instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void destroy_super(struct super_block *s)
{
int i;
list_lru_destroy(&s->s_dentry_lru);
list_lru_destroy(&s->s_inode_lru);
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
free_percpu(s->s_files);
#endif
for (i = 0; i < SB_FREEZE_LEVELS; i++)
percpu_counter_destroy(&s->s_writers.counter[i]);
security_sb_free(s);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&s->s_mounts));
kfree(s->s_subtype);
kfree(s->s_options);
kfree_rcu(s, rcu);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | static void destroy_super(struct super_block *s)
{
int i;
list_lru_destroy(&s->s_dentry_lru);
list_lru_destroy(&s->s_inode_lru);
for (i = 0; i < SB_FREEZE_LEVELS; i++)
percpu_counter_destroy(&s->s_writers.counter[i]);
security_sb_free(s);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&s->s_mounts));
kfree(s->s_subtype);
kfree(s->s_options);
kfree_rcu(s, rcu);
}
| 166,807 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _exsltDateTruncateDate (exsltDateValPtr dt, exsltDateType type)
{
if (dt == NULL)
return 1;
if ((type & XS_TIME) != XS_TIME) {
dt->value.date.hour = 0;
dt->value.date.min = 0;
dt->value.date.sec = 0.0;
}
if ((type & XS_GDAY) != XS_GDAY)
dt->value.date.day = 0;
if ((type & XS_GMONTH) != XS_GMONTH)
dt->value.date.mon = 0;
if ((type & XS_GYEAR) != XS_GYEAR)
dt->value.date.year = 0;
dt->type = type;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | _exsltDateTruncateDate (exsltDateValPtr dt, exsltDateType type)
{
if (dt == NULL)
return 1;
if ((type & XS_TIME) != XS_TIME) {
dt->value.date.hour = 0;
dt->value.date.min = 0;
dt->value.date.sec = 0.0;
}
if ((type & XS_GDAY) != XS_GDAY)
dt->value.date.day = 1;
if ((type & XS_GMONTH) != XS_GMONTH)
dt->value.date.mon = 1;
if ((type & XS_GYEAR) != XS_GYEAR)
dt->value.date.year = 0;
dt->type = type;
return 0;
}
| 173,290 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: P2PQuicStreamImpl* P2PQuicTransportImpl::CreateStreamInternal(
quic::QuicStreamId id) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(crypto_stream_);
DCHECK(IsEncryptionEstablished());
DCHECK(!IsClosed());
return new P2PQuicStreamImpl(id, this);
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | P2PQuicStreamImpl* P2PQuicTransportImpl::CreateStreamInternal(
quic::QuicStreamId id) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(crypto_stream_);
DCHECK(IsEncryptionEstablished());
DCHECK(!IsClosed());
return new P2PQuicStreamImpl(id, this, stream_write_buffer_size_);
}
| 172,265 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_u(BIGNUM *A, BIGNUM *B, BIGNUM *N)
{
/* k = SHA1(PAD(A) || PAD(B) ) -- tls-srp draft 8 */
BIGNUM *u;
unsigned char cu[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char *cAB;
EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
int longN;
if ((A == NULL) ||(B == NULL) || (N == NULL))
return NULL;
if ((A == NULL) ||(B == NULL) || (N == NULL))
return NULL;
longN= BN_num_bytes(N);
if ((cAB = OPENSSL_malloc(2*longN)) == NULL)
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, cAB + BN_bn2bin(A,cAB+longN), longN);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, cAB + BN_bn2bin(B,cAB+longN), longN);
OPENSSL_free(cAB);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctxt, cu, NULL);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctxt);
if (!(u = BN_bin2bn(cu, sizeof(cu), NULL)))
return NULL;
if (!BN_is_zero(u))
return u;
BN_free(u);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_u(BIGNUM *A, BIGNUM *B, BIGNUM *N)
{
/* k = SHA1(PAD(A) || PAD(B) ) -- tls-srp draft 8 */
BIGNUM *u;
unsigned char cu[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char *cAB;
EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
int longN;
if ((A == NULL) ||(B == NULL) || (N == NULL))
return NULL;
if ((A == NULL) ||(B == NULL) || (N == NULL))
return NULL;
if (BN_ucmp(A, N) >= 0 || BN_ucmp(B, N) >= 0)
return NULL;
longN= BN_num_bytes(N);
if ((cAB = OPENSSL_malloc(2*longN)) == NULL)
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, cAB + BN_bn2bin(A,cAB+longN), longN);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, cAB + BN_bn2bin(B,cAB+longN), longN);
OPENSSL_free(cAB);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctxt, cu, NULL);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctxt);
if (!(u = BN_bin2bn(cu, sizeof(cu), NULL)))
return NULL;
if (!BN_is_zero(u))
return u;
BN_free(u);
return NULL;
}
| 165,172 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::SetFormat(size_t number_of_channels,
float source_sample_rate) {
if (number_of_channels != source_number_of_channels_ ||
source_sample_rate != source_sample_rate_) {
if (!number_of_channels ||
number_of_channels > BaseAudioContext::MaxNumberOfChannels() ||
!AudioUtilities::IsValidAudioBufferSampleRate(source_sample_rate)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "setFormat(" << number_of_channels << ", "
<< source_sample_rate << ") - unhandled format change";
Locker<MediaElementAudioSourceHandler> locker(*this);
source_number_of_channels_ = 0;
source_sample_rate_ = 0;
return;
}
Locker<MediaElementAudioSourceHandler> locker(*this);
source_number_of_channels_ = number_of_channels;
source_sample_rate_ = source_sample_rate;
if (source_sample_rate != Context()->sampleRate()) {
double scale_factor = source_sample_rate / Context()->sampleRate();
multi_channel_resampler_ = std::make_unique<MultiChannelResampler>(
scale_factor, number_of_channels);
} else {
multi_channel_resampler_.reset();
}
{
BaseAudioContext::GraphAutoLocker context_locker(Context());
Output(0).SetNumberOfChannels(number_of_channels);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::SetFormat(size_t number_of_channels,
float source_sample_rate) {
bool is_tainted = WouldTaintOrigin();
if (is_tainted) {
PrintCORSMessage(MediaElement()->currentSrc().GetString());
}
if (number_of_channels != source_number_of_channels_ ||
source_sample_rate != source_sample_rate_) {
if (!number_of_channels ||
number_of_channels > BaseAudioContext::MaxNumberOfChannels() ||
!AudioUtilities::IsValidAudioBufferSampleRate(source_sample_rate)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "setFormat(" << number_of_channels << ", "
<< source_sample_rate << ") - unhandled format change";
Locker<MediaElementAudioSourceHandler> locker(*this);
source_number_of_channels_ = 0;
source_sample_rate_ = 0;
is_origin_tainted_ = is_tainted;
return;
}
// Synchronize with process() to protect |source_number_of_channels_|,
// |source_sample_rate_|, |multi_channel_resampler_|. and
// |is_origin_tainted_|.
Locker<MediaElementAudioSourceHandler> locker(*this);
is_origin_tainted_ = is_tainted;
source_number_of_channels_ = number_of_channels;
source_sample_rate_ = source_sample_rate;
if (source_sample_rate != Context()->sampleRate()) {
double scale_factor = source_sample_rate / Context()->sampleRate();
multi_channel_resampler_ = std::make_unique<MultiChannelResampler>(
scale_factor, number_of_channels);
} else {
multi_channel_resampler_.reset();
}
{
BaseAudioContext::GraphAutoLocker context_locker(Context());
Output(0).SetNumberOfChannels(number_of_channels);
}
}
}
| 173,150 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
const u_char *ptr;
u_int i;
size_t dlen;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
if (kex == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
return r;
/* discard packet */
for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
/*
* XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported
* KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using
* a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should
* be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a
* packet later.
* XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means
* for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should
* ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: upstream commit
Unregister the KEXINIT handler after message has been
received. Otherwise an unauthenticated peer can repeat the KEXINIT and cause
allocation of up to 128MB -- until the connection is closed. Reported by
shilei-c at 360.cn
Upstream-ID: 43649ae12a27ef94290db16d1a98294588b75c05
CWE ID: CWE-399 | kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
const u_char *ptr;
u_int i;
size_t dlen;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
if (kex == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
return r;
/* discard packet */
for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
/*
* XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported
* KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using
* a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should
* be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a
* packet later.
* XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means
* for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should
* ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
| 166,902 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void perf_callchain_user_64(struct perf_callchain_entry *entry,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long sp, next_sp;
unsigned long next_ip;
unsigned long lr;
long level = 0;
struct signal_frame_64 __user *sigframe;
unsigned long __user *fp, *uregs;
next_ip = perf_instruction_pointer(regs);
lr = regs->link;
sp = regs->gpr[1];
perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip);
for (;;) {
fp = (unsigned long __user *) sp;
if (!valid_user_sp(sp, 1) || read_user_stack_64(fp, &next_sp))
return;
if (level > 0 && read_user_stack_64(&fp[2], &next_ip))
return;
/*
* Note: the next_sp - sp >= signal frame size check
* is true when next_sp < sp, which can happen when
* transitioning from an alternate signal stack to the
* normal stack.
*/
if (next_sp - sp >= sizeof(struct signal_frame_64) &&
(is_sigreturn_64_address(next_ip, sp) ||
(level <= 1 && is_sigreturn_64_address(lr, sp))) &&
sane_signal_64_frame(sp)) {
/*
* This looks like an signal frame
*/
sigframe = (struct signal_frame_64 __user *) sp;
uregs = sigframe->uc.uc_mcontext.gp_regs;
if (read_user_stack_64(&uregs[PT_NIP], &next_ip) ||
read_user_stack_64(&uregs[PT_LNK], &lr) ||
read_user_stack_64(&uregs[PT_R1], &sp))
return;
level = 0;
perf_callchain_store(entry, PERF_CONTEXT_USER);
perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip);
continue;
}
if (level == 0)
next_ip = lr;
perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip);
++level;
sp = next_sp;
}
}
Commit Message: powerpc/perf: Cap 64bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
We cap 32bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
(currently 127), but we forgot to do the same for 64bit backtraces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void perf_callchain_user_64(struct perf_callchain_entry *entry,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long sp, next_sp;
unsigned long next_ip;
unsigned long lr;
long level = 0;
struct signal_frame_64 __user *sigframe;
unsigned long __user *fp, *uregs;
next_ip = perf_instruction_pointer(regs);
lr = regs->link;
sp = regs->gpr[1];
perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip);
while (entry->nr < PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH) {
fp = (unsigned long __user *) sp;
if (!valid_user_sp(sp, 1) || read_user_stack_64(fp, &next_sp))
return;
if (level > 0 && read_user_stack_64(&fp[2], &next_ip))
return;
/*
* Note: the next_sp - sp >= signal frame size check
* is true when next_sp < sp, which can happen when
* transitioning from an alternate signal stack to the
* normal stack.
*/
if (next_sp - sp >= sizeof(struct signal_frame_64) &&
(is_sigreturn_64_address(next_ip, sp) ||
(level <= 1 && is_sigreturn_64_address(lr, sp))) &&
sane_signal_64_frame(sp)) {
/*
* This looks like an signal frame
*/
sigframe = (struct signal_frame_64 __user *) sp;
uregs = sigframe->uc.uc_mcontext.gp_regs;
if (read_user_stack_64(&uregs[PT_NIP], &next_ip) ||
read_user_stack_64(&uregs[PT_LNK], &lr) ||
read_user_stack_64(&uregs[PT_R1], &sp))
return;
level = 0;
perf_callchain_store(entry, PERF_CONTEXT_USER);
perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip);
continue;
}
if (level == 0)
next_ip = lr;
perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip);
++level;
sp = next_sp;
}
}
| 166,587 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
svc_.encoding_mode = INTER_LAYER_PREDICTION_IP;
svc_.log_level = SVC_LOG_DEBUG;
svc_.log_print = 0;
codec_iface_ = vpx_codec_vp9_cx();
const vpx_codec_err_t res =
vpx_codec_enc_config_default(codec_iface_, &codec_enc_, 0);
EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
codec_enc_.g_w = kWidth;
codec_enc_.g_h = kHeight;
codec_enc_.g_timebase.num = 1;
codec_enc_.g_timebase.den = 60;
codec_enc_.kf_min_dist = 100;
codec_enc_.kf_max_dist = 100;
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t dec_cfg = {0};
VP9CodecFactory codec_factory;
decoder_ = codec_factory.CreateDecoder(dec_cfg, 0);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void SetUp() {
svc_.log_level = SVC_LOG_DEBUG;
svc_.log_print = 0;
codec_iface_ = vpx_codec_vp9_cx();
const vpx_codec_err_t res =
vpx_codec_enc_config_default(codec_iface_, &codec_enc_, 0);
EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
codec_enc_.g_w = kWidth;
codec_enc_.g_h = kHeight;
codec_enc_.g_timebase.num = 1;
codec_enc_.g_timebase.den = 60;
codec_enc_.kf_min_dist = 100;
codec_enc_.kf_max_dist = 100;
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t dec_cfg = vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t();
VP9CodecFactory codec_factory;
decoder_ = codec_factory.CreateDecoder(dec_cfg, 0);
tile_columns_ = 0;
tile_rows_ = 0;
}
| 174,580 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_random_pseudo_bytes)
{
long buffer_length;
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
zval *zstrong_result_returned = NULL;
int strong_result = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|z", &buffer_length, &zstrong_result_returned) == FAILURE) {
return;
return;
}
if (buffer_length <= 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
zval_dtor(zstrong_result_returned);
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, 0);
}
buffer = emalloc(buffer_length + 1);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
strong_result = 1;
/* random/urandom equivalent on Windows */
if (php_win32_get_random_bytes(buffer, (size_t) buffer_length) == FAILURE) {
efree(buffer);
if (php_win32_get_random_bytes(buffer, (size_t) buffer_length) == FAILURE) {
efree(buffer);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#else
if ((strong_result = RAND_pseudo_bytes(buffer, buffer_length)) < 0) {
efree(buffer);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, 0);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, 0);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#endif
RETVAL_STRINGL((char *)buffer, buffer_length, 0);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, strong_result);
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_random_pseudo_bytes)
{
long buffer_length;
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
zval *zstrong_result_returned = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|z", &buffer_length, &zstrong_result_returned) == FAILURE) {
return;
return;
}
if (buffer_length <= 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
zval_dtor(zstrong_result_returned);
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, 0);
}
buffer = emalloc(buffer_length + 1);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
/* random/urandom equivalent on Windows */
if (php_win32_get_random_bytes(buffer, (size_t) buffer_length) == FAILURE) {
efree(buffer);
if (php_win32_get_random_bytes(buffer, (size_t) buffer_length) == FAILURE) {
efree(buffer);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#else
if (RAND_bytes(buffer, buffer_length) <= 0) {
efree(buffer);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, 0);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, 0);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#endif
RETVAL_STRINGL((char *)buffer, buffer_length, 0);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, 1);
}
}
/* }}} */
| 165,272 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
{
int ok = 0;
EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
if ((priv_key = EC_PRIVATEKEY_new()) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(&priv_key, in, len)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
return NULL;
}
if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) {
if ((ret = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (a)
*a = ret;
} else
ret = *a;
ret = *a;
if (priv_key->parameters) {
if (ret->group)
EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret->group);
ret->group = ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(priv_key->parameters);
}
if (ret->group == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret->version = priv_key->version;
if (priv_key->privateKey) {
ret->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->privateKey),
M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->privateKey),
ret->priv_key);
if (ret->priv_key == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
} else {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (priv_key->publicKey) {
const unsigned char *pub_oct;
size_t pub_oct_len;
if (ret->pub_key)
EC_POINT_clear_free(ret->pub_key);
ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group);
if (ret->pub_key == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
pub_oct = M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->publicKey);
pub_oct_len = M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->publicKey);
/* save the point conversion form */
ret->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t) (pub_oct[0] & ~0x01);
if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret->group, ret->pub_key,
pub_oct, pub_oct_len, NULL)) {
}
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
if (ret)
EC_KEY_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
if (priv_key)
EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
{
int ok = 0;
EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
if ((priv_key = EC_PRIVATEKEY_new()) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(&priv_key, in, len)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
return NULL;
}
if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) {
if ((ret = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
} else
ret = *a;
ret = *a;
if (priv_key->parameters) {
if (ret->group)
EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret->group);
ret->group = ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(priv_key->parameters);
}
if (ret->group == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret->version = priv_key->version;
if (priv_key->privateKey) {
ret->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->privateKey),
M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->privateKey),
ret->priv_key);
if (ret->priv_key == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
} else {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (priv_key->publicKey) {
const unsigned char *pub_oct;
size_t pub_oct_len;
if (ret->pub_key)
EC_POINT_clear_free(ret->pub_key);
ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group);
if (ret->pub_key == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
pub_oct = M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->publicKey);
pub_oct_len = M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->publicKey);
/* save the point conversion form */
ret->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t) (pub_oct[0] & ~0x01);
if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret->group, ret->pub_key,
pub_oct, pub_oct_len, NULL)) {
}
}
if (a)
*a = ret;
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
if (ret && (a == NULL || *a != ret))
EC_KEY_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
if (priv_key)
EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
return (ret);
}
| 164,819 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Label::SizeToFit(int max_width) {
DCHECK(is_multi_line_);
std::vector<std::wstring> lines;
base::SplitString(UTF16ToWideHack(text_), L'\n', &lines);
int label_width = 0;
for (std::vector<std::wstring>::const_iterator iter = lines.begin();
iter != lines.end(); ++iter) {
label_width = std::max(label_width,
font_.GetStringWidth(WideToUTF16Hack(*iter)));
}
label_width += GetInsets().width();
if (max_width > 0)
label_width = std::min(label_width, max_width);
SetBounds(x(), y(), label_width, 0);
SizeToPreferredSize();
}
Commit Message: wstring: remove wstring version of SplitString
Retry of r84336.
