instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int nr_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int er;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
release_sock(sk);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL) {
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
er = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (er < 0) {
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
if (sax != NULL) {
memset(sax, 0, sizeof(sax));
sax->sax25_family = AF_NETROM;
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, 7, sax->sax25_call.ax25_call,
AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sax);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return copied;
}
Commit Message: netrom: fix invalid use of sizeof in nr_recvmsg()
sizeof() when applied to a pointer typed expression gives the size of the
pointer, not that of the pointed data.
Introduced by commit 3ce5ef(netrom: fix info leak via msg_name in nr_recvmsg)
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int nr_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int er;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
release_sock(sk);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL) {
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
er = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (er < 0) {
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
if (sax != NULL) {
memset(sax, 0, sizeof(*sax));
sax->sax25_family = AF_NETROM;
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, 7, sax->sax25_call.ax25_call,
AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sax);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return copied;
}
| 169,894 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static size_t safecat(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos,
PNG_CONST char *cat)
{
while (pos < bufsize && cat != NULL && *cat != 0)
buffer[pos++] = *cat++;
if (pos >= bufsize)
pos = bufsize-1;
buffer[pos] = 0;
return pos;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | static size_t safecat(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos,
const char *cat)
{
while (pos < bufsize && cat != NULL && *cat != 0)
buffer[pos++] = *cat++;
if (pos >= bufsize)
pos = bufsize-1;
buffer[pos] = 0;
return pos;
}
| 173,689 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long SeekHead::Parse() {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
int entry_count = 0;
int void_element_count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x0DBB) // SeekEntry ID
++entry_count;
else if (id == 0x6C) // Void ID
++void_element_count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
m_entries = new (std::nothrow) Entry[entry_count];
if (m_entries == NULL)
return -1;
m_void_elements = new (std::nothrow) VoidElement[void_element_count];
if (m_void_elements == NULL)
return -1;
Entry* pEntry = m_entries;
VoidElement* pVoidElement = m_void_elements;
pos = m_start;
while (pos < stop) {
const long long idpos = pos;
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x0DBB) { // SeekEntry ID
if (ParseEntry(pReader, pos, size, pEntry)) {
Entry& e = *pEntry++;
e.element_start = idpos;
e.element_size = (pos + size) - idpos;
}
} else if (id == 0x6C) { // Void ID
VoidElement& e = *pVoidElement++;
e.element_start = idpos;
e.element_size = (pos + size) - idpos;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
ptrdiff_t count_ = ptrdiff_t(pEntry - m_entries);
assert(count_ >= 0);
assert(count_ <= entry_count);
m_entry_count = static_cast<int>(count_);
count_ = ptrdiff_t(pVoidElement - m_void_elements);
assert(count_ >= 0);
assert(count_ <= void_element_count);
m_void_element_count = static_cast<int>(count_);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long SeekHead::Parse() {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
int entry_count = 0;
int void_element_count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x0DBB) // SeekEntry ID
++entry_count;
else if (id == 0x6C) // Void ID
++void_element_count;
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_entries = new (std::nothrow) Entry[entry_count];
if (m_entries == NULL)
return -1;
m_void_elements = new (std::nothrow) VoidElement[void_element_count];
if (m_void_elements == NULL)
return -1;
Entry* pEntry = m_entries;
VoidElement* pVoidElement = m_void_elements;
pos = m_start;
while (pos < stop) {
const long long idpos = pos;
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x0DBB) { // SeekEntry ID
if (ParseEntry(pReader, pos, size, pEntry)) {
Entry& e = *pEntry++;
e.element_start = idpos;
e.element_size = (pos + size) - idpos;
}
} else if (id == 0x6C) { // Void ID
VoidElement& e = *pVoidElement++;
e.element_start = idpos;
e.element_size = (pos + size) - idpos;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
ptrdiff_t count_ = ptrdiff_t(pEntry - m_entries);
assert(count_ >= 0);
assert(count_ <= entry_count);
m_entry_count = static_cast<int>(count_);
count_ = ptrdiff_t(pVoidElement - m_void_elements);
assert(count_ >= 0);
assert(count_ <= void_element_count);
m_void_element_count = static_cast<int>(count_);
return 0;
}
| 173,836 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GaiaOAuthClient::Core::FetchUserInfoAndInvokeCallback() {
request_.reset(new UrlFetcher(
GURL(provider_info_.user_info_url), UrlFetcher::GET));
request_->SetRequestContext(request_context_getter_);
request_->SetHeader("Authorization", "Bearer " + access_token_);
request_->Start(
base::Bind(&GaiaOAuthClient::Core::OnUserInfoFetchComplete, this));
}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void GaiaOAuthClient::Core::FetchUserInfoAndInvokeCallback() {
request_.reset(net::URLFetcher::Create(
GURL(provider_info_.user_info_url), net::URLFetcher::GET, this));
request_->SetRequestContext(request_context_getter_);
request_->AddExtraRequestHeader("Authorization: Bearer " + access_token_);
url_fetcher_type_ = URL_FETCHER_GET_USER_INFO;
request_->Start();
}
| 170,806 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateNull( void )
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item();
if ( item )
item->type = cJSON_NULL;
return item;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cJSON *cJSON_CreateNull( void )
| 167,276 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ThreadableBlobRegistry::addDataToStream(const KURL& url, PassRefPtr<RawData> streamData)
{
if (isMainThread()) {
blobRegistry().addDataToStream(url, streamData);
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url, streamData));
callOnMainThread(&addDataToStreamTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void ThreadableBlobRegistry::addDataToStream(const KURL& url, PassRefPtr<RawData> streamData)
void BlobRegistry::addDataToStream(const KURL& url, PassRefPtr<RawData> streamData)
{
if (isMainThread()) {
if (WebBlobRegistry* registry = blobRegistry()) {
WebThreadSafeData webThreadSafeData(streamData);
registry->addDataToStream(url, webThreadSafeData);
}
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url, streamData));
callOnMainThread(&addDataToStreamTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
| 170,680 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ns_nprint(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, register const u_char *bp)
{
register u_int i, l;
register const u_char *rp = NULL;
register int compress = 0;
int chars_processed;
int elt;
int data_size = ndo->ndo_snapend - bp;
if ((l = labellen(ndo, cp)) == (u_int)-1)
return(NULL);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
chars_processed = 1;
if (((i = *cp++) & INDIR_MASK) != INDIR_MASK) {
compress = 0;
rp = cp + l;
}
if (i != 0)
while (i && cp < ndo->ndo_snapend) {
if ((i & INDIR_MASK) == INDIR_MASK) {
if (!compress) {
rp = cp + 1;
compress = 1;
}
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
cp = bp + (((i << 8) | *cp) & 0x3fff);
if ((l = labellen(ndo, cp)) == (u_int)-1)
return(NULL);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
i = *cp++;
chars_processed++;
/*
* If we've looked at every character in
* the message, this pointer will make
* us look at some character again,
* which means we're looping.
*/
if (chars_processed >= data_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<LOOP>"));
return (NULL);
}
continue;
}
if ((i & INDIR_MASK) == EDNS0_MASK) {
elt = (i & ~INDIR_MASK);
switch(elt) {
case EDNS0_ELT_BITLABEL:
if (blabel_print(ndo, cp) == NULL)
return (NULL);
break;
default:
/* unknown ELT */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<ELT %d>", elt));
return(NULL);
}
} else {
if (fn_printn(ndo, cp, l, ndo->ndo_snapend))
return(NULL);
}
cp += l;
chars_processed += l;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
if ((l = labellen(ndo, cp)) == (u_int)-1)
return(NULL);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
i = *cp++;
chars_processed++;
if (!compress)
rp += l + 1;
}
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
return (rp);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12995/Check for DNS compression pointers that don't point backwards.
This is what BIND 9.11.0-P2 does; it not only detects pointers that
loop, as "point backwards" means "point before anything we've processed
so far, including what we're processing right now", so the pointer can't
point to itself (as that's what we're processing right now).
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
Also, add some infinite-pointer-loop captures.
More checks should be done. We might, for example, want to make sure
the upper 2 bits of the label length/pointer byte are 00 or 11, and that
if we encounter a pointer and jump backwards to what we think is a label
the label ends before the beginning of the last label we processed, to
make sure the pointer doesn't point backwards into the *middle* of a
label, and also make sure the entire name is <= 255 bytes long.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | ns_nprint(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, register const u_char *bp)
{
register u_int i, l;
register const u_char *rp = NULL;
register int compress = 0;
int elt;
u_int offset, max_offset;
if ((l = labellen(ndo, cp)) == (u_int)-1)
return(NULL);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
max_offset = (u_int)(cp - bp);
if (((i = *cp++) & INDIR_MASK) != INDIR_MASK) {
compress = 0;
rp = cp + l;
}
if (i != 0)
while (i && cp < ndo->ndo_snapend) {
if ((i & INDIR_MASK) == INDIR_MASK) {
if (!compress) {
rp = cp + 1;
compress = 1;
}
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
offset = (((i << 8) | *cp) & 0x3fff);
/*
* This must move backwards in the packet.
* No RFC explicitly says that, but BIND's
* name decompression code requires it,
* as a way of preventing infinite loops
* and other bad behavior, and it's probably
* what was intended (compress by pointing
* to domain name suffixes already seen in
* the packet).
*/
if (offset >= max_offset) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<BAD PTR>"));
return(NULL);
}
max_offset = offset;
cp = bp + offset;
if ((l = labellen(ndo, cp)) == (u_int)-1)
return(NULL);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
i = *cp++;
continue;
}
if ((i & INDIR_MASK) == EDNS0_MASK) {
elt = (i & ~INDIR_MASK);
switch(elt) {
case EDNS0_ELT_BITLABEL:
if (blabel_print(ndo, cp) == NULL)
return (NULL);
break;
default:
/* unknown ELT */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<ELT %d>", elt));
return(NULL);
}
} else {
if (fn_printn(ndo, cp, l, ndo->ndo_snapend))
return(NULL);
}
cp += l;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
if ((l = labellen(ndo, cp)) == (u_int)-1)
return(NULL);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
i = *cp++;
if (!compress)
rp += l + 1;
}
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
return (rp);
}
| 167,912 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChildThread::Shutdown() {
file_system_dispatcher_.reset();
quota_dispatcher_.reset();
}
Commit Message: [FileAPI] Clean up WebFileSystemImpl before Blink shutdown
WebFileSystemImpl should not outlive V8 instance, since it may have references to V8.
This CL ensures it deleted before Blink shutdown.
BUG=369525
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/270633009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269345 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void ChildThread::Shutdown() {
file_system_dispatcher_.reset();
quota_dispatcher_.reset();
WebFileSystemImpl::DeleteThreadSpecificInstance();
}
| 171,672 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout(struct upnphttp * h, const char * action, const char * ns)
{
int r;
static const char resp[] =
"<u:%sResponse "
"xmlns:u=\"%s\">"
"<OutboundPinholeTimeout>%d</OutboundPinholeTimeout>"
"</u:%sResponse>";
char body[512];
int bodylen;
struct NameValueParserData data;
char * int_ip, * int_port, * rem_host, * rem_port, * protocol;
int opt=0;
/*int proto=0;*/
unsigned short iport, rport;
if (GETFLAG(IPV6FCFWDISABLEDMASK))
{
SoapError(h, 702, "FirewallDisabled");
return;
}
ParseNameValue(h->req_buf + h->req_contentoff, h->req_contentlen, &data);
int_ip = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "InternalClient");
int_port = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "InternalPort");
rem_host = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "RemoteHost");
rem_port = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "RemotePort");
protocol = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "Protocol");
rport = (unsigned short)atoi(rem_port);
iport = (unsigned short)atoi(int_port);
/*proto = atoi(protocol);*/
syslog(LOG_INFO, "%s: retrieving timeout for outbound pinhole from [%s]:%hu to [%s]:%hu protocol %s", action, int_ip, iport,rem_host, rport, protocol);
/* TODO */
r = -1;/*upnp_check_outbound_pinhole(proto, &opt);*/
switch(r)
{
case 1: /* success */
bodylen = snprintf(body, sizeof(body), resp,
action, ns/*"urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANIPv6FirewallControl:1"*/,
opt, action);
BuildSendAndCloseSoapResp(h, body, bodylen);
break;
case -5: /* Protocol not supported */
SoapError(h, 705, "ProtocolNotSupported");
break;
default:
SoapError(h, 501, "ActionFailed");
}
ClearNameValueList(&data);
}
Commit Message: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout: check args
CWE ID: CWE-476 | GetOutboundPinholeTimeout(struct upnphttp * h, const char * action, const char * ns)
{
int r;
static const char resp[] =
"<u:%sResponse "
"xmlns:u=\"%s\">"
"<OutboundPinholeTimeout>%d</OutboundPinholeTimeout>"
"</u:%sResponse>";
char body[512];
int bodylen;
struct NameValueParserData data;
char * int_ip, * int_port, * rem_host, * rem_port, * protocol;
int opt=0;
/*int proto=0;*/
unsigned short iport, rport;
if (GETFLAG(IPV6FCFWDISABLEDMASK))
{
SoapError(h, 702, "FirewallDisabled");
return;
}
ParseNameValue(h->req_buf + h->req_contentoff, h->req_contentlen, &data);
int_ip = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "InternalClient");
int_port = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "InternalPort");
rem_host = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "RemoteHost");
rem_port = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "RemotePort");
protocol = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "Protocol");
if (!int_port || !ext_port || !protocol)
{
ClearNameValueList(&data);
SoapError(h, 402, "Invalid Args");
return;
}
rport = (unsigned short)atoi(rem_port);
iport = (unsigned short)atoi(int_port);
/*proto = atoi(protocol);*/
syslog(LOG_INFO, "%s: retrieving timeout for outbound pinhole from [%s]:%hu to [%s]:%hu protocol %s", action, int_ip, iport,rem_host, rport, protocol);
/* TODO */
r = -1;/*upnp_check_outbound_pinhole(proto, &opt);*/
switch(r)
{
case 1: /* success */
bodylen = snprintf(body, sizeof(body), resp,
action, ns/*"urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANIPv6FirewallControl:1"*/,
opt, action);
BuildSendAndCloseSoapResp(h, body, bodylen);
break;
case -5: /* Protocol not supported */
SoapError(h, 705, "ProtocolNotSupported");
break;
default:
SoapError(h, 501, "ActionFailed");
}
ClearNameValueList(&data);
}
| 169,667 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
opj_dinfo_t* dinfo;
opj_event_mgr_t event_mgr; /* event manager */
int tnum;
unsigned int snum;
opj_mj2_t *movie;
mj2_tk_t *track;
mj2_sample_t *sample;
unsigned char* frame_codestream;
FILE *file, *outfile;
char outfilename[50];
mj2_dparameters_t parameters;
if (argc != 3) {
printf("Usage: %s mj2filename output_location\n", argv[0]);
printf("Example: %s foreman.mj2 output/foreman\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
file = fopen(argv[1], "rb");
if (!file) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to open %s for reading\n", argv[1]);
return 1;
}
/*
configure the event callbacks (not required)
setting of each callback is optional
*/
memset(&event_mgr, 0, sizeof(opj_event_mgr_t));
event_mgr.error_handler = error_callback;
event_mgr.warning_handler = warning_callback;
event_mgr.info_handler = info_callback;
/* get a MJ2 decompressor handle */
dinfo = mj2_create_decompress();
/* catch events using our callbacks and give a local context */
opj_set_event_mgr((opj_common_ptr)dinfo, &event_mgr, stderr);
/* setup the decoder decoding parameters using user parameters */
memset(¶meters, 0, sizeof(mj2_dparameters_t));
movie = (opj_mj2_t*) dinfo->mj2_handle;
mj2_setup_decoder(movie, ¶meters);
if (mj2_read_struct(file, movie)) { /* Creating the movie structure*/
return 1;
}
/* Decode first video track */
tnum = 0;
while (movie->tk[tnum].track_type != 0) {
tnum ++;
}
track = &movie->tk[tnum];
fprintf(stdout, "Extracting %d frames from file...\n", track->num_samples);
for (snum = 0; snum < track->num_samples; snum++) {
sample = &track->sample[snum];
frame_codestream = (unsigned char*) malloc(sample->sample_size -
8); /* Skipping JP2C marker*/
fseek(file, sample->offset + 8, SEEK_SET);
fread(frame_codestream, sample->sample_size - 8, 1,
file); /* Assuming that jp and ftyp markers size do*/
sprintf(outfilename, "%s_%05d.j2k", argv[2], snum);
outfile = fopen(outfilename, "wb");
if (!outfile) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to open %s for writing\n", outfilename);
return 1;
}
fwrite(frame_codestream, sample->sample_size - 8, 1, outfile);
fclose(outfile);
free(frame_codestream);
}
fclose(file);
fprintf(stdout, "%d frames correctly extracted\n", snum);
/* free remaining structures */
if (dinfo) {
mj2_destroy_decompress((opj_mj2_t*)dinfo->mj2_handle);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: opj_mj2_extract: Check provided output prefix for length
This uses snprintf() with correct buffer length instead of sprintf(). This
prevents a buffer overflow when providing a long output prefix. Furthermore
the program exits with an error when the provided output prefix is too long.
