instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ext4_xattr_block_list(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
int error;
struct mb_cache *ext4_mb_cache = EXT4_GET_MB_CACHE(inode);
ea_idebug(inode, "buffer=%p, buffer_size=%ld",
buffer, (long)buffer_size);
error = 0;
if (!EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
ea_idebug(inode, "reading block %llu",
(unsigned long long)EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
if (!bh)
goto cleanup;
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d, refcount=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)), le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount));
if (ext4_xattr_check_block(inode, bh)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "bad block %llu",
EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto cleanup;
}
ext4_xattr_cache_insert(ext4_mb_cache, bh);
error = ext4_xattr_list_entries(dentry, BFIRST(bh), buffer, buffer_size);
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | ext4_xattr_block_list(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
int error;
struct mb2_cache *ext4_mb_cache = EXT4_GET_MB_CACHE(inode);
ea_idebug(inode, "buffer=%p, buffer_size=%ld",
buffer, (long)buffer_size);
error = 0;
if (!EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
ea_idebug(inode, "reading block %llu",
(unsigned long long)EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
if (!bh)
goto cleanup;
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d, refcount=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)), le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount));
if (ext4_xattr_check_block(inode, bh)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "bad block %llu",
EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto cleanup;
}
ext4_xattr_cache_insert(ext4_mb_cache, bh);
error = ext4_xattr_list_entries(dentry, BFIRST(bh), buffer, buffer_size);
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
return error;
}
| 169,989 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int vfio_msi_enable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int nvec, bool msix)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev;
unsigned int flag = msix ? PCI_IRQ_MSIX : PCI_IRQ_MSI;
int ret;
if (!is_irq_none(vdev))
return -EINVAL;
vdev->ctx = kzalloc(nvec * sizeof(struct vfio_pci_irq_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vdev->ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
/* return the number of supported vectors if we can't get all: */
ret = pci_alloc_irq_vectors(pdev, 1, nvec, flag);
if (ret < nvec) {
if (ret > 0)
pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev);
kfree(vdev->ctx);
return ret;
}
vdev->num_ctx = nvec;
vdev->irq_type = msix ? VFIO_PCI_MSIX_IRQ_INDEX :
VFIO_PCI_MSI_IRQ_INDEX;
if (!msix) {
/*
* Compute the virtual hardware field for max msi vectors -
* it is the log base 2 of the number of vectors.
*/
vdev->msi_qmax = fls(nvec * 2 - 1) - 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int vfio_msi_enable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int nvec, bool msix)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev;
unsigned int flag = msix ? PCI_IRQ_MSIX : PCI_IRQ_MSI;
int ret;
if (!is_irq_none(vdev))
return -EINVAL;
vdev->ctx = kcalloc(nvec, sizeof(struct vfio_pci_irq_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vdev->ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
/* return the number of supported vectors if we can't get all: */
ret = pci_alloc_irq_vectors(pdev, 1, nvec, flag);
if (ret < nvec) {
if (ret > 0)
pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev);
kfree(vdev->ctx);
return ret;
}
vdev->num_ctx = nvec;
vdev->irq_type = msix ? VFIO_PCI_MSIX_IRQ_INDEX :
VFIO_PCI_MSI_IRQ_INDEX;
if (!msix) {
/*
* Compute the virtual hardware field for max msi vectors -
* it is the log base 2 of the number of vectors.
*/
vdev->msi_qmax = fls(nvec * 2 - 1) - 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,901 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: isis_print_id(const uint8_t *cp, int id_len)
{
int i;
static char id[sizeof("xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.yy-zz")];
char *pos = id;
for (i = 1; i <= SYSTEM_ID_LEN; i++) {
snprintf(pos, sizeof(id) - (pos - id), "%02x", *cp++);
pos += strlen(pos);
if (i == 2 || i == 4)
*pos++ = '.';
}
if (id_len >= NODE_ID_LEN) {
snprintf(pos, sizeof(id) - (pos - id), ".%02x", *cp++);
pos += strlen(pos);
}
if (id_len == LSP_ID_LEN)
snprintf(pos, sizeof(id) - (pos - id), "-%02x", *cp);
return (id);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13035/Properly handle IS-IS IDs shorter than a system ID (MAC address).
Some of them are variable-length, with a field giving the total length,
and therefore they can be shorter than 6 octets. If one is, don't run
past the end.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | isis_print_id(const uint8_t *cp, int id_len)
{
int i;
static char id[sizeof("xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.yy-zz")];
char *pos = id;
int sysid_len;
sysid_len = SYSTEM_ID_LEN;
if (sysid_len > id_len)
sysid_len = id_len;
for (i = 1; i <= sysid_len; i++) {
snprintf(pos, sizeof(id) - (pos - id), "%02x", *cp++);
pos += strlen(pos);
if (i == 2 || i == 4)
*pos++ = '.';
}
if (id_len >= NODE_ID_LEN) {
snprintf(pos, sizeof(id) - (pos - id), ".%02x", *cp++);
pos += strlen(pos);
}
if (id_len == LSP_ID_LEN)
snprintf(pos, sizeof(id) - (pos - id), "-%02x", *cp);
return (id);
}
| 167,848 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ext3_fsblk_t get_sb_block(void **data, struct super_block *sb)
{
ext3_fsblk_t sb_block;
char *options = (char *) *data;
if (!options || strncmp(options, "sb=", 3) != 0)
return 1; /* Default location */
options += 3;
/*todo: use simple_strtoll with >32bit ext3 */
sb_block = simple_strtoul(options, &options, 0);
if (*options && *options != ',') {
ext3_msg(sb, "error: invalid sb specification: %s",
(char *) *data);
return 1;
}
if (*options == ',')
options++;
*data = (void *) options;
return sb_block;
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static ext3_fsblk_t get_sb_block(void **data, struct super_block *sb)
{
ext3_fsblk_t sb_block;
char *options = (char *) *data;
if (!options || strncmp(options, "sb=", 3) != 0)
return 1; /* Default location */
options += 3;
/*todo: use simple_strtoll with >32bit ext3 */
sb_block = simple_strtoul(options, &options, 0);
if (*options && *options != ',') {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: invalid sb specification: %s",
(char *) *data);
return 1;
}
if (*options == ',')
options++;
*data = (void *) options;
return sb_block;
}
| 166,110 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual bool IsURLAcceptableForWebUI(
BrowserContext* browser_context, const GURL& url) const {
return HasWebUIScheme(url);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | virtual bool IsURLAcceptableForWebUI(
BrowserContext* browser_context, const GURL& url) const {
return content::GetContentClient()->HasWebUIScheme(url);
}
};
class TabContentsTestClient : public TestContentClient {
public:
TabContentsTestClient() {
}
virtual bool HasWebUIScheme(const GURL& url) const OVERRIDE {
return url.SchemeIs("tabcontentstest");
}
| 171,013 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t aio_setup_single_vector(struct kiocb *kiocb)
{
kiocb->ki_iovec = &kiocb->ki_inline_vec;
kiocb->ki_iovec->iov_base = kiocb->ki_buf;
kiocb->ki_iovec->iov_len = kiocb->ki_left;
kiocb->ki_nr_segs = 1;
kiocb->ki_cur_seg = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: make AIO use the proper rw_verify_area() area helpers
We had for some reason overlooked the AIO interface, and it didn't use
the proper rw_verify_area() helper function that checks (for example)
mandatory locking on the file, and that the size of the access doesn't
cause us to overflow the provided offset limits etc.
Instead, AIO did just the security_file_permission() thing (that
rw_verify_area() also does) directly.
This fixes it to do all the proper helper functions, which not only
means that now mandatory file locking works with AIO too, we can
actually remove lines of code.
Reported-by: Manish Honap <manish_honap_vit@yahoo.co.in>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | static ssize_t aio_setup_single_vector(struct kiocb *kiocb)
static ssize_t aio_setup_single_vector(int type, struct file * file, struct kiocb *kiocb)
{
int bytes;
bytes = rw_verify_area(type, file, &kiocb->ki_pos, kiocb->ki_left);
if (bytes < 0)
return bytes;
kiocb->ki_iovec = &kiocb->ki_inline_vec;
kiocb->ki_iovec->iov_base = kiocb->ki_buf;
kiocb->ki_iovec->iov_len = bytes;
kiocb->ki_nr_segs = 1;
kiocb->ki_cur_seg = 0;
return 0;
}
| 167,612 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool CheckClientDownloadRequest::ShouldUploadForDlpScan() {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kDeepScanningOfDownloads))
return false;
int check_content_compliance = g_browser_process->local_state()->GetInteger(
prefs::kCheckContentCompliance);
if (check_content_compliance !=
CheckContentComplianceValues::CHECK_DOWNLOADS &&
check_content_compliance !=
CheckContentComplianceValues::CHECK_UPLOADS_AND_DOWNLOADS)
return false;
if (policy::BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveDMToken().empty())
return false;
const base::ListValue* domains = g_browser_process->local_state()->GetList(
prefs::kURLsToCheckComplianceOfDownloadedContent);
url_matcher::URLMatcher matcher;
policy::url_util::AddAllowFilters(&matcher, domains);
return !matcher.MatchURL(item_->GetURL()).empty();
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool CheckClientDownloadRequest::ShouldUploadForDlpScan() {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kDeepScanningOfDownloads))
return false;
int check_content_compliance = g_browser_process->local_state()->GetInteger(
prefs::kCheckContentCompliance);
if (check_content_compliance !=
CheckContentComplianceValues::CHECK_DOWNLOADS &&
check_content_compliance !=
CheckContentComplianceValues::CHECK_UPLOADS_AND_DOWNLOADS)
return false;
// If there's no valid DM token, the upload will fail, so we can skip
// uploading now.
if (!BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveBrowserDMToken().is_valid())
return false;
const base::ListValue* domains = g_browser_process->local_state()->GetList(
prefs::kURLsToCheckComplianceOfDownloadedContent);
url_matcher::URLMatcher matcher;
policy::url_util::AddAllowFilters(&matcher, domains);
return !matcher.MatchURL(item_->GetURL()).empty();
}
| 172,356 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetInputMethodLibrary(
InputMethodLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->input_method_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetInputMethodLibrary(
| 170,638 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: HeapObjectHeader* NormalPage::findHeaderFromAddress(Address address) {
if (address < payload())
return nullptr;
if (!m_objectStartBitMapComputed)
populateObjectStartBitMap();
size_t objectOffset = address - payload();
size_t objectStartNumber = objectOffset / allocationGranularity;
size_t mapIndex = objectStartNumber / 8;
ASSERT(mapIndex < objectStartBitMapSize);
size_t bit = objectStartNumber & 7;
uint8_t byte = m_objectStartBitMap[mapIndex] & ((1 << (bit + 1)) - 1);
while (!byte) {
ASSERT(mapIndex > 0);
byte = m_objectStartBitMap[--mapIndex];
}
int leadingZeroes = numberOfLeadingZeroes(byte);
objectStartNumber = (mapIndex * 8) + 7 - leadingZeroes;
objectOffset = objectStartNumber * allocationGranularity;
Address objectAddress = objectOffset + payload();
HeapObjectHeader* header = reinterpret_cast<HeapObjectHeader*>(objectAddress);
if (header->isFree())
return nullptr;
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
return header;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | HeapObjectHeader* NormalPage::findHeaderFromAddress(Address address) {
if (address < payload())
return nullptr;
if (!m_objectStartBitMapComputed)
populateObjectStartBitMap();
size_t objectOffset = address - payload();
size_t objectStartNumber = objectOffset / allocationGranularity;
size_t mapIndex = objectStartNumber / 8;
ASSERT(mapIndex < objectStartBitMapSize);
size_t bit = objectStartNumber & 7;
uint8_t byte = m_objectStartBitMap[mapIndex] & ((1 << (bit + 1)) - 1);
while (!byte) {
ASSERT(mapIndex > 0);
byte = m_objectStartBitMap[--mapIndex];
}
int leadingZeroes = numberOfLeadingZeroes(byte);
objectStartNumber = (mapIndex * 8) + 7 - leadingZeroes;
objectOffset = objectStartNumber * allocationGranularity;
Address objectAddress = objectOffset + payload();
HeapObjectHeader* header = reinterpret_cast<HeapObjectHeader*>(objectAddress);
if (header->isFree())
return nullptr;
header->checkHeader();
return header;
}
| 172,711 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int get_sda(void)
{
return qrio_get_gpio(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SDA1);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | int get_sda(void)
| 169,630 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void __ip_select_ident(struct net *net, struct iphdr *iph, int segs)
{
static u32 ip_idents_hashrnd __read_mostly;
u32 hash, id;
net_get_random_once(&ip_idents_hashrnd, sizeof(ip_idents_hashrnd));
hash = jhash_3words((__force u32)iph->daddr,
(__force u32)iph->saddr,
iph->protocol ^ net_hash_mix(net),
ip_idents_hashrnd);
id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, segs);
iph->id = htons(id);
}
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void __ip_select_ident(struct net *net, struct iphdr *iph, int segs)
{
u32 hash, id;
/* Note the following code is not safe, but this is okay. */
if (unlikely(siphash_key_is_zero(&net->ipv4.ip_id_key)))
get_random_bytes(&net->ipv4.ip_id_key,
sizeof(net->ipv4.ip_id_key));
hash = siphash_3u32((__force u32)iph->daddr,
(__force u32)iph->saddr,
iph->protocol,
&net->ipv4.ip_id_key);
id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, segs);
iph->id = htons(id);
}
| 169,716 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int hi3660_stub_clk_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
struct resource *res;
unsigned int i;
int ret;
/* Use mailbox client without blocking */
stub_clk_chan.cl.dev = dev;
stub_clk_chan.cl.tx_done = NULL;
stub_clk_chan.cl.tx_block = false;
stub_clk_chan.cl.knows_txdone = false;
/* Allocate mailbox channel */
stub_clk_chan.mbox = mbox_request_channel(&stub_clk_chan.cl, 0);
if (IS_ERR(stub_clk_chan.mbox))
return PTR_ERR(stub_clk_chan.mbox);
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
freq_reg = devm_ioremap(dev, res->start, resource_size(res));
if (!freq_reg)
return -ENOMEM;
freq_reg += HI3660_STUB_CLOCK_DATA;
for (i = 0; i < HI3660_CLK_STUB_NUM; i++) {
ret = devm_clk_hw_register(&pdev->dev, &hi3660_stub_clks[i].hw);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return devm_of_clk_add_hw_provider(&pdev->dev, hi3660_stub_clk_hw_get,
hi3660_stub_clks);
}
Commit Message: clk: hisilicon: hi3660：Fix potential NULL dereference in hi3660_stub_clk_probe()
platform_get_resource() may return NULL, add proper check to
avoid potential NULL dereferencing.
This is detected by Coccinelle semantic patch.
@@
expression pdev, res, n, t, e, e1, e2;
@@
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, t, n);
+ if (!res)
+ return -EINVAL;
... when != res == NULL
e = devm_ioremap(e1, res->start, e2);
Fixes: 4f16f7ff3bc0 ("clk: hisilicon: Add support for Hi3660 stub clocks")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int hi3660_stub_clk_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
struct resource *res;
unsigned int i;
int ret;
/* Use mailbox client without blocking */
stub_clk_chan.cl.dev = dev;
stub_clk_chan.cl.tx_done = NULL;
stub_clk_chan.cl.tx_block = false;
stub_clk_chan.cl.knows_txdone = false;
/* Allocate mailbox channel */
stub_clk_chan.mbox = mbox_request_channel(&stub_clk_chan.cl, 0);
if (IS_ERR(stub_clk_chan.mbox))
return PTR_ERR(stub_clk_chan.mbox);
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
if (!res)
return -EINVAL;
freq_reg = devm_ioremap(dev, res->start, resource_size(res));
if (!freq_reg)
return -ENOMEM;
freq_reg += HI3660_STUB_CLOCK_DATA;
for (i = 0; i < HI3660_CLK_STUB_NUM; i++) {
ret = devm_clk_hw_register(&pdev->dev, &hi3660_stub_clks[i].hw);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return devm_of_clk_add_hw_provider(&pdev->dev, hi3660_stub_clk_hw_get,
hi3660_stub_clks);
}
| 169,259 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void xen_netbk_tx_submit(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
{
struct gnttab_copy *gop = netbk->tx_copy_ops;
struct sk_buff *skb;
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&netbk->tx_queue)) != NULL) {
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp;
struct xenvif *vif;
u16 pending_idx;
unsigned data_len;
pending_idx = *((u16 *)skb->data);
vif = netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].vif;
txp = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
/* Check the remap error code. */
if (unlikely(xen_netbk_tx_check_gop(netbk, skb, &gop))) {
netdev_dbg(vif->dev, "netback grant failed.\n");
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = 0;
kfree_skb(skb);
continue;
}
data_len = skb->len;
memcpy(skb->data,
(void *)(idx_to_kaddr(netbk, pending_idx)|txp->offset),
data_len);
if (data_len < txp->size) {
/* Append the packet payload as a fragment. */
txp->offset += data_len;
txp->size -= data_len;
} else {
/* Schedule a response immediately. */
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx);
}
if (txp->flags & XEN_NETTXF_csum_blank)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
else if (txp->flags & XEN_NETTXF_data_validated)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
xen_netbk_fill_frags(netbk, skb);
/*
* If the initial fragment was < PKT_PROT_LEN then
* pull through some bytes from the other fragments to
* increase the linear region to PKT_PROT_LEN bytes.
*/
if (skb_headlen(skb) < PKT_PROT_LEN && skb_is_nonlinear(skb)) {
int target = min_t(int, skb->len, PKT_PROT_LEN);
__pskb_pull_tail(skb, target - skb_headlen(skb));
}
skb->dev = vif->dev;
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, skb->dev);
if (checksum_setup(vif, skb)) {
netdev_dbg(vif->dev,
"Can't setup checksum in net_tx_action\n");
kfree_skb(skb);
continue;
}
vif->dev->stats.rx_bytes += skb->len;
vif->dev->stats.rx_packets++;
xenvif_receive_skb(vif, skb);
}
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void xen_netbk_tx_submit(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
{
struct gnttab_copy *gop = netbk->tx_copy_ops;
struct sk_buff *skb;
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&netbk->tx_queue)) != NULL) {
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp;
struct xenvif *vif;
u16 pending_idx;
unsigned data_len;
pending_idx = *((u16 *)skb->data);
vif = netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].vif;
txp = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
/* Check the remap error code. */
if (unlikely(xen_netbk_tx_check_gop(netbk, skb, &gop))) {
netdev_dbg(vif->dev, "netback grant failed.\n");
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = 0;
kfree_skb(skb);
continue;
}
data_len = skb->len;
memcpy(skb->data,
(void *)(idx_to_kaddr(netbk, pending_idx)|txp->offset),
data_len);
if (data_len < txp->size) {
/* Append the packet payload as a fragment. */
txp->offset += data_len;
txp->size -= data_len;
} else {
/* Schedule a response immediately. */
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx, XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY);
}
if (txp->flags & XEN_NETTXF_csum_blank)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
else if (txp->flags & XEN_NETTXF_data_validated)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
xen_netbk_fill_frags(netbk, skb);
/*
* If the initial fragment was < PKT_PROT_LEN then
* pull through some bytes from the other fragments to
* increase the linear region to PKT_PROT_LEN bytes.