BUG=23581
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6930047
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@84355 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void Label::SizeToFit(int max_width) {
DCHECK(is_multi_line_);
std::vector<string16> lines;
base::SplitString(text_, '\n', &lines);
int label_width = 0;
for (std::vector<string16>::const_iterator iter = lines.begin();
iter != lines.end(); ++iter) {
label_width = std::max(label_width, font_.GetStringWidth(*iter));
}
label_width += GetInsets().width();
if (max_width > 0)
label_width = std::min(label_width, max_width);
SetBounds(x(), y(), label_width, 0);
SizeToPreferredSize();
}
| 170,556 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ServiceWorkerHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
process_ = process_host;
if (!process_host) {
ClearForceUpdate();
context_ = nullptr;
return;
}
StoragePartition* partition = process_host->GetStoragePartition();
DCHECK(partition);
context_ = static_cast<ServiceWorkerContextWrapper*>(
partition->GetServiceWorkerContext());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ServiceWorkerHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
void ServiceWorkerHandler::SetRenderer(int process_host_id,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
RenderProcessHost* process_host = RenderProcessHost::FromID(process_host_id);
if (!process_host) {
ClearForceUpdate();
context_ = nullptr;
return;
}
storage_partition_ =
static_cast<StoragePartitionImpl*>(process_host->GetStoragePartition());
DCHECK(storage_partition_);
context_ = static_cast<ServiceWorkerContextWrapper*>(
storage_partition_->GetServiceWorkerContext());
}
| 172,769 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t yurex_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t count,
loff_t *ppos)
{
struct usb_yurex *dev;
int retval = 0;
int bytes_read = 0;
char in_buffer[20];
unsigned long flags;
dev = file->private_data;
mutex_lock(&dev->io_mutex);
if (!dev->interface) { /* already disconnected */
retval = -ENODEV;
goto exit;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
bytes_read = snprintf(in_buffer, 20, "%lld\n", dev->bbu);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
if (*ppos < bytes_read) {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, in_buffer + *ppos, bytes_read - *ppos))
retval = -EFAULT;
else {
retval = bytes_read - *ppos;
*ppos += bytes_read;
}
}
exit:
mutex_unlock(&dev->io_mutex);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: USB: yurex: fix out-of-bounds uaccess in read handler
In general, accessing userspace memory beyond the length of the supplied
buffer in VFS read/write handlers can lead to both kernel memory corruption
(via kernel_read()/kernel_write(), which can e.g. be triggered via
sys_splice()) and privilege escalation inside userspace.
Fix it by using simple_read_from_buffer() instead of custom logic.
Fixes: 6bc235a2e24a ("USB: add driver for Meywa-Denki & Kayac YUREX")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static ssize_t yurex_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t count,
loff_t *ppos)
{
struct usb_yurex *dev;
int len = 0;
char in_buffer[20];
unsigned long flags;
dev = file->private_data;
mutex_lock(&dev->io_mutex);
if (!dev->interface) { /* already disconnected */
mutex_unlock(&dev->io_mutex);
return -ENODEV;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
len = snprintf(in_buffer, 20, "%lld\n", dev->bbu);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
mutex_unlock(&dev->io_mutex);
return simple_read_from_buffer(buffer, count, ppos, in_buffer, len);
}
| 169,084 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void copy_xauthority(void) {
char *src = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE ;
char *dest;
if (asprintf(&dest, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
if (is_link(dest)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s is a symbolic link\n", dest);
exit(1);
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .Xauthority in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
unlink(src);
}
Commit Message: replace copy_file with copy_file_as_user
CWE ID: CWE-269 | static void copy_xauthority(void) {
char *src = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE ;
char *dest;
if (asprintf(&dest, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
if (is_link(dest)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s is a symbolic link\n", dest);
exit(1);
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
unlink(src);
}
| 170,092 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int xt_check_entry_offsets(const void *base,
unsigned int target_offset,
unsigned int next_offset)
{
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
const char *e = base;
if (target_offset + sizeof(*t) > next_offset)
return -EINVAL;
t = (void *)(e + target_offset);
if (t->u.target_size < sizeof(*t))
return -EINVAL;
if (target_offset + t->u.target_size > next_offset)
return -EINVAL;
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_standard_target) != next_offset)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int xt_check_entry_offsets(const void *base,
const char *elems,
unsigned int target_offset,
unsigned int next_offset)
{
long size_of_base_struct = elems - (const char *)base;
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
const char *e = base;
/* target start is within the ip/ip6/arpt_entry struct */
if (target_offset < size_of_base_struct)
return -EINVAL;
if (target_offset + sizeof(*t) > next_offset)
return -EINVAL;
t = (void *)(e + target_offset);
if (t->u.target_size < sizeof(*t))
return -EINVAL;
if (target_offset + t->u.target_size > next_offset)
return -EINVAL;
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_standard_target) != next_offset)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
| 167,221 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::GetGPUProcessID() {
return host_ ? host_->gpu_process_id() : 0;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | int WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::GetGPUProcessID() {
return host_ ? host_->gpu_host_id() : 0;
}
| 170,930 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t in_read(struct audio_stream_in *stream, void* buffer,
size_t bytes)
{
struct a2dp_stream_in *in = (struct a2dp_stream_in *)stream;
int read;
DEBUG("read %zu bytes, state: %d", bytes, in->common.state);
if (in->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_SUSPENDED)
{
DEBUG("stream suspended");
return -1;
}
/* only allow autostarting if we are in stopped or standby */
if ((in->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPED) ||
(in->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STANDBY))
{
pthread_mutex_lock(&in->common.lock);
if (start_audio_datapath(&in->common) < 0)
{
/* emulate time this write represents to avoid very fast write
failures during transition periods or remote suspend */
int us_delay = calc_audiotime(in->common.cfg, bytes);
DEBUG("emulate a2dp read delay (%d us)", us_delay);
usleep(us_delay);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&in->common.lock);
return -1;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&in->common.lock);
}
else if (in->common.state != AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STARTED)
{
ERROR("stream not in stopped or standby");
return -1;
}
read = skt_read(in->common.audio_fd, buffer, bytes);
if (read == -1)
{
skt_disconnect(in->common.audio_fd);
in->common.audio_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
in->common.state = AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPED;
} else if (read == 0) {
DEBUG("read time out - return zeros");
memset(buffer, 0, bytes);
read = bytes;
}
DEBUG("read %d bytes out of %zu bytes", read, bytes);
return read;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static ssize_t in_read(struct audio_stream_in *stream, void* buffer,
size_t bytes)
{
struct a2dp_stream_in *in = (struct a2dp_stream_in *)stream;
int read;
DEBUG("read %zu bytes, state: %d", bytes, in->common.state);
if (in->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_SUSPENDED)
{
DEBUG("stream suspended");
return -1;
}
/* only allow autostarting if we are in stopped or standby */
if ((in->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPED) ||
(in->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STANDBY))
{
pthread_mutex_lock(&in->common.lock);
if (start_audio_datapath(&in->common) < 0)
{
/* emulate time this write represents to avoid very fast write
failures during transition periods or remote suspend */
int us_delay = calc_audiotime(in->common.cfg, bytes);
DEBUG("emulate a2dp read delay (%d us)", us_delay);
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(usleep(us_delay));
pthread_mutex_unlock(&in->common.lock);
return -1;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&in->common.lock);
}
else if (in->common.state != AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STARTED)
{
ERROR("stream not in stopped or standby");
return -1;
}
read = skt_read(in->common.audio_fd, buffer, bytes);
if (read == -1)
{
skt_disconnect(in->common.audio_fd);
in->common.audio_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
in->common.state = AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPED;
} else if (read == 0) {
DEBUG("read time out - return zeros");
memset(buffer, 0, bytes);
read = bytes;
}
DEBUG("read %d bytes out of %zu bytes", read, bytes);
return read;
}
| 173,426 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Blob::Blob(const KURL& srcURL, const String& type, long long size)
: m_type(type)
, m_size(size)
{
ScriptWrappable::init(this);
m_internalURL = BlobURL::createInternalURL();
ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(0, m_internalURL, srcURL);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | Blob::Blob(const KURL& srcURL, const String& type, long long size)
: m_type(type)
, m_size(size)
{
ScriptWrappable::init(this);
m_internalURL = BlobURL::createInternalURL();
BlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(0, m_internalURL, srcURL);
}
| 170,676 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: atol10(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
{
uint64_t l;
int digit;
l = 0;
digit = *p - '0';
while (digit >= 0 && digit < 10 && char_cnt-- > 0) {
l = (l * 10) + digit;
digit = *++p - '0';
}
return (l);
}
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | atol10(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
{
uint64_t l;
int digit;
if (char_cnt == 0)
return (0);
l = 0;
digit = *p - '0';
while (digit >= 0 && digit < 10 && char_cnt-- > 0) {
l = (l * 10) + digit;
digit = *++p - '0';
}
return (l);
}
| 167,767 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int wanxl_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
{
const size_t size = sizeof(sync_serial_settings);
sync_serial_settings line;
port_t *port = dev_to_port(dev);
if (cmd != SIOCWANDEV)
return hdlc_ioctl(dev, ifr, cmd);
switch (ifr->ifr_settings.type) {
case IF_GET_IFACE:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_SYNC_SERIAL;
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size < size) {
ifr->ifr_settings.size = size; /* data size wanted */
return -ENOBUFS;
}
line.clock_type = get_status(port)->clocking;
line.clock_rate = 0;
line.loopback = 0;
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.sync, &line, size))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case IF_IFACE_SYNC_SERIAL:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP)
return -EBUSY;
if (copy_from_user(&line, ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.sync,
size))
return -EFAULT;
if (line.clock_type != CLOCK_EXT &&
line.clock_type != CLOCK_TXFROMRX)
return -EINVAL; /* No such clock setting */
if (line.loopback != 0)
return -EINVAL;
get_status(port)->clocking = line.clock_type;
return 0;
default:
return hdlc_ioctl(dev, ifr, cmd);
}
}
Commit Message: wanxl: fix info leak in ioctl
The wanxl_ioctl() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static int wanxl_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
{
const size_t size = sizeof(sync_serial_settings);
sync_serial_settings line;
port_t *port = dev_to_port(dev);
if (cmd != SIOCWANDEV)
return hdlc_ioctl(dev, ifr, cmd);
switch (ifr->ifr_settings.type) {
case IF_GET_IFACE:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_SYNC_SERIAL;
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size < size) {
ifr->ifr_settings.size = size; /* data size wanted */
return -ENOBUFS;
}
memset(&line, 0, sizeof(line));
line.clock_type = get_status(port)->clocking;
line.clock_rate = 0;
line.loopback = 0;
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.sync, &line, size))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case IF_IFACE_SYNC_SERIAL:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP)
return -EBUSY;
if (copy_from_user(&line, ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.sync,
size))
return -EFAULT;
if (line.clock_type != CLOCK_EXT &&
line.clock_type != CLOCK_TXFROMRX)
return -EINVAL; /* No such clock setting */
if (line.loopback != 0)
return -EINVAL;
get_status(port)->clocking = line.clock_type;
return 0;
default:
return hdlc_ioctl(dev, ifr, cmd);
}
}
| 166,438 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::OneQuarterTest() {
memset(src_, 255, block_size_);
const int half = block_size_ / 2;
memset(ref_, 255, half);
memset(ref_ + half, 0, half);
unsigned int sse;
unsigned int var;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var = variance_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse));
const unsigned int expected = block_size_ * 255 * 255 / 4;
EXPECT_EQ(expected, var);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::OneQuarterTest() {
const int half = block_size_ / 2;
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
memset(src_, 255, block_size_);
memset(ref_, 255, half);
memset(ref_ + half, 0, half);
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
vpx_memset16(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src_), 255 << (bit_depth_ - 8),
block_size_);
vpx_memset16(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref_), 255 << (bit_depth_ - 8), half);
vpx_memset16(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref_) + half, 0, half);
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
unsigned int sse;
unsigned int var;
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var = variance_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse));
const unsigned int expected = block_size_ * 255 * 255 / 4;
EXPECT_EQ(expected, var);
}
| 174,585 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PredictorEncodeTile(TIFF* tif, uint8* bp0, tmsize_t cc0, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "PredictorEncodeTile";
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
uint8 *working_copy;
tmsize_t cc = cc0, rowsize;
unsigned char* bp;
int result_code;
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->encodepfunc != NULL);
assert(sp->encodetile != NULL);
/*
* Do predictor manipulation in a working buffer to avoid altering
* the callers buffer. http://trac.osgeo.org/gdal/ticket/1965
*/
working_copy = (uint8*) _TIFFmalloc(cc0);
if( working_copy == NULL )
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Out of memory allocating " TIFF_SSIZE_FORMAT " byte temp buffer.",
cc0 );
return 0;
}
memcpy( working_copy, bp0, cc0 );
bp = working_copy;
rowsize = sp->rowsize;
assert(rowsize > 0);
assert((cc0%rowsize)==0);
while (cc > 0) {
(*sp->encodepfunc)(tif, bp, rowsize);
cc -= rowsize;
bp += rowsize;
}
result_code = (*sp->encodetile)(tif, working_copy, cc0, s);
_TIFFfree( working_copy );
return result_code;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | PredictorEncodeTile(TIFF* tif, uint8* bp0, tmsize_t cc0, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "PredictorEncodeTile";
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
uint8 *working_copy;
tmsize_t cc = cc0, rowsize;
unsigned char* bp;
int result_code;
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->encodepfunc != NULL);
assert(sp->encodetile != NULL);
/*
* Do predictor manipulation in a working buffer to avoid altering
* the callers buffer. http://trac.osgeo.org/gdal/ticket/1965
*/
working_copy = (uint8*) _TIFFmalloc(cc0);
if( working_copy == NULL )
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Out of memory allocating " TIFF_SSIZE_FORMAT " byte temp buffer.",
cc0 );
return 0;
}
memcpy( working_copy, bp0, cc0 );
bp = working_copy;
rowsize = sp->rowsize;
assert(rowsize > 0);
if((cc0%rowsize)!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "PredictorEncodeTile",
"%s", "(cc0%rowsize)!=0");
return 0;
}
while (cc > 0) {
(*sp->encodepfunc)(tif, bp, rowsize);
cc -= rowsize;
bp += rowsize;
}
result_code = (*sp->encodetile)(tif, working_copy, cc0, s);
_TIFFfree( working_copy );
return result_code;
}
| 166,879 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ping_unhash(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk);
pr_debug("ping_unhash(isk=%p,isk->num=%u)\n", isk, isk->inet_num);
if (sk_hashed(sk)) {
write_lock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
hlist_nulls_del(&sk->sk_nulls_node);
sock_put(sk);
isk->inet_num = 0;
isk->inet_sport = 0;
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, -1);
write_unlock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
}
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Missing sk_nulls_node_init() in ping_unhash().