Fixes #1088.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
opj_dinfo_t* dinfo;
opj_event_mgr_t event_mgr; /* event manager */
int tnum;
unsigned int snum;
opj_mj2_t *movie;
mj2_tk_t *track;
mj2_sample_t *sample;
unsigned char* frame_codestream;
FILE *file, *outfile;
char outfilename[50];
mj2_dparameters_t parameters;
if (argc != 3) {
printf("Usage: %s mj2filename output_location\n", argv[0]);
printf("Example: %s foreman.mj2 output/foreman\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
file = fopen(argv[1], "rb");
if (!file) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to open %s for reading\n", argv[1]);
return 1;
}
/*
configure the event callbacks (not required)
setting of each callback is optional
*/
memset(&event_mgr, 0, sizeof(opj_event_mgr_t));
event_mgr.error_handler = error_callback;
event_mgr.warning_handler = warning_callback;
event_mgr.info_handler = info_callback;
/* get a MJ2 decompressor handle */
dinfo = mj2_create_decompress();
/* catch events using our callbacks and give a local context */
opj_set_event_mgr((opj_common_ptr)dinfo, &event_mgr, stderr);
/* setup the decoder decoding parameters using user parameters */
memset(¶meters, 0, sizeof(mj2_dparameters_t));
movie = (opj_mj2_t*) dinfo->mj2_handle;
mj2_setup_decoder(movie, ¶meters);
if (mj2_read_struct(file, movie)) { /* Creating the movie structure*/
return 1;
}
/* Decode first video track */
tnum = 0;
while (movie->tk[tnum].track_type != 0) {
tnum ++;
}
track = &movie->tk[tnum];
fprintf(stdout, "Extracting %d frames from file...\n", track->num_samples);
for (snum = 0; snum < track->num_samples; snum++) {
sample = &track->sample[snum];
frame_codestream = (unsigned char*) malloc(sample->sample_size -
8); /* Skipping JP2C marker*/
fseek(file, sample->offset + 8, SEEK_SET);
fread(frame_codestream, sample->sample_size - 8, 1,
file); /* Assuming that jp and ftyp markers size do*/
int num = snprintf(outfilename, sizeof(outfilename), "%s_%05d.j2k", argv[2], snum);
if (num >= sizeof(outfilename)) {
fprintf(stderr, "maximum length of output prefix exceeded\n");
return 1;
}
outfile = fopen(outfilename, "wb");
if (!outfile) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to open %s for writing\n", outfilename);
return 1;
}
fwrite(frame_codestream, sample->sample_size - 8, 1, outfile);
fclose(outfile);
free(frame_codestream);
}
fclose(file);
fprintf(stdout, "%d frames correctly extracted\n", snum);
/* free remaining structures */
if (dinfo) {
mj2_destroy_decompress((opj_mj2_t*)dinfo->mj2_handle);
}
return 0;
}
| 169,307 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_locale_set_default)
{
char* locale_name = NULL;
int len=0;
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&locale_name ,&len ) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_set_default: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(len == 0) {
locale_name = (char *)uloc_getDefault() ;
len = strlen(locale_name);
}
zend_alter_ini_entry(LOCALE_INI_NAME, sizeof(LOCALE_INI_NAME), locale_name, len, PHP_INI_USER, PHP_INI_STAGE_RUNTIME);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_locale_set_default)
{
char* locale_name = NULL;
int len=0;
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&locale_name ,&len ) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_set_default: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(len == 0) {
locale_name = (char *)uloc_getDefault() ;
len = strlen(locale_name);
}
zend_alter_ini_entry(LOCALE_INI_NAME, sizeof(LOCALE_INI_NAME), locale_name, len, PHP_INI_USER, PHP_INI_STAGE_RUNTIME);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
| 167,196 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int dcbnl_getperm_hwaddr(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u8 perm_addr[MAX_ADDR_LEN];
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpermhwaddr)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpermhwaddr(netdev, perm_addr);
return nla_put(skb, DCB_ATTR_PERM_HWADDR, sizeof(perm_addr), perm_addr);
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static int dcbnl_getperm_hwaddr(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u8 perm_addr[MAX_ADDR_LEN];
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpermhwaddr)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
memset(perm_addr, 0, sizeof(perm_addr));
netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpermhwaddr(netdev, perm_addr);
return nla_put(skb, DCB_ATTR_PERM_HWADDR, sizeof(perm_addr), perm_addr);
}
| 166,058 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WT_Interpolate (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 phaseFrac;
EAS_I32 acc0;
const EAS_SAMPLE *pSamples;
const EAS_SAMPLE *loopEnd;
EAS_I32 samp1;
EAS_I32 samp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
loopEnd = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1;
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->phaseAccum;
/*lint -e{713} truncation is OK */
phaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* fetch adjacent samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* linear interpolation */
acc0 = samp2 - samp1;
acc0 = acc0 * phaseFrac;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = samp1 + (acc0 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
/* save new output sample in buffer */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_I16)(acc0 >> 2);
/* increment phase */
phaseFrac += phaseInc;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = phaseFrac >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS;
/* next sample */
if (acc0 > 0) {
/* advance sample pointer */
pSamples += acc0;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)((EAS_U32)phaseFrac & PHASE_FRAC_MASK);
/* check for loop end */
acc0 = (EAS_I32) (pSamples - loopEnd);
if (acc0 >= 0)
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopStart + acc0;
/* fetch new samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
}
}
/* save pointer and phase */
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = (EAS_U32) pSamples;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = (EAS_U32) phaseFrac;
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void WT_Interpolate (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 phaseFrac;
EAS_I32 acc0;
const EAS_SAMPLE *pSamples;
const EAS_SAMPLE *loopEnd;
EAS_I32 samp1;
EAS_I32 samp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
loopEnd = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1;
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->phaseAccum;
/*lint -e{713} truncation is OK */
phaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* fetch adjacent samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* linear interpolation */
acc0 = samp2 - samp1;
acc0 = acc0 * phaseFrac;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = samp1 + (acc0 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
/* save new output sample in buffer */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_I16)(acc0 >> 2);
/* increment phase */
phaseFrac += phaseInc;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = phaseFrac >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS;
/* next sample */
if (acc0 > 0) {
/* advance sample pointer */
pSamples += acc0;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)((EAS_U32)phaseFrac & PHASE_FRAC_MASK);
/* check for loop end */
acc0 = (EAS_I32) (pSamples - loopEnd);
if (acc0 >= 0)
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopStart + acc0;
/* fetch new samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
}
}
/* save pointer and phase */
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = (EAS_U32) pSamples;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = (EAS_U32) phaseFrac;
}
| 173,917 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cib_remote_msg(gpointer data)
{
const char *value = NULL;
xmlNode *command = NULL;
cib_client_t *client = data;
crm_trace("%s callback", client->encrypted ? "secure" : "clear-text");
command = crm_recv_remote_msg(client->session, client->encrypted);
if (command == NULL) {
return -1;
}
value = crm_element_name(command);
if (safe_str_neq(value, "cib_command")) {
crm_log_xml_trace(command, "Bad command: ");
goto bail;
}
if (client->name == NULL) {
value = crm_element_value(command, F_CLIENTNAME);
if (value == NULL) {
client->name = strdup(client->id);
} else {
client->name = strdup(value);
}
}
if (client->callback_id == NULL) {
value = crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLBACK_TOKEN);
if (value != NULL) {
client->callback_id = strdup(value);
crm_trace("Callback channel for %s is %s", client->id, client->callback_id);
} else {
client->callback_id = strdup(client->id);
}
}
/* unset dangerous options */
xml_remove_prop(command, F_ORIG);
xml_remove_prop(command, F_CIB_HOST);
xml_remove_prop(command, F_CIB_GLOBAL_UPDATE);
crm_xml_add(command, F_TYPE, T_CIB);
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CLIENTID, client->id);
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CLIENTNAME, client->name);
#if ENABLE_ACL
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_USER, client->user);
#endif
if (crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLID) == NULL) {
char *call_uuid = crm_generate_uuid();
/* fix the command */
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CALLID, call_uuid);
free(call_uuid);
}
if (crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLOPTS) == NULL) {
crm_xml_add_int(command, F_CIB_CALLOPTS, 0);
}
crm_log_xml_trace(command, "Remote command: ");
cib_common_callback_worker(0, 0, command, client, TRUE);
bail:
free_xml(command);
command = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | cib_remote_msg(gpointer data)
static void
cib_handle_remote_msg(cib_client_t *client, xmlNode *command)
{
const char *value = NULL;
value = crm_element_name(command);
if (safe_str_neq(value, "cib_command")) {
crm_log_xml_trace(command, "Bad command: ");
return;
}
if (client->name == NULL) {
value = crm_element_value(command, F_CLIENTNAME);
if (value == NULL) {
client->name = strdup(client->id);
} else {
client->name = strdup(value);
}
}
if (client->callback_id == NULL) {
value = crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLBACK_TOKEN);
if (value != NULL) {
client->callback_id = strdup(value);
crm_trace("Callback channel for %s is %s", client->id, client->callback_id);
} else {
client->callback_id = strdup(client->id);
}
}
/* unset dangerous options */
xml_remove_prop(command, F_ORIG);
xml_remove_prop(command, F_CIB_HOST);
xml_remove_prop(command, F_CIB_GLOBAL_UPDATE);
crm_xml_add(command, F_TYPE, T_CIB);
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CLIENTID, client->id);
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CLIENTNAME, client->name);
#if ENABLE_ACL
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_USER, client->user);
#endif
if (crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLID) == NULL) {
char *call_uuid = crm_generate_uuid();
/* fix the command */
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CALLID, call_uuid);
free(call_uuid);
}
if (crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLOPTS) == NULL) {
crm_xml_add_int(command, F_CIB_CALLOPTS, 0);
}
crm_log_xml_trace(command, "Remote command: ");
cib_common_callback_worker(0, 0, command, client, TRUE);
}
int
cib_remote_msg(gpointer data)
{
xmlNode *command = NULL;
cib_client_t *client = data;
int disconnected = 0;
int timeout = client->remote_auth ? -1 : 1000;
crm_trace("%s callback", client->encrypted ? "secure" : "clear-text");
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
if (client->encrypted && (client->handshake_complete == FALSE)) {
int rc = 0;
/* Muliple calls to handshake will be required, this callback
* will be invoked once the client sends more handshake data. */
do {
rc = gnutls_handshake(*client->session);
if (rc < 0 && rc != GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) {
crm_err("Remote cib tls handshake failed");
return -1;
}
} while (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED);
if (rc == 0) {
crm_debug("Remote cib tls handshake completed");
client->handshake_complete = TRUE;
if (client->remote_auth_timeout) {
g_source_remove(client->remote_auth_timeout);
}
/* after handshake, clients must send auth in a few seconds */
client->remote_auth_timeout = g_timeout_add(REMOTE_AUTH_TIMEOUT, remote_auth_timeout_cb, client);
}
return 0;
}
#endif
crm_recv_remote_msg(client->session, &client->recv_buf, client->encrypted, timeout, &disconnected);
/* must pass auth before we will process anything else */
if (client->remote_auth == FALSE) {
xmlNode *reg;
#if ENABLE_ACL
const char *user = NULL;
#endif
command = crm_parse_remote_buffer(&client->recv_buf);
if (cib_remote_auth(command) == FALSE) {
free_xml(command);
return -1;
}
crm_debug("remote connection authenticated successfully");
client->remote_auth = TRUE;
g_source_remove(client->remote_auth_timeout);
client->remote_auth_timeout = 0;
client->name = crm_element_value_copy(command, "name");
#if ENABLE_ACL
user = crm_element_value(command, "user");
if (user) {
new_client->user = strdup(user);
}
#endif
/* send ACK */
reg = create_xml_node(NULL, "cib_result");
crm_xml_add(reg, F_CIB_OPERATION, CRM_OP_REGISTER);
crm_xml_add(reg, F_CIB_CLIENTID, client->id);
crm_send_remote_msg(client->session, reg, client->encrypted);
free_xml(reg);
free_xml(command);
}
command = crm_parse_remote_buffer(&client->recv_buf);
while (command) {
crm_trace("command received");
cib_handle_remote_msg(client, command);
free_xml(command);
command = crm_parse_remote_buffer(&client->recv_buf);
}
if (disconnected) {
crm_trace("disconnected while receiving remote cib msg.");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,149 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char *path_name(const struct name_path *path, const char *name)
{
const struct name_path *p;
char *n, *m;
int nlen = strlen(name);
int len = nlen + 1;
for (p = path; p; p = p->up) {
if (p->elem_len)
len += p->elem_len + 1;
}
n = xmalloc(len);
m = n + len - (nlen + 1);
strcpy(m, name);
for (p = path; p; p = p->up) {
if (p->elem_len) {
m -= p->elem_len + 1;
memcpy(m, p->elem, p->elem_len);
m[p->elem_len] = '/';
}
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | char *path_name(const struct name_path *path, const char *name)
{
const struct name_path *p;
char *n, *m;
int nlen = strlen(name);
int len = nlen + 1;
for (p = path; p; p = p->up) {
if (p->elem_len)
len += p->elem_len + 1;
}
n = xmalloc(len);
m = n + len - (nlen + 1);
memcpy(m, name, nlen + 1);
for (p = path; p; p = p->up) {
if (p->elem_len) {
m -= p->elem_len + 1;
memcpy(m, p->elem, p->elem_len);
m[p->elem_len] = '/';
}
}
return n;
}
| 167,429 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RenderWidgetHostViewAura(RenderWidgetHost* host,
bool is_guest_view_hack)
: host_(RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(host)),
window_(nullptr),
in_shutdown_(false),
in_bounds_changed_(false),
popup_parent_host_view_(nullptr),
popup_child_host_view_(nullptr),
is_loading_(false),
has_composition_text_(false),
background_color_(SK_ColorWHITE),
needs_begin_frames_(false),
needs_flush_input_(false),
added_frame_observer_(false),
cursor_visibility_state_in_renderer_(UNKNOWN),
#if defined(OS_WIN)
legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_(nullptr),
legacy_window_destroyed_(false),
virtual_keyboard_requested_(false),
#endif
has_snapped_to_boundary_(false),
is_guest_view_hack_(is_guest_view_hack),
device_scale_factor_(0.0f),
event_handler_(new RenderWidgetHostViewEventHandler(host_, this, this)),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
if (!is_guest_view_hack_)
host_->SetView(this);
if (GetTextInputManager())
GetTextInputManager()->AddObserver(this);
bool overscroll_enabled = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->
GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kOverscrollHistoryNavigation) != "0";
SetOverscrollControllerEnabled(overscroll_enabled);
selection_controller_client_.reset(
new TouchSelectionControllerClientAura(this));
CreateSelectionController();
RenderViewHost* rvh = RenderViewHost::From(host_);
if (rvh) {
ignore_result(rvh->GetWebkitPreferences());
}
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RenderWidgetHostViewAura(RenderWidgetHost* host,
bool is_guest_view_hack)
: host_(RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(host)),
window_(nullptr),
in_shutdown_(false),
in_bounds_changed_(false),
popup_parent_host_view_(nullptr),
popup_child_host_view_(nullptr),
is_loading_(false),
has_composition_text_(false),
background_color_(SK_ColorWHITE),
needs_begin_frames_(false),
needs_flush_input_(false),
added_frame_observer_(false),
cursor_visibility_state_in_renderer_(UNKNOWN),
#if defined(OS_WIN)
legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_(nullptr),
legacy_window_destroyed_(false),
virtual_keyboard_requested_(false),
#endif
has_snapped_to_boundary_(false),
is_guest_view_hack_(is_guest_view_hack),
device_scale_factor_(0.0f),
event_handler_(new RenderWidgetHostViewEventHandler(host_, this, this)),
frame_sink_id_(host_->AllocateFrameSinkId(is_guest_view_hack_)),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
if (!is_guest_view_hack_)
host_->SetView(this);
if (GetTextInputManager())
GetTextInputManager()->AddObserver(this);
bool overscroll_enabled = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->
GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kOverscrollHistoryNavigation) != "0";
SetOverscrollControllerEnabled(overscroll_enabled);
selection_controller_client_.reset(
new TouchSelectionControllerClientAura(this));
CreateSelectionController();
RenderViewHost* rvh = RenderViewHost::From(host_);
if (rvh) {
ignore_result(rvh->GetWebkitPreferences());
}
}
| 172,235 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GpuChannelHost* RenderThreadImpl::EstablishGpuChannelSync(
content::CauseForGpuLaunch cause_for_gpu_launch) {
if (gpu_channel_.get()) {
if (gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kUnconnected ||
gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kConnected)
return GetGpuChannel();
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
}
int client_id = 0;
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process_for_gpu;
content::GPUInfo gpu_info;
if (!Send(new GpuHostMsg_EstablishGpuChannel(cause_for_gpu_launch,
&client_id,
&channel_handle,
&renderer_process_for_gpu,
&gpu_info)) ||
channel_handle.name.empty() ||
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
channel_handle.socket.fd == -1 ||
#endif
renderer_process_for_gpu == base::kNullProcessHandle) {
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
return NULL;
}
gpu_channel_ = new GpuChannelHost(this, 0, client_id);
gpu_channel_->set_gpu_info(gpu_info);
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info);
gpu_channel_->Connect(channel_handle, renderer_process_for_gpu);
return GetGpuChannel();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | GpuChannelHost* RenderThreadImpl::EstablishGpuChannelSync(
content::CauseForGpuLaunch cause_for_gpu_launch) {
if (gpu_channel_.get()) {
if (gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kUnconnected ||
gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kConnected)
return GetGpuChannel();
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
}
int client_id = 0;
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
content::GPUInfo gpu_info;
if (!Send(new GpuHostMsg_EstablishGpuChannel(cause_for_gpu_launch,
&client_id,
&channel_handle,
&gpu_info)) ||
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
channel_handle.socket.fd == -1 ||
#endif
channel_handle.name.empty()) {
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
return NULL;
}
gpu_channel_ = new GpuChannelHost(this, 0, client_id);
gpu_channel_->set_gpu_info(gpu_info);
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info);
gpu_channel_->Connect(channel_handle);
return GetGpuChannel();
}
| 170,954 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_palette_to_rgb(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_set(const image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_palette_to_rgb(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
| 173,640 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SendNotImplementedError(struct mg_connection* connection,
const struct mg_request_info* request_info,
void* user_data) {
std::string body = base::StringPrintf(
"{\"status\":%d,\"value\":{\"message\":"
"\"Command has not been implemented yet: %s %s\"}}",
kUnknownCommand, request_info->request_method, request_info->uri);
std::string header = base::StringPrintf(
"HTTP/1.1 501 Not Implemented\r\n"
"Content-Type:application/json\r\n"
"Content-Length:%" PRIuS "\r\n"
"\r\n", body.length());
LOG(ERROR) << header << body;
mg_write(connection, header.data(), header.length());
mg_write(connection, body.data(), body.length());
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void SendNotImplementedError(struct mg_connection* connection,
const struct mg_request_info* request_info,
void* user_data) {
std::string body = base::StringPrintf(
"{\"status\":%d,\"value\":{\"message\":"
"\"Command has not been implemented yet: %s %s\"}}",
kUnknownCommand, request_info->request_method, request_info->uri);
std::string header = base::StringPrintf(
"HTTP/1.1 501 Not Implemented\r\n"
"Content-Type:application/json\r\n"
"Content-Length:%" PRIuS "\r\n"
"\r\n", body.length());
mg_write(connection, header.data(), header.length());
mg_write(connection, body.data(), body.length());
}
| 170,457 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void __detach_mounts(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct mountpoint *mp;
struct mount *mnt;
namespace_lock();
mp = lookup_mountpoint(dentry);
if (!mp)
goto out_unlock;
lock_mount_hash();
while (!hlist_empty(&mp->m_list)) {
mnt = hlist_entry(mp->m_list.first, struct mount, mnt_mp_list);
umount_tree(mnt, 0);
}
unlock_mount_hash();
put_mountpoint(mp);
out_unlock:
namespace_unlock();
}
Commit Message: mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts
Modify umount(MNT_DETACH) to keep mounts in the hash table that are
locked to their parent mounts, when the parent is lazily unmounted.
In mntput_no_expire detach the children from the hash table, depending
on mnt_pin_kill in cleanup_mnt to decrement the mnt_count of the children.