*/
if (skb_headlen(skb) < PKT_PROT_LEN && skb_is_nonlinear(skb)) {
int target = min_t(int, skb->len, PKT_PROT_LEN);
__pskb_pull_tail(skb, target - skb_headlen(skb));
}
skb->dev = vif->dev;
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, skb->dev);
if (checksum_setup(vif, skb)) {
netdev_dbg(vif->dev,
"Can't setup checksum in net_tx_action\n");
kfree_skb(skb);
continue;
}
vif->dev->stats.rx_bytes += skb->len;
vif->dev->stats.rx_packets++;
xenvif_receive_skb(vif, skb);
}
}
| 166,170 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void TearDown() {
content::GetContentClient()->set_browser(old_browser_client_);
RenderViewHostTestHarness::TearDown();
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | virtual void TearDown() {
content::GetContentClient()->set_browser(old_browser_client_);
content::SetContentClient(old_client_);
RenderViewHostTestHarness::TearDown();
}
| 171,016 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CWebServer::GetFloorplanImage(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, reply & rep)
{
std::string idx = request::findValue(&req, "idx");
if (idx == "") {
return;
}
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
result = m_sql.safe_queryBlob("SELECT Image FROM Floorplans WHERE ID=%s", idx.c_str());
if (result.empty())
return;
reply::set_content(&rep, result[0][0].begin(), result[0][0].end());
std::string oname = "floorplan";
if (result[0][0].size() > 10)
{
if (result[0][0][0] == 'P')
oname += ".png";
else if (result[0][0][0] == -1)
oname += ".jpg";
else if (result[0][0][0] == 'B')
oname += ".bmp";
else if (result[0][0][0] == 'G')
oname += ".gif";
}
reply::add_header_attachment(&rep, oname);
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | void CWebServer::GetFloorplanImage(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, reply & rep)
{
std::string idx = request::findValue(&req, "idx");
if (idx == "") {
return;
}
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
result = m_sql.safe_queryBlob("SELECT Image FROM Floorplans WHERE ID=%d", atol(idx.c_str()));
if (result.empty())
return;
reply::set_content(&rep, result[0][0].begin(), result[0][0].end());
std::string oname = "floorplan";
if (result[0][0].size() > 10)
{
if (result[0][0][0] == 'P')
oname += ".png";
else if (result[0][0][0] == -1)
oname += ".jpg";
else if (result[0][0][0] == 'B')
oname += ".bmp";
else if (result[0][0][0] == 'G')
oname += ".gif";
}
reply::add_header_attachment(&rep, oname);
}
| 169,714 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::setConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR _params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraVOPRefresh:
{
OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *params =
(OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *)_params;
if (params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
mKeyFrameRequested = params->IntraRefreshVOP;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *params =
(OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *)_params;
if (params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (mBitrate != params->nEncodeBitrate) {
mBitrate = params->nEncodeBitrate;
mBitrateUpdated = true;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::setConfig(index, _params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::setConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR _params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraVOPRefresh:
{
OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *params =
(OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *)_params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(params)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
mKeyFrameRequested = params->IntraRefreshVOP;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *params =
(OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *)_params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(params)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (mBitrate != params->nEncodeBitrate) {
mBitrate = params->nEncodeBitrate;
mBitrateUpdated = true;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::setConfig(index, _params);
}
}
| 174,202 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: open_patch_file (char const *filename)
{
file_offset file_pos = 0;
file_offset pos;
struct stat st;
if (!filename || !*filename || strEQ (filename, "-"))
pfp = stdin;
else
{
pfp = fopen (filename, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r");
if (!pfp)
pfatal ("Can't open patch file %s", quotearg (filename));
}
#if HAVE_SETMODE_DOS
if (binary_transput)
{
if (isatty (fileno (pfp)))
fatal ("cannot read binary data from tty on this platform");
setmode (fileno (pfp), O_BINARY);
}
#endif
if (fstat (fileno (pfp), &st) != 0)
pfatal ("fstat");
if (S_ISREG (st.st_mode) && (pos = file_tell (pfp)) != -1)
file_pos = pos;
else
{
size_t charsread;
int fd = make_tempfile (&TMPPATNAME, 'p', NULL, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, 0);
FILE *read_pfp = pfp;
TMPPATNAME_needs_removal = true;
pfp = fdopen (fd, "w+b");
if (! pfp)
pfatal ("Can't open stream for file %s", quotearg (TMPPATNAME));
for (st.st_size = 0;
(charsread = fread (buf, 1, bufsize, read_pfp)) != 0;
st.st_size += charsread)
if (fwrite (buf, 1, charsread, pfp) != charsread)
write_fatal ();
if (ferror (read_pfp) || fclose (read_pfp) != 0)
read_fatal ();
if (fflush (pfp) != 0
|| file_seek (pfp, (file_offset) 0, SEEK_SET) != 0)
write_fatal ();
}
p_filesize = st.st_size;
if (p_filesize != (file_offset) p_filesize)
fatal ("patch file is too long");
next_intuit_at (file_pos, 1);
set_hunkmax();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | open_patch_file (char const *filename)
{
file_offset file_pos = 0;
file_offset pos;
struct stat st;
if (!filename || !*filename || strEQ (filename, "-"))
pfp = stdin;
else
{
pfp = fopen (filename, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r");
if (!pfp)
pfatal ("Can't open patch file %s", quotearg (filename));
}
#if HAVE_SETMODE_DOS
if (binary_transput)
{
if (isatty (fileno (pfp)))
fatal ("cannot read binary data from tty on this platform");
setmode (fileno (pfp), O_BINARY);
}
#endif
if (fstat (fileno (pfp), &st) != 0)
pfatal ("fstat");
if (S_ISREG (st.st_mode) && (pos = file_tell (pfp)) != -1)
file_pos = pos;
else
{
size_t charsread;
int fd = make_tempfile (&TMPPATNAME, 'p', NULL, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, 0);
FILE *read_pfp = pfp;
TMPPATNAME_needs_removal = true;
pfp = fdopen (fd, "w+b");
if (! pfp)
pfatal ("Can't open stream for file %s", quotearg (TMPPATNAME));
for (st.st_size = 0;
(charsread = fread (buf, 1, bufsize, read_pfp)) != 0;
st.st_size += charsread)
if (fwrite (buf, 1, charsread, pfp) != charsread)
write_fatal ();
if (ferror (read_pfp) || fclose (read_pfp) != 0)
read_fatal ();
if (fflush (pfp) != 0
|| file_seek (pfp, (file_offset) 0, SEEK_SET) != 0)
write_fatal ();
}
p_filesize = st.st_size;
if (p_filesize != (file_offset) p_filesize)
fatal ("patch file is too long");
next_intuit_at (file_pos, 1);
}
| 165,400 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void* sspi_SecureHandleGetLowerPointer(SecHandle* handle)
{
void* pointer;
if (!handle)
return NULL;
pointer = (void*) ~((size_t) handle->dwLower);
return pointer;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | void* sspi_SecureHandleGetLowerPointer(SecHandle* handle)
{
void* pointer;
if (!handle || !SecIsValidHandle(handle))
return NULL;
pointer = (void*) ~((size_t) handle->dwLower);
return pointer;
}
| 167,604 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void cJSON_AddItemReferenceToObject( cJSON *object, const char *string, cJSON *item )
{
cJSON_AddItemToObject( object, string, create_reference( item ) );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void cJSON_AddItemReferenceToObject( cJSON *object, const char *string, cJSON *item )
| 167,266 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline void VectorClamp3(DDSVector3 *value)
{
value->x = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->x));
value->y = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->y));
value->z = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->z));
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static inline void VectorClamp3(DDSVector3 *value)
{
value->x = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->x));
value->y = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->y));
value->z = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->z));
}
| 168,907 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: AppModalDialog::~AppModalDialog() {
}
Commit Message: Fix a Windows crash bug with javascript alerts from extension popups.
BUG=137707
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10828423
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152716 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | AppModalDialog::~AppModalDialog() {
CompleteDialog();
}
| 170,755 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: string DecodeFile(const string& filename, int num_threads) {
libvpx_test::WebMVideoSource video(filename);
video.Init();
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t cfg = {0};
cfg.threads = num_threads;
libvpx_test::VP9Decoder decoder(cfg, 0);
libvpx_test::MD5 md5;
for (video.Begin(); video.cxdata(); video.Next()) {
const vpx_codec_err_t res =
decoder.DecodeFrame(video.cxdata(), video.frame_size());
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << decoder.DecodeError();
break;
}
libvpx_test::DxDataIterator dec_iter = decoder.GetDxData();
const vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
while ((img = dec_iter.Next())) {
md5.Add(img);
}
}
return string(md5.Get());
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | string DecodeFile(const string& filename, int num_threads) {
libvpx_test::WebMVideoSource video(filename);
video.Init();
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t cfg = vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t();
cfg.threads = num_threads;
libvpx_test::VP9Decoder decoder(cfg, 0);
libvpx_test::MD5 md5;
for (video.Begin(); video.cxdata(); video.Next()) {
const vpx_codec_err_t res =
decoder.DecodeFrame(video.cxdata(), video.frame_size());
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << decoder.DecodeError();
break;
}
libvpx_test::DxDataIterator dec_iter = decoder.GetDxData();
const vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
while ((img = dec_iter.Next())) {
md5.Add(img);
}
}
return string(md5.Get());
}
| 174,598 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::Reload(ReloadType reload_type,
bool check_for_repost) {
DCHECK_NE(ReloadType::NONE, reload_type);
if (transient_entry_index_ != -1) {
NavigationEntryImpl* transient_entry = GetTransientEntry();
if (!transient_entry)
return;
LoadURL(transient_entry->GetURL(),
Referrer(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_RELOAD,
transient_entry->extra_headers());
return;
}
NavigationEntryImpl* entry = nullptr;
int current_index = -1;
if (IsInitialNavigation() && pending_entry_) {
entry = pending_entry_;
current_index = pending_entry_index_;
} else {
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
current_index = GetCurrentEntryIndex();
if (current_index != -1) {
entry = GetEntryAtIndex(current_index);
}
}
if (!entry)
return;
if (last_committed_reload_type_ != ReloadType::NONE) {
DCHECK(!last_committed_reload_time_.is_null());
base::Time now =
time_smoother_.GetSmoothedTime(get_timestamp_callback_.Run());
DCHECK_GT(now, last_committed_reload_time_);
if (!last_committed_reload_time_.is_null() &&
now > last_committed_reload_time_) {
base::TimeDelta delta = now - last_committed_reload_time_;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES("Navigation.Reload.ReloadToReloadDuration",
delta);
if (last_committed_reload_type_ == ReloadType::NORMAL) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES(
"Navigation.Reload.ReloadMainResourceToReloadDuration", delta);
}
}
}
entry->set_reload_type(reload_type);
if (g_check_for_repost && check_for_repost &&
entry->GetHasPostData()) {
delegate_->NotifyBeforeFormRepostWarningShow();
pending_reload_ = reload_type;
delegate_->ActivateAndShowRepostFormWarningDialog();
} else {
if (!IsInitialNavigation())
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance = entry->site_instance();
bool is_for_guests_only = site_instance && site_instance->HasProcess() &&
site_instance->GetProcess()->IsForGuestsOnly();
if (!is_for_guests_only && site_instance &&
site_instance->HasWrongProcessForURL(entry->GetURL())) {
NavigationEntryImpl* nav_entry = NavigationEntryImpl::FromNavigationEntry(
CreateNavigationEntry(entry->GetURL(), entry->GetReferrer(),
entry->GetTransitionType(), false,
entry->extra_headers(), browser_context_,
nullptr /* blob_url_loader_factory */)
.release());
reload_type = ReloadType::NONE;
nav_entry->set_should_replace_entry(true);
pending_entry_ = nav_entry;
DCHECK_EQ(-1, pending_entry_index_);
} else {
pending_entry_ = entry;
pending_entry_index_ = current_index;
pending_entry_->SetTransitionType(ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_RELOAD);
}
NavigateToPendingEntry(reload_type, nullptr /* navigation_ui_data */);
}
}
Commit Message: Preserve renderer-initiated bit when reloading in a new process.
BUG=847718
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Change-Id: I6c3461793fbb23f1a4d731dc27b4e77312f29227
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1080235
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563312}
CWE ID: | void NavigationControllerImpl::Reload(ReloadType reload_type,
bool check_for_repost) {
DCHECK_NE(ReloadType::NONE, reload_type);
if (transient_entry_index_ != -1) {
NavigationEntryImpl* transient_entry = GetTransientEntry();
if (!transient_entry)
return;
LoadURL(transient_entry->GetURL(),
Referrer(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_RELOAD,
transient_entry->extra_headers());
return;
}
NavigationEntryImpl* entry = nullptr;
int current_index = -1;
if (IsInitialNavigation() && pending_entry_) {
entry = pending_entry_;
current_index = pending_entry_index_;
} else {
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
current_index = GetCurrentEntryIndex();
if (current_index != -1) {
entry = GetEntryAtIndex(current_index);
}
}
if (!entry)
return;
if (last_committed_reload_type_ != ReloadType::NONE) {
DCHECK(!last_committed_reload_time_.is_null());
base::Time now =
time_smoother_.GetSmoothedTime(get_timestamp_callback_.Run());
DCHECK_GT(now, last_committed_reload_time_);
if (!last_committed_reload_time_.is_null() &&
now > last_committed_reload_time_) {
base::TimeDelta delta = now - last_committed_reload_time_;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES("Navigation.Reload.ReloadToReloadDuration",
delta);
if (last_committed_reload_type_ == ReloadType::NORMAL) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES(
"Navigation.Reload.ReloadMainResourceToReloadDuration", delta);
}
}
}
entry->set_reload_type(reload_type);
if (g_check_for_repost && check_for_repost &&
entry->GetHasPostData()) {
delegate_->NotifyBeforeFormRepostWarningShow();
pending_reload_ = reload_type;
delegate_->ActivateAndShowRepostFormWarningDialog();
} else {
if (!IsInitialNavigation())
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance = entry->site_instance();
bool is_for_guests_only = site_instance && site_instance->HasProcess() &&
site_instance->GetProcess()->IsForGuestsOnly();
if (!is_for_guests_only && site_instance &&
site_instance->HasWrongProcessForURL(entry->GetURL())) {
NavigationEntryImpl* nav_entry = NavigationEntryImpl::FromNavigationEntry(
CreateNavigationEntry(entry->GetURL(), entry->GetReferrer(),
entry->GetTransitionType(), false,
entry->extra_headers(), browser_context_,
nullptr /* blob_url_loader_factory */)
.release());
reload_type = ReloadType::NONE;
nav_entry->set_should_replace_entry(true);
nav_entry->set_is_renderer_initiated(entry->is_renderer_initiated());
pending_entry_ = nav_entry;
DCHECK_EQ(-1, pending_entry_index_);
} else {
pending_entry_ = entry;
pending_entry_index_ = current_index;
pending_entry_->SetTransitionType(ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_RELOAD);
}
NavigateToPendingEntry(reload_type, nullptr /* navigation_ui_data */);
}
}
| 173,155 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool LookupMatchInTopDomains(base::StringPiece skeleton) {
DCHECK_NE(skeleton.back(), '.');
auto labels = base::SplitStringPiece(skeleton, ".", base::KEEP_WHITESPACE,
base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
if (labels.size() > kNumberOfLabelsToCheck) {
labels.erase(labels.begin(),
labels.begin() + labels.size() - kNumberOfLabelsToCheck);
}
while (labels.size() > 1) {
std::string partial_skeleton = base::JoinString(labels, ".");
if (net::LookupStringInFixedSet(
g_graph, g_graph_length, partial_skeleton.data(),
partial_skeleton.length()) != net::kDafsaNotFound)
return true;
labels.erase(labels.begin());
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Map U+04CF to lowercase L as well.
U+04CF (ӏ) has the confusability skeleton of 'i' (lowercase
I), but it can be confused for 'l' (lowercase L) or '1' (digit) if rendered
in some fonts.
If a host name contains it, calculate the confusability skeleton
twice, once with the default mapping to 'i' (lowercase I) and the 2nd
time with an alternative mapping to 'l'. Mapping them to 'l' (lowercase L)
also gets it treated as similar to digit 1 because the confusability
skeleton of digit 1 is 'l'.
