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &vblank, sizeof(vblank)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
default:
dprintk(dev, 1, "Unknown ioctl %08x\n", cmd);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,575 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool tight_can_send_png_rect(VncState *vs, int w, int h)
{
if (vs->tight.type != VNC_ENCODING_TIGHT_PNG) {
return false;
}
if (ds_get_bytes_per_pixel(vs->ds) == 1 ||
vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel == 1) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static bool tight_can_send_png_rect(VncState *vs, int w, int h)
{
if (vs->tight.type != VNC_ENCODING_TIGHT_PNG) {
return false;
}
if (ds_get_bytes_per_pixel(vs->ds) == 1 ||
vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel == 1) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 165,463 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: FileEntrySync* DirectoryEntrySync::getFile(const String& path, const Dictionary& options, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
FileSystemFlags flags(options);
RefPtr<EntrySyncCallbackHelper> helper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->getFile(this, path, flags, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return static_cast<FileEntrySync*>(helper->getResult(exceptionState));
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | FileEntrySync* DirectoryEntrySync::getFile(const String& path, const Dictionary& options, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
FileSystemFlags flags(options);
EntrySyncCallbackHelper* helper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->getFile(this, path, flags, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return static_cast<FileEntrySync*>(helper->getResult(exceptionState));
}
| 171,418 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual ssize_t readAt(off64_t offset, void *buffer, size_t size) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(
IMediaHTTPConnection::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt64(offset);
data.writeInt32(size);
status_t err = remote()->transact(READ_AT, data, &reply);
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("remote readAt failed");
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
int32_t exceptionCode = reply.readExceptionCode();
if (exceptionCode) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
int32_t len = reply.readInt32();
if (len > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, mMemory->pointer(), len);
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: Add some sanity checks
Bug: 19400722
Change-Id: Ib3afdf73fd4647eeea5721c61c8b72dbba0647f6
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual ssize_t readAt(off64_t offset, void *buffer, size_t size) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(
IMediaHTTPConnection::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt64(offset);
data.writeInt32(size);
status_t err = remote()->transact(READ_AT, data, &reply);
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("remote readAt failed");
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
int32_t exceptionCode = reply.readExceptionCode();
if (exceptionCode) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
size_t len = reply.readInt32();
if (len > size) {
ALOGE("requested %zu, got %zu", size, len);
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
if (len > mMemory->size()) {
ALOGE("got %zu, but memory has %zu", len, mMemory->size());
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
memcpy(buffer, mMemory->pointer(), len);
return len;
}
| 173,365 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int itacns_add_data_files(sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card)
{
const size_t array_size =
sizeof(itacns_data_files)/sizeof(itacns_data_files[0]);
unsigned int i;
int rv;
sc_pkcs15_data_t *p15_personaldata = NULL;
sc_pkcs15_data_info_t dinfo;
struct sc_pkcs15_object *objs[32];
struct sc_pkcs15_data_info *cinfo;
for(i=0; i < array_size; i++) {
sc_path_t path;
sc_pkcs15_data_info_t data;
sc_pkcs15_object_t obj;
if (itacns_data_files[i].cie_only &&
p15card->card->type != SC_CARD_TYPE_ITACNS_CIE_V2)
continue;
sc_format_path(itacns_data_files[i].path, &path);
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
strlcpy(data.app_label, itacns_data_files[i].label,
sizeof(data.app_label));
strlcpy(obj.label, itacns_data_files[i].label,
sizeof(obj.label));
data.path = path;
rv = sc_pkcs15emu_add_data_object(p15card, &obj, &data);
SC_TEST_RET(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, rv,
"Could not add data file");
}
/*
* If we got this far, we can read the Personal Data file and glean
* the user's full name. Thus we can use it to put together a
* user-friendlier card name.
*/
memset(&dinfo, 0, sizeof(dinfo));
strcpy(dinfo.app_label, "EF_DatiPersonali");
/* Find EF_DatiPersonali */
rv = sc_pkcs15_get_objects(p15card, SC_PKCS15_TYPE_DATA_OBJECT,
objs, 32);
if(rv < 0) {
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Data enumeration failed");
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
for(i=0; i<32; i++) {
cinfo = (struct sc_pkcs15_data_info *) objs[i]->data;
if(!strcmp("EF_DatiPersonali", objs[i]->label))
break;
}
if(i>=32) {
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Could not find EF_DatiPersonali: "
"keeping generic card name");
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
rv = sc_pkcs15_read_data_object(p15card, cinfo, &p15_personaldata);
if (rv) {
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Could not read EF_DatiPersonali: "
"keeping generic card name");
}
{
char fullname[160];
if(get_name_from_EF_DatiPersonali(p15_personaldata->data,
fullname, sizeof(fullname))) {
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Could not parse EF_DatiPersonali: "
"keeping generic card name");
sc_pkcs15_free_data_object(p15_personaldata);
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
set_string(&p15card->tokeninfo->label, fullname);
}
sc_pkcs15_free_data_object(p15_personaldata);
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int itacns_add_data_files(sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card)
{
const size_t array_size =
sizeof(itacns_data_files)/sizeof(itacns_data_files[0]);
unsigned int i;
int rv;
sc_pkcs15_data_t *p15_personaldata = NULL;
sc_pkcs15_data_info_t dinfo;
struct sc_pkcs15_object *objs[32];
struct sc_pkcs15_data_info *cinfo;
for(i=0; i < array_size; i++) {
sc_path_t path;
sc_pkcs15_data_info_t data;
sc_pkcs15_object_t obj;
if (itacns_data_files[i].cie_only &&
p15card->card->type != SC_CARD_TYPE_ITACNS_CIE_V2)
continue;
sc_format_path(itacns_data_files[i].path, &path);
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
strlcpy(data.app_label, itacns_data_files[i].label,
sizeof(data.app_label));
strlcpy(obj.label, itacns_data_files[i].label,
sizeof(obj.label));
data.path = path;
rv = sc_pkcs15emu_add_data_object(p15card, &obj, &data);
SC_TEST_RET(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, rv,
"Could not add data file");
}
/*
* If we got this far, we can read the Personal Data file and glean
* the user's full name. Thus we can use it to put together a
* user-friendlier card name.