In __detach_mounts if there are any mounts that have been unmounted
but still are on the list of mounts of a mountpoint, remove their
children from the mount hash table and those children to the unmounted
list so they won't linger potentially indefinitely waiting for their
final mntput, now that the mounts serve no purpose.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void __detach_mounts(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct mountpoint *mp;
struct mount *mnt;
namespace_lock();
mp = lookup_mountpoint(dentry);
if (!mp)
goto out_unlock;
lock_mount_hash();
while (!hlist_empty(&mp->m_list)) {
mnt = hlist_entry(mp->m_list.first, struct mount, mnt_mp_list);
if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_UMOUNT) {
struct mount *p, *tmp;
list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
hlist_add_head(&p->mnt_umount.s_list, &unmounted);
umount_mnt(p);
}
}
else umount_tree(mnt, 0);
}
unlock_mount_hash();
put_mountpoint(mp);
out_unlock:
namespace_unlock();
}
| 167,588 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: header_put_le_3byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 3)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
} ;
} /* header_put_le_3byte */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | header_put_le_3byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = x ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 16) ;
} /* header_put_le_3byte */
| 170,054 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void TearDown() {
vpx_free(src_);
delete[] ref_;
vpx_free(sec_);
libvpx_test::ClearSystemState();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void TearDown() {
vpx_free(src_);
delete[] ref_;
libvpx_test::ClearSystemState();
}
protected:
void RefTest_mse();
void RefTest_sse();
void MaxTest_mse();
void MaxTest_sse();
ACMRandom rnd;
uint8_t* src_;
uint8_t* ref_;
int width_, log2width_;
int height_, log2height_;
int block_size_;
MseFunctionType mse_;
};
template<typename MseFunctionType>
void MseTest<MseFunctionType>::RefTest_mse() {
for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
src_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
ref_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
const int stride_coeff = 1;
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(mse_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse1));
variance_ref(src_, ref_, log2width_, log2height_, stride_coeff,
stride_coeff, &sse2, false, VPX_BITS_8);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2);
}
}
template<typename MseFunctionType>
void MseTest<MseFunctionType>::RefTest_sse() {
for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
src_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
ref_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
unsigned int sse2;
unsigned int var1;
const int stride_coeff = 1;
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var1 = mse_(src_, width_, ref_, width_));
variance_ref(src_, ref_, log2width_, log2height_, stride_coeff,
stride_coeff, &sse2, false, VPX_BITS_8);
EXPECT_EQ(var1, sse2);
}
}
template<typename MseFunctionType>
void MseTest<MseFunctionType>::MaxTest_mse() {
memset(src_, 255, block_size_);
memset(ref_, 0, block_size_);
unsigned int sse;
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(mse_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse));
const unsigned int expected = block_size_ * 255 * 255;
EXPECT_EQ(expected, sse);
}
template<typename MseFunctionType>
void MseTest<MseFunctionType>::MaxTest_sse() {
memset(src_, 255, block_size_);
memset(ref_, 0, block_size_);
unsigned int var;
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var = mse_(src_, width_, ref_, width_));
const unsigned int expected = block_size_ * 255 * 255;
EXPECT_EQ(expected, var);
}
static uint32_t subpel_avg_variance_ref(const uint8_t *ref,
const uint8_t *src,
const uint8_t *second_pred,
int l2w, int l2h,
int xoff, int yoff,
uint32_t *sse_ptr,
bool use_high_bit_depth,
vpx_bit_depth_t bit_depth) {
int64_t se = 0;
uint64_t sse = 0;
const int w = 1 << l2w;
const int h = 1 << l2h;
xoff <<= 1;
yoff <<= 1;
for (int y = 0; y < h; y++) {
for (int x = 0; x < w; x++) {
// bilinear interpolation at a 16th pel step
if (!use_high_bit_depth) {
const int a1 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 0) + x + 0];
const int a2 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 0) + x + 1];
const int b1 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 1) + x + 0];
const int b2 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 1) + x + 1];
const int a = a1 + (((a2 - a1) * xoff + 8) >> 4);
const int b = b1 + (((b2 - b1) * xoff + 8) >> 4);
const int r = a + (((b - a) * yoff + 8) >> 4);
const int diff = ((r + second_pred[w * y + x] + 1) >> 1) - src[w * y + x];
se += diff;
sse += diff * diff;
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
uint16_t *ref16 = CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref);
uint16_t *src16 = CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src);
uint16_t *sec16 = CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(second_pred);
const int a1 = ref16[(w + 1) * (y + 0) + x + 0];
const int a2 = ref16[(w + 1) * (y + 0) + x + 1];
const int b1 = ref16[(w + 1) * (y + 1) + x + 0];
const int b2 = ref16[(w + 1) * (y + 1) + x + 1];
const int a = a1 + (((a2 - a1) * xoff + 8) >> 4);
const int b = b1 + (((b2 - b1) * xoff + 8) >> 4);
const int r = a + (((b - a) * yoff + 8) >> 4);
const int diff = ((r + sec16[w * y + x] + 1) >> 1) - src16[w * y + x];
se += diff;
sse += diff * diff;
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
}
}
RoundHighBitDepth(bit_depth, &se, &sse);
*sse_ptr = static_cast<uint32_t>(sse);
return static_cast<uint32_t>(sse -
((static_cast<int64_t>(se) * se) >>
(l2w + l2h)));
}
template<typename SubpelVarianceFunctionType>
class SubpelVarianceTest
: public ::testing::TestWithParam<tuple<int, int,
SubpelVarianceFunctionType, int> > {
public:
virtual void SetUp() {
const tuple<int, int, SubpelVarianceFunctionType, int>& params =
this->GetParam();
log2width_ = get<0>(params);
width_ = 1 << log2width_;
log2height_ = get<1>(params);
height_ = 1 << log2height_;
subpel_variance_ = get<2>(params);
if (get<3>(params)) {
bit_depth_ = (vpx_bit_depth_t) get<3>(params);
use_high_bit_depth_ = true;
} else {
bit_depth_ = VPX_BITS_8;
use_high_bit_depth_ = false;
}
mask_ = (1 << bit_depth_)-1;
rnd_.Reset(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
block_size_ = width_ * height_;
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
src_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(vpx_memalign(16, block_size_));
sec_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(vpx_memalign(16, block_size_));
ref_ = new uint8_t[block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1];
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
src_ = CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(
reinterpret_cast<uint16_t *>(
vpx_memalign(16, block_size_*sizeof(uint16_t))));
sec_ = CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(
reinterpret_cast<uint16_t *>(
vpx_memalign(16, block_size_*sizeof(uint16_t))));
ref_ = CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(
new uint16_t[block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1]);
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
ASSERT_TRUE(src_ != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(sec_ != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(ref_ != NULL);
}
virtual void TearDown() {
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
vpx_free(src_);
delete[] ref_;
vpx_free(sec_);
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
vpx_free(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src_));
delete[] CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref_);
vpx_free(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(sec_));
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
libvpx_test::ClearSystemState();
}
| 174,592 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SerializedScriptValue::transferArrayBuffers(v8::Isolate* isolate, const ArrayBufferArray& arrayBuffers, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (!arrayBuffers.size())
return;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arrayBuffers.size(); ++i) {
if (arrayBuffers[i]->isNeutered()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(DataCloneError, "ArrayBuffer at index " + String::number(i) + " is already neutered.");
return;
}
}
OwnPtr<ArrayBufferContentsArray> contents = adoptPtr(new ArrayBufferContentsArray(arrayBuffers.size()));
HeapHashSet<Member<DOMArrayBufferBase>> visited;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arrayBuffers.size(); ++i) {
if (visited.contains(arrayBuffers[i]))
continue;
visited.add(arrayBuffers[i]);
if (arrayBuffers[i]->isShared()) {
bool result = arrayBuffers[i]->shareContentsWith(contents->at(i));
if (!result) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(DataCloneError, "SharedArrayBuffer at index " + String::number(i) + " could not be transferred.");
return;
}
} else {
Vector<v8::Local<v8::ArrayBuffer>, 4> bufferHandles;
v8::HandleScope handleScope(isolate);
acculumateArrayBuffersForAllWorlds(isolate, static_cast<DOMArrayBuffer*>(arrayBuffers[i].get()), bufferHandles);
bool isNeuterable = true;
for (size_t j = 0; j < bufferHandles.size(); ++j)
isNeuterable &= bufferHandles[j]->IsNeuterable();
DOMArrayBufferBase* toTransfer = arrayBuffers[i];
if (!isNeuterable)
toTransfer = DOMArrayBuffer::create(arrayBuffers[i]->buffer());
bool result = toTransfer->transfer(contents->at(i));
if (!result) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(DataCloneError, "ArrayBuffer at index " + String::number(i) + " could not be transferred.");
return;
}
if (isNeuterable)
for (size_t j = 0; j < bufferHandles.size(); ++j)
bufferHandles[j]->Neuter();
}
}
m_arrayBufferContentsArray = contents.release();
}
Commit Message: When we can't neuter ArrayBuffers, we can't transfer them
Instead, we need to copy
BUG=603987
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1904913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#388719}
CWE ID: | void SerializedScriptValue::transferArrayBuffers(v8::Isolate* isolate, const ArrayBufferArray& arrayBuffers, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (!arrayBuffers.size())
return;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arrayBuffers.size(); ++i) {
if (arrayBuffers[i]->isNeutered()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(DataCloneError, "ArrayBuffer at index " + String::number(i) + " is already neutered.");
return;
}
}
OwnPtr<ArrayBufferContentsArray> contents = adoptPtr(new ArrayBufferContentsArray(arrayBuffers.size()));
HeapHashSet<Member<DOMArrayBufferBase>> visited;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arrayBuffers.size(); ++i) {
if (visited.contains(arrayBuffers[i]))
continue;
visited.add(arrayBuffers[i]);
if (arrayBuffers[i]->isShared()) {
bool result = arrayBuffers[i]->shareContentsWith(contents->at(i));
if (!result) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(DataCloneError, "SharedArrayBuffer at index " + String::number(i) + " could not be transferred.");
return;
}
} else {
Vector<v8::Local<v8::ArrayBuffer>, 4> bufferHandles;
v8::HandleScope handleScope(isolate);
acculumateArrayBuffersForAllWorlds(isolate, static_cast<DOMArrayBuffer*>(arrayBuffers[i].get()), bufferHandles);
bool isNeuterable = true;
for (size_t j = 0; j < bufferHandles.size(); ++j)
isNeuterable &= bufferHandles[j]->IsNeuterable();
DOMArrayBufferBase* toTransfer = arrayBuffers[i];
if (!isNeuterable)
toTransfer = DOMArrayBuffer::create(arrayBuffers[i]->buffer()->data(), arrayBuffers[i]->buffer()->byteLength());
bool result = toTransfer->transfer(contents->at(i));
if (!result) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(DataCloneError, "ArrayBuffer at index " + String::number(i) + " could not be transferred.");
return;
}
if (isNeuterable)
for (size_t j = 0; j < bufferHandles.size(); ++j)
bufferHandles[j]->Neuter();
}
}
m_arrayBufferContentsArray = contents.release();
}
| 172,564 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: decrypt_response(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t * out_len)
{
size_t in_len;
size_t i;
unsigned char iv[16] = { 0 };
unsigned char plaintext[4096] = { 0 };
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
/* no cipher */
if (in[0] == 0x99)
return 0;
/* parse cipher length */
if (0x01 == in[2] && 0x82 != in[1]) {
in_len = in[1];
i = 3;
}
else if (0x01 == in[3] && 0x81 == in[1]) {
in_len = in[2];
i = 4;
}
else if (0x01 == in[4] && 0x82 == in[1]) {
in_len = in[2] * 0x100;
in_len += in[3];
i = 5;
}
else {
return -1;
}
/* decrypt */
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == exdata->smtype)
aes128_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], in_len - 1, plaintext);
else
des3_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], in_len - 1, plaintext);
/* unpadding */
while (0x80 != plaintext[in_len - 2] && (in_len - 2 > 0))
in_len--;
if (2 == in_len)
return -1;
memcpy(out, plaintext, in_len - 2);
*out_len = in_len - 2;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | decrypt_response(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t * out_len)
decrypt_response(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, unsigned char *out, size_t * out_len)
{
size_t cipher_len;
size_t i;
unsigned char iv[16] = { 0 };
unsigned char plaintext[4096] = { 0 };
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
/* no cipher */
if (in[0] == 0x99)
return 0;
/* parse cipher length */
if (0x01 == in[2] && 0x82 != in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[1];
i = 3;
}
else if (0x01 == in[3] && 0x81 == in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[2];
i = 4;
}
else if (0x01 == in[4] && 0x82 == in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[2] * 0x100;
cipher_len += in[3];
i = 5;
}
else {
return -1;
}
if (cipher_len < 2 || i+cipher_len > inlen || cipher_len > sizeof plaintext)
return -1;
/* decrypt */
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == exdata->smtype)
aes128_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], cipher_len - 1, plaintext);
else
des3_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], cipher_len - 1, plaintext);
/* unpadding */
while (0x80 != plaintext[cipher_len - 2] && (cipher_len - 2 > 0))
cipher_len--;
if (2 == cipher_len)
return -1;
memcpy(out, plaintext, cipher_len - 2);
*out_len = cipher_len - 2;
return 0;
}
| 169,054 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadUYVYImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
u,
v,
y1,
y2;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
image->columns++;
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
image->depth=8;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Accumulate UYVY, then unpack into two pixels.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (image->columns >> 1); x++)
{
u=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
y1=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
v=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
y2=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(y1));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(u));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(v));
q++;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(y2));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(u));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(v));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
SetImageColorspace(image,YCbCrColorspace);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static Image *ReadUYVYImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
u,
v,
y1,
y2;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
image->columns++;
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
image->depth=8;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Accumulate UYVY, then unpack into two pixels.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (image->columns >> 1); x++)
{
u=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
y1=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
v=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
y2=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(y1));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(u));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(v));
q++;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(y2));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(u));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(v));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
SetImageColorspace(image,YCbCrColorspace);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,615 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int interface_get_command(QXLInstance *sin, struct QXLCommandExt *ext)
{
SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd = container_of(sin, SimpleSpiceDisplay, qxl);
info->num_memslots = NUM_MEMSLOTS;
info->num_memslots_groups = NUM_MEMSLOTS_GROUPS;
info->internal_groupslot_id = 0;
info->qxl_ram_size = ssd->bufsize;
info->n_surfaces = ssd->num_surfaces;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int interface_get_command(QXLInstance *sin, struct QXLCommandExt *ext)
{
SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd = container_of(sin, SimpleSpiceDisplay, qxl);
info->num_memslots = NUM_MEMSLOTS;
info->num_memslots_groups = NUM_MEMSLOTS_GROUPS;
info->internal_groupslot_id = 0;
info->qxl_ram_size = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
info->n_surfaces = ssd->num_surfaces;
}
| 165,150 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Segment::LoadCluster(
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
for (;;)
{
const long result = DoLoadCluster(pos, len);
if (result <= 1)
return result;
}
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Segment::LoadCluster(
if (result <= 1)
return result;
}
}
long Segment::DoLoadCluster(long long& pos, long& len) {
if (m_pos < 0)
return DoLoadClusterUnknownSize(pos, len);
long long total, avail;
long status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
long long cluster_off = -1; // offset relative to start of segment
long long cluster_size = -1; // size of cluster payload
for (;;) {
if ((total >= 0) && (m_pos >= total))
return 1; // no more clusters
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (m_pos >= segment_stop))
return 1; // no more clusters
pos = m_pos;
// Read ID
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
| 174,396 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pipe_iov_copy_to_user(struct iovec *iov, const void *from, unsigned long len,
int atomic)
{
unsigned long copy;
while (len > 0) {
while (!iov->iov_len)
iov++;
copy = min_t(unsigned long, len, iov->iov_len);
if (atomic) {
if (__copy_to_user_inatomic(iov->iov_base, from, copy))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_to_user(iov->iov_base, from, copy))
return -EFAULT;
}
from += copy;
len -= copy;
iov->iov_base += copy;
iov->iov_len -= copy;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: switch pipe_read() to copy_page_to_iter()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | pipe_iov_copy_to_user(struct iovec *iov, const void *from, unsigned long len,
| 169,928 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: psf_close (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ uint32_t k ;
int error = 0 ;
if (psf->codec_close)
{ error = psf->codec_close (psf) ;
/* To prevent it being called in psf->container_close(). */
psf->codec_close = NULL ;
} ;
if (psf->container_close)
error = psf->container_close (psf) ;
error = psf_fclose (psf) ;
psf_close_rsrc (psf) ;
/* For an ISO C compliant implementation it is ok to free a NULL pointer. */
free (psf->container_data) ;
free (psf->codec_data) ;
free (psf->interleave) ;
free (psf->dither) ;
free (psf->peak_info) ;
free (psf->broadcast_16k) ;
free (psf->loop_info) ;
free (psf->instrument) ;
free (psf->cues) ;
free (psf->channel_map) ;
free (psf->format_desc) ;
free (psf->strings.storage) ;
if (psf->wchunks.chunks)
for (k = 0 ; k < psf->wchunks.used ; k++)
free (psf->wchunks.chunks [k].data) ;
free (psf->rchunks.chunks) ;
free (psf->wchunks.chunks) ;
free (psf->iterator) ;
free (psf->cart_16k) ;
memset (psf, 0, sizeof (SF_PRIVATE)) ;
free (psf) ;
return error ;
} /* psf_close */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | psf_close (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ uint32_t k ;
int error = 0 ;
if (psf->codec_close)
{ error = psf->codec_close (psf) ;
/* To prevent it being called in psf->container_close(). */
psf->codec_close = NULL ;
} ;
if (psf->container_close)
error = psf->container_close (psf) ;
error = psf_fclose (psf) ;
psf_close_rsrc (psf) ;
/* For an ISO C compliant implementation it is ok to free a NULL pointer. */
free (psf->header.ptr) ;
free (psf->container_data) ;
free (psf->codec_data) ;
free (psf->interleave) ;
free (psf->dither) ;
free (psf->peak_info) ;
free (psf->broadcast_16k) ;
free (psf->loop_info) ;
free (psf->instrument) ;
free (psf->cues) ;
free (psf->channel_map) ;
free (psf->format_desc) ;
free (psf->strings.storage) ;
if (psf->wchunks.chunks)
for (k = 0 ; k < psf->wchunks.used ; k++)
free (psf->wchunks.chunks [k].data) ;
free (psf->rchunks.chunks) ;
free (psf->wchunks.chunks) ;
free (psf->iterator) ;
free (psf->cart_16k) ;
memset (psf, 0, sizeof (SF_PRIVATE)) ;
free (psf) ;
return error ;
} /* psf_close */
| 170,066 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct ucma_multicast* ucma_alloc_multicast(struct ucma_context *ctx)
{
struct ucma_multicast *mc;
mc = kzalloc(sizeof(*mc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mc)
return NULL;
mutex_lock(&mut);
mc->id = idr_alloc(&multicast_idr, mc, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
if (mc->id < 0)
goto error;
mc->ctx = ctx;
list_add_tail(&mc->list, &ctx->mc_list);
return mc;
error:
kfree(mc);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@beyondsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static struct ucma_multicast* ucma_alloc_multicast(struct ucma_context *ctx)
{
struct ucma_multicast *mc;
mc = kzalloc(sizeof(*mc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mc)
return NULL;
mutex_lock(&mut);
mc->id = idr_alloc(&multicast_idr, NULL, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
if (mc->id < 0)
goto error;
mc->ctx = ctx;
list_add_tail(&mc->list, &ctx->mc_list);
return mc;
error:
kfree(mc);
return NULL;
}
| 169,109 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: INST_HANDLER (lds) { // LDS Rd, k
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4);
int k = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
op->ptr = k;
__generic_ld_st (op, "ram", 0, 1, 0, k, 0);
ESIL_A ("r%d,=,", d);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in anal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-125 | INST_HANDLER (lds) { // LDS Rd, k
if (len < 4) {
return;
}
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4);
int k = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
op->ptr = k;
__generic_ld_st (op, "ram", 0, 1, 0, k, 0);
ESIL_A ("r%d,=,", d);
}
| 169,234 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: zsetstrokecolorspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
int code;
zsetstrokecolorspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
int code;
code = zswapcolors(i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
/* Now, the actual continuation routine */
push_op_estack(setstrokecolorspace_cont);
code = zsetcolorspace(i_ctx_p);
if (code >= 0)
return o_push_estack;
return code;
}
if (code >= 0)
return o_push_estack;
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | zsetstrokecolorspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
int code;
zsetstrokecolorspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
int code;
es_ptr iesp = esp; /* preserve exec stack in case of error */
code = zswapcolors(i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
/* Now, the actual continuation routine */
push_op_estack(setstrokecolorspace_cont);
code = zsetcolorspace(i_ctx_p);
if (code >= 0)
return o_push_estack;
return code;
}
if (code >= 0)
return o_push_estack;
/* Something went wrong, swap back to the non-stroking space and restore the exec stack */
esp = iesp;
(void)zswapcolors(i_ctx_p);
return code;
}
| 164,700 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_init (MyObject *obj)
{
obj->val = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_init (MyObject *obj)
| 165,109 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: on_unregister_handler(TCMUService1HandlerManager1 *interface,
GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation,
gchar *subtype,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler = find_handler_by_subtype(subtype);
struct dbus_info *info = handler->opaque;
if (!handler) {
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", FALSE,
"unknown subtype"));
return TRUE;
}
dbus_unexport_handler(handler);
tcmur_unregister_handler(handler);
g_bus_unwatch_name(info->watcher_id);
g_free(info);
g_free(handler);
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", TRUE, "succeeded"));
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: fixed local DoS when UnregisterHandler was called for a not existing handler
Any user with DBUS access could cause a SEGFAULT in tcmu-runner by
running something like this:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:123
CWE ID: CWE-20 | on_unregister_handler(TCMUService1HandlerManager1 *interface,
GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation,
gchar *subtype,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler = find_handler_by_subtype(subtype);
struct dbus_info *info = handler ? handler->opaque : NULL;
if (!handler) {
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", FALSE,
"unknown subtype"));
return TRUE;
}
dbus_unexport_handler(handler);
tcmur_unregister_handler(handler);
g_bus_unwatch_name(info->watcher_id);
g_free(info);
g_free(handler);
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", TRUE, "succeeded"));
return TRUE;
}
| 167,630 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: swabHorDiff16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
horDiff16(tif, cp0, cc);
TIFFSwabArrayOfShort(wp, wc);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | swabHorDiff16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
if( !horDiff16(tif, cp0, cc) )
return 0;
TIFFSwabArrayOfShort(wp, wc);
return 1;
}
| 166,890 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void FramePktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
if (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) {
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void FramePktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
virtual void PSNRPktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
if (pkt->data.psnr.psnr[0] < min_psnr_)
min_psnr_ = pkt->data.psnr.psnr[0];
}
| 174,512 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintMsg_Print_Params::Reset() {
page_size = gfx::Size();
content_size = gfx::Size();
printable_area = gfx::Rect();
margin_top = 0;
margin_left = 0;
dpi = 0;
min_shrink = 0;
max_shrink = 0;
desired_dpi = 0;
document_cookie = 0;
selection_only = false;
supports_alpha_blend = false;
preview_ui_addr = std::string();
preview_request_id = 0;
is_first_request = false;
print_scaling_option = WebKit::WebPrintScalingOptionSourceSize;
print_to_pdf = false;
display_header_footer = false;
date = string16();
title = string16();
url = string16();
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void PrintMsg_Print_Params::Reset() {
page_size = gfx::Size();
content_size = gfx::Size();
printable_area = gfx::Rect();
margin_top = 0;
margin_left = 0;
dpi = 0;
min_shrink = 0;
max_shrink = 0;
desired_dpi = 0;
document_cookie = 0;
selection_only = false;
supports_alpha_blend = false;
preview_ui_id = -1;
preview_request_id = 0;
is_first_request = false;
print_scaling_option = WebKit::WebPrintScalingOptionSourceSize;
print_to_pdf = false;
display_header_footer = false;
date = string16();
title = string16();
url = string16();
}
| 170,846 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.aac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if ((formatParams->nPortIndex == 0
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM)
|| (formatParams->nPortIndex == 1
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitRate = aacParams->nBitRate;
mNumChannels = aacParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = aacParams->nSampleRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumChannels = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(roleParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.aac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(formatParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if ((formatParams->nPortIndex == 0
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM)
|| (formatParams->nPortIndex == 1
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(aacParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitRate = aacParams->nBitRate;
mNumChannels = aacParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = aacParams->nSampleRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumChannels = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,189 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: setkey_principal_2_svc(setkey_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setkey_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keyblocks, arg->n_keys);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | setkey_principal_2_svc(setkey_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setkey_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keyblocks, arg->n_keys);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,526 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev2_p_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_, int pcount _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int oprop_length,
const u_char *ep, int depth)
{
const struct ikev2_p *p;
struct ikev2_p prop;
u_int prop_length;
const u_char *cp;
int i;
int tcount;
u_char np;
struct isakmp_gen e;
u_int item_len;
p = (const struct ikev2_p *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&prop, ext, sizeof(prop));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_P), prop.h.critical);
/*
* ikev2_sa_print() guarantees that this is >= 4.
*/
prop_length = oprop_length - 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%u protoid=%s transform=%d len=%u",
prop.p_no, PROTOIDSTR(prop.prot_id),
prop.num_t, oprop_length));
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1);
if (prop.spi_size) {
if (prop_length < prop.spi_size)
goto toolong;
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)cp, prop.spi_size))
goto trunc;
cp += prop.spi_size;
prop_length -= prop.spi_size;
}
/*
* Print the transforms.
*/
tcount = 0;
for (np = ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T; np != 0; np = e.np) {
tcount++;
ext = (const struct isakmp_gen *)cp;
if (prop_length < sizeof(*ext))
goto toolong;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
/*
* Since we can't have a payload length of less than 4 bytes,
* we need to bail out here if the generic header is nonsensical
* or truncated, otherwise we could loop forever processing
* zero-length items or otherwise misdissect the packet.
*/
item_len = ntohs(e.len);
if (item_len <= 4)
goto trunc;
if (prop_length < item_len)
goto toolong;
ND_TCHECK2(*cp, item_len);
depth++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n"));
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
if (np == ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T) {
cp = ikev2_t_print(ndo, tcount, ext, item_len, ep);
if (cp == NULL) {
/* error, already reported */
return NULL;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", NPSTR(np)));
cp += item_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
depth--;
prop_length -= item_len;
}
return cp;
toolong:
/*
* Skip the rest of the proposal.
*/
cp += prop_length;
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_P)));
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_P)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev2_p_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_, int pcount _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int oprop_length,
const u_char *ep, int depth)
{
const struct ikev2_p *p;
struct ikev2_p prop;
u_int prop_length;
const u_char *cp;
int i;
int tcount;
u_char np;
struct isakmp_gen e;
u_int item_len;
p = (const struct ikev2_p *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&prop, ext, sizeof(prop));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_P), prop.h.critical);
/*
* ikev2_sa_print() guarantees that this is >= 4.
*/
prop_length = oprop_length - 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%u protoid=%s transform=%d len=%u",
prop.p_no, PROTOIDSTR(prop.prot_id),
prop.num_t, oprop_length));
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1);
if (prop.spi_size) {
if (prop_length < prop.spi_size)
goto toolong;
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)cp, prop.spi_size))
goto trunc;
cp += prop.spi_size;
prop_length -= prop.spi_size;
}
/*
* Print the transforms.
*/
tcount = 0;
for (np = ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T; np != 0; np = e.np) {
tcount++;
ext = (const struct isakmp_gen *)cp;
if (prop_length < sizeof(*ext))
goto toolong;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
/*
* Since we can't have a payload length of less than 4 bytes,
* we need to bail out here if the generic header is nonsensical
* or truncated, otherwise we could loop forever processing
* zero-length items or otherwise misdissect the packet.