Bug: 817247
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I7442b950c9457eea285e17f01d1f43c9acc5d79c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/974165
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#551263}
CWE ID: | bool LookupMatchInTopDomains(base::StringPiece skeleton) {
bool LookupMatchInTopDomains(const icu::UnicodeString& ustr_skeleton) {
std::string skeleton;
ustr_skeleton.toUTF8String(skeleton);
DCHECK_NE(skeleton.back(), '.');
auto labels = base::SplitStringPiece(skeleton, ".", base::KEEP_WHITESPACE,
base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
if (labels.size() > kNumberOfLabelsToCheck) {
labels.erase(labels.begin(),
labels.begin() + labels.size() - kNumberOfLabelsToCheck);
}
while (labels.size() > 1) {
std::string partial_skeleton = base::JoinString(labels, ".");
if (net::LookupStringInFixedSet(
g_graph, g_graph_length, partial_skeleton.data(),
partial_skeleton.length()) != net::kDafsaNotFound)
return true;
labels.erase(labels.begin());
}
return false;
}
| 173,223 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CheckClientDownloadRequest::UploadBinary(
DownloadCheckResult result,
DownloadCheckResultReason reason) {
saved_result_ = result;
saved_reason_ = reason;
bool upload_for_dlp = ShouldUploadForDlpScan();
bool upload_for_malware = ShouldUploadForMalwareScan(reason);
auto request = std::make_unique<DownloadItemRequest>(
item_, /*read_immediately=*/true,
base::BindOnce(&CheckClientDownloadRequest::OnDeepScanningComplete,
weakptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(GetBrowserContext());
if (upload_for_dlp) {
DlpDeepScanningClientRequest dlp_request;
dlp_request.set_content_source(DlpDeepScanningClientRequest::FILE_DOWNLOAD);
request->set_request_dlp_scan(std::move(dlp_request));
}
if (upload_for_malware) {
MalwareDeepScanningClientRequest malware_request;
malware_request.set_population(
MalwareDeepScanningClientRequest::POPULATION_ENTERPRISE);
malware_request.set_download_token(
DownloadProtectionService::GetDownloadPingToken(item_));
request->set_request_malware_scan(std::move(malware_request));
}
request->set_dm_token(
policy::BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveDMToken());
service()->UploadForDeepScanning(profile, std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void CheckClientDownloadRequest::UploadBinary(
DownloadCheckResult result,
DownloadCheckResultReason reason) {
saved_result_ = result;
saved_reason_ = reason;
bool upload_for_dlp = ShouldUploadForDlpScan();
bool upload_for_malware = ShouldUploadForMalwareScan(reason);
auto request = std::make_unique<DownloadItemRequest>(
item_, /*read_immediately=*/true,
base::BindOnce(&CheckClientDownloadRequest::OnDeepScanningComplete,
weakptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(GetBrowserContext());
if (upload_for_dlp) {
DlpDeepScanningClientRequest dlp_request;
dlp_request.set_content_source(DlpDeepScanningClientRequest::FILE_DOWNLOAD);
request->set_request_dlp_scan(std::move(dlp_request));
}
if (upload_for_malware) {
MalwareDeepScanningClientRequest malware_request;
malware_request.set_population(
MalwareDeepScanningClientRequest::POPULATION_ENTERPRISE);
malware_request.set_download_token(
DownloadProtectionService::GetDownloadPingToken(item_));
request->set_request_malware_scan(std::move(malware_request));
}
auto dm_token = BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveBrowserDMToken();
DCHECK(dm_token.is_valid());
request->set_dm_token(dm_token.value());
service()->UploadForDeepScanning(profile, std::move(request));
}
| 172,358 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: safecat_color_encoding(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos,
PNG_CONST color_encoding *e, double encoding_gamma)
{
if (e != 0)
{
if (encoding_gamma != 0)
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "(");
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "R(");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->red.X, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ",");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->red.Y, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ",");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->red.Z, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "),G(");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->green.X, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ",");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->green.Y, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ",");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->green.Z, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "),B(");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->blue.X, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ",");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->blue.Y, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ",");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->blue.Z, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ")");
if (encoding_gamma != 0)
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ")");
}
if (encoding_gamma != 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "^");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, encoding_gamma, 5);
}
return pos;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | safecat_color_encoding(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos,
const color_encoding *e, double encoding_gamma)
{
if (e != 0)
{
if (encoding_gamma != 0)
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "(");
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "R(");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->red.X, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ",");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->red.Y, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ",");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->red.Z, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "),G(");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->green.X, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ",");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->green.Y, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ",");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->green.Z, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "),B(");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->blue.X, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ",");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->blue.Y, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ",");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, e->blue.Z, 4);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ")");
if (encoding_gamma != 0)
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ")");
}
if (encoding_gamma != 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "^");
pos = safecatd(buffer, bufsize, pos, encoding_gamma, 5);
}
return pos;
}
| 173,690 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, count)
{
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(zend_hash_num_elements(&phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PHP_METHOD(Phar, count)
{
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(zend_hash_num_elements(&phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest));
}
| 165,295 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FoFiType1::parse() {
char *line, *line1, *p, *p2;
char buf[256];
char c;
int n, code, i, j;
char *tokptr;
for (i = 1, line = (char *)file;
i <= 100 && line && (!name || !encoding);
++i) {
if (!name && !strncmp(line, "/FontName", 9)) {
strncpy(buf, line, 255);
buf[255] = '\0';
if ((p = strchr(buf+9, '/')) &&
(p = strtok_r(p+1, " \t\n\r", &tokptr))) {
name = copyString(p);
}
line = getNextLine(line);
} else if (!encoding &&
!strncmp(line, "/Encoding StandardEncoding def", 30)) {
encoding = fofiType1StandardEncoding;
} else if (!encoding &&
!strncmp(line, "/Encoding 256 array", 19)) {
encoding = (char **)gmallocn(256, sizeof(char *));
for (j = 0; j < 256; ++j) {
encoding[j] = NULL;
}
for (j = 0, line = getNextLine(line);
j < 300 && line && (line1 = getNextLine(line));
++j, line = line1) {
if ((n = line1 - line) > 255) {
error(-1, "FoFiType1::parse a line has more than 255 characters, we don't support this");
n = 255;
}
strncpy(buf, line, n);
buf[n] = '\0';
for (p = buf; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
if (!strncmp(p, "dup", 3)) {
for (p += 3; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
for (p2 = p; *p2 >= '0' && *p2 <= '9'; ++p2) ;
if (*p2) {
c = *p2; // store it so we can recover it after atoi
*p2 = '\0'; // terminate p so atoi works
code = atoi(p);
*p2 = c;
if (code == 8 && *p2 == '#') {
code = 0;
for (++p2; *p2 >= '0' && *p2 <= '7'; ++p2) {
code = code * 8 + (*p2 - '0');
code = code * 8 + (*p2 - '0');
}
}
if (code < 256) {
for (p = p2; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
if (*p == '/') {
++p;
c = *p2; // store it so we can recover it after copyString
*p2 = '\0'; // terminate p so copyString works
encoding[code] = copyString(p);
*p2 = c;
p = p2;
for (; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p); // eat spaces between string and put
if (!strncmp(p, "put", 3)) {
for (p += 3; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t' || *p == '\n' || *p == '\r'; ++p);
if (*p)
{
line1 = &line[p - buf];
}
} else {
error(-1, "FoFiType1::parse no put after dup");
}
}
}
}
} else {
if (strtok_r(buf, " \t", &tokptr) &&
(p = strtok_r(NULL, " \t\n\r", &tokptr)) && !strcmp(p, "def")) {
break;
}
}
}
} else {
line = getNextLine(line);
}
}
parsed = gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void FoFiType1::parse() {
char *line, *line1, *p, *p2;
char buf[256];
char c;
int n, code, i, j;
char *tokptr;
for (i = 1, line = (char *)file;
i <= 100 && line && (!name || !encoding);
++i) {
if (!name && !strncmp(line, "/FontName", 9)) {
strncpy(buf, line, 255);
buf[255] = '\0';
if ((p = strchr(buf+9, '/')) &&
(p = strtok_r(p+1, " \t\n\r", &tokptr))) {
name = copyString(p);
}
line = getNextLine(line);
} else if (!encoding &&
!strncmp(line, "/Encoding StandardEncoding def", 30)) {
encoding = fofiType1StandardEncoding;
} else if (!encoding &&
!strncmp(line, "/Encoding 256 array", 19)) {
encoding = (char **)gmallocn(256, sizeof(char *));
for (j = 0; j < 256; ++j) {
encoding[j] = NULL;
}
for (j = 0, line = getNextLine(line);
j < 300 && line && (line1 = getNextLine(line));
++j, line = line1) {
if ((n = line1 - line) > 255) {
error(-1, "FoFiType1::parse a line has more than 255 characters, we don't support this");
n = 255;
}
strncpy(buf, line, n);
buf[n] = '\0';
for (p = buf; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
if (!strncmp(p, "dup", 3)) {
for (p += 3; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
for (p2 = p; *p2 >= '0' && *p2 <= '9'; ++p2) ;
if (*p2) {
c = *p2; // store it so we can recover it after atoi
*p2 = '\0'; // terminate p so atoi works
code = atoi(p);
*p2 = c;
if (code == 8 && *p2 == '#') {
code = 0;
for (++p2; *p2 >= '0' && *p2 <= '7'; ++p2) {
code = code * 8 + (*p2 - '0');
code = code * 8 + (*p2 - '0');
}
}
if (likely(code < 256 && code >= 0)) {
for (p = p2; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
if (*p == '/') {
++p;
c = *p2; // store it so we can recover it after copyString
*p2 = '\0'; // terminate p so copyString works
encoding[code] = copyString(p);
*p2 = c;
p = p2;
for (; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p); // eat spaces between string and put
if (!strncmp(p, "put", 3)) {
for (p += 3; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t' || *p == '\n' || *p == '\r'; ++p);
if (*p)
{
line1 = &line[p - buf];
}
} else {
error(-1, "FoFiType1::parse no put after dup");
}
}
}
}
} else {
if (strtok_r(buf, " \t", &tokptr) &&
(p = strtok_r(NULL, " \t\n\r", &tokptr)) && !strcmp(p, "def")) {
break;
}
}
}
} else {
line = getNextLine(line);
}
}
parsed = gTrue;
}
| 164,903 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool PDFiumEngine::HandleEvent(const pp::InputEvent& event) {
DCHECK(!defer_page_unload_);
defer_page_unload_ = true;
bool rv = false;
switch (event.GetType()) {
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEDOWN:
rv = OnMouseDown(pp::MouseInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEUP:
rv = OnMouseUp(pp::MouseInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEMOVE:
rv = OnMouseMove(pp::MouseInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_KEYDOWN:
rv = OnKeyDown(pp::KeyboardInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_KEYUP:
rv = OnKeyUp(pp::KeyboardInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_CHAR:
rv = OnChar(pp::KeyboardInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_TOUCHSTART: {
KillTouchTimer(next_touch_timer_id_);
pp::TouchInputEvent touch_event(event);
if (touch_event.GetTouchCount(PP_TOUCHLIST_TYPE_TARGETTOUCHES) == 1)
ScheduleTouchTimer(touch_event);
break;
}
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_TOUCHEND:
KillTouchTimer(next_touch_timer_id_);
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_TOUCHMOVE:
KillTouchTimer(next_touch_timer_id_);
default:
break;
}
DCHECK(defer_page_unload_);
defer_page_unload_ = false;
for (int page_index : deferred_page_unloads_)
pages_[page_index]->Unload();
deferred_page_unloads_.clear();
return rv;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | bool PDFiumEngine::HandleEvent(const pp::InputEvent& event) {
DCHECK(!defer_page_unload_);
defer_page_unload_ = true;
bool rv = false;
switch (event.GetType()) {
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEDOWN:
rv = OnMouseDown(pp::MouseInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEUP:
rv = OnMouseUp(pp::MouseInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEMOVE:
rv = OnMouseMove(pp::MouseInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_KEYDOWN:
rv = OnKeyDown(pp::KeyboardInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_KEYUP:
rv = OnKeyUp(pp::KeyboardInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_CHAR:
rv = OnChar(pp::KeyboardInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_TOUCHSTART: {
KillTouchTimer(next_touch_timer_id_);
pp::TouchInputEvent touch_event(event);
if (touch_event.GetTouchCount(PP_TOUCHLIST_TYPE_TARGETTOUCHES) == 1)
ScheduleTouchTimer(touch_event);
break;
}
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_TOUCHEND:
KillTouchTimer(next_touch_timer_id_);
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_TOUCHMOVE:
KillTouchTimer(next_touch_timer_id_);
default:
break;
}
DCHECK(defer_page_unload_);
defer_page_unload_ = false;
// Store the pages to unload away because the act of unloading pages can cause
// there to be more pages to unload. We leave those extra pages to be unloaded
// on the next go around.
std::vector<int> pages_to_unload;
std::swap(pages_to_unload, deferred_page_unloads_);
for (int page_index : pages_to_unload)
pages_[page_index]->Unload();
return rv;
}
| 172,665 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SMB2_sess_establish_session(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)
{
int rc = 0;
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
mutex_lock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
if (ses->server->sign && ses->server->ops->generate_signingkey) {
rc = ses->server->ops->generate_signingkey(ses);
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI,
"SMB3 session key generation failed\n");
mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
goto keygen_exit;
}
}
if (!ses->server->session_estab) {
ses->server->sequence_number = 0x2;
ses->server->session_estab = true;
}
mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "SMB2/3 session established successfully\n");
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
ses->status = CifsGood;
ses->need_reconnect = false;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
keygen_exit:
if (!ses->server->sign) {
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | SMB2_sess_establish_session(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)
{
int rc = 0;
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
mutex_lock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
if (ses->server->ops->generate_signingkey) {
rc = ses->server->ops->generate_signingkey(ses);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI,
"SMB3 session key generation failed\n");
mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
return rc;
}
}
if (!ses->server->session_estab) {
ses->server->sequence_number = 0x2;
ses->server->session_estab = true;
}
mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "SMB2/3 session established successfully\n");
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
ses->status = CifsGood;
ses->need_reconnect = false;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
return rc;
}
| 169,361 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GaiaOAuthClient::Core::OnUserInfoFetchComplete(
const net::URLRequestStatus& status,
int response_code,
const std::string& response) {
std::string email;
if (response_code == net::HTTP_OK) {
scoped_ptr<Value> message_value(base::JSONReader::Read(response));
if (message_value.get() &&
message_value->IsType(Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY)) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> response_dict(
static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(message_value.release()));
response_dict->GetString(kEmailValue, &email);
}
}
if (email.empty()) {
delegate_->OnNetworkError(response_code);
} else {
delegate_->OnRefreshTokenResponse(
email, access_token_, expires_in_seconds_);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void GaiaOAuthClient::Core::OnUserInfoFetchComplete(
const net::URLRequestStatus& status,
int response_code,
const std::string& response) {
request_.reset();
url_fetcher_type_ = URL_FETCHER_NONE;
std::string email;
if (response_code == net::HTTP_OK) {
scoped_ptr<Value> message_value(base::JSONReader::Read(response));
if (message_value.get() &&
message_value->IsType(Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY)) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> response_dict(
static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(message_value.release()));
response_dict->GetString(kEmailValue, &email);
}
}
if (email.empty()) {
delegate_->OnNetworkError(response_code);
} else {
delegate_->OnRefreshTokenResponse(
email, access_token_, expires_in_seconds_);
}
}
| 170,808 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: load_fake(png_charp param, png_bytepp profile)
{
char *endptr = NULL;
unsigned long long int size = strtoull(param, &endptr, 0/*base*/);
/* The 'fake' format is <number>*[string] */
if (endptr != NULL && *endptr == '*')
{
size_t len = strlen(++endptr);
size_t result = (size_t)size;
if (len == 0) len = 1; /* capture the terminating '\0' */
/* Now repeat that string to fill 'size' bytes. */
if (result == size && (*profile = malloc(result)) != NULL)
{
png_bytep out = *profile;
if (len == 1)
memset(out, *endptr, result);
else
{
while (size >= len)
{
memcpy(out, endptr, len);
out += len;
size -= len;
}
memcpy(out, endptr, size);
}
return result;
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: size exceeds system limits\n", param);
exit(1);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | load_fake(png_charp param, png_bytepp profile)
{
char *endptr = NULL;
uint64_t size = strtoull(param, &endptr, 0/*base*/);
/* The 'fake' format is <number>*[string] */
if (endptr != NULL && *endptr == '*')
{
size_t len = strlen(++endptr);
size_t result = (size_t)size;
if (len == 0) len = 1; /* capture the terminating '\0' */
/* Now repeat that string to fill 'size' bytes. */
if (result == size && (*profile = malloc(result)) != NULL)
{
png_bytep out = *profile;
if (len == 1)
memset(out, *endptr, result);
else
{
while (size >= len)
{
memcpy(out, endptr, len);
out += len;
size -= len;
}
memcpy(out, endptr, size);
}
return result;
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: size exceeds system limits\n", param);
exit(1);
}
}
return 0;
}
| 173,583 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: FLACParser::FLACParser(
const sp<DataSource> &dataSource,
const sp<MetaData> &fileMetadata,
const sp<MetaData> &trackMetadata)
: mDataSource(dataSource),
mFileMetadata(fileMetadata),
mTrackMetadata(trackMetadata),
mInitCheck(false),
mMaxBufferSize(0),
mGroup(NULL),
mCopy(copyTrespass),
mDecoder(NULL),
mCurrentPos(0LL),
mEOF(false),
mStreamInfoValid(false),
mWriteRequested(false),
mWriteCompleted(false),
mWriteBuffer(NULL),
mErrorStatus((FLAC__StreamDecoderErrorStatus) -1)
{
ALOGV("FLACParser::FLACParser");
memset(&mStreamInfo, 0, sizeof(mStreamInfo));
memset(&mWriteHeader, 0, sizeof(mWriteHeader));
mInitCheck = init();
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | FLACParser::FLACParser(
const sp<DataSource> &dataSource,
const sp<MetaData> &fileMetadata,
const sp<MetaData> &trackMetadata)
: mDataSource(dataSource),
mFileMetadata(fileMetadata),
mTrackMetadata(trackMetadata),
mInitCheck(false),
mMaxBufferSize(0),
mGroup(NULL),
mCopy(copyTrespass),
mDecoder(NULL),
mCurrentPos(0LL),
mEOF(false),
mStreamInfoValid(false),
mWriteRequested(false),
mWriteCompleted(false),
mErrorStatus((FLAC__StreamDecoderErrorStatus) -1)
{
ALOGV("FLACParser::FLACParser");
memset(&mStreamInfo, 0, sizeof(mStreamInfo));
memset(&mWriteHeader, 0, sizeof(mWriteHeader));
mInitCheck = init();
}
| 174,014 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool FileUtilProxy::Read(
scoped_refptr<MessageLoopProxy> message_loop_proxy,
PlatformFile file,
int64 offset,
int bytes_to_read,
ReadCallback* callback) {
if (bytes_to_read < 0)
return false;
return Start(FROM_HERE, message_loop_proxy,
new RelayRead(file, offset, bytes_to_read, callback));
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool FileUtilProxy::Read(
scoped_refptr<MessageLoopProxy> message_loop_proxy,
PlatformFile file,
int64 offset,
int bytes_to_read,
ReadCallback* callback) {
if (bytes_to_read < 0) {
delete callback;
return false;
}
return Start(FROM_HERE, message_loop_proxy,
new RelayRead(file, offset, bytes_to_read, callback));
}
| 170,273 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: String InspectorPageAgent::CachedResourceTypeJson(
const Resource& cached_resource) {
return ResourceTypeJson(CachedResourceType(cached_resource));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | String InspectorPageAgent::CachedResourceTypeJson(
const Resource& cached_resource) {
return ResourceTypeJson(ToResourceType(cached_resource.GetType()));
}
| 172,470 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Browser::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
TabDetachedAtImpl(contents, index, DETACH_TYPE_DETACH);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void Browser::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
void Browser::TabDetachedAt(WebContents* contents, int index) {
TabDetachedAtImpl(contents, index, DETACH_TYPE_DETACH);
}
| 171,507 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Splash::vertFlipImage(SplashBitmap *img, int width, int height,
int nComps) {
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guchar *p0, *p1;
int w;
w = width * nComps;
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guchar *p0, *p1;
int w;
w = width * nComps;
lineBuf = (Guchar *)gmalloc(w);
p0 += width, p1 -= width) {
memcpy(lineBuf, p0, width);
memcpy(p0, p1, width);
memcpy(p1, lineBuf, width);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Splash::vertFlipImage(SplashBitmap *img, int width, int height,
int nComps) {
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guchar *p0, *p1;
int w;
w = width * nComps;
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guchar *p0, *p1;
int w;
if (unlikely(img->data == NULL)) {
error(errInternal, -1, "img->data is NULL in Splash::vertFlipImage");
return;
}
w = width * nComps;
lineBuf = (Guchar *)gmalloc(w);
p0 += width, p1 -= width) {
memcpy(lineBuf, p0, width);
memcpy(p0, p1, width);
memcpy(p1, lineBuf, width);
}
}
| 164,736 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
struct key_type *type,
const char *description)
{
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = type,
.index_key.description = description,
.cred = current_cred(),
.match_data.cmp = type->match,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
.flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK,
};
key_ref_t key;
int ret;
if (!ctx.match_data.cmp)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
if (type->match_preparse) {
ret = type->match_preparse(&ctx.match_data);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
key = keyring_search_aux(keyring, &ctx);
if (type->match_free)
type->match_free(&ctx.match_data);
return key;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
struct key_type *type,
const char *description)
{
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = type,
.index_key.description = description,
.cred = current_cred(),
.match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
.flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK,
};
key_ref_t key;
int ret;
if (type->match_preparse) {
ret = type->match_preparse(&ctx.match_data);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
key = keyring_search_aux(keyring, &ctx);
if (type->match_free)
type->match_free(&ctx.match_data);
return key;
}
| 168,440 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: init_copy(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value dest, mrb_value obj)
{
switch (mrb_type(obj)) {
case MRB_TT_CLASS:
case MRB_TT_MODULE:
copy_class(mrb, dest, obj);
mrb_iv_copy(mrb, dest, obj);
mrb_iv_remove(mrb, dest, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "__classname__"));
break;
case MRB_TT_OBJECT:
case MRB_TT_SCLASS:
case MRB_TT_HASH:
case MRB_TT_DATA:
case MRB_TT_EXCEPTION:
mrb_iv_copy(mrb, dest, obj);
break;
case MRB_TT_ISTRUCT:
mrb_istruct_copy(dest, obj);
break;
default:
break;
}
mrb_funcall(mrb, dest, "initialize_copy", 1, obj);
}
Commit Message: Should not call `initialize_copy` for `TT_ICLASS`; fix #4027
Since `TT_ICLASS` is a internal object that should never be revealed
to Ruby world.
