instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void nfs4_close_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata = data;
struct nfs4_state *state = calldata->state;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(calldata->inode);
if (RPC_ASSASSINATED(task))
return;
/* hmm. we are done with the inode, and in the process of freeing
* the state_owner. we keep this around to process errors
*/
switch (task->tk_status) {
case 0:
nfs_set_open_stateid(state, &calldata->res.stateid, 0);
renew_lease(server, calldata->timestamp);
break;
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED:
if (calldata->arg.open_flags == 0)
break;
default:
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, server, state) == -EAGAIN) {
rpc_restart_call(task);
return;
}
}
nfs_refresh_inode(calldata->inode, calldata->res.fattr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | static void nfs4_close_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata = data;
struct nfs4_state *state = calldata->state;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(calldata->inode);
if (RPC_ASSASSINATED(task))
return;
/* hmm. we are done with the inode, and in the process of freeing
* the state_owner. we keep this around to process errors
*/
switch (task->tk_status) {
case 0:
nfs_set_open_stateid(state, &calldata->res.stateid, 0);
renew_lease(server, calldata->timestamp);
break;
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED:
if (calldata->arg.fmode == 0)
break;
default:
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, server, state) == -EAGAIN) {
rpc_restart_call(task);
return;
}
}
nfs_refresh_inode(calldata->inode, calldata->res.fattr);
}
| 165,689 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fwrite)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char *str;
int str_len;
long length = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|l", &str, &str_len, &length) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() > 1) {
str_len = MAX(0, MIN(length, str_len));
}
if (!str_len) {
RETURN_LONG(0);
}
RETURN_LONG(php_stream_write(intern->u.file.stream, str, str_len));
} /* }}} */
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fread)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
long length = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &length) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (length <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Length parameter must be greater than 0");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value) = emalloc(length + 1);
Z_STRLEN_P(return_value) = php_stream_read(intern->u.file.stream, Z_STRVAL_P(return_value), length);
/* needed because recv/read/gzread doesnt put a null at the end*/
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value)[Z_STRLEN_P(return_value)] = 0;
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_STRING;
}
/* {{{ proto bool SplFileObject::fstat()
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fwrite)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char *str;
int str_len;
long length = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|l", &str, &str_len, &length) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() > 1) {
str_len = MAX(0, MIN(length, str_len));
}
if (!str_len) {
RETURN_LONG(0);
}
RETURN_LONG(php_stream_write(intern->u.file.stream, str, str_len));
} /* }}} */
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fread)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
long length = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &length) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (length <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Length parameter must be greater than 0");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (length > INT_MAX) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Length parameter must be no more than %d", INT_MAX);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value) = emalloc(length + 1);
Z_STRLEN_P(return_value) = php_stream_read(intern->u.file.stream, Z_STRVAL_P(return_value), length);
/* needed because recv/read/gzread doesnt put a null at the end*/
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value)[Z_STRLEN_P(return_value)] = 0;
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_STRING;
}
/* {{{ proto bool SplFileObject::fstat()
| 167,066 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool getCoverageFormat4(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kSegCountOffset = 6;
const size_t kEndCountOffset = 14;
const size_t kHeaderSize = 16;
const size_t kSegmentSize = 8; // total size of array elements for one segment
if (kEndCountOffset > size) {
return false;
}
size_t segCount = readU16(data, kSegCountOffset) >> 1;
if (kHeaderSize + segCount * kSegmentSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < segCount; i++) {
uint32_t end = readU16(data, kEndCountOffset + 2 * i);
uint32_t start = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (segCount + i));
if (end < start) {
return false;
}
uint32_t rangeOffset = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (3 * segCount + i));
if (rangeOffset == 0) {
uint32_t delta = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (2 * segCount + i));
if (((end + delta) & 0xffff) > end - start) {
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1);
} else {
for (uint32_t j = start; j < end + 1; j++) {
if (((j + delta) & 0xffff) != 0) {
addRange(coverage, j, j + 1);
}
}
}
} else {
for (uint32_t j = start; j < end + 1; j++) {
uint32_t actualRangeOffset = kHeaderSize + 6 * segCount + rangeOffset +
(i + j - start) * 2;
if (actualRangeOffset + 2 > size) {
continue;
}
uint32_t glyphId = readU16(data, actualRangeOffset);
if (glyphId != 0) {
addRange(coverage, j, j + 1);
}
}
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add error logging on invalid cmap - DO NOT MERGE
This patch logs instances of fonts with invalid cmap tables.
Bug: 25645298
Bug: 26413177
Change-Id: I183985e9784a97a2b4307a22e036382b1fc90e5e
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static bool getCoverageFormat4(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kSegCountOffset = 6;
const size_t kEndCountOffset = 14;
const size_t kHeaderSize = 16;
const size_t kSegmentSize = 8; // total size of array elements for one segment
if (kEndCountOffset > size) {
return false;
}
size_t segCount = readU16(data, kSegCountOffset) >> 1;
if (kHeaderSize + segCount * kSegmentSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < segCount; i++) {
uint32_t end = readU16(data, kEndCountOffset + 2 * i);
uint32_t start = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (segCount + i));
if (end < start) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26413177");
return false;
}
uint32_t rangeOffset = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (3 * segCount + i));
if (rangeOffset == 0) {
uint32_t delta = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (2 * segCount + i));
if (((end + delta) & 0xffff) > end - start) {
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1);
} else {
for (uint32_t j = start; j < end + 1; j++) {
if (((j + delta) & 0xffff) != 0) {
addRange(coverage, j, j + 1);
}
}
}
} else {
for (uint32_t j = start; j < end + 1; j++) {
uint32_t actualRangeOffset = kHeaderSize + 6 * segCount + rangeOffset +
(i + j - start) * 2;
if (actualRangeOffset + 2 > size) {
continue;
}
uint32_t glyphId = readU16(data, actualRangeOffset);
if (glyphId != 0) {
addRange(coverage, j, j + 1);
}
}
}
}
return true;
}
| 173,896 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CloudPolicySubsystem::StopAutoRetry() {
cloud_policy_controller_->StopAutoRetry();
device_token_fetcher_->StopAutoRetry();
data_store_->Reset();
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void CloudPolicySubsystem::StopAutoRetry() {
void CloudPolicySubsystem::Reset() {
data_store_->Reset();
cloud_policy_cache_->Reset();
cloud_policy_controller_->Reset();
device_token_fetcher_->Reset();
}
| 170,283 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CancelHandwriting(int n_strokes) {
IBusInputContext* context = GetInputContext(input_context_path_, ibus_);
if (!context) {
return;
}
ibus_input_context_cancel_hand_writing(context, n_strokes);
g_object_unref(context);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void CancelHandwriting(int n_strokes) {
// IBusController override.
virtual void CancelHandwriting(int n_strokes) {
IBusInputContext* context = GetInputContext(input_context_path_, ibus_);
if (!context) {
return;
}
ibus_input_context_cancel_hand_writing(context, n_strokes);
g_object_unref(context);
}
| 170,518 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static sk_sp<SkImage> premulSkImageToUnPremul(SkImage* input) {
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::Make(input->width(), input->height(),
kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!dstPixels)
return nullptr;
return newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<size_t>(input->width()) * info.bytesPerPixel());
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static sk_sp<SkImage> premulSkImageToUnPremul(SkImage* input) {
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::Make(input->width(), input->height(),
kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!dstPixels)
return nullptr;
return newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<unsigned>(input->width()) * info.bytesPerPixel());
}
| 172,504 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long ContentEncoding::ParseContentEncAESSettingsEntry(
long long start, long long size, IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentEncAESSettings* aes) {
assert(pReader);
assert(aes);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x7E8) {
aes->cipher_mode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (aes->cipher_mode != 1)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long ContentEncoding::ParseContentEncAESSettingsEntry(
long long start, long long size, IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentEncAESSettings* aes) {
assert(pReader);
assert(aes);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x7E8) {
aes->cipher_mode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (aes->cipher_mode != 1)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
return 0;
}
| 173,849 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev1_attrmap_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, const u_char *ep,
const struct attrmap *map, size_t nmap)
{
int totlen;
uint32_t t, v;
if (p[0] & 0x80)
totlen = 4;
else
totlen = 4 + EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (ep < p + totlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|attr]"));
return ep + 1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
t = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[0]) & 0x7fff;
if (map && t < nmap && map[t].type)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=%s ", map[t].type));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=#%d ", t));
if (p[0] & 0x80) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"value="));
v = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (map && t < nmap && v < map[t].nvalue && map[t].value[v])
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s", map[t].value[v]));
else
rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[2], 2);
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"len=%d value=", EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2])));
rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[4], EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
return p + totlen;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13039/IKEv1: Do more bounds checking.
Have ikev1_attrmap_print() and ikev1_attr_print() do full bounds
checking, and return null on a bounds overflow. Have their callers
check for a null return.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev1_attrmap_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, const u_char *ep2,
const struct attrmap *map, size_t nmap)
{
int totlen;
uint32_t t, v;
ND_TCHECK(p[0]);
if (p[0] & 0x80)
totlen = 4;
else {
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&p[2]);
totlen = 4 + EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
}
if (ep2 < p + totlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|attr]"));
return ep2 + 1;
}
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&p[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
t = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[0]) & 0x7fff;
if (map && t < nmap && map[t].type)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=%s ", map[t].type));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=#%d ", t));
if (p[0] & 0x80) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"value="));
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&p[2]);
v = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (map && t < nmap && v < map[t].nvalue && map[t].value[v])
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s", map[t].value[v]));
else {
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[2], 2)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
goto trunc;
}
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"len=%d value=", totlen - 4));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[4], totlen - 4)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
goto trunc;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
return p + totlen;
trunc:
return NULL;
}
| 167,840 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _pango_emoji_iter_next (PangoEmojiIter *iter)
{
PangoEmojiType current_emoji_type = PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_INVALID;
if (iter->end == iter->text_end)
return FALSE;
iter->start = iter->end;
for (; iter->end < iter->text_end; iter->end = g_utf8_next_char (iter->end))
{
gunichar ch = g_utf8_get_char (iter->end);
/* Except at the beginning, ZWJ just carries over the emoji or neutral
* text type, VS15 & VS16 we just carry over as well, since we already
* resolved those through lookahead. Also, don't downgrade to text
* presentation for emoji that are part of a ZWJ sequence, example
* U+1F441 U+200D U+1F5E8, eye (text presentation) + ZWJ + left speech
* bubble, see below. */
if ((!(ch == kZeroWidthJoinerCharacter && !iter->is_emoji) &&
ch != kVariationSelector15Character &&
ch != kVariationSelector16Character &&
ch != kCombiningEnclosingCircleBackslashCharacter &&
!_pango_Is_Regional_Indicator(ch) &&
!((ch == kLeftSpeechBubbleCharacter ||
ch == kRainbowCharacter ||
ch == kMaleSignCharacter ||
ch == kFemaleSignCharacter ||
ch == kStaffOfAesculapiusCharacter) &&
!iter->is_emoji)) ||
current_emoji_type == PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_INVALID) {
current_emoji_type = _pango_get_emoji_type (ch);
}
if (g_utf8_next_char (iter->end) < iter->text_end) /* Optimize. */
{
gunichar peek_char = g_utf8_get_char (g_utf8_next_char (iter->end));
/* Variation Selectors */
if (current_emoji_type ==
PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_EMOJI_EMOJI &&
peek_char == kVariationSelector15Character) {
current_emoji_type = PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_EMOJI_TEXT;
}
if ((current_emoji_type ==
PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_EMOJI_TEXT ||
_pango_Is_Emoji_Keycap_Base(ch)) &&
peek_char == kVariationSelector16Character) {
current_emoji_type = PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_EMOJI_EMOJI;
}
/* Combining characters Keycap... */
if (_pango_Is_Emoji_Keycap_Base(ch) &&
peek_char == kCombiningEnclosingKeycapCharacter) {
current_emoji_type = PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_EMOJI_EMOJI;
};
/* Regional indicators */
if (_pango_Is_Regional_Indicator(ch) &&
_pango_Is_Regional_Indicator(peek_char)) {
current_emoji_type = PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_EMOJI_EMOJI;
}
/* Upgrade text presentation emoji to emoji presentation when followed by
* ZWJ, Example U+1F441 U+200D U+1F5E8, eye + ZWJ + left speech bubble. */
if ((ch == kEyeCharacter ||
ch == kWavingWhiteFlagCharacter) &&
peek_char == kZeroWidthJoinerCharacter) {
current_emoji_type = PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_EMOJI_EMOJI;
}
}
if (iter->is_emoji == (gboolean) 2)
iter->is_emoji = !PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_IS_EMOJI (current_emoji_type);
if (iter->is_emoji == PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_IS_EMOJI (current_emoji_type))
{
iter->is_emoji = !PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_IS_EMOJI (current_emoji_type);
return TRUE;
}
}
iter->is_emoji = PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_IS_EMOJI (current_emoji_type);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Prevent an assertion with invalid Unicode sequences
Invalid Unicode sequences, such as 0x2665 0xfe0e 0xfe0f,
can trick the Emoji iter code into returning an empty
segment, which then triggers an assertion in the itemizer.
Prevent this by ensuring that we make progress.
This issue was reported by Jeffrey M.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | _pango_emoji_iter_next (PangoEmojiIter *iter)
{
PangoEmojiType current_emoji_type = PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_INVALID;
if (iter->end == iter->text_end)
return FALSE;
iter->start = iter->end;
for (; iter->end < iter->text_end; iter->end = g_utf8_next_char (iter->end))
{
gunichar ch = g_utf8_get_char (iter->end);
/* Except at the beginning, ZWJ just carries over the emoji or neutral
* text type, VS15 & VS16 we just carry over as well, since we already
* resolved those through lookahead. Also, don't downgrade to text
* presentation for emoji that are part of a ZWJ sequence, example
* U+1F441 U+200D U+1F5E8, eye (text presentation) + ZWJ + left speech
* bubble, see below. */
if ((!(ch == kZeroWidthJoinerCharacter && !iter->is_emoji) &&
ch != kVariationSelector15Character &&
ch != kVariationSelector16Character &&
ch != kCombiningEnclosingCircleBackslashCharacter &&
!_pango_Is_Regional_Indicator(ch) &&
!((ch == kLeftSpeechBubbleCharacter ||
ch == kRainbowCharacter ||
ch == kMaleSignCharacter ||
ch == kFemaleSignCharacter ||
ch == kStaffOfAesculapiusCharacter) &&
!iter->is_emoji)) ||
current_emoji_type == PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_INVALID) {
current_emoji_type = _pango_get_emoji_type (ch);
}
if (g_utf8_next_char (iter->end) < iter->text_end) /* Optimize. */
{
gunichar peek_char = g_utf8_get_char (g_utf8_next_char (iter->end));
/* Variation Selectors */
if (current_emoji_type ==
PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_EMOJI_EMOJI &&
peek_char == kVariationSelector15Character) {
current_emoji_type = PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_EMOJI_TEXT;
}
if ((current_emoji_type ==
PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_EMOJI_TEXT ||
_pango_Is_Emoji_Keycap_Base(ch)) &&
peek_char == kVariationSelector16Character) {
current_emoji_type = PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_EMOJI_EMOJI;
}
/* Combining characters Keycap... */
if (_pango_Is_Emoji_Keycap_Base(ch) &&
peek_char == kCombiningEnclosingKeycapCharacter) {
current_emoji_type = PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_EMOJI_EMOJI;
};
/* Regional indicators */
if (_pango_Is_Regional_Indicator(ch) &&
_pango_Is_Regional_Indicator(peek_char)) {
current_emoji_type = PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_EMOJI_EMOJI;
}
/* Upgrade text presentation emoji to emoji presentation when followed by
* ZWJ, Example U+1F441 U+200D U+1F5E8, eye + ZWJ + left speech bubble. */
if ((ch == kEyeCharacter ||
ch == kWavingWhiteFlagCharacter) &&
peek_char == kZeroWidthJoinerCharacter) {
current_emoji_type = PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_EMOJI_EMOJI;
}
}
if (iter->is_emoji == (gboolean) 2)
iter->is_emoji = !PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_IS_EMOJI (current_emoji_type);
if (iter->is_emoji == PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_IS_EMOJI (current_emoji_type))
{
iter->is_emoji = !PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_IS_EMOJI (current_emoji_type);
/* Make sure we make progress. Weird sequences, like a VC15 followed
* by VC16, can trick us into stalling otherwise. */
if (iter->start == iter->end)
iter->end = g_utf8_next_char (iter->end);
return TRUE;
}
}
iter->is_emoji = PANGO_EMOJI_TYPE_IS_EMOJI (current_emoji_type);
return TRUE;
}
| 169,108 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int accept_server_socket(int s)
{
struct sockaddr_un client_address;
socklen_t clen;
int fd = accept(s, (struct sockaddr*)&client_address, &clen);
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("accepted fd:%d for server fd:%d", fd, s);
return fd;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static inline int accept_server_socket(int s)
{
struct sockaddr_un client_address;
socklen_t clen;
int fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(accept(s, (struct sockaddr*)&client_address, &clen));
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("accepted fd:%d for server fd:%d", fd, s);
return fd;
}
| 173,459 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message,
bool* message_was_ok) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(ChromeRenderMessageFilter, message, *message_was_ok)
#if !defined(DISABLE_NACL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ChromeViewHostMsg_LaunchNaCl, OnLaunchNaCl)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ChromeViewHostMsg_GetReadonlyPnaclFD,
OnGetReadonlyPnaclFd)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ChromeViewHostMsg_NaClCreateTemporaryFile,
OnNaClCreateTemporaryFile)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_DnsPrefetch, OnDnsPrefetch)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_ResourceTypeStats,
OnResourceTypeStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_UpdatedCacheStats,
OnUpdatedCacheStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_FPS, OnFPS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_V8HeapStats, OnV8HeapStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_OpenChannelToExtension,
OnOpenChannelToExtension)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_OpenChannelToTab, OnOpenChannelToTab)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ExtensionHostMsg_GetMessageBundle,
OnGetExtensionMessageBundle)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_AddListener, OnExtensionAddListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_RemoveListener,
OnExtensionRemoveListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_AddLazyListener,
OnExtensionAddLazyListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_RemoveLazyListener,
OnExtensionRemoveLazyListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_AddFilteredListener,
OnExtensionAddFilteredListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_RemoveFilteredListener,
OnExtensionRemoveFilteredListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_CloseChannel, OnExtensionCloseChannel)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_RequestForIOThread,
OnExtensionRequestForIOThread)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_ShouldUnloadAck,
OnExtensionShouldUnloadAck)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_GenerateUniqueID,
OnExtensionGenerateUniqueID)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_UnloadAck, OnExtensionUnloadAck)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_ResumeRequests,
OnExtensionResumeRequests);
#if defined(USE_TCMALLOC)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_WriteTcmallocHeapProfile_ACK,
OnWriteTcmallocHeapProfile)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowDatabase, OnAllowDatabase)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowDOMStorage, OnAllowDOMStorage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowFileSystem, OnAllowFileSystem)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowIndexedDB, OnAllowIndexedDB)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_CanTriggerClipboardRead,
OnCanTriggerClipboardRead)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_CanTriggerClipboardWrite,
OnCanTriggerClipboardWrite)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
#if defined(ENABLE_AUTOMATION)
if ((message.type() == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetCookies::ID ||
message.type() == ChromeViewHostMsg_SetCookie::ID) &&
AutomationResourceMessageFilter::ShouldFilterCookieMessages(
render_process_id_, message.routing_id())) {