If we don't do that, then the poison value is left in the ->pprev
backlink.
This can cause crashes if we do a disconnect, followed by a connect().
Tested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Wen Xu <hotdog3645@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | void ping_unhash(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk);
pr_debug("ping_unhash(isk=%p,isk->num=%u)\n", isk, isk->inet_num);
if (sk_hashed(sk)) {
write_lock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
hlist_nulls_del(&sk->sk_nulls_node);
sk_nulls_node_init(&sk->sk_nulls_node);
sock_put(sk);
isk->inet_num = 0;
isk->inet_sport = 0;
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, -1);
write_unlock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
}
}
| 166,623 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BurnLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetBurnLibrary() {
return burn_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | BurnLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetBurnLibrary() {
| 170,621 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(xml_set_object)
{
xml_parser *parser;
zval *pind, *mythis;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ro", &pind, &mythis) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(parser,xml_parser *, &pind, -1, "XML Parser", le_xml_parser);
/* please leave this commented - or ask thies@thieso.net before doing it (again) */
if (parser->object) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->object);
}
/* please leave this commented - or ask thies@thieso.net before doing it (again) */
/* #ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval_add_ref(&parser->object);
#endif */
ALLOC_ZVAL(parser->object);
MAKE_COPY_ZVAL(&mythis, parser->object);
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | PHP_FUNCTION(xml_set_object)
{
xml_parser *parser;
zval *pind, *mythis;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ro", &pind, &mythis) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(parser,xml_parser *, &pind, -1, "XML Parser", le_xml_parser);
/* please leave this commented - or ask thies@thieso.net before doing it (again) */
if (parser->object) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->object);
}
/* please leave this commented - or ask thies@thieso.net before doing it (again) */
/* #ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval_add_ref(&parser->object);
#endif */
ALLOC_ZVAL(parser->object);
MAKE_COPY_ZVAL(&mythis, parser->object);
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
| 165,036 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MediaControlTimelineElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* event) {
if (event->isMouseEvent() &&
toMouseEvent(event)->button() !=
static_cast<short>(WebPointerProperties::Button::Left))
return;
if (!isConnected() || !document().isActive())
return;
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mousedown) {
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.ScrubbingBegin"));
mediaControls().beginScrubbing();
}
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseup) {
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.ScrubbingEnd"));
mediaControls().endScrubbing();
}
MediaControlInputElement::defaultEventHandler(event);
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseover ||
event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseout ||
event->type() == EventTypeNames::mousemove)
return;
double time = value().toDouble();
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::input) {
if (mediaElement().seekable()->contain(time))
mediaElement().setCurrentTime(time);
}
LayoutSliderItem slider = LayoutSliderItem(toLayoutSlider(layoutObject()));
if (!slider.isNull() && slider.inDragMode())
mediaControls().updateCurrentTimeDisplay();
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void MediaControlTimelineElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* event) {
if (event->isMouseEvent() &&
toMouseEvent(event)->button() !=
static_cast<short>(WebPointerProperties::Button::Left))
return;
if (!isConnected() || !document().isActive())
return;
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mousedown) {
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.ScrubbingBegin"));
mediaControls().beginScrubbing();
}
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseup) {
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.ScrubbingEnd"));
mediaControls().endScrubbing();
}
MediaControlInputElement::defaultEventHandler(event);
if (event->type() != EventTypeNames::input)
return;
double time = value().toDouble();
// FIXME: This will need to take the timeline offset into consideration
// once that concept is supported, see https://crbug.com/312699
if (mediaElement().seekable()->contain(time))
mediaElement().setCurrentTime(time);
LayoutSliderItem slider = LayoutSliderItem(toLayoutSlider(layoutObject()));
if (!slider.isNull() && slider.inDragMode())
mediaControls().updateCurrentTimeDisplay();
}
| 171,898 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DocumentLoader::DidInstallNewDocument(Document* document) {
document->SetReadyState(Document::kLoading);
document->InitContentSecurityPolicy(content_security_policy_.Release());
if (history_item_ && IsBackForwardLoadType(load_type_))
document->SetStateForNewFormElements(history_item_->GetDocumentState());
String suborigin_header = response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Suborigin);
if (!suborigin_header.IsNull()) {
Vector<String> messages;
Suborigin suborigin;
if (ParseSuboriginHeader(suborigin_header, &suborigin, messages))
document->EnforceSuborigin(suborigin);
for (auto& message : messages) {
document->AddConsoleMessage(
ConsoleMessage::Create(kSecurityMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel,
"Error with Suborigin header: " + message));
}
}
document->GetClientHintsPreferences().UpdateFrom(client_hints_preferences_);
Settings* settings = document->GetSettings();
fetcher_->SetImagesEnabled(settings->GetImagesEnabled());
fetcher_->SetAutoLoadImages(settings->GetLoadsImagesAutomatically());
const AtomicString& dns_prefetch_control =
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::X_DNS_Prefetch_Control);
if (!dns_prefetch_control.IsEmpty())
document->ParseDNSPrefetchControlHeader(dns_prefetch_control);
String header_content_language =
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Content_Language);
if (!header_content_language.IsEmpty()) {
size_t comma_index = header_content_language.find(',');
header_content_language.Truncate(comma_index);
header_content_language =
header_content_language.StripWhiteSpace(IsHTMLSpace<UChar>);
if (!header_content_language.IsEmpty())
document->SetContentLanguage(AtomicString(header_content_language));
}
OriginTrialContext::AddTokensFromHeader(
document, response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Origin_Trial));
String referrer_policy_header =
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Referrer_Policy);
if (!referrer_policy_header.IsNull()) {
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kReferrerPolicyHeader);
document->ParseAndSetReferrerPolicy(referrer_policy_header);
}
GetLocalFrameClient().DidCreateNewDocument();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | void DocumentLoader::DidInstallNewDocument(Document* document) {
void DocumentLoader::DidInstallNewDocument(Document* document,
InstallNewDocumentReason reason) {
document->SetReadyState(Document::kLoading);
if (content_security_policy_) {
document->InitContentSecurityPolicy(content_security_policy_.Release());
}
if (history_item_ && IsBackForwardLoadType(load_type_))
document->SetStateForNewFormElements(history_item_->GetDocumentState());
String suborigin_header = response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Suborigin);
if (!suborigin_header.IsNull()) {
Vector<String> messages;
Suborigin suborigin;
if (ParseSuboriginHeader(suborigin_header, &suborigin, messages))
document->EnforceSuborigin(suborigin);
for (auto& message : messages) {
document->AddConsoleMessage(
ConsoleMessage::Create(kSecurityMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel,
"Error with Suborigin header: " + message));
}
}
document->GetClientHintsPreferences().UpdateFrom(client_hints_preferences_);
Settings* settings = document->GetSettings();
fetcher_->SetImagesEnabled(settings->GetImagesEnabled());
fetcher_->SetAutoLoadImages(settings->GetLoadsImagesAutomatically());
const AtomicString& dns_prefetch_control =
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::X_DNS_Prefetch_Control);
if (!dns_prefetch_control.IsEmpty())
document->ParseDNSPrefetchControlHeader(dns_prefetch_control);
String header_content_language =
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Content_Language);
if (!header_content_language.IsEmpty()) {
size_t comma_index = header_content_language.find(',');
header_content_language.Truncate(comma_index);
header_content_language =
header_content_language.StripWhiteSpace(IsHTMLSpace<UChar>);
if (!header_content_language.IsEmpty())
document->SetContentLanguage(AtomicString(header_content_language));
}
OriginTrialContext::AddTokensFromHeader(
document, response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Origin_Trial));
String referrer_policy_header =
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Referrer_Policy);
if (!referrer_policy_header.IsNull()) {
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kReferrerPolicyHeader);
document->ParseAndSetReferrerPolicy(referrer_policy_header);
}
GetLocalFrameClient().DidCreateNewDocument();
}
| 172,302 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SortDirection AXTableCell::getSortDirection() const {
if (roleValue() != RowHeaderRole && roleValue() != ColumnHeaderRole)
return SortDirectionUndefined;
const AtomicString& ariaSort =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kSort);
if (ariaSort.isEmpty())
return SortDirectionUndefined;
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaSort, "none"))
return SortDirectionNone;
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaSort, "ascending"))
return SortDirectionAscending;
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaSort, "descending"))
return SortDirectionDescending;
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaSort, "other"))
return SortDirectionOther;
return SortDirectionUndefined;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | SortDirection AXTableCell::getSortDirection() const {
if (roleValue() != RowHeaderRole && roleValue() != ColumnHeaderRole)
return SortDirectionUndefined;
const AtomicString& ariaSort =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kSort);
if (ariaSort.isEmpty())
return SortDirectionUndefined;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(ariaSort, "none"))
return SortDirectionNone;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(ariaSort, "ascending"))
return SortDirectionAscending;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(ariaSort, "descending"))
return SortDirectionDescending;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(ariaSort, "other"))
return SortDirectionOther;
return SortDirectionUndefined;
}
| 171,931 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetExternalFileEntry",
base::Bind(&FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetExternalFileEntry,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetEntryURL",
base::Bind(&FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetEntryURL,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetExternalFileEntry", "fileBrowserHandler",
base::Bind(
&FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetExternalFileEntryCallback,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 173,271 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void svc_rdma_wc_write(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)
{
struct ib_cqe *cqe = wc->wr_cqe;
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
svc_rdma_send_wc_common_put(cq, wc, "write");
ctxt = container_of(cqe, struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt, cqe);
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 0);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | void svc_rdma_wc_write(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)
| 168,184 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BlockEntry::Kind Track::EOSBlock::GetKind() const
{
return kBlockEOS;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | BlockEntry::Kind Track::EOSBlock::GetKind() const
| 174,331 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline signed short ReadPropertySignedShort(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
union
{
unsigned short
unsigned_value;
signed short
signed_value;
} quantum;
unsigned short
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned short) ((buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[0]);
quantum.unsigned_value=(value & 0xffff);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
value=(unsigned short) ((((unsigned char *) buffer)[0] << 8) |
((unsigned char *) buffer)[1]);
quantum.unsigned_value=(value & 0xffff);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static inline signed short ReadPropertySignedShort(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
union
{
unsigned short
unsigned_value;
signed short
signed_value;
} quantum;
unsigned short
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned short) buffer[1] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[0];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
value=(unsigned short) buffer[0] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[1];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
| 169,955 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RefCountedMemory* ChromeWebUIControllerFactory::GetFaviconResourceBytes(
const GURL& page_url) const {
if (page_url.host() == extension_misc::kBookmarkManagerId)
return BookmarksUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme)) {
NOTREACHED();
return NULL;
}
if (!HasWebUIScheme(page_url))
return NULL;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIConflictsHost)
return ConflictsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
#endif
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUICrashesHost)
return CrashesUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIHistoryHost)
return HistoryUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIFlagsHost)
return FlagsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUISessionsHost)
return SessionsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIFlashHost)
return FlashUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIDownloadsHost)
return DownloadsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUISettingsHost)
return OptionsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUISettingsFrameHost)
return options2::OptionsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
#endif
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIPluginsHost)
return PluginsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | RefCountedMemory* ChromeWebUIControllerFactory::GetFaviconResourceBytes(
const GURL& page_url) const {
if (page_url.host() == extension_misc::kBookmarkManagerId)
return BookmarksUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme)) {
NOTREACHED();
return NULL;
}
if (!content::GetContentClient()->HasWebUIScheme(page_url))
return NULL;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIConflictsHost)
return ConflictsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
#endif
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUICrashesHost)
return CrashesUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIHistoryHost)
return HistoryUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIFlagsHost)
return FlagsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUISessionsHost)
return SessionsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIFlashHost)
return FlashUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIDownloadsHost)
return DownloadsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUISettingsHost)
return OptionsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUISettingsFrameHost)
return options2::OptionsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
#endif
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIPluginsHost)
return PluginsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
return NULL;
}
| 171,007 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *ubufs)
{
kref_put(&ubufs->kref, vhost_net_zerocopy_done_signal);
wait_event(ubufs->wait, !atomic_read(&ubufs->kref.refcount));
kfree(ubufs);