CWE ID: CWE-824 | init_copy(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value dest, mrb_value obj)
{
switch (mrb_type(obj)) {
case MRB_TT_ICLASS:
copy_class(mrb, dest, obj);
return;
case MRB_TT_CLASS:
case MRB_TT_MODULE:
copy_class(mrb, dest, obj);
mrb_iv_copy(mrb, dest, obj);
mrb_iv_remove(mrb, dest, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "__classname__"));
break;
case MRB_TT_OBJECT:
case MRB_TT_SCLASS:
case MRB_TT_HASH:
case MRB_TT_DATA:
case MRB_TT_EXCEPTION:
mrb_iv_copy(mrb, dest, obj);
break;
case MRB_TT_ISTRUCT:
mrb_istruct_copy(dest, obj);
break;
default:
break;
}
mrb_funcall(mrb, dest, "initialize_copy", 1, obj);
}
| 169,206 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int parse_report(transport_smart *transport, git_push *push)
{
git_pkt *pkt = NULL;
const char *line_end = NULL;
gitno_buffer *buf = &transport->buffer;
int error, recvd;
git_buf data_pkt_buf = GIT_BUF_INIT;
for (;;) {
if (buf->offset > 0)
error = git_pkt_parse_line(&pkt, buf->data,
&line_end, buf->offset);
else
error = GIT_EBUFS;
if (error < 0 && error != GIT_EBUFS) {
error = -1;
goto done;
}
if (error == GIT_EBUFS) {
if ((recvd = gitno_recv(buf)) < 0) {
error = recvd;
goto done;
}
if (recvd == 0) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "early EOF");
error = GIT_EEOF;
goto done;
}
continue;
}
gitno_consume(buf, line_end);
error = 0;
if (pkt == NULL)
continue;
switch (pkt->type) {
case GIT_PKT_DATA:
/* This is a sideband packet which contains other packets */
error = add_push_report_sideband_pkt(push, (git_pkt_data *)pkt, &data_pkt_buf);
break;
case GIT_PKT_ERR:
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "report-status: Error reported: %s",
((git_pkt_err *)pkt)->error);
error = -1;
break;
case GIT_PKT_PROGRESS:
if (transport->progress_cb) {
git_pkt_progress *p = (git_pkt_progress *) pkt;
error = transport->progress_cb(p->data, p->len, transport->message_cb_payload);
}
break;
default:
error = add_push_report_pkt(push, pkt);
break;
}
git_pkt_free(pkt);
/* add_push_report_pkt returns GIT_ITEROVER when it receives a flush */
if (error == GIT_ITEROVER) {
error = 0;
if (data_pkt_buf.size > 0) {
/* If there was data remaining in the pack data buffer,
* then the server sent a partial pkt-line */
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "Incomplete pack data pkt-line");
error = GIT_ERROR;
}
goto done;
}
if (error < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
done:
git_buf_free(&data_pkt_buf);
return error;
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int parse_report(transport_smart *transport, git_push *push)
{
git_pkt *pkt = NULL;
const char *line_end = NULL;
gitno_buffer *buf = &transport->buffer;
int error, recvd;
git_buf data_pkt_buf = GIT_BUF_INIT;
for (;;) {
if (buf->offset > 0)
error = git_pkt_parse_line(&pkt, buf->data,
&line_end, buf->offset);
else
error = GIT_EBUFS;
if (error < 0 && error != GIT_EBUFS) {
error = -1;
goto done;
}
if (error == GIT_EBUFS) {
if ((recvd = gitno_recv(buf)) < 0) {
error = recvd;
goto done;
}
if (recvd == 0) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "early EOF");
error = GIT_EEOF;
goto done;
}
continue;
}
gitno_consume(buf, line_end);
error = 0;
switch (pkt->type) {
case GIT_PKT_DATA:
/* This is a sideband packet which contains other packets */
error = add_push_report_sideband_pkt(push, (git_pkt_data *)pkt, &data_pkt_buf);
break;
case GIT_PKT_ERR:
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "report-status: Error reported: %s",
((git_pkt_err *)pkt)->error);
error = -1;
break;
case GIT_PKT_PROGRESS:
if (transport->progress_cb) {
git_pkt_progress *p = (git_pkt_progress *) pkt;
error = transport->progress_cb(p->data, p->len, transport->message_cb_payload);
}
break;
default:
error = add_push_report_pkt(push, pkt);
break;
}
git_pkt_free(pkt);
/* add_push_report_pkt returns GIT_ITEROVER when it receives a flush */
if (error == GIT_ITEROVER) {
error = 0;
if (data_pkt_buf.size > 0) {
/* If there was data remaining in the pack data buffer,
* then the server sent a partial pkt-line */
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "Incomplete pack data pkt-line");
error = GIT_ERROR;
}
goto done;
}
if (error < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
done:
git_buf_free(&data_pkt_buf);
return error;
}
| 168,529 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long VideoTrack::GetWidth() const
{
return m_width;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long VideoTrack::GetWidth() const
| 174,382 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ConnectPanelServiceSignals() {
if (!ibus_) {
return;
}
IBusPanelService* ibus_panel_service = IBUS_PANEL_SERVICE(
g_object_get_data(G_OBJECT(ibus_), kPanelObjectKey));
if (!ibus_panel_service) {
LOG(ERROR) << "IBusPanelService is NOT available.";
return;
}
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"focus-in",
G_CALLBACK(FocusInCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"register-properties",
G_CALLBACK(RegisterPropertiesCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"update-property",
G_CALLBACK(UpdatePropertyCallback),
this);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void ConnectPanelServiceSignals() {
if (!ibus_) {
return;
}
IBusPanelService* ibus_panel_service = IBUS_PANEL_SERVICE(
g_object_get_data(G_OBJECT(ibus_), kPanelObjectKey));
if (!ibus_panel_service) {
LOG(ERROR) << "IBusPanelService is NOT available.";
return;
}
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"focus-in",
G_CALLBACK(FocusInThunk),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"register-properties",
G_CALLBACK(RegisterPropertiesThunk),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"update-property",
G_CALLBACK(UpdatePropertyThunk),
this);
}
| 170,530 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Document::InitSecurityContext(const DocumentInit& initializer) {
DCHECK(!GetSecurityOrigin());
if (!initializer.HasSecurityContext()) {
cookie_url_ = KURL(kParsedURLString, g_empty_string);
SetSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::CreateUnique());
InitContentSecurityPolicy();
SetFeaturePolicy(g_empty_string);
return;
}
EnforceSandboxFlags(initializer.GetSandboxFlags());
SetInsecureRequestPolicy(initializer.GetInsecureRequestPolicy());
if (initializer.InsecureNavigationsToUpgrade()) {
for (auto to_upgrade : *initializer.InsecureNavigationsToUpgrade())
AddInsecureNavigationUpgrade(to_upgrade);
}
if (IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin)) {
cookie_url_ = url_;
SetSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::CreateUnique());
Document* owner = initializer.OwnerDocument();
if (owner) {
if (owner->GetSecurityOrigin()->IsPotentiallyTrustworthy())
GetSecurityOrigin()->SetUniqueOriginIsPotentiallyTrustworthy(true);
if (owner->GetSecurityOrigin()->CanLoadLocalResources())
GetSecurityOrigin()->GrantLoadLocalResources();
}
} else if (Document* owner = initializer.OwnerDocument()) {
cookie_url_ = owner->CookieURL();
SetSecurityOrigin(owner->GetSecurityOrigin());
} else {
cookie_url_ = url_;
SetSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::Create(url_));
}
if (initializer.IsHostedInReservedIPRange()) {
SetAddressSpace(GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocalhost()
? kWebAddressSpaceLocal
: kWebAddressSpacePrivate);
} else if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocal()) {
SetAddressSpace(kWebAddressSpaceLocal);
} else {
SetAddressSpace(kWebAddressSpacePublic);
}
if (ImportsController()) {
SetContentSecurityPolicy(
ImportsController()->Master()->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
} else {
InitContentSecurityPolicy();
}
if (GetSecurityOrigin()->HasSuborigin())
EnforceSuborigin(*GetSecurityOrigin()->GetSuborigin());
if (Settings* settings = initializer.GetSettings()) {
if (!settings->GetWebSecurityEnabled()) {
GetSecurityOrigin()->GrantUniversalAccess();
} else if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocal()) {
if (settings->GetAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs()) {
GetSecurityOrigin()->GrantUniversalAccess();
} else if (!settings->GetAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs()) {
GetSecurityOrigin()->BlockLocalAccessFromLocalOrigin();
}
}
}
if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsUnique() &&
SecurityOrigin::Create(url_)->IsPotentiallyTrustworthy())
GetSecurityOrigin()->SetUniqueOriginIsPotentiallyTrustworthy(true);
if (GetSecurityOrigin()->HasSuborigin())
EnforceSuborigin(*GetSecurityOrigin()->GetSuborigin());
SetFeaturePolicy(g_empty_string);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | void Document::InitSecurityContext(const DocumentInit& initializer) {
DCHECK(!GetSecurityOrigin());
if (!initializer.HasSecurityContext()) {
cookie_url_ = KURL(kParsedURLString, g_empty_string);
SetSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::CreateUnique());
InitContentSecurityPolicy();
SetFeaturePolicy(g_empty_string);
return;
}
EnforceSandboxFlags(initializer.GetSandboxFlags());
SetInsecureRequestPolicy(initializer.GetInsecureRequestPolicy());
if (initializer.InsecureNavigationsToUpgrade()) {
for (auto to_upgrade : *initializer.InsecureNavigationsToUpgrade())
AddInsecureNavigationUpgrade(to_upgrade);
}
ContentSecurityPolicy* policy_to_inherit = nullptr;
if (IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin)) {
cookie_url_ = url_;
SetSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::CreateUnique());
Document* owner = initializer.OwnerDocument();
if (owner) {
if (owner->GetSecurityOrigin()->IsPotentiallyTrustworthy())
GetSecurityOrigin()->SetUniqueOriginIsPotentiallyTrustworthy(true);
if (owner->GetSecurityOrigin()->CanLoadLocalResources())
GetSecurityOrigin()->GrantLoadLocalResources();
policy_to_inherit = owner->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
}
} else if (Document* owner = initializer.OwnerDocument()) {
cookie_url_ = owner->CookieURL();
SetSecurityOrigin(owner->GetSecurityOrigin());
policy_to_inherit = owner->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
} else {
cookie_url_ = url_;
SetSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::Create(url_));
}
if (initializer.IsHostedInReservedIPRange()) {
SetAddressSpace(GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocalhost()
? kWebAddressSpaceLocal
: kWebAddressSpacePrivate);
} else if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocal()) {
SetAddressSpace(kWebAddressSpaceLocal);
} else {
SetAddressSpace(kWebAddressSpacePublic);
}
if (ImportsController()) {
SetContentSecurityPolicy(
ImportsController()->Master()->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
} else {
InitContentSecurityPolicy(nullptr, policy_to_inherit);
}
if (GetSecurityOrigin()->HasSuborigin())
EnforceSuborigin(*GetSecurityOrigin()->GetSuborigin());
if (Settings* settings = initializer.GetSettings()) {
if (!settings->GetWebSecurityEnabled()) {
GetSecurityOrigin()->GrantUniversalAccess();
} else if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocal()) {
if (settings->GetAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs()) {
GetSecurityOrigin()->GrantUniversalAccess();
} else if (!settings->GetAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs()) {
GetSecurityOrigin()->BlockLocalAccessFromLocalOrigin();
}
}
}
if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsUnique() &&
SecurityOrigin::Create(url_)->IsPotentiallyTrustworthy())
GetSecurityOrigin()->SetUniqueOriginIsPotentiallyTrustworthy(true);
if (GetSecurityOrigin()->HasSuborigin())
EnforceSuborigin(*GetSecurityOrigin()->GetSuborigin());
SetFeaturePolicy(g_empty_string);
}
| 172,300 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static double outerr(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* There is a serious error in the 2 and 4 bit grayscale transform because
* the gamma table value (8 bits) is simply shifted, not rounded, so the
* error in 4 bit grayscale gamma is up to the value below. This is a hack
* to allow pngvalid to succeed:
*
* TODO: fix this in libpng
*/
if (out_depth == 2)
return .73182-.5;
if (out_depth == 4)
return .90644-.5;
if ((pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
return pm->maxout16;
/* This is the case where the value was calculated at 8-bit precision then
* scaled to 16 bits.
*/
else if (out_depth == 16)
return pm->maxout8 * 257;
else
return pm->maxout8;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | static double outerr(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
static double outerr(const png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* There is a serious error in the 2 and 4 bit grayscale transform because
* the gamma table value (8 bits) is simply shifted, not rounded, so the
* error in 4 bit grayscale gamma is up to the value below. This is a hack
* to allow pngvalid to succeed:
*
* TODO: fix this in libpng
*/
if (out_depth == 2)
return .73182-.5;
if (out_depth == 4)
return .90644-.5;
if ((pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
return pm->maxout16;
/* This is the case where the value was calculated at 8-bit precision then
* scaled to 16 bits.
*/
else if (out_depth == 16)
return pm->maxout8 * 257;
else
return pm->maxout8;
}
| 173,674 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int mpeg4video_probe(AVProbeData *probe_packet)
{
uint32_t temp_buffer = -1;
int VO = 0, VOL = 0, VOP = 0, VISO = 0, res = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < probe_packet->buf_size; i++) {
temp_buffer = (temp_buffer << 8) + probe_packet->buf[i];
if ((temp_buffer & 0xffffff00) != 0x100)
continue;
if (temp_buffer == VOP_START_CODE)
VOP++;
else if (temp_buffer == VISUAL_OBJECT_START_CODE)
VISO++;
else if (temp_buffer < 0x120)
VO++;
else if (temp_buffer < 0x130)
VOL++;
else if (!(0x1AF < temp_buffer && temp_buffer < 0x1B7) &&
!(0x1B9 < temp_buffer && temp_buffer < 0x1C4))
res++;
}
if (VOP >= VISO && VOP >= VOL && VO >= VOL && VOL > 0 && res == 0)
return AVPROBE_SCORE_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: m4vdec: Check for non-startcode 00 00 00 sequences in probe
This makes the m4v detection less trigger-happy.
