instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool WebRequestPermissions::CanExtensionAccessURL(
const extensions::InfoMap* extension_info_map,
const std::string& extension_id,
const GURL& url,
bool crosses_incognito,
HostPermissionsCheck host_permissions_check) {
if (!extension_info_map)
return true;
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extension_info_map->extensions().GetByID(extension_id);
if (!extension)
return false;
if (crosses_incognito && !extension_info_map->CanCrossIncognito(extension))
return false;
switch (host_permissions_check) {
case DO_NOT_CHECK_HOST:
break;
case REQUIRE_HOST_PERMISSION:
if (!((url.SchemeIs(url::kAboutScheme) ||
extension->permissions_data()->HasHostPermission(url) ||
url.GetOrigin() == extension->url()))) {
return false;
}
break;
case REQUIRE_ALL_URLS:
if (!extension->permissions_data()->HasEffectiveAccessToAllHosts())
return false;
break;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | bool WebRequestPermissions::CanExtensionAccessURL(
const extensions::InfoMap* extension_info_map,
const std::string& extension_id,
const GURL& url,
bool crosses_incognito,
HostPermissionsCheck host_permissions_check) {
if (!extension_info_map)
return true;
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extension_info_map->extensions().GetByID(extension_id);
if (!extension)
return false;
if (crosses_incognito && !extension_info_map->CanCrossIncognito(extension))
return false;
switch (host_permissions_check) {
case DO_NOT_CHECK_HOST:
break;
case REQUIRE_HOST_PERMISSION:
if (!url.SchemeIs(url::kAboutScheme) &&
!extension->permissions_data()->HasHostPermission(url) &&
!url::IsSameOriginWith(url, extension->url())) {
return false;
}
break;
case REQUIRE_ALL_URLS:
if (!extension->permissions_data()->HasEffectiveAccessToAllHosts())
return false;
break;
}
return true;
}
| 172,281 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool Browser::ShouldFocusLocationBarByDefault(WebContents* source) {
const content::NavigationEntry* entry =
source->GetController().GetActiveEntry();
if (entry) {
const GURL& url = entry->GetURL();
const GURL& virtual_url = entry->GetVirtualURL();
if ((url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme) &&
url.host_piece() == chrome::kChromeUINewTabHost) ||
(virtual_url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme) &&
virtual_url.host_piece() == chrome::kChromeUINewTabHost)) {
return true;
}
}
return search::NavEntryIsInstantNTP(source, entry);
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID: | bool Browser::ShouldFocusLocationBarByDefault(WebContents* source) {
// Navigations in background tabs shouldn't change the focus state of the
// omnibox, since it's associated with the foreground tab.
if (source != tab_strip_model_->GetActiveWebContents())
return false;
const content::NavigationEntry* entry =
source->GetController().GetActiveEntry();
if (entry) {
const GURL& url = entry->GetURL();
const GURL& virtual_url = entry->GetVirtualURL();
if ((url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme) &&
url.host_piece() == chrome::kChromeUINewTabHost) ||
(virtual_url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme) &&
virtual_url.host_piece() == chrome::kChromeUINewTabHost)) {
return true;
}
}
return search::NavEntryIsInstantNTP(source, entry);
}
| 172,481 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool f2fs_init_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_extent *i_ext)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct extent_tree *et;
struct extent_node *en;
struct extent_info ei;
if (!f2fs_may_extent_tree(inode)) {
/* drop largest extent */
if (i_ext && i_ext->len) {
i_ext->len = 0;
return true;
}
return false;
}
et = __grab_extent_tree(inode);
if (!i_ext || !i_ext->len)
return false;
get_extent_info(&ei, i_ext);
write_lock(&et->lock);
if (atomic_read(&et->node_cnt))
goto out;
en = __init_extent_tree(sbi, et, &ei);
if (en) {
spin_lock(&sbi->extent_lock);
list_add_tail(&en->list, &sbi->extent_list);
spin_unlock(&sbi->extent_lock);
}
out:
write_unlock(&et->lock);
return false;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a bug caused by NULL extent tree
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount
-sbi->mount_opt.opt = 0;
<--- -f2fs_iget
-do_read_inode
-f2fs_init_extent_tree
-F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree is NULL
-default_options && parse_options
-remount return
<--- -f2fs_map_blocks
-f2fs_lookup_extent_tree
-f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !et);
The same problem with f2fs_new_inode.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool f2fs_init_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_extent *i_ext)
static bool __f2fs_init_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_extent *i_ext)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct extent_tree *et;
struct extent_node *en;
struct extent_info ei;
if (!f2fs_may_extent_tree(inode)) {
/* drop largest extent */
if (i_ext && i_ext->len) {
i_ext->len = 0;
return true;
}
return false;
}
et = __grab_extent_tree(inode);
if (!i_ext || !i_ext->len)
return false;
get_extent_info(&ei, i_ext);
write_lock(&et->lock);
if (atomic_read(&et->node_cnt))
goto out;
en = __init_extent_tree(sbi, et, &ei);
if (en) {
spin_lock(&sbi->extent_lock);
list_add_tail(&en->list, &sbi->extent_list);
spin_unlock(&sbi->extent_lock);
}
out:
write_unlock(&et->lock);
return false;
}
| 169,416 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int64 GetReceivedListPrefValue(size_t index) {
return ListPrefInt64Value(*received_update_, index);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | int64 GetReceivedListPrefValue(size_t index) {
return received_.GetListPrefValue(index);
}
| 171,324 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ServiceWorkerContainer::registerServiceWorkerImpl(ExecutionContext* executionContext, const KURL& rawScriptURL, const KURL& scope, PassOwnPtr<RegistrationCallbacks> callbacks)
{
if (!m_provider) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeState, "Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The document is in an invalid state."));
return;
}
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> documentOrigin = executionContext->getSecurityOrigin();
String errorMessage;
if (!executionContext->isSecureContext(errorMessage)) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, errorMessage));
return;
}
KURL pageURL = KURL(KURL(), documentOrigin->toString());
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(pageURL.protocol())) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The URL protocol of the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "') is not supported.")));
return;
}
KURL scriptURL = rawScriptURL;
scriptURL.removeFragmentIdentifier();
if (!documentOrigin->canRequest(scriptURL)) {
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> scriptOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(scriptURL);
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The origin of the provided scriptURL ('" + scriptOrigin->toString() + "') does not match the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "').")));
return;
}
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(scriptURL.protocol())) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The URL protocol of the script ('" + scriptURL.getString() + "') is not supported.")));
return;
}
KURL patternURL = scope;
patternURL.removeFragmentIdentifier();
if (!documentOrigin->canRequest(patternURL)) {
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> patternOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(patternURL);
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The origin of the provided scope ('" + patternOrigin->toString() + "') does not match the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "').")));
return;
}
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(patternURL.protocol())) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The URL protocol of the scope ('" + patternURL.getString() + "') is not supported.")));
return;
}
WebString webErrorMessage;
if (!m_provider->validateScopeAndScriptURL(patternURL, scriptURL, &webErrorMessage)) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeType, WebString::fromUTF8("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: " + webErrorMessage.utf8())));
return;
}
m_provider->registerServiceWorker(patternURL, scriptURL, callbacks.leakPtr());
}
Commit Message: Check CSP before registering ServiceWorkers
Service Worker registrations should be subject to the same CSP checks as
other workers. The spec doesn't say this explicitly
(https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#directive-child-src-workers says "Worker or
SharedWorker constructors"), but it seems to be in the spirit of things,
and it matches Firefox's behavior.
BUG=579801
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1861253004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385775}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void ServiceWorkerContainer::registerServiceWorkerImpl(ExecutionContext* executionContext, const KURL& rawScriptURL, const KURL& scope, PassOwnPtr<RegistrationCallbacks> callbacks)
{
if (!m_provider) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeState, "Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The document is in an invalid state."));
return;
}
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> documentOrigin = executionContext->getSecurityOrigin();
String errorMessage;
if (!executionContext->isSecureContext(errorMessage)) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, errorMessage));
return;
}
KURL pageURL = KURL(KURL(), documentOrigin->toString());
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(pageURL.protocol())) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The URL protocol of the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "') is not supported.")));
return;
}
KURL scriptURL = rawScriptURL;
scriptURL.removeFragmentIdentifier();
if (!documentOrigin->canRequest(scriptURL)) {
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> scriptOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(scriptURL);
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The origin of the provided scriptURL ('" + scriptOrigin->toString() + "') does not match the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "').")));
return;
}
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(scriptURL.protocol())) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The URL protocol of the script ('" + scriptURL.getString() + "') is not supported.")));
return;
}
KURL patternURL = scope;
patternURL.removeFragmentIdentifier();
if (!documentOrigin->canRequest(patternURL)) {
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> patternOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(patternURL);
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The origin of the provided scope ('" + patternOrigin->toString() + "') does not match the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "').")));
return;
}
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(patternURL.protocol())) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The URL protocol of the scope ('" + patternURL.getString() + "') is not supported.")));
return;
}
WebString webErrorMessage;
if (!m_provider->validateScopeAndScriptURL(patternURL, scriptURL, &webErrorMessage)) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeType, WebString::fromUTF8("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: " + webErrorMessage.utf8())));
return;
}
ContentSecurityPolicy* csp = executionContext->contentSecurityPolicy();
if (csp) {
if (!csp->allowWorkerContextFromSource(scriptURL, ContentSecurityPolicy::DidNotRedirect, ContentSecurityPolicy::SendReport)) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The provided scriptURL ('" + scriptURL.getString() + "') violates the Content Security Policy.")));
return;
}
}
m_provider->registerServiceWorker(patternURL, scriptURL, callbacks.leakPtr());
}
| 173,285 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ConvertLoopSequence(ModSample &smp, STPLoopList &loopList)
{
if(!smp.HasSampleData() || loopList.size() < 2) return;
ModSample newSmp = smp;
newSmp.nLength = 0;
newSmp.pSample = nullptr;
size_t numLoops = loopList.size();
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
if((newSmp.nLength + info.loopLength > MAX_SAMPLE_LENGTH) ||
(info.loopLength > MAX_SAMPLE_LENGTH) ||
(info.loopStart + info.loopLength > smp.nLength))
{
numLoops = i;
break;
}
newSmp.nLength += info.loopLength;
}
if(!newSmp.AllocateSample())
{
return;
}
SmpLength start = 0;
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
memcpy(newSmp.pSample8 + start, smp.pSample8 + info.loopStart, info.loopLength);
info.loopStart = start;
if(i > 0 && i <= mpt::size(newSmp.cues))
{
newSmp.cues[i - 1] = start;
}
start += info.loopLength;
}
smp.FreeSample();
smp = newSmp;
smp.nLoopStart = 0;
smp.nLoopEnd = smp.nLength;
smp.uFlags.set(CHN_LOOP);
}
Commit Message: [Fix] STP: Possible out-of-bounds memory read with malformed STP files (caught with afl-fuzz).
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@9567 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void ConvertLoopSequence(ModSample &smp, STPLoopList &loopList)
{
if(!smp.HasSampleData() || loopList.size() < 2) return;
ModSample newSmp = smp;
newSmp.nLength = 0;
newSmp.pSample = nullptr;
size_t numLoops = loopList.size();
// Get the total length of the sample after combining all looped sections
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
// If adding this loop would cause the sample length to exceed maximum,
if(info.loopStart >= smp.nLength
|| smp.nLength - info.loopStart < info.loopLength
|| newSmp.nLength > MAX_SAMPLE_LENGTH - info.loopLength)
{
numLoops = i;
break;
}
newSmp.nLength += info.loopLength;
}
if(!newSmp.AllocateSample())
{
return;
}
SmpLength start = 0;
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
memcpy(newSmp.pSample8 + start, smp.pSample8 + info.loopStart, info.loopLength);
info.loopStart = start;
if(i > 0 && i <= mpt::size(newSmp.cues))
{
newSmp.cues[i - 1] = start;
}
start += info.loopLength;
}
smp.FreeSample();
smp = newSmp;
smp.nLoopStart = 0;
smp.nLoopEnd = smp.nLength;
smp.uFlags.set(CHN_LOOP);
}
| 169,337 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int decode_getacl(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct rpc_rqst *req,
size_t *acl_len)
{
__be32 *savep;
uint32_t attrlen,
bitmap[3] = {0};
struct kvec *iov = req->rq_rcv_buf.head;
int status;
*acl_len = 0;
if ((status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_GETATTR)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_bitmap(xdr, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_length(xdr, &attrlen, &savep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_ACL - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_ACL)) {
size_t hdrlen;
u32 recvd;
/* We ignore &savep and don't do consistency checks on
* the attr length. Let userspace figure it out.... */
hdrlen = (u8 *)xdr->p - (u8 *)iov->iov_base;
recvd = req->rq_rcv_buf.len - hdrlen;
if (attrlen > recvd) {
dprintk("NFS: server cheating in getattr"
" acl reply: attrlen %u > recvd %u\n",
attrlen, recvd);
return -EINVAL;
}
xdr_read_pages(xdr, attrlen);
*acl_len = attrlen;
} else
status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static int decode_getacl(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct rpc_rqst *req,
struct nfs_getaclres *res)
{
__be32 *savep, *bm_p;
uint32_t attrlen,
bitmap[3] = {0};
struct kvec *iov = req->rq_rcv_buf.head;
int status;
res->acl_len = 0;
if ((status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_GETATTR)) != 0)
goto out;
bm_p = xdr->p;
if ((status = decode_attr_bitmap(xdr, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_length(xdr, &attrlen, &savep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_ACL - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_ACL)) {
size_t hdrlen;
u32 recvd;
/* The bitmap (xdr len + bitmaps) and the attr xdr len words
* are stored with the acl data to handle the problem of
* variable length bitmaps.*/
xdr->p = bm_p;
res->acl_data_offset = be32_to_cpup(bm_p) + 2;
res->acl_data_offset <<= 2;
/* We ignore &savep and don't do consistency checks on
* the attr length. Let userspace figure it out.... */
hdrlen = (u8 *)xdr->p - (u8 *)iov->iov_base;
attrlen += res->acl_data_offset;
recvd = req->rq_rcv_buf.len - hdrlen;
if (attrlen > recvd) {
if (res->acl_flags & NFS4_ACL_LEN_REQUEST) {
/* getxattr interface called with a NULL buf */
res->acl_len = attrlen;
goto out;
}
dprintk("NFS: acl reply: attrlen %u > recvd %u\n",
attrlen, recvd);
return -EINVAL;
}
xdr_read_pages(xdr, attrlen);
res->acl_len = attrlen;
} else
status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
out:
return status;
}
| 165,719 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int wait_for_fpga_config(void)
{
int ret = 0, done;
/* approx 5 s */
u32 timeout = 500000;
printf("PCIe FPGA config:");
do {
done = qrio_get_gpio(GPIO_A, FPGA_DONE);
if (timeout-- == 0) {
printf(" FPGA_DONE timeout\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err_out;
}
udelay(10);
} while (!done);
printf(" done\n");
err_out:
/* deactive CONF_SEL and give the CPU conf EEPROM access */
qrio_set_gpio(GPIO_A, CONF_SEL_L, 1);
toggle_fpga_eeprom_bus(true);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static int wait_for_fpga_config(void)
{
int ret = 0, done;
/* approx 5 s */
u32 timeout = 500000;
printf("PCIe FPGA config:");
do {
done = qrio_get_gpio(QRIO_GPIO_A, FPGA_DONE);
if (timeout-- == 0) {
printf(" FPGA_DONE timeout\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err_out;
}
udelay(10);
} while (!done);
printf(" done\n");
err_out:
/* deactive CONF_SEL and give the CPU conf EEPROM access */
qrio_set_gpio(QRIO_GPIO_A, CONF_SEL_L, 1);
toggle_fpga_eeprom_bus(true);
return ret;
}
| 169,636 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, getPathInfo)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zend_class_entry *ce = intern->info_class;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|C", &ce) == SUCCESS) {
int path_len;
char *path = spl_filesystem_object_get_pathname(intern, &path_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (path) {
char *dpath = estrndup(path, path_len);
path_len = php_dirname(dpath, path_len);
spl_filesystem_object_create_info(intern, dpath, path_len, 1, ce, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
efree(dpath);
}
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, getPathInfo)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zend_class_entry *ce = intern->info_class;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|C", &ce) == SUCCESS) {
int path_len;
char *path = spl_filesystem_object_get_pathname(intern, &path_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (path) {
char *dpath = estrndup(path, path_len);
path_len = php_dirname(dpath, path_len);
spl_filesystem_object_create_info(intern, dpath, path_len, 1, ce, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
efree(dpath);
}
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
}
| 167,043 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnDidAddMessageToConsole(
int32_t level,
const base::string16& message,
int32_t line_no,
const base::string16& source_id) {
if (level < logging::LOG_VERBOSE || level > logging::LOG_FATAL) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
GetProcess(), bad_message::RFH_DID_ADD_CONSOLE_MESSAGE_BAD_SEVERITY);
return;
}
if (delegate_->DidAddMessageToConsole(level, message, line_no, source_id))
return;
const bool is_builtin_component =
HasWebUIScheme(delegate_->GetMainFrameLastCommittedURL()) ||
GetContentClient()->browser()->IsBuiltinComponent(
GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext(), GetLastCommittedOrigin());
const bool is_off_the_record =
GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord();
LogConsoleMessage(level, message, line_no, is_builtin_component,
is_off_the_record, source_id);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnDidAddMessageToConsole(
void RenderFrameHostImpl::DidAddMessageToConsole(
blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel log_level,
const base::string16& message,
int32_t line_no,
const base::string16& source_id) {
// TODO(https://crbug.com/786836): Update downstream code to use
// ConsoleMessageLevel everywhere to avoid this conversion.