*/
item_len = ntohs(e.len);
if (item_len <= 4)
goto trunc;
if (prop_length < item_len)
goto toolong;
ND_TCHECK2(*cp, item_len);
depth++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n"));
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
if (np == ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T) {
cp = ikev2_t_print(ndo, tcount, ext, item_len, ep);
if (cp == NULL) {
/* error, already reported */
return NULL;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", NPSTR(np)));
cp += item_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
depth--;
prop_length -= item_len;
}
return cp;
toolong:
/*
* Skip the rest of the proposal.
*/
cp += prop_length;
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_P)));
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_P)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,800 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void php_mb_regex_free_cache(php_mb_regex_t **pre)
{
onig_free(*pre);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415 | static void php_mb_regex_free_cache(php_mb_regex_t **pre)
static void php_mb_regex_free_cache(php_mb_regex_t **pre)
{
onig_free(*pre);
}
| 167,122 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsAppendNamedColor(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* NamedColorList,
const char* Name,
cmsUInt16Number PCS[3], cmsUInt16Number Colorant[cmsMAXCHANNELS])
{
cmsUInt32Number i;
if (NamedColorList == NULL) return FALSE;
if (NamedColorList ->nColors + 1 > NamedColorList ->Allocated) {
if (!GrowNamedColorList(NamedColorList)) return FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i < NamedColorList ->ColorantCount; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].DeviceColorant[i] = Colorant == NULL? 0 : Colorant[i];
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].PCS[i] = PCS == NULL ? 0 : PCS[i];
if (Name != NULL) {
strncpy(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name, Name,
sizeof(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name));
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[cmsMAX_PATH-1] = 0;
}
else
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[0] = 0;
NamedColorList ->nColors++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsAppendNamedColor(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* NamedColorList,
const char* Name,
cmsUInt16Number PCS[3], cmsUInt16Number Colorant[cmsMAXCHANNELS])
{
cmsUInt32Number i;
if (NamedColorList == NULL) return FALSE;
if (NamedColorList ->nColors + 1 > NamedColorList ->Allocated) {
if (!GrowNamedColorList(NamedColorList)) return FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i < NamedColorList ->ColorantCount; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].DeviceColorant[i] = Colorant == NULL? 0 : Colorant[i];
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].PCS[i] = PCS == NULL ? 0 : PCS[i];
if (Name != NULL) {
strncpy(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name, Name, cmsMAX_PATH-1);
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[cmsMAX_PATH-1] = 0;
}
else
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[0] = 0;
NamedColorList ->nColors++;
return TRUE;
}
| 166,543 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virDomainGetTime(virDomainPtr dom,
long long *seconds,
unsigned int *nseconds,
unsigned int flags)
{
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(dom, "seconds=%p, nseconds=%p, flags=%x",
seconds, nseconds, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(dom, -1);
if (dom->conn->driver->domainGetTime) {
int ret = dom->conn->driver->domainGetTime(dom, seconds,
nseconds, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(dom->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | virDomainGetTime(virDomainPtr dom,
long long *seconds,
unsigned int *nseconds,
unsigned int flags)
{
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(dom, "seconds=%p, nseconds=%p, flags=%x",
seconds, nseconds, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(dom, -1);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(dom->conn->flags, error);
if (dom->conn->driver->domainGetTime) {
int ret = dom->conn->driver->domainGetTime(dom, seconds,
nseconds, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(dom->conn);
return -1;
}
| 169,863 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltNumberFormatGetAnyLevel(xsltTransformContextPtr context,
xmlNodePtr node,
xsltCompMatchPtr countPat,
xsltCompMatchPtr fromPat,
double *array,
xmlDocPtr doc,
xmlNodePtr elem)
{
int amount = 0;
int cnt = 0;
xmlNodePtr cur;
/* select the starting node */
switch (node->type) {
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
cur = node;
break;
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
cur = ((xmlAttrPtr) node)->parent;
break;
case XML_TEXT_NODE:
case XML_PI_NODE:
case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
cur = node->parent;
break;
default:
cur = NULL;
break;
}
while (cur != NULL) {
/* process current node */
if (countPat == NULL) {
if ((node->type == cur->type) &&
/* FIXME: must use expanded-name instead of local name */
xmlStrEqual(node->name, cur->name)) {
if ((node->ns == cur->ns) ||
((node->ns != NULL) &&
(cur->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(node->ns->href,
cur->ns->href) )))
cnt++;
}
} else {
if (xsltTestCompMatchList(context, cur, countPat))
cnt++;
}
if ((fromPat != NULL) &&
xsltTestCompMatchList(context, cur, fromPat)) {
break; /* while */
}
/* Skip to next preceding or ancestor */
if ((cur->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
#ifdef LIBXML_DOCB_ENABLED
(cur->type == XML_DOCB_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
#endif
(cur->type == XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE))
break; /* while */
while ((cur->prev != NULL) && ((cur->prev->type == XML_DTD_NODE) ||
(cur->prev->type == XML_XINCLUDE_START) ||
(cur->prev->type == XML_XINCLUDE_END)))
cur = cur->prev;
if (cur->prev != NULL) {
for (cur = cur->prev; cur->last != NULL; cur = cur->last);
} else {
cur = cur->parent;
}
}
array[amount++] = (double) cnt;
return(amount);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xsltNumberFormatGetAnyLevel(xsltTransformContextPtr context,
xmlNodePtr node,
xsltCompMatchPtr countPat,
xsltCompMatchPtr fromPat,
double *array)
{
int amount = 0;
int cnt = 0;
xmlNodePtr cur;
/* select the starting node */
switch (node->type) {
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
cur = node;
break;
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
cur = ((xmlAttrPtr) node)->parent;
break;
case XML_TEXT_NODE:
case XML_PI_NODE:
case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
cur = node->parent;
break;
default:
cur = NULL;
break;
}
while (cur != NULL) {
/* process current node */
if (xsltTestCompMatchCount(context, cur, countPat, node))
cnt++;
if ((fromPat != NULL) &&
xsltTestCompMatchList(context, cur, fromPat)) {
break; /* while */
}
/* Skip to next preceding or ancestor */
if ((cur->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
#ifdef LIBXML_DOCB_ENABLED
(cur->type == XML_DOCB_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
#endif
(cur->type == XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE))
break; /* while */
while ((cur->prev != NULL) && ((cur->prev->type == XML_DTD_NODE) ||
(cur->prev->type == XML_XINCLUDE_START) ||
(cur->prev->type == XML_XINCLUDE_END)))
cur = cur->prev;
if (cur->prev != NULL) {
for (cur = cur->prev; cur->last != NULL; cur = cur->last);
} else {
cur = cur->parent;
}
}
array[amount++] = (double) cnt;
return(amount);
}
| 173,308 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: le64addr_string(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *ep)
{
const unsigned int len = 8;
register u_int i;
register char *cp;
register struct enamemem *tp;
char buf[BUFSIZE];
tp = lookup_bytestring(ndo, ep, len);
if (tp->e_name)
return (tp->e_name);
cp = buf;
for (i = len; i > 0 ; --i) {
*cp++ = hex[*(ep + i - 1) >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*(ep + i - 1) & 0xf];
*cp++ = ':';
}
cp --;
*cp = '\0';
tp->e_name = strdup(buf);
if (tp->e_name == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "le64addr_string: strdup(buf)");
return (tp->e_name);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | le64addr_string(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *ep)
{
const unsigned int len = 8;
register u_int i;
register char *cp;
register struct bsnamemem *tp;
char buf[BUFSIZE];
tp = lookup_bytestring(ndo, ep, len);
if (tp->bs_name)
return (tp->bs_name);
cp = buf;
for (i = len; i > 0 ; --i) {
*cp++ = hex[*(ep + i - 1) >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*(ep + i - 1) & 0xf];
*cp++ = ':';
}
cp --;
*cp = '\0';
tp->bs_name = strdup(buf);
if (tp->bs_name == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "le64addr_string: strdup(buf)");
return (tp->bs_name);
}
| 167,958 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::CreateImageFromMailboxIfNeeded() {
if (texture_holder_->IsSkiaTextureHolder())
return;
texture_holder_ =
std::make_unique<SkiaTextureHolder>(std::move(texture_holder_));
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::CreateImageFromMailboxIfNeeded() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (texture_holder_->IsSkiaTextureHolder())
return;
texture_holder_ =
std::make_unique<SkiaTextureHolder>(std::move(texture_holder_));
}
| 172,592 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::setFillStyle(
const StringOrCanvasGradientOrCanvasPattern& style) {
DCHECK(!style.IsNull());
ValidateStateStack();
String color_string;
CanvasStyle* canvas_style = nullptr;
if (style.IsString()) {
color_string = style.GetAsString();
if (color_string == GetState().UnparsedFillColor())
return;
Color parsed_color = 0;
if (!ParseColorOrCurrentColor(parsed_color, color_string))
return;
if (GetState().FillStyle()->IsEquivalentRGBA(parsed_color.Rgb())) {
ModifiableState().SetUnparsedFillColor(color_string);
return;
}
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromRGBA(parsed_color.Rgb());
} else if (style.IsCanvasGradient()) {
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromGradient(style.GetAsCanvasGradient());
} else if (style.IsCanvasPattern()) {
CanvasPattern* canvas_pattern = style.GetAsCanvasPattern();
if (OriginClean() && !canvas_pattern->OriginClean()) {
SetOriginTainted();
ClearResolvedFilters();
}
if (canvas_pattern->GetPattern()->IsTextureBacked())
DisableDeferral(kDisableDeferralReasonUsingTextureBackedPattern);
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromPattern(canvas_pattern);
}
DCHECK(canvas_style);
ModifiableState().SetFillStyle(canvas_style);
ModifiableState().SetUnparsedFillColor(color_string);
ModifiableState().ClearResolvedFilter();
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void BaseRenderingContext2D::setFillStyle(
const StringOrCanvasGradientOrCanvasPattern& style) {
DCHECK(!style.IsNull());
ValidateStateStack();
String color_string;
CanvasStyle* canvas_style = nullptr;
if (style.IsString()) {
color_string = style.GetAsString();
if (color_string == GetState().UnparsedFillColor())
return;
Color parsed_color = 0;
if (!ParseColorOrCurrentColor(parsed_color, color_string))
return;
if (GetState().FillStyle()->IsEquivalentRGBA(parsed_color.Rgb())) {
ModifiableState().SetUnparsedFillColor(color_string);
return;
}
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromRGBA(parsed_color.Rgb());
} else if (style.IsCanvasGradient()) {
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromGradient(style.GetAsCanvasGradient());
} else if (style.IsCanvasPattern()) {
CanvasPattern* canvas_pattern = style.GetAsCanvasPattern();
if (!origin_tainted_by_content_ && !canvas_pattern->OriginClean()) {
SetOriginTaintedByContent();
}
if (canvas_pattern->GetPattern()->IsTextureBacked())
DisableDeferral(kDisableDeferralReasonUsingTextureBackedPattern);
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromPattern(canvas_pattern);
}
DCHECK(canvas_style);
ModifiableState().SetFillStyle(canvas_style);
ModifiableState().SetUnparsedFillColor(color_string);
ModifiableState().ClearResolvedFilter();
}
| 172,908 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int svc_rdma_init(void)
{
dprintk("SVCRDMA Module Init, register RPC RDMA transport\n");
dprintk("\tsvcrdma_ord : %d\n", svcrdma_ord);
dprintk("\tmax_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_requests);
dprintk("\tsq_depth : %u\n",
svcrdma_max_requests * RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT);
dprintk("\tmax_bc_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_bc_requests);
dprintk("\tmax_inline : %d\n", svcrdma_max_req_size);
svc_rdma_wq = alloc_workqueue("svc_rdma", 0, 0);
if (!svc_rdma_wq)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!svcrdma_table_header)
svcrdma_table_header =
register_sysctl_table(svcrdma_root_table);
/* Register RDMA with the SVC transport switch */
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_class);
#if defined(CONFIG_SUNRPC_BACKCHANNEL)
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_bc_class);
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | int svc_rdma_init(void)
{
dprintk("SVCRDMA Module Init, register RPC RDMA transport\n");
dprintk("\tsvcrdma_ord : %d\n", svcrdma_ord);
dprintk("\tmax_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_requests);
dprintk("\tmax_bc_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_bc_requests);
dprintk("\tmax_inline : %d\n", svcrdma_max_req_size);
svc_rdma_wq = alloc_workqueue("svc_rdma", 0, 0);
if (!svc_rdma_wq)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!svcrdma_table_header)
svcrdma_table_header =
register_sysctl_table(svcrdma_root_table);
/* Register RDMA with the SVC transport switch */
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_class);
#if defined(CONFIG_SUNRPC_BACKCHANNEL)
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_bc_class);
#endif
return 0;
}
| 168,156 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cdf_read_short_sector(const cdf_stream_t *sst, void *buf, size_t offs,
size_t len, const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
size_t ss = CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(h);
size_t pos = CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id);
assert(ss == len);
if (pos > CDF_SEC_SIZE(h) * sst->sst_len) {
DPRINTF(("Out of bounds read %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u > %"
SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
pos, CDF_SEC_SIZE(h) * sst->sst_len));
return -1;
}
(void)memcpy(((char *)buf) + offs,
((const char *)sst->sst_tab) + pos, len);
return len;
}
Commit Message: Apply patches from file-CVE-2012-1571.patch
From Francisco Alonso Espejo:
file < 5.18/git version can be made to crash when checking some
corrupt CDF files (Using an invalid cdf_read_short_sector size)
The problem I found here, is that in most situations (if
h_short_sec_size_p2 > 8) because the blocksize is 512 and normal
values are 06 which means reading 64 bytes.As long as the check
for the block size copy is not checked properly (there's an assert
that makes wrong/invalid assumptions)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cdf_read_short_sector(const cdf_stream_t *sst, void *buf, size_t offs,
size_t len, const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
size_t ss = CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(h);
size_t pos = CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id);
assert(ss == len);
if (pos + len > CDF_SEC_SIZE(h) * sst->sst_len) {
DPRINTF(("Out of bounds read %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u > %"
SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
pos + len, CDF_SEC_SIZE(h) * sst->sst_len));
return -1;
}
(void)memcpy(((char *)buf) + offs,
((const char *)sst->sst_tab) + pos, len);
return len;
}
| 166,444 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool Init(const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle,
PP_Module pp_module,
PP_GetInterface_Func local_get_interface,
const ppapi::Preferences& preferences,
SyncMessageStatusReceiver* status_receiver) {
dispatcher_delegate_.reset(new ProxyChannelDelegate);
dispatcher_.reset(new ppapi::proxy::HostDispatcher(
pp_module, local_get_interface, status_receiver));
if (!dispatcher_->InitHostWithChannel(dispatcher_delegate_.get(),
channel_handle,
true, // Client.
preferences)) {
dispatcher_.reset();
dispatcher_delegate_.reset();
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool Init(const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle,
| 170,735 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void edge_bulk_in_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct edgeport_port *edge_port = urb->context;
struct device *dev = &edge_port->port->dev;
unsigned char *data = urb->transfer_buffer;
int retval = 0;
int port_number;
int status = urb->status;
switch (status) {
case 0:
/* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
/* this urb is terminated, clean up */
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - urb shutting down with status: %d\n", __func__, status);
return;
default:
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - nonzero read bulk status received: %d\n", __func__, status);
}
if (status == -EPIPE)
goto exit;
if (status) {
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - stopping read!\n", __func__);
return;
}
port_number = edge_port->port->port_number;
if (edge_port->lsr_event) {
edge_port->lsr_event = 0;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s ===== Port %u LSR Status = %02x, Data = %02x ======\n",
__func__, port_number, edge_port->lsr_mask, *data);
handle_new_lsr(edge_port, 1, edge_port->lsr_mask, *data);
/* Adjust buffer length/pointer */
--urb->actual_length;
++data;
}
if (urb->actual_length) {
usb_serial_debug_data(dev, __func__, urb->actual_length, data);
if (edge_port->close_pending)
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - close pending, dropping data on the floor\n",
__func__);
else
edge_tty_recv(edge_port->port, data,
urb->actual_length);
edge_port->port->icount.rx += urb->actual_length;
}
exit:
/* continue read unless stopped */
spin_lock(&edge_port->ep_lock);
if (edge_port->ep_read_urb_state == EDGE_READ_URB_RUNNING)
retval = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
else if (edge_port->ep_read_urb_state == EDGE_READ_URB_STOPPING)
edge_port->ep_read_urb_state = EDGE_READ_URB_STOPPED;
spin_unlock(&edge_port->ep_lock);
if (retval)
dev_err(dev, "%s - usb_submit_urb failed with result %d\n", __func__, retval);
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191 | static void edge_bulk_in_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct edgeport_port *edge_port = urb->context;
struct device *dev = &edge_port->port->dev;
unsigned char *data = urb->transfer_buffer;
int retval = 0;
int port_number;
int status = urb->status;
switch (status) {
case 0:
/* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
/* this urb is terminated, clean up */
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - urb shutting down with status: %d\n", __func__, status);
return;
default:
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - nonzero read bulk status received: %d\n", __func__, status);
}
if (status == -EPIPE)
goto exit;
if (status) {
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - stopping read!\n", __func__);
return;
}
port_number = edge_port->port->port_number;
if (urb->actual_length > 0 && edge_port->lsr_event) {
edge_port->lsr_event = 0;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s ===== Port %u LSR Status = %02x, Data = %02x ======\n",
__func__, port_number, edge_port->lsr_mask, *data);
handle_new_lsr(edge_port, 1, edge_port->lsr_mask, *data);
/* Adjust buffer length/pointer */
--urb->actual_length;
++data;
}
if (urb->actual_length) {
usb_serial_debug_data(dev, __func__, urb->actual_length, data);
if (edge_port->close_pending)
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - close pending, dropping data on the floor\n",
__func__);
else
edge_tty_recv(edge_port->port, data,
urb->actual_length);
edge_port->port->icount.rx += urb->actual_length;
}
exit:
/* continue read unless stopped */
spin_lock(&edge_port->ep_lock);
if (edge_port->ep_read_urb_state == EDGE_READ_URB_RUNNING)
retval = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
else if (edge_port->ep_read_urb_state == EDGE_READ_URB_STOPPING)
edge_port->ep_read_urb_state = EDGE_READ_URB_STOPPED;
spin_unlock(&edge_port->ep_lock);
if (retval)
dev_err(dev, "%s - usb_submit_urb failed with result %d\n", __func__, retval);
}
| 168,189 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WT_InterpolateNoLoop (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 phaseFrac;
EAS_I32 acc0;
const EAS_SAMPLE *pSamples;
EAS_I32 samp1;
EAS_I32 samp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->phaseAccum;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
/* fetch adjacent samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* linear interpolation */
acc0 = samp2 - samp1;
acc0 = acc0 * phaseFrac;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = samp1 + (acc0 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
/* save new output sample in buffer */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_I16)(acc0 >> 2);
/* increment phase */
phaseFrac += phaseInc;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = phaseFrac >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS;
/* next sample */
if (acc0 > 0) {
/* advance sample pointer */
pSamples += acc0;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)((EAS_U32)phaseFrac & PHASE_FRAC_MASK);
/* fetch new samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
}
}
/* save pointer and phase */
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = (EAS_U32) pSamples;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = (EAS_U32) phaseFrac;
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void WT_InterpolateNoLoop (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 phaseFrac;
EAS_I32 acc0;
const EAS_SAMPLE *pSamples;
EAS_I32 samp1;
EAS_I32 samp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->phaseAccum;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
/* fetch adjacent samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* linear interpolation */
acc0 = samp2 - samp1;
acc0 = acc0 * phaseFrac;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = samp1 + (acc0 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
/* save new output sample in buffer */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_I16)(acc0 >> 2);
/* increment phase */
phaseFrac += phaseInc;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = phaseFrac >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS;
/* next sample */
if (acc0 > 0) {
/* advance sample pointer */
pSamples += acc0;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)((EAS_U32)phaseFrac & PHASE_FRAC_MASK);
/* fetch new samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
}
}
/* save pointer and phase */
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = (EAS_U32) pSamples;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = (EAS_U32) phaseFrac;
}
| 174,603 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int virtio_net_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
VirtIONet *n = opaque;
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
int ret, i, link_down;
if (version_id < 2 || version_id > VIRTIO_NET_VM_VERSION)
return -EINVAL;
ret = virtio_load(vdev, f);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac, ETH_ALEN);
n->vqs[0].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
virtio_net_set_mrg_rx_bufs(n, qemu_get_be32(f));
if (version_id >= 3)
n->status = qemu_get_be16(f);
if (version_id >= 4) {
if (version_id < 8) {
n->promisc = qemu_get_be32(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_be32(f);
} else {
n->promisc = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
}
if (version_id >= 5) {
n->mac_table.in_use = qemu_get_be32(f);
/* MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES may be different from the saved image */
if (n->mac_table.in_use <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac_table.macs,
n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
} else if (n->mac_table.in_use) {
uint8_t *buf = g_malloc0(n->mac_table.in_use);
qemu_get_buffer(f, buf, n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
g_free(buf);
n->mac_table.multi_overflow = n->mac_table.uni_overflow = 1;
n->mac_table.in_use = 0;
}
error_report("virtio-net: saved image requires vnet_hdr=on");
return -1;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int virtio_net_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
VirtIONet *n = opaque;
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
int ret, i, link_down;
if (version_id < 2 || version_id > VIRTIO_NET_VM_VERSION)
return -EINVAL;
ret = virtio_load(vdev, f);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac, ETH_ALEN);
n->vqs[0].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
virtio_net_set_mrg_rx_bufs(n, qemu_get_be32(f));
if (version_id >= 3)
n->status = qemu_get_be16(f);
if (version_id >= 4) {
if (version_id < 8) {
n->promisc = qemu_get_be32(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_be32(f);
} else {
n->promisc = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
}
if (version_id >= 5) {
n->mac_table.in_use = qemu_get_be32(f);
/* MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES may be different from the saved image */
if (n->mac_table.in_use <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac_table.macs,
n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
} else {
int64_t i;
/* Overflow detected - can happen if source has a larger MAC table.