Bug-Id: 949
Signed-off-by: Diego Biurrun <diego@biurrun.de>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int mpeg4video_probe(AVProbeData *probe_packet)
{
uint32_t temp_buffer = -1;
int VO = 0, VOL = 0, VOP = 0, VISO = 0, res = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < probe_packet->buf_size; i++) {
temp_buffer = (temp_buffer << 8) + probe_packet->buf[i];
if (temp_buffer & 0xfffffe00)
continue;
if (temp_buffer < 2)
continue;
if (temp_buffer == VOP_START_CODE)
VOP++;
else if (temp_buffer == VISUAL_OBJECT_START_CODE)
VISO++;
else if (temp_buffer >= 0x100 && temp_buffer < 0x120)
VO++;
else if (temp_buffer >= 0x120 && temp_buffer < 0x130)
VOL++;
else if (!(0x1AF < temp_buffer && temp_buffer < 0x1B7) &&
!(0x1B9 < temp_buffer && temp_buffer < 0x1C4))
res++;
}
if (VOP >= VISO && VOP >= VOL && VO >= VOL && VOL > 0 && res == 0)
return AVPROBE_SCORE_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
| 168,768 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pdf_t *pdf_new(const char *name)
{
const char *n;
pdf_t *pdf;
pdf = calloc(1, sizeof(pdf_t));
if (name)
{
/* Just get the file name (not path) */
if ((n = strrchr(name, '/')))
++n;
else
n = name;
pdf->name = malloc(strlen(n) + 1);
strcpy(pdf->name, n);
}
else /* !name */
{
pdf->name = malloc(strlen("Unknown") + 1);
strcpy(pdf->name, "Unknown");
}
return pdf;
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787 | pdf_t *pdf_new(const char *name)
{
const char *n;
pdf_t *pdf;
pdf = safe_calloc(sizeof(pdf_t));
if (name)
{
/* Just get the file name (not path) */
if ((n = strrchr(name, '/')))
++n;
else
n = name;
pdf->name = safe_calloc(strlen(n) + 1);
strcpy(pdf->name, n);
}
else /* !name */
{
pdf->name = safe_calloc(strlen("Unknown") + 1);
strcpy(pdf->name, "Unknown");
}
return pdf;
}
| 169,573 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int LELib_Create(const effect_uuid_t *uuid,
int32_t sessionId,
int32_t ioId,
effect_handle_t *pHandle) {
ALOGV("LELib_Create()");
int ret;
int i;
if (pHandle == NULL || uuid == NULL) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (memcmp(uuid, &gLEDescriptor.uuid, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) != 0) {
return -EINVAL;
}
LoudnessEnhancerContext *pContext = new LoudnessEnhancerContext;
pContext->mItfe = &gLEInterface;
pContext->mState = LOUDNESS_ENHANCER_STATE_UNINITIALIZED;
pContext->mCompressor = NULL;
ret = LE_init(pContext);
if (ret < 0) {
ALOGW("LELib_Create() init failed");
delete pContext;
return ret;
}
*pHandle = (effect_handle_t)pContext;
pContext->mState = LOUDNESS_ENHANCER_STATE_INITIALIZED;
ALOGV(" LELib_Create context is %p", pContext);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int LELib_Create(const effect_uuid_t *uuid,
int32_t sessionId __unused,
int32_t ioId __unused,
effect_handle_t *pHandle) {
ALOGV("LELib_Create()");
int ret;
int i;
if (pHandle == NULL || uuid == NULL) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (memcmp(uuid, &gLEDescriptor.uuid, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) != 0) {
return -EINVAL;
}
LoudnessEnhancerContext *pContext = new LoudnessEnhancerContext;
pContext->mItfe = &gLEInterface;
pContext->mState = LOUDNESS_ENHANCER_STATE_UNINITIALIZED;
pContext->mCompressor = NULL;
ret = LE_init(pContext);
if (ret < 0) {
ALOGW("LELib_Create() init failed");
delete pContext;
return ret;
}
*pHandle = (effect_handle_t)pContext;
pContext->mState = LOUDNESS_ENHANCER_STATE_INITIALIZED;
ALOGV(" LELib_Create context is %p", pContext);
return 0;
}
| 173,346 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int strdup_if_nonnull(char **target, char *source)
{
if (source) {
*target = kstrdup(source, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!*target)
return -ENOMEM;
} else
*target = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | int strdup_if_nonnull(char **target, char *source)
| 168,146 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ldb_dn_escape_internal(char *dst, const char *src, int len)
{
const char *p, *s;
char *d;
size_t l;
p = s = src;
d = dst;
while (p - src < len) {
p += strcspn(p, ",=\n\r+<>#;\\\" ");
if (p - src == len) /* found no escapable chars */
break;
/* copy the part of the string before the stop */
memcpy(d, s, p - s);
d += (p - s); /* move to current position */
switch (*p) {
case ' ':
if (p == src || (p-src)==(len-1)) {
/* if at the beginning or end
* of the string then escape */
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = *p++;
} else {
/* otherwise don't escape */
*d++ = *p++;
}
break;
/* if at the beginning or end
* of the string then escape */
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = *p++;
} else {
/* otherwise don't escape */
*d++ = *p++;
}
break;
case '?':
/* these must be escaped using \c form */
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = *p++;
break;
default: {
/* any others get \XX form */
unsigned char v;
const char *hexbytes = "0123456789ABCDEF";
v = *(const unsigned char *)p;
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = hexbytes[v>>4];
*d++ = hexbytes[v&0xF];
p++;
break;
}
}
s = p; /* move forward */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int ldb_dn_escape_internal(char *dst, const char *src, int len)
{
char c;
char *d;
int i;
d = dst;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++){
c = src[i];
switch (c) {
case ' ':
if (i == 0 || i == len - 1) {
/* if at the beginning or end
* of the string then escape */
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = c;
} else {
/* otherwise don't escape */
*d++ = c;
}
break;
/* if at the beginning or end
* of the string then escape */
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = *p++;
} else {
/* otherwise don't escape */
*d++ = *p++;
}
break;
case '?':
/* these must be escaped using \c form */
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = c;
break;
case ';':
case '\r':
case '\n':
case '=':
case '\0': {
/* any others get \XX form */
unsigned char v;
const char *hexbytes = "0123456789ABCDEF";
v = (const unsigned char)c;
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = hexbytes[v>>4];
*d++ = hexbytes[v&0xF];
break;
}
default:
*d++ = c;
}
}
| 164,668 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHPAPI char *php_lookup_class_name(zval *object, zend_uint *nlen)
{
zval **val;
char *retval = NULL;
HashTable *object_properties;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
object_properties = Z_OBJPROP_P(object);
if (zend_hash_find(object_properties, MAGIC_MEMBER, sizeof(MAGIC_MEMBER), (void **) &val) == SUCCESS) {
retval = estrndup(Z_STRVAL_PP(val), Z_STRLEN_PP(val));
if (nlen) {
*nlen = Z_STRLEN_PP(val);
}
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | PHPAPI char *php_lookup_class_name(zval *object, zend_uint *nlen)
{
zval **val;
char *retval = NULL;
HashTable *object_properties;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
object_properties = Z_OBJPROP_P(object);
if (zend_hash_find(object_properties, MAGIC_MEMBER, sizeof(MAGIC_MEMBER), (void **) &val) == SUCCESS && Z_TYPE_PP(val) == IS_STRING) {
retval = estrndup(Z_STRVAL_PP(val), Z_STRLEN_PP(val));
if (nlen) {
*nlen = Z_STRLEN_PP(val);
}
}
return retval;
}
| 165,303 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ShellWindowFrameView::ShellWindowFrameView()
: frame_(NULL),
close_button_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | ShellWindowFrameView::ShellWindowFrameView()
ShellWindowFrameView::ShellWindowFrameView(bool frameless)
: frame_(NULL),
close_button_(NULL),
is_frameless_(frameless) {
}
| 170,718 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MediaRecorderHandler::~MediaRecorderHandler() {
DCHECK(main_render_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (client_)
client_->WriteData(
nullptr, 0u, true,
(TimeTicks::Now() - TimeTicks::UnixEpoch()).InMillisecondsF());
}
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | MediaRecorderHandler::~MediaRecorderHandler() {
DCHECK(main_render_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (client_) {
client_->WriteData(
nullptr, 0u, true,
(TimeTicks::Now() - TimeTicks::UnixEpoch()).InMillisecondsF());
}
}
| 172,604 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void aes_crypt_ecb( aes_context *ctx,
int mode,
const unsigned char input[16],
unsigned char output[16] )
{
int i;
unsigned long *RK, X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3;
#if defined(XYSSL_PADLOCK_C) && defined(XYSSL_HAVE_X86)
if( padlock_supports( PADLOCK_ACE ) )
{
if( padlock_xcryptecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) == 0 )
return;
}
#endif
RK = ctx->rk;
GET_ULONG_LE( X0, input, 0 ); X0 ^= *RK++;
if( mode == AES_DECRYPT )
{
for( i = (ctx->nr >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i-- )
{
AES_RROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
AES_RROUND( X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3 );
}
AES_RROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
X0 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X1 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y1 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X2 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y2 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X3 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y3 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
}
else /* AES_ENCRYPT */
{
for( i = (ctx->nr >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i-- )
{
AES_FROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
AES_FROUND( X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3 );
}
AES_FROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
X0 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X1 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y1 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X2 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y2 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X3 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y3 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
}
PUT_ULONG_LE( X0, output, 0 );
PUT_ULONG_LE( X1, output, 4 );
PUT_ULONG_LE( X2, output, 8 );
PUT_ULONG_LE( X3, output, 12 );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void aes_crypt_ecb( aes_context *ctx,
int mode,
const unsigned char input[16],
unsigned char output[16] )
{
int i;
unsigned long *RK, X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3;
#if defined(XYSSL_PADLOCK_C) && defined(XYSSL_HAVE_X86)
if( padlock_supports( PADLOCK_ACE ) )
{
if( padlock_xcryptecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) == 0 )
return;
}
#endif
if (ctx == NULL || ctx->rk == NULL)
return;
RK = ctx->rk;
GET_ULONG_LE( X0, input, 0 ); X0 ^= *RK++;
if( mode == AES_DECRYPT )
{
for( i = (ctx->nr >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i-- )
{
AES_RROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
AES_RROUND( X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3 );
}
AES_RROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
X0 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X1 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y1 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X2 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y2 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X3 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y3 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
}
else /* AES_ENCRYPT */
{
for( i = (ctx->nr >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i-- )
{
AES_FROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
AES_FROUND( X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3 );
}
AES_FROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
X0 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X1 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y1 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X2 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y2 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X3 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y3 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
}
PUT_ULONG_LE( X0, output, 0 );
PUT_ULONG_LE( X1, output, 4 );
PUT_ULONG_LE( X2, output, 8 );
PUT_ULONG_LE( X3, output, 12 );
}
| 164,702 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(AudioOutputIPCDelegate::State state) {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!stream_id_)
return;
if (state == AudioOutputIPCDelegate::kError) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(kError)";
base::AutoLock auto_lock_(audio_thread_lock_);
if (audio_thread_.get() && !audio_thread_->IsStopped())
callback_->OnRenderError();
}
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(AudioOutputIPCDelegate::State state) {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!stream_id_)
return;
if (state == AudioOutputIPCDelegate::kError) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(kError)";
if (!audio_thread_.IsStopped())
callback_->OnRenderError();
}
}
| 170,704 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool NaClProcessHost::ReplyToRenderer(
const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle) {
std::vector<nacl::FileDescriptor> handles_for_renderer;
for (size_t i = 0; i < internal_->sockets_for_renderer.size(); i++) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
HANDLE handle_in_renderer;
if (!DuplicateHandle(base::GetCurrentProcessHandle(),
reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(
internal_->sockets_for_renderer[i]),
chrome_render_message_filter_->peer_handle(),
&handle_in_renderer,
0, // Unused given DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS.
FALSE,
DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE | DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "DuplicateHandle() failed";
return false;
}
handles_for_renderer.push_back(
reinterpret_cast<nacl::FileDescriptor>(handle_in_renderer));
#else
nacl::FileDescriptor imc_handle;
imc_handle.fd = internal_->sockets_for_renderer[i];
imc_handle.auto_close = true;
handles_for_renderer.push_back(imc_handle);
#endif
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (RunningOnWOW64()) {
if (!content::BrokerAddTargetPeer(process_->GetData().handle)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to add NaCl process PID";
return false;
}
}
#endif
ChromeViewHostMsg_LaunchNaCl::WriteReplyParams(
reply_msg_, handles_for_renderer, channel_handle);
chrome_render_message_filter_->Send(reply_msg_);
chrome_render_message_filter_ = NULL;
reply_msg_ = NULL;
internal_->sockets_for_renderer.clear();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool NaClProcessHost::ReplyToRenderer(
bool NaClProcessHost::ReplyToRenderer() {
std::vector<nacl::FileDescriptor> handles_for_renderer;
for (size_t i = 0; i < internal_->sockets_for_renderer.size(); i++) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
HANDLE handle_in_renderer;
if (!DuplicateHandle(base::GetCurrentProcessHandle(),
reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(
internal_->sockets_for_renderer[i]),
chrome_render_message_filter_->peer_handle(),
&handle_in_renderer,
0, // Unused given DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS.
FALSE,
DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE | DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "DuplicateHandle() failed";
return false;
}
handles_for_renderer.push_back(
reinterpret_cast<nacl::FileDescriptor>(handle_in_renderer));
#else
nacl::FileDescriptor imc_handle;
imc_handle.fd = internal_->sockets_for_renderer[i];
imc_handle.auto_close = true;
handles_for_renderer.push_back(imc_handle);
#endif
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (RunningOnWOW64()) {
if (!content::BrokerAddTargetPeer(process_->GetData().handle)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to add NaCl process PID";
return false;
}
}
#endif
ChromeViewHostMsg_LaunchNaCl::WriteReplyParams(
reply_msg_, handles_for_renderer);
chrome_render_message_filter_->Send(reply_msg_);
chrome_render_message_filter_ = NULL;
reply_msg_ = NULL;
internal_->sockets_for_renderer.clear();
return true;
}
| 170,727 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char *curl_easy_escape(CURL *handle, const char *string, int inlength)
{
size_t alloc = (inlength?(size_t)inlength:strlen(string))+1;
char *ns;
char *testing_ptr = NULL;
unsigned char in; /* we need to treat the characters unsigned */
size_t newlen = alloc;
int strindex=0;
size_t length;
CURLcode res;
ns = malloc(alloc);
if(!ns)
return NULL;
length = alloc-1;
while(length--) {
in = *string;
if(Curl_isunreserved(in))
/* just copy this */
ns[strindex++]=in;
else {
/* encode it */
newlen += 2; /* the size grows with two, since this'll become a %XX */
if(newlen > alloc) {
alloc *= 2;
testing_ptr = realloc(ns, alloc);
if(!testing_ptr) {
free( ns );
return NULL;
}
else {
ns = testing_ptr;
}
}
res = Curl_convert_to_network(handle, &in, 1);
if(res) {
/* Curl_convert_to_network calls failf if unsuccessful */
free(ns);
return NULL;
}
snprintf(&ns[strindex], 4, "%%%02X", in);
strindex+=3;
}
string++;
}
ns[strindex]=0; /* terminate it */
return ns;
}
Commit Message: URL sanitize: reject URLs containing bad data
Protocols (IMAP, POP3 and SMTP) that use the path part of a URL in a
decoded manner now use the new Curl_urldecode() function to reject URLs
with embedded control codes (anything that is or decodes to a byte value
less than 32).
URLs containing such codes could easily otherwise be used to do harm and
allow users to do unintended actions with otherwise innocent tools and
applications. Like for example using a URL like
pop3://pop3.example.com/1%0d%0aDELE%201 when the app wants a URL to get
a mail and instead this would delete one.
This flaw is considered a security vulnerability: CVE-2012-0036
Security advisory at: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20120124.html
Reported by: Dan Fandrich
CWE ID: CWE-89 | char *curl_easy_escape(CURL *handle, const char *string, int inlength)
{
size_t alloc = (inlength?(size_t)inlength:strlen(string))+1;
char *ns;
char *testing_ptr = NULL;
unsigned char in; /* we need to treat the characters unsigned */
size_t newlen = alloc;
size_t strindex=0;
size_t length;
CURLcode res;
ns = malloc(alloc);
if(!ns)
return NULL;
length = alloc-1;
while(length--) {
in = *string;
if(Curl_isunreserved(in))
/* just copy this */
ns[strindex++]=in;
else {
/* encode it */
newlen += 2; /* the size grows with two, since this'll become a %XX */
if(newlen > alloc) {
alloc *= 2;
testing_ptr = realloc(ns, alloc);
if(!testing_ptr) {
free( ns );
return NULL;
}
else {
ns = testing_ptr;
}
}
res = Curl_convert_to_network(handle, &in, 1);
if(res) {
/* Curl_convert_to_network calls failf if unsuccessful */
free(ns);
return NULL;
}
snprintf(&ns[strindex], 4, "%%%02X", in);
strindex+=3;
}
string++;
}
ns[strindex]=0; /* terminate it */
return ns;
}
| 165,664 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: rdpCredssp* credssp_new(freerdp* instance, rdpTransport* transport, rdpSettings* settings)
{
rdpCredssp* credssp;
credssp = (rdpCredssp*) malloc(sizeof(rdpCredssp));
ZeroMemory(credssp, sizeof(rdpCredssp));
if (credssp != NULL)
{
HKEY hKey;
LONG status;
DWORD dwType;
DWORD dwSize;
credssp->instance = instance;
credssp->settings = settings;
credssp->server = settings->ServerMode;
credssp->transport = transport;
credssp->send_seq_num = 0;
credssp->recv_seq_num = 0;
ZeroMemory(&credssp->negoToken, sizeof(SecBuffer));
ZeroMemory(&credssp->pubKeyAuth, sizeof(SecBuffer));
ZeroMemory(&credssp->authInfo, sizeof(SecBuffer));
if (credssp->server)
{
status = RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, _T("Software\\FreeRDP\\Server"),
0, KEY_READ | KEY_WOW64_64KEY, &hKey);
if (status == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
status = RegQueryValueEx(hKey, _T("SspiModule"), NULL, &dwType, NULL, &dwSize);
if (status == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
credssp->SspiModule = (LPTSTR) malloc(dwSize + sizeof(TCHAR));
status = RegQueryValueEx(hKey, _T("SspiModule"), NULL, &dwType,
(BYTE*) credssp->SspiModule, &dwSize);
if (status == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
_tprintf(_T("Using SSPI Module: %s\n"), credssp->SspiModule);
RegCloseKey(hKey);
}
}
}
}
}
return credssp;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | rdpCredssp* credssp_new(freerdp* instance, rdpTransport* transport, rdpSettings* settings)
{
rdpCredssp* credssp;
credssp = (rdpCredssp*) malloc(sizeof(rdpCredssp));
ZeroMemory(credssp, sizeof(rdpCredssp));
if (credssp != NULL)
{
HKEY hKey;
LONG status;
DWORD dwType;
DWORD dwSize;
credssp->instance = instance;
credssp->settings = settings;
credssp->server = settings->ServerMode;
credssp->transport = transport;
credssp->send_seq_num = 0;
credssp->recv_seq_num = 0;
ZeroMemory(&credssp->negoToken, sizeof(SecBuffer));
ZeroMemory(&credssp->pubKeyAuth, sizeof(SecBuffer));
ZeroMemory(&credssp->authInfo, sizeof(SecBuffer));
SecInvalidateHandle(&credssp->context);
if (credssp->server)
{
status = RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, _T("Software\\FreeRDP\\Server"),
0, KEY_READ | KEY_WOW64_64KEY, &hKey);
if (status == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
status = RegQueryValueEx(hKey, _T("SspiModule"), NULL, &dwType, NULL, &dwSize);
if (status == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
credssp->SspiModule = (LPTSTR) malloc(dwSize + sizeof(TCHAR));
status = RegQueryValueEx(hKey, _T("SspiModule"), NULL, &dwType,
(BYTE*) credssp->SspiModule, &dwSize);
if (status == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
_tprintf(_T("Using SSPI Module: %s\n"), credssp->SspiModule);
RegCloseKey(hKey);
}
}
}
}
}
return credssp;
}
| 167,599 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_default_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(colour_type)
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_default_add(image_transform *this,
const image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(colour_type)
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return 1;
}
| 173,620 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ipv4_pktinfo_prepare(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct in_pktinfo *pktinfo = PKTINFO_SKB_CB(skb);
bool prepare = (inet_sk(sk)->cmsg_flags & IP_CMSG_PKTINFO) ||
ipv6_sk_rxinfo(sk);
if (prepare && skb_rtable(skb)) {
/* skb->cb is overloaded: prior to this point it is IP{6}CB
* which has interface index (iif) as the first member of the
* underlying inet{6}_skb_parm struct. This code then overlays
* PKTINFO_SKB_CB and in_pktinfo also has iif as the first
* element so the iif is picked up from the prior IPCB. If iif
* is the loopback interface, then return the sending interface
* (e.g., process binds socket to eth0 for Tx which is
* redirected to loopback in the rtable/dst).
*/
if (pktinfo->ipi_ifindex == LOOPBACK_IFINDEX)
pktinfo->ipi_ifindex = inet_iif(skb);
pktinfo->ipi_spec_dst.s_addr = fib_compute_spec_dst(skb);
} else {
pktinfo->ipi_ifindex = 0;
pktinfo->ipi_spec_dst.s_addr = 0;
}
skb_dst_drop(skb);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: keep skb->dst around in presence of IP options
Andrey Konovalov got crashes in __ip_options_echo() when a NULL skb->dst
is accessed.
ipv4_pktinfo_prepare() should not drop the dst if (evil) IP options
are present.
We could refine the test to the presence of ts_needtime or srr,
but IP options are not often used, so let's be conservative.
Thanks to syzkaller team for finding this bug.
Fixes: d826eb14ecef ("ipv4: PKTINFO doesnt need dst reference")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | void ipv4_pktinfo_prepare(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct in_pktinfo *pktinfo = PKTINFO_SKB_CB(skb);
bool prepare = (inet_sk(sk)->cmsg_flags & IP_CMSG_PKTINFO) ||
ipv6_sk_rxinfo(sk);
if (prepare && skb_rtable(skb)) {
/* skb->cb is overloaded: prior to this point it is IP{6}CB
* which has interface index (iif) as the first member of the
* underlying inet{6}_skb_parm struct. This code then overlays
* PKTINFO_SKB_CB and in_pktinfo also has iif as the first
* element so the iif is picked up from the prior IPCB. If iif
* is the loopback interface, then return the sending interface
* (e.g., process binds socket to eth0 for Tx which is
* redirected to loopback in the rtable/dst).
*/
if (pktinfo->ipi_ifindex == LOOPBACK_IFINDEX)
pktinfo->ipi_ifindex = inet_iif(skb);
pktinfo->ipi_spec_dst.s_addr = fib_compute_spec_dst(skb);
} else {
pktinfo->ipi_ifindex = 0;
pktinfo->ipi_spec_dst.s_addr = 0;
}
/* We need to keep the dst for __ip_options_echo()
* We could restrict the test to opt.ts_needtime || opt.srr,
* but the following is good enough as IP options are not often used.