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(ChromeRenderMessageFilter, message,
*message_was_ok)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ChromeViewHostMsg_GetCookies,
OnGetCookies)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_SetCookie, OnSetCookie)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
handled = true;
}
#endif
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message,
bool* message_was_ok) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(ChromeRenderMessageFilter, message, *message_was_ok)
#if !defined(DISABLE_NACL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ChromeViewHostMsg_LaunchNaCl, OnLaunchNaCl)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ChromeViewHostMsg_GetReadonlyPnaclFD,
OnGetReadonlyPnaclFd)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ChromeViewHostMsg_NaClCreateTemporaryFile,
OnNaClCreateTemporaryFile)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_DnsPrefetch, OnDnsPrefetch)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_ResourceTypeStats,
OnResourceTypeStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_UpdatedCacheStats,
OnUpdatedCacheStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_FPS, OnFPS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_V8HeapStats, OnV8HeapStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_OpenChannelToExtension,
OnOpenChannelToExtension)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_OpenChannelToTab, OnOpenChannelToTab)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ExtensionHostMsg_GetMessageBundle,
OnGetExtensionMessageBundle)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_AddListener, OnExtensionAddListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_RemoveListener,
OnExtensionRemoveListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_AddLazyListener,
OnExtensionAddLazyListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_RemoveLazyListener,
OnExtensionRemoveLazyListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_AddFilteredListener,
OnExtensionAddFilteredListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_RemoveFilteredListener,
OnExtensionRemoveFilteredListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_CloseChannel, OnExtensionCloseChannel)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_RequestForIOThread,
OnExtensionRequestForIOThread)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_ShouldUnloadAck,
OnExtensionShouldUnloadAck)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_GenerateUniqueID,
OnExtensionGenerateUniqueID)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_UnloadAck, OnExtensionUnloadAck)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_ResumeRequests,
OnExtensionResumeRequests);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowDatabase, OnAllowDatabase)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowDOMStorage, OnAllowDOMStorage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowFileSystem, OnAllowFileSystem)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowIndexedDB, OnAllowIndexedDB)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_CanTriggerClipboardRead,
OnCanTriggerClipboardRead)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_CanTriggerClipboardWrite,
OnCanTriggerClipboardWrite)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
#if defined(ENABLE_AUTOMATION)
if ((message.type() == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetCookies::ID ||
message.type() == ChromeViewHostMsg_SetCookie::ID) &&
AutomationResourceMessageFilter::ShouldFilterCookieMessages(
render_process_id_, message.routing_id())) {
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(ChromeRenderMessageFilter, message,
*message_was_ok)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ChromeViewHostMsg_GetCookies,
OnGetCookies)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_SetCookie, OnSetCookie)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
handled = true;
}
#endif
return handled;
}
| 170,663 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mb_ereg_search_init)
{
size_t argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
zval *arg_str;
char *arg_pattern = NULL, *arg_options = NULL;
int arg_pattern_len = 0, arg_options_len = 0;
OnigSyntaxType *syntax = NULL;
OnigOptionType option;
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "z|ss", &arg_str, &arg_pattern, &arg_pattern_len, &arg_options, &arg_options_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (argc > 1 && arg_pattern_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty pattern");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
option = MBREX(regex_default_options);
syntax = MBREX(regex_default_syntax);
if (argc == 3) {
option = 0;
_php_mb_regex_init_options(arg_options, arg_options_len, &option, &syntax, NULL);
}
if (argc > 1) {
/* create regex pattern buffer */
if ((MBREX(search_re) = php_mbregex_compile_pattern(arg_pattern, arg_pattern_len, option, MBREX(current_mbctype), syntax TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (MBREX(search_str) != NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&MBREX(search_str));
MBREX(search_str) = (zval *)NULL;
}
MBREX(search_str) = arg_str;
Z_ADDREF_P(MBREX(search_str));
SEPARATE_ZVAL_IF_NOT_REF(&MBREX(search_str));
MBREX(search_pos) = 0;
if (MBREX(search_regs) != NULL) {
onig_region_free(MBREX(search_regs), 1);
MBREX(search_regs) = (OnigRegion *) NULL;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415 | PHP_FUNCTION(mb_ereg_search_init)
{
size_t argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
zval *arg_str;
char *arg_pattern = NULL, *arg_options = NULL;
int arg_pattern_len = 0, arg_options_len = 0;
OnigSyntaxType *syntax = NULL;
OnigOptionType option;
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "z|ss", &arg_str, &arg_pattern, &arg_pattern_len, &arg_options, &arg_options_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (argc > 1 && arg_pattern_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty pattern");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
option = MBREX(regex_default_options);
syntax = MBREX(regex_default_syntax);
if (argc == 3) {
option = 0;
_php_mb_regex_init_options(arg_options, arg_options_len, &option, &syntax, NULL);
}
if (argc > 1) {
/* create regex pattern buffer */
if ((MBREX(search_re) = php_mbregex_compile_pattern(arg_pattern, arg_pattern_len, option, MBREX(current_mbctype), syntax TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (MBREX(search_str) != NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&MBREX(search_str));
MBREX(search_str) = (zval *)NULL;
}
MBREX(search_str) = arg_str;
Z_ADDREF_P(MBREX(search_str));
SEPARATE_ZVAL_IF_NOT_REF(&MBREX(search_str));
MBREX(search_pos) = 0;
if (MBREX(search_regs) != NULL) {
onig_region_free(MBREX(search_regs), 1);
MBREX(search_regs) = (OnigRegion *) NULL;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
| 167,116 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int mailimf_group_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx,
struct mailimf_group ** result)
{
size_t cur_token;
char * display_name;
struct mailimf_mailbox_list * mailbox_list;
struct mailimf_group * group;
int r;
int res;
cur_token = * indx;
mailbox_list = NULL;
r = mailimf_display_name_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &display_name);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_display_name;
}
r = mailimf_mailbox_list_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &mailbox_list);
switch (r) {
case MAILIMF_NO_ERROR:
break;
case MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE:
r = mailimf_cfws_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if ((r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) && (r != MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE)) {
res = r;
goto free_display_name;
}
break;
default:
res = r;
goto free_display_name;
}
r = mailimf_semi_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_mailbox_list;
}
group = mailimf_group_new(display_name, mailbox_list);
if (group == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_mailbox_list;
}
* indx = cur_token;
* result = group;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
free_mailbox_list:
if (mailbox_list != NULL) {
mailimf_mailbox_list_free(mailbox_list);
}
free_display_name:
mailimf_display_name_free(display_name);
err:
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int mailimf_group_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx,
struct mailimf_group ** result)
{
size_t cur_token;
char * display_name;
struct mailimf_mailbox_list * mailbox_list;
struct mailimf_group * group;
int r;
int res;
clist * list;
cur_token = * indx;
mailbox_list = NULL;
r = mailimf_display_name_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &display_name);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_display_name;
}
r = mailimf_mailbox_list_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &mailbox_list);
switch (r) {
case MAILIMF_NO_ERROR:
break;
case MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE:
r = mailimf_cfws_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if ((r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) && (r != MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE)) {
res = r;
goto free_display_name;
}
list = clist_new();
if (list == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_display_name;
}
mailbox_list = mailimf_mailbox_list_new(list);
if (mailbox_list == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
clist_free(list);
goto free_display_name;
}
break;
default:
res = r;
goto free_display_name;
}
r = mailimf_semi_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_mailbox_list;
}
group = mailimf_group_new(display_name, mailbox_list);
if (group == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_mailbox_list;
}
* indx = cur_token;
* result = group;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
free_mailbox_list:
if (mailbox_list != NULL) {
mailimf_mailbox_list_free(mailbox_list);
}
free_display_name:
mailimf_display_name_free(display_name);
err:
return res;
}
| 168,192 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppControllerImpl::OnAppUpdate(const apps::AppUpdate& update) {
if (!update.StateIsNull() && !update.NameChanged() &&
!update.ReadinessChanged()) {
return;
}
if (client_) {
client_->OnAppChanged(CreateAppPtr(update));
}
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void AppControllerImpl::OnAppUpdate(const apps::AppUpdate& update) {
void AppControllerService::OnAppUpdate(const apps::AppUpdate& update) {
if (!update.StateIsNull() && !update.NameChanged() &&
!update.ReadinessChanged()) {
return;
}
if (client_) {
client_->OnAppChanged(CreateAppPtr(update));
}
}
| 172,087 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_gray_to_rgb_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) == 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_gray_to_rgb_add(image_transform *this,
const image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) == 0;
}
| 173,635 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
struct mschm_decompressor *chmd;
struct mschmd_header *chm;
struct mschmd_file *file, **f;
unsigned int numf, i;
setbuf(stdout, NULL);
setbuf(stderr, NULL);
user_umask = umask(0); umask(user_umask);
MSPACK_SYS_SELFTEST(i);
if (i) return 0;
if ((chmd = mspack_create_chm_decompressor(NULL))) {
for (argv++; *argv; argv++) {
printf("%s\n", *argv);
if ((chm = chmd->open(chmd, *argv))) {
/* build an ordered list of files for maximum extraction speed */
for (numf=0, file=chm->files; file; file = file->next) numf++;
if ((f = (struct mschmd_file **) calloc(numf, sizeof(struct mschmd_file *)))) {
for (i=0, file=chm->files; file; file = file->next) f[i++] = file;
qsort(f, numf, sizeof(struct mschmd_file *), &sortfunc);
for (i = 0; i < numf; i++) {
char *outname = create_output_name((unsigned char *)f[i]->filename,NULL,0,1,0);
printf("Extracting %s\n", outname);
ensure_filepath(outname);
if (chmd->extract(chmd, f[i], outname)) {
printf("%s: extract error on \"%s\": %s\n",
*argv, f[i]->filename, ERROR(chmd));
}
free(outname);
}
free(f);
}
chmd->close(chmd, chm);
}
else {
printf("%s: can't open -- %s\n", *argv, ERROR(chmd));
}
}
mspack_destroy_chm_decompressor(chmd);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: add anti "../" and leading slash protection to chmextract
CWE ID: CWE-22 | int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
struct mschm_decompressor *chmd;
struct mschmd_header *chm;
struct mschmd_file *file, **f;
unsigned int numf, i;
setbuf(stdout, NULL);
setbuf(stderr, NULL);
user_umask = umask(0); umask(user_umask);
MSPACK_SYS_SELFTEST(i);
if (i) return 0;
if ((chmd = mspack_create_chm_decompressor(NULL))) {
for (argv++; *argv; argv++) {
printf("%s\n", *argv);
if ((chm = chmd->open(chmd, *argv))) {
/* build an ordered list of files for maximum extraction speed */
for (numf=0, file=chm->files; file; file = file->next) numf++;
if ((f = (struct mschmd_file **) calloc(numf, sizeof(struct mschmd_file *)))) {
for (i=0, file=chm->files; file; file = file->next) f[i++] = file;
qsort(f, numf, sizeof(struct mschmd_file *), &sortfunc);
for (i = 0; i < numf; i++) {
char *outname = create_output_name(f[i]->filename);
printf("Extracting %s\n", outname);
ensure_filepath(outname);
if (chmd->extract(chmd, f[i], outname)) {
printf("%s: extract error on \"%s\": %s\n",
*argv, f[i]->filename, ERROR(chmd));
}
free(outname);
}
free(f);
}
chmd->close(chmd, chm);
}
else {
printf("%s: can't open -- %s\n", *argv, ERROR(chmd));
}
}
mspack_destroy_chm_decompressor(chmd);
}
return 0;
}
| 169,002 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (!ShouldAllowSession(session))
return false;
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(
GetId(),
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->devtools_frame_token()
: base::UnguessableToken(),
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(
session->client()->MayAttachToBrowser()
? protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kRegular
: protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kAutoAttachOnly,
GetId(), GetRendererChannel(), session->GetRootSession())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(
emulation_handler, session->client()->MayAffectLocalFiles())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (!frame_tree_node_ || !frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(
new protocol::TracingHandler(frame_tree_node_, GetIOContext())));
}
if (sessions().empty()) {
bool use_video_capture_api = true;
#ifdef OS_ANDROID
if (!CompositorImpl::IsInitialized())
use_video_capture_api = false;
#endif
if (!use_video_capture_api)
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Guard DOM.setFileInputFiles under MayAffectLocalFiles
Bug: 805557
Change-Id: Ib6f37ec6e1d091ee54621cc0c5c44f1a6beab10f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1334847
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607902}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (!ShouldAllowSession(session))
return false;
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(
new protocol::DOMHandler(session->client()->MayAffectLocalFiles())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(
GetId(),
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->devtools_frame_token()
: base::UnguessableToken(),
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(
session->client()->MayAttachToBrowser()
? protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kRegular
: protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kAutoAttachOnly,
GetId(), GetRendererChannel(), session->GetRootSession())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(
emulation_handler, session->client()->MayAffectLocalFiles())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (!frame_tree_node_ || !frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(
new protocol::TracingHandler(frame_tree_node_, GetIOContext())));
}
if (sessions().empty()) {
bool use_video_capture_api = true;
#ifdef OS_ANDROID
if (!CompositorImpl::IsInitialized())
use_video_capture_api = false;
#endif
if (!use_video_capture_api)
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
return true;
}
| 173,114 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SubpelVarianceTest<vp9_subp_avg_variance_fn_t>::RefTest() {
for (int x = 0; x < 16; ++x) {
for (int y = 0; y < 16; ++y) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
src_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
sec_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1; j++) {
ref_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
unsigned int var1;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var1 = subpel_variance_(ref_, width_ + 1, x, y,
src_, width_, &sse1, sec_));
const unsigned int var2 = subpel_avg_variance_ref(ref_, src_, sec_,
log2width_, log2height_,
x, y, &sse2);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
EXPECT_EQ(var1, var2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void SubpelVarianceTest<vp9_subp_avg_variance_fn_t>::RefTest() {
void SubpelVarianceTest<SubpixAvgVarMxNFunc>::RefTest() {
for (int x = 0; x < 8; ++x) {
for (int y = 0; y < 8; ++y) {
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
src_[j] = rnd_.Rand8();
sec_[j] = rnd_.Rand8();
}
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1; j++) {
ref_[j] = rnd_.Rand8();
}
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src_)[j] = rnd_.Rand16() & mask_;
CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(sec_)[j] = rnd_.Rand16() & mask_;
}
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1; j++) {
CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref_)[j] = rnd_.Rand16() & mask_;
}
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
unsigned int var1;
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
var1 = subpel_variance_(ref_, width_ + 1, x, y,
src_, width_, &sse1, sec_));
const unsigned int var2 = subpel_avg_variance_ref(ref_, src_, sec_,
log2width_, log2height_,
x, y, &sse2,
use_high_bit_depth_,
bit_depth_);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
EXPECT_EQ(var1, var2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
}
}
}
| 174,588 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int logi_dj_ll_raw_request(struct hid_device *hid,
unsigned char reportnum, __u8 *buf,
size_t count, unsigned char report_type,
int reqtype)
{
struct dj_device *djdev = hid->driver_data;
struct dj_receiver_dev *djrcv_dev = djdev->dj_receiver_dev;
u8 *out_buf;
int ret;
if (buf[0] != REPORT_TYPE_LEDS)
return -EINVAL;
out_buf = kzalloc(DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!out_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
if (count < DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 2)
count = DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 2;
out_buf[0] = REPORT_ID_DJ_SHORT;
out_buf[1] = djdev->device_index;
memcpy(out_buf + 2, buf, count);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(djrcv_dev->hdev, out_buf[0], out_buf,
DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, report_type, reqtype);
kfree(out_buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: HID: logitech: fix bounds checking on LED report size
The check on report size for REPORT_TYPE_LEDS in logi_dj_ll_raw_request()
is wrong; the current check doesn't make any sense -- the report allocated
by HID core in hid_hw_raw_request() can be much larger than
DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, and currently logi_dj_ll_raw_request() doesn't
handle this properly at all.
Fix the check by actually trimming down the report size properly if it is
too large.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int logi_dj_ll_raw_request(struct hid_device *hid,
unsigned char reportnum, __u8 *buf,
size_t count, unsigned char report_type,
int reqtype)
{
struct dj_device *djdev = hid->driver_data;
struct dj_receiver_dev *djrcv_dev = djdev->dj_receiver_dev;
u8 *out_buf;
int ret;
if (buf[0] != REPORT_TYPE_LEDS)
return -EINVAL;
out_buf = kzalloc(DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!out_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
if (count > DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 2)
count = DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 2;
out_buf[0] = REPORT_ID_DJ_SHORT;
out_buf[1] = djdev->device_index;
memcpy(out_buf + 2, buf, count);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(djrcv_dev->hdev, out_buf[0], out_buf,
DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, report_type, reqtype);
kfree(out_buf);
return ret;
}
| 166,376 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: lha_read_file_header_1(struct archive_read *a, struct lha *lha)
{
const unsigned char *p;
size_t extdsize;
int i, err, err2;
int namelen, padding;
unsigned char headersum, sum_calculated;
err = ARCHIVE_OK;
if ((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, H1_FIXED_SIZE, NULL)) == NULL)
return (truncated_error(a));
lha->header_size = p[H1_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET] + 2;
headersum = p[H1_HEADER_SUM_OFFSET];
/* Note: An extended header size is included in a compsize. */
lha->compsize = archive_le32dec(p + H1_COMP_SIZE_OFFSET);
lha->origsize = archive_le32dec(p + H1_ORIG_SIZE_OFFSET);
lha->mtime = lha_dos_time(p + H1_DOS_TIME_OFFSET);
namelen = p[H1_NAME_LEN_OFFSET];
/* Calculate a padding size. The result will be normally 0 only(?) */
padding = ((int)lha->header_size) - H1_FIXED_SIZE - namelen;
if (namelen > 230 || padding < 0)
goto invalid;
if ((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, lha->header_size, NULL)) == NULL)
return (truncated_error(a));
for (i = 0; i < namelen; i++) {
if (p[i + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET] == 0xff)
goto invalid;/* Invalid filename. */
}
archive_strncpy(&lha->filename, p + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET, namelen);
lha->crc = archive_le16dec(p + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET + namelen);
lha->setflag |= CRC_IS_SET;
sum_calculated = lha_calcsum(0, p, 2, lha->header_size - 2);
/* Consume used bytes but not include `next header size' data
* since it will be consumed in lha_read_file_extended_header(). */
__archive_read_consume(a, lha->header_size - 2);
/* Read extended headers */
err2 = lha_read_file_extended_header(a, lha, NULL, 2,
(size_t)(lha->compsize + 2), &extdsize);
if (err2 < ARCHIVE_WARN)
return (err2);
if (err2 < err)
err = err2;
/* Get a real compressed file size. */
lha->compsize -= extdsize - 2;
if (sum_calculated != headersum) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"LHa header sum error");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
return (err);
invalid:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid LHa header");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
Commit Message: Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169
CWE ID: CWE-125 | lha_read_file_header_1(struct archive_read *a, struct lha *lha)
{
const unsigned char *p;
size_t extdsize;
int i, err, err2;
int namelen, padding;
unsigned char headersum, sum_calculated;
err = ARCHIVE_OK;
if ((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, H1_FIXED_SIZE, NULL)) == NULL)
return (truncated_error(a));
lha->header_size = p[H1_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET] + 2;
headersum = p[H1_HEADER_SUM_OFFSET];
/* Note: An extended header size is included in a compsize. */
lha->compsize = archive_le32dec(p + H1_COMP_SIZE_OFFSET);
lha->origsize = archive_le32dec(p + H1_ORIG_SIZE_OFFSET);
lha->mtime = lha_dos_time(p + H1_DOS_TIME_OFFSET);
namelen = p[H1_NAME_LEN_OFFSET];
/* Calculate a padding size. The result will be normally 0 only(?) */
padding = ((int)lha->header_size) - H1_FIXED_SIZE - namelen;
if (namelen > 230 || padding < 0)
goto invalid;
if ((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, lha->header_size, NULL)) == NULL)
return (truncated_error(a));
for (i = 0; i < namelen; i++) {
if (p[i + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET] == 0xff)
goto invalid;/* Invalid filename. */
}
archive_strncpy(&lha->filename, p + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET, namelen);
lha->crc = archive_le16dec(p + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET + namelen);
lha->setflag |= CRC_IS_SET;
sum_calculated = lha_calcsum(0, p, 2, lha->header_size - 2);
/* Consume used bytes but not include `next header size' data
* since it will be consumed in lha_read_file_extended_header(). */