logging::LogSeverity log_severity = logging::LOG_VERBOSE;
switch (log_level) {
case blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kVerbose:
log_severity = logging::LOG_VERBOSE;
break;
case blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kInfo:
log_severity = logging::LOG_INFO;
break;
case blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kWarning:
log_severity = logging::LOG_WARNING;
break;
case blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kError:
log_severity = logging::LOG_ERROR;
break;
}
if (delegate_->DidAddMessageToConsole(log_severity, message, line_no,
source_id)) {
return;
}
// Pass through log severity only on builtin components pages to limit console
const bool is_builtin_component =
HasWebUIScheme(delegate_->GetMainFrameLastCommittedURL()) ||
GetContentClient()->browser()->IsBuiltinComponent(
GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext(), GetLastCommittedOrigin());
const bool is_off_the_record =
GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord();
LogConsoleMessage(log_severity, message, line_no, is_builtin_component,
is_off_the_record, source_id);
}
| 172,485 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DataReductionProxySettings::MaybeActivateDataReductionProxy(
bool at_startup) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
PrefService* prefs = GetOriginalProfilePrefs();
if (!prefs)
return;
if (spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.GetValue() && at_startup) {
int64_t last_enabled_time =
prefs->GetInt64(prefs::kDataReductionProxyLastEnabledTime);
if (last_enabled_time != 0) {
RecordDaysSinceEnabledMetric(
(clock_->Now() - base::Time::FromInternalValue(last_enabled_time))
.InDays());
}
int64_t last_savings_cleared_time = prefs->GetInt64(
prefs::kDataReductionProxySavingsClearedNegativeSystemClock);
if (last_savings_cleared_time != 0) {
int32_t days_since_savings_cleared =
(clock_->Now() -
base::Time::FromInternalValue(last_savings_cleared_time))
.InDays();
if (days_since_savings_cleared == 0)
days_since_savings_cleared = 1;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS(
"DataReductionProxy.DaysSinceSavingsCleared.NegativeSystemClock",
days_since_savings_cleared, 1, 365, 50);
}
}
if (spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.GetValue() &&
!prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kDataReductionProxyWasEnabledBefore)) {
prefs->SetBoolean(prefs::kDataReductionProxyWasEnabledBefore, true);
ResetDataReductionStatistics();
}
if (!at_startup) {
if (IsDataReductionProxyEnabled()) {
RecordSettingsEnabledState(DATA_REDUCTION_SETTINGS_ACTION_OFF_TO_ON);
prefs->SetInt64(prefs::kDataReductionProxyLastEnabledTime,
clock_->Now().ToInternalValue());
RecordDaysSinceEnabledMetric(0);
} else {
RecordSettingsEnabledState(DATA_REDUCTION_SETTINGS_ACTION_ON_TO_OFF);
}
}
if (at_startup && !data_reduction_proxy_service_->Initialized())
deferred_initialization_ = true;
else
UpdateIOData(at_startup);
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void DataReductionProxySettings::MaybeActivateDataReductionProxy(
bool at_startup) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
PrefService* prefs = GetOriginalProfilePrefs();
if (!prefs)
return;
bool enabled = IsDataSaverEnabledByUser(prefs);
if (enabled && at_startup) {
int64_t last_enabled_time =
prefs->GetInt64(prefs::kDataReductionProxyLastEnabledTime);
if (last_enabled_time != 0) {
RecordDaysSinceEnabledMetric(
(clock_->Now() - base::Time::FromInternalValue(last_enabled_time))
.InDays());
}
int64_t last_savings_cleared_time = prefs->GetInt64(
prefs::kDataReductionProxySavingsClearedNegativeSystemClock);
if (last_savings_cleared_time != 0) {
int32_t days_since_savings_cleared =
(clock_->Now() -
base::Time::FromInternalValue(last_savings_cleared_time))
.InDays();
if (days_since_savings_cleared == 0)
days_since_savings_cleared = 1;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS(
"DataReductionProxy.DaysSinceSavingsCleared.NegativeSystemClock",
days_since_savings_cleared, 1, 365, 50);
}
}
if (enabled &&
!prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kDataReductionProxyWasEnabledBefore)) {
prefs->SetBoolean(prefs::kDataReductionProxyWasEnabledBefore, true);
ResetDataReductionStatistics();
}
if (!at_startup) {
if (IsDataReductionProxyEnabled()) {
RecordSettingsEnabledState(DATA_REDUCTION_SETTINGS_ACTION_OFF_TO_ON);
prefs->SetInt64(prefs::kDataReductionProxyLastEnabledTime,
clock_->Now().ToInternalValue());
RecordDaysSinceEnabledMetric(0);
} else {
RecordSettingsEnabledState(DATA_REDUCTION_SETTINGS_ACTION_ON_TO_OFF);
}
}
if (at_startup && !data_reduction_proxy_service_->Initialized())
deferred_initialization_ = true;
else
UpdateIOData(at_startup);
}
| 172,557 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void mp_encode_lua_table_as_array(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, int level) {
#if LUA_VERSION_NUM < 502
size_t len = lua_objlen(L,-1), j;
#else
size_t len = lua_rawlen(L,-1), j;
#endif
mp_encode_array(L,buf,len);
for (j = 1; j <= len; j++) {
lua_pushnumber(L,j);
lua_gettable(L,-2);
mp_encode_lua_type(L,buf,level+1);
}
}
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void mp_encode_lua_table_as_array(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, int level) {
#if LUA_VERSION_NUM < 502
size_t len = lua_objlen(L,-1), j;
#else
size_t len = lua_rawlen(L,-1), j;
#endif
mp_encode_array(L,buf,len);
luaL_checkstack(L, 1, "in function mp_encode_lua_table_as_array");
for (j = 1; j <= len; j++) {
lua_pushnumber(L,j);
lua_gettable(L,-2);
mp_encode_lua_type(L,buf,level+1);
}
}
| 169,239 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void pdf_load_pages_kids(FILE *fp, pdf_t *pdf)
{
int i, id, dummy;
char *buf, *c;
long start, sz;
start = ftell(fp);
/* Load all kids for all xref tables (versions) */
for (i=0; i<pdf->n_xrefs; i++)
{
if (pdf->xrefs[i].version && (pdf->xrefs[i].end != 0))
{
fseek(fp, pdf->xrefs[i].start, SEEK_SET);
while (SAFE_F(fp, (fgetc(fp) != 't')))
; /* Iterate to trailer */
/* Get root catalog */
sz = pdf->xrefs[i].end - ftell(fp);
buf = malloc(sz + 1);
SAFE_E(fread(buf, 1, sz, fp), sz, "Failed to load /Root.\n");
buf[sz] = '\0';
if (!(c = strstr(buf, "/Root")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Jump to catalog (root) */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Root") + 1);
free(buf);
buf = get_object(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i], NULL, &dummy);
if (!buf || !(c = strstr(buf, "/Pages")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Start at the first Pages obj and get kids */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Pages") + 1);
load_kids(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i]);
free(buf);
}
}
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787 | void pdf_load_pages_kids(FILE *fp, pdf_t *pdf)
{
int i, id, dummy;
char *buf, *c;
long start, sz;
start = ftell(fp);
/* Load all kids for all xref tables (versions) */
for (i=0; i<pdf->n_xrefs; i++)
{
if (pdf->xrefs[i].version && (pdf->xrefs[i].end != 0))
{
fseek(fp, pdf->xrefs[i].start, SEEK_SET);
while (SAFE_F(fp, (fgetc(fp) != 't')))
; /* Iterate to trailer */
/* Get root catalog */
sz = pdf->xrefs[i].end - ftell(fp);
buf = safe_calloc(sz + 1);
SAFE_E(fread(buf, 1, sz, fp), sz, "Failed to load /Root.\n");
buf[sz] = '\0';
if (!(c = strstr(buf, "/Root")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Jump to catalog (root) */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Root") + 1);
free(buf);
buf = get_object(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i], NULL, &dummy);
if (!buf || !(c = strstr(buf, "/Pages")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Start at the first Pages obj and get kids */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Pages") + 1);
load_kids(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i]);
free(buf);
}
}
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
}
| 169,571 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: vips_foreign_load_gif_scan_image( VipsForeignLoadGif *gif )
{
VipsObjectClass *class = VIPS_OBJECT_GET_CLASS( gif );
GifFileType *file = gif->file;
ColorMapObject *map = file->Image.ColorMap ?
file->Image.ColorMap : file->SColorMap;
GifByteType *extension;
if( DGifGetImageDesc( gif->file ) == GIF_ERROR ) {
vips_foreign_load_gif_error( gif );
return( -1 );
}
/* Check that the frame looks sane. Perhaps giflib checks
* this for us.
*/
if( file->Image.Left < 0 ||
file->Image.Width < 1 ||
file->Image.Width > 10000 ||
file->Image.Left + file->Image.Width > file->SWidth ||
file->Image.Top < 0 ||
file->Image.Height < 1 ||
file->Image.Height > 10000 ||
file->Image.Top + file->Image.Height > file->SHeight ) {
vips_error( class->nickname, "%s", _( "bad frame size" ) );
return( -1 );
}
/* Test for a non-greyscale colourmap for this frame.
*/
if( !gif->has_colour &&
map ) {
int i;
for( i = 0; i < map->ColorCount; i++ )
if( map->Colors[i].Red != map->Colors[i].Green ||
map->Colors[i].Green != map->Colors[i].Blue ) {
gif->has_colour = TRUE;
break;
}
}
/* Step over compressed image data.
*/
do {
if( vips_foreign_load_gif_code_next( gif, &extension ) )
return( -1 );
} while( extension != NULL );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: fetch map after DGifGetImageDesc()
Earlier refactoring broke GIF map fetch.
CWE ID: | vips_foreign_load_gif_scan_image( VipsForeignLoadGif *gif )
{
VipsObjectClass *class = VIPS_OBJECT_GET_CLASS( gif );
GifFileType *file = gif->file;
ColorMapObject *map;
GifByteType *extension;
if( DGifGetImageDesc( gif->file ) == GIF_ERROR ) {
vips_foreign_load_gif_error( gif );
return( -1 );
}
/* Check that the frame looks sane. Perhaps giflib checks
* this for us.
*/
if( file->Image.Left < 0 ||
file->Image.Width < 1 ||
file->Image.Width > 10000 ||
file->Image.Left + file->Image.Width > file->SWidth ||
file->Image.Top < 0 ||
file->Image.Height < 1 ||
file->Image.Height > 10000 ||
file->Image.Top + file->Image.Height > file->SHeight ) {
vips_error( class->nickname, "%s", _( "bad frame size" ) );
return( -1 );
}
/* Test for a non-greyscale colourmap for this frame.
*/
map = file->Image.ColorMap ? file->Image.ColorMap : file->SColorMap;
if( !gif->has_colour &&
map ) {
int i;
for( i = 0; i < map->ColorCount; i++ )
if( map->Colors[i].Red != map->Colors[i].Green ||
map->Colors[i].Green != map->Colors[i].Blue ) {
gif->has_colour = TRUE;
break;
}
}
/* Step over compressed image data.
*/
do {
if( vips_foreign_load_gif_code_next( gif, &extension ) )
return( -1 );
} while( extension != NULL );
return( 0 );
}
| 169,490 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, portIndex);
return updateGraphicBufferInMeta_l(
portIndex, graphicBuffer, buffer, header,
portIndex == kPortIndexOutput /* updateCodecBuffer */);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, portIndex);
return updateGraphicBufferInMeta_l(
portIndex, graphicBuffer, buffer, header,
true /* updateCodecBuffer */);
}
| 174,141 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void rds_inc_info_copy(struct rds_incoming *inc,
struct rds_info_iterator *iter,
__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, int flip)
{
struct rds_info_message minfo;
minfo.seq = be64_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_sequence);
minfo.len = be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len);
if (flip) {
minfo.laddr = daddr;
minfo.faddr = saddr;
minfo.lport = inc->i_hdr.h_dport;
minfo.fport = inc->i_hdr.h_sport;
} else {
minfo.laddr = saddr;
minfo.faddr = daddr;
minfo.lport = inc->i_hdr.h_sport;
minfo.fport = inc->i_hdr.h_dport;
}
rds_info_copy(iter, &minfo, sizeof(minfo));
}
Commit Message: rds: fix an infoleak in rds_inc_info_copy
The last field "flags" of object "minfo" is not initialized.
Copying this object out may leak kernel stack data.
Assign 0 to it to avoid leak.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void rds_inc_info_copy(struct rds_incoming *inc,
struct rds_info_iterator *iter,
__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, int flip)
{
struct rds_info_message minfo;
minfo.seq = be64_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_sequence);
minfo.len = be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len);
if (flip) {
minfo.laddr = daddr;
minfo.faddr = saddr;
minfo.lport = inc->i_hdr.h_dport;
minfo.fport = inc->i_hdr.h_sport;
} else {
minfo.laddr = saddr;
minfo.faddr = daddr;
minfo.lport = inc->i_hdr.h_sport;
minfo.fport = inc->i_hdr.h_dport;
}
minfo.flags = 0;
rds_info_copy(iter, &minfo, sizeof(minfo));
}
| 167,161 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool ldm_frag_add (const u8 *data, int size, struct list_head *frags)
{
struct frag *f;
struct list_head *item;
int rec, num, group;
BUG_ON (!data || !frags);
if (size < 2 * VBLK_SIZE_HEAD) {
ldm_error("Value of size is to small.");
return false;
}
group = get_unaligned_be32(data + 0x08);
rec = get_unaligned_be16(data + 0x0C);
num = get_unaligned_be16(data + 0x0E);
if ((num < 1) || (num > 4)) {
ldm_error ("A VBLK claims to have %d parts.", num);
return false;
}
if (rec >= num) {
ldm_error("REC value (%d) exceeds NUM value (%d)", rec, num);
return false;
}
list_for_each (item, frags) {
f = list_entry (item, struct frag, list);
if (f->group == group)
goto found;
}
f = kmalloc (sizeof (*f) + size*num, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!f) {
ldm_crit ("Out of memory.");
return false;
}
f->group = group;
f->num = num;
f->rec = rec;
f->map = 0xFF << num;
list_add_tail (&f->list, frags);
found:
if (f->map & (1 << rec)) {
ldm_error ("Duplicate VBLK, part %d.", rec);
f->map &= 0x7F; /* Mark the group as broken */
return false;
}
f->map |= (1 << rec);
data += VBLK_SIZE_HEAD;
size -= VBLK_SIZE_HEAD;
memcpy (f->data+rec*(size-VBLK_SIZE_HEAD)+VBLK_SIZE_HEAD, data, size);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix for buffer overflow in ldm_frag_add not sufficient
As Ben Hutchings discovered [1], the patch for CVE-2011-1017 (buffer
overflow in ldm_frag_add) is not sufficient. The original patch in
commit c340b1d64000 ("fs/partitions/ldm.c: fix oops caused by corrupted
partition table") does not consider that, for subsequent fragments,
previously allocated memory is used.
[1] http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/5/6/407
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static bool ldm_frag_add (const u8 *data, int size, struct list_head *frags)
{
struct frag *f;
struct list_head *item;
int rec, num, group;
BUG_ON (!data || !frags);
if (size < 2 * VBLK_SIZE_HEAD) {
ldm_error("Value of size is to small.");
return false;
}
group = get_unaligned_be32(data + 0x08);
rec = get_unaligned_be16(data + 0x0C);
num = get_unaligned_be16(data + 0x0E);
if ((num < 1) || (num > 4)) {
ldm_error ("A VBLK claims to have %d parts.", num);
return false;
}
if (rec >= num) {
ldm_error("REC value (%d) exceeds NUM value (%d)", rec, num);
return false;
}
list_for_each (item, frags) {
f = list_entry (item, struct frag, list);
if (f->group == group)
goto found;
}
f = kmalloc (sizeof (*f) + size*num, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!f) {
ldm_crit ("Out of memory.");
return false;
}
f->group = group;
f->num = num;
f->rec = rec;
f->map = 0xFF << num;
list_add_tail (&f->list, frags);
found:
if (rec >= f->num) {
ldm_error("REC value (%d) exceeds NUM value (%d)", rec, f->num);
return false;
}
if (f->map & (1 << rec)) {
ldm_error ("Duplicate VBLK, part %d.", rec);
f->map &= 0x7F; /* Mark the group as broken */
return false;
}
f->map |= (1 << rec);
data += VBLK_SIZE_HEAD;
size -= VBLK_SIZE_HEAD;
memcpy (f->data+rec*(size-VBLK_SIZE_HEAD)+VBLK_SIZE_HEAD, data, size);
return true;
}
| 165,872 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Track::ParseContentEncodingsEntry(long long start, long long size) {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
assert(pReader);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
int count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) // ContentEncoding ID
++count;
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (count <= 0)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_ = new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding*[count];
if (!content_encoding_entries_)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_end_ = content_encoding_entries_;
pos = start;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) { // ContentEncoding ID
ContentEncoding* const content_encoding =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding();
if (!content_encoding)
return -1;
status = content_encoding->ParseContentEncodingEntry(pos,
size,
pReader);
if (status) {
delete content_encoding;
return status;
}
*content_encoding_entries_end_++ = content_encoding;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Track::ParseContentEncodingsEntry(long long start, long long size) {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
assert(pReader);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
int count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
// pos now designates start of element
if (id == 0x2240) // ContentEncoding ID
++count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (count <= 0)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_ = new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding* [count];
if (!content_encoding_entries_)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_end_ = content_encoding_entries_;
pos = start;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
// pos now designates start of element
if (id == 0x2240) { // ContentEncoding ID
ContentEncoding* const content_encoding =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding();
if (!content_encoding)
return -1;
status = content_encoding->ParseContentEncodingEntry(pos, size, pReader);
if (status) {
delete content_encoding;
return status;
}
*content_encoding_entries_end_++ = content_encoding;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
| 174,420 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void UnloadController::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
TabDetachedImpl(contents);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void UnloadController::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
void UnloadController::TabDetachedAt(content::WebContents* contents,
int index) {
TabDetachedImpl(contents);
}
| 171,519 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void php_snmp_error(zval *object, const char *docref, int type, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
php_snmp_object *snmp_object = NULL;
if (object) {
snmp_object = Z_SNMP_P(object);
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
memset(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, 0, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr));
} else {
va_start(args, format);
vsnprintf(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr) - 1, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
snmp_object->snmp_errno = type;
}
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
return;
}
if (object && (snmp_object->exceptions_enabled & type)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(php_snmp_exception_ce, type, snmp_object->snmp_errstr);
} else {
va_start(args, format);
php_verror(docref, "", E_WARNING, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void php_snmp_error(zval *object, const char *docref, int type, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
php_snmp_object *snmp_object = NULL;
if (object) {
snmp_object = Z_SNMP_P(object);
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
memset(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, 0, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr));
} else {
va_start(args, format);
vsnprintf(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr) - 1, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
snmp_object->snmp_errno = type;
}
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
return;
}
if (object && (snmp_object->exceptions_enabled & type)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(php_snmp_exception_ce, type, "%s", snmp_object->snmp_errstr);
} else {
va_start(args, format);
php_verror(docref, "", E_WARNING, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
}
| 165,074 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator::OnDecode(
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle, int32 id, int32 size) {
DCHECK(video_decode_accelerator_.get());
video_decode_accelerator_->Decode(media::BitstreamBuffer(id, handle, size));
}
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator::OnDecode(
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle, int32 id, uint32 size) {
DCHECK(video_decode_accelerator_.get());
video_decode_accelerator_->Decode(media::BitstreamBuffer(id, handle, size));
}
| 171,407 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WorkerProcessLauncherTest::WorkerProcessLauncherTest()
: message_loop_(MessageLoop::TYPE_IO) {
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | WorkerProcessLauncherTest::WorkerProcessLauncherTest()
: message_loop_(MessageLoop::TYPE_IO),
client_pid_(GetCurrentProcessId()),
permanent_error_(false) {
}
| 171,553 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void reflectStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
Element* impl = V8Element::toImpl(holder);
v8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->fastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectstringattributeAttr), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static void reflectStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestInterfaceNode* impl = V8TestInterfaceNode::toImpl(holder);
v8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->fastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectstringattributeAttr), info.GetIsolate());
}
| 171,597 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnCancelPendingPreviewRequest() {
g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Set(preview_ui_addr_str_, -1);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void PrintPreviewUI::OnCancelPendingPreviewRequest() {
g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Set(id_, -1);
}
| 170,836 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: poppler_page_prepare_output_dev (PopplerPage *page,
double scale,
int rotation,
gboolean transparent,
OutputDevData *output_dev_data)
{
CairoOutputDev *output_dev;
cairo_surface_t *surface;
double width, height;
int cairo_width, cairo_height, cairo_rowstride, rotate;
unsigned char *cairo_data;
rotate = rotation + page->page->getRotate ();
if (rotate == 90 || rotate == 270) {
height = page->page->getCropWidth ();
width = page->page->getCropHeight ();
} else {
width = page->page->getCropWidth ();
height = page->page->getCropHeight ();
}
cairo_width = (int) ceil(width * scale);
cairo_height = (int) ceil(height * scale);
output_dev = page->document->output_dev;
cairo_rowstride = cairo_width * 4;
cairo_data = (guchar *) gmalloc (cairo_height * cairo_rowstride);
if (transparent)
memset (cairo_data, 0x00, cairo_height * cairo_rowstride);
else
memset (cairo_data, 0xff, cairo_height * cairo_rowstride);
surface = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data(cairo_data,
CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,
cairo_width, cairo_height,
cairo_rowstride);
output_dev_data->cairo_data = cairo_data;
output_dev_data->surface = surface;
output_dev_data->cairo = cairo_create (surface);
output_dev->setCairo (output_dev_data->cairo);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | poppler_page_prepare_output_dev (PopplerPage *page,
double scale,
int rotation,
gboolean transparent,
OutputDevData *output_dev_data)
{
CairoOutputDev *output_dev;
cairo_surface_t *surface;
double width, height;
int cairo_width, cairo_height, cairo_rowstride, rotate;
unsigned char *cairo_data;
rotate = rotation + page->page->getRotate ();
if (rotate == 90 || rotate == 270) {
height = page->page->getCropWidth ();
width = page->page->getCropHeight ();
} else {
width = page->page->getCropWidth ();
height = page->page->getCropHeight ();
}
cairo_width = (int) ceil(width * scale);
cairo_height = (int) ceil(height * scale);
output_dev = page->document->output_dev;
cairo_rowstride = cairo_width * 4;
cairo_data = (guchar *) gmallocn (cairo_height, cairo_rowstride);
if (transparent)
memset (cairo_data, 0x00, cairo_height * cairo_rowstride);
else
memset (cairo_data, 0xff, cairo_height * cairo_rowstride);
surface = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data(cairo_data,
CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,
cairo_width, cairo_height,
cairo_rowstride);
output_dev_data->cairo_data = cairo_data;
output_dev_data->surface = surface;
output_dev_data->cairo = cairo_create (surface);
output_dev->setCairo (output_dev_data->cairo);
}
| 164,617 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void llc_conn_handler(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct llc_addr saddr, daddr;
struct sock *sk;
llc_pdu_decode_sa(skb, saddr.mac);
llc_pdu_decode_ssap(skb, &saddr.lsap);
llc_pdu_decode_da(skb, daddr.mac);
llc_pdu_decode_dsap(skb, &daddr.lsap);
sk = __llc_lookup(sap, &saddr, &daddr);
if (!sk)
goto drop;
bh_lock_sock(sk);
/*
* This has to be done here and not at the upper layer ->accept
* method because of the way the PROCOM state machine works:
* it needs to set several state variables (see, for instance,
* llc_adm_actions_2 in net/llc/llc_c_st.c) and send a packet to
* the originator of the new connection, and this state has to be
* in the newly created struct sock private area. -acme
*/
if (unlikely(sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)) {
struct sock *newsk = llc_create_incoming_sock(sk, skb->dev,
&saddr, &daddr);
if (!newsk)
goto drop_unlock;
skb_set_owner_r(skb, newsk);
} else {
/*
* Can't be skb_set_owner_r, this will be done at the
* llc_conn_state_process function, later on, when we will use
* skb_queue_rcv_skb to send it to upper layers, this is
* another trick required to cope with how the PROCOM state
* machine works. -acme
*/
skb->sk = sk;
}
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
llc_conn_rcv(sk, skb);
else {
dprintk("%s: adding to backlog...\n", __func__);
llc_set_backlog_type(skb, LLC_PACKET);
if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, sk->sk_rcvbuf))
goto drop_unlock;
}
out:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
return;
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
return;
drop_unlock:
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void llc_conn_handler(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct llc_addr saddr, daddr;
struct sock *sk;
llc_pdu_decode_sa(skb, saddr.mac);
llc_pdu_decode_ssap(skb, &saddr.lsap);
llc_pdu_decode_da(skb, daddr.mac);
llc_pdu_decode_dsap(skb, &daddr.lsap);
sk = __llc_lookup(sap, &saddr, &daddr);
if (!sk)
goto drop;
bh_lock_sock(sk);
/*
* This has to be done here and not at the upper layer ->accept
* method because of the way the PROCOM state machine works:
* it needs to set several state variables (see, for instance,
* llc_adm_actions_2 in net/llc/llc_c_st.c) and send a packet to
* the originator of the new connection, and this state has to be
* in the newly created struct sock private area. -acme
*/
if (unlikely(sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)) {
struct sock *newsk = llc_create_incoming_sock(sk, skb->dev,
&saddr, &daddr);
if (!newsk)
goto drop_unlock;
skb_set_owner_r(skb, newsk);
} else {
/*
* Can't be skb_set_owner_r, this will be done at the
* llc_conn_state_process function, later on, when we will use
* skb_queue_rcv_skb to send it to upper layers, this is
* another trick required to cope with how the PROCOM state
* machine works. -acme
*/
skb_orphan(skb);
sock_hold(sk);
skb->sk = sk;
skb->destructor = sock_efree;
}
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
llc_conn_rcv(sk, skb);
else {
dprintk("%s: adding to backlog...\n", __func__);
llc_set_backlog_type(skb, LLC_PACKET);
if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, sk->sk_rcvbuf))
goto drop_unlock;
}
out:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
return;
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
return;
drop_unlock:
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
| 168,348 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeContentRendererClient::WillSendRequest(WebKit::WebFrame* frame,
const GURL& url,
GURL* new_url) {
if (url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme) &&
!ExtensionResourceRequestPolicy::CanRequestResource(
url,
GURL(frame->document().url()),
extension_dispatcher_->extensions())) {
*new_url = GURL("chrome-extension://invalid/");
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Do not require DevTools extension resources to be white-listed in manifest.