*/
memset(&dinfo, 0, sizeof(dinfo));
strcpy(dinfo.app_label, "EF_DatiPersonali");
/* Find EF_DatiPersonali */
rv = sc_pkcs15_get_objects(p15card, SC_PKCS15_TYPE_DATA_OBJECT,
objs, 32);
if(rv < 0) {
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Data enumeration failed");
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
for(i=0; i<32; i++) {
cinfo = (struct sc_pkcs15_data_info *) objs[i]->data;
if(!strcmp("EF_DatiPersonali", objs[i]->label))
break;
}
if(i>=32) {
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Could not find EF_DatiPersonali: "
"keeping generic card name");
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
rv = sc_pkcs15_read_data_object(p15card, cinfo, &p15_personaldata);
if (rv) {
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Could not read EF_DatiPersonali: "
"keeping generic card name");
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
{
char fullname[160];
if(get_name_from_EF_DatiPersonali(p15_personaldata->data,
fullname, sizeof(fullname))) {
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Could not parse EF_DatiPersonali: "
"keeping generic card name");
sc_pkcs15_free_data_object(p15_personaldata);
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
set_string(&p15card->tokeninfo->label, fullname);
}
sc_pkcs15_free_data_object(p15_personaldata);
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
| 169,066 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int object_common2(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, long elements)
{
zval *retval_ptr = NULL;
zval fname;
if (Z_TYPE_PP(rval) != IS_OBJECT) {
return 0;
}
if (!process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, Z_OBJPROP_PP(rval), elements, 1)) {
/* We've got partially constructed object on our hands here. Wipe it. */
if(Z_TYPE_PP(rval) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_hash_clean(Z_OBJPROP_PP(rval));
}
ZVAL_NULL(*rval);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(rval) != IS_OBJECT) {
return 0;
}
if (Z_OBJCE_PP(rval) != PHP_IC_ENTRY &&
zend_hash_exists(&Z_OBJCE_PP(rval)->function_table, "__wakeup", sizeof("__wakeup"))) {
INIT_PZVAL(&fname);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&fname, "__wakeup", sizeof("__wakeup") - 1, 0);
BG(serialize_lock)++;
call_user_function_ex(CG(function_table), rval, &fname, &retval_ptr, 0, 0, 1, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
BG(serialize_lock)--;
}
if (retval_ptr) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval_ptr);
}
if (EG(exception)) {
return 0;
}
return finish_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static inline int object_common2(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, long elements)
{
zval *retval_ptr = NULL;
zval fname;
if (Z_TYPE_PP(rval) != IS_OBJECT) {
return 0;
}
if (!process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, Z_OBJPROP_PP(rval), elements, 1)) {
/* We've got partially constructed object on our hands here. Wipe it. */
if(Z_TYPE_PP(rval) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_hash_clean(Z_OBJPROP_PP(rval));
zend_object_store_ctor_failed(*rval TSRMLS_CC);
}
ZVAL_NULL(*rval);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(rval) != IS_OBJECT) {
return 0;
}
if (Z_OBJCE_PP(rval) != PHP_IC_ENTRY &&
zend_hash_exists(&Z_OBJCE_PP(rval)->function_table, "__wakeup", sizeof("__wakeup"))) {
INIT_PZVAL(&fname);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&fname, "__wakeup", sizeof("__wakeup") - 1, 0);
BG(serialize_lock)++;
call_user_function_ex(CG(function_table), rval, &fname, &retval_ptr, 0, 0, 1, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
BG(serialize_lock)--;
}
if (retval_ptr) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval_ptr);
}
if (EG(exception)) {
return 0;
}
return finish_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU);
}
| 166,940 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool extractPages (const char *srcFileName, const char *destFileName) {
char pathName[1024];
GooString *gfileName = new GooString (srcFileName);
PDFDoc *doc = new PDFDoc (gfileName, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!doc->isOk()) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "Could not extract page(s) from damaged file ('{0:s}')", srcFileName);
return false;
}
if (firstPage == 0 && lastPage == 0) {
firstPage = 1;
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
}
if (lastPage == 0)
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
if (firstPage == 0)
firstPage = 1;
if (firstPage != lastPage && strstr(destFileName, "%d") == NULL) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "'{0:s}' must contain '%%d' if more than one page should be extracted", destFileName);
return false;
}
for (int pageNo = firstPage; pageNo <= lastPage; pageNo++) {
sprintf (pathName, destFileName, pageNo);
GooString *gpageName = new GooString (pathName);
int errCode = doc->savePageAs(gpageName, pageNo);
if ( errCode != errNone) {
delete gpageName;
delete gfileName;
return false;
}
delete gpageName;
}
delete gfileName;
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool extractPages (const char *srcFileName, const char *destFileName) {
char pathName[4096];
GooString *gfileName = new GooString (srcFileName);
PDFDoc *doc = new PDFDoc (gfileName, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!doc->isOk()) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "Could not extract page(s) from damaged file ('{0:s}')", srcFileName);
return false;
}
if (firstPage == 0 && lastPage == 0) {
firstPage = 1;
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
}
if (lastPage == 0)
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
if (firstPage == 0)
firstPage = 1;
if (firstPage != lastPage && strstr(destFileName, "%d") == NULL) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "'{0:s}' must contain '%%d' if more than one page should be extracted", destFileName);
return false;
}
for (int pageNo = firstPage; pageNo <= lastPage; pageNo++) {
snprintf (pathName, sizeof (pathName) - 1, destFileName, pageNo);
GooString *gpageName = new GooString (pathName);
int errCode = doc->savePageAs(gpageName, pageNo);
if ( errCode != errNone) {
delete gpageName;
delete gfileName;
return false;
}
delete gpageName;
}
delete gfileName;
return true;
}
| 164,654 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int imap_subscribe(char *path, bool subscribe)
{
struct ImapData *idata = NULL;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
char mbox[LONG_STRING];
char errstr[STRING];
struct Buffer err, token;
struct ImapMbox mx;
if (!mx_is_imap(path) || imap_parse_path(path, &mx) || !mx.mbox)
{
mutt_error(_("Bad mailbox name"));
return -1;
}
idata = imap_conn_find(&(mx.account), 0);
if (!idata)
goto fail;
imap_fix_path(idata, mx.mbox, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (!*buf)
mutt_str_strfcpy(buf, "INBOX", sizeof(buf));
if (ImapCheckSubscribed)
{
mutt_buffer_init(&token);
mutt_buffer_init(&err);
err.data = errstr;
err.dsize = sizeof(errstr);
snprintf(mbox, sizeof(mbox), "%smailboxes \"%s\"", subscribe ? "" : "un", path);
if (mutt_parse_rc_line(mbox, &token, &err))
mutt_debug(1, "Error adding subscribed mailbox: %s\n", errstr);
FREE(&token.data);
}
if (subscribe)
mutt_message(_("Subscribing to %s..."), buf);
else
mutt_message(_("Unsubscribing from %s..."), buf);
imap_munge_mbox_name(idata, mbox, sizeof(mbox), buf);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%sSUBSCRIBE %s", subscribe ? "" : "UN", mbox);
if (imap_exec(idata, buf, 0) < 0)
goto fail;
imap_unmunge_mbox_name(idata, mx.mbox);
if (subscribe)
mutt_message(_("Subscribed to %s"), mx.mbox);
else
mutt_message(_("Unsubscribed from %s"), mx.mbox);
FREE(&mx.mbox);
return 0;
fail:
FREE(&mx.mbox);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Quote path in imap_subscribe
CWE ID: CWE-77 | int imap_subscribe(char *path, bool subscribe)
{
struct ImapData *idata = NULL;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
char mbox[LONG_STRING];
char errstr[STRING];
struct Buffer err, token;
struct ImapMbox mx;
size_t len = 0;
if (!mx_is_imap(path) || imap_parse_path(path, &mx) || !mx.mbox)
{
mutt_error(_("Bad mailbox name"));
return -1;
}
idata = imap_conn_find(&(mx.account), 0);
if (!idata)
goto fail;
imap_fix_path(idata, mx.mbox, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (!*buf)
mutt_str_strfcpy(buf, "INBOX", sizeof(buf));
if (ImapCheckSubscribed)
{
mutt_buffer_init(&token);
mutt_buffer_init(&err);
err.data = errstr;
err.dsize = sizeof(errstr);
len = snprintf(mbox, sizeof(mbox), "%smailboxes ", subscribe ? "" : "un");
imap_quote_string(mbox + len, sizeof(mbox) - len, path, true);
if (mutt_parse_rc_line(mbox, &token, &err))
mutt_debug(1, "Error adding subscribed mailbox: %s\n", errstr);
FREE(&token.data);
}
if (subscribe)
mutt_message(_("Subscribing to %s..."), buf);
else
mutt_message(_("Unsubscribing from %s..."), buf);
imap_munge_mbox_name(idata, mbox, sizeof(mbox), buf);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%sSUBSCRIBE %s", subscribe ? "" : "UN", mbox);
if (imap_exec(idata, buf, 0) < 0)
goto fail;
imap_unmunge_mbox_name(idata, mx.mbox);
if (subscribe)
mutt_message(_("Subscribed to %s"), mx.mbox);
else
mutt_message(_("Unsubscribed from %s"), mx.mbox);
FREE(&mx.mbox);
return 0;
fail:
FREE(&mx.mbox);
return -1;
}
| 169,137 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t oz_cdev_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *fpos)