* We simply set overflow flag so there's no need to maintain the
* table of addresses, discard them all.
* Note: 64 bit math to avoid integer overflow.
*/
for (i = 0; i < (int64_t)n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN; ++i) {
qemu_get_byte(f);
}
n->mac_table.multi_overflow = n->mac_table.uni_overflow = 1;
n->mac_table.in_use = 0;
}
error_report("virtio-net: saved image requires vnet_hdr=on");
return -1;
}
}
| 165,363 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ntlm_read_message_fields_buffer(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (fields->Len > 0)
{
if ((fields->BufferOffset + fields->Len) > Stream_Length(s))
return -1;
fields->Buffer = (PBYTE) malloc(fields->Len);
if (!fields->Buffer)
return -1;
Stream_SetPosition(s, fields->BufferOffset);
Stream_Read(s, fields->Buffer, fields->Len);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int ntlm_read_message_fields_buffer(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
static int ntlm_read_message_fields_buffer(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (fields->Len > 0)
{
const UINT64 offset = (UINT64)fields->BufferOffset + (UINT64)fields->Len;
if (offset > Stream_Length(s))
return -1;
fields->Buffer = (PBYTE) malloc(fields->Len);
if (!fields->Buffer)
return -1;
Stream_SetPosition(s, fields->BufferOffset);
Stream_Read(s, fields->Buffer, fields->Len);
}
return 1;
}
| 169,277 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: tbGetBuffer(unsigned size)
{
char *rtrn;
if (size >= BUFFER_SIZE)
return NULL;
if ((BUFFER_SIZE - tbNext) <= size)
tbNext = 0;
rtrn = &textBuffer[tbNext];
tbNext += size;
return rtrn;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | tbGetBuffer(unsigned size)
{
struct textBuffer *tb;
tb = &textBuffer[textBufferIndex];
textBufferIndex = (textBufferIndex + 1) % NUM_BUFFER;
if (size > tb->size) {
free(tb->buffer);
tb->buffer = xnfalloc(size);
tb->size = size;
}
return tb->buffer;
}
| 164,692 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void process_constructors (RBinFile *bf, RList *ret, int bits) {
RList *secs = sections (bf);
RListIter *iter;
RBinSection *sec;
int i, type;
r_list_foreach (secs, iter, sec) {
type = -1;
if (!strcmp (sec->name, ".fini_array")) {
type = R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_FINI;
} else if (!strcmp (sec->name, ".init_array")) {
type = R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_INIT;
} else if (!strcmp (sec->name, ".preinit_array")) {
type = R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_PREINIT;
}
if (type != -1) {
ut8 *buf = calloc (sec->size, 1);
if (!buf) {
continue;
}
(void)r_buf_read_at (bf->buf, sec->paddr, buf, sec->size);
if (bits == 32) {
for (i = 0; i < sec->size; i += 4) {
ut32 addr32 = r_read_le32 (buf + i);
if (addr32) {
RBinAddr *ba = newEntry (sec->paddr + i, (ut64)addr32, type, bits);
r_list_append (ret, ba);
}
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < sec->size; i += 8) {
ut64 addr64 = r_read_le64 (buf + i);
if (addr64) {
RBinAddr *ba = newEntry (sec->paddr + i, addr64, type, bits);
r_list_append (ret, ba);
}
}
}
free (buf);
}
}
r_list_free (secs);
}
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void process_constructors (RBinFile *bf, RList *ret, int bits) {
RList *secs = sections (bf);
RListIter *iter;
RBinSection *sec;
int i, type;
r_list_foreach (secs, iter, sec) {
type = -1;
if (!strcmp (sec->name, ".fini_array")) {
type = R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_FINI;
} else if (!strcmp (sec->name, ".init_array")) {
type = R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_INIT;
} else if (!strcmp (sec->name, ".preinit_array")) {
type = R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_PREINIT;
}
if (type != -1) {
ut8 *buf = calloc (sec->size, 1);
if (!buf) {
continue;
}
(void)r_buf_read_at (bf->buf, sec->paddr, buf, sec->size);
if (bits == 32) {
for (i = 0; (i + 3) < sec->size; i += 4) {
ut32 addr32 = r_read_le32 (buf + i);
if (addr32) {
RBinAddr *ba = newEntry (sec->paddr + i, (ut64)addr32, type, bits);
r_list_append (ret, ba);
}
}
} else {
for (i = 0; (i + 7) < sec->size; i += 8) {
ut64 addr64 = r_read_le64 (buf + i);
if (addr64) {
RBinAddr *ba = newEntry (sec->paddr + i, addr64, type, bits);
r_list_append (ret, ba);
}
}
}
free (buf);
}
}
r_list_free (secs);
}
| 169,232 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InstallablePaymentAppCrawler::OnPaymentMethodManifestParsed(
const GURL& method_manifest_url,
const std::vector<GURL>& default_applications,
const std::vector<url::Origin>& supported_origins,
bool all_origins_supported) {
number_of_payment_method_manifest_to_parse_--;
if (web_contents() == nullptr)
return;
content::PermissionManager* permission_manager =
web_contents()->GetBrowserContext()->GetPermissionManager();
if (permission_manager == nullptr)
return;
for (const auto& url : default_applications) {
if (downloaded_web_app_manifests_.find(url) !=
downloaded_web_app_manifests_.end()) {
continue;
}
if (permission_manager->GetPermissionStatus(
content::PermissionType::PAYMENT_HANDLER, url.GetOrigin(),
url.GetOrigin()) != blink::mojom::PermissionStatus::GRANTED) {
continue;
}
number_of_web_app_manifest_to_download_++;
downloaded_web_app_manifests_.insert(url);
downloader_->DownloadWebAppManifest(
url,
base::BindOnce(
&InstallablePaymentAppCrawler::OnPaymentWebAppManifestDownloaded,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), method_manifest_url, url));
}
FinishCrawlingPaymentAppsIfReady();
}
Commit Message: [Payments] Restrict just-in-time payment handler to payment method domain and its subdomains
Bug: 853937
Change-Id: I148b3d96950a9d90fa362e580e9593caa6b92a36
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1132116
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ganggui Tang <gogerald@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573911}
CWE ID: | void InstallablePaymentAppCrawler::OnPaymentMethodManifestParsed(
const GURL& method_manifest_url,
const std::vector<GURL>& default_applications,
const std::vector<url::Origin>& supported_origins,
bool all_origins_supported) {
number_of_payment_method_manifest_to_parse_--;
if (web_contents() == nullptr)
return;
content::PermissionManager* permission_manager =
web_contents()->GetBrowserContext()->GetPermissionManager();
if (permission_manager == nullptr)
return;
for (const auto& url : default_applications) {
if (downloaded_web_app_manifests_.find(url) !=
downloaded_web_app_manifests_.end()) {
continue;
}
if (!net::registry_controlled_domains::SameDomainOrHost(
method_manifest_url, url,
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES)) {
WarnIfPossible("Installable payment app from " + url.spec() +
" is not allowed for the method " +
method_manifest_url.spec());
continue;
}
if (permission_manager->GetPermissionStatus(
content::PermissionType::PAYMENT_HANDLER, url.GetOrigin(),
url.GetOrigin()) != blink::mojom::PermissionStatus::GRANTED) {
continue;
}
number_of_web_app_manifest_to_download_++;
downloaded_web_app_manifests_.insert(url);
downloader_->DownloadWebAppManifest(
url,
base::BindOnce(
&InstallablePaymentAppCrawler::OnPaymentWebAppManifestDownloaded,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), method_manifest_url, url));
}
FinishCrawlingPaymentAppsIfReady();
}
| 172,652 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int mlx4_register_vlan(struct mlx4_dev *dev, u8 port, u16 vlan, int *index)
{
struct mlx4_vlan_table *table = &mlx4_priv(dev)->port[port].vlan_table;
int i, err = 0;
int free = -1;
mutex_lock(&table->mutex);
for (i = MLX4_VLAN_REGULAR; i < MLX4_MAX_VLAN_NUM; i++) {
if (free < 0 && (table->refs[i] == 0)) {
free = i;
continue;
}
if (table->refs[i] &&
(vlan == (MLX4_VLAN_MASK &
be32_to_cpu(table->entries[i])))) {
/* Vlan already registered, increase refernce count */
*index = i;
++table->refs[i];
goto out;
}
}
if (table->total == table->max) {
/* No free vlan entries */
err = -ENOSPC;
goto out;
}
/* Register new MAC */
table->refs[free] = 1;
table->entries[free] = cpu_to_be32(vlan | MLX4_VLAN_VALID);
err = mlx4_set_port_vlan_table(dev, port, table->entries);
if (unlikely(err)) {
mlx4_warn(dev, "Failed adding vlan: %u\n", vlan);
table->refs[free] = 0;
table->entries[free] = 0;
goto out;
}
*index = free;
++table->total;
out:
mutex_unlock(&table->mutex);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mlx4_en: Fix out of bounds array access
When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or
mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without
updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. Fix
this by adding a proper check outside the loop.
Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int mlx4_register_vlan(struct mlx4_dev *dev, u8 port, u16 vlan, int *index)
{
struct mlx4_vlan_table *table = &mlx4_priv(dev)->port[port].vlan_table;
int i, err = 0;
int free = -1;
mutex_lock(&table->mutex);
for (i = MLX4_VLAN_REGULAR; i < MLX4_MAX_VLAN_NUM; i++) {
if (free < 0 && (table->refs[i] == 0)) {
free = i;
continue;
}
if (table->refs[i] &&
(vlan == (MLX4_VLAN_MASK &
be32_to_cpu(table->entries[i])))) {
/* Vlan already registered, increase refernce count */
*index = i;
++table->refs[i];
goto out;
}
}
if (free < 0) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (table->total == table->max) {
/* No free vlan entries */
err = -ENOSPC;
goto out;
}
/* Register new MAC */
table->refs[free] = 1;
table->entries[free] = cpu_to_be32(vlan | MLX4_VLAN_VALID);
err = mlx4_set_port_vlan_table(dev, port, table->entries);
if (unlikely(err)) {
mlx4_warn(dev, "Failed adding vlan: %u\n", vlan);
table->refs[free] = 0;
table->entries[free] = 0;
goto out;
}
*index = free;
++table->total;
out:
mutex_unlock(&table->mutex);
return err;
}
| 169,872 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void jsR_calllwfunction(js_State *J, int n, js_Function *F, js_Environment *scope)
{
js_Value v;
int i;
jsR_savescope(J, scope);
if (n > F->numparams) {
js_pop(J, F->numparams - n);
n = F->numparams;
}
for (i = n; i < F->varlen; ++i)
js_pushundefined(J);
jsR_run(J, F);
v = *stackidx(J, -1);
TOP = --BOT; /* clear stack */
js_pushvalue(J, v);
jsR_restorescope(J);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void jsR_calllwfunction(js_State *J, int n, js_Function *F, js_Environment *scope)
{
js_Value v;
int i;
jsR_savescope(J, scope);
if (n > F->numparams) {
js_pop(J, n - F->numparams);
n = F->numparams;
}
for (i = n; i < F->varlen; ++i)
js_pushundefined(J);
jsR_run(J, F);
v = *stackidx(J, -1);
TOP = --BOT; /* clear stack */
js_pushvalue(J, v);
jsR_restorescope(J);
}
| 165,240 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebViewTestClient::DidFocus() {
test_runner()->SetFocus(web_view_test_proxy_base_->web_view(), true);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | void WebViewTestClient::DidFocus() {
void WebViewTestClient::DidFocus(blink::WebLocalFrame* calling_frame) {
test_runner()->SetFocus(web_view_test_proxy_base_->web_view(), true);
}
| 172,721 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::readMetaData() {
if (mInitCheck != NO_INIT) {
return mInitCheck;
}
off64_t offset = 0;
status_t err;
bool sawMoovOrSidx = false;
while (!(sawMoovOrSidx && (mMdatFound || mMoofFound))) {
off64_t orig_offset = offset;
err = parseChunk(&offset, 0);
if (err != OK && err != UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
break;
} else if (offset <= orig_offset) {
ALOGE("did not advance: %lld->%lld", (long long)orig_offset, (long long)offset);
err = ERROR_MALFORMED;
break;
} else if (err == UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
sawMoovOrSidx = true;
}
}
if (mInitCheck == OK) {
if (mHasVideo) {
mFileMetaData->setCString(
kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_CONTAINER_MPEG4);
} else {
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "audio/mp4");
}
} else {
mInitCheck = err;
}
CHECK_NE(err, (status_t)NO_INIT);
uint64_t psshsize = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
psshsize += 20 + mPssh[i].datalen;
}
if (psshsize > 0 && psshsize <= UINT32_MAX) {
char *buf = (char*)malloc(psshsize);
char *ptr = buf;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
memcpy(ptr, mPssh[i].uuid, 20); // uuid + length
memcpy(ptr + 20, mPssh[i].data, mPssh[i].datalen);
ptr += (20 + mPssh[i].datalen);
}
mFileMetaData->setData(kKeyPssh, 'pssh', buf, psshsize);
free(buf);
}
return mInitCheck;
}
Commit Message: Check malloc result to avoid NPD
Bug: 28471206
Change-Id: Id5d055d76893d6f53a2e524ff5f282d1ddca3345
CWE ID: CWE-20 | status_t MPEG4Extractor::readMetaData() {
if (mInitCheck != NO_INIT) {
return mInitCheck;
}
off64_t offset = 0;
status_t err;
bool sawMoovOrSidx = false;
while (!(sawMoovOrSidx && (mMdatFound || mMoofFound))) {
off64_t orig_offset = offset;
err = parseChunk(&offset, 0);
if (err != OK && err != UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
break;
} else if (offset <= orig_offset) {
ALOGE("did not advance: %lld->%lld", (long long)orig_offset, (long long)offset);
err = ERROR_MALFORMED;
break;
} else if (err == UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
sawMoovOrSidx = true;
}
}
if (mInitCheck == OK) {
if (mHasVideo) {
mFileMetaData->setCString(
kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_CONTAINER_MPEG4);
} else {
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "audio/mp4");
}
} else {
mInitCheck = err;
}
CHECK_NE(err, (status_t)NO_INIT);
uint64_t psshsize = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
psshsize += 20 + mPssh[i].datalen;
}
if (psshsize > 0 && psshsize <= UINT32_MAX) {
char *buf = (char*)malloc(psshsize);
if (!buf) {
ALOGE("b/28471206");
return NO_MEMORY;
}
char *ptr = buf;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
memcpy(ptr, mPssh[i].uuid, 20); // uuid + length
memcpy(ptr + 20, mPssh[i].data, mPssh[i].datalen);
ptr += (20 + mPssh[i].datalen);
}
mFileMetaData->setData(kKeyPssh, 'pssh', buf, psshsize);
free(buf);
}
return mInitCheck;
}
| 173,548 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: vcard_apdu_new(unsigned char *raw_apdu, int len, vcard_7816_status_t *status)
{
VCardAPDU *new_apdu;
*status = VCARD7816_STATUS_EXC_ERROR_MEMORY_FAILURE;
if (len < 4) {
*status = VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_WRONG_LENGTH;
return NULL;
}
new_apdu = g_new(VCardAPDU, 1);
new_apdu->a_data = g_memdup(raw_apdu, len);
new_apdu->a_len = len;
*status = vcard_apdu_set_class(new_apdu);
if (*status != VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
g_free(new_apdu);
return NULL;
}
*status = vcard_apdu_set_length(new_apdu);
if (*status != VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
g_free(new_apdu);
new_apdu = NULL;
}
return new_apdu;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | vcard_apdu_new(unsigned char *raw_apdu, int len, vcard_7816_status_t *status)
{
VCardAPDU *new_apdu;
*status = VCARD7816_STATUS_EXC_ERROR_MEMORY_FAILURE;
if (len < 4) {
*status = VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_WRONG_LENGTH;
return NULL;
}
new_apdu = g_new(VCardAPDU, 1);
new_apdu->a_data = g_memdup(raw_apdu, len);
new_apdu->a_len = len;
*status = vcard_apdu_set_class(new_apdu);
if (*status != VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
vcard_apdu_delete(new_apdu);
return NULL;
}
*status = vcard_apdu_set_length(new_apdu);
if (*status != VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
vcard_apdu_delete(new_apdu);
new_apdu = NULL;
}
return new_apdu;
}
| 164,941 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: CronTab::initRegexObject() {
if ( ! CronTab::regex.isInitialized() ) {
const char *errptr;
int erroffset;
MyString pattern( CRONTAB_PARAMETER_PATTERN ) ;
if ( ! CronTab::regex.compile( pattern, &errptr, &erroffset )) {
MyString error = "CronTab: Failed to compile Regex - ";
error += pattern;
EXCEPT( const_cast<char*>(error.Value()));
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | CronTab::initRegexObject() {
if ( ! CronTab::regex.isInitialized() ) {
const char *errptr;
int erroffset;
MyString pattern( CRONTAB_PARAMETER_PATTERN ) ;
if ( ! CronTab::regex.compile( pattern, &errptr, &erroffset )) {
MyString error = "CronTab: Failed to compile Regex - ";
error += pattern;
EXCEPT( "%s", const_cast<char*>(error.Value()) );
}
}
}
| 165,383 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PepperRendererConnection::OnMsgDidDeleteInProcessInstance(
PP_Instance instance) {
in_process_host_->DeleteInstance(instance);
}
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void PepperRendererConnection::OnMsgDidDeleteInProcessInstance(
PP_Instance instance) {
// 'instance' is possibly invalid. The host must be careful not to trust it.
in_process_host_->DeleteInstance(instance);
}
| 172,312 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int nfsd_mountpoint(struct dentry *dentry, struct svc_export *exp)
{
if (d_mountpoint(dentry))
return 1;
if (nfsd4_is_junction(dentry))
return 1;
if (!(exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_V4ROOT))
return 0;
return d_inode(dentry) != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | int nfsd_mountpoint(struct dentry *dentry, struct svc_export *exp)
{
if (!d_inode(dentry))
return 0;
if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_V4ROOT)
return 1;
if (nfsd4_is_junction(dentry))
return 1;
if (d_mountpoint(dentry))
/*
* Might only be a mountpoint in a different namespace,
* but we need to check.
*/
return 2;
return 0;
}
| 168,154 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *frame)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FieldOrderContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
int h, plane, line_step, line_size, line;
uint8_t *data;
if (!frame->interlaced_frame ||
frame->top_field_first == s->dst_tff)
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, frame);
av_dlog(ctx,
"picture will move %s one line\n",
s->dst_tff ? "up" : "down");
h = frame->height;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane]; plane++) {
line_step = frame->linesize[plane];
line_size = s->line_size[plane];
data = frame->data[plane];
if (s->dst_tff) {
/** Move every line up one line, working from
* the top to the bottom of the frame.
* The original top line is lost.
* The new last line is created as a copy of the
* penultimate line from that field. */
for (line = 0; line < h; line++) {
if (1 + line < frame->height) {
memcpy(data, data + line_step, line_size);
} else {
memcpy(data, data - line_step - line_step, line_size);
}
data += line_step;
}
} else {
/** Move every line down one line, working from
* the bottom to the top of the frame.
* The original bottom line is lost.
* The new first line is created as a copy of the
* second line from that field. */
data += (h - 1) * line_step;
for (line = h - 1; line >= 0 ; line--) {
if (line > 0) {
memcpy(data, data - line_step, line_size);
} else {
memcpy(data, data + line_step + line_step, line_size);
}
data -= line_step;
}
}
}
frame->top_field_first = s->dst_tff;
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, frame);
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *frame)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FieldOrderContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
int h, plane, line_step, line_size, line;
uint8_t *data;
if (!frame->interlaced_frame ||
frame->top_field_first == s->dst_tff)
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, frame);
av_dlog(ctx,
"picture will move %s one line\n",
s->dst_tff ? "up" : "down");
h = frame->height;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane] && frame->linesize[plane]; plane++) {
line_step = frame->linesize[plane];
line_size = s->line_size[plane];
data = frame->data[plane];
if (s->dst_tff) {
/** Move every line up one line, working from
* the top to the bottom of the frame.
* The original top line is lost.
* The new last line is created as a copy of the
* penultimate line from that field. */
for (line = 0; line < h; line++) {
if (1 + line < frame->height) {
memcpy(data, data + line_step, line_size);
} else {
memcpy(data, data - line_step - line_step, line_size);
}
data += line_step;
}
} else {
/** Move every line down one line, working from
* the bottom to the top of the frame.
* The original bottom line is lost.