Currently, resources used by DevTools extensions need to be white-listed as web_accessible_resources in manifest. This is quite inconvenitent and appears to be an overkill, given the fact that DevTools front-end is
(a) trusted and
(b) picky on the frames it loads.
This change adds resources that belong to DevTools extensions and are being loaded into a DevTools front-end page to the list of exceptions from web_accessible_resources check.
BUG=none
TEST=DevToolsExtensionTest.*
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9663076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool ChromeContentRendererClient::WillSendRequest(WebKit::WebFrame* frame,
const GURL& url,
GURL* new_url) {
if (url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme) &&
!ExtensionResourceRequestPolicy::CanRequestResource(
url,
frame,
extension_dispatcher_->extensions())) {
*new_url = GURL("chrome-extension://invalid/");
return true;
}
return false;
}
| 171,000 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool HasPermissionsForFile(const FilePath& file, int permissions) {
FilePath current_path = file.StripTrailingSeparators();
FilePath last_path;
while (current_path != last_path) {
if (file_permissions_.find(current_path) != file_permissions_.end())
return (file_permissions_[current_path] & permissions) == permissions;
last_path = current_path;
current_path = current_path.DirName();
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Apply missing kParentDirectory check
BUG=161564
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11414046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | bool HasPermissionsForFile(const FilePath& file, int permissions) {
FilePath current_path = file.StripTrailingSeparators();
FilePath last_path;
int skip = 0;
while (current_path != last_path) {
FilePath base_name = current_path.BaseName();
if (base_name.value() == FilePath::kParentDirectory) {
++skip;
} else if (skip > 0) {
if (base_name.value() != FilePath::kCurrentDirectory)
--skip;
} else {
if (file_permissions_.find(current_path) != file_permissions_.end())
return (file_permissions_[current_path] & permissions) == permissions;
}
last_path = current_path;
current_path = current_path.DirName();
}
return false;
}
| 170,673 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ProcEstablishConnection(ClientPtr client)
{
const char *reason;
char *auth_proto, *auth_string;
xConnClientPrefix *prefix;
REQUEST(xReq);
prefix = (xConnClientPrefix *) ((char *) stuff + sz_xReq);
auth_proto = (char *) prefix + sz_xConnClientPrefix;
auth_string = auth_proto + pad_to_int32(prefix->nbytesAuthProto);
if ((prefix->majorVersion != X_PROTOCOL) ||
(prefix->minorVersion != X_PROTOCOL_REVISION))
reason = "Protocol version mismatch";
else
return (SendConnSetup(client, reason));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ProcEstablishConnection(ClientPtr client)
{
const char *reason;
char *auth_proto, *auth_string;
xConnClientPrefix *prefix;
REQUEST(xReq);
prefix = (xConnClientPrefix *) ((char *) stuff + sz_xReq);
auth_proto = (char *) prefix + sz_xConnClientPrefix;
auth_string = auth_proto + pad_to_int32(prefix->nbytesAuthProto);
if ((client->req_len << 2) != sz_xReq + sz_xConnClientPrefix +
pad_to_int32(prefix->nbytesAuthProto) +
pad_to_int32(prefix->nbytesAuthString))
reason = "Bad length";
else if ((prefix->majorVersion != X_PROTOCOL) ||
(prefix->minorVersion != X_PROTOCOL_REVISION))
reason = "Protocol version mismatch";
else
return (SendConnSetup(client, reason));
}
| 165,448 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void vrend_renderer_context_destroy(uint32_t handle)
{
struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx;
bool ret;
if (handle >= VREND_MAX_CTX)
return;
ctx = dec_ctx[handle];
if (!ctx)
return;
vrend_hw_switch_context(dec_ctx[0]->grctx, true);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | void vrend_renderer_context_destroy(uint32_t handle)
{
struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx;
bool ret;
if (handle >= VREND_MAX_CTX)
return;
/* never destroy context 0 here, it will be destroyed in vrend_decode_reset()*/
if (handle == 0) {
return;
}
ctx = dec_ctx[handle];
if (!ctx)
return;
vrend_hw_switch_context(dec_ctx[0]->grctx, true);
}
| 164,949 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CloudPolicyController::SetState(
CloudPolicyController::ControllerState new_state) {
state_ = new_state;
backend_.reset(); // Discard any pending requests.
base::Time now(base::Time::NowFromSystemTime());
base::Time refresh_at;
base::Time last_refresh(cache_->last_policy_refresh_time());
if (last_refresh.is_null())
last_refresh = now;
bool inform_notifier_done = false;
switch (state_) {
case STATE_TOKEN_UNMANAGED:
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::UNMANAGED,
CloudPolicySubsystem::NO_DETAILS,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
break;
case STATE_TOKEN_UNAVAILABLE:
case STATE_TOKEN_VALID:
refresh_at = now;
break;
case STATE_POLICY_VALID:
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ =
kPolicyRefreshErrorDelayInMilliseconds;
refresh_at =
last_refresh + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(GetRefreshDelay());
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::SUCCESS,
CloudPolicySubsystem::NO_DETAILS,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
break;
case STATE_TOKEN_ERROR:
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR,
CloudPolicySubsystem::BAD_DMTOKEN,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
inform_notifier_done = true;
case STATE_POLICY_ERROR:
if (!inform_notifier_done) {
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR,
CloudPolicySubsystem::POLICY_NETWORK_ERROR,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
}
refresh_at = now + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_);
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ =
std::min(effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ * 2,
policy_refresh_rate_ms_);
break;
case STATE_POLICY_UNAVAILABLE:
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ = policy_refresh_rate_ms_;
refresh_at = now + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_);
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR,
CloudPolicySubsystem::POLICY_NETWORK_ERROR,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
break;
}
scheduler_->CancelDelayedWork();
if (!refresh_at.is_null()) {
int64 delay = std::max<int64>((refresh_at - now).InMilliseconds(), 0);
scheduler_->PostDelayedWork(
base::Bind(&CloudPolicyController::DoWork, base::Unretained(this)),
delay);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void CloudPolicyController::SetState(
CloudPolicyController::ControllerState new_state) {
state_ = new_state;
backend_.reset(); // Stop any pending requests.
base::Time now(base::Time::NowFromSystemTime());
base::Time refresh_at;
base::Time last_refresh(cache_->last_policy_refresh_time());
if (last_refresh.is_null())
last_refresh = now;
bool inform_notifier_done = false;
switch (state_) {
case STATE_TOKEN_UNMANAGED:
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::UNMANAGED,
CloudPolicySubsystem::NO_DETAILS,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
break;
case STATE_TOKEN_UNAVAILABLE:
case STATE_TOKEN_VALID:
refresh_at = now;
break;
case STATE_POLICY_VALID:
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ =
kPolicyRefreshErrorDelayInMilliseconds;
refresh_at =
last_refresh + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(GetRefreshDelay());
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::SUCCESS,
CloudPolicySubsystem::NO_DETAILS,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
break;
case STATE_TOKEN_ERROR:
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR,
CloudPolicySubsystem::BAD_DMTOKEN,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
inform_notifier_done = true;
case STATE_POLICY_ERROR:
if (!inform_notifier_done) {
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR,
CloudPolicySubsystem::POLICY_NETWORK_ERROR,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
}
refresh_at = now + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_);
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ =
std::min(effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ * 2,
policy_refresh_rate_ms_);
break;
case STATE_POLICY_UNAVAILABLE:
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ = policy_refresh_rate_ms_;
refresh_at = now + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_);
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR,
CloudPolicySubsystem::POLICY_NETWORK_ERROR,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
break;
}
scheduler_->CancelDelayedWork();
if (!refresh_at.is_null()) {
int64 delay = std::max<int64>((refresh_at - now).InMilliseconds(), 0);
scheduler_->PostDelayedWork(
base::Bind(&CloudPolicyController::DoWork, base::Unretained(this)),
delay);
}
}
| 170,281 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int32_t PPB_Flash_MessageLoop_Impl::InternalRun(
const RunFromHostProxyCallback& callback) {
if (state_->run_called()) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(PP_ERROR_FAILED);
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
}
state_->set_run_called();
state_->set_run_callback(callback);
scoped_refptr<State> state_protector(state_);
{
base::MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower allow(
base::MessageLoop::current());
base::MessageLoop::current()->Run();
}
return state_protector->result();
}
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int32_t PPB_Flash_MessageLoop_Impl::InternalRun(
const RunFromHostProxyCallback& callback) {
if (state_->run_called()) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(PP_ERROR_FAILED);
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
}
state_->set_run_called();
state_->set_run_callback(callback);
scoped_refptr<State> state_protector(state_);
{
base::MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower allow(
base::MessageLoop::current());
blink::WebView::willEnterModalLoop();
base::MessageLoop::current()->Run();
blink::WebView::didExitModalLoop();
}
return state_protector->result();
}
| 172,123 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void vrend_renderer_context_create_internal(uint32_t handle, uint32_t nlen,
const char *debug_name)
{
struct vrend_decode_ctx *dctx;
if (handle >= VREND_MAX_CTX)
return;
dctx = malloc(sizeof(struct vrend_decode_ctx));
if (!dctx)
return;
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void vrend_renderer_context_create_internal(uint32_t handle, uint32_t nlen,
const char *debug_name)
{
struct vrend_decode_ctx *dctx;
if (handle >= VREND_MAX_CTX)
return;
dctx = dec_ctx[handle];
if (dctx)
return;
dctx = malloc(sizeof(struct vrend_decode_ctx));
if (!dctx)
return;
return;
}
| 165,239 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int put_chars(u32 vtermno, const char *buf, int count)
{
struct port *port;
struct scatterlist sg[1];
if (unlikely(early_put_chars))
return early_put_chars(vtermno, buf, count);
port = find_port_by_vtermno(vtermno);
if (!port)
return -EPIPE;
sg_init_one(sg, buf, count);
return __send_to_port(port, sg, 1, count, (void *)buf, false);
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int put_chars(u32 vtermno, const char *buf, int count)
{
struct port *port;
struct scatterlist sg[1];
void *data;
int ret;
if (unlikely(early_put_chars))
return early_put_chars(vtermno, buf, count);
port = find_port_by_vtermno(vtermno);
if (!port)
return -EPIPE;
data = kmemdup(buf, count, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
sg_init_one(sg, data, count);
ret = __send_to_port(port, sg, 1, count, data, false);
kfree(data);
return ret;
}
| 168,219 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long CuePoint::GetTime(const Segment* pSegment) const
{
assert(pSegment);
assert(m_timecode >= 0);
const SegmentInfo* const pInfo = pSegment->GetInfo();
assert(pInfo);
const long long scale = pInfo->GetTimeCodeScale();
assert(scale >= 1);
const long long time = scale * m_timecode;
return time;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long CuePoint::GetTime(const Segment* pSegment) const
| 174,364 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cdc_ncm_bind(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
{
int ret;
/* MBIM backwards compatible function? */
if (cdc_ncm_select_altsetting(intf) != CDC_NCM_COMM_ALTSETTING_NCM)
return -ENODEV;
/* The NCM data altsetting is fixed, so we hard-coded it.
* Additionally, generic NCM devices are assumed to accept arbitrarily
* placed NDP.
*/
ret = cdc_ncm_bind_common(dev, intf, CDC_NCM_DATA_ALTSETTING_NCM, 0);
/*
* We should get an event when network connection is "connected" or
* "disconnected". Set network connection in "disconnected" state
* (carrier is OFF) during attach, so the IP network stack does not
* start IPv6 negotiation and more.
*/
usbnet_link_change(dev, 0, 0);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | static int cdc_ncm_bind(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
{
/* MBIM backwards compatible function? */
if (cdc_ncm_select_altsetting(intf) != CDC_NCM_COMM_ALTSETTING_NCM)
return -ENODEV;
/* The NCM data altsetting is fixed, so we hard-coded it.
* Additionally, generic NCM devices are assumed to accept arbitrarily
* placed NDP.