{
struct oz_pd *pd;
struct oz_elt_buf *eb;
struct oz_elt_info *ei;
struct oz_elt *elt;
struct oz_app_hdr *app_hdr;
struct oz_serial_ctx *ctx;
spin_lock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
pd = g_cdev.active_pd;
if (pd)
oz_pd_get(pd);
spin_unlock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
if (pd == NULL)
return -ENXIO;
if (!(pd->state & OZ_PD_S_CONNECTED))
return -EAGAIN;
eb = &pd->elt_buff;
ei = oz_elt_info_alloc(eb);
if (ei == NULL) {
count = 0;
goto out;
}
elt = (struct oz_elt *)ei->data;
app_hdr = (struct oz_app_hdr *)(elt+1);
elt->length = sizeof(struct oz_app_hdr) + count;
elt->type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA;
ei->app_id = OZ_APPID_SERIAL;
ei->length = elt->length + sizeof(struct oz_elt);
app_hdr->app_id = OZ_APPID_SERIAL;
if (copy_from_user(app_hdr+1, buf, count))
goto out;
spin_lock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB-1]);
ctx = (struct oz_serial_ctx *)pd->app_ctx[OZ_APPID_SERIAL-1];
if (ctx) {
app_hdr->elt_seq_num = ctx->tx_seq_num++;
if (ctx->tx_seq_num == 0)
ctx->tx_seq_num = 1;
spin_lock(&eb->lock);
if (oz_queue_elt_info(eb, 0, 0, ei) == 0)
ei = NULL;
spin_unlock(&eb->lock);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB-1]);
out:
if (ei) {
count = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&eb->lock);
oz_elt_info_free(eb, ei);
spin_unlock_bh(&eb->lock);
}
oz_pd_put(pd);
return count;
}
Commit Message: staging: ozwpan: prevent overflow in oz_cdev_write()
We need to check "count" so we don't overflow the ei->data buffer.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static ssize_t oz_cdev_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *fpos)
{
struct oz_pd *pd;
struct oz_elt_buf *eb;
struct oz_elt_info *ei;
struct oz_elt *elt;
struct oz_app_hdr *app_hdr;
struct oz_serial_ctx *ctx;
if (count > sizeof(ei->data) - sizeof(*elt) - sizeof(*app_hdr))
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
pd = g_cdev.active_pd;
if (pd)
oz_pd_get(pd);
spin_unlock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
if (pd == NULL)
return -ENXIO;
if (!(pd->state & OZ_PD_S_CONNECTED))
return -EAGAIN;
eb = &pd->elt_buff;
ei = oz_elt_info_alloc(eb);
if (ei == NULL) {
count = 0;
goto out;
}
elt = (struct oz_elt *)ei->data;
app_hdr = (struct oz_app_hdr *)(elt+1);
elt->length = sizeof(struct oz_app_hdr) + count;
elt->type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA;
ei->app_id = OZ_APPID_SERIAL;
ei->length = elt->length + sizeof(struct oz_elt);
app_hdr->app_id = OZ_APPID_SERIAL;
if (copy_from_user(app_hdr+1, buf, count))
goto out;
spin_lock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB-1]);
ctx = (struct oz_serial_ctx *)pd->app_ctx[OZ_APPID_SERIAL-1];
if (ctx) {
app_hdr->elt_seq_num = ctx->tx_seq_num++;
if (ctx->tx_seq_num == 0)
ctx->tx_seq_num = 1;
spin_lock(&eb->lock);
if (oz_queue_elt_info(eb, 0, 0, ei) == 0)
ei = NULL;
spin_unlock(&eb->lock);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB-1]);
out:
if (ei) {
count = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&eb->lock);
oz_elt_info_free(eb, ei);
spin_unlock_bh(&eb->lock);
}
oz_pd_put(pd);
return count;
}
| 165,965 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewDataService::RemoveEntry(
const std::string& preview_ui_addr_str) {
PreviewDataStoreMap::iterator it = data_store_map_.find(preview_ui_addr_str);
if (it != data_store_map_.end())
data_store_map_.erase(it);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void PrintPreviewDataService::RemoveEntry(
void PrintPreviewDataService::RemoveEntry(int32 preview_ui_id) {
data_store_map_.erase(preview_ui_id);
}
| 170,823 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::RunBeforeUnloadConfirm(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
bool is_reload,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfhi =
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(render_frame_host);
if (delegate_)
delegate_->WillRunBeforeUnloadConfirm();
bool suppress_this_message =
!rfhi->is_active() ||
ShowingInterstitialPage() || !delegate_ ||
delegate_->ShouldSuppressDialogs(this) ||
!delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
if (suppress_this_message) {
rfhi->JavaScriptDialogClosed(reply_msg, true, base::string16());
return;
}
is_showing_before_unload_dialog_ = true;
dialog_manager_ = delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
dialog_manager_->RunBeforeUnloadDialog(
this, is_reload,
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnDialogClosed, base::Unretained(this),
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID(), reply_msg,
false));
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void WebContentsImpl::RunBeforeUnloadConfirm(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
bool is_reload,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
// Running a dialog causes an exit to webpage-initiated fullscreen.
// http://crbug.com/728276
if (IsFullscreenForCurrentTab())
ExitFullscreen(true);
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfhi =
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(render_frame_host);
if (delegate_)
delegate_->WillRunBeforeUnloadConfirm();
bool suppress_this_message =
!rfhi->is_active() ||
ShowingInterstitialPage() || !delegate_ ||
delegate_->ShouldSuppressDialogs(this) ||
!delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
if (suppress_this_message) {
rfhi->JavaScriptDialogClosed(reply_msg, true, base::string16());
return;
}
is_showing_before_unload_dialog_ = true;
dialog_manager_ = delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
dialog_manager_->RunBeforeUnloadDialog(
this, is_reload,
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnDialogClosed, base::Unretained(this),
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID(), reply_msg,
false));
}
| 172,315 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: read_png(FILE *fp)
{
png_structp png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,0,0,0);
png_infop info_ptr = NULL;
png_bytep row = NULL, display = NULL;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return 0;
if (setjmp(png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
{
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
if (row != NULL) free(row);
if (display != NULL) free(display);
return 0;
}
png_init_io(png_ptr, fp);
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (info_ptr == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating info structure");
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_ptr, PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_ALWAYS, NULL, 0);
png_read_info(png_ptr, info_ptr);
{
png_size_t rowbytes = png_get_rowbytes(png_ptr, info_ptr);
row = malloc(rowbytes);
display = malloc(rowbytes);
if (row == NULL || display == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating row buffers");
{
png_uint_32 height = png_get_image_height(png_ptr, info_ptr);
int passes = png_set_interlace_handling(png_ptr);
int pass;
png_start_read_image(png_ptr);
for (pass = 0; pass < passes; ++pass)
{
png_uint_32 y = height;
/* NOTE: this trashes the row each time; interlace handling won't
* work, but this avoids memory thrashing for speed testing.
*/
while (y-- > 0)
png_read_row(png_ptr, row, display);
}
}
}
/* Make sure to read to the end of the file: */
png_read_end(png_ptr, info_ptr);
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
free(row);
free(display);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | read_png(FILE *fp)
{
png_structp png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,0,0,0);
png_infop info_ptr = NULL;
png_bytep row = NULL, display = NULL;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return 0;
if (setjmp(png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
{
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
if (row != NULL) free(row);
if (display != NULL) free(display);
return 0;
}
png_init_io(png_ptr, fp);
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (info_ptr == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating info structure");
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_ptr, PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_ALWAYS, NULL, 0);
png_read_info(png_ptr, info_ptr);
{
png_size_t rowbytes = png_get_rowbytes(png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* Failure to initialize these is harmless */
row = malloc(rowbytes);
display = malloc(rowbytes);
if (row == NULL || display == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating row buffers");
{
png_uint_32 height = png_get_image_height(png_ptr, info_ptr);
# ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
int passes = png_set_interlace_handling(png_ptr);
# else /* !READ_INTERLACING */
int passes = png_get_interlace_type(png_ptr, info_ptr) ==
PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7 ? PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7_PASSES : 1;
# endif /* !READ_INTERLACING */
int pass;
png_start_read_image(png_ptr);
for (pass = 0; pass < passes; ++pass)
{
png_uint_32 y = height;
# ifndef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
if (passes == PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7_PASSES)
y = PNG_PASS_ROWS(y, pass);
# endif /* READ_INTERLACING */
/* NOTE: this trashes the row each time; interlace handling won't
* work, but this avoids memory thrashing for speed testing.