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *ubufs)
{
kref_put(&ubufs->kref, vhost_net_zerocopy_done_signal);
wait_event(ubufs->wait, !atomic_read(&ubufs->kref.refcount));
}
static void vhost_net_ubuf_put_wait_and_free(struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *ubufs)
{
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(ubufs);
kfree(ubufs);
}
| 166,021 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int set_registers(rtl8150_t * dev, u16 indx, u16 size, void *data)
{
return usb_control_msg(dev->udev, usb_sndctrlpipe(dev->udev, 0),
RTL8150_REQ_SET_REGS, RTL8150_REQT_WRITE,
indx, 0, data, size, 500);
}
Commit Message: rtl8150: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int set_registers(rtl8150_t * dev, u16 indx, u16 size, void *data)
static int set_registers(rtl8150_t * dev, u16 indx, u16 size, const void *data)
{
void *buf;
int ret;
buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_NOIO);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = usb_control_msg(dev->udev, usb_sndctrlpipe(dev->udev, 0),
RTL8150_REQ_SET_REGS, RTL8150_REQT_WRITE,
indx, 0, buf, size, 500);
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
| 168,215 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GraphicsContext::strokeArc(const IntRect& rect, int startAngle, int angleSpan)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
m_data->context->SetPen(wxPen(strokeColor(), strokeThickness(), strokeStyleToWxPenStyle(strokeStyle())));
m_data->context->DrawEllipticArc(rect.x(), rect.y(), rect.width(), rect.height(), startAngle, angleSpan);
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void GraphicsContext::strokeArc(const IntRect& rect, int startAngle, int angleSpan)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
m_data->context->SetPen(wxPen(strokeColor(), strokeThickness(), strokeStyleToWxPenStyle(strokeStyle())));
m_data->context->DrawEllipticArc(rect.x(), rect.y(), rect.width(), rect.height(), startAngle, startAngle + angleSpan);
}
| 170,427 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int tap_if_down(const char *devname)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
int sk;
sk = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (sk < 0)
return -1;
memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, devname, IF_NAMESIZE - 1);
ifr.ifr_flags &= ~IFF_UP;
ioctl(sk, SIOCSIFFLAGS, (caddr_t) &ifr);
close(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static int tap_if_down(const char *devname)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
int sk;
sk = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (sk < 0)
return -1;
memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, devname, IF_NAMESIZE - 1);
ifr.ifr_flags &= ~IFF_UP;
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(ioctl(sk, SIOCSIFFLAGS, (caddr_t) &ifr));
close(sk);
return 0;
}
| 173,448 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DevToolsSession::ReceivedBadMessage() {
MojoConnectionDestroyed();
if (process_) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
process_, bad_message::RFH_INCONSISTENT_DEVTOOLS_MESSAGE);
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void DevToolsSession::ReceivedBadMessage() {
MojoConnectionDestroyed();
RenderProcessHost* process = RenderProcessHost::FromID(process_host_id_);
if (process) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
process, bad_message::RFH_INCONSISTENT_DEVTOOLS_MESSAGE);
}
}
| 172,742 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: tt_cmap12_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p;
FT_ULong length;
FT_ULong num_groups;
if ( table + 16 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
p = table + 4;
length = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
p = table + 12;
p = table + 12;
num_groups = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( table + length > valid->limit || length < 16 + 12 * num_groups )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check groups, they must be in increasing order */
for ( n = 0; n < num_groups; n++ )
{
start = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
end = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
start_id = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( start > end )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( n > 0 && start <= last )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
if ( start_id + end - start >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
}
last = end;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | tt_cmap12_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p;
FT_ULong length;
FT_ULong num_groups;
if ( table + 16 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
p = table + 4;
length = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
p = table + 12;
p = table + 12;
num_groups = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( length > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - table ) ||
length < 16 + 12 * num_groups )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check groups, they must be in increasing order */
for ( n = 0; n < num_groups; n++ )
{
start = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
end = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
start_id = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( start > end )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( n > 0 && start <= last )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
if ( start_id + end - start >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
}
last = end;
}
}
| 164,740 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnRegisterAgentError(
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback,
const std::string& error_name,
const std::string& error_message) {
if (--num_connecting_calls_ == 0)
adapter_->NotifyDeviceChanged(this);
DCHECK(num_connecting_calls_ >= 0);
LOG(WARNING) << object_path_.value() << ": Failed to register agent: "
<< error_name << ": " << error_message;
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": " << num_connecting_calls_
<< " still in progress";
UnregisterAgent();
ConnectErrorCode error_code = ERROR_UNKNOWN;
if (error_name == bluetooth_agent_manager::kErrorAlreadyExists)
error_code = ERROR_INPROGRESS;
RecordPairingResult(error_code);
error_callback.Run(error_code);
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnRegisterAgentError(
| 171,230 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_set_IHDR(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
png_uint_32 width, png_uint_32 height, int bit_depth,
int color_type, int interlace_type, int compression_type,
int filter_type)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "IHDR");
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL)
return;
info_ptr->width = width;
info_ptr->height = height;
info_ptr->bit_depth = (png_byte)bit_depth;
info_ptr->color_type = (png_byte)color_type;
info_ptr->compression_type = (png_byte)compression_type;
info_ptr->filter_type = (png_byte)filter_type;
info_ptr->interlace_type = (png_byte)interlace_type;
png_check_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr->width, info_ptr->height,
info_ptr->bit_depth, info_ptr->color_type, info_ptr->interlace_type,
info_ptr->compression_type, info_ptr->filter_type);
if (info_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
info_ptr->channels = 1;
else if (info_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
info_ptr->channels = 3;
else
info_ptr->channels = 1;
if (info_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA)
info_ptr->channels++;
info_ptr->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(info_ptr->channels * info_ptr->bit_depth);
/* Check for potential overflow */
if (width > (PNG_UINT_32_MAX
>> 3) /* 8-byte RGBA pixels */
- 64 /* bigrowbuf hack */
- 1 /* filter byte */
- 7*8 /* rounding of width to multiple of 8 pixels */
- 8) /* extra max_pixel_depth pad */
info_ptr->rowbytes = (png_size_t)0;
else
info_ptr->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(info_ptr->pixel_depth, width);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | png_set_IHDR(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
png_uint_32 width, png_uint_32 height, int bit_depth,
int color_type, int interlace_type, int compression_type,
int filter_type)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "IHDR");
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL)
return;
info_ptr->width = width;
info_ptr->height = height;
info_ptr->bit_depth = (png_byte)bit_depth;
info_ptr->color_type = (png_byte)color_type;
info_ptr->compression_type = (png_byte)compression_type;
info_ptr->filter_type = (png_byte)filter_type;
info_ptr->interlace_type = (png_byte)interlace_type;
png_check_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr->width, info_ptr->height,
info_ptr->bit_depth, info_ptr->color_type, info_ptr->interlace_type,
info_ptr->compression_type, info_ptr->filter_type);
if (info_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
info_ptr->channels = 1;
else if (info_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
info_ptr->channels = 3;
else
info_ptr->channels = 1;
if (info_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA)
info_ptr->channels++;
info_ptr->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(info_ptr->channels * info_ptr->bit_depth);
/* Check for potential overflow */
if (width > (PNG_UINT_32_MAX
>> 3) /* 8-byte RGBA pixels */
- 64 /* bigrowbuf hack */
- 1 /* filter byte */
- 7*8 /* rounding of width to multiple of 8 pixels */
- 8) /* extra max_pixel_depth pad */
{
info_ptr->rowbytes = (png_size_t)0;
png_error(png_ptr, "Image width is too large for this architecture");
}
else
info_ptr->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(info_ptr->pixel_depth, width);
}
| 172,182 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
FILE *infile = NULL;
vpx_codec_ctx_t codec = {0};
vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t cfg = {0};
int frame_count = 0;
vpx_image_t raw;
vpx_codec_err_t res;
VpxVideoInfo info = {0};
VpxVideoWriter *writer = NULL;
const VpxInterface *encoder = NULL;
int update_frame_num = 0;
const int fps = 30; // TODO(dkovalev) add command line argument
const int bitrate = 200; // kbit/s TODO(dkovalev) add command line argument
exec_name = argv[0];
if (argc != 6)
die("Invalid number of arguments");
encoder = get_vpx_encoder_by_name("vp8");
if (!encoder)
die("Unsupported codec.");
update_frame_num = atoi(argv[5]);
if (!update_frame_num)
die("Couldn't parse frame number '%s'\n", argv[5]);
info.codec_fourcc = encoder->fourcc;
info.frame_width = strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0);
info.frame_height = strtol(argv[2], NULL, 0);
info.time_base.numerator = 1;
info.time_base.denominator = fps;
if (info.frame_width <= 0 ||
info.frame_height <= 0 ||
(info.frame_width % 2) != 0 ||
(info.frame_height % 2) != 0) {
die("Invalid frame size: %dx%d", info.frame_width, info.frame_height);
}
if (!vpx_img_alloc(&raw, VPX_IMG_FMT_I420, info.frame_width,
info.frame_height, 1)) {
die("Failed to allocate image.");
}
printf("Using %s\n", vpx_codec_iface_name(encoder->interface()));
res = vpx_codec_enc_config_default(encoder->interface(), &cfg, 0);
if (res)
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to get default codec config.");
cfg.g_w = info.frame_width;
cfg.g_h = info.frame_height;
cfg.g_timebase.num = info.time_base.numerator;
cfg.g_timebase.den = info.time_base.denominator;
cfg.rc_target_bitrate = bitrate;
writer = vpx_video_writer_open(argv[4], kContainerIVF, &info);
if (!writer)
die("Failed to open %s for writing.", argv[4]);
if (!(infile = fopen(argv[3], "rb")))
die("Failed to open %s for reading.", argv[3]);
if (vpx_codec_enc_init(&codec, encoder->interface(), &cfg, 0))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to initialize encoder");
while (vpx_img_read(&raw, infile)) {
if (frame_count + 1 == update_frame_num) {
vpx_ref_frame_t ref;
ref.frame_type = VP8_LAST_FRAME;
ref.img = raw;
if (vpx_codec_control(&codec, VP8_SET_REFERENCE, &ref))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to set reference frame");
}
encode_frame(&codec, &raw, frame_count++, writer);
}
encode_frame(&codec, NULL, -1, writer);
printf("\n");
fclose(infile);
printf("Processed %d frames.\n", frame_count);
vpx_img_free(&raw);
if (vpx_codec_destroy(&codec))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to destroy codec.");
vpx_video_writer_close(writer);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int main(int argc, char **argv) {
FILE *infile = NULL;
vpx_codec_ctx_t codec = {0};
vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t cfg = {0};
int frame_count = 0;
vpx_image_t raw;
vpx_codec_err_t res;
VpxVideoInfo info = {0};
VpxVideoWriter *writer = NULL;
const VpxInterface *encoder = NULL;
int update_frame_num = 0;
const int fps = 30; // TODO(dkovalev) add command line argument
const int bitrate = 200; // kbit/s TODO(dkovalev) add command line argument
exec_name = argv[0];
if (argc != 6)
die("Invalid number of arguments");
encoder = get_vpx_encoder_by_name("vp8");
if (!encoder)
die("Unsupported codec.");
update_frame_num = atoi(argv[5]);
if (!update_frame_num)
die("Couldn't parse frame number '%s'\n", argv[5]);
info.codec_fourcc = encoder->fourcc;
info.frame_width = strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0);
info.frame_height = strtol(argv[2], NULL, 0);
info.time_base.numerator = 1;
info.time_base.denominator = fps;
if (info.frame_width <= 0 ||
info.frame_height <= 0 ||
(info.frame_width % 2) != 0 ||
(info.frame_height % 2) != 0) {
die("Invalid frame size: %dx%d", info.frame_width, info.frame_height);
}
if (!vpx_img_alloc(&raw, VPX_IMG_FMT_I420, info.frame_width,
info.frame_height, 1)) {
die("Failed to allocate image.");
}
printf("Using %s\n", vpx_codec_iface_name(encoder->codec_interface()));
res = vpx_codec_enc_config_default(encoder->codec_interface(), &cfg, 0);
if (res)
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to get default codec config.");
cfg.g_w = info.frame_width;
cfg.g_h = info.frame_height;
cfg.g_timebase.num = info.time_base.numerator;
cfg.g_timebase.den = info.time_base.denominator;
cfg.rc_target_bitrate = bitrate;
writer = vpx_video_writer_open(argv[4], kContainerIVF, &info);
if (!writer)
die("Failed to open %s for writing.", argv[4]);
if (!(infile = fopen(argv[3], "rb")))
die("Failed to open %s for reading.", argv[3]);
if (vpx_codec_enc_init(&codec, encoder->codec_interface(), &cfg, 0))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to initialize encoder");
// Encode frames.
while (vpx_img_read(&raw, infile)) {
if (frame_count + 1 == update_frame_num) {
vpx_ref_frame_t ref;
ref.frame_type = VP8_LAST_FRAME;
ref.img = raw;
if (vpx_codec_control(&codec, VP8_SET_REFERENCE, &ref))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to set reference frame");
}
encode_frame(&codec, &raw, frame_count++, writer);
}
// Flush encoder.
while (encode_frame(&codec, NULL, -1, writer)) {}
printf("\n");
fclose(infile);
printf("Processed %d frames.\n", frame_count);
vpx_img_free(&raw);
if (vpx_codec_destroy(&codec))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to destroy codec.");
vpx_video_writer_close(writer);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
| 174,498 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfs_printfh(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const uint32_t *dp, const u_int len)
{
my_fsid fsid;
uint32_t ino;
const char *sfsname = NULL;
char *spacep;
if (ndo->ndo_uflag) {
u_int i;
char const *sep = "";
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fh["));
for (i=0; i<len; i++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%x", sep, dp[i]));
sep = ":";
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]"));
return;
}
Parse_fh((const u_char *)dp, len, &fsid, &ino, NULL, &sfsname, 0);
if (sfsname) {
/* file system ID is ASCII, not numeric, for this server OS */
static char temp[NFSX_V3FHMAX+1];
/* Make sure string is null-terminated */
strncpy(temp, sfsname, NFSX_V3FHMAX);
temp[sizeof(temp) - 1] = '\0';
/* Remove trailing spaces */
spacep = strchr(temp, ' ');
if (spacep)
*spacep = '\0';
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fh %s/", temp));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fh %d,%d/",
fsid.Fsid_dev.Major, fsid.Fsid_dev.Minor));
}
if(fsid.Fsid_dev.Minor == 257)
/* Print the undecoded handle */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", fsid.Opaque_Handle));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%ld", (long) ino));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13001/NFS: Don't copy more data than is in the file handle.