*/
return cdc_ncm_bind_common(dev, intf, CDC_NCM_DATA_ALTSETTING_NCM, 0);
}
| 167,323 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Automation::InitWithBrowserPath(const FilePath& browser_exe,
const CommandLine& options,
Error** error) {
if (!file_util::PathExists(browser_exe)) {
std::string message = base::StringPrintf(
"Could not find Chrome binary at: %" PRFilePath,
browser_exe.value().c_str());
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, message);
return;
}
CommandLine command(browser_exe);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableHangMonitor);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePromptOnRepost);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kDomAutomationController);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kFullMemoryCrashReport);
command.AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kHomePage, chrome::kAboutBlankURL);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kNoDefaultBrowserCheck);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kNoFirstRun);
command.AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kTestType, "webdriver");
command.AppendArguments(options, false);
launcher_.reset(new AnonymousProxyLauncher(false));
ProxyLauncher::LaunchState launch_props = {
false, // clear_profile
FilePath(), // template_user_data
ProxyLauncher::DEFAULT_THEME,
command,
true, // include_testing_id
true // show_window
};
std::string chrome_details = base::StringPrintf(
"Using Chrome binary at: %" PRFilePath,
browser_exe.value().c_str());
VLOG(1) << chrome_details;
if (!launcher_->LaunchBrowserAndServer(launch_props, true)) {
*error = new Error(
kUnknownError,
"Unable to either launch or connect to Chrome. Please check that "
"ChromeDriver is up-to-date. " + chrome_details);
return;
}
launcher_->automation()->set_action_timeout_ms(base::kNoTimeout);
VLOG(1) << "Chrome launched successfully. Version: "
<< automation()->server_version();
bool has_automation_version = false;
*error = CompareVersion(730, 0, &has_automation_version);
if (*error)
return;
chrome_details += ", version (" + automation()->server_version() + ")";
if (has_automation_version) {
int version = 0;
std::string error_msg;
if (!SendGetChromeDriverAutomationVersion(
automation(), &version, &error_msg)) {
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg + " " + chrome_details);
return;
}
if (version > automation::kChromeDriverAutomationVersion) {
*error = new Error(
kUnknownError,
"ChromeDriver is not compatible with this version of Chrome. " +
chrome_details);
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void Automation::InitWithBrowserPath(const FilePath& browser_exe,
const CommandLine& options,
Error** error) {
if (!file_util::PathExists(browser_exe)) {
std::string message = base::StringPrintf(
"Could not find Chrome binary at: %" PRFilePath,
browser_exe.value().c_str());
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, message);
return;
}
CommandLine command(browser_exe);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableHangMonitor);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePromptOnRepost);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kDomAutomationController);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kFullMemoryCrashReport);
command.AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kHomePage, chrome::kAboutBlankURL);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kNoDefaultBrowserCheck);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kNoFirstRun);
command.AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kTestType, "webdriver");
command.AppendArguments(options, false);
launcher_.reset(new AnonymousProxyLauncher(false));
ProxyLauncher::LaunchState launch_props = {
false, // clear_profile
FilePath(), // template_user_data
ProxyLauncher::DEFAULT_THEME,
command,
true, // include_testing_id
true // show_window
};
std::string chrome_details = base::StringPrintf(
"Using Chrome binary at: %" PRFilePath,
browser_exe.value().c_str());
LOG(INFO) << chrome_details;
if (!launcher_->LaunchBrowserAndServer(launch_props, true)) {
*error = new Error(
kUnknownError,
"Unable to either launch or connect to Chrome. Please check that "
"ChromeDriver is up-to-date. " + chrome_details);
return;
}
launcher_->automation()->set_action_timeout_ms(base::kNoTimeout);
LOG(INFO) << "Chrome launched successfully. Version: "
<< automation()->server_version();
bool has_automation_version = false;
*error = CompareVersion(730, 0, &has_automation_version);
if (*error)
return;
chrome_details += ", version (" + automation()->server_version() + ")";
if (has_automation_version) {
int version = 0;
std::string error_msg;
if (!SendGetChromeDriverAutomationVersion(
automation(), &version, &error_msg)) {
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg + " " + chrome_details);
return;
}
if (version > automation::kChromeDriverAutomationVersion) {
*error = new Error(
kUnknownError,
"ChromeDriver is not compatible with this version of Chrome. " +
chrome_details);
return;
}
}
}
| 170,452 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_is_block_algorithm_mode)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(modes_dir)
if (mcrypt_module_is_block_algorithm_mode(module, dir) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_is_block_algorithm_mode)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(modes_dir)
if (mcrypt_module_is_block_algorithm_mode(module, dir) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
| 167,096 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: create_bits (pixman_format_code_t format,
int width,
int height,
int * rowstride_bytes,
pixman_bool_t clear)
{
int stride;
size_t buf_size;
int bpp;
/* what follows is a long-winded way, avoiding any possibility of integer
* overflows, of saying:
* stride = ((width * bpp + 0x1f) >> 5) * sizeof (uint32_t);
*/
bpp = PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP (format);
if (_pixman_multiply_overflows_int (width, bpp))
return NULL;
stride = width * bpp;
if (_pixman_addition_overflows_int (stride, 0x1f))
return NULL;
stride += 0x1f;
stride >>= 5;
stride *= sizeof (uint32_t);
if (_pixman_multiply_overflows_size (height, stride))
return NULL;
buf_size = height * stride;
if (rowstride_bytes)
*rowstride_bytes = stride;
if (clear)
return calloc (buf_size, 1);
else
return malloc (buf_size);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | create_bits (pixman_format_code_t format,
int width,
int height,
int * rowstride_bytes,
pixman_bool_t clear)
{
int stride;
size_t buf_size;
int bpp;
/* what follows is a long-winded way, avoiding any possibility of integer
* overflows, of saying:
* stride = ((width * bpp + 0x1f) >> 5) * sizeof (uint32_t);
*/
bpp = PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP (format);
if (_pixman_multiply_overflows_int (width, bpp))
return NULL;
stride = width * bpp;
if (_pixman_addition_overflows_int (stride, 0x1f))
return NULL;
stride += 0x1f;
stride >>= 5;
stride *= sizeof (uint32_t);
if (_pixman_multiply_overflows_size (height, stride))
return NULL;
buf_size = (size_t)height * stride;
if (rowstride_bytes)
*rowstride_bytes = stride;
if (clear)
return calloc (buf_size, 1);
else
return malloc (buf_size);
}
| 165,337 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplTempFileObject, __construct)
{
long max_memory = PHP_STREAM_MAX_MEM;
char tmp_fname[48];
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|l", &max_memory) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
if (max_memory < 0) {
intern->file_name = "php://memory";
intern->file_name_len = 12;
} else if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS()) {
intern->file_name_len = slprintf(tmp_fname, sizeof(tmp_fname), "php://temp/maxmemory:%ld", max_memory);
intern->file_name = tmp_fname;
} else {
intern->file_name = "php://temp";
intern->file_name_len = 10;
}
intern->u.file.open_mode = "wb";
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 1;
intern->u.file.zcontext = NULL;
if (spl_filesystem_file_open(intern, 0, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
intern->_path_len = 0;
intern->_path = estrndup("", 0);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplFileObject::rewind()
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(SplTempFileObject, __construct)
{
long max_memory = PHP_STREAM_MAX_MEM;
char tmp_fname[48];
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|l", &max_memory) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
if (max_memory < 0) {
intern->file_name = "php://memory";
intern->file_name_len = 12;
} else if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS()) {
intern->file_name_len = slprintf(tmp_fname, sizeof(tmp_fname), "php://temp/maxmemory:%ld", max_memory);
intern->file_name = tmp_fname;
} else {
intern->file_name = "php://temp";
intern->file_name_len = 10;
}
intern->u.file.open_mode = "wb";
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 1;
intern->u.file.zcontext = NULL;
if (spl_filesystem_file_open(intern, 0, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
intern->_path_len = 0;
intern->_path = estrndup("", 0);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplFileObject::rewind()
| 167,050 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void CloudPrintInfoCallback(bool enabled,
const std::string& email,
const std::string& proxy_id) {
QuitMessageLoop();
}
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
CWE ID: CWE-94 | static void CloudPrintInfoCallback(bool enabled,
void LaunchServiceProcessControlAndWait() {
base::RunLoop run_loop;
LaunchServiceProcessControl(run_loop.QuitClosure());
run_loop.Run();
}
| 172,048 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: AutocompleteLog::AutocompleteLog(
const string16& text,
bool just_deleted_text,
AutocompleteInput::Type input_type,
size_t selected_index,
SessionID::id_type tab_id,
metrics::OmniboxEventProto::PageClassification current_page_classification,
base::TimeDelta elapsed_time_since_user_first_modified_omnibox,
size_t inline_autocompleted_length,
const AutocompleteResult& result)
: text(text),
just_deleted_text(just_deleted_text),
input_type(input_type),
selected_index(selected_index),
tab_id(tab_id),
current_page_classification(current_page_classification),
elapsed_time_since_user_first_modified_omnibox(
elapsed_time_since_user_first_modified_omnibox),
inline_autocompleted_length(inline_autocompleted_length),
result(result) {
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | AutocompleteLog::AutocompleteLog(
const string16& text,
bool just_deleted_text,
AutocompleteInput::Type input_type,
size_t selected_index,
SessionID::id_type tab_id,
metrics::OmniboxEventProto::PageClassification current_page_classification,
base::TimeDelta elapsed_time_since_user_first_modified_omnibox,
size_t inline_autocompleted_length,
const AutocompleteResult& result)
: text(text),
just_deleted_text(just_deleted_text),
input_type(input_type),
selected_index(selected_index),
tab_id(tab_id),
current_page_classification(current_page_classification),
elapsed_time_since_user_first_modified_omnibox(
elapsed_time_since_user_first_modified_omnibox),
inline_autocompleted_length(inline_autocompleted_length),
result(result),
providers_info() {
}
| 170,757 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const BlockEntry* Segment::GetBlock(
const CuePoint& cp,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition& tp)
{
Cluster** const ii = m_clusters;
Cluster** i = ii;
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** const jj = ii + count;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j)
{
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
Cluster* const pCluster = *k;
assert(pCluster);
const long long pos = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(pos >= 0);
if (pos < tp.m_pos)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > tp.m_pos)
j = k;
else
return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp);
}
assert(i == j);
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this, -1, tp.m_pos); //, -1);
assert(pCluster);
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_clusters;
PreloadCluster(pCluster, idx);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const BlockEntry* Segment::GetBlock(
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** const jj = ii + count;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j) {
// INVARIANT:
//[ii, i) < pTP->m_pos
//[i, j) ?
//[j, jj) > pTP->m_pos
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
Cluster* const pCluster = *k;
assert(pCluster);
// const long long pos_ = pCluster->m_pos;
// assert(pos_);
// const long long pos = pos_ * ((pos_ < 0) ? -1 : 1);
const long long pos = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(pos >= 0);
if (pos < tp.m_pos)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > tp.m_pos)
j = k;
else
return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp);
}
assert(i == j);
// assert(Cluster::HasBlockEntries(this, tp.m_pos));
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this, -1, tp.m_pos); //, -1);
assert(pCluster);
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_clusters;
PreloadCluster(pCluster, idx);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp);
}
| 174,288 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Chapters::~Chapters() {
while (m_editions_count > 0) {
Edition& e = m_editions[--m_editions_count];
e.Clear();
}
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | Chapters::~Chapters() {
while (m_editions_count > 0) {
Edition& e = m_editions[--m_editions_count];
e.Clear();
}
delete[] m_editions;
}
| 173,869 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: av_cold void ff_idctdsp_init(IDCTDSPContext *c, AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
const unsigned high_bit_depth = avctx->bits_per_raw_sample > 8;
if (avctx->lowres==1) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct4_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct4_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct4;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else if (avctx->lowres==2) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct2_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct2_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct2;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else if (avctx->lowres==3) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct1_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct1_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct1;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else {
if (avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 10 || avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 9) {
/* 10-bit MPEG-4 Simple Studio Profile requires a higher precision IDCT
However, it only uses idct_put */
if (avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4 && avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO)
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int32_10bit;
else {
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int16_10bit;
c->idct_add = ff_simple_idct_add_int16_10bit;
c->idct = ff_simple_idct_int16_10bit;
}
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else if (avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 12) {
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int16_12bit;
c->idct_add = ff_simple_idct_add_int16_12bit;
c->idct = ff_simple_idct_int16_12bit;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else {
if (avctx->idct_algo == FF_IDCT_INT) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_LIBMPEG2;
#if CONFIG_FAANIDCT
} else if (avctx->idct_algo == FF_IDCT_FAAN) {
c->idct_put = ff_faanidct_put;
c->idct_add = ff_faanidct_add;
c->idct = ff_faanidct;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
#endif /* CONFIG_FAANIDCT */
} else { // accurate/default
/* Be sure FF_IDCT_NONE will select this one, since it uses FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE */
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int16_8bit;
c->idct_add = ff_simple_idct_add_int16_8bit;
c->idct = ff_simple_idct_int16_8bit;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
}
}
}
c->put_pixels_clamped = ff_put_pixels_clamped_c;
c->put_signed_pixels_clamped = put_signed_pixels_clamped_c;
c->add_pixels_clamped = ff_add_pixels_clamped_c;
if (CONFIG_MPEG4_DECODER && avctx->idct_algo == FF_IDCT_XVID)
ff_xvid_idct_init(c, avctx);
if (ARCH_AARCH64)
ff_idctdsp_init_aarch64(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_ALPHA)
ff_idctdsp_init_alpha(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_ARM)
ff_idctdsp_init_arm(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_PPC)
ff_idctdsp_init_ppc(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_X86)
ff_idctdsp_init_x86(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_MIPS)
ff_idctdsp_init_mips(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
ff_init_scantable_permutation(c->idct_permutation,
c->perm_type);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | av_cold void ff_idctdsp_init(IDCTDSPContext *c, AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
const unsigned high_bit_depth = avctx->bits_per_raw_sample > 8;
if (avctx->lowres==1) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct4_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct4_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct4;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else if (avctx->lowres==2) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct2_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct2_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct2;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else if (avctx->lowres==3) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct1_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct1_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct1;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else {
if (avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 10 || avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 9) {
/* 10-bit MPEG-4 Simple Studio Profile requires a higher precision IDCT
However, it only uses idct_put */
if (c->mpeg4_studio_profile)
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int32_10bit;
else {
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int16_10bit;
c->idct_add = ff_simple_idct_add_int16_10bit;
c->idct = ff_simple_idct_int16_10bit;
}
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else if (avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 12) {
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int16_12bit;
c->idct_add = ff_simple_idct_add_int16_12bit;
c->idct = ff_simple_idct_int16_12bit;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else {
if (avctx->idct_algo == FF_IDCT_INT) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_LIBMPEG2;
#if CONFIG_FAANIDCT
} else if (avctx->idct_algo == FF_IDCT_FAAN) {
c->idct_put = ff_faanidct_put;
c->idct_add = ff_faanidct_add;
c->idct = ff_faanidct;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
#endif /* CONFIG_FAANIDCT */
} else { // accurate/default
/* Be sure FF_IDCT_NONE will select this one, since it uses FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE */
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int16_8bit;
c->idct_add = ff_simple_idct_add_int16_8bit;
c->idct = ff_simple_idct_int16_8bit;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
}
}
}
c->put_pixels_clamped = ff_put_pixels_clamped_c;
c->put_signed_pixels_clamped = put_signed_pixels_clamped_c;
c->add_pixels_clamped = ff_add_pixels_clamped_c;
if (CONFIG_MPEG4_DECODER && avctx->idct_algo == FF_IDCT_XVID)
ff_xvid_idct_init(c, avctx);
if (ARCH_AARCH64)
ff_idctdsp_init_aarch64(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_ALPHA)
ff_idctdsp_init_alpha(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_ARM)
ff_idctdsp_init_arm(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_PPC)
ff_idctdsp_init_ppc(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_X86)
ff_idctdsp_init_x86(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_MIPS)
ff_idctdsp_init_mips(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
ff_init_scantable_permutation(c->idct_permutation,
c->perm_type);
}
| 169,189 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void mk_request_free(struct session_request *sr)
{
if (sr->fd_file > 0) {
mk_vhost_close(sr);
}
if (sr->headers.location) {
mk_mem_free(sr->headers.location);
}
if (sr->uri_processed.data != sr->uri.data) {
mk_ptr_free(&sr->uri_processed);
}
if (sr->real_path.data != sr->real_path_static) {
mk_ptr_free(&sr->real_path);
}
}
Commit Message: Request: new request session flag to mark those files opened by FDT
This patch aims to fix a potential DDoS problem that can be caused
in the server quering repetitive non-existent resources.
When serving a static file, the core use Vhost FDT mechanism, but if
it sends a static error page it does a direct open(2). When closing
the resources for the same request it was just calling mk_vhost_close()
which did not clear properly the file descriptor.
This patch adds a new field on the struct session_request called 'fd_is_fdt',
which contains MK_TRUE or MK_FALSE depending of how fd_file was opened.
Thanks to Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com> for report and troubleshoot this
problem.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <eduardo@monkey.io>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void mk_request_free(struct session_request *sr)
{
if (sr->fd_file > 0) {
if (sr->fd_is_fdt == MK_TRUE) {
mk_vhost_close(sr);
}
else {
close(sr->fd_file);
}
}
if (sr->headers.location) {
mk_mem_free(sr->headers.location);
}
if (sr->uri_processed.data != sr->uri.data) {
mk_ptr_free(&sr->uri_processed);
}
if (sr->real_path.data != sr->real_path_static) {
mk_ptr_free(&sr->real_path);
}
}
| 166,277 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: header_gets (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char *ptr, int bufsize)
{ int k ;
for (k = 0 ; k < bufsize - 1 ; k++)
{ if (psf->headindex < psf->headend)
{ ptr [k] = psf->header [psf->headindex] ;
psf->headindex ++ ;
}
else
{ psf->headend += psf_fread (psf->header + psf->headend, 1, 1, psf) ;
ptr [k] = psf->header [psf->headindex] ;
psf->headindex = psf->headend ;
} ;
if (ptr [k] == '\n')
break ;
} ;
ptr [k] = 0 ;
return k ;
} /* header_gets */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | header_gets (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char *ptr, int bufsize)
{ int k ;
if (psf->header.indx + bufsize >= psf->header.len && psf_bump_header_allocation (psf, bufsize))
return 0 ;
for (k = 0 ; k < bufsize - 1 ; k++)
{ if (psf->header.indx < psf->header.end)
{ ptr [k] = psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx] ;
psf->header.indx ++ ;
}
else
{ psf->header.end += psf_fread (psf->header.ptr + psf->header.end, 1, 1, psf) ;
ptr [k] = psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx] ;
psf->header.indx = psf->header.end ;
} ;
if (ptr [k] == '\n')
break ;
} ;
ptr [k] = 0 ;
return k ;
} /* header_gets */
| 170,047 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dhcpv4_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *cp, u_int length, int indent)
{
u_int i, t;
const u_char *tlv, *value;
uint8_t type, optlen;
i = 0;
while (i < length) {
tlv = cp + i;
type = (uint8_t)tlv[0];
optlen = (uint8_t)tlv[1];
value = tlv + 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n"));
for (t = indent; t > 0; t--)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(dh4opt_str, "Unknown", type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo," (%u)", optlen + 2 ));
switch (type) {
case DH4OPT_DNS_SERVERS:
case DH4OPT_NTP_SERVERS: {
if (optlen < 4 || optlen % 4 != 0) {
return -1;
}
for (t = 0; t < optlen; t += 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, value + t)));
}
break;
case DH4OPT_DOMAIN_SEARCH: {
const u_char *tp = value;
while (tp < value + optlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if ((tp = ns_nprint(ndo, tp, value + optlen)) == NULL)
return -1;
}
}
break;
}
i += 2 + optlen;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13044/HNCP: add DHCPv4-Data bounds checks
dhcpv4_print() in print-hncp.c had the same bug as dhcpv6_print(), apply
a fix along the same lines.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | dhcpv4_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *cp, u_int length, int indent)
{
u_int i, t;
const u_char *tlv, *value;
uint8_t type, optlen;
i = 0;
while (i < length) {
if (i + 2 > length)
return -1;
tlv = cp + i;
type = (uint8_t)tlv[0];
optlen = (uint8_t)tlv[1];
value = tlv + 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n"));
for (t = indent; t > 0; t--)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(dh4opt_str, "Unknown", type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo," (%u)", optlen + 2 ));
if (i + 2 + optlen > length)
return -1;
switch (type) {
case DH4OPT_DNS_SERVERS:
case DH4OPT_NTP_SERVERS: {
if (optlen < 4 || optlen % 4 != 0) {
return -1;
}
for (t = 0; t < optlen; t += 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, value + t)));
}
break;
case DH4OPT_DOMAIN_SEARCH: {
const u_char *tp = value;
while (tp < value + optlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if ((tp = ns_nprint(ndo, tp, value + optlen)) == NULL)
return -1;
}
}
break;
}
i += 2 + optlen;
}
return 0;
}
| 167,831 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::RegisterForDevicePolicy(
const std::string& token,
policy::BrowserPolicyConnector::TokenType token_type) {
policy::BrowserPolicyConnector* connector =
g_browser_process->browser_policy_connector();
if (!connector->device_cloud_policy_subsystem()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Cloud policy subsystem not initialized.";
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentOtherFailed,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
if (is_showing_)
actor_->ShowFatalEnrollmentError();
return;
}
connector->ScheduleServiceInitialization(0);
registrar_.reset(new policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::ObserverRegistrar(
connector->device_cloud_policy_subsystem(), this));
connector->SetDeviceCredentials(user_, token, token_type);
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::RegisterForDevicePolicy(
const std::string& token,
policy::BrowserPolicyConnector::TokenType token_type) {
policy::BrowserPolicyConnector* connector =
g_browser_process->browser_policy_connector();
if (!connector->device_cloud_policy_subsystem()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Cloud policy subsystem not initialized.";
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentOtherFailed,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
if (is_showing_)
actor_->ShowFatalEnrollmentError();
return;
}
connector->ScheduleServiceInitialization(0);
registrar_.reset(new policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::ObserverRegistrar(
connector->device_cloud_policy_subsystem(), this));
connector->RegisterForDevicePolicy(user_, token, token_type);
}
| 170,278 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int TS_OBJ_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
{
char obj_txt[128];
int len = OBJ_obj2txt(obj_txt, sizeof(obj_txt), obj, 0);
BIO_write(bio, obj_txt, len);
BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio().
TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_txt2obj: it should print the result
as a null terminated buffer. The length value returned is the total
length the complete text reprsentation would need not the amount of
data written.