*/
if (unlikely(IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen))
skb_dst_force(skb);
else
skb_dst_drop(skb);
}
| 168,370 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebSocketJob::OnSentData(SocketStream* socket, int amount_sent) {
DCHECK_NE(INITIALIZED, state_);
if (state_ == CLOSED)
return;
if (state_ == CONNECTING) {
OnSentHandshakeRequest(socket, amount_sent);
return;
}
if (delegate_) {
DCHECK(state_ == OPEN || state_ == CLOSING);
DCHECK_GT(amount_sent, 0);
DCHECK(current_buffer_);
current_buffer_->DidConsume(amount_sent);
if (current_buffer_->BytesRemaining() > 0)
return;
amount_sent = send_frame_handler_->GetOriginalBufferSize();
DCHECK_GT(amount_sent, 0);
current_buffer_ = NULL;
send_frame_handler_->ReleaseCurrentBuffer();
delegate_->OnSentData(socket, amount_sent);
MessageLoopForIO::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, NewRunnableMethod(this, &WebSocketJob::SendPending));
}
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void WebSocketJob::OnSentData(SocketStream* socket, int amount_sent) {
DCHECK_NE(INITIALIZED, state_);
if (state_ == CLOSED)
return;
if (state_ == CONNECTING) {
OnSentHandshakeRequest(socket, amount_sent);
return;
}
if (delegate_) {
DCHECK(state_ == OPEN || state_ == CLOSING);
DCHECK_GT(amount_sent, 0);
DCHECK(current_buffer_);
current_buffer_->DidConsume(amount_sent);
if (current_buffer_->BytesRemaining() > 0)
return;
amount_sent = send_frame_handler_->GetOriginalBufferSize();
DCHECK_GT(amount_sent, 0);
current_buffer_ = NULL;
send_frame_handler_->ReleaseCurrentBuffer();
if (method_factory_.empty()) {
MessageLoopForIO::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
method_factory_.NewRunnableMethod(&WebSocketJob::SendPending));
}
delegate_->OnSentData(socket, amount_sent);
}
}
| 170,305 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval *key, *data, **old_data;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(key);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&key, p, max, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_LONG && Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(data);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&data, p, max, var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
zval_dtor(data);
FREE_ZVAL(data);
return 0;
}
if (!objprops) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(key)) {
case IS_LONG:
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_index_update(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
case IS_STRING:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_symtable_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
}
} else {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(key);
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data,
sizeof data, NULL);
}
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for bug #68710 (Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's unserialize())
CWE ID: | static inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval *key, *data, **old_data;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(key);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&key, p, max, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_LONG && Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(data);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&data, p, max, var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
zval_dtor(data);
FREE_ZVAL(data);
return 0;
}
if (!objprops) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(key)) {
case IS_LONG:
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_index_update(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
case IS_STRING:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_symtable_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
}
} else {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(key);
if (zend_hash_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data,
sizeof data, NULL);
}
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
| 166,743 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: StatisticsRecorderTest() : use_persistent_histogram_allocator_(GetParam()) {
PersistentHistogramAllocator::GetCreateHistogramResultHistogram();
InitializeStatisticsRecorder();
if (use_persistent_histogram_allocator_) {
GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithLocalMemory(kAllocatorMemorySize, 0,
"StatisticsRecorderTest");
}
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | StatisticsRecorderTest() : use_persistent_histogram_allocator_(GetParam()) {
InitializeStatisticsRecorder();
if (use_persistent_histogram_allocator_) {
GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithLocalMemory(kAllocatorMemorySize, 0,
"StatisticsRecorderTest");
}
}
| 172,139 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SProcXFixesSelectCursorInput(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesSelectCursorInputReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->window);
return (*ProcXFixesVector[stuff->xfixesReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | SProcXFixesSelectCursorInput(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesSelectCursorInputReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXFixesSelectCursorInputReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->window);
return (*ProcXFixesVector[stuff->xfixesReqType]) (client);
}
| 165,441 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: size_t jsuGetFreeStack() {
#ifdef ARM
void *frame = __builtin_frame_address(0);
size_t stackPos = (size_t)((char*)frame);
size_t stackEnd = (size_t)((char*)&LINKER_END_VAR);
if (stackPos < stackEnd) return 0; // should never happen, but just in case of overflow!
return stackPos - stackEnd;
#elif defined(LINUX)
char ptr; // this is on the stack
extern void *STACK_BASE;
uint32_t count = (uint32_t)((size_t)STACK_BASE - (size_t)&ptr);
return 1000000 - count; // give it 1 megabyte of stack
#else
return 1000000; // no stack depth check on this platform
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | size_t jsuGetFreeStack() {
#ifdef ARM
void *frame = __builtin_frame_address(0);
size_t stackPos = (size_t)((char*)frame);
size_t stackEnd = (size_t)((char*)&LINKER_END_VAR);
if (stackPos < stackEnd) return 0; // should never happen, but just in case of overflow!
return stackPos - stackEnd;
#elif defined(LINUX)
char ptr; // this is on the stack
extern void *STACK_BASE;
uint32_t count = (uint32_t)((size_t)STACK_BASE - (size_t)&ptr);
const uint32_t max_stack = 1000000; // give it 1 megabyte of stack
if (count>max_stack) return 0;
return max_stack - count;
#else
return 1000000; // no stack depth check on this platform
#endif
}
| 169,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s)
{
int avail, index, boundary;
index = s->curpag << 8;
boundary = s->boundary << 8;
if (index < boundary)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s)
{
int avail, index, boundary;
if (s->stop <= s->start) {
return 1;
}
index = s->curpag << 8;
boundary = s->boundary << 8;
if (index < boundary)
return 1;
return 0;
}
| 165,184 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintingMessageFilter::OnCheckForCancel(const std::string& preview_ui_addr,
int preview_request_id,
bool* cancel) {
PrintPreviewUI::GetCurrentPrintPreviewStatus(preview_ui_addr,
preview_request_id,
cancel);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void PrintingMessageFilter::OnCheckForCancel(const std::string& preview_ui_addr,
void PrintingMessageFilter::OnCheckForCancel(int32 preview_ui_id,
int preview_request_id,
bool* cancel) {
PrintPreviewUI::GetCurrentPrintPreviewStatus(preview_ui_id,
preview_request_id,
cancel);
}
| 170,826 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int http_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int flags,
AVDictionary **options)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
int ret;
if( s->seekable == 1 )
h->is_streamed = 0;
else
h->is_streamed = 1;
s->filesize = -1;
s->location = av_strdup(uri);
if (!s->location)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (options)
av_dict_copy(&s->chained_options, *options, 0);
if (s->headers) {
int len = strlen(s->headers);
if (len < 2 || strcmp("\r\n", s->headers + len - 2)) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"No trailing CRLF found in HTTP header.\n");
ret = av_reallocp(&s->headers, len + 3);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
s->headers[len] = '\r';
s->headers[len + 1] = '\n';
s->headers[len + 2] = '\0';
}
}
if (s->listen) {
return http_listen(h, uri, flags, options);
}
ret = http_open_cnx(h, options);
if (ret < 0)
av_dict_free(&s->chained_options);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int http_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int flags,
AVDictionary **options)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
int ret;
if( s->seekable == 1 )
h->is_streamed = 0;
else
h->is_streamed = 1;
s->filesize = UINT64_MAX;
s->location = av_strdup(uri);
if (!s->location)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (options)
av_dict_copy(&s->chained_options, *options, 0);
if (s->headers) {
int len = strlen(s->headers);
if (len < 2 || strcmp("\r\n", s->headers + len - 2)) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"No trailing CRLF found in HTTP header.\n");
ret = av_reallocp(&s->headers, len + 3);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
s->headers[len] = '\r';
s->headers[len + 1] = '\n';
s->headers[len + 2] = '\0';
}
}
if (s->listen) {
return http_listen(h, uri, flags, options);
}
ret = http_open_cnx(h, options);
if (ret < 0)
av_dict_free(&s->chained_options);
return ret;
}
| 168,498 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: modifier_init(png_modifier *pm)
{
memset(pm, 0, sizeof *pm);
store_init(&pm->this);
pm->modifications = NULL;
pm->state = modifier_start;
pm->sbitlow = 1U;
pm->ngammas = 0;
pm->ngamma_tests = 0;
pm->gammas = 0;
pm->current_gamma = 0;
pm->encodings = 0;
pm->nencodings = 0;
pm->current_encoding = 0;
pm->encoding_counter = 0;
pm->encoding_ignored = 0;
pm->repeat = 0;
pm->test_uses_encoding = 0;
pm->maxout8 = pm->maxpc8 = pm->maxabs8 = pm->maxcalc8 = 0;
pm->maxout16 = pm->maxpc16 = pm->maxabs16 = pm->maxcalc16 = 0;
pm->maxcalcG = 0;
pm->limit = 4E-3;
pm->log8 = pm->log16 = 0; /* Means 'off' */
pm->error_gray_2 = pm->error_gray_4 = pm->error_gray_8 = 0;
pm->error_gray_16 = pm->error_color_8 = pm->error_color_16 = 0;
pm->error_indexed = 0;
pm->use_update_info = 0;
pm->interlace_type = PNG_INTERLACE_NONE;
pm->test_standard = 0;
pm->test_size = 0;
pm->test_transform = 0;
pm->use_input_precision = 0;
pm->use_input_precision_sbit = 0;
pm->use_input_precision_16to8 = 0;
pm->calculations_use_input_precision = 0;
pm->assume_16_bit_calculations = 0;
pm->test_gamma_threshold = 0;
pm->test_gamma_transform = 0;
pm->test_gamma_sbit = 0;
pm->test_gamma_scale16 = 0;
pm->test_gamma_background = 0;
pm->test_gamma_alpha_mode = 0;
pm->test_gamma_expand16 = 0;
pm->test_exhaustive = 0;
pm->log = 0;
/* Rely on the memset for all the other fields - there are no pointers */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | modifier_init(png_modifier *pm)
{
memset(pm, 0, sizeof *pm);
store_init(&pm->this);
pm->modifications = NULL;
pm->state = modifier_start;
pm->sbitlow = 1U;
pm->ngammas = 0;
pm->ngamma_tests = 0;
pm->gammas = 0;
pm->current_gamma = 0;
pm->encodings = 0;
pm->nencodings = 0;
pm->current_encoding = 0;
pm->encoding_counter = 0;
pm->encoding_ignored = 0;
pm->repeat = 0;
pm->test_uses_encoding = 0;
pm->maxout8 = pm->maxpc8 = pm->maxabs8 = pm->maxcalc8 = 0;
pm->maxout16 = pm->maxpc16 = pm->maxabs16 = pm->maxcalc16 = 0;
pm->maxcalcG = 0;
pm->limit = 4E-3;
pm->log8 = pm->log16 = 0; /* Means 'off' */
pm->error_gray_2 = pm->error_gray_4 = pm->error_gray_8 = 0;
pm->error_gray_16 = pm->error_color_8 = pm->error_color_16 = 0;
pm->error_indexed = 0;
pm->use_update_info = 0;
pm->interlace_type = PNG_INTERLACE_NONE;
pm->test_standard = 0;
pm->test_size = 0;
pm->test_transform = 0;
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_tRNS_SUPPORTED
pm->test_tRNS = 1;
# else
pm->test_tRNS = 0;
# endif
pm->use_input_precision = 0;
pm->use_input_precision_sbit = 0;
pm->use_input_precision_16to8 = 0;
pm->calculations_use_input_precision = 0;
pm->assume_16_bit_calculations = 0;
pm->test_gamma_threshold = 0;
pm->test_gamma_transform = 0;
pm->test_gamma_sbit = 0;
pm->test_gamma_scale16 = 0;
pm->test_gamma_background = 0;
pm->test_gamma_alpha_mode = 0;
pm->test_gamma_expand16 = 0;
pm->test_lbg = 1;
pm->test_lbg_gamma_threshold = 1;
pm->test_lbg_gamma_transform = 1;
pm->test_lbg_gamma_sbit = 1;
pm->test_lbg_gamma_composition = 1;
pm->test_exhaustive = 0;
pm->log = 0;
/* Rely on the memset for all the other fields - there are no pointers */
}
| 173,670 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cac_get_serial_nr_from_CUID(sc_card_t* card, sc_serial_number_t* serial)
{
cac_private_data_t * priv = CAC_DATA(card);
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL);
if (card->serialnr.len) {
*serial = card->serialnr;
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_SUCCESS);
}
if (priv->cac_id_len) {
serial->len = MIN(priv->cac_id_len, SC_MAX_SERIALNR);
memcpy(serial->value, priv->cac_id, priv->cac_id_len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_SUCCESS);
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | static int cac_get_serial_nr_from_CUID(sc_card_t* card, sc_serial_number_t* serial)
{
cac_private_data_t * priv = CAC_DATA(card);
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL);
if (card->serialnr.len) {
*serial = card->serialnr;
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_SUCCESS);
}
if (priv->cac_id_len) {
serial->len = MIN(priv->cac_id_len, SC_MAX_SERIALNR);
memcpy(serial->value, priv->cac_id, serial->len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_SUCCESS);
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND);
}
| 169,071 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::empty_this_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret1 = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned int nBufferIndex ;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB: buffer = %p, buffer->pBuffer[%p]", buffer, buffer->pBuffer);
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Empty this buffer in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (buffer == NULL || (buffer->nSize != sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::etb--> buffer is null or buffer size is invalid");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (buffer->nVersion.nVersion != OMX_SPEC_VERSION) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::etb--> OMX Version Invalid");
return OMX_ErrorVersionMismatch;
}
if (buffer->nInputPortIndex != (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_IN) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Bad port index to call empty_this_buffer");
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (!m_sInPortDef.bEnabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Cannot call empty_this_buffer while I/P port is disabled");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
nBufferIndex = buffer - ((!meta_mode_enable)?m_inp_mem_ptr:meta_buffer_hdr);
if (nBufferIndex > m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual ) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETB: Invalid buffer index[%d]", nBufferIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
m_etb_count++;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("DBG: i/p nTimestamp = %u", (unsigned)buffer->nTimeStamp);
post_event ((unsigned long)hComp,(unsigned long)buffer,m_input_msg_id);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27903498
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem #3)
CRs-Fixed: 1010088
Change-Id: I898b42034c0add621d4f9d8e02ca0ed4403d4fd3
CWE ID: | OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::empty_this_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret1 = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned int nBufferIndex ;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB: buffer = %p, buffer->pBuffer[%p]", buffer, buffer->pBuffer);
if (m_state != OMX_StateExecuting &&
m_state != OMX_StatePause &&
m_state != OMX_StateIdle) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Empty this buffer in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (buffer == NULL || (buffer->nSize != sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::etb--> buffer is null or buffer size is invalid");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (buffer->nVersion.nVersion != OMX_SPEC_VERSION) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::etb--> OMX Version Invalid");
return OMX_ErrorVersionMismatch;
}
if (buffer->nInputPortIndex != (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_IN) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Bad port index to call empty_this_buffer");
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (!m_sInPortDef.bEnabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Cannot call empty_this_buffer while I/P port is disabled");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
nBufferIndex = buffer - ((!meta_mode_enable)?m_inp_mem_ptr:meta_buffer_hdr);
if (nBufferIndex > m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual ) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETB: Invalid buffer index[%d]", nBufferIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
m_etb_count++;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("DBG: i/p nTimestamp = %u", (unsigned)buffer->nTimeStamp);
post_event ((unsigned long)hComp,(unsigned long)buffer,m_input_msg_id);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
| 173,745 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pipe_iov_copy_from_user(void *to, struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len,
int atomic)
{
unsigned long copy;
while (len > 0) {
while (!iov->iov_len)
iov++;
copy = min_t(unsigned long, len, iov->iov_len);
if (atomic) {
if (__copy_from_user_inatomic(to, iov->iov_base, copy))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_from_user(to, iov->iov_base, copy))
return -EFAULT;
}
to += copy;
len -= copy;
iov->iov_base += copy;
iov->iov_len -= copy;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | pipe_iov_copy_from_user(void *to, struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len,
| 166,686 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gs_nulldevice(gs_gstate * pgs)
{
int code = 0;
if (pgs->device == 0 || !gx_device_is_null(pgs->device)) {
gx_device *ndev;
code = gs_copydevice(&ndev, (const gx_device *)&gs_null_device,
pgs->memory);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/*
* Internal devices have a reference count of 0, not 1,
* aside from references from graphics states.
to sort out how the icc profile is best handled with this device.
It seems to inherit properties from the current device if there
is one */
rc_init(ndev, pgs->memory, 0);
if (pgs->device != NULL) {
if ((code = dev_proc(pgs->device, get_profile)(pgs->device,
&(ndev->icc_struct))) < 0)
return code;
rc_increment(ndev->icc_struct);
set_dev_proc(ndev, get_profile, gx_default_get_profile);
}
if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0)
if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0)
gs_free_object(pgs->memory, ndev, "gs_copydevice(device)");
}
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | gs_nulldevice(gs_gstate * pgs)
{
int code = 0;
bool saveLockSafety = false;
if (pgs->device == 0 || !gx_device_is_null(pgs->device)) {
gx_device *ndev;
code = gs_copydevice(&ndev, (const gx_device *)&gs_null_device,
pgs->memory);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (gs_currentdevice_inline(pgs) != NULL)
saveLockSafety = gs_currentdevice_inline(pgs)->LockSafetyParams;
/*
* Internal devices have a reference count of 0, not 1,
* aside from references from graphics states.
to sort out how the icc profile is best handled with this device.
It seems to inherit properties from the current device if there
is one */
rc_init(ndev, pgs->memory, 0);
if (pgs->device != NULL) {
if ((code = dev_proc(pgs->device, get_profile)(pgs->device,
&(ndev->icc_struct))) < 0)
return code;
rc_increment(ndev->icc_struct);
set_dev_proc(ndev, get_profile, gx_default_get_profile);
}
if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0)
if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0)
gs_free_object(pgs->memory, ndev, "gs_copydevice(device)");
gs_currentdevice_inline(pgs)->LockSafetyParams = saveLockSafety;
}
return code;
}
| 164,687 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng = &rng_ctx;
unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_mpi h;
if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
ECDSA_RS_ENTER( det );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
{
/* redirect to our context */
p_rng = &rs_ctx->det->rng_ctx;
/* jump to current step */
if( rs_ctx->det->state == ecdsa_det_sign )
goto sign;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
rs_ctx->det->state = ecdsa_det_sign;
sign:
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng );
#else
ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, rs_ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
cleanup:
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );
ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( det );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng_blind,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng = &rng_ctx;
unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_mpi h;
if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
ECDSA_RS_ENTER( det );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
{
/* redirect to our context */
p_rng = &rs_ctx->det->rng_ctx;
/* jump to current step */
if( rs_ctx->det->state == ecdsa_det_sign )
goto sign;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
rs_ctx->det->state = ecdsa_det_sign;
sign:
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng );
#else
if( f_rng_blind != NULL )
ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx );
else
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng_blind_det;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a
* second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid
* reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the
* risk that they leak this way.
*/
const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT";
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind );
p_rng_blind_det = &rng_ctx_blind;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng_blind_det, md_info,
data, 2 * grp_len );
ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( p_rng_blind_det,
(const unsigned char*) blind_label,
strlen( blind_label ) );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
goto cleanup;
}
#else
/*
* In the case of restartable computations we would either need to store
* the second RNG in the restart context too or set it up at every
* restart. The first option would penalize the correct application of
* the function and the second would defeat the purpose of the
* restartable feature.
*
* Therefore in this case we reuse the original RNG. This comes with the
* price that the resulting signature might not be a valid deterministic
* ECDSA signature with a very low probability (same magnitude as
* successfully guessing the private key). However even then it is still
* a valid ECDSA signature.
*/
p_rng_blind_det = p_rng;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/*
* Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and
* message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information
* through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL
* won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should
* be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed.