* The new first line is created as a copy of the
* second line from that field. */
data += (h - 1) * line_step;
for (line = h - 1; line >= 0 ; line--) {
if (line > 0) {
memcpy(data, data - line_step, line_size);
} else {
memcpy(data, data + line_step + line_step, line_size);
}
data -= line_step;
}
}
}
frame->top_field_first = s->dst_tff;
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, frame);
}
| 166,000 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, set_cpu_used_);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ENABLEAUTOALTREF, 1);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_MAXFRAMES, 7);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_STRENGTH, 5);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_TYPE, 3);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, set_cpu_used_);
if (encoding_mode_ != ::libvpx_test::kRealTime) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ENABLEAUTOALTREF, 1);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_MAXFRAMES, 7);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_STRENGTH, 5);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_TYPE, 3);
}
}
}
| 174,513 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Accelerator GetAccelerator(KeyboardCode code, int mask) {
return Accelerator(code, mask & (1 << 0), mask & (1 << 1), mask & (1 << 2));
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | Accelerator GetAccelerator(KeyboardCode code, int mask) {
return Accelerator(code, mask);
}
| 170,907 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static unsigned short get_ushort(const unsigned char *data)
{
unsigned short val = *(const unsigned short *)data;
#ifdef OPJ_BIG_ENDIAN
val = ((val & 0xffU) << 8) | (val >> 8);
#endif
return val;
}
Commit Message: tgatoimage(): avoid excessive memory allocation attempt, and fixes unaligned load (#995)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static unsigned short get_ushort(const unsigned char *data)
/* Returns a ushort from a little-endian serialized value */
static unsigned short get_tga_ushort(const unsigned char *data)
{
return data[0] | (data[1] << 8);
}
| 167,780 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void copyMultiCh24(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i] >> 8;
}
}
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void copyMultiCh24(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
static void copyMultiCh24(short *dst, const int * src[FLACParser::kMaxChannels], unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i] >> 8;
}
}
}
| 174,019 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int check_mtab(const char *progname, const char *devname,
const char *dir)
{
if (check_newline(progname, devname) == -1 ||
check_newline(progname, dir) == -1)
return EX_USAGE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int check_mtab(const char *progname, const char *devname,
const char *dir)
{
if (check_newline(progname, devname) || check_newline(progname, dir))
return EX_USAGE;
return 0;
}
| 164,662 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAMR::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (mMode == MODE_NARROW) {
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.amrnb",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
} else {
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.amrwb",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAmr:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *aacParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAMR::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(roleParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (mMode == MODE_NARROW) {
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.amrnb",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
} else {
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.amrwb",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAmr:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *aacParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(aacParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,193 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: secret_core_crt (gcry_mpi_t M, gcry_mpi_t C,
gcry_mpi_t D, unsigned int Nlimbs,
gcry_mpi_t P, gcry_mpi_t Q, gcry_mpi_t U)
{
gcry_mpi_t m1 = mpi_alloc_secure ( Nlimbs + 1 );
gcry_mpi_t m2 = mpi_alloc_secure ( Nlimbs + 1 );
gcry_mpi_t h = mpi_alloc_secure ( Nlimbs + 1 );
/* m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p */
mpi_sub_ui ( h, P, 1 );
mpi_fdiv_r ( h, D, h );
mpi_powm ( m1, C, h, P );
/* m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q */
mpi_sub_ui ( h, Q, 1 );
mpi_fdiv_r ( h, D, h );
mpi_powm ( m2, C, h, Q );
/* h = u * ( m2 - m1 ) mod q */
mpi_sub ( h, m2, m1 );
/* Remove superfluous leading zeroes from INPUT. */
mpi_normalize (input);
if (!skey->p || !skey->q || !skey->u)
{
secret_core_std (output, input, skey->d, skey->n);
}
else
{
secret_core_crt (output, input, skey->d, mpi_get_nlimbs (skey->n),
skey->p, skey->q, skey->u);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | secret_core_crt (gcry_mpi_t M, gcry_mpi_t C,
gcry_mpi_t D, unsigned int Nlimbs,
gcry_mpi_t P, gcry_mpi_t Q, gcry_mpi_t U)
{
gcry_mpi_t m1 = mpi_alloc_secure ( Nlimbs + 1 );
gcry_mpi_t m2 = mpi_alloc_secure ( Nlimbs + 1 );
gcry_mpi_t h = mpi_alloc_secure ( Nlimbs + 1 );
gcry_mpi_t D_blind = mpi_alloc_secure ( Nlimbs + 1 );
gcry_mpi_t r;
unsigned int r_nbits;
r_nbits = mpi_get_nbits (P) / 4;
if (r_nbits < 96)
r_nbits = 96;
r = mpi_alloc_secure ( (r_nbits + BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
/* d_blind = (d mod (p-1)) + (p-1) * r */
/* m1 = c ^ d_blind mod p */
_gcry_mpi_randomize (r, r_nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
mpi_set_highbit (r, r_nbits - 1);
mpi_sub_ui ( h, P, 1 );
mpi_mul ( D_blind, h, r );
mpi_fdiv_r ( h, D, h );
mpi_add ( D_blind, D_blind, h );
mpi_powm ( m1, C, D_blind, P );
/* d_blind = (d mod (q-1)) + (q-1) * r */
/* m2 = c ^ d_blind mod q */
_gcry_mpi_randomize (r, r_nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
mpi_set_highbit (r, r_nbits - 1);
mpi_sub_ui ( h, Q, 1 );
mpi_mul ( D_blind, h, r );
mpi_fdiv_r ( h, D, h );
mpi_add ( D_blind, D_blind, h );
mpi_powm ( m2, C, D_blind, Q );
mpi_free ( r );
mpi_free ( D_blind );
/* h = u * ( m2 - m1 ) mod q */
mpi_sub ( h, m2, m1 );
/* Remove superfluous leading zeroes from INPUT. */
mpi_normalize (input);
if (!skey->p || !skey->q || !skey->u)
{
secret_core_std (output, input, skey->d, skey->n);
}
else
{
secret_core_crt (output, input, skey->d, mpi_get_nlimbs (skey->n),
skey->p, skey->q, skey->u);
}
}
| 165,456 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct sk_buff *nf_ct_frag6_gather(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user)
{
struct sk_buff *clone;
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
struct frag_hdr *fhdr;
struct nf_ct_frag6_queue *fq;
struct ipv6hdr *hdr;
int fhoff, nhoff;
u8 prevhdr;
struct sk_buff *ret_skb = NULL;
/* Jumbo payload inhibits frag. header */
if (ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len == 0) {
pr_debug("payload len = 0\n");
return skb;
}
if (find_prev_fhdr(skb, &prevhdr, &nhoff, &fhoff) < 0)
return skb;
clone = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (clone == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't clone skb\n");
return skb;
}
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(clone)->orig = skb;
if (!pskb_may_pull(clone, fhoff + sizeof(*fhdr))) {
pr_debug("message is too short.\n");
goto ret_orig;
}
skb_set_transport_header(clone, fhoff);
hdr = ipv6_hdr(clone);
fhdr = (struct frag_hdr *)skb_transport_header(clone);
if (!(fhdr->frag_off & htons(0xFFF9))) {
pr_debug("Invalid fragment offset\n");
/* It is not a fragmented frame */
goto ret_orig;
}
if (atomic_read(&nf_init_frags.mem) > nf_init_frags.high_thresh)
nf_ct_frag6_evictor();
fq = fq_find(fhdr->identification, user, &hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr);
if (fq == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't find and can't create new queue\n");
goto ret_orig;
}
spin_lock_bh(&fq->q.lock);
if (nf_ct_frag6_queue(fq, clone, fhdr, nhoff) < 0) {
spin_unlock_bh(&fq->q.lock);
pr_debug("Can't insert skb to queue\n");
fq_put(fq);
goto ret_orig;
}
if (fq->q.last_in == (INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN | INET_FRAG_LAST_IN) &&
fq->q.meat == fq->q.len) {
ret_skb = nf_ct_frag6_reasm(fq, dev);
if (ret_skb == NULL)
pr_debug("Can't reassemble fragmented packets\n");
}
spin_unlock_bh(&fq->q.lock);
fq_put(fq);
return ret_skb;
ret_orig:
kfree_skb(clone);
return skb;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: properly handle packets fragmented into a single fragment
When an ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG message is received with a MTU below 1280,
all further packets include a fragment header.
Unlike regular defragmentation, conntrack also needs to "reassemble"
those fragments in order to obtain a packet without the fragment
header for connection tracking. Currently nf_conntrack_reasm checks
whether a fragment has either IP6_MF set or an offset != 0, which
makes it ignore those fragments.
Remove the invalid check and make reassembly handle fragment queues
containing only a single fragment.
Reported-and-tested-by: Ulrich Weber <uweber@astaro.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: | struct sk_buff *nf_ct_frag6_gather(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user)
{
struct sk_buff *clone;
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
struct frag_hdr *fhdr;
struct nf_ct_frag6_queue *fq;
struct ipv6hdr *hdr;
int fhoff, nhoff;
u8 prevhdr;
struct sk_buff *ret_skb = NULL;
/* Jumbo payload inhibits frag. header */
if (ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len == 0) {
pr_debug("payload len = 0\n");
return skb;
}
if (find_prev_fhdr(skb, &prevhdr, &nhoff, &fhoff) < 0)
return skb;
clone = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (clone == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't clone skb\n");
return skb;
}
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(clone)->orig = skb;
if (!pskb_may_pull(clone, fhoff + sizeof(*fhdr))) {
pr_debug("message is too short.\n");
goto ret_orig;
}
skb_set_transport_header(clone, fhoff);
hdr = ipv6_hdr(clone);
fhdr = (struct frag_hdr *)skb_transport_header(clone);
if (atomic_read(&nf_init_frags.mem) > nf_init_frags.high_thresh)
nf_ct_frag6_evictor();
fq = fq_find(fhdr->identification, user, &hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr);
if (fq == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't find and can't create new queue\n");
goto ret_orig;
}
spin_lock_bh(&fq->q.lock);
if (nf_ct_frag6_queue(fq, clone, fhdr, nhoff) < 0) {
spin_unlock_bh(&fq->q.lock);
pr_debug("Can't insert skb to queue\n");
fq_put(fq);
goto ret_orig;
}
if (fq->q.last_in == (INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN | INET_FRAG_LAST_IN) &&
fq->q.meat == fq->q.len) {
ret_skb = nf_ct_frag6_reasm(fq, dev);
if (ret_skb == NULL)
pr_debug("Can't reassemble fragmented packets\n");
}
spin_unlock_bh(&fq->q.lock);
fq_put(fq);
return ret_skb;
ret_orig:
kfree_skb(clone);
return skb;
}
| 165,590 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PredictorEncodeTile(TIFF* tif, uint8* bp0, tmsize_t cc0, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "PredictorEncodeTile";
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
uint8 *working_copy;
tmsize_t cc = cc0, rowsize;
unsigned char* bp;
int result_code;
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->encodepfunc != NULL);
assert(sp->encodetile != NULL);
/*
* Do predictor manipulation in a working buffer to avoid altering
* the callers buffer. http://trac.osgeo.org/gdal/ticket/1965
*/
working_copy = (uint8*) _TIFFmalloc(cc0);
if( working_copy == NULL )
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Out of memory allocating " TIFF_SSIZE_FORMAT " byte temp buffer.",
cc0 );
return 0;
}
memcpy( working_copy, bp0, cc0 );
bp = working_copy;
rowsize = sp->rowsize;
assert(rowsize > 0);
if((cc0%rowsize)!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "PredictorEncodeTile",
"%s", "(cc0%rowsize)!=0");
return 0;
}
while (cc > 0) {
(*sp->encodepfunc)(tif, bp, rowsize);
cc -= rowsize;
bp += rowsize;
}
result_code = (*sp->encodetile)(tif, working_copy, cc0, s);
_TIFFfree( working_copy );
return result_code;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predic.c: fix memory leaks in error code paths added in
previous commit (fix for MSVR 35105)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | PredictorEncodeTile(TIFF* tif, uint8* bp0, tmsize_t cc0, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "PredictorEncodeTile";
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
uint8 *working_copy;
tmsize_t cc = cc0, rowsize;
unsigned char* bp;
int result_code;
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->encodepfunc != NULL);
assert(sp->encodetile != NULL);
/*
* Do predictor manipulation in a working buffer to avoid altering
* the callers buffer. http://trac.osgeo.org/gdal/ticket/1965
*/
working_copy = (uint8*) _TIFFmalloc(cc0);
if( working_copy == NULL )
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Out of memory allocating " TIFF_SSIZE_FORMAT " byte temp buffer.",
cc0 );
return 0;
}
memcpy( working_copy, bp0, cc0 );
bp = working_copy;
rowsize = sp->rowsize;
assert(rowsize > 0);
if((cc0%rowsize)!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "PredictorEncodeTile",
"%s", "(cc0%rowsize)!=0");
_TIFFfree( working_copy );
return 0;
}
while (cc > 0) {
(*sp->encodepfunc)(tif, bp, rowsize);
cc -= rowsize;
bp += rowsize;
}
result_code = (*sp->encodetile)(tif, working_copy, cc0, s);
_TIFFfree( working_copy );
return result_code;
}
| 169,937 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, getSupportedCompression)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
if (PHAR_G(has_zlib)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "GZ", 2, 1);
}
if (PHAR_G(has_bz2)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "BZIP2", 5, 1);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PHP_METHOD(Phar, getSupportedCompression)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
if (PHAR_G(has_zlib)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "GZ", 2, 1);
}
if (PHAR_G(has_bz2)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "BZIP2", 5, 1);
}
}
| 165,293 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: smb_fdata(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *buf, const char *fmt, const u_char *maxbuf,
int unicodestr)
{
static int depth = 0;
char s[128];
char *p;
while (*fmt) {
switch (*fmt) {
case '*':
fmt++;
while (buf < maxbuf) {
const u_char *buf2;
depth++;
buf2 = smb_fdata(ndo, buf, fmt, maxbuf, unicodestr);
depth--;
if (buf2 == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (buf2 == buf)
return(buf);
buf = buf2;
}
return(buf);
case '|':
fmt++;
if (buf >= maxbuf)
return(buf);
break;
case '%':
fmt++;
buf = maxbuf;
break;
case '#':
fmt++;
return(buf);
break;
case '[':
fmt++;
if (buf >= maxbuf)
return(buf);
memset(s, 0, sizeof(s));
p = strchr(fmt, ']');
if ((size_t)(p - fmt + 1) > sizeof(s)) {
/* overrun */
return(buf);
}
strncpy(s, fmt, p - fmt);
s[p - fmt] = '\0';
fmt = p + 1;
buf = smb_fdata1(ndo, buf, s, maxbuf, unicodestr);
if (buf == NULL)
return(NULL);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", *fmt));
fmt++;
break;
}
}
if (!depth && buf < maxbuf) {
size_t len = PTR_DIFF(maxbuf, buf);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Data: (%lu bytes)\n", (unsigned long)len));
smb_print_data(ndo, buf, len);
return(buf + len);
}
return(buf);
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16452/SMB: prevent stack exhaustion
Enforce a limit on how many times smb_fdata() can recurse.
This fixes a stack exhaustion discovered by Include Security working
under the Mozilla SOS program in 2018 by means of code audit.
CWE ID: CWE-674 | smb_fdata(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *buf, const char *fmt, const u_char *maxbuf,
int unicodestr)
{
static int depth = 0;
char s[128];
char *p;
while (*fmt) {
switch (*fmt) {
case '*':
fmt++;
while (buf < maxbuf) {
const u_char *buf2;
depth++;
/* Not sure how this relates with the protocol specification,
* but in order to avoid stack exhaustion recurse at most that
* many levels.
*/
if (depth == 10)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(too many nested levels, not recursing)"));
else
buf2 = smb_fdata(ndo, buf, fmt, maxbuf, unicodestr);
depth--;
if (buf2 == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (buf2 == buf)
return(buf);
buf = buf2;
}
return(buf);
case '|':
fmt++;
if (buf >= maxbuf)
return(buf);
break;
case '%':
fmt++;
buf = maxbuf;
break;
case '#':
fmt++;
return(buf);
break;
case '[':
fmt++;
if (buf >= maxbuf)
return(buf);
memset(s, 0, sizeof(s));
p = strchr(fmt, ']');
if ((size_t)(p - fmt + 1) > sizeof(s)) {
/* overrun */
return(buf);
}
strncpy(s, fmt, p - fmt);
s[p - fmt] = '\0';
fmt = p + 1;
buf = smb_fdata1(ndo, buf, s, maxbuf, unicodestr);
if (buf == NULL)
return(NULL);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", *fmt));
fmt++;
break;
}
}
if (!depth && buf < maxbuf) {
size_t len = PTR_DIFF(maxbuf, buf);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Data: (%lu bytes)\n", (unsigned long)len));
smb_print_data(ndo, buf, len);
return(buf + len);
}
return(buf);
}
| 169,814 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long Chapters::Atom::GetStartTimecode() const
{
return m_start_timecode;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long Chapters::Atom::GetStartTimecode() const
| 174,356 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::ScrollTo(gfx::Vector2d scroll_offset) {
gfx::Vector2d max_offset = max_scroll_offset();
gfx::Vector2dF scroll_offset_dip;
if (max_offset.x()) {
scroll_offset_dip.set_x((scroll_offset.x() * max_scroll_offset_dip_.x()) /
max_offset.x());
}
if (max_offset.y()) {
scroll_offset_dip.set_y((scroll_offset.y() * max_scroll_offset_dip_.y()) /
max_offset.y());
}
DCHECK_LE(0.f, scroll_offset_dip.x());
DCHECK_LE(0.f, scroll_offset_dip.y());
DCHECK(scroll_offset_dip.x() < max_scroll_offset_dip_.x() ||
scroll_offset_dip.x() - max_scroll_offset_dip_.x() < kEpsilon)
<< scroll_offset_dip.x() << " " << max_scroll_offset_dip_.x();
DCHECK(scroll_offset_dip.y() < max_scroll_offset_dip_.y() ||
scroll_offset_dip.y() - max_scroll_offset_dip_.y() < kEpsilon)
<< scroll_offset_dip.y() << " " << max_scroll_offset_dip_.y();
if (scroll_offset_dip_ == scroll_offset_dip)
return;
scroll_offset_dip_ = scroll_offset_dip;
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT2("android_webview",
"BrowserViewRenderer::ScrollTo",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD,
"x",
scroll_offset_dip.x(),
"y",
scroll_offset_dip.y());
if (compositor_) {
compositor_->DidChangeRootLayerScrollOffset(
gfx::ScrollOffset(scroll_offset_dip_));
}
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void BrowserViewRenderer::ScrollTo(gfx::Vector2d scroll_offset) {
void BrowserViewRenderer::ScrollTo(const gfx::Vector2d& scroll_offset) {
gfx::Vector2d max_offset = max_scroll_offset();
gfx::Vector2dF scroll_offset_dip;
if (max_offset.x()) {
scroll_offset_dip.set_x((scroll_offset.x() * max_scroll_offset_dip_.x()) /
max_offset.x());
}
if (max_offset.y()) {
scroll_offset_dip.set_y((scroll_offset.y() * max_scroll_offset_dip_.y()) /
max_offset.y());
}
DCHECK_LE(0.f, scroll_offset_dip.x());
DCHECK_LE(0.f, scroll_offset_dip.y());
DCHECK(scroll_offset_dip.x() < max_scroll_offset_dip_.x() ||
scroll_offset_dip.x() - max_scroll_offset_dip_.x() < kEpsilon)
<< scroll_offset_dip.x() << " " << max_scroll_offset_dip_.x();
DCHECK(scroll_offset_dip.y() < max_scroll_offset_dip_.y() ||
scroll_offset_dip.y() - max_scroll_offset_dip_.y() < kEpsilon)
<< scroll_offset_dip.y() << " " << max_scroll_offset_dip_.y();
if (scroll_offset_dip_ == scroll_offset_dip)
return;
scroll_offset_dip_ = scroll_offset_dip;
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT2("android_webview",
"BrowserViewRenderer::ScrollTo",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD,
"x",
scroll_offset_dip.x(),
"y",
scroll_offset_dip.y());
if (compositor_) {
compositor_->DidChangeRootLayerScrollOffset(
gfx::ScrollOffset(scroll_offset_dip_));
}
}
| 171,614 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int nfs4_do_close(struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, int wait)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata;
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp = state->owner;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_CLOSE],
.rpc_cred = state->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = server->client,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_close_ops,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int status = -ENOMEM;
calldata = kmalloc(sizeof(*calldata), GFP_KERNEL);
if (calldata == NULL)
goto out;
calldata->inode = state->inode;
calldata->state = state;
calldata->arg.fh = NFS_FH(state->inode);
calldata->arg.stateid = &state->open_stateid;
/* Serialization for the sequence id */
calldata->arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&state->owner->so_seqid);
if (calldata->arg.seqid == NULL)
goto out_free_calldata;
calldata->arg.open_flags = 0;
calldata->arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
calldata->res.fattr = &calldata->fattr;
calldata->res.seqid = calldata->arg.seqid;
calldata->res.server = server;
calldata->path.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
calldata->path.dentry = dget(path->dentry);
msg.rpc_argp = &calldata->arg,
msg.rpc_resp = &calldata->res,
task_setup_data.callback_data = calldata;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
status = 0;
if (wait)
status = rpc_wait_for_completion_task(task);
rpc_put_task(task);
return status;
out_free_calldata:
kfree(calldata);
out:
nfs4_put_open_state(state);
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | int nfs4_do_close(struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, int wait)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata;
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp = state->owner;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_CLOSE],
.rpc_cred = state->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = server->client,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_close_ops,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int status = -ENOMEM;
calldata = kmalloc(sizeof(*calldata), GFP_KERNEL);
if (calldata == NULL)
goto out;
calldata->inode = state->inode;
calldata->state = state;
calldata->arg.fh = NFS_FH(state->inode);
calldata->arg.stateid = &state->open_stateid;
/* Serialization for the sequence id */
calldata->arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&state->owner->so_seqid);
if (calldata->arg.seqid == NULL)
goto out_free_calldata;
calldata->arg.fmode = 0;
calldata->arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
calldata->res.fattr = &calldata->fattr;
calldata->res.seqid = calldata->arg.seqid;
calldata->res.server = server;
calldata->path.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
calldata->path.dentry = dget(path->dentry);
msg.rpc_argp = &calldata->arg,
msg.rpc_resp = &calldata->res,
task_setup_data.callback_data = calldata;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
status = 0;
if (wait)
status = rpc_wait_for_completion_task(task);
rpc_put_task(task);
return status;
out_free_calldata:
kfree(calldata);
out:
nfs4_put_open_state(state);
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
return status;
}
| 165,691 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int amd_gpio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
int ret = 0;
int irq_base;
struct resource *res;
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev;
gpio_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct amd_gpio), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!gpio_dev)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&gpio_dev->lock);
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
if (!res) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get gpio io resource.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
gpio_dev->base = devm_ioremap_nocache(&pdev->dev, res->start,
resource_size(res));
if (!gpio_dev->base)
return -ENOMEM;
irq_base = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
if (irq_base < 0) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get gpio IRQ.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
gpio_dev->pdev = pdev;
gpio_dev->gc.direction_input = amd_gpio_direction_input;
gpio_dev->gc.direction_output = amd_gpio_direction_output;
gpio_dev->gc.get = amd_gpio_get_value;
gpio_dev->gc.set = amd_gpio_set_value;
gpio_dev->gc.set_debounce = amd_gpio_set_debounce;
gpio_dev->gc.dbg_show = amd_gpio_dbg_show;
gpio_dev->gc.base = 0;
gpio_dev->gc.label = pdev->name;
gpio_dev->gc.owner = THIS_MODULE;
gpio_dev->gc.parent = &pdev->dev;
gpio_dev->gc.ngpio = TOTAL_NUMBER_OF_PINS;
#if defined(CONFIG_OF_GPIO)
gpio_dev->gc.of_node = pdev->dev.of_node;
#endif
gpio_dev->groups = kerncz_groups;
gpio_dev->ngroups = ARRAY_SIZE(kerncz_groups);
amd_pinctrl_desc.name = dev_name(&pdev->dev);
gpio_dev->pctrl = pinctrl_register(&amd_pinctrl_desc,
&pdev->dev, gpio_dev);
if (IS_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl)) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Couldn't register pinctrl driver\n");
return PTR_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl);
}
ret = gpiochip_add_data(&gpio_dev->gc, gpio_dev);
if (ret)
goto out1;
ret = gpiochip_add_pin_range(&gpio_dev->gc, dev_name(&pdev->dev),
0, 0, TOTAL_NUMBER_OF_PINS);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to add pin range\n");
goto out2;
}
ret = gpiochip_irqchip_add(&gpio_dev->gc,
&amd_gpio_irqchip,
0,
handle_simple_irq,
IRQ_TYPE_NONE);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "could not add irqchip\n");
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out2;
}
gpiochip_set_chained_irqchip(&gpio_dev->gc,
&amd_gpio_irqchip,
irq_base,
amd_gpio_irq_handler);
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, gpio_dev);
dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "amd gpio driver loaded\n");
return ret;
out2:
gpiochip_remove(&gpio_dev->gc);
out1:
pinctrl_unregister(gpio_dev->pctrl);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: pinctrl: amd: Use devm_pinctrl_register() for pinctrl registration
Use devm_pinctrl_register() for pin control registration and clean
error path.