CVE-2016-2180
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int TS_OBJ_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
{
char obj_txt[128];
OBJ_obj2txt(obj_txt, sizeof(obj_txt), obj, 0);
BIO_printf(bio, "%s\n", obj_txt);
return 1;
}
| 167,435 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GraphicsContext::clipOut(const Path&)
{
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void GraphicsContext::clipOut(const Path&)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
notImplemented();
}
| 170,423 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jbig2_sd_count_referred(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment)
{
int index;
Jbig2Segment *rsegment;
int n_dicts = 0;
for (index = 0; index < segment->referred_to_segment_count; index++) {
rsegment = jbig2_find_segment(ctx, segment->referred_to_segments[index]);
if (rsegment && ((rsegment->flags & 63) == 0) &&
rsegment->result && (((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->n_symbols > 0) && ((*((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->glyphs) != NULL))
n_dicts++;
}
return (n_dicts);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | jbig2_sd_count_referred(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment)
{
int index;
Jbig2Segment *rsegment;
uint32_t n_dicts = 0;
for (index = 0; index < segment->referred_to_segment_count; index++) {
rsegment = jbig2_find_segment(ctx, segment->referred_to_segments[index]);
if (rsegment && ((rsegment->flags & 63) == 0) &&
rsegment->result && (((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->n_symbols > 0) && ((*((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->glyphs) != NULL))
n_dicts++;
}
return (n_dicts);
}
| 165,500 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool SessionManager::Remove(const std::string& id) {
std::map<std::string, Session*>::iterator it;
Session* session;
base::AutoLock lock(map_lock_);
it = map_.find(id);
if (it == map_.end()) {
VLOG(1) << "No such session with ID " << id;
return false;
}
session = it->second;
map_.erase(it);
return true;
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool SessionManager::Remove(const std::string& id) {
std::map<std::string, Session*>::iterator it;
Session* session;
base::AutoLock lock(map_lock_);
it = map_.find(id);
if (it == map_.end())
return false;
session = it->second;
map_.erase(it);
return true;
}
| 170,464 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static const char *parse_array( cJSON *item, const char *value )
{
cJSON *child;
if ( *value != '[' ) {
/* Not an array! */
ep = value;
return 0;
}
item->type = cJSON_Array;
value = skip( value + 1 );
if ( *value == ']' )
return value + 1; /* empty array. */
if ( ! ( item->child = child = cJSON_New_Item() ) )
return 0; /* memory fail */
if ( ! ( value = skip( parse_value( child, skip( value ) ) ) ) )
return 0;
while ( *value == ',' ) {
cJSON *new_item;
if ( ! ( new_item = cJSON_New_Item() ) )
return 0; /* memory fail */
child->next = new_item;
new_item->prev = child;
child = new_item;
if ( ! ( value = skip( parse_value( child, skip( value+1 ) ) ) ) )
return 0; /* memory fail */
}
if ( *value == ']' )
return value + 1; /* end of array */
/* Malformed. */
ep = value;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static const char *parse_array( cJSON *item, const char *value )
static const char *parse_array(cJSON *item,const char *value,const char **ep)
{
cJSON *child;
if (*value!='[') {*ep=value;return 0;} /* not an array! */
item->type=cJSON_Array;
value=skip(value+1);
if (*value==']') return value+1; /* empty array. */
item->child=child=cJSON_New_Item();
if (!item->child) return 0; /* memory fail */
value=skip(parse_value(child,skip(value),ep)); /* skip any spacing, get the value. */
if (!value) return 0;
while (*value==',')
{
cJSON *new_item;
if (!(new_item=cJSON_New_Item())) return 0; /* memory fail */
child->next=new_item;new_item->prev=child;child=new_item;
value=skip(parse_value(child,skip(value+1),ep));
if (!value) return 0; /* memory fail */
}
if (*value==']') return value+1; /* end of array */
*ep=value;return 0; /* malformed. */
}
| 167,301 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void copyMultiCh8(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i] << 8;
}
}
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void copyMultiCh8(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
static void copyMultiCh8(short *dst, const int * src[FLACParser::kMaxChannels], unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i] << 8;
}
}
}
| 174,020 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetBurnLibrary(
BurnLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->burn_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetBurnLibrary(
| 170,636 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char *print_array( cJSON *item, int depth, int fmt )
{
char **entries;
char *out = 0, *ptr, *ret;
int len = 5;
cJSON *child = item->child;
int numentries = 0, i = 0, fail = 0;
/* How many entries in the array? */
while ( child ) {
++numentries;
child = child->next;
}
/* Allocate an array to hold the values for each. */
if ( ! ( entries = (char**) cJSON_malloc( numentries * sizeof(char*) ) ) )
return 0;
memset( entries, 0, numentries * sizeof(char*) );
/* Retrieve all the results. */
child = item->child;
while ( child && ! fail ) {
ret = print_value( child, depth + 1, fmt );
entries[i++] = ret;
if ( ret )
len += strlen( ret ) + 2 + ( fmt ? 1 : 0 );
else
fail = 1;
child = child -> next;
}
/* If we didn't fail, try to malloc the output string. */
if ( ! fail ) {
out = (char*) cJSON_malloc( len );
if ( ! out )
fail = 1;
}
/* Handle failure. */
if ( fail ) {
for ( i = 0; i < numentries; ++i )
if ( entries[i] )
cJSON_free( entries[i] );
cJSON_free( entries );
return 0;
}
/* Compose the output array. */
*out = '[';
ptr = out + 1;
*ptr = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < numentries; ++i ) {
strcpy( ptr, entries[i] );
ptr += strlen( entries[i] );
if ( i != numentries - 1 ) {
*ptr++ = ',';
if ( fmt )
*ptr++ = ' ';
*ptr = 0;
}
cJSON_free( entries[i] );
}
cJSON_free( entries );
*ptr++ = ']';
*ptr++ = 0;
return out;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static char *print_array( cJSON *item, int depth, int fmt )
static char *print_array(cJSON *item,int depth,int fmt,printbuffer *p)
{
char **entries;
char *out=0,*ptr,*ret;int len=5;
cJSON *child=item->child;
int numentries=0,i=0,fail=0;
size_t tmplen=0;
/* How many entries in the array? */
while (child) numentries++,child=child->next;
/* Explicitly handle numentries==0 */
if (!numentries)
{
if (p) out=ensure(p,3);
else out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(3);
if (out) strcpy(out,"[]");
return out;
}
if (p)
{
/* Compose the output array. */
i=p->offset;
ptr=ensure(p,1);if (!ptr) return 0; *ptr='['; p->offset++;
child=item->child;
while (child && !fail)
{
print_value(child,depth+1,fmt,p);
p->offset=update(p);
if (child->next) {len=fmt?2:1;ptr=ensure(p,len+1);if (!ptr) return 0;*ptr++=',';if(fmt)*ptr++=' ';*ptr=0;p->offset+=len;}
child=child->next;
}
ptr=ensure(p,2);if (!ptr) return 0; *ptr++=']';*ptr=0;
out=(p->buffer)+i;
}
else
{
/* Allocate an array to hold the values for each */
entries=(char**)cJSON_malloc(numentries*sizeof(char*));
if (!entries) return 0;
memset(entries,0,numentries*sizeof(char*));
/* Retrieve all the results: */
child=item->child;
while (child && !fail)
{
ret=print_value(child,depth+1,fmt,0);
entries[i++]=ret;
if (ret) len+=strlen(ret)+2+(fmt?1:0); else fail=1;
child=child->next;
}
/* If we didn't fail, try to malloc the output string */
if (!fail) out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(len);
/* If that fails, we fail. */
if (!out) fail=1;
/* Handle failure. */
if (fail)
{
for (i=0;i<numentries;i++) if (entries[i]) cJSON_free(entries[i]);
cJSON_free(entries);
return 0;
}
/* Compose the output array. */
*out='[';
ptr=out+1;*ptr=0;
for (i=0;i<numentries;i++)
{
tmplen=strlen(entries[i]);memcpy(ptr,entries[i],tmplen);ptr+=tmplen;
if (i!=numentries-1) {*ptr++=',';if(fmt)*ptr++=' ';*ptr=0;}
cJSON_free(entries[i]);
}
cJSON_free(entries);
*ptr++=']';*ptr++=0;
}
return out;
}
| 167,306 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AudioRendererHost::OnCreateStream(
int stream_id, const media::AudioParameters& params, int input_channels) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(LookupById(stream_id) == NULL);
media::AudioParameters audio_params(params);
uint32 buffer_size = media::AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(audio_params);
DCHECK_GT(buffer_size, 0U);
DCHECK_LE(buffer_size,
static_cast<uint32>(media::limits::kMaxPacketSizeInBytes));
DCHECK_GE(input_channels, 0);
DCHECK_LT(input_channels, media::limits::kMaxChannels);
int output_memory_size = AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(audio_params);
DCHECK_GT(output_memory_size, 0);
int frames = audio_params.frames_per_buffer();
int input_memory_size =
AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(input_channels, frames);
DCHECK_GE(input_memory_size, 0);
scoped_ptr<AudioEntry> entry(new AudioEntry());
uint32 io_buffer_size = output_memory_size + input_memory_size;
uint32 shared_memory_size =
media::TotalSharedMemorySizeInBytes(io_buffer_size);
if (!entry->shared_memory.CreateAndMapAnonymous(shared_memory_size)) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<AudioSyncReader> reader(
new AudioSyncReader(&entry->shared_memory, params, input_channels));
if (!reader->Init()) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->reader.reset(reader.release());
entry->controller = media::AudioOutputController::Create(
audio_manager_, this, audio_params, entry->reader.get());
if (!entry->controller) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->stream_id = stream_id;
audio_entries_.insert(std::make_pair(stream_id, entry.release()));
if (media_observer_)
media_observer_->OnSetAudioStreamStatus(this, stream_id, "created");
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void AudioRendererHost::OnCreateStream(
int stream_id, const media::AudioParameters& params, int input_channels) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
// media::AudioParameters is validated in the deserializer.
if (input_channels < 0 ||
input_channels > media::limits::kMaxChannels ||
LookupById(stream_id) != NULL) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
media::AudioParameters audio_params(params);
int output_memory_size = AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(audio_params);
int frames = audio_params.frames_per_buffer();
int input_memory_size =
AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(input_channels, frames);
scoped_ptr<AudioEntry> entry(new AudioEntry());
uint32 io_buffer_size = output_memory_size + input_memory_size;
uint32 shared_memory_size =
media::TotalSharedMemorySizeInBytes(io_buffer_size);
if (!entry->shared_memory.CreateAndMapAnonymous(shared_memory_size)) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<AudioSyncReader> reader(
new AudioSyncReader(&entry->shared_memory, params, input_channels));
if (!reader->Init()) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->reader.reset(reader.release());
entry->controller = media::AudioOutputController::Create(
audio_manager_, this, audio_params, entry->reader.get());
if (!entry->controller) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->stream_id = stream_id;
audio_entries_.insert(std::make_pair(stream_id, entry.release()));
if (media_observer_)
media_observer_->OnSetAudioStreamStatus(this, stream_id, "created");
}
| 171,525 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int tcp_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
sk_read_actor_t recv_actor)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
u32 seq = tp->copied_seq;
u32 offset;
int copied = 0;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
return -ENOTCONN;
while ((skb = tcp_recv_skb(sk, seq, &offset)) != NULL) {
if (offset < skb->len) {
int used;
size_t len;
len = skb->len - offset;
/* Stop reading if we hit a patch of urgent data */
if (tp->urg_data) {
u32 urg_offset = tp->urg_seq - seq;
if (urg_offset < len)
len = urg_offset;
if (!len)
break;
}
used = recv_actor(desc, skb, offset, len);
if (used < 0) {
if (!copied)
copied = used;
break;
} else if (used <= len) {
seq += used;
copied += used;
offset += used;
}
/*
* If recv_actor drops the lock (e.g. TCP splice
* receive) the skb pointer might be invalid when
* getting here: tcp_collapse might have deleted it
* while aggregating skbs from the socket queue.
*/
skb = tcp_recv_skb(sk, seq-1, &offset);
if (!skb || (offset+1 != skb->len))
break;
}
if (tcp_hdr(skb)->fin) {
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb, 0);
++seq;
break;
}
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb, 0);
if (!desc->count)
break;
}
tp->copied_seq = seq;
tcp_rcv_space_adjust(sk);
/* Clean up data we have read: This will do ACK frames. */
if (copied > 0)
tcp_cleanup_rbuf(sk, copied);
return copied;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int tcp_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
sk_read_actor_t recv_actor)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
u32 seq = tp->copied_seq;
u32 offset;
int copied = 0;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
return -ENOTCONN;
while ((skb = tcp_recv_skb(sk, seq, &offset)) != NULL) {
if (offset < skb->len) {
int used;
size_t len;
len = skb->len - offset;
/* Stop reading if we hit a patch of urgent data */
if (tp->urg_data) {
u32 urg_offset = tp->urg_seq - seq;
if (urg_offset < len)
len = urg_offset;
if (!len)
break;
}
used = recv_actor(desc, skb, offset, len);
if (used < 0) {
if (!copied)
copied = used;
break;
} else if (used <= len) {
seq += used;
copied += used;
offset += used;
}
/*
* If recv_actor drops the lock (e.g. TCP splice
* receive) the skb pointer might be invalid when
* getting here: tcp_collapse might have deleted it
* while aggregating skbs from the socket queue.
*/
skb = tcp_recv_skb(sk, seq-1, &offset);
if (!skb || (offset+1 != skb->len))
break;
}
if (tcp_hdr(skb)->fin) {
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb, 0);
++seq;
break;
}
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb, 0);
if (!desc->count)
break;
tp->copied_seq = seq;
}
tp->copied_seq = seq;
tcp_rcv_space_adjust(sk);
/* Clean up data we have read: This will do ACK frames. */
if (copied > 0)
tcp_cleanup_rbuf(sk, copied);
return copied;
}
| 166,084 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HTMLImportsController::Dispose() {
for (const auto& loader : loaders_)
loader->Dispose();
loaders_.clear();
if (root_) {
root_->Dispose();
root_.Clear();
}
}
Commit Message: Speculative fix for crashes in HTMLImportsController::Dispose().
Copy the loaders_ vector before iterating it.
This CL has no tests because we don't know stable reproduction.
Bug: 843151
Change-Id: I3d5e184657cbce56dcfca0c717d7a0c464e20efe
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1245017
Reviewed-by: Keishi Hattori <keishi@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594226}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void HTMLImportsController::Dispose() {
// TODO(tkent): We copy loaders_ before iteration to avoid crashes.
// This copy should be unnecessary. loaders_ is not modified during
// the iteration. Also, null-check for |loader| should be
// unnecessary. crbug.com/843151.
LoaderList list;
list.swap(loaders_);
for (const auto& loader : list) {
if (loader)
loader->Dispose();
}
if (root_) {
root_->Dispose();
root_.Clear();
}
}
| 172,663 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int btif_hl_select_close_connected(void){
char sig_on = btif_hl_signal_select_close_connected;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_close_connected");
return send(signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static inline int btif_hl_select_close_connected(void){
char sig_on = btif_hl_signal_select_close_connected;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_close_connected");
return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0));
}
| 173,440 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::IsDangerousFile(
const DownloadItem& download,
const FilePath& suggested_path,
bool visited_referrer_before) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (download.GetTransitionType() & content::PAGE_TRANSITION_FROM_ADDRESS_BAR)
return false;
if (extensions::FeatureSwitch::easy_off_store_install()->IsEnabled() &&
download_crx_util::IsExtensionDownload(download) &&
!extensions::WebstoreInstaller::GetAssociatedApproval(download)) {
return true;
}
if (ShouldOpenFileBasedOnExtension(suggested_path) &&
download.HasUserGesture())
return false;
download_util::DownloadDangerLevel danger_level =
download_util::GetFileDangerLevel(suggested_path.BaseName());
if (danger_level == download_util::AllowOnUserGesture)
return !download.HasUserGesture() || !visited_referrer_before;
return danger_level == download_util::Dangerous;
}
Commit Message: For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::IsDangerousFile(
const DownloadItem& download,
const FilePath& suggested_path,
bool visited_referrer_before) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (extensions::FeatureSwitch::easy_off_store_install()->IsEnabled() &&
download_crx_util::IsExtensionDownload(download) &&
!extensions::WebstoreInstaller::GetAssociatedApproval(download)) {
return true;
}
if (ShouldOpenFileBasedOnExtension(suggested_path) &&
download.HasUserGesture())
return false;
download_util::DownloadDangerLevel danger_level =
download_util::GetFileDangerLevel(suggested_path.BaseName());
if (danger_level == download_util::AllowOnUserGesture) {
if (download.GetTransitionType() &
content::PAGE_TRANSITION_FROM_ADDRESS_BAR) {
return false;
}
return !download.HasUserGesture() || !visited_referrer_before;
}
return danger_level == download_util::Dangerous;
}
| 171,393 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FrameworkListener::init(const char *socketName UNUSED, bool withSeq) {
mCommands = new FrameworkCommandCollection();
errorRate = 0;
mCommandCount = 0;
mWithSeq = withSeq;
}
Commit Message: Fix vold vulnerability in FrameworkListener
Modify FrameworkListener to ignore commands that exceed the maximum
buffer length and send an error message.
Bug: 29831647
Change-Id: I9e57d1648d55af2ca0191bb47868e375ecc26950
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit baa126dc158a40bc83c17c6d428c760e5b93fb1a)
(cherry picked from commit 470484d2a25ad432190a01d1c763b4b36db33c7e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void FrameworkListener::init(const char *socketName UNUSED, bool withSeq) {
mCommands = new FrameworkCommandCollection();
errorRate = 0;
mCommandCount = 0;
mWithSeq = withSeq;
mSkipToNextNullByte = false;
}
| 173,390 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void OMX::binderDied(const wp<IBinder> &the_late_who) {
OMXNodeInstance *instance;
{
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
ssize_t index = mLiveNodes.indexOfKey(the_late_who);
CHECK(index >= 0);
instance = mLiveNodes.editValueAt(index);
mLiveNodes.removeItemsAt(index);
index = mDispatchers.indexOfKey(instance->nodeID());
CHECK(index >= 0);
mDispatchers.removeItemsAt(index);
invalidateNodeID_l(instance->nodeID());
}
instance->onObserverDied(mMaster);
}
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void OMX::binderDied(const wp<IBinder> &the_late_who) {
OMXNodeInstance *instance;
{
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
ssize_t index = mLiveNodes.indexOfKey(the_late_who);
if (index < 0) {
ALOGE("b/27597103, nonexistent observer on binderDied");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27597103");
return;
}
instance = mLiveNodes.editValueAt(index);
mLiveNodes.removeItemsAt(index);
index = mDispatchers.indexOfKey(instance->nodeID());
CHECK(index >= 0);
mDispatchers.removeItemsAt(index);
invalidateNodeID_l(instance->nodeID());
}
instance->onObserverDied(mMaster);
}
| 173,881 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GraphicsContext::clipConvexPolygon(size_t numPoints, const FloatPoint* points, bool antialiased)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
if (numPoints <= 1)
return;
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void GraphicsContext::clipConvexPolygon(size_t numPoints, const FloatPoint* points, bool antialiased)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
if (numPoints <= 1)
return;
notImplemented();
}
| 170,422 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_self_test)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir);
if (mcrypt_module_self_test(module, dir) == 0) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_self_test)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir);
if (mcrypt_module_self_test(module, dir) == 0) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
| 167,095 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig, siginfo_t *info)
{
/* This is only valid for single tasks */
if (pid <= 0 || tgid <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
Nor can they impersonate a kill(), which adds source info. */
if (info->si_code >= 0)
return -EPERM;
info->si_signo = sig;
return do_send_specific(tgid, pid, sig, info);
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | long do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig, siginfo_t *info)
{
/* This is only valid for single tasks */
if (pid <= 0 || tgid <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
* Nor can they impersonate a kill()/tgkill(), which adds source info.