*/
ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng_blind_det,
rs_ctx );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
#endif
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
cleanup:
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );
ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( det );
return( ret );
}
| 169,505 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadTILEImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image,
*tile_image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
/*
Initialize Image structure.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
*read_info->magick='\0';
tile_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (tile_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
if (*image_info->filename == '\0')
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyAnImageName");
image->colorspace=tile_image->colorspace;
image->matte=tile_image->matte;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent);
if (LocaleCompare(tile_image->magick,"PATTERN") == 0)
{
tile_image->tile_offset.x=0;
tile_image->tile_offset.y=0;
}
(void) TextureImage(image,tile_image);
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
if (image->colorspace == GRAYColorspace)
image->type=GrayscaleType;
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static Image *ReadTILEImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image,
*tile_image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
/*
Initialize Image structure.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
*read_info->magick='\0';
tile_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (tile_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (*image_info->filename == '\0')
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyAnImageName");
image->colorspace=tile_image->colorspace;
image->matte=tile_image->matte;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent);
if (LocaleCompare(tile_image->magick,"PATTERN") == 0)
{
tile_image->tile_offset.x=0;
tile_image->tile_offset.y=0;
}
(void) TextureImage(image,tile_image);
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
if (image->colorspace == GRAYColorspace)
image->type=GrayscaleType;
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,610 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IndexedDBDispatcher* IndexedDBDispatcher::ThreadSpecificInstance() {
if (g_idb_dispatcher_tls.Pointer()->Get())
return g_idb_dispatcher_tls.Pointer()->Get();
IndexedDBDispatcher* dispatcher = new IndexedDBDispatcher;
if (WorkerTaskRunner::Instance()->CurrentWorkerId())
webkit_glue::WorkerTaskRunner::Instance()->AddStopObserver(dispatcher);
return dispatcher;
}
Commit Message: Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | IndexedDBDispatcher* IndexedDBDispatcher::ThreadSpecificInstance() {
if (g_idb_dispatcher_tls.Pointer()->Get() == HAS_BEEN_DELETED) {
NOTREACHED() << "Re-instantiating TLS IndexedDBDispatcher.";
g_idb_dispatcher_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
}
if (g_idb_dispatcher_tls.Pointer()->Get())
return g_idb_dispatcher_tls.Pointer()->Get();
IndexedDBDispatcher* dispatcher = new IndexedDBDispatcher;
if (WorkerTaskRunner::Instance()->CurrentWorkerId())
webkit_glue::WorkerTaskRunner::Instance()->AddStopObserver(dispatcher);
return dispatcher;
}
| 171,039 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long mkvparser::ReadUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long& len)
{
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
int status;
len = 1;
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) //error or underflow
return status;
if (status > 0) //interpreted as "underflow"
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if (b == 0) //we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m))
{
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
long long result = b & (~m);
++pos;
for (int i = 1; i < len; ++i)
{
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
{
len = 1;
return status;
}
if (status > 0)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long mkvparser::ReadUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long& len)
int status;
//#ifdef _DEBUG
// long long total, available;
// status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
// assert(status >= 0);
// assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
// assert(pos < available);
// assert((available - pos) >= 1); //assume here max u-int len is 8
//#endif
len = 1;
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) // error or underflow
return status;
if (status > 0) // interpreted as "underflow"
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if (b == 0) // we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m)) {
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
//#ifdef _DEBUG
// assert((available - pos) >= len);
//#endif
long long result = b & (~m);
++pos;
for (int i = 1; i < len; ++i) {
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) {
len = 1;
return status;
}
if (status > 0) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
| 174,434 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Resource::Resource(PluginInstance* instance)
: resource_id_(0), instance_(instance) {
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | Resource::Resource(PluginInstance* instance)
: resource_id_(0), instance_(instance) {
ResourceTracker::Get()->ResourceCreated(this, instance_);
}
| 170,414 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: seamless_process(STREAM s)
{
unsigned int pkglen;
char *buf;
pkglen = s->end - s->p;
/* str_handle_lines requires null terminated strings */
buf = xmalloc(pkglen + 1);
STRNCPY(buf, (char *) s->p, pkglen + 1);
str_handle_lines(buf, &seamless_rest, seamless_line_handler, NULL);
xfree(buf);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | seamless_process(STREAM s)
{
unsigned int pkglen;
char *buf;
struct stream packet = *s;
if (!s_check(s))
{
rdp_protocol_error("seamless_process(), stream is in unstable state", &packet);
}
pkglen = s->end - s->p;
/* str_handle_lines requires null terminated strings */
buf = xmalloc(pkglen + 1);
STRNCPY(buf, (char *) s->p, pkglen + 1);
str_handle_lines(buf, &seamless_rest, seamless_line_handler, NULL);
xfree(buf);
}
| 169,808 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int jpc_bitstream_putbits(jpc_bitstream_t *bitstream, int n, long v)
{
int m;
/* We can reliably put at most 31 bits since ISO/IEC 9899 only
guarantees that a long can represent values up to 2^31-1. */
assert(n >= 0 && n < 32);
/* Ensure that only the bits to be output are nonzero. */
assert(!(v & (~JAS_ONES(n))));
/* Put the desired number of bits to the specified bit stream. */
m = n - 1;
while (--n >= 0) {
if (jpc_bitstream_putbit(bitstream, (v >> m) & 1) == EOF) {
return EOF;
}
v <<= 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Changed the JPC bitstream code to more gracefully handle a request
for a larger sized integer than what can be handled (i.e., return
with an error instead of failing an assert).
CWE ID: | int jpc_bitstream_putbits(jpc_bitstream_t *bitstream, int n, long v)
{
int m;
/* We can reliably put at most 31 bits since ISO/IEC 9899 only
guarantees that a long can represent values up to 2^31-1. */
//assert(n >= 0 && n < 32);
if (n < 0 || n >= 32) {
return EOF;
}
/* Ensure that only the bits to be output are nonzero. */
assert(!(v & (~JAS_ONES(n))));
/* Put the desired number of bits to the specified bit stream. */
m = n - 1;
while (--n >= 0) {
if (jpc_bitstream_putbit(bitstream, (v >> m) & 1) == EOF) {
return EOF;
}
v <<= 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,733 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: LosslessTestLarge()
: EncoderTest(GET_PARAM(0)),
psnr_(kMaxPsnr),
nframes_(0),
encoding_mode_(GET_PARAM(1)) {
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | LosslessTestLarge()
LosslessTest()
: EncoderTest(GET_PARAM(0)),
psnr_(kMaxPsnr),
nframes_(0),
encoding_mode_(GET_PARAM(1)) {
}
| 174,597 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
| 167,214 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool asn1_write_OctetString(struct asn1_data *data, const void *p, size_t length)
{
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
asn1_write(data, p, length);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
return !data->has_error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool asn1_write_OctetString(struct asn1_data *data, const void *p, size_t length)
{
if (!asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) return false;
if (!asn1_write(data, p, length)) return false;
return asn1_pop_tag(data);
}
| 164,591 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppCacheGroup::RemoveCache(AppCache* cache) {
DCHECK(cache->associated_hosts().empty());
if (cache == newest_complete_cache_) {
CancelUpdate();
AppCache* tmp_cache = newest_complete_cache_;
newest_complete_cache_ = nullptr;
tmp_cache->set_owning_group(nullptr); // may cause this group to be deleted
} else {
scoped_refptr<AppCacheGroup> protect(this);
Caches::iterator it =
std::find(old_caches_.begin(), old_caches_.end(), cache);
if (it != old_caches_.end()) {
AppCache* tmp_cache = *it;
old_caches_.erase(it);
tmp_cache->set_owning_group(nullptr); // may cause group to be released
}
if (!is_obsolete() && old_caches_.empty() &&
!newly_deletable_response_ids_.empty()) {
storage_->DeleteResponses(manifest_url_, newly_deletable_response_ids_);
newly_deletable_response_ids_.clear();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Refcount AppCacheGroup correctly.
Bug: 888926
Change-Id: Iab0d82d272e2f24a5e91180d64bc8e2aa8a8238d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1246827
Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594475}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void AppCacheGroup::RemoveCache(AppCache* cache) {
DCHECK(cache->associated_hosts().empty());
if (cache == newest_complete_cache_) {
AppCache* tmp_cache = newest_complete_cache_;
newest_complete_cache_ = nullptr;
CancelUpdate();
tmp_cache->set_owning_group(nullptr); // may cause this group to be deleted
} else {
scoped_refptr<AppCacheGroup> protect(this);
Caches::iterator it =
std::find(old_caches_.begin(), old_caches_.end(), cache);
if (it != old_caches_.end()) {
AppCache* tmp_cache = *it;
old_caches_.erase(it);
tmp_cache->set_owning_group(nullptr); // may cause group to be released
}
if (!is_obsolete() && old_caches_.empty() &&
!newly_deletable_response_ids_.empty()) {
storage_->DeleteResponses(manifest_url_, newly_deletable_response_ids_);
newly_deletable_response_ids_.clear();
}
}
}
| 172,653 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAMRWBEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
formatParams->eEncoding =
(formatParams->nPortIndex == 0)
? OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM : OMX_AUDIO_CodingAMR;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAmr:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *amrParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *)params;
if (amrParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
amrParams->nChannels = 1;
amrParams->nBitRate = mBitRate;
amrParams->eAMRBandMode =
(OMX_AUDIO_AMRBANDMODETYPE)(mMode + OMX_AUDIO_AMRBandModeWB0);
amrParams->eAMRDTXMode = OMX_AUDIO_AMRDTXModeOff;
amrParams->eAMRFrameFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AMRFrameFormatFSF;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelCF;
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = kSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAMRWBEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(formatParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
formatParams->eEncoding =
(formatParams->nPortIndex == 0)
? OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM : OMX_AUDIO_CodingAMR;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAmr:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *amrParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(amrParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (amrParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
amrParams->nChannels = 1;
amrParams->nBitRate = mBitRate;
amrParams->eAMRBandMode =
(OMX_AUDIO_AMRBANDMODETYPE)(mMode + OMX_AUDIO_AMRBandModeWB0);
amrParams->eAMRDTXMode = OMX_AUDIO_AMRDTXModeOff;
amrParams->eAMRFrameFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AMRFrameFormatFSF;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelCF;
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = kSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,196 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
{
/* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
* protocol_version alerts */
* protocol_version alerts */
if (desc < 0)
return -1;
/* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
* else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
* the future
*/
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
{
/* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
* protocol_version alerts */
* protocol_version alerts */
if (desc < 0)
return -1;
/* If a fatal one, remove from cache and go into the error state */
if (level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
if (s->session != NULL)
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
}
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
* else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
* the future
*/
return -1;
}
| 165,141 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: u_char *_our_safe_pcap_next(pcap_t *pcap, struct pcap_pkthdr *pkthdr,
const char *funcname, const int line, const char *file)
{
u_char *pktdata = (u_char *)pcap_next(pcap, pkthdr);
if (pktdata) {
if (pkthdr->len > MAXPACKET) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: %u is greater than maximum %u\n",
file, funcname, line, pkthdr->len, MAXPACKET);
exit(-1);
}
if (pkthdr->len < pkthdr->caplen) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: packet length %u is less than capture length %u\n",
file, funcname, line, pkthdr->len, pkthdr->caplen);
exit(-1);
}
}
return pktdata;
}
Commit Message: Bug #520 Fix heap overflow on zero or 0xFFFF packet length
Add check for packets that report zero packet length. Example
of fix:
src/tcpprep --auto=bridge --pcap=poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow --cachefile=/dev/null
Warning: poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow was captured using a snaplen of 17 bytes. This may mean you have truncated packets.
safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in tcpprep.c:process_raw_packets() line 334: packet length=0 capture length=0
CWE ID: CWE-125 | u_char *_our_safe_pcap_next(pcap_t *pcap, struct pcap_pkthdr *pkthdr,
const char *funcname, const int line, const char *file)
{
u_char *pktdata = (u_char *)pcap_next(pcap, pkthdr);
if (pktdata) {
if (pkthdr->len > MAXPACKET) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: %u is greater than maximum %u\n",
file, funcname, line, pkthdr->len, MAXPACKET);
exit(-1);
}
if (!pkthdr->len || pkthdr->len < pkthdr->caplen) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: packet length=%u capture length=%u\n",
file, funcname, line, pkthdr->len, pkthdr->caplen);
exit(-1);
}
}
return pktdata;
}
| 168,946 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->src_reg);
else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM) {
verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%x\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
} else {
verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
verbose("(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code,
func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->off);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->imm, insn->off);
}
} else {
verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
}
}
Commit Message: bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
The patch fixes two things at once:
1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn)
static void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->src_reg);
else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM &&
BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW) {
/* At this point, we already made sure that the second
* part of the ldimm64 insn is accessible.
*/
u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
bool map_ptr = insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD;
if (map_ptr && !env->allow_ptr_leaks)
imm = 0;
verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code,
insn->dst_reg, (unsigned long long)imm);
} else {
verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
verbose("(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code,
func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->off);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->imm, insn->off);
}
} else {
verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
}
}
| 168,121 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char *__filterShell(const char *arg) {
r_return_val_if_fail (arg, NULL);
char *a = malloc (strlen (arg) + 1);
if (!a) {
return NULL;
}
char *b = a;
while (*arg) {
switch (*arg) {
case '@':
case '`':
case '|':
case ';':
case '\n':
break;
default:
*b++ = *arg;
break;
}
arg++;
}
*b = 0;
return a;
}
Commit Message: More fixes for the CVE-2019-14745
CWE ID: CWE-78 | static char *__filterShell(const char *arg) {
r_return_val_if_fail (arg, NULL);
char *a = malloc (strlen (arg) + 1);
if (!a) {
return NULL;
}
char *b = a;
while (*arg) {
char ch = *arg;
switch (ch) {
case '@':
case '`':
case '|':
case ';':
case '=':
case '\n':
break;
default:
*b++ = ch;
break;
}
arg++;
}
*b = 0;
return a;
}
| 170,185 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GC_INNER void * GC_generic_malloc_ignore_off_page(size_t lb, int k)
{
void *result;
size_t lg;
size_t lb_rounded;
word n_blocks;
GC_bool init;
DCL_LOCK_STATE;
if (SMALL_OBJ(lb))
return(GC_generic_malloc((word)lb, k));
lg = ROUNDED_UP_GRANULES(lb);
lb_rounded = GRANULES_TO_BYTES(lg);
n_blocks = OBJ_SZ_TO_BLOCKS(lb_rounded);
init = GC_obj_kinds[k].ok_init;
if (EXPECT(GC_have_errors, FALSE))
GC_print_all_errors();
GC_INVOKE_FINALIZERS();
LOCK();
result = (ptr_t)GC_alloc_large(ADD_SLOP(lb), k, IGNORE_OFF_PAGE);
if (0 != result) {
if (GC_debugging_started) {
BZERO(result, n_blocks * HBLKSIZE);
} else {
# ifdef THREADS
/* Clear any memory that might be used for GC descriptors */
/* before we release the lock. */
((word *)result)[0] = 0;
((word *)result)[1] = 0;
((word *)result)[GRANULES_TO_WORDS(lg)-1] = 0;
((word *)result)[GRANULES_TO_WORDS(lg)-2] = 0;
# endif
}
}
GC_bytes_allocd += lb_rounded;
if (0 == result) {
GC_oom_func oom_fn = GC_oom_fn;
UNLOCK();
return((*oom_fn)(lb));
} else {
UNLOCK();
if (init && !GC_debugging_started) {
BZERO(result, n_blocks * HBLKSIZE);
}
return(result);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix allocation size overflows due to rounding.
* malloc.c (GC_generic_malloc): Check if the allocation size is
rounded to a smaller value.