Also, put the buffer on the stack; no reason to make it static. (65
bytes isn't a lot.)
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | nfs_printfh(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const uint32_t *dp, const u_int len)
{
my_fsid fsid;
uint32_t ino;
const char *sfsname = NULL;
char *spacep;
if (ndo->ndo_uflag) {
u_int i;
char const *sep = "";
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fh["));
for (i=0; i<len; i++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%x", sep, dp[i]));
sep = ":";
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]"));
return;
}
Parse_fh((const u_char *)dp, len, &fsid, &ino, NULL, &sfsname, 0);
if (sfsname) {
/* file system ID is ASCII, not numeric, for this server OS */
char temp[NFSX_V3FHMAX+1];
u_int stringlen;
/* Make sure string is null-terminated */
stringlen = len;
if (stringlen > NFSX_V3FHMAX)
stringlen = NFSX_V3FHMAX;
strncpy(temp, sfsname, stringlen);
temp[stringlen] = '\0';
/* Remove trailing spaces */
spacep = strchr(temp, ' ');
if (spacep)
*spacep = '\0';
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fh %s/", temp));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fh %d,%d/",
fsid.Fsid_dev.Major, fsid.Fsid_dev.Minor));
}
if(fsid.Fsid_dev.Minor == 257)
/* Print the undecoded handle */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", fsid.Opaque_Handle));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%ld", (long) ino));
}
| 167,906 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int PrintPreviewDataService::GetAvailableDraftPageCount(
const std::string& preview_ui_addr_str) {
if (data_store_map_.find(preview_ui_addr_str) != data_store_map_.end())
return data_store_map_[preview_ui_addr_str]->GetAvailableDraftPageCount();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | int PrintPreviewDataService::GetAvailableDraftPageCount(
int PrintPreviewDataService::GetAvailableDraftPageCount(int32 preview_ui_id) {
PreviewDataStoreMap::const_iterator it = data_store_map_.find(preview_ui_id);
return (it == data_store_map_.end()) ?
0 : it->second->GetAvailableDraftPageCount();
}
| 170,820 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_increment_retval (MyObject *obj, gint32 x)
{
return x + 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_increment_retval (MyObject *obj, gint32 x)
| 165,106 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_InstrumentName(ModPlugFile* file, unsigned int qual, char* buff)
{
const char* str;
unsigned int retval;
size_t tmpretval;
if(!file) return 0;
str = openmpt_module_get_instrument_name(file->mod,qual-1);
if(!str){
if(buff){
*buff = '\0';
}
return 0;
}
tmpretval = strlen(str);
if(tmpretval>=INT_MAX){
tmpretval = INT_MAX-1;
}
retval = (int)tmpretval;
if(buff){
memcpy(buff,str,retval+1);
buff[retval] = '\0';
}
openmpt_free_string(str);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: [Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buffer size beforehand. libopenmpt can return strings longer than 32 bytes here beacuse the internal limit of 32 bytes applies to strings encoded in arbitrary character encodings but the API returns them converted to UTF-8, which can be longer. (reported by Antonio Morales Maldonado of Semmle Security Research Team)
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@12127 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-120 | LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_InstrumentName(ModPlugFile* file, unsigned int qual, char* buff)
{
const char* str;
char buf[32];
if(!file) return 0;
str = openmpt_module_get_instrument_name(file->mod,qual-1);
memset(buf,0,32);
if(str){
strncpy(buf,str,31);
openmpt_free_string(str);
}
if(buff){
strncpy(buff,buf,32);
}
return (unsigned int)strlen(buf);
}
| 169,500 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DynamicMetadataProvider::DynamicMetadataProvider(const DOMElement* e)
: saml2md::DynamicMetadataProvider(e),
m_verifyHost(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, true, verifyHost)),
m_ignoreTransport(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, false, ignoreTransport)),
m_encoded(true), m_trust(nullptr)
{
const DOMElement* child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, Subst);
if (child && child->hasChildNodes()) {
auto_ptr_char s(child->getFirstChild()->getNodeValue());
if (s.get() && *s.get()) {
m_subst = s.get();
m_encoded = XMLHelper::getAttrBool(child, true, encoded);
m_hashed = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, hashed);
}
}
if (m_subst.empty()) {
child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, Regex);
if (child && child->hasChildNodes() && child->hasAttributeNS(nullptr, match)) {
m_match = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, match);
auto_ptr_char repl(child->getFirstChild()->getNodeValue());
if (repl.get() && *repl.get())
m_regex = repl.get();
}
}
if (!m_ignoreTransport) {
child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, _TrustEngine);
string t = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, _type);
if (!t.empty()) {
TrustEngine* trust = XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().TrustEngineManager.newPlugin(t.c_str(), child);
if (!dynamic_cast<X509TrustEngine*>(trust)) {
delete trust;
throw ConfigurationException("DynamicMetadataProvider requires an X509TrustEngine plugin.");
}
m_trust.reset(dynamic_cast<X509TrustEngine*>(trust));
m_dummyCR.reset(XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().CredentialResolverManager.newPlugin(DUMMY_CREDENTIAL_RESOLVER, nullptr));
}
if (!m_trust.get() || !m_dummyCR.get())
throw ConfigurationException("DynamicMetadataProvider requires an X509TrustEngine plugin unless ignoreTransport is true.");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-347 | DynamicMetadataProvider::DynamicMetadataProvider(const DOMElement* e)
: saml2md::DynamicMetadataProvider(e), MetadataProvider(e),
m_verifyHost(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, true, verifyHost)),
m_ignoreTransport(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, false, ignoreTransport)),
m_encoded(true), m_trust(nullptr)
{
const DOMElement* child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, Subst);
if (child && child->hasChildNodes()) {
auto_ptr_char s(child->getFirstChild()->getNodeValue());
if (s.get() && *s.get()) {
m_subst = s.get();
m_encoded = XMLHelper::getAttrBool(child, true, encoded);
m_hashed = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, hashed);
}
}
if (m_subst.empty()) {
child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, Regex);
if (child && child->hasChildNodes() && child->hasAttributeNS(nullptr, match)) {
m_match = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, match);
auto_ptr_char repl(child->getFirstChild()->getNodeValue());
if (repl.get() && *repl.get())
m_regex = repl.get();
}
}
if (!m_ignoreTransport) {
child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, _TrustEngine);
string t = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, _type);
if (!t.empty()) {
TrustEngine* trust = XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().TrustEngineManager.newPlugin(t.c_str(), child);
if (!dynamic_cast<X509TrustEngine*>(trust)) {
delete trust;
throw ConfigurationException("DynamicMetadataProvider requires an X509TrustEngine plugin.");
}
m_trust.reset(dynamic_cast<X509TrustEngine*>(trust));
m_dummyCR.reset(XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().CredentialResolverManager.newPlugin(DUMMY_CREDENTIAL_RESOLVER, nullptr));
}
if (!m_trust.get() || !m_dummyCR.get())
throw ConfigurationException("DynamicMetadataProvider requires an X509TrustEngine plugin unless ignoreTransport is true.");
}
}
| 164,623 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void toggle_os_keylockstates(int fd, int changedlockstates)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s: fd = %d, changedlockstates = 0x%x",
__FUNCTION__, fd, changedlockstates);
UINT8 hidreport[9];
int reportIndex;
memset(hidreport,0,9);
hidreport[0]=1;
reportIndex=4;
if (changedlockstates & BTIF_HH_KEYSTATE_MASK_CAPSLOCK) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s Setting CAPSLOCK", __FUNCTION__);
hidreport[reportIndex++] = (UINT8)HID_REPORT_CAPSLOCK;
}
if (changedlockstates & BTIF_HH_KEYSTATE_MASK_NUMLOCK) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s Setting NUMLOCK", __FUNCTION__);
hidreport[reportIndex++] = (UINT8)HID_REPORT_NUMLOCK;
}
if (changedlockstates & BTIF_HH_KEYSTATE_MASK_SCROLLLOCK) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s Setting SCROLLLOCK", __FUNCTION__);
hidreport[reportIndex++] = (UINT8) HID_REPORT_SCROLLLOCK;
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Writing hidreport #1 to os: "\
"%s: %x %x %x", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[0], hidreport[1], hidreport[2]);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: %x %x %x", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[3], hidreport[4], hidreport[5]);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: %x %x %x", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[6], hidreport[7], hidreport[8]);
bta_hh_co_write(fd , hidreport, sizeof(hidreport));
usleep(200000);
memset(hidreport,0,9);
hidreport[0]=1;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Writing hidreport #2 to os: "\
"%s: %x %x %x", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[0], hidreport[1], hidreport[2]);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: %x %x %x", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[3], hidreport[4], hidreport[5]);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: %x %x %x ", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[6], hidreport[7], hidreport[8]);
bta_hh_co_write(fd , hidreport, sizeof(hidreport));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void toggle_os_keylockstates(int fd, int changedlockstates)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s: fd = %d, changedlockstates = 0x%x",
__FUNCTION__, fd, changedlockstates);
UINT8 hidreport[9];
int reportIndex;
memset(hidreport,0,9);
hidreport[0]=1;
reportIndex=4;
if (changedlockstates & BTIF_HH_KEYSTATE_MASK_CAPSLOCK) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s Setting CAPSLOCK", __FUNCTION__);
hidreport[reportIndex++] = (UINT8)HID_REPORT_CAPSLOCK;
}
if (changedlockstates & BTIF_HH_KEYSTATE_MASK_NUMLOCK) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s Setting NUMLOCK", __FUNCTION__);
hidreport[reportIndex++] = (UINT8)HID_REPORT_NUMLOCK;
}
if (changedlockstates & BTIF_HH_KEYSTATE_MASK_SCROLLLOCK) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s Setting SCROLLLOCK", __FUNCTION__);
hidreport[reportIndex++] = (UINT8) HID_REPORT_SCROLLLOCK;
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Writing hidreport #1 to os: "\
"%s: %x %x %x", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[0], hidreport[1], hidreport[2]);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: %x %x %x", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[3], hidreport[4], hidreport[5]);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: %x %x %x", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[6], hidreport[7], hidreport[8]);
bta_hh_co_write(fd , hidreport, sizeof(hidreport));
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(usleep(200000));
memset(hidreport,0,9);
hidreport[0]=1;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Writing hidreport #2 to os: "\
"%s: %x %x %x", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[0], hidreport[1], hidreport[2]);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: %x %x %x", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[3], hidreport[4], hidreport[5]);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: %x %x %x ", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[6], hidreport[7], hidreport[8]);
bta_hh_co_write(fd , hidreport, sizeof(hidreport));
}
| 173,438 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: HistogramBase* SparseHistogram::FactoryGet(const std::string& name,
int32_t flags) {
HistogramBase* histogram = StatisticsRecorder::FindHistogram(name);
if (!histogram) {
PersistentMemoryAllocator::Reference histogram_ref = 0;
std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> tentative_histogram;
PersistentHistogramAllocator* allocator = GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get();
if (allocator) {
tentative_histogram = allocator->AllocateHistogram(
SPARSE_HISTOGRAM, name, 0, 0, nullptr, flags, &histogram_ref);
}
if (!tentative_histogram) {
DCHECK(!histogram_ref); // Should never have been set.
DCHECK(!allocator); // Shouldn't have failed.
flags &= ~HistogramBase::kIsPersistent;
tentative_histogram.reset(new SparseHistogram(name));
tentative_histogram->SetFlags(flags);
}
const void* tentative_histogram_ptr = tentative_histogram.get();
histogram = StatisticsRecorder::RegisterOrDeleteDuplicate(
tentative_histogram.release());
if (histogram_ref) {
allocator->FinalizeHistogram(histogram_ref,
histogram == tentative_histogram_ptr);
}
ReportHistogramActivity(*histogram, HISTOGRAM_CREATED);
} else {
ReportHistogramActivity(*histogram, HISTOGRAM_LOOKUP);
}
DCHECK_EQ(SPARSE_HISTOGRAM, histogram->GetHistogramType());
return histogram;
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | HistogramBase* SparseHistogram::FactoryGet(const std::string& name,
int32_t flags) {
HistogramBase* histogram = StatisticsRecorder::FindHistogram(name);
if (!histogram) {
PersistentMemoryAllocator::Reference histogram_ref = 0;
std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> tentative_histogram;
PersistentHistogramAllocator* allocator = GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get();
if (allocator) {
tentative_histogram = allocator->AllocateHistogram(
SPARSE_HISTOGRAM, name, 0, 0, nullptr, flags, &histogram_ref);
}
if (!tentative_histogram) {
DCHECK(!histogram_ref); // Should never have been set.