*/
if (info->si_code != SI_QUEUE) {
/* We used to allow any < 0 si_code */
WARN_ON_ONCE(info->si_code < 0);
return -EPERM;
}
info->si_signo = sig;
return do_send_specific(tgid, pid, sig, info);
}
| 166,232 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mcid_char_imp(fz_context *ctx, pdf_filter_processor *p, tag_record *tr, int uni, int remove)
{
if (tr->mcid_obj == NULL)
/* No object, or already deleted */
return;
if (remove)
{
/* Remove the expanded abbreviation, if there is one. */
pdf_dict_del(ctx, tr->mcid_obj, PDF_NAME(E));
/* Remove the structure title, if there is one. */
pdf_dict_del(ctx, tr->mcid_obj, PDF_NAME(T));
}
/* Edit the Alt string */
walk_string(ctx, uni, remove, &tr->alt);
/* Edit the ActualText string */
walk_string(ctx, uni, remove, &tr->actualtext);
/* If we're removing a character, and either of the strings
* haven't matched up to what we were expecting, then just
* delete the whole string. */
else if (tr->alt.pos >= 0 || tr->actualtext.pos >= 0)
{
/* The strings are making sense so far */
remove = 0;
/* The strings are making sense so far */
remove = 0;
}
if (remove)
{
/* Anything else we have to err on the side of caution and
if (tr->alt.pos == -1)
pdf_dict_del(ctx, tr->mcid_obj, PDF_NAME(Alt));
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, tr->mcid_obj);
tr->mcid_obj = NULL;
fz_free(ctx, tr->alt.utf8);
tr->alt.utf8 = NULL;
fz_free(ctx, tr->actualtext.utf8);
tr->actualtext.utf8 = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | mcid_char_imp(fz_context *ctx, pdf_filter_processor *p, tag_record *tr, int uni, int remove)
{
if (tr->mcid_obj == NULL)
/* No object, or already deleted */
return;
if (remove)
{
/* Remove the expanded abbreviation, if there is one. */
pdf_dict_del(ctx, tr->mcid_obj, PDF_NAME(E));
/* Remove the structure title, if there is one. */
pdf_dict_del(ctx, tr->mcid_obj, PDF_NAME(T));
}
/* Edit the Alt string */
walk_string(ctx, uni, remove, &tr->alt);
/* Edit the ActualText string */
walk_string(ctx, uni, remove, &tr->actualtext);
/* If we're removing a character, and either of the strings
* haven't matched up to what we were expecting, then just
* delete the whole string. */
else if (tr->alt.pos >= 0 || tr->actualtext.pos >= 0)
{
/* The strings are making sense so far */
remove = 0;
/* The strings are making sense so far */
remove = 0;
}
if (remove)
{
/* Anything else we have to err on the side of caution and
if (tr->alt.pos == -1)
pdf_dict_del(ctx, tr->mcid_obj, PDF_NAME(Alt));
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, tr->mcid_obj);
tr->mcid_obj = NULL;
fz_free(ctx, tr->alt.utf8);
tr->alt.utf8 = NULL;
fz_free(ctx, tr->actualtext.utf8);
tr->actualtext.utf8 = NULL;
}
}
| 164,659 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void P2PSocketDispatcherHost::OnAcceptIncomingTcpConnection(
const IPC::Message& msg, int listen_socket_id,
net::IPEndPoint remote_address, int connected_socket_id) {
P2PSocketHost* socket = LookupSocket(msg.routing_id(), listen_socket_id);
if (!socket) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Received P2PHostMsg_AcceptIncomingTcpConnection "
"for invalid socket_id.";
return;
}
P2PSocketHost* accepted_connection =
socket->AcceptIncomingTcpConnection(remote_address, connected_socket_id);
if (accepted_connection) {
sockets_.insert(std::pair<ExtendedSocketId, P2PSocketHost*>(
ExtendedSocketId(msg.routing_id(), connected_socket_id),
accepted_connection));
}
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void P2PSocketDispatcherHost::OnAcceptIncomingTcpConnection(
const IPC::Message& msg, int listen_socket_id,
const net::IPEndPoint& remote_address, int connected_socket_id) {
P2PSocketHost* socket = LookupSocket(msg.routing_id(), listen_socket_id);
if (!socket) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Received P2PHostMsg_AcceptIncomingTcpConnection "
"for invalid socket_id.";
return;
}
P2PSocketHost* accepted_connection =
socket->AcceptIncomingTcpConnection(remote_address, connected_socket_id);
if (accepted_connection) {
sockets_.insert(std::pair<ExtendedSocketId, P2PSocketHost*>(
ExtendedSocketId(msg.routing_id(), connected_socket_id),
accepted_connection));
}
}
| 170,312 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::RequestPasskey(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
const PasskeyCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(device_path == object_path_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": RequestPasskey";
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_REQUEST_PASSKEY,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
DCHECK(passkey_callback_.is_null());
passkey_callback_ = callback;
pairing_delegate_->RequestPasskey(this);
pairing_delegate_used_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::RequestPasskey(
| 171,236 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MountLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetMountLibrary() {
return mount_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | MountLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetMountLibrary() {
| 170,626 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::PerformNextQueuedGlobalMemoryDump() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
QueuedRequest* request = GetCurrentRequest();
if (request == nullptr)
return;
std::vector<QueuedRequestDispatcher::ClientInfo> clients;
for (const auto& kv : clients_) {
auto client_identity = kv.second->identity;
const base::ProcessId pid = GetProcessIdForClientIdentity(client_identity);
if (pid == base::kNullProcessId) {
VLOG(1) << "Couldn't find a PID for client \"" << client_identity.name()
<< "." << client_identity.instance() << "\"";
continue;
}
clients.emplace_back(kv.second->client.get(), pid, kv.second->process_type);
}
auto chrome_callback = base::Bind(
&CoordinatorImpl::OnChromeMemoryDumpResponse, base::Unretained(this));
auto os_callback = base::Bind(&CoordinatorImpl::OnOSMemoryDumpResponse,
base::Unretained(this), request->dump_guid);
QueuedRequestDispatcher::SetUpAndDispatch(request, clients, chrome_callback,
os_callback);
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CoordinatorImpl::OnQueuedRequestTimedOut,
base::Unretained(this), request->dump_guid),
client_process_timeout_);
if (request->args.add_to_trace && heap_profiler_) {
request->heap_dump_in_progress = true;
bool strip_path_from_mapped_files =
base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance()
->GetCurrentTraceConfig()
.IsArgumentFilterEnabled();
heap_profiler_->DumpProcessesForTracing(
strip_path_from_mapped_files,
base::BindRepeating(&CoordinatorImpl::OnDumpProcessesForTracing,
base::Unretained(this), request->dump_guid));
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CoordinatorImpl::OnHeapDumpTimeOut,
base::Unretained(this), request->dump_guid),
kHeapDumpTimeout);
}
FinalizeGlobalMemoryDumpIfAllManagersReplied();
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void CoordinatorImpl::PerformNextQueuedGlobalMemoryDump() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
QueuedRequest* request = GetCurrentRequest();
if (request == nullptr)
return;
std::vector<QueuedRequestDispatcher::ClientInfo> clients;
for (const auto& kv : clients_) {
auto client_identity = kv.second->identity;
const base::ProcessId pid = GetProcessIdForClientIdentity(client_identity);
if (pid == base::kNullProcessId) {
VLOG(1) << "Couldn't find a PID for client \"" << client_identity.name()
<< "." << client_identity.instance() << "\"";
continue;
}
clients.emplace_back(kv.second->client.get(), pid, kv.second->process_type);
}
auto chrome_callback =
base::Bind(&CoordinatorImpl::OnChromeMemoryDumpResponse,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
auto os_callback =
base::Bind(&CoordinatorImpl::OnOSMemoryDumpResponse,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), request->dump_guid);
QueuedRequestDispatcher::SetUpAndDispatch(request, clients, chrome_callback,
os_callback);
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CoordinatorImpl::OnQueuedRequestTimedOut,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), request->dump_guid),
client_process_timeout_);
if (request->args.add_to_trace && heap_profiler_) {
request->heap_dump_in_progress = true;
bool strip_path_from_mapped_files =
base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance()
->GetCurrentTraceConfig()
.IsArgumentFilterEnabled();
heap_profiler_->DumpProcessesForTracing(
strip_path_from_mapped_files,
base::BindRepeating(&CoordinatorImpl::OnDumpProcessesForTracing,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
request->dump_guid));
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CoordinatorImpl::OnHeapDumpTimeOut,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), request->dump_guid),
kHeapDumpTimeout);
}
FinalizeGlobalMemoryDumpIfAllManagersReplied();
}
| 173,214 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MockRenderThread::AddRoute(int32 routing_id,
IPC::Channel::Listener* listener) {
EXPECT_EQ(routing_id_, routing_id);
widget_ = listener;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void MockRenderThread::AddRoute(int32 routing_id,
IPC::Channel::Listener* listener) {
// We may hear this for views created from OnMsgCreateWindow as well,
// in which case we don't want to track the new widget.
if (routing_id_ == routing_id)
widget_ = listener;
}
| 171,021 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
unsigned int j;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ipt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
return -EINVAL;
ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e,
e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct ipt_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name, &e->ip, &off);
if (ret != 0)
goto release_matches;
++j;
}
t = compat_ipt_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_IPV4, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto release_matches;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(AF_INET, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
out:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
release_matches:
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
module_put(ematch->u.kernel.match->me);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
unsigned int j;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ipt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
return -EINVAL;
ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems,
e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct ipt_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name, &e->ip, &off);
if (ret != 0)
goto release_matches;
++j;
}
t = compat_ipt_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_IPV4, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto release_matches;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(AF_INET, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
out:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
release_matches:
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
module_put(ematch->u.kernel.match->me);
}
return ret;
}
| 167,217 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_encrypt)
{
zend_bool raw_output = 0;
char *data, *method, *password, *iv = "";
int data_len, method_len, password_len, iv_len = 0, max_iv_len;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_type;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
int i, outlen, keylen;
unsigned char *outbuf, *key;
zend_bool free_iv;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "sss|bs", &data, &data_len, &method, &method_len, &password, &password_len, &raw_output, &iv, &iv_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
cipher_type = EVP_get_cipherbyname(method);
if (!cipher_type) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown cipher algorithm");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher_type);
if (keylen > password_len) {
key = emalloc(keylen);
memset(key, 0, keylen);
memcpy(key, password, password_len);
} else {
key = (unsigned char*)password;
}
max_iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher_type);
if (iv_len <= 0 && max_iv_len > 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Using an empty Initialization Vector (iv) is potentially insecure and not recommended");
}
free_iv = php_openssl_validate_iv(&iv, &iv_len, max_iv_len TSRMLS_CC);
outlen = data_len + EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cipher_type);
outbuf = emalloc(outlen + 1);
EVP_EncryptInit(&cipher_ctx, cipher_type, NULL, NULL);
if (password_len > keylen) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cipher_ctx, password_len);
}
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, (unsigned char *)iv);
if (data_len > 0) {
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&cipher_ctx, outbuf, &i, (unsigned char *)data, data_len);
}
outlen = i;
if (EVP_EncryptFinal(&cipher_ctx, (unsigned char *)outbuf + i, &i)) {
outlen += i;
if (raw_output) {
outbuf[outlen] = '\0';
RETVAL_STRINGL((char *)outbuf, outlen, 0);
} else {
int base64_str_len;
char *base64_str;
base64_str = (char*)php_base64_encode(outbuf, outlen, &base64_str_len);
efree(outbuf);
RETVAL_STRINGL(base64_str, base64_str_len, 0);
}
} else {
efree(outbuf);
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
if (key != (unsigned char*)password) {
efree(key);
}
if (free_iv) {
efree(iv);
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher_ctx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_encrypt)
{
zend_bool raw_output = 0;
char *data, *method, *password, *iv = "";
int data_len, method_len, password_len, iv_len = 0, max_iv_len;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_type;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
int i = 0, outlen, keylen;
unsigned char *outbuf, *key;
zend_bool free_iv;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "sss|bs", &data, &data_len, &method, &method_len, &password, &password_len, &raw_output, &iv, &iv_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
cipher_type = EVP_get_cipherbyname(method);
if (!cipher_type) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown cipher algorithm");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher_type);
if (keylen > password_len) {
key = emalloc(keylen);
memset(key, 0, keylen);
memcpy(key, password, password_len);
} else {
key = (unsigned char*)password;
}
max_iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher_type);
if (iv_len <= 0 && max_iv_len > 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Using an empty Initialization Vector (iv) is potentially insecure and not recommended");
}
free_iv = php_openssl_validate_iv(&iv, &iv_len, max_iv_len TSRMLS_CC);
outlen = data_len + EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cipher_type);
outbuf = emalloc(outlen + 1);
EVP_EncryptInit(&cipher_ctx, cipher_type, NULL, NULL);
if (password_len > keylen) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cipher_ctx, password_len);
}
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, (unsigned char *)iv);
if (data_len > 0) {
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&cipher_ctx, outbuf, &i, (unsigned char *)data, data_len);
}
outlen = i;
if (EVP_EncryptFinal(&cipher_ctx, (unsigned char *)outbuf + i, &i)) {
outlen += i;
if (raw_output) {
outbuf[outlen] = '\0';
RETVAL_STRINGL((char *)outbuf, outlen, 0);
} else {
int base64_str_len;
char *base64_str;
base64_str = (char*)php_base64_encode(outbuf, outlen, &base64_str_len);
efree(outbuf);
RETVAL_STRINGL(base64_str, base64_str_len, 0);
}
} else {
efree(outbuf);
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
if (key != (unsigned char*)password) {
efree(key);
}
if (free_iv) {
efree(iv);
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher_ctx);
}
| 164,805 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static time_t asn1_time_to_time_t(ASN1_UTCTIME * timestr TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
/*
This is how the time string is formatted:
snprintf(p, sizeof(p), "%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ",ts->tm_year%100,
ts->tm_mon+1,ts->tm_mday,ts->tm_hour,ts->tm_min,ts->tm_sec);
*/
time_t ret;
struct tm thetime;
char * strbuf;
char * thestr;
long gmadjust = 0;
if (timestr->length < 13) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "extension author too lazy to parse %s correctly", timestr->data);
return (time_t)-1;
}
strbuf = estrdup((char *)timestr->data);
memset(&thetime, 0, sizeof(thetime));
/* we work backwards so that we can use atoi more easily */
thestr = strbuf + timestr->length - 3;
thetime.tm_sec = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thetime.tm_mon = atoi(thestr)-1;
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_year = atoi(thestr);
if (thetime.tm_year < 68) {
thetime.tm_year += 100;
}
thetime.tm_isdst = -1;
ret = mktime(&thetime);
#if HAVE_TM_GMTOFF
gmadjust = thetime.tm_gmtoff;
#else
/*
** If correcting for daylight savings time, we set the adjustment to
** the value of timezone - 3600 seconds. Otherwise, we need to overcorrect and
** set the adjustment to the main timezone + 3600 seconds.
*/
gmadjust = -(thetime.tm_isdst ? (long)timezone - 3600 : (long)timezone + 3600);
#endif
ret += gmadjust;
efree(strbuf);
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static time_t asn1_time_to_time_t(ASN1_UTCTIME * timestr TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
/*
This is how the time string is formatted:
snprintf(p, sizeof(p), "%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ",ts->tm_year%100,
ts->tm_mon+1,ts->tm_mday,ts->tm_hour,ts->tm_min,ts->tm_sec);
*/
time_t ret;
struct tm thetime;
char * strbuf;
char * thestr;
long gmadjust = 0;
if (ASN1_STRING_type(timestr) != V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "illegal ASN1 data type for timestamp");
return (time_t)-1;
}
if (ASN1_STRING_length(timestr) != strlen(ASN1_STRING_data(timestr))) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "illegal length in timestamp");
return (time_t)-1;
}
if (ASN1_STRING_length(timestr) < 13) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "unable to parse time string %s correctly", timestr->data);
return (time_t)-1;
}
strbuf = estrdup((char *)ASN1_STRING_data(timestr));
memset(&thetime, 0, sizeof(thetime));
/* we work backwards so that we can use atoi more easily */
thestr = strbuf + ASN1_STRING_length(timestr) - 3;
thetime.tm_sec = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thetime.tm_mon = atoi(thestr)-1;
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_year = atoi(thestr);
if (thetime.tm_year < 68) {
thetime.tm_year += 100;
}
thetime.tm_isdst = -1;
ret = mktime(&thetime);
#if HAVE_TM_GMTOFF
gmadjust = thetime.tm_gmtoff;
#else
/*
** If correcting for daylight savings time, we set the adjustment to
** the value of timezone - 3600 seconds. Otherwise, we need to overcorrect and
** set the adjustment to the main timezone + 3600 seconds.
*/
gmadjust = -(thetime.tm_isdst ? (long)timezone - 3600 : (long)timezone + 3600);
#endif
ret += gmadjust;
efree(strbuf);
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
| 164,568 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetSupportedInputMethods() {
if (!initialized_successfully_) {
InputMethodDescriptors* result = new InputMethodDescriptors;
result->push_back(input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor());
return result;
}
return chromeos::GetSupportedInputMethodDescriptors();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetSupportedInputMethods() {
virtual input_method::InputMethodDescriptors* GetSupportedInputMethods() {
if (!initialized_successfully_) {
input_method::InputMethodDescriptors* result =
new input_method::InputMethodDescriptors;
result->push_back(input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor());
return result;
}
return input_method::GetSupportedInputMethodDescriptors();
}
| 170,492 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void impeg2d_dec_hdr(void *pv_dec,impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t *ps_ip,
impeg2d_video_decode_op_t *ps_op)
{
UWORD32 u4_bits_read;
dec_state_t *ps_dec;
UWORD32 u4_size = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
ps_dec = (dec_state_t *)pv_dec;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
if (u4_size > MAX_BITSTREAM_BUFFER_SIZE)
{
u4_size = MAX_BITSTREAM_BUFFER_SIZE;
}
memcpy(ps_dec->pu1_input_buffer, ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.pv_stream_buffer, u4_size);
impeg2d_bit_stream_init(&(ps_dec->s_bit_stream), ps_dec->pu1_input_buffer,
u4_size);
{
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
e_error = impeg2d_process_video_header(ps_dec);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = e_error;
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_num_bits_read(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream);
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = u4_bits_read>> 3;
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed > ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
}
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code == 0)
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = e_error;
if (IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS == e_error)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec->u2_header_done = 0;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_height;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_width;
}
impeg2d_next_code(ps_dec, SEQUENCE_HEADER_CODE);
return;
}
}
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_vertical_size;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = IV_SUCCESS;
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_num_bits_read(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream);
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = u4_bits_read>> 3;
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed > ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
}
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
/* MOD */
ps_dec->u2_header_done = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Adding check for min_width and min_height
Add check for min_wd and min_ht. Stride is updated if header
decode is done.