__archive_read_consume(a, lha->header_size - 2);
/* Read extended headers */
err2 = lha_read_file_extended_header(a, lha, NULL, 2,
(size_t)(lha->compsize + 2), &extdsize);
if (err2 < ARCHIVE_WARN)
return (err2);
if (err2 < err)
err = err2;
/* Get a real compressed file size. */
lha->compsize -= extdsize - 2;
if (lha->compsize < 0)
goto invalid; /* Invalid compressed file size */
if (sum_calculated != headersum) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"LHa header sum error");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
return (err);
invalid:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid LHa header");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
| 168,381 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: x86_reg X86_insn_reg_intel(unsigned int id, enum cs_ac_type *access)
{
unsigned int first = 0;
unsigned int last = ARR_SIZE(insn_regs_intel) - 1;
unsigned int mid = ARR_SIZE(insn_regs_intel) / 2;
if (!intel_regs_sorted) {
memcpy(insn_regs_intel_sorted, insn_regs_intel,
sizeof(insn_regs_intel_sorted));
qsort(insn_regs_intel_sorted,
ARR_SIZE(insn_regs_intel_sorted),
sizeof(struct insn_reg), regs_cmp);
intel_regs_sorted = true;
}
while (first <= last) {
if (insn_regs_intel_sorted[mid].insn < id) {
first = mid + 1;
} else if (insn_regs_intel_sorted[mid].insn == id) {
if (access) {
*access = insn_regs_intel_sorted[mid].access;
}
return insn_regs_intel_sorted[mid].reg;
} else {
if (mid == 0)
break;
last = mid - 1;
}
mid = (first + last) / 2;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: x86: fast path checking for X86_insn_reg_intel()
CWE ID: CWE-125 | x86_reg X86_insn_reg_intel(unsigned int id, enum cs_ac_type *access)
{
static bool intel_regs_sorted = false;
unsigned int first = 0;
unsigned int last = ARR_SIZE(insn_regs_intel) - 1;
unsigned int mid;
if (!intel_regs_sorted) {
memcpy(insn_regs_intel_sorted, insn_regs_intel,
sizeof(insn_regs_intel_sorted));
qsort(insn_regs_intel_sorted,
ARR_SIZE(insn_regs_intel_sorted),
sizeof(struct insn_reg), regs_cmp);
intel_regs_sorted = true;
}
if (insn_regs_intel_sorted[0].insn > id ||
insn_regs_intel_sorted[last].insn < id) {
return 0;
}
while (first <= last) {
mid = (first + last) / 2;
if (insn_regs_intel_sorted[mid].insn < id) {
first = mid + 1;
} else if (insn_regs_intel_sorted[mid].insn == id) {
if (access) {
*access = insn_regs_intel_sorted[mid].access;
}
return insn_regs_intel_sorted[mid].reg;
} else {
if (mid == 0)
break;
last = mid - 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 169,866 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: chrm_modification_init(chrm_modification *me, png_modifier *pm,
PNG_CONST color_encoding *encoding)
{
CIE_color white = white_point(encoding);
/* Original end points: */
me->encoding = encoding;
/* Chromaticities (in fixed point): */
me->wx = fix(chromaticity_x(white));
me->wy = fix(chromaticity_y(white));
me->rx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->red));
me->ry = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->red));
me->gx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->green));
me->gy = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->green));
me->bx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->blue));
me->by = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->blue));
modification_init(&me->this);
me->this.chunk = CHUNK_cHRM;
me->this.modify_fn = chrm_modify;
me->this.add = CHUNK_PLTE;
me->this.next = pm->modifications;
pm->modifications = &me->this;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | chrm_modification_init(chrm_modification *me, png_modifier *pm,
const color_encoding *encoding)
{
CIE_color white = white_point(encoding);
/* Original end points: */
me->encoding = encoding;
/* Chromaticities (in fixed point): */
me->wx = fix(chromaticity_x(white));
me->wy = fix(chromaticity_y(white));
me->rx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->red));
me->ry = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->red));
me->gx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->green));
me->gy = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->green));
me->bx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->blue));
me->by = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->blue));
modification_init(&me->this);
me->this.chunk = CHUNK_cHRM;
me->this.modify_fn = chrm_modify;
me->this.add = CHUNK_PLTE;
me->this.next = pm->modifications;
pm->modifications = &me->this;
}
| 173,606 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool InputWindowInfo::isTrustedOverlay() const {
return layoutParamsType == TYPE_INPUT_METHOD
|| layoutParamsType == TYPE_INPUT_METHOD_DIALOG
|| layoutParamsType == TYPE_MAGNIFICATION_OVERLAY
|| layoutParamsType == TYPE_SECURE_SYSTEM_OVERLAY;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool InputWindowInfo::isTrustedOverlay() const {
return layoutParamsType == TYPE_INPUT_METHOD
|| layoutParamsType == TYPE_INPUT_METHOD_DIALOG
|| layoutParamsType == TYPE_MAGNIFICATION_OVERLAY
|| layoutParamsType == TYPE_STATUS_BAR
|| layoutParamsType == TYPE_NAVIGATION_BAR
|| layoutParamsType == TYPE_SECURE_SYSTEM_OVERLAY;
}
| 174,170 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(readgzfile)
{
char *filename;
int filename_len;
int flags = REPORT_ERRORS;
php_stream *stream;
int size;
long use_include_path = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|l", &filename, &filename_len, &use_include_path) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (use_include_path) {
flags |= USE_PATH;
}
stream = php_stream_gzopen(NULL, filename, "rb", flags, NULL, NULL STREAMS_CC TSRMLS_CC);
if (!stream) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
size = php_stream_passthru(stream);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_LONG(size);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | static PHP_FUNCTION(readgzfile)
{
char *filename;
int filename_len;
int flags = REPORT_ERRORS;
php_stream *stream;
int size;
long use_include_path = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p|l", &filename, &filename_len, &use_include_path) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (use_include_path) {
flags |= USE_PATH;
}
stream = php_stream_gzopen(NULL, filename, "rb", flags, NULL, NULL STREAMS_CC TSRMLS_CC);
if (!stream) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
size = php_stream_passthru(stream);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_LONG(size);
}
| 165,320 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ResourcePrefetchPredictor::GetRedirectEndpointsForPreconnect(
const url::Origin& entry_origin,
const RedirectDataMap& redirect_data,
PreconnectPrediction* prediction) const {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kLoadingPreconnectToRedirectTarget)) {
return false;
}
DCHECK(!prediction || prediction->requests.empty());
RedirectData data;
if (!redirect_data.TryGetData(entry_origin.host(), &data))
return false;
const float kMinRedirectConfidenceToTriggerPrefetch = 0.1f;
bool at_least_one_redirect_endpoint_added = false;
for (const auto& redirect : data.redirect_endpoints()) {
if (ComputeRedirectConfidence(redirect) <
kMinRedirectConfidenceToTriggerPrefetch) {
continue;
}
std::string redirect_scheme =
redirect.url_scheme().empty() ? "https" : redirect.url_scheme();
int redirect_port = redirect.has_url_port() ? redirect.url_port() : 443;
const url::Origin redirect_origin = url::Origin::CreateFromNormalizedTuple(
redirect_scheme, redirect.url(), redirect_port);
if (redirect_origin == entry_origin) {
continue;
}
if (prediction) {
prediction->requests.emplace_back(
redirect_origin.GetURL(), 1 /* num_scokets */,
net::NetworkIsolationKey(redirect_origin, redirect_origin));
}
at_least_one_redirect_endpoint_added = true;
}
if (prediction && prediction->host.empty() &&
at_least_one_redirect_endpoint_added) {
prediction->host = entry_origin.host();
}
return at_least_one_redirect_endpoint_added;
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | bool ResourcePrefetchPredictor::GetRedirectEndpointsForPreconnect(
const url::Origin& entry_origin,
const RedirectDataMap& redirect_data,
PreconnectPrediction* prediction) const {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kLoadingPreconnectToRedirectTarget)) {
return false;
}
DCHECK(!prediction || prediction->requests.empty());
RedirectData data;
if (!redirect_data.TryGetData(entry_origin.host(), &data))
return false;
const float kMinRedirectConfidenceToTriggerPrefetch = 0.1f;
bool at_least_one_redirect_endpoint_added = false;
for (const auto& redirect : data.redirect_endpoints()) {
if (ComputeRedirectConfidence(redirect) <
kMinRedirectConfidenceToTriggerPrefetch) {
continue;
}
std::string redirect_scheme =
redirect.url_scheme().empty() ? "https" : redirect.url_scheme();
int redirect_port = redirect.has_url_port() ? redirect.url_port() : 443;
const url::Origin redirect_origin = url::Origin::CreateFromNormalizedTuple(
redirect_scheme, redirect.url(), redirect_port);
if (redirect_origin == entry_origin) {
continue;
}
if (prediction) {
prediction->requests.emplace_back(
redirect_origin, 1 /* num_scokets */,
net::NetworkIsolationKey(redirect_origin, redirect_origin));
}
at_least_one_redirect_endpoint_added = true;
}
if (prediction && prediction->host.empty() &&
at_least_one_redirect_endpoint_added) {
prediction->host = entry_origin.host();
}
return at_least_one_redirect_endpoint_added;
}
| 172,378 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, copy)
{
char *oldfile, *newfile, *error;
const char *pcr_error;
size_t oldfile_len, newfile_len;
phar_entry_info *oldentry, newentry = {0}, *temp;
int tmp_len = 0;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ss", &oldfile, &oldfile_len, &newfile, &newfile_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"Cannot copy \"%s\" to \"%s\", phar is read-only", oldfile, newfile);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (oldfile_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(oldfile, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
/* can't copy a meta file */
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", cannot copy Phar meta-file in %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (newfile_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(newfile, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
/* can't copy a meta file */
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", cannot copy to Phar meta-file in %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, oldfile, (uint) oldfile_len) || NULL == (oldentry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, oldfile, (uint) oldfile_len)) || oldentry->is_deleted) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", file does not exist in %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, newfile, (uint) newfile_len)) {
if (NULL != (temp = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, newfile, (uint) newfile_len)) || !temp->is_deleted) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", file must not already exist in phar %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
tmp_len = (int)newfile_len;
if (phar_path_check(&newfile, &tmp_len, &pcr_error) > pcr_is_ok) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" contains invalid characters %s, cannot be copied from \"%s\" in phar %s", newfile, pcr_error, oldfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
newfile_len = tmp_len;
if (phar_obj->archive->is_persistent) {
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->archive))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
/* re-populate with copied-on-write entry */
oldentry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, oldfile, (uint) oldfile_len);
}
memcpy((void *) &newentry, oldentry, sizeof(phar_entry_info));
if (Z_TYPE(newentry.metadata) != IS_UNDEF) {
zval_copy_ctor(&newentry.metadata);
newentry.metadata_str.s = NULL;
}
newentry.filename = estrndup(newfile, newfile_len);
newentry.filename_len = newfile_len;
newentry.fp_refcount = 0;
if (oldentry->fp_type != PHAR_FP) {
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_entry_fp(oldentry, &newentry, &error)) {
efree(newentry.filename);
php_stream_close(newentry.fp);
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
return;
}
}
zend_hash_str_add_mem(&oldentry->phar->manifest, newfile, newfile_len, &newentry, sizeof(phar_entry_info));
phar_obj->archive->is_modified = 1;
phar_flush(phar_obj->archive, 0, 0, 0, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PHP_METHOD(Phar, copy)
{
char *oldfile, *newfile, *error;
const char *pcr_error;
size_t oldfile_len, newfile_len;
phar_entry_info *oldentry, newentry = {0}, *temp;
int tmp_len = 0;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "pp", &oldfile, &oldfile_len, &newfile, &newfile_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"Cannot copy \"%s\" to \"%s\", phar is read-only", oldfile, newfile);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (oldfile_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(oldfile, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
/* can't copy a meta file */
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", cannot copy Phar meta-file in %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (newfile_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(newfile, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
/* can't copy a meta file */
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", cannot copy to Phar meta-file in %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, oldfile, (uint) oldfile_len) || NULL == (oldentry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, oldfile, (uint) oldfile_len)) || oldentry->is_deleted) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", file does not exist in %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, newfile, (uint) newfile_len)) {
if (NULL != (temp = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, newfile, (uint) newfile_len)) || !temp->is_deleted) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", file must not already exist in phar %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
tmp_len = (int)newfile_len;
if (phar_path_check(&newfile, &tmp_len, &pcr_error) > pcr_is_ok) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" contains invalid characters %s, cannot be copied from \"%s\" in phar %s", newfile, pcr_error, oldfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
newfile_len = tmp_len;
if (phar_obj->archive->is_persistent) {
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->archive))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
/* re-populate with copied-on-write entry */
oldentry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, oldfile, (uint) oldfile_len);
}
memcpy((void *) &newentry, oldentry, sizeof(phar_entry_info));
if (Z_TYPE(newentry.metadata) != IS_UNDEF) {
zval_copy_ctor(&newentry.metadata);
newentry.metadata_str.s = NULL;
}
newentry.filename = estrndup(newfile, newfile_len);
newentry.filename_len = newfile_len;
newentry.fp_refcount = 0;
if (oldentry->fp_type != PHAR_FP) {
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_entry_fp(oldentry, &newentry, &error)) {
efree(newentry.filename);
php_stream_close(newentry.fp);
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
return;
}
}
zend_hash_str_add_mem(&oldentry->phar->manifest, newfile, newfile_len, &newentry, sizeof(phar_entry_info));
phar_obj->archive->is_modified = 1;
phar_flush(phar_obj->archive, 0, 0, 0, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
| 165,064 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int au1200fb_fb_mmap(struct fb_info *info, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned int len;
unsigned long start=0, off;
struct au1200fb_device *fbdev = info->par;
if (vma->vm_pgoff > (~0UL >> PAGE_SHIFT)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
start = fbdev->fb_phys & PAGE_MASK;
len = PAGE_ALIGN((start & ~PAGE_MASK) + fbdev->fb_len);
off = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
if ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start + off) > len) {
return -EINVAL;
}
off += start;
vma->vm_pgoff = off >> PAGE_SHIFT;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
pgprot_val(vma->vm_page_prot) |= _CACHE_MASK; /* CCA=7 */
return io_remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, off >> PAGE_SHIFT,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start,
vma->vm_page_prot);
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int au1200fb_fb_mmap(struct fb_info *info, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct au1200fb_device *fbdev = info->par;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
pgprot_val(vma->vm_page_prot) |= _CACHE_MASK; /* CCA=7 */
return vm_iomap_memory(vma, fbdev->fb_phys, fbdev->fb_len);
}
| 165,936 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PPB_Widget_Impl::Invalidate(const PP_Rect* dirty) {
const PPP_Widget_Dev* widget = static_cast<const PPP_Widget_Dev*>(
instance()->module()->GetPluginInterface(PPP_WIDGET_DEV_INTERFACE));
if (!widget)
return;
ScopedResourceId resource(this);
widget->Invalidate(instance()->pp_instance(), resource.id, dirty);
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void PPB_Widget_Impl::Invalidate(const PP_Rect* dirty) {
if (!instance())
return;
const PPP_Widget_Dev* widget = static_cast<const PPP_Widget_Dev*>(
instance()->module()->GetPluginInterface(PPP_WIDGET_DEV_INTERFACE));
if (!widget)
return;
ScopedResourceId resource(this);
widget->Invalidate(instance()->pp_instance(), resource.id, dirty);
}
| 170,412 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: zend_function *spl_filesystem_object_get_method_check(zval **object_ptr, char *method, int method_len, const struct _zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *fsobj = zend_object_store_get_object(*object_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
if (fsobj->u.dir.entry.d_name[0] == '\0' && fsobj->orig_path == NULL) {
method = "_bad_state_ex";
method_len = sizeof("_bad_state_ex") - 1;
key = NULL;
}
return zend_get_std_object_handlers()->get_method(object_ptr, method, method_len, key TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | zend_function *spl_filesystem_object_get_method_check(zval **object_ptr, char *method, int method_len, const struct _zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *fsobj = zend_object_store_get_object(*object_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
if (fsobj->u.dir.entry.d_name[0] == '\0' && fsobj->orig_path == NULL) {
method = "_bad_state_ex";
method_len = sizeof("_bad_state_ex") - 1;
key = NULL;
}
return zend_get_std_object_handlers()->get_method(object_ptr, method, method_len, key TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
| 167,085 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: row_copy(png_bytep toBuffer, png_const_bytep fromBuffer, unsigned int bitWidth)
{
memcpy(toBuffer, fromBuffer, bitWidth >> 3);
if ((bitWidth & 7) != 0)
{
unsigned int mask;
toBuffer += bitWidth >> 3;
fromBuffer += bitWidth >> 3;
/* The remaining bits are in the top of the byte, the mask is the bits to
* retain.
*/
mask = 0xff >> (bitWidth & 7);
*toBuffer = (png_byte)((*toBuffer & mask) | (*fromBuffer & ~mask));
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | row_copy(png_bytep toBuffer, png_const_bytep fromBuffer, unsigned int bitWidth)
row_copy(png_bytep toBuffer, png_const_bytep fromBuffer, unsigned int bitWidth,
int littleendian)
{
memcpy(toBuffer, fromBuffer, bitWidth >> 3);
if ((bitWidth & 7) != 0)
{
unsigned int mask;
toBuffer += bitWidth >> 3;
fromBuffer += bitWidth >> 3;
if (littleendian)
mask = 0xff << (bitWidth & 7);
else
mask = 0xff >> (bitWidth & 7);
*toBuffer = (png_byte)((*toBuffer & mask) | (*fromBuffer & ~mask));
}
}
| 173,688 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::DetachInterstitialPage() {
if (node_.OuterContentsFrameTreeNode()) {
if (GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate()) {
DCHECK(static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
GetRenderManager()->current_frame_host()->GetView())
->IsRenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame());
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame* view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame*>(
GetRenderManager()->current_frame_host()->GetView());
GetRenderManager()->SetRWHViewForInnerContents(view);
}
}
bool interstitial_pausing_throbber =
ShowingInterstitialPage() &&
GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page()->pause_throbber();
if (ShowingInterstitialPage())
GetRenderManager()->remove_interstitial_page();
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidDetachInterstitialPage();
if (interstitial_pausing_throbber && frame_tree_.IsLoading())
LoadingStateChanged(true, true, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void WebContentsImpl::DetachInterstitialPage() {
if (node_.OuterContentsFrameTreeNode()) {
if (GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate()) {
DCHECK(static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
GetRenderManager()->current_frame_host()->GetView())
->IsRenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame());
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame* view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame*>(
GetRenderManager()->current_frame_host()->GetView());
GetRenderManager()->SetRWHViewForInnerContents(view);
}
}
bool interstitial_pausing_throbber =
ShowingInterstitialPage() && interstitial_page_->pause_throbber();
if (ShowingInterstitialPage())
interstitial_page_ = nullptr;
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidDetachInterstitialPage();
if (interstitial_pausing_throbber && frame_tree_.IsLoading())
LoadingStateChanged(true, true, nullptr);
}
| 172,325 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool TradQT_Manager::ParseCachedBoxes ( const MOOV_Manager & moovMgr )
{
MOOV_Manager::BoxInfo udtaInfo;
MOOV_Manager::BoxRef udtaRef = moovMgr.GetBox ( "moov/udta", &udtaInfo );
if ( udtaRef == 0 ) return false;
for ( XMP_Uns32 i = 0; i < udtaInfo.childCount; ++i ) {
MOOV_Manager::BoxInfo currInfo;
MOOV_Manager::BoxRef currRef = moovMgr.GetNthChild ( udtaRef, i, &currInfo );
if ( currRef == 0 ) break; // Sanity check, should not happen.
if ( (currInfo.boxType >> 24) != 0xA9 ) continue;
if ( currInfo.contentSize < 2+2+1 ) continue; // Want enough for a non-empty value.
InfoMapPos newInfo = this->parsedBoxes.insert ( this->parsedBoxes.end(),
InfoMap::value_type ( currInfo.boxType, ParsedBoxInfo ( currInfo.boxType ) ) );
std::vector<ValueInfo> * newValues = &newInfo->second.values;
XMP_Uns8 * boxPtr = (XMP_Uns8*) currInfo.content;
XMP_Uns8 * boxEnd = boxPtr + currInfo.contentSize;
XMP_Uns16 miniLen, macLang;
for ( ; boxPtr < boxEnd-4; boxPtr += miniLen ) {
miniLen = 4 + GetUns16BE ( boxPtr ); // ! Include header in local miniLen.
macLang = GetUns16BE ( boxPtr+2);
if ( (miniLen <= 4) || (miniLen > (boxEnd - boxPtr)) ) continue; // Ignore bad or empty values.
XMP_StringPtr valuePtr = (char*)(boxPtr+4);
size_t valueLen = miniLen - 4;
newValues->push_back ( ValueInfo() );
ValueInfo * newValue = &newValues->back();
newValue->macLang = macLang;
if ( IsMacLangKnown ( macLang ) ) newValue->xmpLang = GetXMPLang ( macLang );
newValue->macValue.assign ( valuePtr, valueLen );
}
}
return (! this->parsedBoxes.empty());
} // TradQT_Manager::ParseCachedBoxes
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | bool TradQT_Manager::ParseCachedBoxes ( const MOOV_Manager & moovMgr )
{
MOOV_Manager::BoxInfo udtaInfo;
MOOV_Manager::BoxRef udtaRef = moovMgr.GetBox ( "moov/udta", &udtaInfo );
if ( udtaRef == 0 ) return false;
for ( XMP_Uns32 i = 0; i < udtaInfo.childCount; ++i ) {
MOOV_Manager::BoxInfo currInfo;
MOOV_Manager::BoxRef currRef = moovMgr.GetNthChild ( udtaRef, i, &currInfo );
if ( currRef == 0 ) break; // Sanity check, should not happen.
if ( (currInfo.boxType >> 24) != 0xA9 ) continue;
if ( currInfo.contentSize < 2+2+1 ) continue; // Want enough for a non-empty value.
InfoMapPos newInfo = this->parsedBoxes.insert ( this->parsedBoxes.end(),
InfoMap::value_type ( currInfo.boxType, ParsedBoxInfo ( currInfo.boxType ) ) );
std::vector<ValueInfo> * newValues = &newInfo->second.values;
XMP_Uns8 * boxPtr = (XMP_Uns8*) currInfo.content;
XMP_Uns8 * boxEnd = boxPtr + currInfo.contentSize;
XMP_Uns16 miniLen, macLang;
for ( ; boxPtr < boxEnd-4; boxPtr += miniLen ) {
miniLen = 4 + GetUns16BE ( boxPtr ); // ! Include header in local miniLen.
macLang = GetUns16BE ( boxPtr+2);
if ( (miniLen <= 4) || (miniLen > (boxEnd - boxPtr)) )
break; // Ignore bad or empty values.