DCHECK(!allocator); // Shouldn't have failed.
flags &= ~HistogramBase::kIsPersistent;
tentative_histogram.reset(new SparseHistogram(name));
tentative_histogram->SetFlags(flags);
}
const void* tentative_histogram_ptr = tentative_histogram.get();
histogram = StatisticsRecorder::RegisterOrDeleteDuplicate(
tentative_histogram.release());
if (histogram_ref) {
allocator->FinalizeHistogram(histogram_ref,
histogram == tentative_histogram_ptr);
}
ReportHistogramActivity(*histogram, HISTOGRAM_CREATED);
} else {
ReportHistogramActivity(*histogram, HISTOGRAM_LOOKUP);
}
CHECK_EQ(SPARSE_HISTOGRAM, histogram->GetHistogramType());
return histogram;
}
| 172,494 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, getFileInfo)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zend_class_entry *ce = intern->info_class;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|C", &ce) == SUCCESS) {
spl_filesystem_object_create_type(ht, intern, SPL_FS_INFO, ce, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, getFileInfo)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zend_class_entry *ce = intern->info_class;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|C", &ce) == SUCCESS) {
spl_filesystem_object_create_type(ht, intern, SPL_FS_INFO, ce, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
}
| 167,042 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int rpc_type_of_NPNVariable(int variable)
{
int type;
switch (variable) {
case NPNVjavascriptEnabledBool:
case NPNVasdEnabledBool:
case NPNVisOfflineBool:
case NPNVSupportsXEmbedBool:
case NPNVSupportsWindowless:
type = RPC_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
break;
case NPNVToolkit:
case NPNVnetscapeWindow:
type = RPC_TYPE_UINT32;
break;
case NPNVWindowNPObject:
case NPNVPluginElementNPObject:
type = RPC_TYPE_NP_OBJECT;
break;
default:
type = RPC_ERROR_GENERIC;
break;
}
return type;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int rpc_type_of_NPNVariable(int variable)
{
int type;
switch (variable) {
case NPNVjavascriptEnabledBool:
case NPNVasdEnabledBool:
case NPNVisOfflineBool:
case NPNVSupportsXEmbedBool:
case NPNVSupportsWindowless:
case NPNVprivateModeBool:
case NPNVsupportsAdvancedKeyHandling:
type = RPC_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
break;
case NPNVToolkit:
case NPNVnetscapeWindow:
type = RPC_TYPE_UINT32;
break;
case NPNVWindowNPObject:
case NPNVPluginElementNPObject:
type = RPC_TYPE_NP_OBJECT;
break;
default:
type = RPC_ERROR_GENERIC;
break;
}
return type;
}
| 165,862 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: juniper_atm1_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[0] == 0x80) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1, l2info.caplen - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | juniper_atm1_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[0] == 0x80) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
}
| 167,948 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RunFwdTxfm(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride) {
fwd_txfm_(in, out, stride);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void RunFwdTxfm(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride) {
void RunFwdTxfm(const int16_t *in, tran_low_t *out, int stride) {
fwd_txfm_(in, out, stride);
}
| 174,549 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cpStripToTile(uint8* out, uint8* in,
uint32 rows, uint32 cols, int outskew, int inskew)
{
while (rows-- > 0) {
uint32 j = cols;
while (j-- > 0)
*out++ = *in++;
out += outskew;
in += inskew;
}
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix uint32 underflow/overflow that can cause heap-based
buffer overflow.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2610
CWE ID: CWE-190 | cpStripToTile(uint8* out, uint8* in,
uint32 rows, uint32 cols, int outskew, int64 inskew)
{
while (rows-- > 0) {
uint32 j = cols;
while (j-- > 0)
*out++ = *in++;
out += outskew;
in += inskew;
}
}
| 168,533 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool CheckClientDownloadRequest::ShouldUploadForMalwareScan(
DownloadCheckResultReason reason) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kDeepScanningOfDownloads))
return false;
if (reason != DownloadCheckResultReason::REASON_DOWNLOAD_SAFE &&
reason != DownloadCheckResultReason::REASON_DOWNLOAD_UNCOMMON &&
reason != DownloadCheckResultReason::REASON_VERDICT_UNKNOWN)
return false;
content::BrowserContext* browser_context =
content::DownloadItemUtils::GetBrowserContext(item_);
if (!browser_context)
return false;
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
if (!profile)
return false;
int send_files_for_malware_check = profile->GetPrefs()->GetInteger(
prefs::kSafeBrowsingSendFilesForMalwareCheck);
if (send_files_for_malware_check !=
SendFilesForMalwareCheckValues::SEND_DOWNLOADS &&
send_files_for_malware_check !=
SendFilesForMalwareCheckValues::SEND_UPLOADS_AND_DOWNLOADS)
return false;
return !policy::BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveDMToken().empty();
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool CheckClientDownloadRequest::ShouldUploadForMalwareScan(
DownloadCheckResultReason reason) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kDeepScanningOfDownloads))
return false;
if (reason != DownloadCheckResultReason::REASON_DOWNLOAD_SAFE &&
reason != DownloadCheckResultReason::REASON_DOWNLOAD_UNCOMMON &&
reason != DownloadCheckResultReason::REASON_VERDICT_UNKNOWN)
return false;
content::BrowserContext* browser_context =
content::DownloadItemUtils::GetBrowserContext(item_);
if (!browser_context)
return false;
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
if (!profile)
return false;
int send_files_for_malware_check = profile->GetPrefs()->GetInteger(
prefs::kSafeBrowsingSendFilesForMalwareCheck);
if (send_files_for_malware_check !=
SendFilesForMalwareCheckValues::SEND_DOWNLOADS &&
send_files_for_malware_check !=
SendFilesForMalwareCheckValues::SEND_UPLOADS_AND_DOWNLOADS)
return false;
// If there's no valid DM token, the upload will fail, so we can skip
// uploading now.
return BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveBrowserDMToken().is_valid();
}
| 172,357 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long video_ioctl2(struct file *file,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
char sbuf[128];
void *mbuf = NULL;
void *parg = (void *)arg;
long err = -EINVAL;
bool has_array_args;
size_t array_size = 0;
void __user *user_ptr = NULL;
void **kernel_ptr = NULL;
/* Copy arguments into temp kernel buffer */
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) != _IOC_NONE) {
if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) <= sizeof(sbuf)) {
parg = sbuf;
} else {
/* too big to allocate from stack */
mbuf = kmalloc(_IOC_SIZE(cmd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (NULL == mbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
parg = mbuf;
}
err = -EFAULT;
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
unsigned long n = cmd_input_size(cmd);
if (copy_from_user(parg, (void __user *)arg, n))
goto out;
/* zero out anything we don't copy from userspace */
if (n < _IOC_SIZE(cmd))
memset((u8 *)parg + n, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd) - n);
} else {
/* read-only ioctl */
memset(parg, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
}
}
err = check_array_args(cmd, parg, &array_size, &user_ptr, &kernel_ptr);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
has_array_args = err;
if (has_array_args) {
/*
* When adding new types of array args, make sure that the
* parent argument to ioctl (which contains the pointer to the
* array) fits into sbuf (so that mbuf will still remain
* unused up to here).
*/
mbuf = kmalloc(array_size, GFP_KERNEL);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (NULL == mbuf)
goto out_array_args;
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(mbuf, user_ptr, array_size))
goto out_array_args;
*kernel_ptr = mbuf;
}
/* Handles IOCTL */
err = __video_do_ioctl(file, cmd, parg);
if (err == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
err = -EINVAL;
if (has_array_args) {
*kernel_ptr = user_ptr;
if (copy_to_user(user_ptr, mbuf, array_size))
err = -EFAULT;
goto out_array_args;
}
if (err < 0)
goto out;
out_array_args:
/* Copy results into user buffer */
switch (_IOC_DIR(cmd)) {
case _IOC_READ:
case (_IOC_WRITE | _IOC_READ):
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, parg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
out:
kfree(mbuf);
return err;
}
Commit Message: [media] v4l: Share code between video_usercopy and video_ioctl2
The two functions are mostly identical. They handle the copy_from_user
and copy_to_user operations related with V4L2 ioctls and call the real
ioctl handler.
Create a __video_usercopy function that implements the core of
video_usercopy and video_ioctl2, and call that function from both.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | long video_ioctl2(struct file *file,
long
video_usercopy(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg,
v4l2_kioctl func)
{
char sbuf[128];
void *mbuf = NULL;
void *parg = (void *)arg;
long err = -EINVAL;
bool has_array_args;
size_t array_size = 0;
void __user *user_ptr = NULL;
void **kernel_ptr = NULL;
/* Copy arguments into temp kernel buffer */
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) != _IOC_NONE) {
if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) <= sizeof(sbuf)) {
parg = sbuf;
} else {
/* too big to allocate from stack */
mbuf = kmalloc(_IOC_SIZE(cmd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (NULL == mbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
parg = mbuf;
}
err = -EFAULT;
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
unsigned long n = cmd_input_size(cmd);
if (copy_from_user(parg, (void __user *)arg, n))
goto out;
/* zero out anything we don't copy from userspace */
if (n < _IOC_SIZE(cmd))
memset((u8 *)parg + n, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd) - n);
} else {
/* read-only ioctl */
memset(parg, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
}
}
err = check_array_args(cmd, parg, &array_size, &user_ptr, &kernel_ptr);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
has_array_args = err;
if (has_array_args) {
/*
* When adding new types of array args, make sure that the
* parent argument to ioctl (which contains the pointer to the
* array) fits into sbuf (so that mbuf will still remain
* unused up to here).
*/
mbuf = kmalloc(array_size, GFP_KERNEL);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (NULL == mbuf)
goto out_array_args;
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(mbuf, user_ptr, array_size))
goto out_array_args;
*kernel_ptr = mbuf;
}
/* Handles IOCTL */
err = func(file, cmd, parg);
if (err == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
err = -EINVAL;
if (has_array_args) {
*kernel_ptr = user_ptr;
if (copy_to_user(user_ptr, mbuf, array_size))
err = -EFAULT;
goto out_array_args;
}
if (err < 0)
goto out;
out_array_args:
/* Copy results into user buffer */
switch (_IOC_DIR(cmd)) {
case _IOC_READ:
case (_IOC_WRITE | _IOC_READ):
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, parg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
out:
kfree(mbuf);
return err;
}
| 168,915 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: kg_unseal(minor_status, context_handle, input_token_buffer,
message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer;
gss_buffer_t message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_qop_t *qop_state;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
unsigned char *ptr;
unsigned int bodysize;
int err;
int toktype2;
int vfyflags = 0;
OM_uint32 ret;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
/* parse the token, leave the data in message_buffer, setting conf_state */
/* verify the header */
ptr = (unsigned char *) input_token_buffer->value;
err = g_verify_token_header(ctx->mech_used,
&bodysize, &ptr, -1,
input_token_buffer->length,
vfyflags);
if (err) {
*minor_status = err;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (bodysize < 2) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
toktype2 = load_16_be(ptr);
ptr += 2;
bodysize -= 2;
switch (toktype2) {
case KG2_TOK_MIC_MSG:
case KG2_TOK_WRAP_MSG:
case KG2_TOK_DEL_CTX:
ret = gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3(&ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx,
ptr, bodysize, message_buffer,
conf_state, qop_state, toktype);
break;
case KG_TOK_MIC_MSG:
case KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG:
case KG_TOK_DEL_CTX:
ret = kg_unseal_v1(ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx, ptr, bodysize,
message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state,
toktype);
break;
default:
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
break;
}
if (ret != 0)
save_error_info (*minor_status, ctx->k5_context);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | kg_unseal(minor_status, context_handle, input_token_buffer,
message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer;
gss_buffer_t message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_qop_t *qop_state;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
unsigned char *ptr;
unsigned int bodysize;
int err;
int toktype2;
int vfyflags = 0;
OM_uint32 ret;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
/* parse the token, leave the data in message_buffer, setting conf_state */
/* verify the header */
ptr = (unsigned char *) input_token_buffer->value;
err = g_verify_token_header(ctx->mech_used,
&bodysize, &ptr, -1,
input_token_buffer->length,
vfyflags);
if (err) {
*minor_status = err;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (bodysize < 2) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
toktype2 = load_16_be(ptr);
ptr += 2;
bodysize -= 2;
switch (toktype2) {
case KG2_TOK_MIC_MSG:
case KG2_TOK_WRAP_MSG:
case KG2_TOK_DEL_CTX:
ret = gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3(&ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx,
ptr, bodysize, message_buffer,
conf_state, qop_state, toktype);
break;
case KG_TOK_MIC_MSG:
case KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG:
case KG_TOK_DEL_CTX:
ret = kg_unseal_v1(ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx, ptr, bodysize,
message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state,
toktype);
break;
default:
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
break;
}