Bug: 74078669
Change-Id: Ided95395e1138335dbb4b05131a8551f6f7bbfcd
(cherry picked from commit 84eba4863dd50083951db83ea3cc81e015bf51da)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | void impeg2d_dec_hdr(void *pv_dec,impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t *ps_ip,
impeg2d_video_decode_op_t *ps_op)
{
UWORD32 u4_bits_read;
dec_state_t *ps_dec;
UWORD32 u4_size = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
ps_dec = (dec_state_t *)pv_dec;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
if (u4_size > MAX_BITSTREAM_BUFFER_SIZE)
{
u4_size = MAX_BITSTREAM_BUFFER_SIZE;
}
memcpy(ps_dec->pu1_input_buffer, ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.pv_stream_buffer, u4_size);
impeg2d_bit_stream_init(&(ps_dec->s_bit_stream), ps_dec->pu1_input_buffer,
u4_size);
{
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
e_error = impeg2d_process_video_header(ps_dec);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = e_error;
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_num_bits_read(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream);
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = u4_bits_read>> 3;
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed > ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
}
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code == 0)
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = e_error;
if (IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS == e_error)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec->u2_header_done = 0;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_height;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_width;
}
impeg2d_next_code(ps_dec, SEQUENCE_HEADER_CODE);
return;
}
}
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_vertical_size;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = IV_SUCCESS;
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_num_bits_read(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream);
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = u4_bits_read>> 3;
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed > ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
}
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
/* Set the stride */
if (0 == ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride)
{
ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride = ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size;
}
/* MOD */
ps_dec->u2_header_done = 1;
}
}
| 174,086 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RenderView::RenderView(RenderThreadBase* render_thread,
gfx::NativeViewId parent_hwnd,
int32 opener_id,
const RendererPreferences& renderer_prefs,
const WebPreferences& webkit_prefs,
SharedRenderViewCounter* counter,
int32 routing_id,
int64 session_storage_namespace_id,
const string16& frame_name)
: RenderWidget(render_thread, WebKit::WebPopupTypeNone),
webkit_preferences_(webkit_prefs),
send_content_state_immediately_(false),
enabled_bindings_(0),
send_preferred_size_changes_(false),
is_loading_(false),
navigation_gesture_(NavigationGestureUnknown),
opened_by_user_gesture_(true),
opener_suppressed_(false),
page_id_(-1),
last_page_id_sent_to_browser_(-1),
history_list_offset_(-1),
history_list_length_(0),
target_url_status_(TARGET_NONE),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(pepper_delegate_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(accessibility_method_factory_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(cookie_jar_(this)),
geolocation_dispatcher_(NULL),
speech_input_dispatcher_(NULL),
device_orientation_dispatcher_(NULL),
accessibility_ack_pending_(false),
p2p_socket_dispatcher_(NULL),
session_storage_namespace_id_(session_storage_namespace_id) {
routing_id_ = routing_id;
if (opener_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
opener_id_ = opener_id;
webwidget_ = WebView::create(this);
if (counter) {
shared_popup_counter_ = counter;
shared_popup_counter_->data++;
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = true;
} else {
shared_popup_counter_ = new SharedRenderViewCounter(0);
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = false;
}
notification_provider_ = new NotificationProvider(this);
render_thread_->AddRoute(routing_id_, this);
AddRef();
if (opener_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
did_show_ = true;
CompleteInit(parent_hwnd);
}
g_view_map.Get().insert(std::make_pair(webview(), this));
webkit_preferences_.Apply(webview());
webview()->initializeMainFrame(this);
if (!frame_name.empty())
webview()->mainFrame()->setName(frame_name);
webview()->settings()->setMinimumTimerInterval(
is_hidden() ? webkit_glue::kBackgroundTabTimerInterval :
webkit_glue::kForegroundTabTimerInterval);
OnSetRendererPrefs(renderer_prefs);
host_window_ = parent_hwnd;
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAccessibility))
WebAccessibilityCache::enableAccessibility();
#if defined(ENABLE_P2P_APIS)
p2p_socket_dispatcher_ = new P2PSocketDispatcher(this);
#endif
new MHTMLGenerator(this);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableMediaStream)) {
media_stream_impl_ = new MediaStreamImpl(
RenderThread::current()->video_capture_impl_manager());
}
content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->RenderViewCreated(this);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | RenderView::RenderView(RenderThreadBase* render_thread,
gfx::NativeViewId parent_hwnd,
int32 opener_id,
const RendererPreferences& renderer_prefs,
const WebPreferences& webkit_prefs,
SharedRenderViewCounter* counter,
int32 routing_id,
int64 session_storage_namespace_id,
const string16& frame_name)
: RenderWidget(render_thread, WebKit::WebPopupTypeNone),
webkit_preferences_(webkit_prefs),
send_content_state_immediately_(false),
enabled_bindings_(0),
send_preferred_size_changes_(false),
is_loading_(false),
navigation_gesture_(NavigationGestureUnknown),
opened_by_user_gesture_(true),
opener_suppressed_(false),
page_id_(-1),
last_page_id_sent_to_browser_(-1),
history_list_offset_(-1),
history_list_length_(0),
target_url_status_(TARGET_NONE),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(pepper_delegate_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(accessibility_method_factory_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(cookie_jar_(this)),
geolocation_dispatcher_(NULL),
speech_input_dispatcher_(NULL),
device_orientation_dispatcher_(NULL),
accessibility_ack_pending_(false),
p2p_socket_dispatcher_(NULL),
session_storage_namespace_id_(session_storage_namespace_id) {
routing_id_ = routing_id;
if (opener_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
opener_id_ = opener_id;
webwidget_ = WebView::create(this);
if (counter) {
shared_popup_counter_ = counter;
shared_popup_counter_->data++;
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = true;
} else {
shared_popup_counter_ = new SharedRenderViewCounter(0);
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = false;
}
notification_provider_ = new NotificationProvider(this);
render_thread_->AddRoute(routing_id_, this);
AddRef();
if (opener_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
did_show_ = true;
CompleteInit(parent_hwnd);
}
g_view_map.Get().insert(std::make_pair(webview(), this));
webkit_preferences_.Apply(webview());
webview()->initializeMainFrame(this);
if (!frame_name.empty())
webview()->mainFrame()->setName(frame_name);
webview()->settings()->setMinimumTimerInterval(
is_hidden() ? webkit_glue::kBackgroundTabTimerInterval :
webkit_glue::kForegroundTabTimerInterval);
OnSetRendererPrefs(renderer_prefs);
host_window_ = parent_hwnd;
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAccessibility))
WebAccessibilityCache::enableAccessibility();
#if defined(ENABLE_P2P_APIS)
p2p_socket_dispatcher_ = new P2PSocketDispatcher(this);
#endif
new MHTMLGenerator(this);
new DevToolsAgent(this);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableMediaStream)) {
media_stream_impl_ = new MediaStreamImpl(
RenderThread::current()->video_capture_impl_manager());
}
content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->RenderViewCreated(this);
}
| 170,328 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void LauncherView::SetAlignment(ShelfAlignment alignment) {
if (alignment_ == alignment)
return;
alignment_ = alignment;
UpdateFirstButtonPadding();
LayoutToIdealBounds();
tooltip_->SetArrowLocation(alignment_);
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void LauncherView::SetAlignment(ShelfAlignment alignment) {
if (alignment_ == alignment)
return;
alignment_ = alignment;
UpdateFirstButtonPadding();
LayoutToIdealBounds();
tooltip_->SetArrowLocation(alignment_);
if (overflow_bubble_.get())
overflow_bubble_->Hide();
}
| 170,895 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::free_input_buffer(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufferHdr)
{
unsigned int index = 0;
OMX_U8 *temp_buff ;
if (bufferHdr == NULL || m_inp_mem_ptr == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: free_input: Invalid bufferHdr[%p] or m_inp_mem_ptr[%p]",
bufferHdr, m_inp_mem_ptr);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
index = bufferHdr - ((!meta_mode_enable)?m_inp_mem_ptr:meta_buffer_hdr);
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (meta_mode_enable) {
if (index < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
memset(&meta_buffer_hdr[index], 0, sizeof(meta_buffer_hdr[index]));
memset(&meta_buffers[index], 0, sizeof(meta_buffers[index]));
}
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat)
return OMX_ErrorNone;
else {
c2d_conv.close();
opaque_buffer_hdr[index] = NULL;
}
}
#endif
if (index < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual && !mUseProxyColorFormat &&
dev_free_buf(&m_pInput_pmem[index],PORT_INDEX_IN) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ERROR: dev_free_buf() Failed for i/p buf");
}
if (index < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual && m_pInput_pmem) {
if (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd > 0 && input_use_buffer == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FreeBuffer:: i/p AllocateBuffer case");
if(!secure_session) {
munmap (m_pInput_pmem[index].buffer,m_pInput_pmem[index].size);
} else {
free(m_pInput_pmem[index].buffer);
}
close (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pInput_ion[index]);
#endif
m_pInput_pmem[index].fd = -1;
} else if (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd > 0 && (input_use_buffer == true &&
m_use_input_pmem == OMX_FALSE)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FreeBuffer:: i/p Heap UseBuffer case");
if (dev_free_buf(&m_pInput_pmem[index],PORT_INDEX_IN) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_free_buf() Failed for i/p buf");
}
if(!secure_session) {
munmap (m_pInput_pmem[index].buffer,m_pInput_pmem[index].size);
}
close (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pInput_ion[index]);
#endif
m_pInput_pmem[index].fd = -1;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("FreeBuffer:: fd is invalid or i/p PMEM UseBuffer case");
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27903498
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem #3)
CRs-Fixed: 1010088
Change-Id: I898b42034c0add621d4f9d8e02ca0ed4403d4fd3
CWE ID: | OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::free_input_buffer(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufferHdr)
{
unsigned int index = 0;
OMX_U8 *temp_buff ;
if (bufferHdr == NULL || m_inp_mem_ptr == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: free_input: Invalid bufferHdr[%p] or m_inp_mem_ptr[%p]",
bufferHdr, m_inp_mem_ptr);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
index = bufferHdr - ((!meta_mode_enable)?m_inp_mem_ptr:meta_buffer_hdr);
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (meta_mode_enable) {
if (index < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
memset(&meta_buffer_hdr[index], 0, sizeof(meta_buffer_hdr[index]));
memset(&meta_buffers[index], 0, sizeof(meta_buffers[index]));
}
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat)
return OMX_ErrorNone;
else {
c2d_conv.close();
opaque_buffer_hdr[index] = NULL;
}
}
#endif
if (index < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual && !mUseProxyColorFormat &&
dev_free_buf(&m_pInput_pmem[index],PORT_INDEX_IN) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ERROR: dev_free_buf() Failed for i/p buf");
}
if (index < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual && m_pInput_pmem) {
auto_lock l(m_lock);
if (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd > 0 && input_use_buffer == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FreeBuffer:: i/p AllocateBuffer case");
if(!secure_session) {
munmap (m_pInput_pmem[index].buffer,m_pInput_pmem[index].size);
} else {
free(m_pInput_pmem[index].buffer);
}
m_pInput_pmem[index].buffer = NULL;
close (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pInput_ion[index]);
#endif
m_pInput_pmem[index].fd = -1;
} else if (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd > 0 && (input_use_buffer == true &&
m_use_input_pmem == OMX_FALSE)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FreeBuffer:: i/p Heap UseBuffer case");
if (dev_free_buf(&m_pInput_pmem[index],PORT_INDEX_IN) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_free_buf() Failed for i/p buf");
}
if(!secure_session) {
munmap (m_pInput_pmem[index].buffer,m_pInput_pmem[index].size);
m_pInput_pmem[index].buffer = NULL;
}
close (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pInput_ion[index]);
#endif
m_pInput_pmem[index].fd = -1;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("FreeBuffer:: fd is invalid or i/p PMEM UseBuffer case");
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
| 173,748 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
{
BN_ULONG t1,t2;
BN_ULONG c1,c2,c3;
c1=0;
c2=0;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3);
r[0]=c1;
c1=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1);
r[1]=c2;
c2=0;
sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2);
sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2);
r[2]=c3;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3);
sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3);
r[3]=c1;
c1=0;
sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1);
sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1);
r[4]=c2;
c2=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2);
r[5]=c3;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3);
r[6]=c1;
r[7]=c2;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2014-3570 (with minor bn_asm.c revamp).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
{
BN_ULONG c1,c2,c3;
c1=0;
c2=0;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3);
r[0]=c1;
c1=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1);
r[1]=c2;
c2=0;
sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2);
sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2);
r[2]=c3;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3);
sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3);
r[3]=c1;
c1=0;
sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1);
sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1);
r[4]=c2;
c2=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2);
r[5]=c3;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3);
r[6]=c1;
r[7]=c2;
}
| 166,830 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SpdyWriteQueue::RemovePendingWritesForStreamsAfter(
SpdyStreamId last_good_stream_id) {
CHECK(!removing_writes_);
removing_writes_ = true;
for (int i = MINIMUM_PRIORITY; i <= MAXIMUM_PRIORITY; ++i) {
std::deque<PendingWrite>* queue = &queue_[i];
std::deque<PendingWrite>::iterator out_it = queue->begin();
for (std::deque<PendingWrite>::const_iterator it = queue->begin();
it != queue->end(); ++it) {
if (it->stream.get() && (it->stream->stream_id() > last_good_stream_id ||
it->stream->stream_id() == 0)) {
delete it->frame_producer;
} else {
*out_it = *it;
++out_it;
}
}
queue->erase(out_it, queue->end());
}
removing_writes_ = false;
}
Commit Message: These can post callbacks which re-enter into SpdyWriteQueue.
BUG=369539
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/265933007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268730 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void SpdyWriteQueue::RemovePendingWritesForStreamsAfter(
SpdyStreamId last_good_stream_id) {
CHECK(!removing_writes_);
removing_writes_ = true;
std::vector<SpdyBufferProducer*> erased_buffer_producers;
for (int i = MINIMUM_PRIORITY; i <= MAXIMUM_PRIORITY; ++i) {
std::deque<PendingWrite>* queue = &queue_[i];
std::deque<PendingWrite>::iterator out_it = queue->begin();
for (std::deque<PendingWrite>::const_iterator it = queue->begin();
it != queue->end(); ++it) {
if (it->stream.get() && (it->stream->stream_id() > last_good_stream_id ||
it->stream->stream_id() == 0)) {
erased_buffer_producers.push_back(it->frame_producer);
} else {
*out_it = *it;
++out_it;
}
}
queue->erase(out_it, queue->end());
}
removing_writes_ = false;
STLDeleteElements(&erased_buffer_producers); // Invokes callbacks.
}
| 171,675 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct tcp_conn_t *tcp_conn_accept(struct tcp_sock_t *sock)
{
struct tcp_conn_t *conn = calloc(1, sizeof *conn);
if (conn == NULL) {
ERR("Calloc for connection struct failed");
goto error;
}
conn->sd = accept(sock->sd, NULL, NULL);
if (conn->sd < 0) {
ERR("accept failed");
goto error;
}
return conn;
error:
if (conn != NULL)
free(conn);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY FIX: Actually restrict the access to the printer to localhost
Before, any machine in any network connected by any of the interfaces (as
listed by "ifconfig") could access to an IPP-over-USB printer on the assigned
port, allowing users on remote machines to print and to access the web
configuration interface of a IPP-over-USB printer in contrary to conventional
USB printers which are only accessible locally.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | struct tcp_conn_t *tcp_conn_accept(struct tcp_sock_t *sock)
struct tcp_conn_t *tcp_conn_select(struct tcp_sock_t *sock,
struct tcp_sock_t *sock6)
{
struct tcp_conn_t *conn = calloc(1, sizeof *conn);
if (conn == NULL) {
ERR("Calloc for connection struct failed");
goto error;
}
fd_set rfds;
struct timeval tv;
int retval = 0;
int nfds = 0;
while (retval == 0) {
FD_ZERO(&rfds);
if (sock) {
FD_SET(sock->sd, &rfds);
nfds = sock->sd;
}
if (sock6) {
FD_SET(sock6->sd, &rfds);
if (sock6->sd > nfds)
nfds = sock6->sd;
}
if (nfds == 0) {
ERR("No valid TCP socket supplied.");
goto error;
}
nfds += 1;
/* Wait up to five seconds. */
tv.tv_sec = 5;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
retval = select(nfds, &rfds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
if (retval == -1) {
ERR("Failed to open tcp connection");
goto error;
}
}
if (sock && FD_ISSET(sock->sd, &rfds)) {
conn->sd = accept(sock->sd, NULL, NULL);
NOTE ("Using IPv4");
} else if (sock6 && FD_ISSET(sock6->sd, &rfds)) {
conn->sd = accept(sock6->sd, NULL, NULL);
NOTE ("Using IPv6");
} else {
ERR("select failed");
goto error;
}
if (conn->sd < 0) {
ERR("accept failed");
goto error;
}
return conn;
error:
if (conn != NULL)
free(conn);
return NULL;
}
| 166,589 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool SharedMemory::Create(const SharedMemoryCreateOptions& options) {
DCHECK(!options.executable);
DCHECK(!mapped_file_);
if (options.size == 0)
return false;
uint32 rounded_size = (options.size + 0xffff) & ~0xffff;
name_ = ASCIIToWide(options.name == NULL ? "" : *options.name);
mapped_file_ = CreateFileMapping(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, NULL,
PAGE_READWRITE, 0, static_cast<DWORD>(rounded_size),
name_.empty() ? NULL : name_.c_str());
if (!mapped_file_)
return false;
created_size_ = options.size;
if (GetLastError() == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
created_size_ = 0;
if (!options.open_existing) {
Close();
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in Windows shared memory handling.
BUG=164490
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11450016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171369 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | bool SharedMemory::Create(const SharedMemoryCreateOptions& options) {
DCHECK(!options.executable);
DCHECK(!mapped_file_);
if (options.size == 0)
return false;
uint32 rounded_size = (options.size + 0xffff) & ~0xffff;
if (rounded_size < options.size)
return false;
name_ = ASCIIToWide(options.name == NULL ? "" : *options.name);
mapped_file_ = CreateFileMapping(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, NULL,
PAGE_READWRITE, 0, static_cast<DWORD>(rounded_size),
name_.empty() ? NULL : name_.c_str());
if (!mapped_file_)
return false;
created_size_ = options.size;
if (GetLastError() == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
created_size_ = 0;
if (!options.open_existing) {
Close();
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
| 171,538 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int dccp_v6_send_response(const struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
int err = -1;
struct dst_entry *dst;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_DCCP;
fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
fl6.saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6.flowlabel = 0;
fl6.flowi6_oif = ireq->ir_iif;
fl6.fl6_dport = ireq->ir_rmt_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = htons(ireq->ir_num);
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
dst = NULL;
goto done;
}
skb = dccp_make_response(sk, dst, req);
if (skb != NULL) {
struct dccp_hdr *dh = dccp_hdr(skb);
dh->dccph_checksum = dccp_v6_csum_finish(skb,
&ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr,
&ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr);
fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
done:
dst_release(dst);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int dccp_v6_send_response(const struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
int err = -1;
struct dst_entry *dst;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_DCCP;
fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
fl6.saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6.flowlabel = 0;
fl6.flowi6_oif = ireq->ir_iif;
fl6.fl6_dport = ireq->ir_rmt_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = htons(ireq->ir_num);
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
rcu_read_lock();
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
dst = NULL;
goto done;
}
skb = dccp_make_response(sk, dst, req);
if (skb != NULL) {
struct dccp_hdr *dh = dccp_hdr(skb);
dh->dccph_checksum = dccp_v6_csum_finish(skb,
&ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr,
&ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr);
fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
rcu_read_lock();
err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
np->tclass);
rcu_read_unlock();
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
done:
dst_release(dst);
return err;
}
| 167,326 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool FakeCentral::IsPowered() const {
switch (state_) {
case mojom::CentralState::POWERED_OFF:
return false;
case mojom::CentralState::POWERED_ON:
return true;
case mojom::CentralState::ABSENT:
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool FakeCentral::IsPowered() const {
switch (state_) {
case mojom::CentralState::ABSENT:
// SetState() calls IsPowered() to notify observers properly when an adapter
// being removed is simulated, so it should return false.
case mojom::CentralState::POWERED_OFF:
return false;
case mojom::CentralState::POWERED_ON:
return true;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
| 172,447 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MediaStreamImpl::~MediaStreamImpl() {
DCHECK(!peer_connection_handler_);
if (dependency_factory_.get())
dependency_factory_->ReleasePeerConnectionFactory();
if (network_manager_) {
if (chrome_worker_thread_.IsRunning()) {
chrome_worker_thread_.message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(
&MediaStreamImpl::DeleteIpcNetworkManager,
base::Unretained(this)));
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Worker thread not running.";
}
}
}
Commit Message: Explicitly stopping thread in MediaStreamImpl dtor to avoid any racing issues.
This may solve the below bugs.