XMP_StringPtr valuePtr = (char*)(boxPtr+4);
size_t valueLen = miniLen - 4;
newValues->push_back ( ValueInfo() );
ValueInfo * newValue = &newValues->back();
newValue->macLang = macLang;
if ( IsMacLangKnown ( macLang ) ) newValue->xmpLang = GetXMPLang ( macLang );
newValue->macValue.assign ( valuePtr, valueLen );
}
}
return (! this->parsedBoxes.empty());
} // TradQT_Manager::ParseCachedBoxes
| 165,364 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int skcipher_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
{
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx) + crypto_skcipher_reqsize(private);
ctx = sock_kmalloc(sk, len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
ctx->iv = sock_kmalloc(sk, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(private),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->iv) {
sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset(ctx->iv, 0, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(private));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->tsgl);
ctx->len = len;
ctx->used = 0;
ctx->more = 0;
ctx->merge = 0;
ctx->enc = 0;
atomic_set(&ctx->inflight, 0);
af_alg_init_completion(&ctx->completion);
ask->private = ctx;
skcipher_request_set_tfm(&ctx->req, private);
skcipher_request_set_callback(&ctx->req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
af_alg_complete, &ctx->completion);
sk->sk_destruct = skcipher_sock_destruct;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: algif_skcipher - Require setkey before accept(2)
Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them
without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that
the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been
done on the socket yet.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int skcipher_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
{
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct skcipher_tfm *tfm = private;
struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher = tfm->skcipher;
unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx) + crypto_skcipher_reqsize(skcipher);
if (!tfm->has_key)
return -ENOKEY;
ctx = sock_kmalloc(sk, len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
ctx->iv = sock_kmalloc(sk, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(skcipher),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->iv) {
sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset(ctx->iv, 0, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(skcipher));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->tsgl);
ctx->len = len;
ctx->used = 0;
ctx->more = 0;
ctx->merge = 0;
ctx->enc = 0;
atomic_set(&ctx->inflight, 0);
af_alg_init_completion(&ctx->completion);
ask->private = ctx;
skcipher_request_set_tfm(&ctx->req, skcipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(&ctx->req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
af_alg_complete, &ctx->completion);
sk->sk_destruct = skcipher_sock_destruct;
return 0;
}
| 167,454 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nm_ip4_config_commit (const NMIP4Config *config, int ifindex, guint32 default_route_metric)
{
NMIP4ConfigPrivate *priv = NM_IP4_CONFIG_GET_PRIVATE (config);
guint32 mtu = nm_ip4_config_get_mtu (config);
int i;
g_return_val_if_fail (ifindex > 0, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (ifindex > 0, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (config != NULL, FALSE);
/* Addresses */
nm_platform_ip4_address_sync (ifindex, priv->addresses, default_route_metric);
/* Routes */
{
int count = nm_ip4_config_get_num_routes (config);
GArray *routes = g_array_sized_new (FALSE, FALSE, sizeof (NMPlatformIP4Route), count);
const NMPlatformIP4Route *route;
gboolean success;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
route = nm_ip4_config_get_route (config, i);
/* Don't add the route if it's more specific than one of the subnets
* the device already has an IP address on.
*/
if ( route->gateway == 0
&& nm_ip4_config_destination_is_direct (config, route->network, route->plen))
continue;
g_array_append_vals (routes, route, 1);
}
success = nm_route_manager_ip4_route_sync (nm_route_manager_get (), ifindex, routes);
g_array_unref (routes);
return FALSE;
}
/* MTU */
if (mtu && mtu != nm_platform_link_get_mtu (ifindex))
nm_platform_link_set_mtu (ifindex, mtu);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | nm_ip4_config_commit (const NMIP4Config *config, int ifindex, guint32 default_route_metric)
{
NMIP4ConfigPrivate *priv = NM_IP4_CONFIG_GET_PRIVATE (config);
int i;
g_return_val_if_fail (ifindex > 0, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (ifindex > 0, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (config != NULL, FALSE);
/* Addresses */
nm_platform_ip4_address_sync (ifindex, priv->addresses, default_route_metric);
/* Routes */
{
int count = nm_ip4_config_get_num_routes (config);
GArray *routes = g_array_sized_new (FALSE, FALSE, sizeof (NMPlatformIP4Route), count);
const NMPlatformIP4Route *route;
gboolean success;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
route = nm_ip4_config_get_route (config, i);
/* Don't add the route if it's more specific than one of the subnets
* the device already has an IP address on.
*/
if ( route->gateway == 0
&& nm_ip4_config_destination_is_direct (config, route->network, route->plen))
continue;
g_array_append_vals (routes, route, 1);
}
success = nm_route_manager_ip4_route_sync (nm_route_manager_get (), ifindex, routes);
g_array_unref (routes);
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
| 164,815 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void nalm_dump(FILE * trace, char *data, u32 data_size)
{
GF_BitStream *bs;
Bool rle, large_size;
u32 entry_count;
if (!data) {
fprintf(trace, "<NALUMap rle=\"\" large_size=\"\">\n");
fprintf(trace, "<NALUMapEntry NALU_startNumber=\"\" groupID=\"\"/>\n");
fprintf(trace, "</NALUMap>\n");
return;
}
bs = gf_bs_new(data, data_size, GF_BITSTREAM_READ);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6);
large_size = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
rle = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
entry_count = gf_bs_read_int(bs, large_size ? 16 : 8);
fprintf(trace, "<NALUMap rle=\"%d\" large_size=\"%d\">\n", rle, large_size);
while (entry_count) {
u32 ID;
fprintf(trace, "<NALUMapEntry ");
if (rle) {
u32 start_num = gf_bs_read_int(bs, large_size ? 16 : 8);
fprintf(trace, "NALU_startNumber=\"%d\" ", start_num);
}
ID = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
fprintf(trace, "groupID=\"%d\"/>\n", ID);
entry_count--;
}
gf_bs_del(bs);
fprintf(trace, "</NALUMap>\n");
return;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void nalm_dump(FILE * trace, char *data, u32 data_size)
{
GF_BitStream *bs;
Bool rle, large_size;
u32 entry_count;
if (!data) {
fprintf(trace, "<NALUMap rle=\"\" large_size=\"\">\n");
fprintf(trace, "<NALUMapEntry NALU_startNumber=\"\" groupID=\"\"/>\n");
fprintf(trace, "</NALUMap>\n");
return;
}
bs = gf_bs_new(data, data_size, GF_BITSTREAM_READ);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6);
large_size = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
rle = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
entry_count = gf_bs_read_int(bs, large_size ? 16 : 8);
fprintf(trace, "<NALUMap rle=\"%d\" large_size=\"%d\">\n", rle, large_size);
while (entry_count) {
u32 ID;
fprintf(trace, "<NALUMapEntry ");
if (rle) {
u32 start_num = gf_bs_read_int(bs, large_size ? 16 : 8);
fprintf(trace, "NALU_startNumber=\"%d\" ", start_num);
}
ID = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
fprintf(trace, "groupID=\"%d\"/>\n", ID);
entry_count--;
}
gf_bs_del(bs);
fprintf(trace, "</NALUMap>\n");
return;
}
| 169,169 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
int ret, key_tries, sign_tries, blind_tries;
mbedtls_ecp_point R;
mbedtls_mpi k, e, t;
/* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
if( grp->N.p == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* Make sure d is in range 1..n-1 */
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &t );
sign_tries = 0;
do
{
/*
* Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair
* and set r = xR mod n
*/
key_tries = 0;
do
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( grp, &k, &R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( r, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
if( key_tries++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 0 ) == 0 );
/*
* Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );
/*
* Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
* avoiding a potential timing leak.
*/
blind_tries = 0;
do
{
size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &t, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );
/* See mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair() */
if( ++blind_tries > 30 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &t, 1 ) < 0 ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &t, &grp->N ) >= 0 );
/*
* Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, r, d ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &k, &k, &t ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, &k, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) );
if( sign_tries++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 );
cleanup:
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &t );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200 | int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
static int ecdsa_sign_internal( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
size_t),
void *p_rng_blind )
{
int ret, key_tries, sign_tries, blind_tries;
mbedtls_ecp_point R;
mbedtls_mpi k, e, t;
/* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
if( grp->N.p == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* Make sure d is in range 1..n-1 */
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &t );
sign_tries = 0;
do
{
/*
* Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair
* and set r = xR mod n
*/
key_tries = 0;
do
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &k, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, &R, &k, &grp->G,
f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( r, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
if( key_tries++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 0 ) == 0 );
/*
* Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );
/*
* Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
* avoiding a potential timing leak.
*
* This loop does the same job as mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey() and it is
* replaced by a call to it in the mainline. This change is not
* necessary to backport the fix separating the blinding and ephemeral
* key generating RNGs, therefore the original code is kept.
*/
blind_tries = 0;
do
{
size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng_blind,
p_rng_blind ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &t, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );
if( ++blind_tries > 30 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &t, 1 ) < 0 ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &t, &grp->N ) >= 0 );
/*
* Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, r, d ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &k, &k, &t ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, &k, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) );
if( sign_tries++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 );
cleanup:
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &t );
return( ret );
}
| 170,180 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void smp_process_keypress_notification(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = (uint8_t*)p_data;
uint8_t reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
p_cb->status = *(uint8_t*)p_data;
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
if (p != NULL) {
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_keypress_notification, p);
} else {
p_cb->peer_keypress_notification = BTM_SP_KEY_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_PEER_KEYPR_NOT_EVT;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix OOB read before buffer length check
Bug: 111936834
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ib98528fb62db0d724ebd9112d071e367f78e369d
(cherry picked from commit 4548f34c90803c6544f6bed03399f2eabeab2a8e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void smp_process_keypress_notification(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = (uint8_t*)p_data;
uint8_t reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
if (p_cb->rcvd_cmd_len < 2) { // 1 (opcode) + 1 (Notif Type) bytes
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111936834");
}
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
p_cb->status = *(uint8_t*)p_data;
if (p != NULL) {
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_keypress_notification, p);
} else {
p_cb->peer_keypress_notification = BTM_SP_KEY_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_PEER_KEYPR_NOT_EVT;
}
| 174,077 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: send_parameters(struct iperf_test *test)
{
int r = 0;
cJSON *j;
j = cJSON_CreateObject();
if (j == NULL) {
i_errno = IESENDPARAMS;
r = -1;
} else {
if (test->protocol->id == Ptcp)
cJSON_AddTrueToObject(j, "tcp");
else if (test->protocol->id == Pudp)
cJSON_AddTrueToObject(j, "udp");
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "omit", test->omit);
if (test->server_affinity != -1)
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "server_affinity", test->server_affinity);
if (test->duration)
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "time", test->duration);
if (test->settings->bytes)
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "num", test->settings->bytes);
if (test->settings->blocks)
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "blockcount", test->settings->blocks);
if (test->settings->mss)
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "MSS", test->settings->mss);
if (test->no_delay)
cJSON_AddTrueToObject(j, "nodelay");
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "parallel", test->num_streams);
if (test->reverse)
cJSON_AddTrueToObject(j, "reverse");
if (test->settings->socket_bufsize)
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "window", test->settings->socket_bufsize);
if (test->settings->blksize)
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "len", test->settings->blksize);
if (test->settings->rate)
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "bandwidth", test->settings->rate);
if (test->settings->burst)
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "burst", test->settings->burst);
if (test->settings->tos)
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "TOS", test->settings->tos);
if (test->settings->flowlabel)
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "flowlabel", test->settings->flowlabel);
if (test->title)
cJSON_AddStringToObject(j, "title", test->title);
if (test->congestion)
cJSON_AddStringToObject(j, "congestion", test->congestion);
if (test->get_server_output)
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "get_server_output", iperf_get_test_get_server_output(test));
if (test->debug) {
printf("send_parameters:\n%s\n", cJSON_Print(j));
}
if (JSON_write(test->ctrl_sck, j) < 0) {
i_errno = IESENDPARAMS;
r = -1;
}
cJSON_Delete(j);
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | send_parameters(struct iperf_test *test)
{
int r = 0;
cJSON *j;
j = cJSON_CreateObject();
if (j == NULL) {
i_errno = IESENDPARAMS;
r = -1;
} else {
if (test->protocol->id == Ptcp)
cJSON_AddTrueToObject(j, "tcp");
else if (test->protocol->id == Pudp)
cJSON_AddTrueToObject(j, "udp");
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "omit", test->omit);
if (test->server_affinity != -1)
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "server_affinity", test->server_affinity);
if (test->duration)
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "time", test->duration);
if (test->settings->bytes)
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "num", test->settings->bytes);
if (test->settings->blocks)
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "blockcount", test->settings->blocks);
if (test->settings->mss)
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "MSS", test->settings->mss);
if (test->no_delay)
cJSON_AddTrueToObject(j, "nodelay");
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "parallel", test->num_streams);
if (test->reverse)
cJSON_AddTrueToObject(j, "reverse");
if (test->settings->socket_bufsize)
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "window", test->settings->socket_bufsize);
if (test->settings->blksize)
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "len", test->settings->blksize);
if (test->settings->rate)
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "bandwidth", test->settings->rate);
if (test->settings->burst)
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "burst", test->settings->burst);
if (test->settings->tos)
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "TOS", test->settings->tos);
if (test->settings->flowlabel)
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "flowlabel", test->settings->flowlabel);
if (test->title)
cJSON_AddStringToObject(j, "title", test->title);
if (test->congestion)
cJSON_AddStringToObject(j, "congestion", test->congestion);
if (test->get_server_output)
<<<<<<< HEAD
cJSON_AddIntToObject(j, "get_server_output", iperf_get_test_get_server_output(test));
=======
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "get_server_output", iperf_get_test_get_server_output(test));
if (test->udp_counters_64bit)
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "udp_counters_64bit", iperf_get_test_udp_counters_64bit(test));
if (test->no_fq_socket_pacing)
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(j, "no_fq_socket_pacing", iperf_get_no_fq_socket_pacing(test));
cJSON_AddStringToObject(j, "client_version", IPERF_VERSION);
>>>>>>> ed94082... Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
if (test->debug) {
printf("send_parameters:\n%s\n", cJSON_Print(j));
}
if (JSON_write(test->ctrl_sck, j) < 0) {
i_errno = IESENDPARAMS;
r = -1;
}
cJSON_Delete(j);
}
return r;
}
| 167,316 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MediaRecorder::MediaRecorder(const String16& opPackageName) : mSurfaceMediaSource(NULL)
{
ALOGV("constructor");
const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& service(getMediaPlayerService());
if (service != NULL) {
mMediaRecorder = service->createMediaRecorder(opPackageName);
}
if (mMediaRecorder != NULL) {
mCurrentState = MEDIA_RECORDER_IDLE;
}
doCleanUp();
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476 | MediaRecorder::MediaRecorder(const String16& opPackageName) : mSurfaceMediaSource(NULL)
{
ALOGV("constructor");
const sp<IMediaPlayerService> service(getMediaPlayerService());
if (service != NULL) {
mMediaRecorder = service->createMediaRecorder(opPackageName);
}
if (mMediaRecorder != NULL) {
mCurrentState = MEDIA_RECORDER_IDLE;
}
doCleanUp();
}
| 173,540 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::CreateBlockGroup(
long long start_offset,
long long size,
long long discard_padding)
{
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count >= 0);
assert(m_entries_count < m_entries_size);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = start_offset;
const long long stop = start_offset + size;
long long prev = 1; //nonce
long long next = 0; //nonce
long long duration = -1; //really, this is unsigned
long long bpos = -1;
long long bsize = -1;
while (pos < stop)
{
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); //TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; //consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0); //TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; //consume size
if (id == 0x21) //Block ID
{
if (bpos < 0) //Block ID
{
bpos = pos;
bsize = size;
}
}
else if (id == 0x1B) //Duration ID
{
assert(size <= 8);
duration = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
assert(duration >= 0); //TODO
}
else if (id == 0x7B) //ReferenceBlock
{
assert(size <= 8);
const long size_ = static_cast<long>(size);
long long time;
long status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, size_, time);
assert(status == 0);
if (status != 0)
return -1;
if (time <= 0) //see note above
prev = time;
else //weird
next = time;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
assert(bpos >= 0);
assert(bsize >= 0);
const long idx = m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** const ppEntry = m_entries + idx;
BlockEntry*& pEntry = *ppEntry;
pEntry = new (std::nothrow) BlockGroup(
this,
idx,
bpos,
bsize,
prev,
next,
duration,
discard_padding);
if (pEntry == NULL)
return -1; //generic error
BlockGroup* const p = static_cast<BlockGroup*>(pEntry);
const long status = p->Parse();
if (status == 0) //success
{
++m_entries_count;
return 0;
}
delete pEntry;
pEntry = 0;
return status;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Cluster::CreateBlockGroup(
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) { // error
pLast = NULL;
return status;
}
if (status > 0) // no new block
break;
}
| 174,258 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetRenderWidgetHostWithPageFocus() {
WebContentsImpl* focused_web_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (focused_web_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
focused_web_contents->GetRenderManager()
->interstitial_page()
->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
return focused_web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | RenderWidgetHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetRenderWidgetHostWithPageFocus() {
WebContentsImpl* focused_web_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (focused_web_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
focused_web_contents->interstitial_page_->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
return focused_web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
| 172,330 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref)
{
atomic_inc(&map->refcnt);
if (uref)
atomic_inc(&map->usercnt);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | void bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref)
/* prog's and map's refcnt limit */
#define BPF_MAX_REFCNT 32768
struct bpf_map *bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref)
{
if (atomic_inc_return(&map->refcnt) > BPF_MAX_REFCNT) {
atomic_dec(&map->refcnt);
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
}
if (uref)
atomic_inc(&map->usercnt);
return map;
}
| 167,253 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::internalSetParameter(OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
return internalSetBitrateParams(
(const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *)params);
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *avcType = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *)params;
if (avcType->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mEntropyMode = 0;
if (OMX_TRUE == avcType->bEntropyCodingCABAC)
mEntropyMode = 1;
if ((avcType->nAllowedPictureTypes & OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeB) &&
avcType->nPFrames) {
mBframes = avcType->nBFrames / avcType->nPFrames;
}
mIInterval = avcType->nPFrames + avcType->nBFrames;
if (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLoopFilterDisable == avcType->eLoopFilterMode)
mDisableDeblkLevel = 4;
if (avcType->nRefFrames != 1
|| avcType->bUseHadamard != OMX_TRUE
|| avcType->nRefIdx10ActiveMinus1 != 0
|| avcType->nRefIdx11ActiveMinus1 != 0
|| avcType->bWeightedPPrediction != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->bconstIpred != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->bDirect8x8Inference != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->bDirectSpatialTemporal != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->nCabacInitIdc != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (OK != ConvertOmxAvcLevelToAvcSpecLevel(avcType->eLevel, &mAVCEncLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::internalSetParameter(OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(bitRate)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
return internalSetBitrateParams(bitRate);
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *avcType = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(avcType)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (avcType->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mEntropyMode = 0;
if (OMX_TRUE == avcType->bEntropyCodingCABAC)
mEntropyMode = 1;
if ((avcType->nAllowedPictureTypes & OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeB) &&
avcType->nPFrames) {
mBframes = avcType->nBFrames / avcType->nPFrames;
}
mIInterval = avcType->nPFrames + avcType->nBFrames;
if (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLoopFilterDisable == avcType->eLoopFilterMode)
mDisableDeblkLevel = 4;
if (avcType->nRefFrames != 1
|| avcType->bUseHadamard != OMX_TRUE
|| avcType->nRefIdx10ActiveMinus1 != 0
|| avcType->nRefIdx11ActiveMinus1 != 0
|| avcType->bWeightedPPrediction != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->bconstIpred != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->bDirect8x8Inference != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->bDirectSpatialTemporal != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->nCabacInitIdc != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (OK != ConvertOmxAvcLevelToAvcSpecLevel(avcType->eLevel, &mAVCEncLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,201 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void vmx_complete_atomic_exit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
u32 exit_intr_info;
if (!(vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY
|| vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI))
return;
vmx->exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
exit_intr_info = vmx->exit_intr_info;
/* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
if (is_machine_check(exit_intr_info))
kvm_machine_check();
/* We need to handle NMIs before interrupts are enabled */
if ((exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) == INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR &&
(exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK)) {
kvm_before_handle_nmi(&vmx->vcpu);
asm("int $2");
kvm_after_handle_nmi(&vmx->vcpu);
}
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | static void vmx_complete_atomic_exit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
u32 exit_intr_info;
if (!(vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY
|| vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI))
return;
vmx->exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
exit_intr_info = vmx->exit_intr_info;
/* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
if (is_machine_check(exit_intr_info))
kvm_machine_check();
/* We need to handle NMIs before interrupts are enabled */
if (is_nmi(exit_intr_info)) {
kvm_before_handle_nmi(&vmx->vcpu);
asm("int $2");
kvm_after_handle_nmi(&vmx->vcpu);
}
}
| 166,857 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::string print_valuetype(Value::ValueType e) {
switch (e) {
case Value::TYPE_NULL:
return "NULL ";
case Value::TYPE_BOOLEAN:
return "BOOL";
case Value::TYPE_INTEGER:
return "INT";
case Value::TYPE_DOUBLE:
return "DOUBLE";
case Value::TYPE_STRING:
return "STRING";
case Value::TYPE_BINARY:
return "BIN";
case Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY:
return "DICT";
case Value::TYPE_LIST:
return "LIST";
default:
return "ERROR";
}
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | std::string print_valuetype(Value::ValueType e) {
| 170,467 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadFAXImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
if (image->columns == 0)
image->columns=2592;
if (image->rows == 0)
image->rows=3508;
image->depth=8;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,2) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Monochrome colormap.
*/
image->colormap[0].red=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[0].green=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[0].blue=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[1].red=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[1].green=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[1].blue=(Quantum) 0;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=HuffmanDecodeImage(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static Image *ReadFAXImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
if (image->columns == 0)
image->columns=2592;
if (image->rows == 0)
image->rows=3508;
image->depth=8;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,2) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Monochrome colormap.