*/
while (y-- > 0)
png_read_row(png_ptr, row, display);
}
}
}
/* Make sure to read to the end of the file: */
png_read_end(png_ptr, info_ptr);
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
free(row);
free(display);
return 1;
}
| 173,719 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool SimplifiedBackwardsTextIterator::handleTextNode()
{
m_lastTextNode = m_node;
int startOffset;
int offsetInNode;
RenderText* renderer = handleFirstLetter(startOffset, offsetInNode);
if (!renderer)
return true;
String text = renderer->text();
if (!renderer->firstTextBox() && text.length() > 0)
return true;
m_positionEndOffset = m_offset;
m_offset = startOffset + offsetInNode;
m_positionNode = m_node;
m_positionStartOffset = m_offset;
ASSERT(0 <= m_positionStartOffset - offsetInNode && m_positionStartOffset - offsetInNode <= static_cast<int>(text.length()));
ASSERT(1 <= m_positionEndOffset - offsetInNode && m_positionEndOffset - offsetInNode <= static_cast<int>(text.length()));
ASSERT(m_positionStartOffset <= m_positionEndOffset);
m_textLength = m_positionEndOffset - m_positionStartOffset;
m_textCharacters = text.characters() + (m_positionStartOffset - offsetInNode);
ASSERT(m_textCharacters >= text.characters());
ASSERT(m_textCharacters + m_textLength <= text.characters() + static_cast<int>(text.length()));
m_lastCharacter = text[m_positionEndOffset - 1];
return !m_shouldHandleFirstLetter;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool SimplifiedBackwardsTextIterator::handleTextNode()
{
m_lastTextNode = m_node;
int startOffset;
int offsetInNode;
RenderText* renderer = handleFirstLetter(startOffset, offsetInNode);
if (!renderer)
return true;
String text = renderer->text();
if (!renderer->firstTextBox() && text.length() > 0)
return true;
m_positionEndOffset = m_offset;
m_offset = startOffset + offsetInNode;
m_positionNode = m_node;
m_positionStartOffset = m_offset;
ASSERT(0 <= m_positionStartOffset - offsetInNode && m_positionStartOffset - offsetInNode <= static_cast<int>(text.length()));
ASSERT(1 <= m_positionEndOffset - offsetInNode && m_positionEndOffset - offsetInNode <= static_cast<int>(text.length()));
ASSERT(m_positionStartOffset <= m_positionEndOffset);
m_textLength = m_positionEndOffset - m_positionStartOffset;
m_textCharacters = text.characters() + (m_positionStartOffset - offsetInNode);
ASSERT(m_textCharacters >= text.characters());
RELEASE_ASSERT(m_textCharacters + m_textLength <= text.characters() + static_cast<int>(text.length()));
m_lastCharacter = text[m_positionEndOffset - 1];
return !m_shouldHandleFirstLetter;
}
| 171,311 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionServiceBackend::OnExtensionInstalled(
const scoped_refptr<const Extension>& extension) {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (frontend_.get())
frontend_->OnExtensionInstalled(extension);
}
Commit Message: Unrevert: Show the install dialog for the initial load of an unpacked extension
with plugins.
First landing broke some browser tests.
BUG=83273
TEST=in the extensions managmenet page, with developer mode enabled, Load an unpacked extension on an extension with NPAPI plugins. You should get an install dialog.
TBR=mihaip
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87738 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ExtensionServiceBackend::OnExtensionInstalled(
void ExtensionServiceBackend::OnLoadSingleExtension(
const scoped_refptr<const Extension>& extension) {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (frontend_.get())
frontend_->OnLoadSingleExtension(extension);
}
| 170,408 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char *M_fs_path_tmpdir(M_fs_system_t sys_type)
{
char *d = NULL;
char *out = NULL;
M_fs_error_t res;
#ifdef _WIN32
size_t len = M_fs_path_get_path_max(M_FS_SYSTEM_WINDOWS)+1;
d = M_malloc_zero(len);
/* Return is length without NULL. */
if (GetTempPath((DWORD)len, d) >= len) {
M_free(d);
d = NULL;
}
#elif defined(__APPLE__)
d = M_fs_path_mac_tmpdir();
#else
const char *const_temp;
/* Try Unix env var. */
# ifdef HAVE_SECURE_GETENV
const_temp = secure_getenv("TMPDIR");
# else
const_temp = getenv("TMPDIR");
# endif
if (!M_str_isempty(const_temp) && M_fs_perms_can_access(const_temp, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
d = M_strdup(const_temp);
}
/* Fallback to some "standard" system paths. */
if (d == NULL) {
const_temp = "/tmp";
if (!M_str_isempty(const_temp) && M_fs_perms_can_access(const_temp, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
d = M_strdup(const_temp);
}
}
if (d == NULL) {
const_temp = "/var/tmp";
if (!M_str_isempty(const_temp) && M_fs_perms_can_access(const_temp, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
d = M_strdup(const_temp);
}
}
#endif
if (d != NULL) {
res = M_fs_path_norm(&out, d, M_FS_PATH_NORM_ABSOLUTE, sys_type);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
out = NULL;
}
}
M_free(d);
return out;
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732 | char *M_fs_path_tmpdir(M_fs_system_t sys_type)
{
char *d = NULL;
char *out = NULL;
M_fs_error_t res;
#ifdef _WIN32
size_t len = M_fs_path_get_path_max(M_FS_SYSTEM_WINDOWS)+1;
d = M_malloc_zero(len);
/* Return is length without NULL. */
if (GetTempPath((DWORD)len, d) >= len) {
M_free(d);
d = NULL;
}
#elif defined(__APPLE__)
d = M_fs_path_mac_tmpdir();
#else
const char *const_temp;
/* Unix doens't have a fancy function to get the standard
* temporary directory an application can use. Instead there
* is a convoluted set of possible paths that could be used.
*
* We're going to go though each one in a priority order and
* verify if we can read and write the directory. If so then
* that's the one that will be used. We are fine using access
* here because it doesn't matter if the path ends up being
* changed out from underneath us later on. When it's used
* at that time it will fail. Right now we just want to get
* a path that can be tried. */
/* Try Unix env vars.
*
* This is not ideal but a valid way to set the temporary directory
* for a user. Per Single Unix Specification 4 and probably other things.
*/
# ifdef HAVE_SECURE_GETENV
const_temp = secure_getenv("TMPDIR");
# else
const_temp = getenv("TMPDIR");
# endif
if (!M_str_isempty(const_temp) && M_fs_perms_can_access(const_temp, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
d = M_strdup(const_temp);
}
/* Fallback to some "standard" system paths. */
if (d == NULL) {
const_temp = "/tmp";
if (!M_str_isempty(const_temp) && M_fs_perms_can_access(const_temp, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
d = M_strdup(const_temp);
}
}
if (d == NULL) {
const_temp = "/var/tmp";
if (!M_str_isempty(const_temp) && M_fs_perms_can_access(const_temp, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
d = M_strdup(const_temp);
}
}
#endif
if (d != NULL) {
res = M_fs_path_norm(&out, d, M_FS_PATH_NORM_ABSOLUTE, sys_type);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
out = NULL;
}
}
M_free(d);
return out;
}
| 169,147 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DataReductionProxyConfig::SecureProxyCheck(
SecureProxyCheckerCallback fetcher_callback) {
secure_proxy_checker_->CheckIfSecureProxyIsAllowed(fetcher_callback);
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void DataReductionProxyConfig::SecureProxyCheck(
SecureProxyCheckerCallback fetcher_callback) {
if (params::IsIncludedInHoldbackFieldTrial())
return;
secure_proxy_checker_->CheckIfSecureProxyIsAllowed(fetcher_callback);
}
| 172,418 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: entry_guard_obeys_restriction(const entry_guard_t *guard,
const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst)
{
tor_assert(guard);
if (! rst)
return 1; // No restriction? No problem.
return tor_memneq(guard->identity, rst->exclude_id, DIGEST_LEN);
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | entry_guard_obeys_restriction(const entry_guard_t *guard,
const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst)
{
tor_assert(guard);
if (! rst)
return 1; // No restriction? No problem.
// Only one kind of restriction exists right now: excluding an exit
// ID and all of its family.