BUG=112408,111202
TEST=content_unittests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9307058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120222 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | MediaStreamImpl::~MediaStreamImpl() {
DCHECK(!peer_connection_handler_);
if (dependency_factory_.get())
dependency_factory_->ReleasePeerConnectionFactory();
if (network_manager_) {
if (chrome_worker_thread_.IsRunning()) {
chrome_worker_thread_.message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(
&MediaStreamImpl::DeleteIpcNetworkManager,
base::Unretained(this)));
// Stopping the thread will wait until all tasks have been
// processed before returning. We wait for the above task to finish before
// letting the destructor continue to avoid any potential race issues.
chrome_worker_thread_.Stop();
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Worker thread not running.";
}
}
}
| 170,957 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Segment::Load()
{
assert(m_clusters == NULL);
assert(m_clusterSize == 0);
assert(m_clusterCount == 0);
const long long header_status = ParseHeaders();
if (header_status < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(header_status);
if (header_status > 0) //underflow
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
assert(m_pInfo);
assert(m_pTracks);
for (;;)
{
const int status = LoadCluster();
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (status >= 1) //no more clusters
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Segment::Load()
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
long& size = m_clusterSize;
assert(size >= count);
if (count >= size) {
const long n = (size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2 * size;
Cluster** const qq = new Cluster* [n];
Cluster** q = qq;
Cluster** p = m_clusters;
Cluster** const pp = p + count;
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_clusters;
m_clusters = qq;
size = n;
}
assert(m_clusters);
Cluster** const p = m_clusters + idx;
Cluster** q = m_clusters + count;
assert(q >= p);
assert(q < (m_clusters + size));
while (q > p) {
Cluster** const qq = q - 1;
assert((*qq)->m_index < 0);
*q = *qq;
q = qq;
}
m_clusters[idx] = pCluster;
++m_clusterPreloadCount;
}
| 174,394 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nsPluginInstance::setupCookies(const std::string& pageurl)
{
std::string::size_type pos;
pos = pageurl.find("/", pageurl.find("//", 0) + 2) + 1;
std::string url = pageurl.substr(0, pos);
std::string ncookie;
char *cookie = 0;
uint32_t length = 0;
NPError rv = NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
#if NPAPI_VERSION != 190
if (NPNFuncs.getvalueforurl) {
rv = NPN_GetValueForURL(_instance, NPNURLVCookie, url.c_str(),
&cookie, &length);
} else {
LOG_ONCE( gnash::log_debug("Browser doesn't support getvalueforurl") );
}
#endif
if (rv == NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR) {
log_debug("Trying window.document.cookie for cookies");
ncookie = getDocumentProp("cookie");
}
if (cookie) {
ncookie.assign(cookie, length);
NPN_MemFree(cookie);
}
if (ncookie.empty()) {
gnash::log_debug("No stored Cookie for %s", url);
return;
}
gnash::log_debug("The Cookie for %s is %s", url, ncookie);
std::ofstream cookiefile;
std::stringstream ss;
ss << "/tmp/gnash-cookies." << getpid();
cookiefile.open(ss.str().c_str(), std::ios::out | std::ios::trunc);
typedef boost::char_separator<char> char_sep;
typedef boost::tokenizer<char_sep> tokenizer;
tokenizer tok(ncookie, char_sep(";"));
for (tokenizer::iterator it=tok.begin(); it != tok.end(); ++it) {
cookiefile << "Set-Cookie: " << *it << std::endl;
}
cookiefile.close();
if (setenv("GNASH_COOKIES_IN", ss.str().c_str(), 1) < 0) {
gnash::log_error(
"Couldn't set environment variable GNASH_COOKIES_IN to %s",
ncookie);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | nsPluginInstance::setupCookies(const std::string& pageurl)
{
std::string::size_type pos;
pos = pageurl.find("/", pageurl.find("//", 0) + 2) + 1;
std::string url = pageurl.substr(0, pos);
std::string ncookie;
char *cookie = 0;
uint32_t length = 0;
NPError rv = NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
#if NPAPI_VERSION != 190
if (NPNFuncs.getvalueforurl) {
rv = NPN_GetValueForURL(_instance, NPNURLVCookie, url.c_str(),
&cookie, &length);
} else {
LOG_ONCE( gnash::log_debug("Browser doesn't support getvalueforurl") );
}
#endif
if (rv == NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR) {
log_debug("Trying window.document.cookie for cookies");
ncookie = getDocumentProp("cookie");
}
if (cookie) {
ncookie.assign(cookie, length);
NPN_MemFree(cookie);
}
if (ncookie.empty()) {
gnash::log_debug("No stored Cookie for %s", url);
return;
}
gnash::log_debug("The Cookie for %s is %s", url, ncookie);
std::ofstream cookiefile;
std::stringstream ss;
ss << "/tmp/gnash-cookies." << getpid();
cookiefile.open(ss.str().c_str(), std::ios::out | std::ios::trunc);
chmod (ss.str().c_str(), 0600);
typedef boost::char_separator<char> char_sep;
typedef boost::tokenizer<char_sep> tokenizer;
tokenizer tok(ncookie, char_sep(";"));
for (tokenizer::iterator it=tok.begin(); it != tok.end(); ++it) {
cookiefile << "Set-Cookie: " << *it << std::endl;
}
cookiefile.close();
if (setenv("GNASH_COOKIES_IN", ss.str().c_str(), 1) < 0) {
gnash::log_error(
"Couldn't set environment variable GNASH_COOKIES_IN to %s",
ncookie);
}
}
| 165,233 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline void uipc_wakeup_locked(void)
{
char sig_on = 1;
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC SEND WAKE UP");
send(uipc_main.signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static inline void uipc_wakeup_locked(void)
{
char sig_on = 1;
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC SEND WAKE UP");
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(uipc_main.signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0));
}
| 173,499 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PrintingContext::Result PrintingContextCairo::UpdatePrinterSettings(
const DictionaryValue& job_settings, const PageRanges& ranges) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
bool landscape = false;
if (!job_settings.GetBoolean(kSettingLandscape, &landscape))
return OnError();
settings_.SetOrientation(landscape);
settings_.ranges = ranges;
return OK;
#else
DCHECK(!in_print_job_);
if (!print_dialog_->UpdateSettings(job_settings, ranges))
return OnError();
return OK;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | PrintingContext::Result PrintingContextCairo::UpdatePrinterSettings(
const DictionaryValue& job_settings, const PageRanges& ranges) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
bool landscape = false;
if (!job_settings.GetBoolean(kSettingLandscape, &landscape))
return OnError();
settings_.SetOrientation(landscape);
settings_.ranges = ranges;
return OK;
#else
DCHECK(!in_print_job_);
if (!print_dialog_) {
print_dialog_ = create_dialog_func_(this);
print_dialog_->AddRefToDialog();
}
if (!print_dialog_->UpdateSettings(job_settings, ranges))
return OnError();
return OK;
#endif
}
| 170,267 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: raptor_rss_parse_start(raptor_parser *rdf_parser)
{
raptor_uri *uri = rdf_parser->base_uri;
raptor_rss_parser* rss_parser = (raptor_rss_parser*)rdf_parser->context;
int n;
/* base URI required for RSS */
if(!uri)
return 1;
for(n = 0; n < RAPTOR_RSS_NAMESPACES_SIZE; n++)
rss_parser->nspaces_seen[n] = 'N';
/* Optionally forbid internal network and file requests in the XML parser */
raptor_sax2_set_option(rss_parser->sax2,
RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_NET, NULL,
RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_NET));
raptor_sax2_set_option(rss_parser->sax2,
RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_FILE, NULL,
RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_FILE));
if(rdf_parser->uri_filter)
raptor_sax2_set_uri_filter(rss_parser->sax2, rdf_parser->uri_filter,
rdf_parser->uri_filter_user_data);
raptor_sax2_parse_start(rss_parser->sax2, uri);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | raptor_rss_parse_start(raptor_parser *rdf_parser)
{
raptor_uri *uri = rdf_parser->base_uri;
raptor_rss_parser* rss_parser = (raptor_rss_parser*)rdf_parser->context;
int n;
/* base URI required for RSS */
if(!uri)
return 1;
for(n = 0; n < RAPTOR_RSS_NAMESPACES_SIZE; n++)
rss_parser->nspaces_seen[n] = 'N';
/* Optionally forbid internal network and file requests in the XML parser */
raptor_sax2_set_option(rss_parser->sax2,
RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_NET, NULL,
RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_NET));
raptor_sax2_set_option(rss_parser->sax2,
RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_FILE, NULL,
RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_FILE));
raptor_sax2_set_option(rss_parser->sax2,
RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES, NULL,
RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES));
if(rdf_parser->uri_filter)
raptor_sax2_set_uri_filter(rss_parser->sax2, rdf_parser->uri_filter,
rdf_parser->uri_filter_user_data);
raptor_sax2_parse_start(rss_parser->sax2, uri);
return 0;
}
| 165,661 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int rtecp_select_file(sc_card_t *card,
const sc_path_t *in_path, sc_file_t **file_out)
{
sc_file_t **file_out_copy, *file;
int r;
assert(card && card->ctx && in_path);
switch (in_path->type)
{
case SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME:
case SC_PATH_TYPE_FROM_CURRENT:
case SC_PATH_TYPE_PARENT:
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
}
assert(iso_ops && iso_ops->select_file);
file_out_copy = file_out;
r = iso_ops->select_file(card, in_path, file_out_copy);
if (r || file_out_copy == NULL)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
assert(file_out_copy);
file = *file_out_copy;
assert(file);
if (file->sec_attr && file->sec_attr_len == SC_RTECP_SEC_ATTR_SIZE)
set_acl_from_sec_attr(card, file);
else
r = SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED;
if (r)
sc_file_free(file);
else
{
assert(file_out);
*file_out = file;
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int rtecp_select_file(sc_card_t *card,
const sc_path_t *in_path, sc_file_t **file_out)
{
sc_file_t **file_out_copy, *file;
int r;
assert(card && card->ctx && in_path);
switch (in_path->type)
{
case SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME:
case SC_PATH_TYPE_FROM_CURRENT:
case SC_PATH_TYPE_PARENT:
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
}
assert(iso_ops && iso_ops->select_file);
file_out_copy = file_out;
r = iso_ops->select_file(card, in_path, file_out_copy);
if (r || file_out_copy == NULL)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
assert(file_out_copy);
file = *file_out_copy;
assert(file);
if (file->sec_attr && file->sec_attr_len == SC_RTECP_SEC_ATTR_SIZE)
set_acl_from_sec_attr(card, file);
else
r = SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED;
if (r && !file_out)
sc_file_free(file);
else
{
assert(file_out);
*file_out = file;
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
}
| 169,063 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: store_image_row(PNG_CONST png_store* ps, png_const_structp pp, int nImage,
png_uint_32 y)
{
png_size_t coffset = (nImage * ps->image_h + y) * (ps->cb_row + 5) + 2;
if (ps->image == NULL)
png_error(pp, "no allocated image");
if (coffset + ps->cb_row + 3 > ps->cb_image)
png_error(pp, "image too small");
return ps->image + coffset;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | store_image_row(PNG_CONST png_store* ps, png_const_structp pp, int nImage,
store_image_row(const png_store* ps, png_const_structp pp, int nImage,
png_uint_32 y)
{
png_size_t coffset = (nImage * ps->image_h + y) * (ps->cb_row + 5) + 2;
if (ps->image == NULL)
png_error(pp, "no allocated image");
if (coffset + ps->cb_row + 3 > ps->cb_image)
png_error(pp, "image too small");
return ps->image + coffset;
}
| 173,705 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int Equalizer_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int32_t preset;
int32_t band;
int32_t level;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
preset = (int32_t)(*(uint16_t *)pValue);
if ((preset >= EqualizerGetNumPresets())||(preset < 0)) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, preset);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
band = *pParamTemp;
level = (int32_t)(*(int16_t *)pValue);
if (band >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, band, level);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
if ((int)p[0] >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (p[0] >= 0) {
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, (int)p[0]);
} else {
if ((int)p[1] != FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, i, (int)p[2 + i]);
}
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_setParameter */
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability: Effect command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32448258
Bug: 32095626
Test: Use POC bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I69f24eac5866f8d9090fc4c0ebe58c2c297b63df
(cherry picked from commit 01183402d757f0c28bfd5e3b127b3809dfd67459)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | int Equalizer_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int32_t preset;
int32_t band;
int32_t level;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
preset = (int32_t)(*(uint16_t *)pValue);
if ((preset >= EqualizerGetNumPresets())||(preset < 0)) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, preset);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
band = *pParamTemp;
level = (int32_t)(*(int16_t *)pValue);
if (band < 0 || band >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
if (band < 0) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "32095626");
ALOGE("\tERROR Equalizer_setParameter() EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL band %d", band);
}
break;
}
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, band, level);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
if ((int)p[0] >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (p[0] >= 0) {
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, (int)p[0]);
} else {
if ((int)p[1] != FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, i, (int)p[2 + i]);
}
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_setParameter */
| 174,060 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void OmniboxEditModel::RestoreState(const State* state) {
controller_->GetToolbarModel()->set_url_replacement_enabled(
!state || state->url_replacement_enabled);
permanent_text_ = controller_->GetToolbarModel()->GetText();
view_->RevertWithoutResettingSearchTermReplacement();
input_ = state ? state->autocomplete_input : AutocompleteInput();
if (!state)
return;
SetFocusState(state->focus_state, OMNIBOX_FOCUS_CHANGE_TAB_SWITCH);
focus_source_ = state->focus_source;
if (state->user_input_in_progress) {
keyword_ = state->keyword;
is_keyword_hint_ = state->is_keyword_hint;
view_->SetUserText(state->user_text,
DisplayTextFromUserText(state->user_text), false);
view_->SetGrayTextAutocompletion(state->gray_text);
}
}
Commit Message: [OriginChip] Re-enable the chip as necessary when switching tabs.
BUG=369500
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/292493003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@271161 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void OmniboxEditModel::RestoreState(const State* state) {
bool url_replacement_enabled = !state || state->url_replacement_enabled;
controller_->GetToolbarModel()->set_url_replacement_enabled(
url_replacement_enabled);
controller_->GetToolbarModel()->set_origin_chip_enabled(
url_replacement_enabled);
permanent_text_ = controller_->GetToolbarModel()->GetText();
view_->RevertWithoutResettingSearchTermReplacement();
input_ = state ? state->autocomplete_input : AutocompleteInput();
if (!state)
return;
SetFocusState(state->focus_state, OMNIBOX_FOCUS_CHANGE_TAB_SWITCH);
focus_source_ = state->focus_source;
if (state->user_input_in_progress) {
keyword_ = state->keyword;
is_keyword_hint_ = state->is_keyword_hint;
view_->SetUserText(state->user_text,
DisplayTextFromUserText(state->user_text), false);
view_->SetGrayTextAutocompletion(state->gray_text);
}
}
| 171,175 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SocketStream::CheckPrivacyMode() {
if (context_.get() && context_->network_delegate()) {
bool enable = context_->network_delegate()->CanEnablePrivacyMode(url_,
url_);
privacy_mode_ = enable ? kPrivacyModeEnabled : kPrivacyModeDisabled;
if (enable)
server_ssl_config_.channel_id_enabled = false;
}
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void SocketStream::CheckPrivacyMode() {
if (context_ && context_->network_delegate()) {
bool enable = context_->network_delegate()->CanEnablePrivacyMode(url_,
url_);
privacy_mode_ = enable ? kPrivacyModeEnabled : kPrivacyModeDisabled;
if (enable)
server_ssl_config_.channel_id_enabled = false;
}
}
| 171,251 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client)
{
int ret;
SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
s->d1->listen = 1;
(void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(s), client);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client)
{
int ret;
/* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */
SSL_clear(s);
SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
s->d1->listen = 1;
(void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(s), client);
return 1;
}
| 164,821 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _gcry_ecc_ecdsa_sign (gcry_mpi_t input, ECC_secret_key *skey,
gcry_mpi_t r, gcry_mpi_t s,
int flags, int hashalgo)
{
gpg_err_code_t rc = 0;
int extraloops = 0;
gcry_mpi_t k, dr, sum, k_1, x;
mpi_point_struct I;
gcry_mpi_t hash;
const void *abuf;
unsigned int abits, qbits;
mpi_ec_t ctx;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_mpidump ("ecdsa sign hash ", input );
/* Convert the INPUT into an MPI if needed. */
rc = _gcry_dsa_normalize_hash (input, &hash, qbits);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (rc)
return rc;
k = NULL;
dr = mpi_alloc (0);
sum = mpi_alloc (0);
{
do
{
mpi_free (k);
k = NULL;
if ((flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_RFC6979) && hashalgo)
{
/* Use Pornin's method for deterministic DSA. If this
flag is set, it is expected that HASH is an opaque
MPI with the to be signed hash. That hash is also
used as h1 from 3.2.a. */
if (!mpi_is_opaque (input))
{
rc = GPG_ERR_CONFLICT;
goto leave;
}
abuf = mpi_get_opaque (input, &abits);
rc = _gcry_dsa_gen_rfc6979_k (&k, skey->E.n, skey->d,
abuf, (abits+7)/8,
hashalgo, extraloops);
if (rc)
goto leave;
extraloops++;
}
else
k = _gcry_dsa_gen_k (skey->E.n, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
_gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (&I, k, &skey->E.G, ctx);
if (_gcry_mpi_ec_get_affine (x, NULL, &I, ctx))
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("ecc sign: Failed to get affine coordinates\n");
rc = GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
goto leave;
}
mpi_mod (r, x, skey->E.n); /* r = x mod n */
}
while (!mpi_cmp_ui (r, 0));
mpi_mulm (dr, skey->d, r, skey->E.n); /* dr = d*r mod n */
mpi_addm (sum, hash, dr, skey->E.n); /* sum = hash + (d*r) mod n */
mpi_invm (k_1, k, skey->E.n); /* k_1 = k^(-1) mod n */
mpi_mulm (s, k_1, sum, skey->E.n); /* s = k^(-1)*(hash+(d*r)) mod n */
}
while (!mpi_cmp_ui (s, 0));
if (DBG_CIPHER)
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | _gcry_ecc_ecdsa_sign (gcry_mpi_t input, ECC_secret_key *skey,
gcry_mpi_t r, gcry_mpi_t s,
int flags, int hashalgo)
{
gpg_err_code_t rc = 0;
int extraloops = 0;
gcry_mpi_t k, dr, sum, k_1, x;
mpi_point_struct I;
gcry_mpi_t hash;
const void *abuf;
unsigned int abits, qbits;
mpi_ec_t ctx;
gcry_mpi_t b; /* Random number needed for blinding. */
gcry_mpi_t bi; /* multiplicative inverse of B. */
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_mpidump ("ecdsa sign hash ", input );
/* Convert the INPUT into an MPI if needed. */
rc = _gcry_dsa_normalize_hash (input, &hash, qbits);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (rc)
return rc;
b = mpi_snew (qbits);
bi = mpi_snew (qbits);
do
{
_gcry_mpi_randomize (b, qbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
mpi_mod (b, b, skey->E.n);
}
while (!mpi_invm (bi, b, skey->E.n));
k = NULL;
dr = mpi_alloc (0);
sum = mpi_alloc (0);
{
do
{
mpi_free (k);
k = NULL;
if ((flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_RFC6979) && hashalgo)
{
/* Use Pornin's method for deterministic DSA. If this
flag is set, it is expected that HASH is an opaque
MPI with the to be signed hash. That hash is also
used as h1 from 3.2.a. */
if (!mpi_is_opaque (input))
{
rc = GPG_ERR_CONFLICT;
goto leave;
}
abuf = mpi_get_opaque (input, &abits);
rc = _gcry_dsa_gen_rfc6979_k (&k, skey->E.n, skey->d,
abuf, (abits+7)/8,
hashalgo, extraloops);
if (rc)
goto leave;
extraloops++;
}
else
k = _gcry_dsa_gen_k (skey->E.n, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
_gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (&I, k, &skey->E.G, ctx);
if (_gcry_mpi_ec_get_affine (x, NULL, &I, ctx))
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("ecc sign: Failed to get affine coordinates\n");
rc = GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
goto leave;
}
mpi_mod (r, x, skey->E.n); /* r = x mod n */
}
while (!mpi_cmp_ui (r, 0));
mpi_mulm (dr, skey->d, r, skey->E.n); /* dr = d*r mod n */
mpi_addm (sum, hash, dr, skey->E.n); /* sum = hash + (d*r) mod n */
mpi_invm (k_1, k, skey->E.n); /* k_1 = k^(-1) mod n */
mpi_mulm (s, k_1, sum, skey->E.n); /* s = k^(-1)*(hash+(d*r)) mod n */
}
while (!mpi_cmp_ui (s, 0));
if (DBG_CIPHER)
}
| 165,348 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.