if (ret != 0)
save_error_info (*minor_status, ctx->k5_context);
return ret;
}
| 166,819 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SiteInstanceTest()
: ui_thread_(BrowserThread::UI, &message_loop_),
old_browser_client_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | SiteInstanceTest()
: ui_thread_(BrowserThread::UI, &message_loop_),
old_client_(NULL),
old_browser_client_(NULL) {
}
| 171,011 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size)
{
#if defined(CHECK_MEMORY_USAGE)
/* Note that if the decoder has to free and reallocate some of the buffers
* the total value will be invalid */
static u32 numBytes = 0;
numBytes += size;
DEBUG(("Allocated %d bytes, total %d\n", size, numBytes));
#endif
return malloc(size);
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size)
void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size, u32 num)
{
if (size > UINT32_MAX / num) {
return NULL;
}
#if defined(CHECK_MEMORY_USAGE)
/* Note that if the decoder has to free and reallocate some of the buffers
* the total value will be invalid */
static u32 numBytes = 0;
numBytes += size * num;
DEBUG(("Allocated %d bytes, total %d\n", size, numBytes));
#endif
return malloc(size * num);
}
| 173,871 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: VOID ixheaacd_esbr_postradixcompute2(WORD32 *ptr_y, WORD32 *ptr_x,
const WORD32 *pdig_rev_tbl,
WORD32 npoints) {
WORD32 i, k;
WORD32 h2;
WORD32 x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3;
WORD32 x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7;
WORD32 x_8, x_9, x_a, x_b, x_c, x_d, x_e, x_f;
WORD32 n00, n10, n20, n30, n01, n11, n21, n31;
WORD32 n02, n12, n22, n32, n03, n13, n23, n33;
WORD32 n0, j0;
WORD32 *x2, *x0;
WORD32 *y0, *y1, *y2, *y3;
y0 = ptr_y;
y2 = ptr_y + (WORD32)npoints;
x0 = ptr_x;
x2 = ptr_x + (WORD32)(npoints >> 1);
y1 = y0 + (WORD32)(npoints >> 2);
y3 = y2 + (WORD32)(npoints >> 2);
j0 = 8;
n0 = npoints >> 1;
for (k = 0; k < 2; k++) {
for (i = 0; i<npoints>> 1; i += 8) {
h2 = *pdig_rev_tbl++ >> 2;
x_0 = *x0++;
x_1 = *x0++;
x_2 = *x0++;
x_3 = *x0++;
x_4 = *x0++;
x_5 = *x0++;
x_6 = *x0++;
x_7 = *x0++;
n00 = x_0 + x_2;
n01 = x_1 + x_3;
n20 = x_0 - x_2;
n21 = x_1 - x_3;
n10 = x_4 + x_6;
n11 = x_5 + x_7;
n30 = x_4 - x_6;
n31 = x_5 - x_7;
y0[h2] = n00;
y0[h2 + 1] = n01;
y1[h2] = n10;
y1[h2 + 1] = n11;
y2[h2] = n20;
y2[h2 + 1] = n21;
y3[h2] = n30;
y3[h2 + 1] = n31;
x_8 = *x2++;
x_9 = *x2++;
x_a = *x2++;
x_b = *x2++;
x_c = *x2++;
x_d = *x2++;
x_e = *x2++;
x_f = *x2++;
n02 = x_8 + x_a;
n03 = x_9 + x_b;
n22 = x_8 - x_a;
n23 = x_9 - x_b;
n12 = x_c + x_e;
n13 = x_d + x_f;
n32 = x_c - x_e;
n33 = x_d - x_f;
y0[h2 + 2] = n02;
y0[h2 + 3] = n03;
y1[h2 + 2] = n12;
y1[h2 + 3] = n13;
y2[h2 + 2] = n22;
y2[h2 + 3] = n23;
y3[h2 + 2] = n32;
y3[h2 + 3] = n33;
}
x0 += (WORD32)npoints >> 1;
x2 += (WORD32)npoints >> 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | VOID ixheaacd_esbr_postradixcompute2(WORD32 *ptr_y, WORD32 *ptr_x,
const WORD32 *pdig_rev_tbl,
WORD32 npoints) {
WORD32 i, k;
WORD32 h2;
WORD32 x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3;
WORD32 x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7;
WORD32 x_8, x_9, x_a, x_b, x_c, x_d, x_e, x_f;
WORD32 n0, j0;
WORD32 *x2, *x0;
WORD32 *y0, *y1, *y2, *y3;
y0 = ptr_y;
y2 = ptr_y + (WORD32)npoints;
x0 = ptr_x;
x2 = ptr_x + (WORD32)(npoints >> 1);
y1 = y0 + (WORD32)(npoints >> 2);
y3 = y2 + (WORD32)(npoints >> 2);
j0 = 8;
n0 = npoints >> 1;
for (k = 0; k < 2; k++) {
for (i = 0; i<npoints>> 1; i += 8) {
h2 = *pdig_rev_tbl++ >> 2;
x_0 = *x0++;
x_1 = *x0++;
x_2 = *x0++;
x_3 = *x0++;
x_4 = *x0++;
x_5 = *x0++;
x_6 = *x0++;
x_7 = *x0++;
y0[h2] = ixheaacd_add32_sat(x_0, x_2);
y0[h2 + 1] = ixheaacd_add32_sat(x_1, x_3);
y1[h2] = ixheaacd_add32_sat(x_4, x_6);
y1[h2 + 1] = ixheaacd_add32_sat(x_5, x_7);
y2[h2] = ixheaacd_sub32_sat(x_0, x_2);
y2[h2 + 1] = ixheaacd_sub32_sat(x_1, x_3);
y3[h2] = ixheaacd_sub32_sat(x_4, x_6);
y3[h2 + 1] = ixheaacd_sub32_sat(x_5, x_7);
x_8 = *x2++;
x_9 = *x2++;
x_a = *x2++;
x_b = *x2++;
x_c = *x2++;
x_d = *x2++;
x_e = *x2++;
x_f = *x2++;
y0[h2 + 2] = ixheaacd_add32_sat(x_8, x_a);
y0[h2 + 3] = ixheaacd_add32_sat(x_9, x_b);
y1[h2 + 2] = ixheaacd_add32_sat(x_c, x_e);
y1[h2 + 3] = ixheaacd_add32_sat(x_d, x_f);
y2[h2 + 2] = ixheaacd_sub32_sat(x_8, x_a);
y2[h2 + 3] = ixheaacd_sub32_sat(x_9, x_b);
y3[h2 + 2] = ixheaacd_sub32_sat(x_c, x_e);
y3[h2 + 3] = ixheaacd_sub32_sat(x_d, x_f);
}
x0 += (WORD32)npoints >> 1;
x2 += (WORD32)npoints >> 1;
}
}
| 174,087 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ScriptProcessorHandler::Process(size_t frames_to_process) {
AudioBus* input_bus = Input(0).Bus();
AudioBus* output_bus = Output(0).Bus();
unsigned double_buffer_index = this->DoubleBufferIndex();
bool is_double_buffer_index_good =
double_buffer_index < 2 && double_buffer_index < input_buffers_.size() &&
double_buffer_index < output_buffers_.size();
DCHECK(is_double_buffer_index_good);
if (!is_double_buffer_index_good)
return;
AudioBuffer* input_buffer = input_buffers_[double_buffer_index].Get();
AudioBuffer* output_buffer = output_buffers_[double_buffer_index].Get();
unsigned number_of_input_channels = internal_input_bus_->NumberOfChannels();
bool buffers_are_good =
output_buffer && BufferSize() == output_buffer->length() &&
buffer_read_write_index_ + frames_to_process <= BufferSize();
if (internal_input_bus_->NumberOfChannels())
buffers_are_good = buffers_are_good && input_buffer &&
BufferSize() == input_buffer->length();
DCHECK(buffers_are_good);
if (!buffers_are_good)
return;
bool is_frames_to_process_good = frames_to_process &&
BufferSize() >= frames_to_process &&
!(BufferSize() % frames_to_process);
DCHECK(is_frames_to_process_good);
if (!is_frames_to_process_good)
return;
unsigned number_of_output_channels = output_bus->NumberOfChannels();
bool channels_are_good =
(number_of_input_channels == number_of_input_channels_) &&
(number_of_output_channels == number_of_output_channels_);
DCHECK(channels_are_good);
if (!channels_are_good)
return;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < number_of_input_channels; ++i)
internal_input_bus_->SetChannelMemory(
i,
input_buffer->getChannelData(i).View()->Data() +
buffer_read_write_index_,
frames_to_process);
if (number_of_input_channels)
internal_input_bus_->CopyFrom(*input_bus);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < number_of_output_channels; ++i) {
memcpy(output_bus->Channel(i)->MutableData(),
output_buffer->getChannelData(i).View()->Data() +
buffer_read_write_index_,
sizeof(float) * frames_to_process);
}
buffer_read_write_index_ =
(buffer_read_write_index_ + frames_to_process) % BufferSize();
if (!buffer_read_write_index_) {
MutexTryLocker try_locker(process_event_lock_);
if (!try_locker.Locked()) {
output_buffer->Zero();
} else if (Context()->GetExecutionContext()) {
if (Context()->HasRealtimeConstraint()) {
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kMediaElementEvent,
Context()->GetExecutionContext())
->PostTask(BLINK_FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(
&ScriptProcessorHandler::FireProcessEvent,
CrossThreadUnretained(this), double_buffer_index_));
} else {
std::unique_ptr<WaitableEvent> waitable_event =
WTF::MakeUnique<WaitableEvent>();
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kMediaElementEvent,
Context()->GetExecutionContext())
->PostTask(BLINK_FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(
&ScriptProcessorHandler::
FireProcessEventForOfflineAudioContext,
CrossThreadUnretained(this), double_buffer_index_,
CrossThreadUnretained(waitable_event.get())));
waitable_event->Wait();
}
}
SwapBuffers();
}
}
Commit Message: Keep ScriptProcessorHandler alive across threads
When posting a task from the ScriptProcessorHandler::Process to fire a
process event, we need to keep the handler alive in case the
ScriptProcessorNode goes away (because it has no onaudioprocess
handler) and removes the its handler.
Bug: 765495
Test:
Change-Id: Ib4fa39d7b112c7051897700a1eff9f59a4a7a054
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/677137
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503629}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void ScriptProcessorHandler::Process(size_t frames_to_process) {
AudioBus* input_bus = Input(0).Bus();
AudioBus* output_bus = Output(0).Bus();
unsigned double_buffer_index = this->DoubleBufferIndex();
bool is_double_buffer_index_good =
double_buffer_index < 2 && double_buffer_index < input_buffers_.size() &&
double_buffer_index < output_buffers_.size();
DCHECK(is_double_buffer_index_good);
if (!is_double_buffer_index_good)
return;
AudioBuffer* input_buffer = input_buffers_[double_buffer_index].Get();
AudioBuffer* output_buffer = output_buffers_[double_buffer_index].Get();
unsigned number_of_input_channels = internal_input_bus_->NumberOfChannels();
bool buffers_are_good =
output_buffer && BufferSize() == output_buffer->length() &&
buffer_read_write_index_ + frames_to_process <= BufferSize();
if (internal_input_bus_->NumberOfChannels())
buffers_are_good = buffers_are_good && input_buffer &&
BufferSize() == input_buffer->length();
DCHECK(buffers_are_good);
if (!buffers_are_good)
return;
bool is_frames_to_process_good = frames_to_process &&
BufferSize() >= frames_to_process &&
!(BufferSize() % frames_to_process);
DCHECK(is_frames_to_process_good);
if (!is_frames_to_process_good)
return;
unsigned number_of_output_channels = output_bus->NumberOfChannels();
bool channels_are_good =
(number_of_input_channels == number_of_input_channels_) &&
(number_of_output_channels == number_of_output_channels_);
DCHECK(channels_are_good);
if (!channels_are_good)
return;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < number_of_input_channels; ++i)
internal_input_bus_->SetChannelMemory(
i,
input_buffer->getChannelData(i).View()->Data() +
buffer_read_write_index_,
frames_to_process);
if (number_of_input_channels)
internal_input_bus_->CopyFrom(*input_bus);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < number_of_output_channels; ++i) {
memcpy(output_bus->Channel(i)->MutableData(),
output_buffer->getChannelData(i).View()->Data() +
buffer_read_write_index_,
sizeof(float) * frames_to_process);
}
buffer_read_write_index_ =
(buffer_read_write_index_ + frames_to_process) % BufferSize();
if (!buffer_read_write_index_) {
MutexTryLocker try_locker(process_event_lock_);
if (!try_locker.Locked()) {
output_buffer->Zero();
} else if (Context()->GetExecutionContext()) {
if (Context()->HasRealtimeConstraint()) {
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kMediaElementEvent,
Context()->GetExecutionContext())
->PostTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(&ScriptProcessorHandler::FireProcessEvent,
WrapRefPtr(this), double_buffer_index_));
} else {
std::unique_ptr<WaitableEvent> waitable_event =
WTF::MakeUnique<WaitableEvent>();
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kMediaElementEvent,
Context()->GetExecutionContext())
->PostTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(&ScriptProcessorHandler::
FireProcessEventForOfflineAudioContext,
WrapRefPtr(this), double_buffer_index_,
CrossThreadUnretained(waitable_event.get())));
waitable_event->Wait();
}
}
SwapBuffers();
}
}
| 172,943 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateBool( int b )
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item();
if ( item )
item->type = b ? cJSON_True : cJSON_False;
return item;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cJSON *cJSON_CreateBool( int b )
| 167,270 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_cabac_init(cab_ctxt_t *ps_cabac,
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm,
WORD32 qp,
WORD32 cabac_init_idc,
const UWORD8 *pu1_init_ctxt)
{
/* Sanity checks */
ASSERT(ps_cabac != NULL);
ASSERT(ps_bitstrm != NULL);
ASSERT((qp >= 0) && (qp < 52));
ASSERT((cabac_init_idc >= 0) && (cabac_init_idc < 3));
UNUSED(qp);
UNUSED(cabac_init_idc);
/* CABAC engine uses 32 bit range instead of 9 bits as specified by
* the spec. This is done to reduce number of renormalizations
*/
/* cabac engine initialization */
#if FULLRANGE
ps_cabac->u4_range = (UWORD32)510 << RANGE_SHIFT;
BITS_GET(ps_cabac->u4_ofst, ps_bitstrm->pu4_buf, ps_bitstrm->u4_bit_ofst,
ps_bitstrm->u4_cur_word, ps_bitstrm->u4_nxt_word, (9 + RANGE_SHIFT));
#else
ps_cabac->u4_range = (UWORD32)510;
BITS_GET(ps_cabac->u4_ofst, ps_bitstrm->pu4_buf, ps_bitstrm->u4_bit_ofst,
ps_bitstrm->u4_cur_word, ps_bitstrm->u4_nxt_word, 9);
#endif
/* cabac context initialization based on init idc and slice qp */
memcpy(ps_cabac->au1_ctxt_models,
pu1_init_ctxt,
IHEVC_CAB_CTXT_END);
DEBUG_RANGE_OFST("init", ps_cabac->u4_range, ps_cabac->u4_ofst);
return ((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: Return error from cabac init if offset is greater than range
When the offset was greater than range, the bitstream was read
more than the valid range in leaf-level cabac parsing modules.
Error check was added to cabac init to fix this issue. Additionally
end of slice and slice error were signalled to suppress further
parsing of current slice.
Bug: 34897036
Change-Id: I1263f1d1219684ffa6e952c76e5a08e9a933c9d2
(cherry picked from commit 3b175da88a1807d19cdd248b74bce60e57f05c6a)
(cherry picked from commit b92314c860d01d754ef579eafe55d7377962b3ba)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_cabac_init(cab_ctxt_t *ps_cabac,
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm,
WORD32 qp,
WORD32 cabac_init_idc,
const UWORD8 *pu1_init_ctxt)
{
/* Sanity checks */
ASSERT(ps_cabac != NULL);
ASSERT(ps_bitstrm != NULL);
ASSERT((qp >= 0) && (qp < 52));
ASSERT((cabac_init_idc >= 0) && (cabac_init_idc < 3));
UNUSED(qp);
UNUSED(cabac_init_idc);
/* CABAC engine uses 32 bit range instead of 9 bits as specified by
* the spec. This is done to reduce number of renormalizations
*/
/* cabac engine initialization */
#if FULLRANGE
ps_cabac->u4_range = (UWORD32)510 << RANGE_SHIFT;
BITS_GET(ps_cabac->u4_ofst, ps_bitstrm->pu4_buf, ps_bitstrm->u4_bit_ofst,
ps_bitstrm->u4_cur_word, ps_bitstrm->u4_nxt_word, (9 + RANGE_SHIFT));
#else
ps_cabac->u4_range = (UWORD32)510;
BITS_GET(ps_cabac->u4_ofst, ps_bitstrm->pu4_buf, ps_bitstrm->u4_bit_ofst,
ps_bitstrm->u4_cur_word, ps_bitstrm->u4_nxt_word, 9);
#endif
/* cabac context initialization based on init idc and slice qp */
memcpy(ps_cabac->au1_ctxt_models,
pu1_init_ctxt,
IHEVC_CAB_CTXT_END);
DEBUG_RANGE_OFST("init", ps_cabac->u4_range, ps_cabac->u4_ofst);
/*
* If the offset is greater than or equal to range, return fail.