const node_t *node = node_get_by_id((const char*)rst->exclude_id);
if (node && guard_in_node_family(guard, node))
return 0;
return tor_memneq(guard->identity, rst->exclude_id, DIGEST_LEN);
}
| 168,450 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: unset_and_free_gvalue (gpointer val)
{
g_value_unset (val);
g_free (val);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | unset_and_free_gvalue (gpointer val)
| 165,127 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SocketStream::SocketStream(const GURL& url, Delegate* delegate)
: delegate_(delegate),
url_(url),
max_pending_send_allowed_(kMaxPendingSendAllowed),
next_state_(STATE_NONE),
factory_(ClientSocketFactory::GetDefaultFactory()),
proxy_mode_(kDirectConnection),
proxy_url_(url),
pac_request_(NULL),
privacy_mode_(kPrivacyModeDisabled),
io_callback_(base::Bind(&SocketStream::OnIOCompleted,
base::Unretained(this))),
read_buf_(NULL),
current_write_buf_(NULL),
waiting_for_write_completion_(false),
closing_(false),
server_closed_(false),
metrics_(new SocketStreamMetrics(url)) {
DCHECK(base::MessageLoop::current())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must exist";
DCHECK_EQ(base::MessageLoop::TYPE_IO, base::MessageLoop::current()->type())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must be TYPE_IO";
DCHECK(delegate_);
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | SocketStream::SocketStream(const GURL& url, Delegate* delegate)
: delegate_(delegate),
url_(url),
max_pending_send_allowed_(kMaxPendingSendAllowed),
context_(NULL),
next_state_(STATE_NONE),
factory_(ClientSocketFactory::GetDefaultFactory()),
proxy_mode_(kDirectConnection),
proxy_url_(url),
pac_request_(NULL),
privacy_mode_(kPrivacyModeDisabled),
io_callback_(base::Bind(&SocketStream::OnIOCompleted,
base::Unretained(this))),
read_buf_(NULL),
current_write_buf_(NULL),
waiting_for_write_completion_(false),
closing_(false),
server_closed_(false),
metrics_(new SocketStreamMetrics(url)) {
DCHECK(base::MessageLoop::current())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must exist";
DCHECK_EQ(base::MessageLoop::TYPE_IO, base::MessageLoop::current()->type())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must be TYPE_IO";
DCHECK(delegate_);
}
| 171,256 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: uch *readpng_get_image(double display_exponent, int *pChannels, ulg *pRowbytes)
{
ulg rowbytes;
/* expand palette images to RGB, low-bit-depth grayscale images to 8 bits,
* transparency chunks to full alpha channel; strip 16-bit-per-sample
* images to 8 bits per sample; and convert grayscale to RGB[A] */
/* GRR WARNING: grayscale needs to be expanded and channels reset! */
*pRowbytes = rowbytes = channels*width;
*pChannels = channels;
if ((image_data = (uch *)malloc(rowbytes*height)) == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
Trace((stderr, "readpng_get_image: rowbytes = %ld, height = %ld\n", rowbytes, height));
/* now we can go ahead and just read the whole image */
fread(image_data, 1L, rowbytes*height, saved_infile);
return image_data;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | uch *readpng_get_image(double display_exponent, int *pChannels, ulg *pRowbytes)
{
ulg rowbytes;
/* expand palette images to RGB, low-bit-depth grayscale images to 8 bits,
* transparency chunks to full alpha channel; strip 16-bit-per-sample
* images to 8 bits per sample; and convert grayscale to RGB[A] */
/* GRR WARNING: grayscale needs to be expanded and channels reset! */
*pRowbytes = rowbytes = channels*width;
*pChannels = channels;
if ((image_data = (uch *)malloc(rowbytes*height)) == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
Trace((stderr, "readpng_get_image: rowbytes = %ld, height = %ld\n", rowbytes, height));
/* now we can go ahead and just read the whole image */
if (fread(image_data, 1L, rowbytes*height, saved_infile) <
rowbytes*height) {
free (image_data);
image_data = NULL;
return NULL;
}
return image_data;
}
| 173,572 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: scoped_ptr<cc::CompositorFrame> TestSynchronousCompositor::DemandDrawHw(
gfx::Size surface_size,
const gfx::Transform& transform,
gfx::Rect viewport,
gfx::Rect clip,
gfx::Rect viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
const gfx::Transform& transform_for_tile_priority) {
return hardware_frame_.Pass();
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | scoped_ptr<cc::CompositorFrame> TestSynchronousCompositor::DemandDrawHw(
const gfx::Size& surface_size,
const gfx::Transform& transform,
const gfx::Rect& viewport,
const gfx::Rect& clip,
const gfx::Rect& viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
const gfx::Transform& transform_for_tile_priority) {
return hardware_frame_.Pass();
}
| 171,620 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: size_t OpenMP4SourceUDTA(char *filename)
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)malloc(sizeof(mp4object));
if (mp4 == NULL) return 0;
memset(mp4, 0, sizeof(mp4object));
#ifdef _WINDOWS
fopen_s(&mp4->mediafp, filename, "rb");
#else
mp4->mediafp = fopen(filename, "rb");
#endif
if (mp4->mediafp)
{
uint32_t qttag, qtsize32, len;
int32_t nest = 0;
uint64_t nestsize[MAX_NEST_LEVEL] = { 0 };
uint64_t lastsize = 0, qtsize;
do
{
len = fread(&qtsize32, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&qttag, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
if (len == 8)
{
if (!GPMF_VALID_FOURCC(qttag))
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, lastsize - 8 - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(lastsize - 8);
continue;
}
qtsize32 = BYTESWAP32(qtsize32);
if (qtsize32 == 1) // 64-bit Atom
{
fread(&qtsize, 1, 8, mp4->mediafp);
qtsize = BYTESWAP64(qtsize) - 8;
}
else
qtsize = qtsize32;
nest++;
if (qtsize < 8) break;
if (nest >= MAX_NEST_LEVEL) break;
nestsize[nest] = qtsize;
lastsize = qtsize;
if (qttag == MAKEID('m', 'd', 'a', 't') ||
qttag == MAKEID('f', 't', 'y', 'p'))
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
continue;
}
if (qttag == MAKEID('G', 'P', 'M', 'F'))
{
mp4->videolength += 1.0;
mp4->metadatalength += 1.0;
mp4->indexcount = (int)mp4->metadatalength;
mp4->metasizes = (uint32_t *)malloc(mp4->indexcount * 4 + 4); memset(mp4->metasizes, 0, mp4->indexcount * 4 + 4);
mp4->metaoffsets = (uint64_t *)malloc(mp4->indexcount * 8 + 8); memset(mp4->metaoffsets, 0, mp4->indexcount * 8 + 8);
mp4->metasizes[0] = (int)qtsize - 8;
mp4->metaoffsets[0] = ftell(mp4->mediafp);
mp4->metasize_count = 1;
return (size_t)mp4; // not an MP4, RAW GPMF which has not inherent timing, assigning a during of 1second.
}
if (qttag != MAKEID('m', 'o', 'o', 'v') && //skip over all but these atoms
qttag != MAKEID('u', 'd', 't', 'a'))
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
continue;
}
else
{
NESTSIZE(8);
}
}
} while (len > 0);
}
return (size_t)mp4;
}
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader
CWE ID: CWE-787 | size_t OpenMP4SourceUDTA(char *filename)
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)malloc(sizeof(mp4object));
if (mp4 == NULL) return 0;
memset(mp4, 0, sizeof(mp4object));
#ifdef _WINDOWS
fopen_s(&mp4->mediafp, filename, "rb");
#else
mp4->mediafp = fopen(filename, "rb");
#endif
if (mp4->mediafp)
{
uint32_t qttag, qtsize32;
size_t len;
int32_t nest = 0;
uint64_t nestsize[MAX_NEST_LEVEL] = { 0 };
uint64_t lastsize = 0, qtsize;
do
{
len = fread(&qtsize32, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&qttag, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
if (len == 8)
{
if (!GPMF_VALID_FOURCC(qttag))
{
LongSeek(mp4, lastsize - 8 - 8);
NESTSIZE(lastsize - 8);
continue;
}
qtsize32 = BYTESWAP32(qtsize32);
if (qtsize32 == 1) // 64-bit Atom
{
fread(&qtsize, 1, 8, mp4->mediafp);
qtsize = BYTESWAP64(qtsize) - 8;
}
else
qtsize = qtsize32;
nest++;
if (qtsize < 8) break;
if (nest >= MAX_NEST_LEVEL) break;
nestsize[nest] = qtsize;
lastsize = qtsize;
if (qttag == MAKEID('m', 'd', 'a', 't') ||
qttag == MAKEID('f', 't', 'y', 'p'))
{
LongSeek(mp4, qtsize - 8);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
continue;
}
if (qttag == MAKEID('G', 'P', 'M', 'F'))
{
mp4->videolength += 1.0;
mp4->metadatalength += 1.0;
mp4->indexcount = (int)mp4->metadatalength;
mp4->metasizes = (uint32_t *)malloc(mp4->indexcount * 4 + 4); memset(mp4->metasizes, 0, mp4->indexcount * 4 + 4);
mp4->metaoffsets = (uint64_t *)malloc(mp4->indexcount * 8 + 8); memset(mp4->metaoffsets, 0, mp4->indexcount * 8 + 8);
mp4->metasizes[0] = (int)qtsize - 8;
mp4->metaoffsets[0] = ftell(mp4->mediafp);
mp4->metasize_count = 1;
return (size_t)mp4; // not an MP4, RAW GPMF which has not inherent timing, assigning a during of 1second.