*/
image->colormap[0].red=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[0].green=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[0].blue=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[1].red=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[1].green=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[1].blue=(Quantum) 0;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
status=HuffmanDecodeImage(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,564 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: normalize_color_encoding(color_encoding *encoding)
{
PNG_CONST double whiteY = encoding->red.Y + encoding->green.Y +
encoding->blue.Y;
if (whiteY != 1)
{
encoding->red.X /= whiteY;
encoding->red.Y /= whiteY;
encoding->red.Z /= whiteY;
encoding->green.X /= whiteY;
encoding->green.Y /= whiteY;
encoding->green.Z /= whiteY;
encoding->blue.X /= whiteY;
encoding->blue.Y /= whiteY;
encoding->blue.Z /= whiteY;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | normalize_color_encoding(color_encoding *encoding)
{
const double whiteY = encoding->red.Y + encoding->green.Y +
encoding->blue.Y;
if (whiteY != 1)
{
encoding->red.X /= whiteY;
encoding->red.Y /= whiteY;
encoding->red.Z /= whiteY;
encoding->green.X /= whiteY;
encoding->green.Y /= whiteY;
encoding->green.Z /= whiteY;
encoding->blue.X /= whiteY;
encoding->blue.Y /= whiteY;
encoding->blue.Z /= whiteY;
}
}
| 173,673 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: init_util(void)
{
filegen_register(statsdir, "peerstats", &peerstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "loopstats", &loopstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "clockstats", &clockstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "rawstats", &rawstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "sysstats", &sysstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "protostats", &protostats);
#ifdef AUTOKEY
filegen_register(statsdir, "cryptostats", &cryptostats);
#endif /* AUTOKEY */
#ifdef DEBUG_TIMING
filegen_register(statsdir, "timingstats", &timingstats);
#endif /* DEBUG_TIMING */
/*
* register with libntp ntp_set_tod() to call us back
* when time is stepped.
*/
step_callback = &ntpd_time_stepped;
#ifdef DEBUG
atexit(&uninit_util);
#endif /* DEBUG */
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | init_util(void)
{
filegen_register(statsdir, "peerstats", &peerstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "loopstats", &loopstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "clockstats", &clockstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "rawstats", &rawstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "sysstats", &sysstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "protostats", &protostats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "cryptostats", &cryptostats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "timingstats", &timingstats);
/*
* register with libntp ntp_set_tod() to call us back
* when time is stepped.
*/
step_callback = &ntpd_time_stepped;
#ifdef DEBUG
atexit(&uninit_util);
#endif /* DEBUG */
}
| 168,876 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: push_decoder_state (DECODER_STATE ds)
{
if (ds->idx >= ds->stacksize)
{
fprintf (stderr, "ERROR: decoder stack overflow!\n");
abort ();
}
ds->stack[ds->idx++] = ds->cur;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | push_decoder_state (DECODER_STATE ds)
{
if (ds->idx >= ds->stacksize)
{
fprintf (stderr, "ksba: ber-decoder: stack overflow!\n");
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_LIMIT_REACHED);
}
ds->stack[ds->idx++] = ds->cur;
return 0;
}
| 165,052 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jbig2_sd_release(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2SymbolDict *dict)
{
int i;
if (dict == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < dict->n_symbols; i++)
if (dict->glyphs[i])
jbig2_image_release(ctx, dict->glyphs[i]);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, dict->glyphs);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, dict);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | jbig2_sd_release(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2SymbolDict *dict)
{
uint32_t i;
if (dict == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < dict->n_symbols; i++)
if (dict->glyphs[i])
jbig2_image_release(ctx, dict->glyphs[i]);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, dict->glyphs);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, dict);
}
| 165,503 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cdf_read_short_sector(const cdf_stream_t *sst, void *buf, size_t offs,
size_t len, const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
size_t ss = CDF_SEC_SIZE(h);
size_t pos = CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id);
assert(ss == len);
if (pos > ss * sst->sst_len) {
DPRINTF(("Out of bounds read %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u > %"
SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
pos, ss * sst->sst_len));
return -1;
}
(void)memcpy(((char *)buf) + offs,
((const char *)sst->sst_tab) + pos, len);
return len;
}
Commit Message: Fix bounds checks again.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cdf_read_short_sector(const cdf_stream_t *sst, void *buf, size_t offs,
size_t len, const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
size_t ss = CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(h);
size_t pos = CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id);
assert(ss == len);
if (pos > CDF_SEC_SIZE(h) * sst->sst_len) {
DPRINTF(("Out of bounds read %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u > %"
SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
pos, CDF_SEC_SIZE(h) * sst->sst_len));
return -1;
}
(void)memcpy(((char *)buf) + offs,
((const char *)sst->sst_tab) + pos, len);
return len;
}
| 165,624 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int link_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *ipipe,
struct pipe_inode_info *opipe,
size_t len, unsigned int flags)
{
struct pipe_buffer *ibuf, *obuf;
int ret = 0, i = 0, nbuf;
/*
* Potential ABBA deadlock, work around it by ordering lock
* grabbing by pipe info address. Otherwise two different processes
* could deadlock (one doing tee from A -> B, the other from B -> A).
*/
pipe_double_lock(ipipe, opipe);
do {
if (!opipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = -EPIPE;
break;
}
/*
* If we have iterated all input buffers or ran out of
* output room, break.
*/
if (i >= ipipe->nrbufs || opipe->nrbufs >= opipe->buffers)
break;
ibuf = ipipe->bufs + ((ipipe->curbuf + i) & (ipipe->buffers-1));
nbuf = (opipe->curbuf + opipe->nrbufs) & (opipe->buffers - 1);
/*
* Get a reference to this pipe buffer,
* so we can copy the contents over.
*/
pipe_buf_get(ipipe, ibuf);
obuf = opipe->bufs + nbuf;
*obuf = *ibuf;
/*
* Don't inherit the gift flag, we need to
* prevent multiple steals of this page.
*/
obuf->flags &= ~PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT;
pipe_buf_mark_unmergeable(obuf);
if (obuf->len > len)
obuf->len = len;
opipe->nrbufs++;
ret += obuf->len;
len -= obuf->len;
i++;
} while (len);
/*
* return EAGAIN if we have the potential of some data in the
* future, otherwise just return 0
*/
if (!ret && ipipe->waiting_writers && (flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK))
ret = -EAGAIN;
pipe_unlock(ipipe);
pipe_unlock(opipe);
/*
* If we put data in the output pipe, wakeup any potential readers.
*/
if (ret > 0)
wakeup_pipe_readers(opipe);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int link_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *ipipe,
struct pipe_inode_info *opipe,
size_t len, unsigned int flags)
{
struct pipe_buffer *ibuf, *obuf;
int ret = 0, i = 0, nbuf;
/*
* Potential ABBA deadlock, work around it by ordering lock
* grabbing by pipe info address. Otherwise two different processes
* could deadlock (one doing tee from A -> B, the other from B -> A).
*/
pipe_double_lock(ipipe, opipe);
do {
if (!opipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = -EPIPE;
break;
}
/*
* If we have iterated all input buffers or ran out of
* output room, break.
*/
if (i >= ipipe->nrbufs || opipe->nrbufs >= opipe->buffers)
break;
ibuf = ipipe->bufs + ((ipipe->curbuf + i) & (ipipe->buffers-1));
nbuf = (opipe->curbuf + opipe->nrbufs) & (opipe->buffers - 1);
/*
* Get a reference to this pipe buffer,
* so we can copy the contents over.
*/
if (!pipe_buf_get(ipipe, ibuf)) {
if (ret == 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
obuf = opipe->bufs + nbuf;
*obuf = *ibuf;
/*
* Don't inherit the gift flag, we need to
* prevent multiple steals of this page.
*/
obuf->flags &= ~PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT;
pipe_buf_mark_unmergeable(obuf);
if (obuf->len > len)
obuf->len = len;
opipe->nrbufs++;
ret += obuf->len;
len -= obuf->len;
i++;
} while (len);
/*
* return EAGAIN if we have the potential of some data in the
* future, otherwise just return 0
*/
if (!ret && ipipe->waiting_writers && (flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK))
ret = -EAGAIN;
pipe_unlock(ipipe);
pipe_unlock(opipe);
/*
* If we put data in the output pipe, wakeup any potential readers.
*/
if (ret > 0)
wakeup_pipe_readers(opipe);
return ret;
}
| 170,219 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: buffer_add_range(int fd, struct evbuffer *evb, struct range *range)
{
char buf[BUFSIZ];
size_t n, range_sz;
ssize_t nread;
if (lseek(fd, range->start, SEEK_SET) == -1)
return (0);
range_sz = range->end - range->start + 1;
while (range_sz) {
n = MINIMUM(range_sz, sizeof(buf));
if ((nread = read(fd, buf, n)) == -1)
return (0);
evbuffer_add(evb, buf, nread);
range_sz -= nread;
}
return (1);
}
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
CWE ID: CWE-770 | buffer_add_range(int fd, struct evbuffer *evb, struct range *range)
| 168,375 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: store_image_check(PNG_CONST png_store* ps, png_const_structp pp, int iImage)
{
png_const_bytep image = ps->image;
if (image[-1] != 0xed || image[ps->cb_image] != 0xfe)
png_error(pp, "image overwrite");
else
{
png_size_t cbRow = ps->cb_row;
png_uint_32 rows = ps->image_h;
image += iImage * (cbRow+5) * ps->image_h;
image += 2; /* skip image first row markers */
while (rows-- > 0)
{
if (image[-2] != 190 || image[-1] != 239)
png_error(pp, "row start overwritten");
if (image[cbRow] != 222 || image[cbRow+1] != 173 ||
image[cbRow+2] != 17)
png_error(pp, "row end overwritten");
image += cbRow+5;
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | store_image_check(PNG_CONST png_store* ps, png_const_structp pp, int iImage)
store_image_check(const png_store* ps, png_const_structp pp, int iImage)
{
png_const_bytep image = ps->image;
if (image[-1] != 0xed || image[ps->cb_image] != 0xfe)
png_error(pp, "image overwrite");
else
{
png_size_t cbRow = ps->cb_row;
png_uint_32 rows = ps->image_h;
image += iImage * (cbRow+5) * ps->image_h;
image += 2; /* skip image first row markers */
while (rows-- > 0)
{
if (image[-2] != 190 || image[-1] != 239)
png_error(pp, "row start overwritten");
if (image[cbRow] != 222 || image[cbRow+1] != 173 ||
image[cbRow+2] != 17)
png_error(pp, "row end overwritten");
image += cbRow+5;
}
}
}
| 173,704 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Track::Seek(
long long time_ns,
const BlockEntry*& pResult) const
{
const long status = GetFirst(pResult);
if (status < 0) //buffer underflow, etc
return status;
assert(pResult);
if (pResult->EOS())
return 0;
const Cluster* pCluster = pResult->GetCluster();
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() >= 0);
if (time_ns <= pResult->GetBlock()->GetTime(pCluster))
return 0;
Cluster** const clusters = m_pSegment->m_clusters;
assert(clusters);
const long count = m_pSegment->GetCount(); //loaded only, not preloaded
assert(count > 0);
Cluster** const i = clusters + pCluster->GetIndex();
assert(i);
assert(*i == pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
Cluster** const j = clusters + count;
Cluster** lo = i;
Cluster** hi = j;
while (lo < hi)
{
Cluster** const mid = lo + (hi - lo) / 2;
assert(mid < hi);
pCluster = *mid;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() >= 0);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() == long(mid - m_pSegment->m_clusters));
const long long t = pCluster->GetTime();
if (t <= time_ns)
lo = mid + 1;
else
hi = mid;
assert(lo <= hi);
}
assert(lo == hi);
assert(lo > i);
assert(lo <= j);
while (lo > i)
{
pCluster = *--lo;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
pResult = pCluster->GetEntry(this);
if ((pResult != 0) && !pResult->EOS())
return 0;
}
pResult = GetEOS(); //weird
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Track::Seek(
long Track::Seek(long long time_ns, const BlockEntry*& pResult) const {
const long status = GetFirst(pResult);
if (status < 0) // buffer underflow, etc
return status;
assert(pResult);
if (pResult->EOS())
return 0;
const Cluster* pCluster = pResult->GetCluster();
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() >= 0);
if (time_ns <= pResult->GetBlock()->GetTime(pCluster))
return 0;
Cluster** const clusters = m_pSegment->m_clusters;
assert(clusters);
const long count = m_pSegment->GetCount(); // loaded only, not preloaded
assert(count > 0);
Cluster** const i = clusters + pCluster->GetIndex();
assert(i);
assert(*i == pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
Cluster** const j = clusters + count;
Cluster** lo = i;
Cluster** hi = j;
while (lo < hi) {
// INVARIANT:
//[i, lo) <= time_ns
//[lo, hi) ?
//[hi, j) > time_ns
Cluster** const mid = lo + (hi - lo) / 2;
assert(mid < hi);
pCluster = *mid;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() >= 0);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() == long(mid - m_pSegment->m_clusters));
const long long t = pCluster->GetTime();
if (t <= time_ns)
lo = mid + 1;
else
hi = mid;
assert(lo <= hi);
}
assert(lo == hi);
assert(lo > i);
assert(lo <= j);
while (lo > i) {
pCluster = *--lo;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
pResult = pCluster->GetEntry(this);
if ((pResult != 0) && !pResult->EOS())
return 0;
// landed on empty cluster (no entries)
}
pResult = GetEOS(); // weird
return 0;
}
| 174,435 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DECLAREreadFunc(readContigTilesIntoBuffer)
{
int status = 1;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(in);
tdata_t tilebuf;
uint32 imagew = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
uint32 tilew = TIFFTileRowSize(in);
int iskew = imagew - tilew;
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
uint32 tw, tl;
uint32 row;
(void) spp;
tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tilesize);
if (tilebuf == 0)
return 0;
_TIFFmemset(tilebuf, 0, tilesize);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl);
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl) {
uint32 nrow = (row+tl > imagelength) ? imagelength-row : tl;
uint32 colb = 0;
uint32 col;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth && colb < imagew; col += tw) {
if (TIFFReadTile(in, tilebuf, col, row, 0, 0) < 0
&& !ignore) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read tile at %lu %lu",
(unsigned long) col,
(unsigned long) row);
status = 0;
goto done;
}
if (colb + tilew > imagew) {
uint32 width = imagew - colb;
uint32 oskew = tilew - width;
cpStripToTile(bufp + colb,
tilebuf, nrow, width,
oskew + iskew, oskew );
} else
cpStripToTile(bufp + colb,
tilebuf, nrow, tilew,
iskew, 0);
colb += tilew;
}
bufp += imagew * nrow;
}
done:
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix uint32 underflow/overflow that can cause heap-based
buffer overflow.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2610
CWE ID: CWE-190 | DECLAREreadFunc(readContigTilesIntoBuffer)
{
int status = 1;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(in);
tdata_t tilebuf;
uint32 imagew = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
uint32 tilew = TIFFTileRowSize(in);
int64 iskew = (int64)imagew - (int64)tilew;
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
uint32 tw, tl;
uint32 row;
(void) spp;
tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tilesize);
if (tilebuf == 0)
return 0;
_TIFFmemset(tilebuf, 0, tilesize);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl);
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl) {
uint32 nrow = (row+tl > imagelength) ? imagelength-row : tl;
uint32 colb = 0;
uint32 col;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth && colb < imagew; col += tw) {
if (TIFFReadTile(in, tilebuf, col, row, 0, 0) < 0
&& !ignore) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read tile at %lu %lu",
(unsigned long) col,
(unsigned long) row);
status = 0;
goto done;
}
if (colb > iskew) {
uint32 width = imagew - colb;
uint32 oskew = tilew - width;
cpStripToTile(bufp + colb,
tilebuf, nrow, width,
oskew + iskew, oskew );
} else
cpStripToTile(bufp + colb,
tilebuf, nrow, tilew,
iskew, 0);
colb += tilew;
}
bufp += imagew * nrow;
}
done:
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
| 168,532 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ContextualSearchDelegate::DecodeSearchTermFromJsonResponse(
const std::string& response,
std::string* search_term,
std::string* display_text,
std::string* alternate_term,
std::string* mid,
std::string* prevent_preload,
int* mention_start,
int* mention_end,
std::string* lang,
std::string* thumbnail_url,
std::string* caption) {
bool contains_xssi_escape =
base::StartsWith(response, kXssiEscape, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE);
const std::string& proper_json =
contains_xssi_escape ? response.substr(sizeof(kXssiEscape) - 1)
: response;
JSONStringValueDeserializer deserializer(proper_json);
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> root =
deserializer.Deserialize(nullptr, nullptr);
const std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> dict =
base::DictionaryValue::From(std::move(root));
if (!dict)
return;
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchPreventPreload, prevent_preload);
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseSearchTermParam, search_term);
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseLanguageParam, lang);
if (!dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseDisplayTextParam,
display_text)) {
*display_text = *search_term;
}
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseMidParam, mid);
if (!field_trial_->IsDecodeMentionsDisabled()) {
base::ListValue* mentions_list = nullptr;
dict->GetList(kContextualSearchMentions, &mentions_list);
if (mentions_list && mentions_list->GetSize() >= 2)
ExtractMentionsStartEnd(*mentions_list, mention_start, mention_end);
}
std::string selected_text;
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseSelectedTextParam, &selected_text);
if (selected_text != *search_term) {
*alternate_term = selected_text;
} else {
std::string resolved_term;
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseResolvedTermParam, &resolved_term);
if (resolved_term != *search_term) {
*alternate_term = resolved_term;
}
}
if (field_trial_->IsNowOnTapBarIntegrationEnabled()) {
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchCaption, caption);
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchThumbnail, thumbnail_url);
}
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | void ContextualSearchDelegate::DecodeSearchTermFromJsonResponse(
const std::string& response,
std::string* search_term,
std::string* display_text,
std::string* alternate_term,
std::string* mid,
std::string* prevent_preload,
int* mention_start,
int* mention_end,
std::string* lang,
std::string* thumbnail_url,
std::string* caption) {
bool contains_xssi_escape =
base::StartsWith(response, kXssiEscape, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE);
const std::string& proper_json =
contains_xssi_escape ? response.substr(sizeof(kXssiEscape) - 1)
: response;
JSONStringValueDeserializer deserializer(proper_json);
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> root =
deserializer.Deserialize(nullptr, nullptr);
const std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> dict =
base::DictionaryValue::From(std::move(root));
if (!dict)
return;
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchPreventPreload, prevent_preload);
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseSearchTermParam, search_term);
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseLanguageParam, lang);
if (!dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseDisplayTextParam,
display_text)) {
*display_text = *search_term;
}
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseMidParam, mid);
if (!field_trial_->IsDecodeMentionsDisabled()) {
base::ListValue* mentions_list = nullptr;
dict->GetList(kContextualSearchMentions, &mentions_list);
if (mentions_list && mentions_list->GetSize() >= 2)
ExtractMentionsStartEnd(*mentions_list, mention_start, mention_end);
}
std::string selected_text;
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseSelectedTextParam, &selected_text);
if (selected_text != *search_term) {
*alternate_term = selected_text;
} else {
std::string resolved_term;
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseResolvedTermParam, &resolved_term);
if (resolved_term != *search_term) {
*alternate_term = resolved_term;
}
}
if (field_trial_->IsContextualCardsBarIntegrationEnabled()) {
// Get the basic Bar data for Contextual Cards integration directly
// from the root.