Signed-off-by: Laxman Dewangan <ldewangan@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | static int amd_gpio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
int ret = 0;
int irq_base;
struct resource *res;
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev;
gpio_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct amd_gpio), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!gpio_dev)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&gpio_dev->lock);
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
if (!res) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get gpio io resource.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
gpio_dev->base = devm_ioremap_nocache(&pdev->dev, res->start,
resource_size(res));
if (!gpio_dev->base)
return -ENOMEM;
irq_base = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
if (irq_base < 0) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get gpio IRQ.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
gpio_dev->pdev = pdev;
gpio_dev->gc.direction_input = amd_gpio_direction_input;
gpio_dev->gc.direction_output = amd_gpio_direction_output;
gpio_dev->gc.get = amd_gpio_get_value;
gpio_dev->gc.set = amd_gpio_set_value;
gpio_dev->gc.set_debounce = amd_gpio_set_debounce;
gpio_dev->gc.dbg_show = amd_gpio_dbg_show;
gpio_dev->gc.base = 0;
gpio_dev->gc.label = pdev->name;
gpio_dev->gc.owner = THIS_MODULE;
gpio_dev->gc.parent = &pdev->dev;
gpio_dev->gc.ngpio = TOTAL_NUMBER_OF_PINS;
#if defined(CONFIG_OF_GPIO)
gpio_dev->gc.of_node = pdev->dev.of_node;
#endif
gpio_dev->groups = kerncz_groups;
gpio_dev->ngroups = ARRAY_SIZE(kerncz_groups);
amd_pinctrl_desc.name = dev_name(&pdev->dev);
gpio_dev->pctrl = devm_pinctrl_register(&pdev->dev, &amd_pinctrl_desc,
gpio_dev);
if (IS_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl)) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Couldn't register pinctrl driver\n");
return PTR_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl);
}
ret = gpiochip_add_data(&gpio_dev->gc, gpio_dev);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = gpiochip_add_pin_range(&gpio_dev->gc, dev_name(&pdev->dev),
0, 0, TOTAL_NUMBER_OF_PINS);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to add pin range\n");
goto out2;
}
ret = gpiochip_irqchip_add(&gpio_dev->gc,
&amd_gpio_irqchip,
0,
handle_simple_irq,
IRQ_TYPE_NONE);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "could not add irqchip\n");
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out2;
}
gpiochip_set_chained_irqchip(&gpio_dev->gc,
&amd_gpio_irqchip,
irq_base,
amd_gpio_irq_handler);
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, gpio_dev);
dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "amd gpio driver loaded\n");
return ret;
out2:
gpiochip_remove(&gpio_dev->gc);
return ret;
}
| 170,172 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: get_caller_uid (GDBusMethodInvocation *context, gint *uid)
{
PolkitSubject *subject;
PolkitSubject *process;
subject = polkit_system_bus_name_new (g_dbus_method_invocation_get_sender (context));
process = polkit_system_bus_name_get_process_sync (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject), NULL, NULL);
if (!process) {
g_object_unref (subject);
return FALSE;
}
*uid = polkit_unix_process_get_uid (POLKIT_UNIX_PROCESS (process));
g_object_unref (subject);
g_object_unref (process);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | get_caller_uid (GDBusMethodInvocation *context, gint *uid)
get_caller_uid (GDBusMethodInvocation *context,
gint *uid)
{
GVariant *reply;
GError *error;
error = NULL;
reply = g_dbus_connection_call_sync (g_dbus_method_invocation_get_connection (context),
"org.freedesktop.DBus",
"/org/freedesktop/DBus",
"org.freedesktop.DBus",
"GetConnectionUnixUser",
g_variant_new ("(s)",
g_dbus_method_invocation_get_sender (context)),
G_VARIANT_TYPE ("(u)"),
G_DBUS_CALL_FLAGS_NONE,
-1,
NULL,
&error);
if (reply == NULL) {
g_warning ("Could not talk to message bus to find uid of sender %s: %s",
g_dbus_method_invocation_get_sender (context),
error->message);
g_error_free (error);
return FALSE;
}
g_variant_get (reply, "(u)", uid);
g_variant_unref (reply);
return TRUE;
}
| 165,011 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GF_Err urn_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 i, to_read;
char *tmpName;
GF_DataEntryURNBox *ptr = (GF_DataEntryURNBox *)s;
if (! ptr->size ) return GF_OK;
to_read = (u32) ptr->size;
tmpName = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * to_read);
if (!tmpName) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
gf_bs_read_data(bs, tmpName, to_read);
i = 0;
while ( (tmpName[i] != 0) && (i < to_read) ) {
i++;
}
if (i == to_read) {
gf_free(tmpName);
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
if (i == to_read - 1) {
ptr->nameURN = tmpName;
ptr->location = NULL;
return GF_OK;
}
ptr->nameURN = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * (i+1));
if (!ptr->nameURN) {
gf_free(tmpName);
return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
}
ptr->location = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * (to_read - i - 1));
if (!ptr->location) {
gf_free(tmpName);
gf_free(ptr->nameURN);
ptr->nameURN = NULL;
return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
}
memcpy(ptr->nameURN, tmpName, i + 1);
memcpy(ptr->location, tmpName + i + 1, (to_read - i - 1));
gf_free(tmpName);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | GF_Err urn_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 i, to_read;
char *tmpName;
GF_DataEntryURNBox *ptr = (GF_DataEntryURNBox *)s;
if (! ptr->size ) return GF_OK;
to_read = (u32) ptr->size;
tmpName = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * to_read);
if (!tmpName) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
gf_bs_read_data(bs, tmpName, to_read);
i = 0;
while ( (i < to_read) && (tmpName[i] != 0) ) {
i++;
}
if (i == to_read) {
gf_free(tmpName);
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
if (i == to_read - 1) {
ptr->nameURN = tmpName;
ptr->location = NULL;
return GF_OK;
}
ptr->nameURN = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * (i+1));
if (!ptr->nameURN) {
gf_free(tmpName);
return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
}
ptr->location = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * (to_read - i - 1));
if (!ptr->location) {
gf_free(tmpName);
gf_free(ptr->nameURN);
ptr->nameURN = NULL;
return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
}
memcpy(ptr->nameURN, tmpName, i + 1);
memcpy(ptr->location, tmpName + i + 1, (to_read - i - 1));
gf_free(tmpName);
return GF_OK;
}
| 169,167 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int mlx4_register_mac(struct mlx4_dev *dev, u8 port, u64 mac, int *index)
{
struct mlx4_mac_table *table = &mlx4_priv(dev)->port[port].mac_table;
int i, err = 0;
int free = -1;
mlx4_dbg(dev, "Registering MAC: 0x%llx\n", (unsigned long long) mac);
mutex_lock(&table->mutex);
for (i = 0; i < MLX4_MAX_MAC_NUM - 1; i++) {
if (free < 0 && !table->refs[i]) {
free = i;
continue;
}
if (mac == (MLX4_MAC_MASK & be64_to_cpu(table->entries[i]))) {
/* MAC already registered, increase refernce count */
*index = i;
++table->refs[i];
goto out;
}
}
mlx4_dbg(dev, "Free MAC index is %d\n", free);
if (table->total == table->max) {
/* No free mac entries */
err = -ENOSPC;
goto out;
}
/* Register new MAC */
table->refs[free] = 1;
table->entries[free] = cpu_to_be64(mac | MLX4_MAC_VALID);
err = mlx4_set_port_mac_table(dev, port, table->entries);
if (unlikely(err)) {
mlx4_err(dev, "Failed adding MAC: 0x%llx\n", (unsigned long long) mac);
table->refs[free] = 0;
table->entries[free] = 0;
goto out;
}
*index = free;
++table->total;
out:
mutex_unlock(&table->mutex);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mlx4_en: Fix out of bounds array access
When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or
mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without
updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. Fix
this by adding a proper check outside the loop.
Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int mlx4_register_mac(struct mlx4_dev *dev, u8 port, u64 mac, int *index)
{
struct mlx4_mac_table *table = &mlx4_priv(dev)->port[port].mac_table;
int i, err = 0;
int free = -1;
mlx4_dbg(dev, "Registering MAC: 0x%llx\n", (unsigned long long) mac);
mutex_lock(&table->mutex);
for (i = 0; i < MLX4_MAX_MAC_NUM - 1; i++) {
if (free < 0 && !table->refs[i]) {
free = i;
continue;
}
if (mac == (MLX4_MAC_MASK & be64_to_cpu(table->entries[i]))) {
/* MAC already registered, increase refernce count */
*index = i;
++table->refs[i];
goto out;
}
}
if (free < 0) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
mlx4_dbg(dev, "Free MAC index is %d\n", free);
if (table->total == table->max) {
/* No free mac entries */
err = -ENOSPC;
goto out;
}
/* Register new MAC */
table->refs[free] = 1;
table->entries[free] = cpu_to_be64(mac | MLX4_MAC_VALID);
err = mlx4_set_port_mac_table(dev, port, table->entries);
if (unlikely(err)) {
mlx4_err(dev, "Failed adding MAC: 0x%llx\n", (unsigned long long) mac);
table->refs[free] = 0;
table->entries[free] = 0;
goto out;
}
*index = free;
++table->total;
out:
mutex_unlock(&table->mutex);
return err;
}
| 169,871 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WarmupURLFetcher::FetchWarmupURL(
size_t previous_attempt_counts,
const DataReductionProxyServer& proxy_server) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
previous_attempt_counts_ = previous_attempt_counts;
DCHECK_LE(0u, previous_attempt_counts_);
DCHECK_GE(2u, previous_attempt_counts_);
fetch_delay_timer_.Stop();
if (previous_attempt_counts_ == 0) {
FetchWarmupURLNow(proxy_server);
return;
}
fetch_delay_timer_.Start(
FROM_HERE, GetFetchWaitTime(),
base::BindOnce(&WarmupURLFetcher::FetchWarmupURLNow,
base::Unretained(this), proxy_server));
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void WarmupURLFetcher::FetchWarmupURL(
size_t previous_attempt_counts,
const DataReductionProxyServer& proxy_server) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
DCHECK(!params::IsIncludedInHoldbackFieldTrial());
previous_attempt_counts_ = previous_attempt_counts;
DCHECK_LE(0u, previous_attempt_counts_);
DCHECK_GE(2u, previous_attempt_counts_);
fetch_delay_timer_.Stop();
if (previous_attempt_counts_ == 0) {
FetchWarmupURLNow(proxy_server);
return;
}
fetch_delay_timer_.Start(
FROM_HERE, GetFetchWaitTime(),
base::BindOnce(&WarmupURLFetcher::FetchWarmupURLNow,
base::Unretained(this), proxy_server));
}
| 172,424 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetSyslogsLibrary(
SyslogsLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->syslogs_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetSyslogsLibrary(
| 170,646 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: views::View* CardUnmaskPromptViews::CreateFootnoteView() {
if (!controller_->CanStoreLocally())
return nullptr;
storage_row_ = new FadeOutView();
views::BoxLayout* storage_row_layout = new views::BoxLayout(
views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal, kEdgePadding, kEdgePadding, 0);
storage_row_->SetLayoutManager(storage_row_layout);
storage_row_->SetBorder(
views::Border::CreateSolidSidedBorder(1, 0, 0, 0, kSubtleBorderColor));
storage_row_->set_background(
views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kShadingColor));
storage_checkbox_ = new views::Checkbox(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_AUTOFILL_CARD_UNMASK_PROMPT_STORAGE_CHECKBOX));
storage_checkbox_->SetChecked(controller_->GetStoreLocallyStartState());
storage_row_->AddChildView(storage_checkbox_);
storage_row_layout->SetFlexForView(storage_checkbox_, 1);
storage_row_->AddChildView(new TooltipIcon(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_AUTOFILL_CARD_UNMASK_PROMPT_STORAGE_TOOLTIP)));
return storage_row_;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | views::View* CardUnmaskPromptViews::CreateFootnoteView() {
if (!controller_->CanStoreLocally())
return nullptr;
storage_row_ = new FadeOutView();
views::BoxLayout* storage_row_layout = new views::BoxLayout(
views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal, kEdgePadding, kEdgePadding, 0);
storage_row_->SetLayoutManager(storage_row_layout);
storage_row_->SetBorder(
views::Border::CreateSolidSidedBorder(1, 0, 0, 0, kSubtleBorderColor));
storage_row_->set_background(
views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kLightShadingColor));
storage_checkbox_ = new views::Checkbox(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_AUTOFILL_CARD_UNMASK_PROMPT_STORAGE_CHECKBOX));
storage_checkbox_->SetChecked(controller_->GetStoreLocallyStartState());
storage_row_->AddChildView(storage_checkbox_);
storage_row_layout->SetFlexForView(storage_checkbox_, 1);
storage_row_->AddChildView(new TooltipIcon(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_AUTOFILL_CARD_UNMASK_PROMPT_STORAGE_TOOLTIP)));
return storage_row_;
}
| 171,141 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ConvertProperty(IBusProperty* ibus_prop,
int selection_item_id,
ImePropertyList* out_prop_list) {
DCHECK(ibus_prop);
DCHECK(ibus_prop->key);
DCHECK(out_prop_list);
const bool has_sub_props = PropertyHasChildren(ibus_prop);
if (has_sub_props && (ibus_prop->type != PROP_TYPE_MENU)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "The property has sub properties, "
<< "but the type of the property is not PROP_TYPE_MENU";
return false;
}
if ((!has_sub_props) && (ibus_prop->type == PROP_TYPE_MENU)) {
DLOG(INFO) << "Property list is empty";
return false;
}
if (ibus_prop->type == PROP_TYPE_SEPARATOR ||
ibus_prop->type == PROP_TYPE_MENU) {
return true;
}
const bool is_selection_item = (ibus_prop->type == PROP_TYPE_RADIO);
selection_item_id = is_selection_item ?
selection_item_id : ImeProperty::kInvalidSelectionItemId;
bool is_selection_item_checked = false;
if (ibus_prop->state == PROP_STATE_INCONSISTENT) {
LOG(WARNING) << "The property is in PROP_STATE_INCONSISTENT, "
<< "which is not supported.";
} else if ((!is_selection_item) && (ibus_prop->state == PROP_STATE_CHECKED)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "PROP_STATE_CHECKED is meaningful only if the type is "
<< "PROP_TYPE_RADIO.";
} else {
is_selection_item_checked = (ibus_prop->state == PROP_STATE_CHECKED);
}
if (!ibus_prop->key) {
LOG(ERROR) << "key is NULL";
}
if (ibus_prop->tooltip && (!ibus_prop->tooltip->text)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "tooltip is NOT NULL, but tooltip->text IS NULL: key="
<< Or(ibus_prop->key, "");
}
if (ibus_prop->label && (!ibus_prop->label->text)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "label is NOT NULL, but label->text IS NULL: key="
<< Or(ibus_prop->key, "");
}
std::string label =
((ibus_prop->tooltip &&
ibus_prop->tooltip->text) ? ibus_prop->tooltip->text : "");
if (label.empty()) {
label = (ibus_prop->label && ibus_prop->label->text)
? ibus_prop->label->text : "";
}
if (label.empty()) {
label = Or(ibus_prop->key, "");
}
out_prop_list->push_back(ImeProperty(ibus_prop->key,
label,
is_selection_item,
is_selection_item_checked,
selection_item_id));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool ConvertProperty(IBusProperty* ibus_prop,
int selection_item_id,
ImePropertyList* out_prop_list) {
DCHECK(ibus_prop);
DCHECK(ibus_prop->key);
DCHECK(out_prop_list);
const bool has_sub_props = PropertyHasChildren(ibus_prop);
if (has_sub_props && (ibus_prop->type != PROP_TYPE_MENU)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "The property has sub properties, "
<< "but the type of the property is not PROP_TYPE_MENU";
return false;
}
if ((!has_sub_props) && (ibus_prop->type == PROP_TYPE_MENU)) {
VLOG(1) << "Property list is empty";
return false;
}
if (ibus_prop->type == PROP_TYPE_SEPARATOR ||
ibus_prop->type == PROP_TYPE_MENU) {
return true;
}
const bool is_selection_item = (ibus_prop->type == PROP_TYPE_RADIO);
selection_item_id = is_selection_item ?
selection_item_id : ImeProperty::kInvalidSelectionItemId;
bool is_selection_item_checked = false;
if (ibus_prop->state == PROP_STATE_INCONSISTENT) {
LOG(WARNING) << "The property is in PROP_STATE_INCONSISTENT, "
<< "which is not supported.";
} else if ((!is_selection_item) && (ibus_prop->state == PROP_STATE_CHECKED)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "PROP_STATE_CHECKED is meaningful only if the type is "
<< "PROP_TYPE_RADIO.";
} else {
is_selection_item_checked = (ibus_prop->state == PROP_STATE_CHECKED);
}
if (!ibus_prop->key) {
LOG(ERROR) << "key is NULL";
}
if (ibus_prop->tooltip && (!ibus_prop->tooltip->text)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "tooltip is NOT NULL, but tooltip->text IS NULL: key="
<< Or(ibus_prop->key, "");
}
if (ibus_prop->label && (!ibus_prop->label->text)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "label is NOT NULL, but label->text IS NULL: key="
<< Or(ibus_prop->key, "");
}
std::string label =
((ibus_prop->tooltip &&
ibus_prop->tooltip->text) ? ibus_prop->tooltip->text : "");
if (label.empty()) {
label = (ibus_prop->label && ibus_prop->label->text)
? ibus_prop->label->text : "";
}
if (label.empty()) {
label = Or(ibus_prop->key, "");
}
out_prop_list->push_back(ImeProperty(ibus_prop->key,
label,
is_selection_item,
is_selection_item_checked,
selection_item_id));
return true;
}
| 170,531 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void jpc_undo_roi(jas_matrix_t *x, int roishift, int bgshift, int numbps)
{
int i;
int j;
int thresh;
jpc_fix_t val;
jpc_fix_t mag;
bool warn;
uint_fast32_t mask;
if (roishift == 0 && bgshift == 0) {
return;
}
thresh = 1 << roishift;
warn = false;
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(x); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(x); ++j) {
val = jas_matrix_get(x, i, j);
mag = JAS_ABS(val);
if (mag >= thresh) {
/* We are dealing with ROI data. */
mag >>= roishift;
val = (val < 0) ? (-mag) : mag;
jas_matrix_set(x, i, j, val);
} else {
/* We are dealing with non-ROI (i.e., background) data. */
mag <<= bgshift;
mask = (1 << numbps) - 1;
/* Perform a basic sanity check on the sample value. */
/* Some implementations write garbage in the unused
most-significant bit planes introduced by ROI shifting.
Here we ensure that any such bits are masked off. */
if (mag & (~mask)) {
if (!warn) {
jas_eprintf("warning: possibly corrupt code stream\n");
warn = true;
}
mag &= mask;
}
val = (val < 0) ? (-mag) : mag;
jas_matrix_set(x, i, j, val);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static void jpc_undo_roi(jas_matrix_t *x, int roishift, int bgshift, int numbps)
{
int i;
int j;
int thresh;
jpc_fix_t val;
jpc_fix_t mag;
bool warn;
uint_fast32_t mask;
if (roishift < 0) {
/* We could instead return an error here. */
/* I do not think it matters much. */
jas_eprintf("warning: forcing negative ROI shift to zero "
"(bitstream is probably corrupt)\n");
roishift = 0;
}
if (roishift == 0 && bgshift == 0) {
return;
}
thresh = 1 << roishift;
warn = false;
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(x); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(x); ++j) {
val = jas_matrix_get(x, i, j);
mag = JAS_ABS(val);
if (mag >= thresh) {
/* We are dealing with ROI data. */
mag >>= roishift;
val = (val < 0) ? (-mag) : mag;
jas_matrix_set(x, i, j, val);
} else {
/* We are dealing with non-ROI (i.e., background) data. */
mag <<= bgshift;
mask = (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << numbps) - 1;
/* Perform a basic sanity check on the sample value. */
/* Some implementations write garbage in the unused
most-significant bit planes introduced by ROI shifting.