}
if (qttag != MAKEID('m', 'o', 'o', 'v') && //skip over all but these atoms
qttag != MAKEID('u', 'd', 't', 'a'))
{
LongSeek(mp4, qtsize - 8);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
continue;
}
else
{
NESTSIZE(8);
}
}
} while (len > 0);
}
return (size_t)mp4;
}
| 169,551 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse> GetConfigResponse(
const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
auto response = std::make_unique<net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse>();
response->set_content(config_.SerializeAsString());
response->set_content_type("text/plain");
if (config_run_loop_)
config_run_loop_->Quit();
return response;
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse> GetConfigResponse(
const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
// Config should not be fetched when in holdback.
EXPECT_FALSE(
data_reduction_proxy::params::IsIncludedInHoldbackFieldTrial());
auto response = std::make_unique<net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse>();
response->set_content(config_.SerializeAsString());
response->set_content_type("text/plain");
if (config_run_loop_)
config_run_loop_->Quit();
return response;
}
| 172,414 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void get_nb10(ut8* dbg_data, SCV_NB10_HEADER* res) {
const int nb10sz = 16;
memcpy (res, dbg_data, nb10sz);
res->file_name = (ut8*) strdup ((const char*) dbg_data + nb10sz);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in pe
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void get_nb10(ut8* dbg_data, SCV_NB10_HEADER* res) {
const int nb10sz = 16;
// memcpy (res, dbg_data, nb10sz);
// res->file_name = (ut8*) strdup ((const char*) dbg_data + nb10sz);
}
| 169,229 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long BlockGroup::GetPrevTimeCode() const
{
return m_prev;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long BlockGroup::GetPrevTimeCode() const
| 174,351 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: l2tp_accm_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
uint16_t val_h, val_l;
ptr++; /* skip "Reserved" */
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "send=%08x ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "recv=%08x ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | l2tp_accm_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
l2tp_accm_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
uint16_t val_h, val_l;
if (length < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
ptr++; /* skip "Reserved" */
length -= 2;
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "send=%08x ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "recv=%08x ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
}
| 167,889 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HostCache::RecordSet(SetOutcome outcome,
base::TimeTicks now,
const Entry* old_entry,
const Entry& new_entry) {
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_ENUM("Set", outcome, MAX_SET_OUTCOME);
switch (outcome) {
case SET_INSERT:
case SET_UPDATE_VALID:
break;
case SET_UPDATE_STALE: {
EntryStaleness stale;
old_entry->GetStaleness(now, network_changes_, &stale);
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_TIME("UpdateStale.ExpiredBy", stale.expired_by);
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_COUNT("UpdateStale.NetworkChanges",
stale.network_changes);
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_COUNT("UpdateStale.StaleHits", stale.stale_hits);
if (old_entry->error() == OK && new_entry.error() == OK) {
AddressListDeltaType delta = FindAddressListDeltaType(
old_entry->addresses(), new_entry.addresses());
RecordUpdateStale(delta, stale);
}
break;
}
case MAX_SET_OUTCOME:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
CWE ID: | void HostCache::RecordSet(SetOutcome outcome,
base::TimeTicks now,
const Entry* old_entry,
const Entry& new_entry,
AddressListDeltaType delta) {
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_ENUM("Set", outcome, MAX_SET_OUTCOME);
switch (outcome) {
case SET_INSERT:
case SET_UPDATE_VALID:
break;
case SET_UPDATE_STALE: {
EntryStaleness stale;
old_entry->GetStaleness(now, network_changes_, &stale);
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_TIME("UpdateStale.ExpiredBy", stale.expired_by);
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_COUNT("UpdateStale.NetworkChanges",
stale.network_changes);
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_COUNT("UpdateStale.StaleHits", stale.stale_hits);
if (old_entry->error() == OK && new_entry.error() == OK) {
RecordUpdateStale(delta, stale);
}
break;
}
case MAX_SET_OUTCOME:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
| 172,008 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AudioInputRendererHost::OnCreateStream(
int stream_id, const media::AudioParameters& params,
const std::string& device_id, bool automatic_gain_control) {
VLOG(1) << "AudioInputRendererHost::OnCreateStream(stream_id="
<< stream_id << ")";
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(LookupById(stream_id) == NULL);
media::AudioParameters audio_params(params);
if (media_stream_manager_->audio_input_device_manager()->
ShouldUseFakeDevice()) {
audio_params.Reset(media::AudioParameters::AUDIO_FAKE,
params.channel_layout(), params.sample_rate(),
params.bits_per_sample(), params.frames_per_buffer());
} else if (WebContentsCaptureUtil::IsWebContentsDeviceId(device_id)) {
audio_params.Reset(media::AudioParameters::AUDIO_VIRTUAL,
params.channel_layout(), params.sample_rate(),
params.bits_per_sample(), params.frames_per_buffer());
}
DCHECK_GT(audio_params.frames_per_buffer(), 0);
uint32 buffer_size = audio_params.GetBytesPerBuffer();
scoped_ptr<AudioEntry> entry(new AudioEntry());
uint32 mem_size = sizeof(media::AudioInputBufferParameters) + buffer_size;
if (!entry->shared_memory.CreateAndMapAnonymous(mem_size)) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<AudioInputSyncWriter> writer(
new AudioInputSyncWriter(&entry->shared_memory));
if (!writer->Init()) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->writer.reset(writer.release());
entry->controller = media::AudioInputController::CreateLowLatency(
audio_manager_,
this,
audio_params,
device_id,
entry->writer.get());
if (!entry->controller) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
if (params.format() == media::AudioParameters::AUDIO_PCM_LOW_LATENCY)
entry->controller->SetAutomaticGainControl(automatic_gain_control);
entry->stream_id = stream_id;
audio_entries_.insert(std::make_pair(stream_id, entry.release()));
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void AudioInputRendererHost::OnCreateStream(
int stream_id, const media::AudioParameters& params,
const std::string& device_id, bool automatic_gain_control) {
VLOG(1) << "AudioInputRendererHost::OnCreateStream(stream_id="
<< stream_id << ")";
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
// media::AudioParameters is validated in the deserializer.
if (LookupById(stream_id) != NULL) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
media::AudioParameters audio_params(params);
if (media_stream_manager_->audio_input_device_manager()->
ShouldUseFakeDevice()) {
audio_params.Reset(media::AudioParameters::AUDIO_FAKE,
params.channel_layout(), params.sample_rate(),
params.bits_per_sample(), params.frames_per_buffer());
} else if (WebContentsCaptureUtil::IsWebContentsDeviceId(device_id)) {
audio_params.Reset(media::AudioParameters::AUDIO_VIRTUAL,
params.channel_layout(), params.sample_rate(),
params.bits_per_sample(), params.frames_per_buffer());
}
uint32 buffer_size = audio_params.GetBytesPerBuffer();
scoped_ptr<AudioEntry> entry(new AudioEntry());
uint32 mem_size = sizeof(media::AudioInputBufferParameters) + buffer_size;
if (!entry->shared_memory.CreateAndMapAnonymous(mem_size)) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<AudioInputSyncWriter> writer(
new AudioInputSyncWriter(&entry->shared_memory));
if (!writer->Init()) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->writer.reset(writer.release());
entry->controller = media::AudioInputController::CreateLowLatency(
audio_manager_,
this,
audio_params,
device_id,
entry->writer.get());
if (!entry->controller) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
if (params.format() == media::AudioParameters::AUDIO_PCM_LOW_LATENCY)
entry->controller->SetAutomaticGainControl(automatic_gain_control);
entry->stream_id = stream_id;
audio_entries_.insert(std::make_pair(stream_id, entry.release()));
}
| 171,524 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MediaMetadataRetriever::MediaMetadataRetriever()
{
ALOGV("constructor");
const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& service(getService());
if (service == 0) {
ALOGE("failed to obtain MediaMetadataRetrieverService");
return;
}
sp<IMediaMetadataRetriever> retriever(service->createMetadataRetriever());
if (retriever == 0) {
ALOGE("failed to create IMediaMetadataRetriever object from server");
}
mRetriever = retriever;
}
Commit Message: Get service by value instead of reference
to prevent a cleared service binder from being used.