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchCaption, caption);
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchThumbnail, thumbnail_url);
}
}
| 171,642 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void addModuleArgument(sqlite3 *db, Table *pTable, char *zArg){
int nBytes = sizeof(char *)*(2+pTable->nModuleArg);
char **azModuleArg;
azModuleArg = sqlite3DbRealloc(db, pTable->azModuleArg, nBytes);
if( azModuleArg==0 ){
sqlite3DbFree(db, zArg);
}else{
int i = pTable->nModuleArg++;
azModuleArg[i] = zArg;
azModuleArg[i+1] = 0;
pTable->azModuleArg = azModuleArg;
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static void addModuleArgument(sqlite3 *db, Table *pTable, char *zArg){
static void addModuleArgument(Parse *pParse, Table *pTable, char *zArg){
sqlite3_int64 nBytes = sizeof(char *)*(2+pTable->nModuleArg);
char **azModuleArg;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
if( pTable->nModuleArg+3>=db->aLimit[SQLITE_LIMIT_COLUMN] ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "too many columns on %s", pTable->zName);
}
azModuleArg = sqlite3DbRealloc(db, pTable->azModuleArg, nBytes);
if( azModuleArg==0 ){
sqlite3DbFree(db, zArg);
}else{
int i = pTable->nModuleArg++;
azModuleArg[i] = zArg;
azModuleArg[i+1] = 0;
pTable->azModuleArg = azModuleArg;
}
}
| 173,014 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void mp_encode_lua_table_as_map(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, int level) {
size_t len = 0;
/* First step: count keys into table. No other way to do it with the
* Lua API, we need to iterate a first time. Note that an alternative
* would be to do a single run, and then hack the buffer to insert the
* map opcodes for message pack. Too hackish for this lib. */
lua_pushnil(L);
while(lua_next(L,-2)) {
lua_pop(L,1); /* remove value, keep key for next iteration. */
len++;
}
/* Step two: actually encoding of the map. */
mp_encode_map(L,buf,len);
lua_pushnil(L);
while(lua_next(L,-2)) {
/* Stack: ... key value */
lua_pushvalue(L,-2); /* Stack: ... key value key */
mp_encode_lua_type(L,buf,level+1); /* encode key */
mp_encode_lua_type(L,buf,level+1); /* encode val */
}
}
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void mp_encode_lua_table_as_map(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, int level) {
size_t len = 0;
/* First step: count keys into table. No other way to do it with the
* Lua API, we need to iterate a first time. Note that an alternative
* would be to do a single run, and then hack the buffer to insert the
* map opcodes for message pack. Too hackish for this lib. */
luaL_checkstack(L, 3, "in function mp_encode_lua_table_as_map");
lua_pushnil(L);
while(lua_next(L,-2)) {
lua_pop(L,1); /* remove value, keep key for next iteration. */
len++;
}
/* Step two: actually encoding of the map. */
mp_encode_map(L,buf,len);
lua_pushnil(L);
while(lua_next(L,-2)) {
/* Stack: ... key value */
lua_pushvalue(L,-2); /* Stack: ... key value key */
mp_encode_lua_type(L,buf,level+1); /* encode key */
mp_encode_lua_type(L,buf,level+1); /* encode val */
}
}
| 169,240 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AXObject::isHiddenForTextAlternativeCalculation() const {
if (equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false"))
return false;
if (getLayoutObject())
return getLayoutObject()->style()->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
Document* document = getDocument();
if (!document || !document->frame())
return false;
if (Node* node = getNode()) {
if (node->isConnected() && node->isElementNode()) {
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> style =
document->ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(toElement(node));
return style->display() == EDisplay::kNone ||
style->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool AXObject::isHiddenForTextAlternativeCalculation() const {
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false"))
return false;
if (getLayoutObject())
return getLayoutObject()->style()->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
Document* document = getDocument();
if (!document || !document->frame())
return false;
if (Node* node = getNode()) {
if (node->isConnected() && node->isElementNode()) {
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> style =
document->ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(toElement(node));
return style->display() == EDisplay::kNone ||
style->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
}
}
return false;
}
| 171,926 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void mptsas_fetch_request(MPTSASState *s)
{
PCIDevice *pci = (PCIDevice *) s;
char req[MPTSAS_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE];
MPIRequestHeader *hdr = (MPIRequestHeader *)req;
hwaddr addr;
int size;
if (s->state != MPI_IOC_STATE_OPERATIONAL) {
mptsas_set_fault(s, MPI_IOCSTATUS_INVALID_STATE);
return;
}
/* Read the message header from the guest first. */
addr = s->host_mfa_high_addr | MPTSAS_FIFO_GET(s, request_post);
pci_dma_read(pci, addr, req, sizeof(hdr));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void mptsas_fetch_request(MPTSASState *s)
{
PCIDevice *pci = (PCIDevice *) s;
char req[MPTSAS_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE];
MPIRequestHeader *hdr = (MPIRequestHeader *)req;
hwaddr addr;
int size;
/* Read the message header from the guest first. */
addr = s->host_mfa_high_addr | MPTSAS_FIFO_GET(s, request_post);
pci_dma_read(pci, addr, req, sizeof(hdr));
}
| 165,017 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void exit_io_context(void)
{
struct io_context *ioc;
task_lock(current);
ioc = current->io_context;
current->io_context = NULL;
task_unlock(current);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ioc->nr_tasks)) {
if (ioc->aic && ioc->aic->exit)
ioc->aic->exit(ioc->aic);
cfq_exit(ioc);
}
put_io_context(ioc);
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after failure of clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, parent's io_context->nr_tasks is incremented, but never
decremented whenever copy_process() fails afterwards, which prevents
exit_io_context() from calling IO schedulers exit functions.
Give a task_struct to exit_io_context(), and call exit_io_context() instead of
put_io_context() in copy_process() cleanup path.
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void exit_io_context(void)
void exit_io_context(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct io_context *ioc;
task_lock(task);
ioc = task->io_context;
task->io_context = NULL;
task_unlock(task);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ioc->nr_tasks)) {
if (ioc->aic && ioc->aic->exit)
ioc->aic->exit(ioc->aic);
cfq_exit(ioc);
}
put_io_context(ioc);
}
| 169,885 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jbig2_sd_cat(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, int n_dicts, Jbig2SymbolDict **dicts)
{
int i, j, k, symbols;
Jbig2SymbolDict *new = NULL;
/* count the imported symbols and allocate a new array */
symbols = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_dicts; i++)
symbols += dicts[i]->n_symbols;
/* fill a new array with cloned glyph pointers */
new = jbig2_sd_new(ctx, symbols);
if (new != NULL) {
k = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_dicts; i++)
for (j = 0; j < dicts[i]->n_symbols; j++)
new->glyphs[k++] = jbig2_image_clone(ctx, dicts[i]->glyphs[j]);
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, -1, "failed to allocate new symbol dictionary");
}
return new;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | jbig2_sd_cat(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, int n_dicts, Jbig2SymbolDict **dicts)
jbig2_sd_cat(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, uint32_t n_dicts, Jbig2SymbolDict **dicts)
{
uint32_t i, j, k, symbols;
Jbig2SymbolDict *new_dict = NULL;
/* count the imported symbols and allocate a new array */
symbols = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_dicts; i++)
symbols += dicts[i]->n_symbols;
/* fill a new array with cloned glyph pointers */
new_dict = jbig2_sd_new(ctx, symbols);
if (new_dict != NULL) {
k = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_dicts; i++)
for (j = 0; j < dicts[i]->n_symbols; j++)
new_dict->glyphs[k++] = jbig2_image_clone(ctx, dicts[i]->glyphs[j]);
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, -1, "failed to allocate new symbol dictionary");
}
return new_dict;
}
| 165,499 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Chapters::Chapters(
Segment* pSegment,
long long payload_start,
long long payload_size,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_start(payload_start),
m_size(payload_size),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
m_editions(NULL),
m_editions_size(0),
m_editions_count(0)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Chapters::Chapters(
| 174,243 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cib_notify_client(gpointer key, gpointer value, gpointer user_data)
{
const char *type = NULL;
gboolean do_send = FALSE;
cib_client_t *client = value;
xmlNode *update_msg = user_data;
CRM_CHECK(client != NULL, return TRUE);
CRM_CHECK(update_msg != NULL, return TRUE);
if (client->ipc == NULL) {
crm_warn("Skipping client with NULL channel");
return FALSE;
}
type = crm_element_value(update_msg, F_SUBTYPE);
CRM_LOG_ASSERT(type != NULL);
if (client->diffs && safe_str_eq(type, T_CIB_DIFF_NOTIFY)) {
do_send = TRUE;
} else if (client->replace && safe_str_eq(type, T_CIB_REPLACE_NOTIFY)) {
do_send = TRUE;
} else if (client->confirmations && safe_str_eq(type, T_CIB_UPDATE_CONFIRM)) {
do_send = TRUE;
} else if (client->pre_notify && safe_str_eq(type, T_CIB_PRE_NOTIFY)) {
do_send = TRUE;
} else if (client->post_notify && safe_str_eq(type, T_CIB_POST_NOTIFY)) {
do_send = TRUE;
}
if (do_send) {
if (client->ipc) {
if(crm_ipcs_send(client->ipc, 0, update_msg, TRUE) == FALSE) {
crm_warn("Notification of client %s/%s failed", client->name, client->id);
}
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
} else if (client->session) {
crm_debug("Sent %s notification to client %s/%s", type, client->name, client->id);
crm_send_remote_msg(client->session, update_msg, client->encrypted);
#endif
} else {
crm_err("Unknown transport for %s", client->name);
}
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | cib_notify_client(gpointer key, gpointer value, gpointer user_data)
{
const char *type = NULL;
gboolean do_send = FALSE;
cib_client_t *client = value;
xmlNode *update_msg = user_data;
CRM_CHECK(client != NULL, return TRUE);
CRM_CHECK(update_msg != NULL, return TRUE);
if (client->ipc == NULL && client->session == NULL) {
crm_warn("Skipping client with NULL channel");
return FALSE;
}
type = crm_element_value(update_msg, F_SUBTYPE);
CRM_LOG_ASSERT(type != NULL);
if (client->diffs && safe_str_eq(type, T_CIB_DIFF_NOTIFY)) {
do_send = TRUE;
} else if (client->replace && safe_str_eq(type, T_CIB_REPLACE_NOTIFY)) {
do_send = TRUE;
} else if (client->confirmations && safe_str_eq(type, T_CIB_UPDATE_CONFIRM)) {
do_send = TRUE;
} else if (client->pre_notify && safe_str_eq(type, T_CIB_PRE_NOTIFY)) {
do_send = TRUE;
} else if (client->post_notify && safe_str_eq(type, T_CIB_POST_NOTIFY)) {
do_send = TRUE;
}
if (do_send) {
if (client->ipc) {
if(crm_ipcs_send(client->ipc, 0, update_msg, TRUE) == FALSE) {
crm_warn("Notification of client %s/%s failed", client->name, client->id);
}
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
} else if (client->session) {
crm_debug("Sent %s notification to client %s/%s", type, client->name, client->id);
crm_send_remote_msg(client->session, update_msg, client->encrypted);
#endif
} else {
crm_err("Unknown transport for %s", client->name);
}
}
return FALSE;
}
| 166,146 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateIntArray( int64_t *numbers, int count )
{
int i;
cJSON *n = 0, *p = 0, *a = cJSON_CreateArray();
for ( i = 0; a && i < count; ++i ) {
n = cJSON_CreateInt( numbers[i] );
if ( ! i )
a->child = n;
else
suffix_object( p, n );
p = n;
}
return a;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cJSON *cJSON_CreateIntArray( int64_t *numbers, int count )
| 167,275 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_strip_16_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_strip_16(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_strip_16_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_strip_16_set(const image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_strip_16(pp);
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10700
/* libpng will limit the gamma table size: */
that->max_gamma_8 = PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8;
# endif
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
| 173,650 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int v9fs_device_realize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
{
V9fsVirtioState *v = container_of(s, V9fsVirtioState, state);
int i, len;
struct stat stat;
FsDriverEntry *fse;
V9fsPath path;
int rc = 1;
/* initialize pdu allocator */
QLIST_INIT(&s->free_list);
QLIST_INIT(&s->active_list);
for (i = 0; i < (MAX_REQ - 1); i++) {
QLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&s->free_list, &v->pdus[i], next);
v->pdus[i].s = s;
v->pdus[i].idx = i;
}
v9fs_path_init(&path);
fse = get_fsdev_fsentry(s->fsconf.fsdev_id);
if (!fse) {
/* We don't have a fsdev identified by fsdev_id */
error_setg(errp, "9pfs device couldn't find fsdev with the "
"id = %s",
s->fsconf.fsdev_id ? s->fsconf.fsdev_id : "NULL");
goto out;
}
if (!s->fsconf.tag) {
/* we haven't specified a mount_tag */
error_setg(errp, "fsdev with id %s needs mount_tag arguments",
s->fsconf.fsdev_id);
goto out;
}
s->ctx.export_flags = fse->export_flags;
s->ctx.fs_root = g_strdup(fse->path);
s->ctx.exops.get_st_gen = NULL;
len = strlen(s->fsconf.tag);
if (len > MAX_TAG_LEN - 1) {
error_setg(errp, "mount tag '%s' (%d bytes) is longer than "
"maximum (%d bytes)", s->fsconf.tag, len, MAX_TAG_LEN - 1);
goto out;
}
s->tag = g_strdup(s->fsconf.tag);
s->ctx.uid = -1;
s->ops = fse->ops;
s->fid_list = NULL;
qemu_co_rwlock_init(&s->rename_lock);
if (s->ops->init(&s->ctx) < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "9pfs Failed to initialize fs-driver with id:%s"
" and export path:%s", s->fsconf.fsdev_id, s->ctx.fs_root);
goto out;
}
/*
* Check details of export path, We need to use fs driver
* call back to do that. Since we are in the init path, we don't
* use co-routines here.
*/
if (s->ops->name_to_path(&s->ctx, NULL, "/", &path) < 0) {
error_setg(errp,
"error in converting name to path %s", strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (s->ops->lstat(&s->ctx, &path, &stat)) {
error_setg(errp, "share path %s does not exist", fse->path);
goto out;
} else if (!S_ISDIR(stat.st_mode)) {
error_setg(errp, "share path %s is not a directory", fse->path);
goto out;
}
v9fs_path_free(&path);
rc = 0;
out:
if (rc) {
g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
g_free(s->tag);
v9fs_path_free(&path);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | int v9fs_device_realize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
{
V9fsVirtioState *v = container_of(s, V9fsVirtioState, state);
int i, len;
struct stat stat;
FsDriverEntry *fse;
V9fsPath path;
int rc = 1;
/* initialize pdu allocator */
QLIST_INIT(&s->free_list);
QLIST_INIT(&s->active_list);
for (i = 0; i < (MAX_REQ - 1); i++) {
QLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&s->free_list, &v->pdus[i], next);
v->pdus[i].s = s;
v->pdus[i].idx = i;
}
v9fs_path_init(&path);
fse = get_fsdev_fsentry(s->fsconf.fsdev_id);
if (!fse) {
/* We don't have a fsdev identified by fsdev_id */
error_setg(errp, "9pfs device couldn't find fsdev with the "
"id = %s",
s->fsconf.fsdev_id ? s->fsconf.fsdev_id : "NULL");
goto out;
}
if (!s->fsconf.tag) {
/* we haven't specified a mount_tag */
error_setg(errp, "fsdev with id %s needs mount_tag arguments",
s->fsconf.fsdev_id);
goto out;
}
s->ctx.export_flags = fse->export_flags;
s->ctx.fs_root = g_strdup(fse->path);
s->ctx.exops.get_st_gen = NULL;
len = strlen(s->fsconf.tag);
if (len > MAX_TAG_LEN - 1) {
error_setg(errp, "mount tag '%s' (%d bytes) is longer than "
"maximum (%d bytes)", s->fsconf.tag, len, MAX_TAG_LEN - 1);
goto out;
}
s->tag = g_strdup(s->fsconf.tag);
s->ctx.uid = -1;
s->ops = fse->ops;
s->fid_list = NULL;
qemu_co_rwlock_init(&s->rename_lock);
if (s->ops->init(&s->ctx) < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "9pfs Failed to initialize fs-driver with id:%s"
" and export path:%s", s->fsconf.fsdev_id, s->ctx.fs_root);
goto out;
}
/*
* Check details of export path, We need to use fs driver
* call back to do that. Since we are in the init path, we don't
* use co-routines here.
*/
if (s->ops->name_to_path(&s->ctx, NULL, "/", &path) < 0) {
error_setg(errp,
"error in converting name to path %s", strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (s->ops->lstat(&s->ctx, &path, &stat)) {
error_setg(errp, "share path %s does not exist", fse->path);
goto out;
} else if (!S_ISDIR(stat.st_mode)) {
error_setg(errp, "share path %s is not a directory", fse->path);
goto out;
}
v9fs_path_free(&path);
rc = 0;
out:
if (rc) {
g_free(s->tag);
g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
v9fs_path_free(&path);
}
return rc;
}
| 164,895 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void KioskNextHomeInterfaceBrokerImpl::GetAppController(
mojom::AppControllerRequest request) {
app_controller_->BindRequest(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void KioskNextHomeInterfaceBrokerImpl::GetAppController(
mojom::AppControllerRequest request) {
AppControllerService::Get(context_)->BindRequest(std::move(request));
}
| 172,090 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: parse_range(char *str, size_t file_sz, int *nranges)
{
static struct range ranges[MAX_RANGES];
int i = 0;
char *p, *q;
/* Extract range unit */
if ((p = strchr(str, '=')) == NULL)
return (NULL);
*p++ = '\0';
/* Check if it's a bytes range spec */
if (strcmp(str, "bytes") != 0)
return (NULL);
while ((q = strchr(p, ',')) != NULL) {
*q++ = '\0';
/* Extract start and end positions */
if (parse_range_spec(p, file_sz, &ranges[i]) == 0)
continue;
i++;
if (i == MAX_RANGES)
return (NULL);
p = q;
}
if (parse_range_spec(p, file_sz, &ranges[i]) != 0)
i++;
*nranges = i;
return (i ? ranges : NULL);
}
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
CWE ID: CWE-770 | parse_range(char *str, size_t file_sz, int *nranges)
int
parse_ranges(struct client *clt, char *str, size_t file_sz)
{
int i = 0;
char *p, *q;
struct range_data *r = &clt->clt_ranges;
memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r));
/* Extract range unit */
if ((p = strchr(str, '=')) == NULL)
return (-1);
*p++ = '\0';
/* Check if it's a bytes range spec */
if (strcmp(str, "bytes") != 0)
return (-1);
while ((q = strchr(p, ',')) != NULL) {
*q++ = '\0';
/* Extract start and end positions */
if (parse_range_spec(p, file_sz, &r->range[i]) == 0)
continue;
i++;
if (i == SERVER_MAX_RANGES)
return (-1);
p = q;
}
if (parse_range_spec(p, file_sz, &r->range[i]) != 0)
i++;
r->range_total = file_sz;
r->range_count = i;
return (i);
}
| 168,376 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: modifier_color_encoding_is_set(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm)
{
return pm->current_gamma != 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | modifier_color_encoding_is_set(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm)
modifier_color_encoding_is_set(const png_modifier *pm)
{
return pm->current_gamma != 0;
}
| 173,668 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IW_IMPL(unsigned int) iw_get_ui16le(const iw_byte *b)
{
return b[0] | (b[1]<<8);
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682 | IW_IMPL(unsigned int) iw_get_ui16le(const iw_byte *b)
{
return (unsigned int)b[0] | ((unsigned int)b[1]<<8);
}
| 168,198 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: rpl_daoack_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
const struct nd_rpl_daoack *daoack = (const struct nd_rpl_daoack *)bp;
const char *dagid_str = "<elided>";
ND_TCHECK2(*daoack, ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN);
if (length < ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN)
goto tooshort;
bp += ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN;
length -= ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN;
if(RPL_DAOACK_D(daoack->rpl_flags)) {
ND_TCHECK2(daoack->rpl_dagid, DAGID_LEN);
if (length < DAGID_LEN)
goto tooshort;
dagid_str = ip6addr_string (ndo, daoack->rpl_dagid);
bp += DAGID_LEN;
length -= DAGID_LEN;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [dagid:%s,seq:%u,instance:%u,status:%u]",
dagid_str,
daoack->rpl_daoseq,
daoack->rpl_instanceid,
daoack->rpl_status));
/* no officially defined options for DAOACK, but print any we find */
if(ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const struct rpl_dio_genoption *opt = (const struct rpl_dio_genoption *)bp;
rpl_dio_printopt(ndo, opt, length);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|dao-truncated]"));
return;
tooshort:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|dao-length too short]"));
return;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | rpl_daoack_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
const struct nd_rpl_daoack *daoack = (const struct nd_rpl_daoack *)bp;
const char *dagid_str = "<elided>";
ND_TCHECK2(*daoack, ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN);
if (length < ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN)
goto tooshort;
bp += ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN;
length -= ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN;
if(RPL_DAOACK_D(daoack->rpl_flags)) {
ND_TCHECK2(daoack->rpl_dagid, DAGID_LEN);
if (length < DAGID_LEN)
goto tooshort;
dagid_str = ip6addr_string (ndo, daoack->rpl_dagid);
bp += DAGID_LEN;
length -= DAGID_LEN;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [dagid:%s,seq:%u,instance:%u,status:%u]",
dagid_str,
daoack->rpl_daoseq,
daoack->rpl_instanceid,
daoack->rpl_status));
/* no officially defined options for DAOACK, but print any we find */
if(ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const struct rpl_dio_genoption *opt = (const struct rpl_dio_genoption *)bp;
rpl_dio_printopt(ndo, opt, length);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", rpl_tstr));
return;
tooshort:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|dao-length too short]"));
return;
}
| 169,829 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int btif_hl_select_wake_reset(void){
char sig_recv = 0;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wake_reset");
recv(signal_fds[0], &sig_recv, sizeof(sig_recv), MSG_WAITALL);
return(int)sig_recv;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static inline int btif_hl_select_wake_reset(void){
char sig_recv = 0;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wake_reset");
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(recv(signal_fds[0], &sig_recv, sizeof(sig_recv), MSG_WAITALL));
return(int)sig_recv;
}
| 173,443 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Resource::~Resource() {
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | Resource::~Resource() {
ResourceTracker::Get()->ResourceDestroyed(this);
}
| 170,415 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setSyncSampleParams(off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mSyncSampleOffset >= 0 || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mSyncSampleOffset = data_offset;
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mNumSyncSamples = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (mNumSyncSamples < 2) {
ALOGV("Table of sync samples is empty or has only a single entry!");
}
uint64_t allocSize = mNumSyncSamples * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mSyncSamples = new uint32_t[mNumSyncSamples];
size_t size = mNumSyncSamples * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (mDataSource->readAt(mSyncSampleOffset + 8, mSyncSamples, size)
!= (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mNumSyncSamples; ++i) {
mSyncSamples[i] = ntohl(mSyncSamples[i]) - 1;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix several ineffective integer overflow checks
Commit edd4a76 (which addressed bugs 15328708, 15342615, 15342751) added
several integer overflow checks. Unfortunately, those checks fail to take into
account integer promotion rules and are thus themselves subject to an integer
overflow. Cast the sizeof() operator to a uint64_t to force promotion while
multiplying.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit e2e812e58e8d2716b00d7d82db99b08d3afb4b32)
Change-Id: I080eb3fa147601f18cedab86e0360406c3963d7b
CWE ID: CWE-189 | status_t SampleTable::setSyncSampleParams(off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mSyncSampleOffset >= 0 || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mSyncSampleOffset = data_offset;
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mNumSyncSamples = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (mNumSyncSamples < 2) {
ALOGV("Table of sync samples is empty or has only a single entry!");
}
uint64_t allocSize = mNumSyncSamples * (uint64_t)sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mSyncSamples = new uint32_t[mNumSyncSamples];
size_t size = mNumSyncSamples * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (mDataSource->readAt(mSyncSampleOffset + 8, mSyncSamples, size)
!= (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mNumSyncSamples; ++i) {
mSyncSamples[i] = ntohl(mSyncSamples[i]) - 1;
}
return OK;
}
| 173,338 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cuse_channel_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct fuse_dev *fud = file->private_data;
struct cuse_conn *cc = fc_to_cc(fud->fc);
int rc;
/* remove from the conntbl, no more access from this point on */
mutex_lock(&cuse_lock);
list_del_init(&cc->list);
mutex_unlock(&cuse_lock);
/* remove device */
if (cc->dev)
device_unregister(cc->dev);
if (cc->cdev) {
unregister_chrdev_region(cc->cdev->dev, 1);
cdev_del(cc->cdev);
}
rc = fuse_dev_release(inode, file); /* puts the base reference */
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cuse: fix memory leak
The problem is that fuse_dev_alloc() acquires an extra reference to cc.fc,
and the original ref count is never dropped.