* mallocx.c (GC_generic_malloc_ignore_off_page): Likewise.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | GC_INNER void * GC_generic_malloc_ignore_off_page(size_t lb, int k)
{
void *result;
size_t lg;
size_t lb_rounded;
word n_blocks;
GC_bool init;
DCL_LOCK_STATE;
if (SMALL_OBJ(lb))
return(GC_generic_malloc((word)lb, k));
lg = ROUNDED_UP_GRANULES(lb);
lb_rounded = GRANULES_TO_BYTES(lg);
if (lb_rounded < lb)
return((*GC_get_oom_fn())(lb));
n_blocks = OBJ_SZ_TO_BLOCKS(lb_rounded);
init = GC_obj_kinds[k].ok_init;
if (EXPECT(GC_have_errors, FALSE))
GC_print_all_errors();
GC_INVOKE_FINALIZERS();
LOCK();
result = (ptr_t)GC_alloc_large(ADD_SLOP(lb), k, IGNORE_OFF_PAGE);
if (0 != result) {
if (GC_debugging_started) {
BZERO(result, n_blocks * HBLKSIZE);
} else {
# ifdef THREADS
/* Clear any memory that might be used for GC descriptors */
/* before we release the lock. */
((word *)result)[0] = 0;
((word *)result)[1] = 0;
((word *)result)[GRANULES_TO_WORDS(lg)-1] = 0;
((word *)result)[GRANULES_TO_WORDS(lg)-2] = 0;
# endif
}
}
GC_bytes_allocd += lb_rounded;
if (0 == result) {
GC_oom_func oom_fn = GC_oom_fn;
UNLOCK();
return((*oom_fn)(lb));
} else {
UNLOCK();
if (init && !GC_debugging_started) {
BZERO(result, n_blocks * HBLKSIZE);
}
return(result);
}
}
| 169,879 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static BT_HDR *create_pbuf(UINT16 len, UINT8 *data)
{
BT_HDR* p_buf = GKI_getbuf((UINT16) (len + BTA_HH_MIN_OFFSET + sizeof(BT_HDR)));
if (p_buf) {
UINT8* pbuf_data;
p_buf->len = len;
p_buf->offset = BTA_HH_MIN_OFFSET;
pbuf_data = (UINT8*) (p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
memcpy(pbuf_data, data, len);
}
return p_buf;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE btif: check overflow on create_pbuf size
Bug: 27930580
Change-Id: Ieb1f23f9a8a937b21f7c5eca92da3b0b821400e6
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static BT_HDR *create_pbuf(UINT16 len, UINT8 *data)
{
UINT16 buflen = (UINT16) (len + BTA_HH_MIN_OFFSET + sizeof(BT_HDR));
if (buflen < len) {
android_errorWriteWithInfoLog(0x534e4554, "28672558", -1, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
BT_HDR* p_buf = GKI_getbuf(buflen);
if (p_buf) {
UINT8* pbuf_data;
p_buf->len = len;
p_buf->offset = BTA_HH_MIN_OFFSET;
pbuf_data = (UINT8*) (p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
memcpy(pbuf_data, data, len);
}
return p_buf;
}
| 173,757 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int generate_key(DH *dh)
{
int ok = 0;
int generate_new_key = 0;
unsigned l;
BN_CTX *ctx;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
generate_new_key = 1;
} else
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-320 | static int generate_key(DH *dh)
{
int ok = 0;
int generate_new_key = 0;
unsigned l;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
generate_new_key = 1;
} else
| 165,332 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: JsVar *jswrap_graphics_createArrayBuffer(int width, int height, int bpp, JsVar *options) {
if (width<=0 || height<=0 || width>32767 || height>32767) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Invalid Size");
return 0;
}
if (!isValidBPP(bpp)) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Invalid BPP");
return 0;
}
JsVar *parent = jspNewObject(0, "Graphics");
if (!parent) return 0; // low memory
JsGraphics gfx;
graphicsStructInit(&gfx);
gfx.data.type = JSGRAPHICSTYPE_ARRAYBUFFER;
gfx.data.flags = JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_NONE;
gfx.graphicsVar = parent;
gfx.data.width = (unsigned short)width;
gfx.data.height = (unsigned short)height;
gfx.data.bpp = (unsigned char)bpp;
if (jsvIsObject(options)) {
if (jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvObjectGetChild(options, "zigzag", 0)))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_ARRAYBUFFER_ZIGZAG);
if (jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvObjectGetChild(options, "msb", 0)))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_ARRAYBUFFER_MSB);
if (jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvObjectGetChild(options, "vertical_byte", 0))) {
if (gfx.data.bpp==1)
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_ARRAYBUFFER_VERTICAL_BYTE);
else
jsWarn("vertical_byte only works for 1bpp ArrayBuffers\n");
}
JsVar *colorv = jsvObjectGetChild(options, "color_order", 0);
if (colorv) {
if (jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "rgb")) ; // The default
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "brg"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_BRG);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "bgr"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_BGR);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "gbr"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_GBR);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "grb"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_GRB);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "rbg"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_RBG);
else
jsWarn("color_order must be 3 characters");
jsvUnLock(colorv);
}
}
lcdInit_ArrayBuffer(&gfx);
graphicsSetVar(&gfx);
return parent;
}
Commit Message: Add height check for Graphics.createArrayBuffer(...vertical_byte:true) (fix #1421)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | JsVar *jswrap_graphics_createArrayBuffer(int width, int height, int bpp, JsVar *options) {
if (width<=0 || height<=0 || width>32767 || height>32767) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Invalid Size");
return 0;
}
if (!isValidBPP(bpp)) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Invalid BPP");
return 0;
}
JsVar *parent = jspNewObject(0, "Graphics");
if (!parent) return 0; // low memory
JsGraphics gfx;
graphicsStructInit(&gfx);
gfx.data.type = JSGRAPHICSTYPE_ARRAYBUFFER;
gfx.data.flags = JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_NONE;
gfx.graphicsVar = parent;
gfx.data.width = (unsigned short)width;
gfx.data.height = (unsigned short)height;
gfx.data.bpp = (unsigned char)bpp;
if (jsvIsObject(options)) {
if (jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvObjectGetChild(options, "zigzag", 0)))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_ARRAYBUFFER_ZIGZAG);
if (jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvObjectGetChild(options, "msb", 0)))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_ARRAYBUFFER_MSB);
if (jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvObjectGetChild(options, "vertical_byte", 0))) {
if (gfx.data.bpp==1)
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_ARRAYBUFFER_VERTICAL_BYTE);
else {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "vertical_byte only works for 1bpp ArrayBuffers\n");
return 0;
}
if (gfx.data.height&7) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "height must be a multiple of 8 when using vertical_byte\n");
return 0;
}
}
JsVar *colorv = jsvObjectGetChild(options, "color_order", 0);
if (colorv) {
if (jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "rgb")) ; // The default
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "brg"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_BRG);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "bgr"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_BGR);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "gbr"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_GBR);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "grb"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_GRB);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "rbg"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_RBG);
else
jsWarn("color_order must be 3 characters");
jsvUnLock(colorv);
}
}
lcdInit_ArrayBuffer(&gfx);
graphicsSetVar(&gfx);
return parent;
}
| 169,216 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SaveTestFileSystem() {
GDataRootDirectoryProto root;
GDataDirectoryProto* root_dir = root.mutable_gdata_directory();
GDataEntryProto* file_base = root_dir->mutable_gdata_entry();
PlatformFileInfoProto* platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("drive");
platform_info->set_is_directory(true);
GDataFileProto* file = root_dir->add_child_files();
file_base = file->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("File1");
platform_info->set_is_directory(false);
platform_info->set_size(1048576);
GDataDirectoryProto* dir1 = root_dir->add_child_directories();
file_base = dir1->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("Dir1");
platform_info->set_is_directory(true);
file = dir1->add_child_files();
file_base = file->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("File2");
platform_info->set_is_directory(false);
platform_info->set_size(555);
GDataDirectoryProto* dir2 = dir1->add_child_directories();
file_base = dir2->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("SubDir2");
platform_info->set_is_directory(true);
file = dir2->add_child_files();
file_base = file->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("File3");
platform_info->set_is_directory(false);
platform_info->set_size(12345);
std::string serialized_proto;
ASSERT_TRUE(root.SerializeToString(&serialized_proto));
ASSERT_TRUE(!serialized_proto.empty());
FilePath cache_dir_path = profile_->GetPath().Append(
FILE_PATH_LITERAL("GCache/v1/meta/"));
ASSERT_TRUE(file_util::CreateDirectory(cache_dir_path));
const int file_size = static_cast<int>(serialized_proto.length());
ASSERT_EQ(file_util::WriteFile(cache_dir_path.Append("file_system.pb"),
serialized_proto.data(), file_size), file_size);
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void SaveTestFileSystem() {
GDataRootDirectoryProto root;
GDataDirectoryProto* root_dir = root.mutable_gdata_directory();
GDataEntryProto* file_base = root_dir->mutable_gdata_entry();
PlatformFileInfoProto* platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("drive");
file_base->set_resource_id(kGDataRootDirectoryResourceId);
platform_info->set_is_directory(true);
GDataFileProto* file = root_dir->add_child_files();
file_base = file->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("File1");
platform_info->set_is_directory(false);
platform_info->set_size(1048576);
GDataDirectoryProto* dir1 = root_dir->add_child_directories();
file_base = dir1->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("Dir1");
platform_info->set_is_directory(true);
file = dir1->add_child_files();
file_base = file->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("File2");
platform_info->set_is_directory(false);
platform_info->set_size(555);
GDataDirectoryProto* dir2 = dir1->add_child_directories();
file_base = dir2->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("SubDir2");
platform_info->set_is_directory(true);
file = dir2->add_child_files();
file_base = file->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("File3");
platform_info->set_is_directory(false);
platform_info->set_size(12345);
std::string serialized_proto;
ASSERT_TRUE(root.SerializeToString(&serialized_proto));
ASSERT_TRUE(!serialized_proto.empty());
FilePath cache_dir_path = profile_->GetPath().Append(
FILE_PATH_LITERAL("GCache/v1/meta/"));
ASSERT_TRUE(file_util::CreateDirectory(cache_dir_path));
const int file_size = static_cast<int>(serialized_proto.length());
ASSERT_EQ(file_util::WriteFile(cache_dir_path.Append("file_system.pb"),
serialized_proto.data(), file_size), file_size);
}
| 170,776 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InitOnIOThread(const std::string& mime_type) {
PluginServiceImpl* plugin_service = PluginServiceImpl::GetInstance();
std::vector<WebPluginInfo> plugins;
plugin_service->GetPluginInfoArray(
GURL(), mime_type, false, &plugins, NULL);
base::FilePath plugin_path;
if (!plugins.empty()) // May be empty for some tests.
plugin_path = plugins[0].path;
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
remove_start_time_ = base::Time::Now();
is_removing_ = true;
AddRef();
PepperPluginInfo* pepper_info =
plugin_service->GetRegisteredPpapiPluginInfo(plugin_path);
if (pepper_info) {
plugin_name_ = pepper_info->name;
plugin_service->OpenChannelToPpapiBroker(0, plugin_path, this);
} else {
plugin_service->OpenChannelToNpapiPlugin(
0, 0, GURL(), GURL(), mime_type, this);
}
}
Commit Message: Do not attempt to open a channel to a plugin in Plugin Data Remover if there are no plugins available.
BUG=485886
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1144353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#331168}
CWE ID: | void InitOnIOThread(const std::string& mime_type) {
PluginServiceImpl* plugin_service = PluginServiceImpl::GetInstance();
std::vector<WebPluginInfo> plugins;
plugin_service->GetPluginInfoArray(
GURL(), mime_type, false, &plugins, NULL);
if (plugins.empty()) {
// May be empty for some tests and on the CrOS login OOBE screen.
event_->Signal();
return;
}
base::FilePath plugin_path = plugins[0].path;
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
remove_start_time_ = base::Time::Now();
is_removing_ = true;
AddRef();
PepperPluginInfo* pepper_info =
plugin_service->GetRegisteredPpapiPluginInfo(plugin_path);
if (pepper_info) {
plugin_name_ = pepper_info->name;
plugin_service->OpenChannelToPpapiBroker(0, plugin_path, this);
} else {
plugin_service->OpenChannelToNpapiPlugin(
0, 0, GURL(), GURL(), mime_type, this);
}
}
| 171,628 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void QuicTransportHost::Initialize(
IceTransportHost* ice_transport_host,
quic::Perspective perspective,
const std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate>>& certificates) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(ice_transport_host);
DCHECK(!ice_transport_host_);
ice_transport_host_ = ice_transport_host;
P2PQuicTransportConfig config(
this, ice_transport_host->ConnectConsumer(this)->packet_transport(),
certificates);
config.is_server = (perspective == quic::Perspective::IS_SERVER);
quic_transport_ =
quic_transport_factory_->CreateQuicTransport(std::move(config));
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void QuicTransportHost::Initialize(
IceTransportHost* ice_transport_host,
quic::Perspective perspective,
const std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate>>& certificates) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(ice_transport_host);
DCHECK(!ice_transport_host_);
ice_transport_host_ = ice_transport_host;
// TODO(https://crbug.com/874296): Pass through values for read and write
// stream buffer sizes in the P2PQuicTransportConfig. Currently this is just
// set to the same size as the QUIC receive window size (24 MB).
uint32_t stream_buffer_size = 24 * 1024 * 1024;
P2PQuicTransportConfig config(
this, ice_transport_host->ConnectConsumer(this)->packet_transport(),
certificates, stream_buffer_size);
config.is_server = (perspective == quic::Perspective::IS_SERVER);
quic_transport_ =
quic_transport_factory_->CreateQuicTransport(std::move(config));
}
| 172,270 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: usage(const char *prog)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [OPTION...]\n", prog);
fprintf(stderr, " -f, --use-file=FILE Use the specified configuration file\n");
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -P, --vrrp Only run with VRRP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -C, --check Only run with Health-checker subsystem\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -B, --no_bfd Don't run BFD subsystem\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " --all Force all child processes to run, even if have no configuration\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -l, --log-console Log messages to local console\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -D, --log-detail Detailed log messages\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -S, --log-facility=[0-7] Set syslog facility to LOG_LOCAL[0-7]\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -g, --log-file=FILE Also log to FILE (default /tmp/keepalived.log)\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --flush-log-file Flush log file on write\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -G, --no-syslog Don't log via syslog\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -X, --release-vips Drop VIP on transition from signal.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -V, --dont-release-vrrp Don't remove VRRP VIPs and VROUTEs on daemon stop\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -I, --dont-release-ipvs Don't remove IPVS topology on daemon stop\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -R, --dont-respawn Don't respawn child processes\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -n, --dont-fork Don't fork the daemon process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -d, --dump-conf Dump the configuration data\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -p, --pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for parent process\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -r, --vrrp_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for VRRP child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -c, --checkers_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for checkers child process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -a, --address-monitoring Report all address additions/deletions notified via netlink\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -b, --bfd_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for BFD child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
fprintf(stderr, " -x, --snmp Enable SNMP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -A, --snmp-agent-socket=FILE Use the specified socket for master agent\n");
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
fprintf(stderr, " -s, --namespace=NAME Run in network namespace NAME (overrides config)\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -m, --core-dump Produce core dump if terminate abnormally\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -M, --core-dump-pattern=PATN Also set /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern to PATN (default 'core')\n");
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
fprintf(stderr, " -L, --mem-check-log Log malloc/frees to syslog\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -i, --config-id id Skip any configuration lines beginning '@' that don't match id\n"
" or any lines beginning @^ that do match.\n"
" The config-id defaults to the node name if option not used\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --signum=SIGFUNC Return signal number for STOP, RELOAD, DATA, STATS"
#ifdef _WITH_JSON_
", JSON"
#endif
"\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -t, --config-test[=LOG_FILE] Check the configuration for obvious errors, output to\n"
" stderr by default\n");
#ifdef _WITH_PERF_
fprintf(stderr, " --perf[=PERF_TYPE] Collect perf data, PERF_TYPE=all, run(default) or end\n");
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_OPTIONS
fprintf(stderr, " --debug[=...] Enable debug options. p, b, c, v specify parent, bfd, checker and vrrp processes\n");
#ifdef _TIMER_CHECK_
fprintf(stderr, " T - timer debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _SMTP_ALERT_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " M - email alert debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " E - epoll debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_THREAD_DUMP_
fprintf(stderr, " D - epoll thread dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _VRRP_FD_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, " F - vrrp fd dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _REGEX_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " R - regex debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_REGEX_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " X - regex timers\n");
#endif
#ifdef _TSM_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " S - TSM debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _NETLINK_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " N - netlink timer debug\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " Example --debug=TpMEvcp\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -v, --version Display the version number\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -h, --help Display this help message\n");
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | usage(const char *prog)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [OPTION...]\n", prog);
fprintf(stderr, " -f, --use-file=FILE Use the specified configuration file\n");
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -P, --vrrp Only run with VRRP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -C, --check Only run with Health-checker subsystem\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -B, --no_bfd Don't run BFD subsystem\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " --all Force all child processes to run, even if have no configuration\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -l, --log-console Log messages to local console\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -D, --log-detail Detailed log messages\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -S, --log-facility=[0-7] Set syslog facility to LOG_LOCAL[0-7]\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -g, --log-file=FILE Also log to FILE (default /tmp/keepalived.log)\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --flush-log-file Flush log file on write\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -G, --no-syslog Don't log via syslog\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -u, --umask=MASK umask for file creation (in numeric form)\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -X, --release-vips Drop VIP on transition from signal.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -V, --dont-release-vrrp Don't remove VRRP VIPs and VROUTEs on daemon stop\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -I, --dont-release-ipvs Don't remove IPVS topology on daemon stop\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -R, --dont-respawn Don't respawn child processes\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -n, --dont-fork Don't fork the daemon process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -d, --dump-conf Dump the configuration data\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -p, --pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for parent process\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -r, --vrrp_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for VRRP child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -c, --checkers_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for checkers child process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -a, --address-monitoring Report all address additions/deletions notified via netlink\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -b, --bfd_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for BFD child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
fprintf(stderr, " -x, --snmp Enable SNMP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -A, --snmp-agent-socket=FILE Use the specified socket for master agent\n");
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
fprintf(stderr, " -s, --namespace=NAME Run in network namespace NAME (overrides config)\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -m, --core-dump Produce core dump if terminate abnormally\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -M, --core-dump-pattern=PATN Also set /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern to PATN (default 'core')\n");
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
fprintf(stderr, " -L, --mem-check-log Log malloc/frees to syslog\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -i, --config-id id Skip any configuration lines beginning '@' that don't match id\n"
" or any lines beginning @^ that do match.\n"
" The config-id defaults to the node name if option not used\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --signum=SIGFUNC Return signal number for STOP, RELOAD, DATA, STATS"
#ifdef _WITH_JSON_
", JSON"
#endif
"\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -t, --config-test[=LOG_FILE] Check the configuration for obvious errors, output to\n"
" stderr by default\n");
#ifdef _WITH_PERF_
fprintf(stderr, " --perf[=PERF_TYPE] Collect perf data, PERF_TYPE=all, run(default) or end\n");
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_OPTIONS
fprintf(stderr, " --debug[=...] Enable debug options. p, b, c, v specify parent, bfd, checker and vrrp processes\n");
#ifdef _TIMER_CHECK_
fprintf(stderr, " T - timer debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _SMTP_ALERT_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " M - email alert debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " E - epoll debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_THREAD_DUMP_
fprintf(stderr, " D - epoll thread dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _VRRP_FD_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, " F - vrrp fd dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _REGEX_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " R - regex debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_REGEX_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " X - regex timers\n");
#endif
#ifdef _TSM_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " S - TSM debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _NETLINK_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " N - netlink timer debug\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " Example --debug=TpMEvcp\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -v, --version Display the version number\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -h, --help Display this help message\n");
}
| 168,984 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void nbd_recv_coroutines_enter_all(NBDClientSession *s)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_NBD_REQUESTS; i++) {
qemu_coroutine_enter(s->recv_coroutine[i]);
qemu_coroutine_enter(s->recv_coroutine[i]);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void nbd_recv_coroutines_enter_all(NBDClientSession *s)
static void nbd_recv_coroutines_enter_all(BlockDriverState *bs)
{
NBDClientSession *s = nbd_get_client_session(bs);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_NBD_REQUESTS; i++) {
qemu_coroutine_enter(s->recv_coroutine[i]);
qemu_coroutine_enter(s->recv_coroutine[i]);
}
}
| 165,449 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
return 0;
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .Xauthority in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: replace copy_file with copy_file_as_user
CWE ID: CWE-269 | static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
return 0;
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
| 170,095 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAMRNBEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
formatParams->eEncoding =
(formatParams->nPortIndex == 0)
? OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM : OMX_AUDIO_CodingAMR;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAmr:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *amrParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *)params;
if (amrParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
amrParams->nChannels = 1;
amrParams->nBitRate = mBitRate;
amrParams->eAMRBandMode = (OMX_AUDIO_AMRBANDMODETYPE)(mMode + 1);
amrParams->eAMRDTXMode = OMX_AUDIO_AMRDTXModeOff;
amrParams->eAMRFrameFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AMRFrameFormatFSF;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelCF;
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = kSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAMRNBEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(formatParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
formatParams->eEncoding =
(formatParams->nPortIndex == 0)
? OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM : OMX_AUDIO_CodingAMR;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAmr:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *amrParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(amrParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (amrParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
amrParams->nChannels = 1;
amrParams->nBitRate = mBitRate;
amrParams->eAMRBandMode = (OMX_AUDIO_AMRBANDMODETYPE)(mMode + 1);
amrParams->eAMRDTXMode = OMX_AUDIO_AMRDTXModeOff;
amrParams->eAMRFrameFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AMRFrameFormatFSF;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelCF;
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = kSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,194 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jpc_siz_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->caps) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->width) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->height) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->xoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->yoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilewidth) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileheight) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilexoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileyoff) ||
jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->numcomps)) {
return -1;
}
if (!siz->width || !siz->height || !siz->tilewidth ||
!siz->tileheight || !siz->numcomps || siz->numcomps > 16384) {
return -1;
}
if (!(siz->comps = jas_alloc2(siz->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_sizcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].hsamp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].vsamp)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].hsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].hsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid XRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].hsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].vsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].vsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid YRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].vsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
siz->comps[i].sgnd = (tmp >> 7) & 1;
siz->comps[i].prec = (tmp & 0x7f) + 1;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Ensure that not all tiles lie outside the image area.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int jpc_siz_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->caps) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->width) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->height) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->xoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->yoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilewidth) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileheight) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilexoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileyoff) ||
jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->numcomps)) {
return -1;
}
if (!siz->width || !siz->height || !siz->tilewidth ||
!siz->tileheight || !siz->numcomps || siz->numcomps > 16384) {
return -1;
}
if (siz->tilexoff >= siz->width || siz->tileyoff >= siz->height) {
jas_eprintf("all tiles are outside the image area\n");
return -1;
}
if (!(siz->comps = jas_alloc2(siz->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_sizcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].hsamp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].vsamp)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].hsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].hsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid XRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].hsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].vsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].vsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid YRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].vsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
siz->comps[i].sgnd = (tmp >> 7) & 1;
siz->comps[i].prec = (tmp & 0x7f) + 1;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,736 |
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