Bug: 26040840
Change-Id: Ifb5483c55b172d3553deb80dbe27f2204b86ecdb
CWE ID: CWE-119 | MediaMetadataRetriever::MediaMetadataRetriever()
{
ALOGV("constructor");
const sp<IMediaPlayerService> service(getService());
if (service == 0) {
ALOGE("failed to obtain MediaMetadataRetrieverService");
return;
}
sp<IMediaMetadataRetriever> retriever(service->createMetadataRetriever());
if (retriever == 0) {
ALOGE("failed to create IMediaMetadataRetriever object from server");
}
mRetriever = retriever;
}
| 173,911 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GestureProviderAura::OnTouchEventAck(bool event_consumed) {
DCHECK(pending_gestures_.empty());
DCHECK(!handling_event_);
base::AutoReset<bool> handling_event(&handling_event_, true);
filtered_gesture_provider_.OnTouchEventAck(event_consumed);
}
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GestureProviderAura::OnTouchEventAck(bool event_consumed) {
DCHECK(pending_gestures_.empty());
DCHECK(!handling_event_);
base::AutoReset<bool> handling_event(&handling_event_, true);
filtered_gesture_provider_.OnTouchEventAck(event_consumed);
last_touch_event_latency_info_.Clear();
}
| 171,206 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PluginChannel::PluginChannel()
: renderer_handle_(0),
renderer_id_(-1),
in_send_(0),
incognito_(false),
filter_(new MessageFilter()) {
set_send_unblocking_only_during_unblock_dispatch();
ChildProcess::current()->AddRefProcess();
const CommandLine* command_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
log_messages_ = command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kLogPluginMessages);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | PluginChannel::PluginChannel()
: renderer_id_(-1),
in_send_(0),
incognito_(false),
filter_(new MessageFilter()) {
set_send_unblocking_only_during_unblock_dispatch();
ChildProcess::current()->AddRefProcess();
const CommandLine* command_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
log_messages_ = command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kLogPluginMessages);
}
| 170,950 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static jlong Region_createFromParcel(JNIEnv* env, jobject clazz, jobject parcel)
{
if (parcel == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
android::Parcel* p = android::parcelForJavaObject(env, parcel);
const size_t size = p->readInt32();
const void* regionData = p->readInplace(size);
if (regionData == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
SkRegion* region = new SkRegion;
region->readFromMemory(regionData, size);
return reinterpret_cast<jlong>(region);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Ensure that unparcelling Region only reads the expected number of bytes
bug: 20883006
Change-Id: I4f109667fb210a80fbddddf5f1bfb7ef3a02b6ce
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static jlong Region_createFromParcel(JNIEnv* env, jobject clazz, jobject parcel)
{
if (parcel == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
android::Parcel* p = android::parcelForJavaObject(env, parcel);
const size_t size = p->readInt32();
const void* regionData = p->readInplace(size);
if (regionData == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
SkRegion* region = new SkRegion;
size_t actualSize = region->readFromMemory(regionData, size);
if (size != actualSize) {
delete region;
return NULL;
}
return reinterpret_cast<jlong>(region);
}
| 174,121 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool getCoverageFormat4(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kSegCountOffset = 6;
const size_t kEndCountOffset = 14;
const size_t kHeaderSize = 16;
const size_t kSegmentSize = 8; // total size of array elements for one segment
if (kEndCountOffset > size) {
return false;
}
size_t segCount = readU16(data, kSegCountOffset) >> 1;
if (kHeaderSize + segCount * kSegmentSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < segCount; i++) {
int end = readU16(data, kEndCountOffset + 2 * i);
int start = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (segCount + i));
int rangeOffset = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (3 * segCount + i));
if (rangeOffset == 0) {
int delta = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (2 * segCount + i));
if (((end + delta) & 0xffff) > end - start) {
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1);
} else {
for (int j = start; j < end + 1; j++) {
if (((j + delta) & 0xffff) != 0) {
addRange(coverage, j, j + 1);
}
}
}
} else {
for (int j = start; j < end + 1; j++) {
uint32_t actualRangeOffset = kHeaderSize + 6 * segCount + rangeOffset +
(i + j - start) * 2;
if (actualRangeOffset + 2 > size) {
return false;
}
int glyphId = readU16(data, actualRangeOffset);
if (glyphId != 0) {
addRange(coverage, j, j + 1);
}
}
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reject fonts with invalid ranges in cmap
A corrupt or malicious font may have a negative size in its cmap
range, which in turn could lead to memory corruption. This patch
detects the case and rejects the font, and also includes an assertion
in the sparse bit set implementation if we missed any such case.
External issue:
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=192618
Bug: 26413177
Change-Id: Icc0c80e4ef389abba0964495b89aa0fae3e9f4b2
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static bool getCoverageFormat4(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kSegCountOffset = 6;
const size_t kEndCountOffset = 14;
const size_t kHeaderSize = 16;
const size_t kSegmentSize = 8; // total size of array elements for one segment
if (kEndCountOffset > size) {
return false;
}
size_t segCount = readU16(data, kSegCountOffset) >> 1;
if (kHeaderSize + segCount * kSegmentSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < segCount; i++) {
uint32_t end = readU16(data, kEndCountOffset + 2 * i);
uint32_t start = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (segCount + i));
if (end < start) {
// invalid segment range: size must be positive
return false;
}
uint32_t rangeOffset = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (3 * segCount + i));
if (rangeOffset == 0) {
uint32_t delta = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (2 * segCount + i));
if (((end + delta) & 0xffff) > end - start) {
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1);
} else {
for (uint32_t j = start; j < end + 1; j++) {
if (((j + delta) & 0xffff) != 0) {
addRange(coverage, j, j + 1);
}
}
}
} else {
for (uint32_t j = start; j < end + 1; j++) {
uint32_t actualRangeOffset = kHeaderSize + 6 * segCount + rangeOffset +
(i + j - start) * 2;
if (actualRangeOffset + 2 > size) {
return false;
}
uint32_t glyphId = readU16(data, actualRangeOffset);
if (glyphId != 0) {
addRange(coverage, j, j + 1);
}
}
}
}
return true;
}
| 174,235 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int insert_key(
sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,
const char *path,
unsigned char id,
unsigned char key_reference,
int key_length,
unsigned char auth_id,
const char *label
){
sc_card_t *card=p15card->card;
sc_context_t *ctx=p15card->card->ctx;
sc_file_t *f;
struct sc_pkcs15_prkey_info prkey_info;
struct sc_pkcs15_object prkey_obj;
int r, can_sign, can_crypt;
memset(&prkey_info, 0, sizeof(prkey_info));
prkey_info.id.len = 1;
prkey_info.id.value[0] = id;
prkey_info.native = 1;
prkey_info.key_reference = key_reference;
prkey_info.modulus_length = key_length;
sc_format_path(path, &prkey_info.path);
memset(&prkey_obj, 0, sizeof(prkey_obj));
strlcpy(prkey_obj.label, label, sizeof(prkey_obj.label));
prkey_obj.flags = SC_PKCS15_CO_FLAG_PRIVATE;
prkey_obj.auth_id.len = 1;
prkey_obj.auth_id.value[0] = auth_id;
can_sign=can_crypt=0;
if(card->type==SC_CARD_TYPE_TCOS_V3){
unsigned char buf[256];
int i, rec_no=0;
if(prkey_info.path.len>=2) prkey_info.path.len-=2;
sc_append_file_id(&prkey_info.path, 0x5349);
if(sc_select_file(card, &prkey_info.path, NULL)!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Select(%s) failed\n",
sc_print_path(&prkey_info.path));
return 1;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Searching for Key-Ref %02X\n", key_reference);
while((r=sc_read_record(card, ++rec_no, buf, sizeof(buf), SC_RECORD_BY_REC_NR))>0){
int found=0;
if(buf[0]!=0xA0) continue;
for(i=2;i<buf[1]+2;i+=2+buf[i+1]){
if(buf[i]==0x83 && buf[i+1]==1 && buf[i+2]==key_reference) ++found;
}
if(found) break;
}
if(r<=0){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,"No EF_KEYD-Record found\n");
return 1;
}
for(i=0;i<r;i+=2+buf[i+1]){
if(buf[i]==0xB6) can_sign++;
if(buf[i]==0xB8) can_crypt++;
}
} else {
if(sc_select_file(card, &prkey_info.path, &f)!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Select(%s) failed\n",
sc_print_path(&prkey_info.path));
return 1;
}
if (f->prop_attr[1] & 0x04) can_crypt=1;
if (f->prop_attr[1] & 0x08) can_sign=1;
sc_file_free(f);
}
prkey_info.usage= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_SIGN;
if(can_crypt) prkey_info.usage |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT|SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_DECRYPT;
if(can_sign) prkey_info.usage |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_NONREPUDIATION;
r=sc_pkcs15emu_add_rsa_prkey(p15card, &prkey_obj, &prkey_info);
if(r!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "sc_pkcs15emu_add_rsa_prkey(%s) failed\n", path);