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: cc080e9e9be1 ("fuse: introduce per-instance fuse_dev structure")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static int cuse_channel_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct fuse_dev *fud = file->private_data;
struct cuse_conn *cc = fc_to_cc(fud->fc);
int rc;
/* remove from the conntbl, no more access from this point on */
mutex_lock(&cuse_lock);
list_del_init(&cc->list);
mutex_unlock(&cuse_lock);
/* remove device */
if (cc->dev)
device_unregister(cc->dev);
if (cc->cdev) {
unregister_chrdev_region(cc->cdev->dev, 1);
cdev_del(cc->cdev);
}
/* Base reference is now owned by "fud" */
fuse_conn_put(&cc->fc);
rc = fuse_dev_release(inode, file); /* puts the base reference */
return rc;
}
| 167,573 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::createGraphicBufferSource(
OMX_U32 portIndex, sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer, MetadataBufferType *type) {
status_t err;
const sp<GraphicBufferSource>& surfaceCheck = getGraphicBufferSource();
if (surfaceCheck != NULL) {
if (portIndex < NELEM(mMetadataType) && type != NULL) {
*type = mMetadataType[portIndex];
}
return ALREADY_EXISTS;
}
if (type != NULL) {
*type = kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
}
err = storeMetaDataInBuffers_l(portIndex, OMX_TRUE, type);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
OMX_ERRORTYPE oerr = OMX_GetParameter(
mHandle, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def);
if (oerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition;
CLOG_ERROR(getParameter, oerr, "%s(%#x): %s:%u",
asString(index), index, portString(portIndex), portIndex);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
if (def.format.video.eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
CLOGW("createInputSurface requires COLOR_FormatSurface "
"(AndroidOpaque) color format instead of %s(%#x)",
asString(def.format.video.eColorFormat), def.format.video.eColorFormat);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
uint32_t usageBits;
oerr = OMX_GetParameter(
mHandle, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits, &usageBits);
if (oerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
usageBits = 0;
}
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource = new GraphicBufferSource(this,
def.format.video.nFrameWidth,
def.format.video.nFrameHeight,
def.nBufferCountActual,
usageBits,
bufferConsumer);
if ((err = bufferSource->initCheck()) != OK) {
return err;
}
setGraphicBufferSource(bufferSource);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::createGraphicBufferSource(
OMX_U32 portIndex, sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer, MetadataBufferType *type) {
status_t err;
// only allow graphic source on input port, when there are no allocated buffers yet
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return BAD_VALUE;
} else if (mNumPortBuffers[portIndex] > 0) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
const sp<GraphicBufferSource> surfaceCheck = getGraphicBufferSource();
if (surfaceCheck != NULL) {
if (portIndex < NELEM(mMetadataType) && type != NULL) {
*type = mMetadataType[portIndex];
}
return ALREADY_EXISTS;
}
if (type != NULL) {
*type = kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
}
err = storeMetaDataInBuffers_l(portIndex, OMX_TRUE, type);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
OMX_ERRORTYPE oerr = OMX_GetParameter(
mHandle, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def);
if (oerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition;
CLOG_ERROR(getParameter, oerr, "%s(%#x): %s:%u",
asString(index), index, portString(portIndex), portIndex);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
if (def.format.video.eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
CLOGW("createInputSurface requires COLOR_FormatSurface "
"(AndroidOpaque) color format instead of %s(%#x)",
asString(def.format.video.eColorFormat), def.format.video.eColorFormat);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
uint32_t usageBits;
oerr = OMX_GetParameter(
mHandle, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits, &usageBits);
if (oerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
usageBits = 0;
}
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource = new GraphicBufferSource(this,
def.format.video.nFrameWidth,
def.format.video.nFrameHeight,
def.nBufferCountActual,
usageBits,
bufferConsumer);
if ((err = bufferSource->initCheck()) != OK) {
return err;
}
setGraphicBufferSource(bufferSource);
return OK;
}
| 174,132 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void LogErrorEventDescription(Display* dpy,
const XErrorEvent& error_event) {
char error_str[256];
char request_str[256];
XGetErrorText(dpy, error_event.error_code, error_str, sizeof(error_str));
strncpy(request_str, "Unknown", sizeof(request_str));
if (error_event.request_code < 128) {
std::string num = base::UintToString(error_event.request_code);
XGetErrorDatabaseText(
dpy, "XRequest", num.c_str(), "Unknown", request_str,
sizeof(request_str));
} else {
int num_ext;
char** ext_list = XListExtensions(dpy, &num_ext);
for (int i = 0; i < num_ext; i++) {
int ext_code, first_event, first_error;
XQueryExtension(dpy, ext_list[i], &ext_code, &first_event, &first_error);
if (error_event.request_code == ext_code) {
std::string msg = StringPrintf(
"%s.%d", ext_list[i], error_event.minor_code);
XGetErrorDatabaseText(
dpy, "XRequest", msg.c_str(), "Unknown", request_str,
sizeof(request_str));
break;
}
}
XFreeExtensionList(ext_list);
}
LOG(ERROR)
<< "X Error detected: "
<< "serial " << error_event.serial << ", "
<< "error_code " << static_cast<int>(error_event.error_code)
<< " (" << error_str << "), "
<< "request_code " << static_cast<int>(error_event.request_code) << ", "
<< "minor_code " << static_cast<int>(error_event.minor_code)
<< " (" << request_str << ")";
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void LogErrorEventDescription(Display* dpy,
const XErrorEvent& error_event) {
char error_str[256];
char request_str[256];
XGetErrorText(dpy, error_event.error_code, error_str, sizeof(error_str));
strncpy(request_str, "Unknown", sizeof(request_str));
if (error_event.request_code < 128) {
std::string num = base::UintToString(error_event.request_code);
XGetErrorDatabaseText(
dpy, "XRequest", num.c_str(), "Unknown", request_str,
sizeof(request_str));
} else {
int num_ext;
char** ext_list = XListExtensions(dpy, &num_ext);
for (int i = 0; i < num_ext; i++) {
int ext_code, first_event, first_error;
XQueryExtension(dpy, ext_list[i], &ext_code, &first_event, &first_error);
if (error_event.request_code == ext_code) {
std::string msg = StringPrintf(
"%s.%d", ext_list[i], error_event.minor_code);
XGetErrorDatabaseText(
dpy, "XRequest", msg.c_str(), "Unknown", request_str,
sizeof(request_str));
break;
}
}
XFreeExtensionList(ext_list);
}
LOG(ERROR)
<< "X Error detected: "
<< "serial " << error_event.serial << ", "
<< "error_code " << static_cast<int>(error_event.error_code)
<< " (" << error_str << "), "
<< "request_code " << static_cast<int>(error_event.request_code) << ", "
<< "minor_code " << static_cast<int>(error_event.minor_code)
<< " (" << request_str << ")";
}
| 171,595 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
{
size_t i, dlen;
dlen = strlen(display);
for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) {
if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) &&
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
{
size_t i, dlen;
if (display == NULL)
return 0;
dlen = strlen(display);
for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) {
if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) &&
}
}
| 165,351 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void UserSelectionScreen::OnBeforeUserRemoved(const AccountId& account_id) {
for (user_manager::UserList::iterator it = users_.begin(); it != users_.end();
++it) {
if ((*it)->GetAccountId() == account_id) {
users_.erase(it);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | void UserSelectionScreen::OnBeforeUserRemoved(const AccountId& account_id) {
for (auto it = users_.cbegin(); it != users_.cend(); ++it) {
if ((*it)->GetAccountId() == account_id) {
users_.erase(it);
break;
}
}
}
| 172,202 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static uint64_t ReadBits(BitReader* reader, int num_bits) {
DCHECK_GE(reader->bits_available(), num_bits);
DCHECK((num_bits > 0) && (num_bits <= 64));
uint64_t value;
reader->ReadBits(num_bits, &value);
return value;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by adtolbar@microsoft.com.
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <chcunningham@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static uint64_t ReadBits(BitReader* reader, int num_bits) {
DCHECK_GE(reader->bits_available(), num_bits);
DCHECK((num_bits > 0) && (num_bits <= 64));
uint64_t value = 0;
if (!reader->ReadBits(num_bits, &value))
return 0;
return value;
}
| 173,019 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_throw_error (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"%s",
"this method always loses");
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_throw_error (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
| 165,124 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int aac_sync(uint64_t state, AACAC3ParseContext *hdr_info,
int *need_next_header, int *new_frame_start)
{
GetBitContext bits;
AACADTSHeaderInfo hdr;
int size;
union {
uint64_t u64;
uint8_t u8[8];
} tmp;
tmp.u64 = av_be2ne64(state);
init_get_bits(&bits, tmp.u8+8-AAC_ADTS_HEADER_SIZE, AAC_ADTS_HEADER_SIZE * 8);
if ((size = avpriv_aac_parse_header(&bits, &hdr)) < 0)
return 0;
*need_next_header = 0;
*new_frame_start = 1;
hdr_info->sample_rate = hdr.sample_rate;
hdr_info->channels = ff_mpeg4audio_channels[hdr.chan_config];
hdr_info->samples = hdr.samples;
hdr_info->bit_rate = hdr.bit_rate;
return size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int aac_sync(uint64_t state, AACAC3ParseContext *hdr_info,
int *need_next_header, int *new_frame_start)
{
GetBitContext bits;
AACADTSHeaderInfo hdr;
int size;
union {
uint64_t u64;
uint8_t u8[8 + FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE];
} tmp;
tmp.u64 = av_be2ne64(state);
init_get_bits(&bits, tmp.u8+8-AAC_ADTS_HEADER_SIZE, AAC_ADTS_HEADER_SIZE * 8);
if ((size = avpriv_aac_parse_header(&bits, &hdr)) < 0)
return 0;
*need_next_header = 0;
*new_frame_start = 1;
hdr_info->sample_rate = hdr.sample_rate;
hdr_info->channels = ff_mpeg4audio_channels[hdr.chan_config];
hdr_info->samples = hdr.samples;
hdr_info->bit_rate = hdr.bit_rate;
return size;
}
| 165,278 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool compare_img(const vpx_image_t *img1,
const vpx_image_t *img2) {
bool match = (img1->fmt == img2->fmt) &&
(img1->d_w == img2->d_w) &&
(img1->d_h == img2->d_h);
const unsigned int width_y = img1->d_w;
const unsigned int height_y = img1->d_h;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < height_y; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
width_y) == 0) && match;
const unsigned int width_uv = (img1->d_w + 1) >> 1;
const unsigned int height_uv = (img1->d_h + 1) >> 1;
for (i = 0; i < height_uv; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_U] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_U] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
width_uv) == 0) && match;
for (i = 0; i < height_uv; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_V] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_V] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
width_uv) == 0) && match;
return match;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static bool compare_img(const vpx_image_t *img1,
const vpx_image_t *img2) {
bool match = (img1->fmt == img2->fmt) &&
(img1->cs == img2->cs) &&
(img1->d_w == img2->d_w) &&
(img1->d_h == img2->d_h);
const unsigned int width_y = img1->d_w;
const unsigned int height_y = img1->d_h;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < height_y; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
width_y) == 0) && match;
const unsigned int width_uv = (img1->d_w + 1) >> 1;
const unsigned int height_uv = (img1->d_h + 1) >> 1;
for (i = 0; i < height_uv; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_U] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_U] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
width_uv) == 0) && match;
for (i = 0; i < height_uv; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_V] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_V] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
width_uv) == 0) && match;
return match;
}
| 174,541 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ID3::removeUnsynchronizationV2_4(bool iTunesHack) {
size_t oldSize = mSize;
size_t offset = 0;
while (mSize >= 10 && offset <= mSize - 10) {
if (!memcmp(&mData[offset], "\0\0\0\0", 4)) {
break;
}
size_t dataSize;
if (iTunesHack) {
dataSize = U32_AT(&mData[offset + 4]);
} else if (!ParseSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], &dataSize)) {
return false;
}
if (dataSize > mSize - 10 - offset) {
return false;
}
uint16_t flags = U16_AT(&mData[offset + 8]);
uint16_t prevFlags = flags;
if (flags & 1) {
if (mSize < 14 || mSize - 14 < offset || dataSize < 4) {
return false;
}
memmove(&mData[offset + 10], &mData[offset + 14], mSize - offset - 14);
mSize -= 4;
dataSize -= 4;
flags &= ~1;
}
if (flags & 2) {
size_t readOffset = offset + 11;
size_t writeOffset = offset + 11;
for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < dataSize; ++i) {
if (mData[readOffset - 1] == 0xff
&& mData[readOffset] == 0x00) {
++readOffset;
--mSize;
--dataSize;
}
mData[writeOffset++] = mData[readOffset++];
}
memmove(&mData[writeOffset], &mData[readOffset], oldSize - readOffset);
flags &= ~2;
}
if (flags != prevFlags || iTunesHack) {
WriteSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], dataSize);
mData[offset + 8] = flags >> 8;
mData[offset + 9] = flags & 0xff;
}
offset += 10 + dataSize;
}
memset(&mData[mSize], 0, oldSize - mSize);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access
Bug: 34618607
Change-Id: I84f0ef948414d0b2d54e8948b6c30b8ae4da2b36
(cherry picked from commit d1c19c57f66d91ea8033c8fa6510a8760a6e663b)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool ID3::removeUnsynchronizationV2_4(bool iTunesHack) {
size_t oldSize = mSize;
size_t offset = 0;
while (mSize >= 10 && offset <= mSize - 10) {
if (!memcmp(&mData[offset], "\0\0\0\0", 4)) {
break;
}
size_t dataSize;
if (iTunesHack) {
dataSize = U32_AT(&mData[offset + 4]);
} else if (!ParseSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], &dataSize)) {
return false;
}
if (dataSize > mSize - 10 - offset) {
return false;
}
uint16_t flags = U16_AT(&mData[offset + 8]);
uint16_t prevFlags = flags;
if (flags & 1) {
if (mSize < 14 || mSize - 14 < offset || dataSize < 4) {
return false;
}
memmove(&mData[offset + 10], &mData[offset + 14], mSize - offset - 14);
mSize -= 4;
dataSize -= 4;
flags &= ~1;
}
if ((flags & 2) && (dataSize >= 2)) {
size_t readOffset = offset + 11;
size_t writeOffset = offset + 11;
for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < dataSize; ++i) {
if (mData[readOffset - 1] == 0xff
&& mData[readOffset] == 0x00) {
++readOffset;
--mSize;
--dataSize;
}
mData[writeOffset++] = mData[readOffset++];
}
if (readOffset <= oldSize) {
memmove(&mData[writeOffset], &mData[readOffset], oldSize - readOffset);
} else {
ALOGE("b/34618607 (%zu %zu %zu %zu)", readOffset, writeOffset, oldSize, mSize);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "34618607");
}
}
flags &= ~2;
if (flags != prevFlags || iTunesHack) {
WriteSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], dataSize);
mData[offset + 8] = flags >> 8;
mData[offset + 9] = flags & 0xff;
}
offset += 10 + dataSize;
}
memset(&mData[mSize], 0, oldSize - mSize);
return true;
}
| 174,031 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: archive_read_format_zip_cleanup(struct archive_read *a)
{
struct zip *zip;
struct zip_entry *zip_entry, *next_zip_entry;
zip = (struct zip *)(a->format->data);
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H
if (zip->stream_valid)
inflateEnd(&zip->stream);
#endif
#if HAVA_LZMA_H && HAVE_LIBLZMA
if (zip->zipx_lzma_valid) {
lzma_end(&zip->zipx_lzma_stream);
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_BZLIB_H
if (zip->bzstream_valid) {
BZ2_bzDecompressEnd(&zip->bzstream);
}
#endif
free(zip->uncompressed_buffer);
if (zip->ppmd8_valid)
__archive_ppmd8_functions.Ppmd8_Free(&zip->ppmd8);
if (zip->zip_entries) {
zip_entry = zip->zip_entries;
while (zip_entry != NULL) {
next_zip_entry = zip_entry->next;
archive_string_free(&zip_entry->rsrcname);
free(zip_entry);
zip_entry = next_zip_entry;
}
}
free(zip->decrypted_buffer);
if (zip->cctx_valid)
archive_decrypto_aes_ctr_release(&zip->cctx);
if (zip->hctx_valid)
archive_hmac_sha1_cleanup(&zip->hctx);
free(zip->iv);
free(zip->erd);
free(zip->v_data);
archive_string_free(&zip->format_name);
free(zip);
(a->format->data) = NULL;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Fix typo in preprocessor macro in archive_read_format_zip_cleanup()
Frees lzma_stream on cleanup()
Fixes #1165
CWE ID: CWE-399 | archive_read_format_zip_cleanup(struct archive_read *a)
{
struct zip *zip;
struct zip_entry *zip_entry, *next_zip_entry;
zip = (struct zip *)(a->format->data);
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H
if (zip->stream_valid)
inflateEnd(&zip->stream);
#endif
#if HAVE_LZMA_H && HAVE_LIBLZMA
if (zip->zipx_lzma_valid) {
lzma_end(&zip->zipx_lzma_stream);
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_BZLIB_H
if (zip->bzstream_valid) {
BZ2_bzDecompressEnd(&zip->bzstream);
}
#endif
free(zip->uncompressed_buffer);
if (zip->ppmd8_valid)
__archive_ppmd8_functions.Ppmd8_Free(&zip->ppmd8);
if (zip->zip_entries) {
zip_entry = zip->zip_entries;
while (zip_entry != NULL) {
next_zip_entry = zip_entry->next;
archive_string_free(&zip_entry->rsrcname);
free(zip_entry);
zip_entry = next_zip_entry;
}
}
free(zip->decrypted_buffer);
if (zip->cctx_valid)
archive_decrypto_aes_ctr_release(&zip->cctx);
if (zip->hctx_valid)
archive_hmac_sha1_cleanup(&zip->hctx);
free(zip->iv);
free(zip->erd);
free(zip->v_data);
archive_string_free(&zip->format_name);
free(zip);
(a->format->data) = NULL;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
| 169,695 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Track::GetNext(const BlockEntry* pCurrEntry,
const BlockEntry*& pNextEntry) const {
assert(pCurrEntry);
assert(!pCurrEntry->EOS()); //?
const Block* const pCurrBlock = pCurrEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pCurrBlock && pCurrBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number);
if (!pCurrBlock || pCurrBlock->GetTrackNumber() != m_info.number)
return -1;
const Cluster* pCluster = pCurrEntry->GetCluster();
assert(pCluster);
assert(!pCluster->EOS());
long status = pCluster->GetNext(pCurrEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
for (int i = 0;;) {
while (pNextEntry) {
const Block* const pNextBlock = pNextEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pNextBlock);
if (pNextBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number)
return 0;
pCurrEntry = pNextEntry;
status = pCluster->GetNext(pCurrEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
if (pCluster == NULL) {
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
if (pCluster->EOS()) {
#if 0
if (m_pSegment->Unparsed() <= 0) //all clusters have been loaded
{
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#else
if (m_pSegment->DoneParsing()) {
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#endif
pNextEntry = NULL;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
status = pCluster->GetFirst(pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pNextEntry == NULL) // empty cluster
continue;
++i;
if (i >= 100)
break;
}
pNextEntry = GetEOS(); // so we can return a non-NULL value
return 1;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long Track::GetNext(const BlockEntry* pCurrEntry,
const BlockEntry*& pNextEntry) const {
assert(pCurrEntry);
assert(!pCurrEntry->EOS()); //?