Here we ensure that any such bits are masked off. */
if (mag & (~mask)) {
if (!warn) {
jas_eprintf("warning: possibly corrupt code stream\n");
warn = true;
}
mag &= mask;
}
val = (val < 0) ? (-mag) : mag;
jas_matrix_set(x, i, j, val);
}
}
}
}
| 168,477 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DECLAREreadFunc(readContigTilesIntoBuffer)
{
int status = 1;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(in);
tdata_t tilebuf;
uint32 imagew = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
uint32 tilew = TIFFTileRowSize(in);
int iskew = imagew - tilew;
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
uint32 tw, tl;
uint32 row;
(void) spp;
tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tilesize);
if (tilebuf == 0)
return 0;
_TIFFmemset(tilebuf, 0, tilesize);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl);
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl) {
uint32 nrow = (row+tl > imagelength) ? imagelength-row : tl;
uint32 colb = 0;
uint32 col;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw) {
if (TIFFReadTile(in, tilebuf, col, row, 0, 0) < 0
&& !ignore) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read tile at %lu %lu",
(unsigned long) col,
(unsigned long) row);
status = 0;
goto done;
}
if (colb + tilew > imagew) {
uint32 width = imagew - colb;
uint32 oskew = tilew - width;
cpStripToTile(bufp + colb,
tilebuf, nrow, width,
oskew + iskew, oskew );
} else
cpStripToTile(bufp + colb,
tilebuf, nrow, tilew,
iskew, 0);
colb += tilew;
}
bufp += imagew * nrow;
}
done:
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd
tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103
by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | DECLAREreadFunc(readContigTilesIntoBuffer)
{
int status = 1;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(in);
tdata_t tilebuf;
uint32 imagew = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
uint32 tilew = TIFFTileRowSize(in);
int iskew = imagew - tilew;
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
uint32 tw, tl;
uint32 row;
(void) spp;
tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tilesize);
if (tilebuf == 0)
return 0;
_TIFFmemset(tilebuf, 0, tilesize);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl);
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl) {
uint32 nrow = (row+tl > imagelength) ? imagelength-row : tl;
uint32 colb = 0;
uint32 col;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth && colb < imagew; col += tw) {
if (TIFFReadTile(in, tilebuf, col, row, 0, 0) < 0
&& !ignore) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read tile at %lu %lu",
(unsigned long) col,
(unsigned long) row);
status = 0;
goto done;
}
if (colb + tilew > imagew) {
uint32 width = imagew - colb;
uint32 oskew = tilew - width;
cpStripToTile(bufp + colb,
tilebuf, nrow, width,
oskew + iskew, oskew );
} else
cpStripToTile(bufp + colb,
tilebuf, nrow, tilew,
iskew, 0);
colb += tilew;
}
bufp += imagew * nrow;
}
done:
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
| 166,862 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool dump_fd_info(const char *dest_filename, char *source_filename, int source_base_ofs)
{
FILE *fp = fopen(dest_filename, "w");
if (!fp)
return false;
unsigned fd = 0;
while (fd <= 99999) /* paranoia check */
{
sprintf(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fd/%u", fd);
char *name = malloc_readlink(source_filename);
if (!name)
break;
fprintf(fp, "%u:%s\n", fd, name);
free(name);
sprintf(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fdinfo/%u", fd);
fd++;
FILE *in = fopen(source_filename, "r");
if (!in)
continue;
char buf[128];
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, in))
{
/* in case the line is not terminated, terminate it */
char *eol = strchrnul(buf, '\n');
eol[0] = '\n';
eol[1] = '\0';
fputs(buf, fp);
}
fclose(in);
}
fclose(fp);
return true;
}
Commit Message: ccpp: fix symlink race conditions
Fix copy & chown race conditions
Related: #1211835
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | static bool dump_fd_info(const char *dest_filename, char *source_filename, int source_base_ofs)
static bool dump_fd_info(const char *dest_filename, char *source_filename, int source_base_ofs, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
FILE *fp = fopen(dest_filename, "w");
if (!fp)
return false;
unsigned fd = 0;
while (fd <= 99999) /* paranoia check */
{
sprintf(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fd/%u", fd);
char *name = malloc_readlink(source_filename);
if (!name)
break;
fprintf(fp, "%u:%s\n", fd, name);
free(name);
sprintf(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fdinfo/%u", fd);
fd++;
FILE *in = fopen(source_filename, "r");
if (!in)
continue;
char buf[128];
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, in))
{
/* in case the line is not terminated, terminate it */
char *eol = strchrnul(buf, '\n');
eol[0] = '\n';
eol[1] = '\0';
fputs(buf, fp);
}
fclose(in);
}
const int dest_fd = fileno(fp);
if (fchown(dest_fd, uid, gid) < 0)
{
perror_msg("Can't change '%s' ownership to %lu:%lu", dest_filename, (long)uid, (long)gid);
fclose(fp);
unlink(dest_filename);
return false;
}
fclose(fp);
return true;
}
| 170,136 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: file_check_mem(struct magic_set *ms, unsigned int level)
{
size_t len;
if (level >= ms->c.len) {
len = (ms->c.len += 20) * sizeof(*ms->c.li);
ms->c.li = CAST(struct level_info *, (ms->c.li == NULL) ?
malloc(len) :
realloc(ms->c.li, len));
if (ms->c.li == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, len);
return -1;
}
}
ms->c.li[level].got_match = 0;
#ifdef ENABLE_CONDITIONALS
ms->c.li[level].last_match = 0;
ms->c.li[level].last_cond = COND_NONE;
#endif /* ENABLE_CONDITIONALS */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: PR/454: Fix memory corruption when the continuation level jumps by more than
20 in a single step.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | file_check_mem(struct magic_set *ms, unsigned int level)
{
size_t len;
if (level >= ms->c.len) {
len = (ms->c.len = 20 + level) * sizeof(*ms->c.li);
ms->c.li = CAST(struct level_info *, (ms->c.li == NULL) ?
malloc(len) :
realloc(ms->c.li, len));
if (ms->c.li == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, len);
return -1;
}
}
ms->c.li[level].got_match = 0;
#ifdef ENABLE_CONDITIONALS
ms->c.li[level].last_match = 0;
ms->c.li[level].last_cond = COND_NONE;
#endif /* ENABLE_CONDITIONALS */
return 0;
}
| 167,475 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ut64 MACH0_(get_main)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
ut64 addr = 0LL;
struct symbol_t *symbols;
int i;
if (!(symbols = MACH0_(get_symbols) (bin))) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; !symbols[i].last; i++) {
if (!strcmp (symbols[i].name, "_main")) {
addr = symbols[i].addr;
break;
}
}
free (symbols);
if (!addr && bin->main_cmd.cmd == LC_MAIN) {
addr = bin->entry + bin->baddr;
}
if (!addr) {
ut8 b[128];
ut64 entry = addr_to_offset(bin, bin->entry);
if (entry > bin->size || entry + sizeof (b) > bin->size)
return 0;
i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, entry, b, sizeof (b));
if (i < 1) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
if (b[i] == 0xe8 && !b[i+3] && !b[i+4]) {
int delta = b[i+1] | (b[i+2] << 8) | (b[i+3] << 16) | (b[i+4] << 24);
return bin->entry + i + 5 + delta;
}
}
}
return addr;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416 | ut64 MACH0_(get_main)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
ut64 addr = 0LL;
struct symbol_t *symbols;
int i;
if (!(symbols = MACH0_(get_symbols) (bin))) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; !symbols[i].last; i++) {
if (!strcmp (symbols[i].name, "_main")) {
addr = symbols[i].addr;
break;
}
}
free (symbols);
if (!addr && bin->main_cmd.cmd == LC_MAIN) {
addr = bin->entry + bin->baddr;
}
if (!addr) {
ut8 b[128];
ut64 entry = addr_to_offset(bin, bin->entry);
if (entry > bin->size || entry + sizeof (b) > bin->size) {
return 0;
}
i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, entry, b, sizeof (b));
if (i < 1) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
if (b[i] == 0xe8 && !b[i+3] && !b[i+4]) {
int delta = b[i+1] | (b[i+2] << 8) | (b[i+3] << 16) | (b[i+4] << 24);
return bin->entry + i + 5 + delta;
}
}
}
return addr;
}
| 168,235 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: php_stream *php_stream_zip_opener(php_stream_wrapper *wrapper,
char *path,
char *mode,
int options,
char **opened_path,
php_stream_context *context STREAMS_DC TSRMLS_DC)
{
int path_len;
char *file_basename;
size_t file_basename_len;
char file_dirname[MAXPATHLEN];
struct zip *za;
struct zip_file *zf = NULL;
char *fragment;
int fragment_len;
int err;
php_stream *stream = NULL;
struct php_zip_stream_data_t *self;
fragment = strchr(path, '#');
if (!fragment) {
return NULL;
}
if (strncasecmp("zip://", path, 6) == 0) {
path += 6;
}
fragment_len = strlen(fragment);
if (fragment_len < 1) {
return NULL;
}
path_len = strlen(path);
if (path_len >= MAXPATHLEN || mode[0] != 'r') {
return NULL;
}
memcpy(file_dirname, path, path_len - fragment_len);
file_dirname[path_len - fragment_len] = '\0';
php_basename(path, path_len - fragment_len, NULL, 0, &file_basename, &file_basename_len TSRMLS_CC);
fragment++;
if (ZIP_OPENBASEDIR_CHECKPATH(file_dirname)) {
efree(file_basename);
return NULL;
}
za = zip_open(file_dirname, ZIP_CREATE, &err);
if (za) {
zf = zip_fopen(za, fragment, 0);
if (zf) {
self = emalloc(sizeof(*self));
self->za = za;
self->zf = zf;
self->stream = NULL;
self->cursor = 0;
stream = php_stream_alloc(&php_stream_zipio_ops, self, NULL, mode);
if (opened_path) {
*opened_path = estrdup(path);
}
} else {
zip_close(za);
}
}
efree(file_basename);
if (!stream) {
return NULL;
} else {
return stream;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | php_stream *php_stream_zip_opener(php_stream_wrapper *wrapper,
char *path,
char *mode,
int options,
char **opened_path,
php_stream_context *context STREAMS_DC TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t path_len;
char *file_basename;
size_t file_basename_len;
char file_dirname[MAXPATHLEN];
struct zip *za;
struct zip_file *zf = NULL;
char *fragment;
size_t fragment_len;
int err;
php_stream *stream = NULL;
struct php_zip_stream_data_t *self;
fragment = strchr(path, '#');
if (!fragment) {
return NULL;
}
if (strncasecmp("zip://", path, 6) == 0) {
path += 6;
}
fragment_len = strlen(fragment);
if (fragment_len < 1) {
return NULL;
}
path_len = strlen(path);
if (path_len >= MAXPATHLEN || mode[0] != 'r') {
return NULL;
}
memcpy(file_dirname, path, path_len - fragment_len);
file_dirname[path_len - fragment_len] = '\0';
php_basename(path, path_len - fragment_len, NULL, 0, &file_basename, &file_basename_len TSRMLS_CC);
fragment++;
if (ZIP_OPENBASEDIR_CHECKPATH(file_dirname)) {
efree(file_basename);
return NULL;
}
za = zip_open(file_dirname, ZIP_CREATE, &err);
if (za) {
zf = zip_fopen(za, fragment, 0);
if (zf) {
self = emalloc(sizeof(*self));
self->za = za;
self->zf = zf;
self->stream = NULL;
self->cursor = 0;
stream = php_stream_alloc(&php_stream_zipio_ops, self, NULL, mode);
if (opened_path) {
*opened_path = estrdup(path);
}
} else {
zip_close(za);
}
}
efree(file_basename);
if (!stream) {
return NULL;
} else {
return stream;
}
}
| 164,969 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: get_pols_2_svc(gpols_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gpols_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gpols_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->exp;
if (prime_arg == NULL)
prime_arg = "*";
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_LIST, NULL, NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_LIST;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_policies", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_policies((void *)handle,
arg->exp, &ret.pols,
&ret.count);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_policies", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | get_pols_2_svc(gpols_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gpols_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gpols_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->exp;
if (prime_arg == NULL)
prime_arg = "*";
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_LIST, NULL, NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_LIST;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_policies", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_policies((void *)handle,
arg->exp, &ret.pols,
&ret.count);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_policies", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,514 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool SetExtendedFileAttribute(const char* path,
const char* name,
const char* value,
size_t value_size,
int flags) {
//// On Chrome OS, there is no component that can validate these extended
//// attributes so there is no need to set them.
base::ScopedBlockingCall scoped_blocking_call(base::BlockingType::MAY_BLOCK);
int result = setxattr(path, name, value, value_size, flags);
if (result) {
DPLOG(ERROR) << "Could not set extended attribute " << name << " on file "
<< path;
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Disable setxattr calls from quarantine subsystem on Chrome OS.
BUG=733943
Change-Id: I6e743469a8dc91536e180ecf4ff0df0cf427037c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1380571
Commit-Queue: Will Harris <wfh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Thiemo Nagel <tnagel@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617961}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | bool SetExtendedFileAttribute(const char* path,
const char* name,
const char* value,
size_t value_size,
int flags) {
//// On Chrome OS, there is no component that can validate these extended
//// attributes so there is no need to set them.
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
base::ScopedBlockingCall scoped_blocking_call(base::BlockingType::MAY_BLOCK);
int result = setxattr(path, name, value, value_size, flags);
if (result) {
DPLOG(ERROR) << "Could not set extended attribute " << name << " on file "
<< path;
return false;
}
#endif // !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
return true;
}
| 173,117 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: unsigned int svc_rdma_xdr_get_reply_hdr_len(__be32 *rdma_resp)
{
unsigned int nsegs;
__be32 *p;
p = rdma_resp;
/* RPC-over-RDMA V1 replies never have a Read list. */
p += rpcrdma_fixed_maxsz + 1;
/* Skip Write list. */
while (*p++ != xdr_zero) {
nsegs = be32_to_cpup(p++);
p += nsegs * rpcrdma_segment_maxsz;
}
/* Skip Reply chunk. */
if (*p++ != xdr_zero) {
nsegs = be32_to_cpup(p++);
p += nsegs * rpcrdma_segment_maxsz;
}
return (unsigned long)p - (unsigned long)rdma_resp;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | unsigned int svc_rdma_xdr_get_reply_hdr_len(__be32 *rdma_resp)
| 168,163 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::Decode(
const media::BitstreamBuffer& bitstream_buffer) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE((state_ == kNormal || state_ == kStopped),
"Invalid state: " << state_, ILLEGAL_STATE,);
base::win::ScopedComPtr<IMFSample> sample;
sample.Attach(CreateSampleFromInputBuffer(bitstream_buffer,
renderer_process_,
input_stream_info_.cbSize,
input_stream_info_.cbAlignment));
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(sample, "Failed to create input sample",
PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
if (!inputs_before_decode_) {
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator.Decoding", this, "");
}
inputs_before_decode_++;
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(
SendMFTMessage(MFT_MESSAGE_NOTIFY_START_OF_STREAM, 0),
"Failed to create input sample", PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
HRESULT hr = decoder_->ProcessInput(0, sample, 0);
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to process input sample",
PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(
SendMFTMessage(MFT_MESSAGE_NOTIFY_END_OF_STREAM, 0),
"Failed to send eos message to MFT", PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
state_ = kEosDrain;
last_input_buffer_id_ = bitstream_buffer.id();
DoDecode();
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE((state_ == kStopped || state_ == kNormal),
"Failed to process output. Unexpected decoder state: " << state_,
ILLEGAL_STATE,);
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(
&DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::NotifyInputBufferRead, this,
bitstream_buffer.id()));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::Decode(
const media::BitstreamBuffer& bitstream_buffer) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE((state_ == kNormal || state_ == kStopped),
"Invalid state: " << state_, ILLEGAL_STATE,);
base::win::ScopedComPtr<IMFSample> sample;
sample.Attach(CreateSampleFromInputBuffer(bitstream_buffer,
input_stream_info_.cbSize,
input_stream_info_.cbAlignment));
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(sample, "Failed to create input sample",
PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
if (!inputs_before_decode_) {
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator.Decoding", this, "");
}
inputs_before_decode_++;
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(
SendMFTMessage(MFT_MESSAGE_NOTIFY_START_OF_STREAM, 0),
"Failed to create input sample", PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
HRESULT hr = decoder_->ProcessInput(0, sample, 0);
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to process input sample",
PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(
SendMFTMessage(MFT_MESSAGE_NOTIFY_END_OF_STREAM, 0),
"Failed to send eos message to MFT", PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
state_ = kEosDrain;
last_input_buffer_id_ = bitstream_buffer.id();
DoDecode();
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE((state_ == kStopped || state_ == kNormal),
"Failed to process output. Unexpected decoder state: " << state_,
ILLEGAL_STATE,);
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(
&DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::NotifyInputBufferRead, this,
bitstream_buffer.id()));
}
| 170,941 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void DefragTrackerInit(DefragTracker *dt, Packet *p)
{
/* copy address */
COPY_ADDRESS(&p->src, &dt->src_addr);
COPY_ADDRESS(&p->dst, &dt->dst_addr);
if (PKT_IS_IPV4(p)) {
dt->id = (int32_t)IPV4_GET_IPID(p);
dt->af = AF_INET;
} else {
dt->id = (int32_t)IPV6_EXTHDR_GET_FH_ID(p);
dt->af = AF_INET6;
}
dt->vlan_id[0] = p->vlan_id[0];
dt->vlan_id[1] = p->vlan_id[1];
dt->policy = DefragGetOsPolicy(p);
dt->host_timeout = DefragPolicyGetHostTimeout(p);
dt->remove = 0;
dt->seen_last = 0;
TAILQ_INIT(&dt->frags);
(void) DefragTrackerIncrUsecnt(dt);
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | static void DefragTrackerInit(DefragTracker *dt, Packet *p)
{
/* copy address */
COPY_ADDRESS(&p->src, &dt->src_addr);
COPY_ADDRESS(&p->dst, &dt->dst_addr);
if (PKT_IS_IPV4(p)) {
dt->id = (int32_t)IPV4_GET_IPID(p);
dt->af = AF_INET;
} else {
dt->id = (int32_t)IPV6_EXTHDR_GET_FH_ID(p);
dt->af = AF_INET6;
}
dt->proto = IP_GET_IPPROTO(p);
dt->vlan_id[0] = p->vlan_id[0];
dt->vlan_id[1] = p->vlan_id[1];
dt->policy = DefragGetOsPolicy(p);
dt->host_timeout = DefragPolicyGetHostTimeout(p);
dt->remove = 0;
dt->seen_last = 0;
TAILQ_INIT(&dt->frags);
(void) DefragTrackerIncrUsecnt(dt);
}
| 168,293 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SimpleSoftOMXComponent::onPortEnable(OMX_U32 portIndex, bool enable) {
CHECK_LT(portIndex, mPorts.size());
PortInfo *port = &mPorts.editItemAt(portIndex);
CHECK_EQ((int)port->mTransition, (int)PortInfo::NONE);
CHECK(port->mDef.bEnabled == !enable);
if (!enable) {
port->mDef.bEnabled = OMX_FALSE;
port->mTransition = PortInfo::DISABLING;
for (size_t i = 0; i < port->mBuffers.size(); ++i) {
BufferInfo *buffer = &port->mBuffers.editItemAt(i);
if (buffer->mOwnedByUs) {
buffer->mOwnedByUs = false;
if (port->mDef.eDir == OMX_DirInput) {
notifyEmptyBufferDone(buffer->mHeader);
} else {
CHECK_EQ(port->mDef.eDir, OMX_DirOutput);
notifyFillBufferDone(buffer->mHeader);
}
}
}
port->mQueue.clear();
} else {
port->mTransition = PortInfo::ENABLING;
}
checkTransitions();
}
Commit Message: omx: prevent input port enable/disable for software codecs
Bug: 29421804
Change-Id: Iba1011e9af942a6dff7f659af769a51e3f5ba66f
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void SimpleSoftOMXComponent::onPortEnable(OMX_U32 portIndex, bool enable) {
CHECK_LT(portIndex, mPorts.size());
PortInfo *port = &mPorts.editItemAt(portIndex);
CHECK_EQ((int)port->mTransition, (int)PortInfo::NONE);
CHECK(port->mDef.bEnabled == !enable);
if (port->mDef.eDir != OMX_DirOutput) {
ALOGE("Port enable/disable allowed only on output ports.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29421804");
return;
}
if (!enable) {
port->mDef.bEnabled = OMX_FALSE;
port->mTransition = PortInfo::DISABLING;
for (size_t i = 0; i < port->mBuffers.size(); ++i) {
BufferInfo *buffer = &port->mBuffers.editItemAt(i);
if (buffer->mOwnedByUs) {
buffer->mOwnedByUs = false;
if (port->mDef.eDir == OMX_DirInput) {
notifyEmptyBufferDone(buffer->mHeader);
} else {
CHECK_EQ(port->mDef.eDir, OMX_DirOutput);
notifyFillBufferDone(buffer->mHeader);
}
}
}
port->mQueue.clear();
} else {
port->mTransition = PortInfo::ENABLING;
}
checkTransitions();
}
| 173,416 |
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