return 4;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "%s: OK%s%s\n", path, can_sign ? ", Sign" : "", can_crypt ? ", Crypt" : "");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int insert_key(
sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,
const char *path,
unsigned char id,
unsigned char key_reference,
int key_length,
unsigned char auth_id,
const char *label
){
sc_card_t *card=p15card->card;
sc_context_t *ctx=p15card->card->ctx;
sc_file_t *f;
struct sc_pkcs15_prkey_info prkey_info;
struct sc_pkcs15_object prkey_obj;
int r, can_sign, can_crypt;
memset(&prkey_info, 0, sizeof(prkey_info));
prkey_info.id.len = 1;
prkey_info.id.value[0] = id;
prkey_info.native = 1;
prkey_info.key_reference = key_reference;
prkey_info.modulus_length = key_length;
sc_format_path(path, &prkey_info.path);
memset(&prkey_obj, 0, sizeof(prkey_obj));
strlcpy(prkey_obj.label, label, sizeof(prkey_obj.label));
prkey_obj.flags = SC_PKCS15_CO_FLAG_PRIVATE;
prkey_obj.auth_id.len = 1;
prkey_obj.auth_id.value[0] = auth_id;
can_sign=can_crypt=0;
if(card->type==SC_CARD_TYPE_TCOS_V3){
unsigned char buf[256];
int i, rec_no=0;
if(prkey_info.path.len>=2) prkey_info.path.len-=2;
sc_append_file_id(&prkey_info.path, 0x5349);
if(sc_select_file(card, &prkey_info.path, NULL)!=SC_SUCCESS || !f->prop_attr){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Select(%s) failed\n",
sc_print_path(&prkey_info.path));
return 1;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Searching for Key-Ref %02X\n", key_reference);
while((r=sc_read_record(card, ++rec_no, buf, sizeof(buf), SC_RECORD_BY_REC_NR))>0){
int found=0;
if(buf[0]!=0xA0) continue;
for(i=2;i<buf[1]+2;i+=2+buf[i+1]){
if(buf[i]==0x83 && buf[i+1]==1 && buf[i+2]==key_reference) ++found;
}
if(found) break;
}
if(r<=0){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,"No EF_KEYD-Record found\n");
return 1;
}
for(i=0;i<r;i+=2+buf[i+1]){
if(buf[i]==0xB6) can_sign++;
if(buf[i]==0xB8) can_crypt++;
}
} else {
if(sc_select_file(card, &prkey_info.path, &f)!=SC_SUCCESS
|| !f->prop_attr || f->prop_attr_len < 2){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Select(%s) failed\n",
sc_print_path(&prkey_info.path));
return 1;
}
if (f->prop_attr[1] & 0x04) can_crypt=1;
if (f->prop_attr[1] & 0x08) can_sign=1;
sc_file_free(f);
}
prkey_info.usage= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_SIGN;
if(can_crypt) prkey_info.usage |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT|SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_DECRYPT;
if(can_sign) prkey_info.usage |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_NONREPUDIATION;
r=sc_pkcs15emu_add_rsa_prkey(p15card, &prkey_obj, &prkey_info);
if(r!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "sc_pkcs15emu_add_rsa_prkey(%s) failed\n", path);
return 4;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "%s: OK%s%s\n", path, can_sign ? ", Sign" : "", can_crypt ? ", Crypt" : "");
return 0;
}
| 169,067 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CheckValueType(const Value::ValueType expected,
const Value* const actual) {
DCHECK(actual != NULL) << "Expected value to be non-NULL";
DCHECK(expected == actual->GetType())
<< "Expected " << print_valuetype(expected)
<< ", but was " << print_valuetype(actual->GetType());
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void CheckValueType(const Value::ValueType expected,
| 170,465 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void update_open_stateflags(struct nfs4_state *state, mode_t open_flags)
{
switch (open_flags) {
case FMODE_WRITE:
state->n_wronly++;
break;
case FMODE_READ:
state->n_rdonly++;
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
state->n_rdwr++;
}
nfs4_state_set_mode_locked(state, state->state | open_flags);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | static void update_open_stateflags(struct nfs4_state *state, mode_t open_flags)
static void update_open_stateflags(struct nfs4_state *state, fmode_t fmode)
{
switch (fmode) {
case FMODE_WRITE:
state->n_wronly++;
break;
case FMODE_READ:
state->n_rdonly++;
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
state->n_rdwr++;
}
nfs4_state_set_mode_locked(state, state->state | fmode);
}
| 165,707 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int svc_rdma_xdr_encode_error(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
enum rpcrdma_errcode err, __be32 *va)
{
__be32 *startp = va;
*va++ = rmsgp->rm_xid;
*va++ = rmsgp->rm_vers;
*va++ = xprt->sc_fc_credits;
*va++ = rdma_error;
*va++ = cpu_to_be32(err);
if (err == ERR_VERS) {
*va++ = rpcrdma_version;
*va++ = rpcrdma_version;
}
return (int)((unsigned long)va - (unsigned long)startp);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | int svc_rdma_xdr_encode_error(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
| 168,160 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Array> V8Debugger::internalProperties(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Value> value)
{
v8::Local<v8::Array> properties;
if (!v8::Debug::GetInternalProperties(m_isolate, value).ToLocal(&properties))
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Array>();
if (value->IsFunction()) {
v8::Local<v8::Function> function = value.As<v8::Function>();
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = functionLocation(context, function);
if (location->IsObject()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[FunctionLocation]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), location);
}
if (function->IsGeneratorFunction()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[IsGenerator]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), v8::True(m_isolate));
}
}
if (!enabled())
return properties;
if (value->IsMap() || value->IsWeakMap() || value->IsSet() || value->IsWeakSet() || value->IsSetIterator() || value->IsMapIterator()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> entries = collectionEntries(context, v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value));
if (entries->IsArray()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[Entries]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), entries);
}
}
if (value->IsGeneratorObject()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = generatorObjectLocation(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value));
if (location->IsObject()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[GeneratorLocation]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), location);
}
}
if (value->IsFunction()) {
v8::Local<v8::Function> function = value.As<v8::Function>();
v8::Local<v8::Value> boundFunction = function->GetBoundFunction();
v8::Local<v8::Value> scopes;
if (boundFunction->IsUndefined() && functionScopes(function).ToLocal(&scopes)) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[Scopes]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), scopes);
}
}
return properties;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Array> V8Debugger::internalProperties(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Value> value)
{
v8::Local<v8::Array> properties;
if (!v8::Debug::GetInternalProperties(m_isolate, value).ToLocal(&properties))
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Array>();
if (value->IsFunction()) {
v8::Local<v8::Function> function = value.As<v8::Function>();
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = functionLocation(context, function);
if (location->IsObject()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[FunctionLocation]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), location);
}
if (function->IsGeneratorFunction()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[IsGenerator]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), v8::True(m_isolate));
}
}
if (!enabled())
return properties;
if (value->IsMap() || value->IsWeakMap() || value->IsSet() || value->IsWeakSet() || value->IsSetIterator() || value->IsMapIterator()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> entries = collectionEntries(context, v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value));
if (entries->IsArray()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[Entries]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), entries);
}
}
if (value->IsGeneratorObject()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = generatorObjectLocation(context, v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value));
if (location->IsObject()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[GeneratorLocation]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), location);
}
}
if (value->IsFunction()) {
v8::Local<v8::Function> function = value.As<v8::Function>();
v8::Local<v8::Value> boundFunction = function->GetBoundFunction();
v8::Local<v8::Value> scopes;
if (boundFunction->IsUndefined() && functionScopes(context, function).ToLocal(&scopes)) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[Scopes]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), scopes);
}
}
return properties;
}
| 172,068 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Block::Lacing Block::GetLacing() const
{
const int value = int(m_flags & 0x06) >> 1;
return static_cast<Lacing>(value);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Block::Lacing Block::GetLacing() const
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, len, buf);
return status;
}
| 174,335 |
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