const Block* const pCurrBlock = pCurrEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pCurrBlock && pCurrBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number);
if (!pCurrBlock || pCurrBlock->GetTrackNumber() != m_info.number)
return -1;
const Cluster* pCluster = pCurrEntry->GetCluster();
assert(pCluster);
assert(!pCluster->EOS());
long status = pCluster->GetNext(pCurrEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
for (int i = 0;;) {
while (pNextEntry) {
const Block* const pNextBlock = pNextEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pNextBlock);
if (pNextBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number)
return 0;
pCurrEntry = pNextEntry;
status = pCluster->GetNext(pCurrEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
if (pCluster == NULL) {
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
if (pCluster->EOS()) {
if (m_pSegment->DoneParsing()) {
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
pNextEntry = NULL;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
status = pCluster->GetFirst(pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pNextEntry == NULL) // empty cluster
continue;
++i;
if (i >= 100)
break;
}
pNextEntry = GetEOS(); // so we can return a non-NULL value
return 1;
}
| 173,823 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: onig_new_deluxe(regex_t** reg, const UChar* pattern, const UChar* pattern_end,
OnigCompileInfo* ci, OnigErrorInfo* einfo)
{
int r;
UChar *cpat, *cpat_end;
if (IS_NOT_NULL(einfo)) einfo->par = (UChar* )NULL;
if (ci->pattern_enc != ci->target_enc) {
r = conv_encoding(ci->pattern_enc, ci->target_enc, pattern, pattern_end,
&cpat, &cpat_end);
if (r != 0) return r;
}
else {
cpat = (UChar* )pattern;
cpat_end = (UChar* )pattern_end;
}
*reg = (regex_t* )xmalloc(sizeof(regex_t));
if (IS_NULL(*reg)) {
r = ONIGERR_MEMORY;
goto err2;
}
r = onig_reg_init(*reg, ci->option, ci->case_fold_flag, ci->target_enc,
ci->syntax);
if (r != 0) goto err;
r = onig_compile(*reg, cpat, cpat_end, einfo);
if (r != 0) {
err:
onig_free(*reg);
*reg = NULL;
}
err2:
if (cpat != pattern) xfree(cpat);
return r;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13224: don't allow different encodings for onig_new_deluxe()
CWE ID: CWE-416 | onig_new_deluxe(regex_t** reg, const UChar* pattern, const UChar* pattern_end,
OnigCompileInfo* ci, OnigErrorInfo* einfo)
{
int r;
UChar *cpat, *cpat_end;
if (IS_NOT_NULL(einfo)) einfo->par = (UChar* )NULL;
if (ci->pattern_enc != ci->target_enc) {
return ONIGERR_NOT_SUPPORTED_ENCODING_COMBINATION;
}
else {
cpat = (UChar* )pattern;
cpat_end = (UChar* )pattern_end;
}
*reg = (regex_t* )xmalloc(sizeof(regex_t));
if (IS_NULL(*reg)) {
r = ONIGERR_MEMORY;
goto err2;
}
r = onig_reg_init(*reg, ci->option, ci->case_fold_flag, ci->target_enc,
ci->syntax);
if (r != 0) goto err;
r = onig_compile(*reg, cpat, cpat_end, einfo);
if (r != 0) {
err:
onig_free(*reg);
*reg = NULL;
}
err2:
if (cpat != pattern) xfree(cpat);
return r;
}
| 169,613 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void timer_config_save(UNUSED_ATTR void *data) {
assert(config != NULL);
assert(alarm_timer != NULL);
static const size_t CACHE_MAX = 256;
const char *keys[CACHE_MAX];
size_t num_keys = 0;
size_t total_candidates = 0;
pthread_mutex_lock(&lock);
for (const config_section_node_t *snode = config_section_begin(config); snode != config_section_end(config); snode = config_section_next(snode)) {
const char *section = config_section_name(snode);
if (!string_is_bdaddr(section))
continue;
if (config_has_key(config, section, "LinkKey") ||
config_has_key(config, section, "LE_KEY_PENC") ||
config_has_key(config, section, "LE_KEY_PID") ||
config_has_key(config, section, "LE_KEY_PCSRK") ||
config_has_key(config, section, "LE_KEY_LENC") ||
config_has_key(config, section, "LE_KEY_LCSRK"))
continue;
if (num_keys < CACHE_MAX)
keys[num_keys++] = section;
++total_candidates;
}
if (total_candidates > CACHE_MAX * 2)
while (num_keys > 0)
config_remove_section(config, keys[--num_keys]);
config_save(config, CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&lock);
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes with lots of discovered LE devices
When loads of devices are discovered a config file which is too large
can be written out, which causes the BT daemon to crash on startup.
This limits the number of config entries for unpaired devices which
are initialized, and prevents a large number from being saved to the
filesystem.
Bug: 26071376
Change-Id: I4a74094f57a82b17f94e99a819974b8bc8082184
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void timer_config_save(UNUSED_ATTR void *data) {
static void timer_config_save_cb(UNUSED_ATTR void *data) {
btif_config_write();
}
static void btif_config_write(void) {
assert(config != NULL);
assert(alarm_timer != NULL);
btif_config_devcache_cleanup();
pthread_mutex_lock(&lock);
config_save(config, CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&lock);
}
| 173,931 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int btpan_tap_open()
{
struct ifreq ifr;
int fd, err;
const char *clonedev = "/dev/tun";
/* open the clone device */
if ((fd = open(clonedev, O_RDWR)) < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("could not open %s, err:%d", clonedev, errno);
return fd;
}
memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TAP | IFF_NO_PI;
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, TAP_IF_NAME, IFNAMSIZ);
/* try to create the device */
if ((err = ioctl(fd, TUNSETIFF, (void *) &ifr)) < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("ioctl error:%d, errno:%s", err, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return err;
}
if (tap_if_up(TAP_IF_NAME, controller_get_interface()->get_address()) == 0)
{
int flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK);
return fd;
}
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("can not bring up tap interface:%s", TAP_IF_NAME);
close(fd);
return INVALID_FD;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | int btpan_tap_open()
{
struct ifreq ifr;
int fd, err;
const char *clonedev = "/dev/tun";
/* open the clone device */
if ((fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(clonedev, O_RDWR))) < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("could not open %s, err:%d", clonedev, errno);
return fd;
}
memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TAP | IFF_NO_PI;
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, TAP_IF_NAME, IFNAMSIZ);
/* try to create the device */
if ((err = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(ioctl(fd, TUNSETIFF, (void *) &ifr))) < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("ioctl error:%d, errno:%s", err, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return err;
}
if (tap_if_up(TAP_IF_NAME, controller_get_interface()->get_address()) == 0)
{
int flags = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0));
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK));
return fd;
}
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("can not bring up tap interface:%s", TAP_IF_NAME);
close(fd);
return INVALID_FD;
}
| 173,445 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int mp_pack(lua_State *L) {
int nargs = lua_gettop(L);
int i;
mp_buf *buf;
if (nargs == 0)
return luaL_argerror(L, 0, "MessagePack pack needs input.");
if (!lua_checkstack(L, nargs))
return luaL_argerror(L, 0, "Too many arguments for MessagePack pack.");
buf = mp_buf_new(L);
for(i = 1; i <= nargs; i++) {
/* Copy argument i to top of stack for _encode processing;
* the encode function pops it from the stack when complete. */
lua_pushvalue(L, i);
mp_encode_lua_type(L,buf,0);
lua_pushlstring(L,(char*)buf->b,buf->len);
/* Reuse the buffer for the next operation by
* setting its free count to the total buffer size
* and the current position to zero. */
buf->free += buf->len;
buf->len = 0;
}
mp_buf_free(L, buf);
/* Concatenate all nargs buffers together */
lua_concat(L, nargs);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int mp_pack(lua_State *L) {
int nargs = lua_gettop(L);
int i;
mp_buf *buf;
if (nargs == 0)
return luaL_argerror(L, 0, "MessagePack pack needs input.");
if (!lua_checkstack(L, nargs))
return luaL_argerror(L, 0, "Too many arguments for MessagePack pack.");
buf = mp_buf_new(L);
for(i = 1; i <= nargs; i++) {
/* Copy argument i to top of stack for _encode processing;
* the encode function pops it from the stack when complete. */
luaL_checkstack(L, 1, "in function mp_check");
lua_pushvalue(L, i);
mp_encode_lua_type(L,buf,0);
lua_pushlstring(L,(char*)buf->b,buf->len);
/* Reuse the buffer for the next operation by
* setting its free count to the total buffer size
* and the current position to zero. */
buf->free += buf->len;
buf->len = 0;
}
mp_buf_free(L, buf);
/* Concatenate all nargs buffers together */
lua_concat(L, nargs);
return 1;
}
| 169,241 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Huff_transmit (huff_t *huff, int ch, byte *fout) {
int i;
if (huff->loc[ch] == NULL) {
/* node_t hasn't been transmitted, send a NYT, then the symbol */
Huff_transmit(huff, NYT, fout);
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
add_bit((char)((ch >> i) & 0x1), fout);
}
} else {
send(huff->loc[ch], NULL, fout);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Huff_transmit (huff_t *huff, int ch, byte *fout) {
void Huff_transmit (huff_t *huff, int ch, byte *fout, int maxoffset) {
int i;
if (huff->loc[ch] == NULL) {
/* node_t hasn't been transmitted, send a NYT, then the symbol */
Huff_transmit(huff, NYT, fout, maxoffset);
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
add_bit((char)((ch >> i) & 0x1), fout);
}
} else {
send(huff->loc[ch], NULL, fout, maxoffset);
}
}
| 167,996 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void *nlmsg_reserve(struct nl_msg *n, size_t len, int pad)
{
void *buf = n->nm_nlh;
size_t nlmsg_len = n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len;
size_t tlen;
tlen = pad ? ((len + (pad - 1)) & ~(pad - 1)) : len;
if ((tlen + nlmsg_len) > n->nm_size)
n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len += tlen;
if (tlen > len)
memset(buf + len, 0, tlen - len);
NL_DBG(2, "msg %p: Reserved %zu (%zu) bytes, pad=%d, nlmsg_len=%d\n",
n, tlen, len, pad, n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len);
return buf;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | void *nlmsg_reserve(struct nl_msg *n, size_t len, int pad)
{
void *buf = n->nm_nlh;
size_t nlmsg_len = n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len;
size_t tlen;
if (len > n->nm_size)
return NULL;
tlen = pad ? ((len + (pad - 1)) & ~(pad - 1)) : len;
if ((tlen + nlmsg_len) > n->nm_size)
n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len += tlen;
if (tlen > len)
memset(buf + len, 0, tlen - len);
NL_DBG(2, "msg %p: Reserved %zu (%zu) bytes, pad=%d, nlmsg_len=%d\n",
n, tlen, len, pad, n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len);
return buf;
}
| 165,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ripng_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, unsigned int length)
{
register const struct rip6 *rp = (const struct rip6 *)dat;
register const struct netinfo6 *ni;
register u_int amt;
register u_int i;
int j;
int trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_snapend < dat)
return;
amt = ndo->ndo_snapend - dat;
i = min(length, amt);
if (i < (sizeof(struct rip6) - sizeof(struct netinfo6)))
return;
i -= (sizeof(struct rip6) - sizeof(struct netinfo6));
switch (rp->rip6_cmd) {
case RIP6_REQUEST:
j = length / sizeof(*ni);
if (j == 1
&& rp->rip6_nets->rip6_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY6
&& IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&rp->rip6_nets->rip6_dest)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-req dump"));
break;
}
if (j * sizeof(*ni) != length - 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-req %d[%u]:", j, length));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-req %d:", j));
trunc = ((i / sizeof(*ni)) * sizeof(*ni) != i);
for (ni = rp->rip6_nets; i >= sizeof(*ni);
i -= sizeof(*ni), ++ni) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
rip6_entry_print(ndo, ni, 0);
}
break;
case RIP6_RESPONSE:
j = length / sizeof(*ni);
if (j * sizeof(*ni) != length - 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-resp %d[%u]:", j, length));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-resp %d:", j));
trunc = ((i / sizeof(*ni)) * sizeof(*ni) != i);
for (ni = rp->rip6_nets; i >= sizeof(*ni);
i -= sizeof(*ni), ++ni) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
rip6_entry_print(ndo, ni, ni->rip6_metric);
}
if (trunc)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ripng]"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-%d ?? %u", rp->rip6_cmd, length));
break;
}
if (rp->rip6_vers != RIP6_VERSION)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [vers %d]", rp->rip6_vers));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12992/RIPng: Clean up bounds checking.
Do bounds checking as we access items.
Scan the list of netinfo6 entries based on the supplied packet length,
without taking the captured length into account; let the aforementioned
bounds checking handle that.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ripng_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, unsigned int length)
{
register const struct rip6 *rp = (const struct rip6 *)dat;
register const struct netinfo6 *ni;
unsigned int length_left;
u_int j;
ND_TCHECK(rp->rip6_cmd);
switch (rp->rip6_cmd) {
case RIP6_REQUEST:
length_left = length;
if (length_left < (sizeof(struct rip6) - sizeof(struct netinfo6)))
goto trunc;
length_left -= (sizeof(struct rip6) - sizeof(struct netinfo6));
j = length_left / sizeof(*ni);
if (j == 1) {
ND_TCHECK(rp->rip6_nets);
if (rp->rip6_nets->rip6_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY6
&& IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&rp->rip6_nets->rip6_dest)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-req dump"));
break;
}
}
if (j * sizeof(*ni) != length_left)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-req %u[%u]:", j, length));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-req %u:", j));
for (ni = rp->rip6_nets; length_left >= sizeof(*ni);
length_left -= sizeof(*ni), ++ni) {
ND_TCHECK(*ni);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
rip6_entry_print(ndo, ni, 0);
}
if (length_left != 0)
goto trunc;
break;
case RIP6_RESPONSE:
length_left = length;
if (length_left < (sizeof(struct rip6) - sizeof(struct netinfo6)))
goto trunc;
length_left -= (sizeof(struct rip6) - sizeof(struct netinfo6));
j = length_left / sizeof(*ni);
if (j * sizeof(*ni) != length_left)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-resp %d[%u]:", j, length));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-resp %d:", j));
for (ni = rp->rip6_nets; length_left >= sizeof(*ni);
length_left -= sizeof(*ni), ++ni) {
ND_TCHECK(*ni);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
rip6_entry_print(ndo, ni, ni->rip6_metric);
}
if (length_left != 0)
goto trunc;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-%d ?? %u", rp->rip6_cmd, length));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK(rp->rip6_vers);
if (rp->rip6_vers != RIP6_VERSION)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [vers %d]", rp->rip6_vers));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ripng]"));
return;
}
| 167,922 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsAndroid::OpenURL(JNIEnv* env,
jobject obj,
jstring url,
jboolean user_gesture,
jboolean is_renderer_initiated) {
GURL gurl(base::android::ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, url));
OpenURLParams open_params(gurl,
Referrer(),
CURRENT_TAB,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
is_renderer_initiated);
open_params.user_gesture = user_gesture;
web_contents_->OpenURL(open_params);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
TBR=tedchoc@chromium.org,jbudorick@chromium.org,sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void WebContentsAndroid::OpenURL(JNIEnv* env,
| 171,138 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static enum try_read_result try_read_network(conn *c) {
enum try_read_result gotdata = READ_NO_DATA_RECEIVED;
int res;
assert(c != NULL);
if (c->rcurr != c->rbuf) {
if (c->rbytes != 0) /* otherwise there's nothing to copy */
memmove(c->rbuf, c->rcurr, c->rbytes);
c->rcurr = c->rbuf;
}
while (1) {
if (c->rbytes >= c->rsize) {
char *new_rbuf = realloc(c->rbuf, c->rsize * 2);
if (!new_rbuf) {
if (settings.verbose > 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't realloc input buffer\n");
c->rbytes = 0; /* ignore what we read */
out_string(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory reading request");
c->write_and_go = conn_closing;
return READ_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
c->rcurr = c->rbuf = new_rbuf;
c->rsize *= 2;
}
int avail = c->rsize - c->rbytes;
res = read(c->sfd, c->rbuf + c->rbytes, avail);
if (res > 0) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.bytes_read += res;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
gotdata = READ_DATA_RECEIVED;
c->rbytes += res;
if (res == avail) {
continue;
} else {
break;
}
}
if (res == 0) {
return READ_ERROR;
}
if (res == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
break;
}
return READ_ERROR;
}
}
return gotdata;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static enum try_read_result try_read_network(conn *c) {
enum try_read_result gotdata = READ_NO_DATA_RECEIVED;
int res;
int num_allocs = 0;
assert(c != NULL);
if (c->rcurr != c->rbuf) {
if (c->rbytes != 0) /* otherwise there's nothing to copy */
memmove(c->rbuf, c->rcurr, c->rbytes);
c->rcurr = c->rbuf;
}
while (1) {
if (c->rbytes >= c->rsize) {
if (num_allocs == 4) {
return gotdata;
}
++num_allocs;
char *new_rbuf = realloc(c->rbuf, c->rsize * 2);
if (!new_rbuf) {
if (settings.verbose > 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't realloc input buffer\n");
c->rbytes = 0; /* ignore what we read */
out_string(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory reading request");
c->write_and_go = conn_closing;
return READ_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
c->rcurr = c->rbuf = new_rbuf;
c->rsize *= 2;
}
int avail = c->rsize - c->rbytes;
res = read(c->sfd, c->rbuf + c->rbytes, avail);
if (res > 0) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.bytes_read += res;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
gotdata = READ_DATA_RECEIVED;
c->rbytes += res;
if (res == avail) {
continue;
} else {
break;
}
}
if (res == 0) {
return READ_ERROR;
}
if (res == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
break;
}
return READ_ERROR;
}
}
return gotdata;
}
| 169,876 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: plan_a (char const *filename)
{
char const *s;
char const *lim;
char const **ptr;
char *buffer;
lin iline;
size_t size = instat.st_size;
/* Fail if the file size doesn't fit in a size_t,
or if storage isn't available. */
if (! (size == instat.st_size
&& (buffer = malloc (size ? size : (size_t) 1))))
return false;
/* Read the input file, but don't bother reading it if it's empty.
When creating files, the files do not actually exist. */
if (size)
{
if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode))
{
int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0);
size_t buffered = 0, n;
if (ifd < 0)
pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
/* Some non-POSIX hosts exaggerate st_size in text mode;
or the file may have shrunk! */
size = buffered;
break;
}
if (n == (size_t) -1)
{
/* Perhaps size is too large for this host. */
close (ifd);
free (buffer);
return false;
}
buffered += n;
}
if (close (ifd) != 0)
read_fatal ();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-59 | plan_a (char const *filename)
{
char const *s;
char const *lim;
char const **ptr;
char *buffer;
lin iline;
size_t size = instat.st_size;
/* Fail if the file size doesn't fit in a size_t,
or if storage isn't available. */
if (! (size == instat.st_size
&& (buffer = malloc (size ? size : (size_t) 1))))
return false;
/* Read the input file, but don't bother reading it if it's empty.
When creating files, the files do not actually exist. */
if (size)
{
if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode))
{
int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
size_t buffered = 0, n;
int ifd;
if (! follow_symlinks)
flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0);
if (ifd < 0)
pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
/* Some non-POSIX hosts exaggerate st_size in text mode;
or the file may have shrunk! */
size = buffered;
break;
}
if (n == (size_t) -1)
{
/* Perhaps size is too large for this host. */
close (ifd);
free (buffer);
return false;
}
buffered += n;
}
if (close (ifd) != 0)
read_fatal ();
}
| 164,685 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: get_next_file(FILE *VFile, char *ptr)
{
char *ret;
ret = fgets(ptr, PATH_MAX, VFile);
if (!ret)
return NULL;
if (ptr[strlen(ptr) - 1] == '\n')
ptr[strlen(ptr) - 1] = '\0';
return ret;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14879/fix -V to fail invalid input safely
get_next_file() did not check the return value of strlen() and
underflowed an array index if the line read by fgets() from the file
started with \0. This caused an out-of-bounds read and could cause a
write. Add the missing check.
This vulnerability was discovered by Brian Carpenter & Geeknik Labs.
CWE ID: CWE-120 | get_next_file(FILE *VFile, char *ptr)
{
char *ret;
size_t len;
ret = fgets(ptr, PATH_MAX, VFile);
if (!ret)
return NULL;
len = strlen (ptr);
if (len > 0 && ptr[len - 1] == '\n')
ptr[len - 1] = '\0';
return ret;
}
| 169,835 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BluetoothChooserDesktop::~BluetoothChooserDesktop() {
bluetooth_chooser_controller_->ResetEventHandler();
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | BluetoothChooserDesktop::~BluetoothChooserDesktop() {
bluetooth_chooser_controller_->ResetEventHandler();
if (bubble_)
bubble_->CloseBubble(BUBBLE_CLOSE_FORCED);
}
| 173,202 |
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