*/
if(ps_cabac->u4_ofst >= ps_cabac->u4_range)
{
return ((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_FAIL);
}
return ((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS);
}
| 174,029 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, mount)
{
char *fname, *arch = NULL, *entry = NULL, *path, *actual;
int fname_len, arch_len, entry_len;
size_t path_len, actual_len;
phar_archive_data *pphar;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ss", &path, &path_len, &actual, &actual_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
fname = (char*)zend_get_executed_filename();
fname_len = strlen(fname);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(fname, fname_len);
#endif
if (fname_len > 7 && !memcmp(fname, "phar://", 7) && SUCCESS == phar_split_fname(fname, fname_len, &arch, &arch_len, &entry, &entry_len, 2, 0)) {
efree(entry);
entry = NULL;
if (path_len > 7 && !memcmp(path, "phar://", 7)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "Can only mount internal paths within a phar archive, use a relative path instead of \"%s\"", path);
efree(arch);
return;
}
carry_on2:
if (NULL == (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), arch, arch_len))) {
if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && NULL != (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&cached_phars, arch, arch_len))) {
if (SUCCESS == phar_copy_on_write(&pphar)) {
goto carry_on;
}
}
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s is not a phar archive, cannot mount", arch);
if (arch) {
efree(arch);
}
return;
}
carry_on:
if (SUCCESS != phar_mount_entry(pphar, actual, actual_len, path, path_len)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "Mounting of %s to %s within phar %s failed", path, actual, arch);
if (path && path == entry) {
efree(entry);
}
if (arch) {
efree(arch);
}
return;
}
if (entry && path && path == entry) {
efree(entry);
}
if (arch) {
efree(arch);
}
return;
} else if (PHAR_G(phar_fname_map.u.flags) && NULL != (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), fname, fname_len))) {
goto carry_on;
} else if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && NULL != (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&cached_phars, fname, fname_len))) {
if (SUCCESS == phar_copy_on_write(&pphar)) {
goto carry_on;
}
goto carry_on;
} else if (SUCCESS == phar_split_fname(path, path_len, &arch, &arch_len, &entry, &entry_len, 2, 0)) {
path = entry;
path_len = entry_len;
goto carry_on2;
}
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "Mounting of %s to %s failed", path, actual);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PHP_METHOD(Phar, mount)
{
char *fname, *arch = NULL, *entry = NULL, *path, *actual;
int fname_len, arch_len, entry_len;
size_t path_len, actual_len;
phar_archive_data *pphar;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "pp", &path, &path_len, &actual, &actual_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
fname = (char*)zend_get_executed_filename();
fname_len = strlen(fname);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(fname, fname_len);
#endif
if (fname_len > 7 && !memcmp(fname, "phar://", 7) && SUCCESS == phar_split_fname(fname, fname_len, &arch, &arch_len, &entry, &entry_len, 2, 0)) {
efree(entry);
entry = NULL;
if (path_len > 7 && !memcmp(path, "phar://", 7)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "Can only mount internal paths within a phar archive, use a relative path instead of \"%s\"", path);
efree(arch);
return;
}
carry_on2:
if (NULL == (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), arch, arch_len))) {
if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && NULL != (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&cached_phars, arch, arch_len))) {
if (SUCCESS == phar_copy_on_write(&pphar)) {
goto carry_on;
}
}
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s is not a phar archive, cannot mount", arch);
if (arch) {
efree(arch);
}
return;
}
carry_on:
if (SUCCESS != phar_mount_entry(pphar, actual, actual_len, path, path_len)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "Mounting of %s to %s within phar %s failed", path, actual, arch);
if (path && path == entry) {
efree(entry);
}
if (arch) {
efree(arch);
}
return;
}
if (entry && path && path == entry) {
efree(entry);
}
if (arch) {
efree(arch);
}
return;
} else if (PHAR_G(phar_fname_map.u.flags) && NULL != (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), fname, fname_len))) {
goto carry_on;
} else if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && NULL != (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&cached_phars, fname, fname_len))) {
if (SUCCESS == phar_copy_on_write(&pphar)) {
goto carry_on;
}
goto carry_on;
} else if (SUCCESS == phar_split_fname(path, path_len, &arch, &arch_len, &entry, &entry_len, 2, 0)) {
path = entry;
path_len = entry_len;
goto carry_on2;
}
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "Mounting of %s to %s failed", path, actual);
}
| 165,056 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GF_Err gf_isom_oinf_read_entry(void *entry, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_OperatingPointsInformation* ptr = (GF_OperatingPointsInformation *)entry;
u32 i, j, count;
if (!ptr) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
ptr->scalability_mask = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);//reserved
count = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHEVC_ProfileTierLevel *ptl;
GF_SAFEALLOC(ptl, LHEVC_ProfileTierLevel);
if (!ptl) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
ptl->general_profile_space = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
ptl->general_tier_flag= gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
ptl->general_profile_idc = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
ptl->general_profile_compatibility_flags = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptl->general_constraint_indicator_flags = gf_bs_read_long_int(bs, 48);
ptl->general_level_idc = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
gf_list_add(ptr->profile_tier_levels, ptl);
}
count = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHEVC_OperatingPoint *op;
GF_SAFEALLOC(op, LHEVC_OperatingPoint);
if (!op) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
op->output_layer_set_idx = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->max_temporal_id = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
op->layer_count = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
for (j = 0; j < op->layer_count; j++) {
op->layers_info[j].ptl_idx = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
op->layers_info[j].layer_id = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6);
op->layers_info[j].is_outputlayer = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
op->layers_info[j].is_alternate_outputlayer = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
}
op->minPicWidth = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->minPicHeight = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->maxPicWidth = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->maxPicHeight = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->maxChromaFormat = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
op->maxBitDepth = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3) + 8;
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);//reserved
op->frame_rate_info_flag = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
op->bit_rate_info_flag = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
if (op->frame_rate_info_flag) {
op->avgFrameRate = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6); //reserved
op->constantFrameRate = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
}
if (op->bit_rate_info_flag) {
op->maxBitRate = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
op->avgBitRate = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
}
gf_list_add(ptr->operating_points, op);
}
count = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHEVC_DependentLayer *dep;
GF_SAFEALLOC(dep, LHEVC_DependentLayer);
if (!dep) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
dep->dependent_layerID = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
dep->num_layers_dependent_on = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
for (j = 0; j < dep->num_layers_dependent_on; j++)
dep->dependent_on_layerID[j] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
if (ptr->scalability_mask & (1 << j))
dep->dimension_identifier[j] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
}
gf_list_add(ptr->dependency_layers, dep);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | GF_Err gf_isom_oinf_read_entry(void *entry, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_OperatingPointsInformation* ptr = (GF_OperatingPointsInformation *)entry;
u32 i, j, count;
if (!ptr) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
ptr->scalability_mask = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);//reserved
count = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHEVC_ProfileTierLevel *ptl;
GF_SAFEALLOC(ptl, LHEVC_ProfileTierLevel);
if (!ptl) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
ptl->general_profile_space = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
ptl->general_tier_flag= gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
ptl->general_profile_idc = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
ptl->general_profile_compatibility_flags = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptl->general_constraint_indicator_flags = gf_bs_read_long_int(bs, 48);
ptl->general_level_idc = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
gf_list_add(ptr->profile_tier_levels, ptl);
}
count = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHEVC_OperatingPoint *op;
GF_SAFEALLOC(op, LHEVC_OperatingPoint);
if (!op) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
op->output_layer_set_idx = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->max_temporal_id = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
op->layer_count = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
if (op->layer_count > ARRAY_LENGTH(op->layers_info))
return GF_NON_COMPLIANT_BITSTREAM;
for (j = 0; j < op->layer_count; j++) {
op->layers_info[j].ptl_idx = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
op->layers_info[j].layer_id = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6);
op->layers_info[j].is_outputlayer = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
op->layers_info[j].is_alternate_outputlayer = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
}
op->minPicWidth = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->minPicHeight = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->maxPicWidth = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->maxPicHeight = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->maxChromaFormat = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
op->maxBitDepth = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3) + 8;
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);//reserved
op->frame_rate_info_flag = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
op->bit_rate_info_flag = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
if (op->frame_rate_info_flag) {
op->avgFrameRate = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6); //reserved
op->constantFrameRate = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
}
if (op->bit_rate_info_flag) {
op->maxBitRate = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
op->avgBitRate = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
}
gf_list_add(ptr->operating_points, op);
}
count = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHEVC_DependentLayer *dep;
GF_SAFEALLOC(dep, LHEVC_DependentLayer);
if (!dep) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
dep->dependent_layerID = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
dep->num_layers_dependent_on = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
for (j = 0; j < dep->num_layers_dependent_on; j++)
dep->dependent_on_layerID[j] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
if (ptr->scalability_mask & (1 << j))
dep->dimension_identifier[j] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
}
gf_list_add(ptr->dependency_layers, dep);
}
return GF_OK;
}
| 169,306 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: flatpak_proxy_client_finalize (GObject *object)
{
FlatpakProxyClient *client = FLATPAK_PROXY_CLIENT (object);
client->proxy->clients = g_list_remove (client->proxy->clients, client);
g_clear_object (&client->proxy);
g_hash_table_destroy (client->rewrite_reply);
g_hash_table_destroy (client->get_owner_reply);
g_hash_table_destroy (client->unique_id_policy);
free_side (&client->client_side);
free_side (&client->bus_side);
G_OBJECT_CLASS (flatpak_proxy_client_parent_class)->finalize (object);
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | flatpak_proxy_client_finalize (GObject *object)
{
FlatpakProxyClient *client = FLATPAK_PROXY_CLIENT (object);
client->proxy->clients = g_list_remove (client->proxy->clients, client);
g_clear_object (&client->proxy);
g_byte_array_free (client->auth_buffer, TRUE);
g_hash_table_destroy (client->rewrite_reply);
g_hash_table_destroy (client->get_owner_reply);
g_hash_table_destroy (client->unique_id_policy);
free_side (&client->client_side);
free_side (&client->bus_side);
G_OBJECT_CLASS (flatpak_proxy_client_parent_class)->finalize (object);
}
| 169,341 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeRenderProcessObserver::OnWriteTcmallocHeapProfile(
const FilePath::StringType& filename) {
#if !defined(OS_WIN)
if (!IsHeapProfilerRunning())
return;
char* profile = GetHeapProfile();
if (!profile) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Unable to get heap profile.";
return;
}
std::string result(profile);
delete profile;
RenderThread::Get()->Send(
new ChromeViewHostMsg_WriteTcmallocHeapProfile_ACK(filename, result));
#endif
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void ChromeRenderProcessObserver::OnWriteTcmallocHeapProfile(
| 170,667 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mrb_io_initialize_copy(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value copy)
{
mrb_value orig;
mrb_value buf;
struct mrb_io *fptr_copy;
struct mrb_io *fptr_orig;
mrb_bool failed = TRUE;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "o", &orig);
fptr_copy = (struct mrb_io *)DATA_PTR(copy);
if (fptr_copy != NULL) {
fptr_finalize(mrb, fptr_copy, FALSE);
mrb_free(mrb, fptr_copy);
}
fptr_copy = (struct mrb_io *)mrb_io_alloc(mrb);
fptr_orig = io_get_open_fptr(mrb, orig);
DATA_TYPE(copy) = &mrb_io_type;
DATA_PTR(copy) = fptr_copy;
buf = mrb_iv_get(mrb, orig, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "@buf"));
mrb_iv_set(mrb, copy, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "@buf"), buf);
fptr_copy->fd = mrb_dup(mrb, fptr_orig->fd, &failed);
if (failed) {
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, 0);
}
mrb_fd_cloexec(mrb, fptr_copy->fd);
if (fptr_orig->fd2 != -1) {
fptr_copy->fd2 = mrb_dup(mrb, fptr_orig->fd2, &failed);
if (failed) {
close(fptr_copy->fd);
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, 0);
}
mrb_fd_cloexec(mrb, fptr_copy->fd2);
}
fptr_copy->pid = fptr_orig->pid;
fptr_copy->readable = fptr_orig->readable;
fptr_copy->writable = fptr_orig->writable;
fptr_copy->sync = fptr_orig->sync;
fptr_copy->is_socket = fptr_orig->is_socket;
return copy;
}
Commit Message: Fix `use after free in File#initilialize_copy`; fix #4001
The bug and the fix were reported by https://hackerone.com/pnoltof
CWE ID: CWE-416 | mrb_io_initialize_copy(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value copy)
{
mrb_value orig;
mrb_value buf;
struct mrb_io *fptr_copy;
struct mrb_io *fptr_orig;
mrb_bool failed = TRUE;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "o", &orig);
fptr_orig = io_get_open_fptr(mrb, orig);
fptr_copy = (struct mrb_io *)DATA_PTR(copy);
if (fptr_copy != NULL) {
fptr_finalize(mrb, fptr_copy, FALSE);
mrb_free(mrb, fptr_copy);
}
fptr_copy = (struct mrb_io *)mrb_io_alloc(mrb);
DATA_TYPE(copy) = &mrb_io_type;
DATA_PTR(copy) = fptr_copy;
buf = mrb_iv_get(mrb, orig, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "@buf"));
mrb_iv_set(mrb, copy, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "@buf"), buf);
fptr_copy->fd = mrb_dup(mrb, fptr_orig->fd, &failed);
if (failed) {
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, 0);
}
mrb_fd_cloexec(mrb, fptr_copy->fd);
if (fptr_orig->fd2 != -1) {
fptr_copy->fd2 = mrb_dup(mrb, fptr_orig->fd2, &failed);
if (failed) {
close(fptr_copy->fd);
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, 0);
}
mrb_fd_cloexec(mrb, fptr_copy->fd2);
}
fptr_copy->pid = fptr_orig->pid;
fptr_copy->readable = fptr_orig->readable;
fptr_copy->writable = fptr_orig->writable;
fptr_copy->sync = fptr_orig->sync;
fptr_copy->is_socket = fptr_orig->is_socket;
return copy;
}
| 169,255 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: unsigned long insn_get_seg_base(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx)
{
struct desc_struct *desc;
short sel;
sel = get_segment_selector(regs, seg_reg_idx);
if (sel < 0)
return -1L;
if (v8086_mode(regs))
/*
* Base is simply the segment selector shifted 4
* bits to the right.
*/
return (unsigned long)(sel << 4);
if (user_64bit_mode(regs)) {
/*
* Only FS or GS will have a base address, the rest of
* the segments' bases are forced to 0.
*/
unsigned long base;
if (seg_reg_idx == INAT_SEG_REG_FS)
rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, base);
else if (seg_reg_idx == INAT_SEG_REG_GS)
/*
* swapgs was called at the kernel entry point. Thus,
* MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE will have the user-space GS base.
*/
rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, base);
else
base = 0;
return base;
}
/* In protected mode the segment selector cannot be null. */
if (!sel)
return -1L;
desc = get_desc(sel);
if (!desc)
return -1L;
return get_desc_base(desc);
}
Commit Message: x86/insn-eval: Fix use-after-free access to LDT entry
get_desc() computes a pointer into the LDT while holding a lock that
protects the LDT from being freed, but then drops the lock and returns the
(now potentially dangling) pointer to its caller.
Fix it by giving the caller a copy of the LDT entry instead.
Fixes: 670f928ba09b ("x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | unsigned long insn_get_seg_base(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx)
{
struct desc_struct desc;
short sel;
sel = get_segment_selector(regs, seg_reg_idx);
if (sel < 0)
return -1L;
if (v8086_mode(regs))
/*
* Base is simply the segment selector shifted 4
* bits to the right.
*/
return (unsigned long)(sel << 4);
if (user_64bit_mode(regs)) {
/*
* Only FS or GS will have a base address, the rest of
* the segments' bases are forced to 0.
*/
unsigned long base;
if (seg_reg_idx == INAT_SEG_REG_FS)
rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, base);
else if (seg_reg_idx == INAT_SEG_REG_GS)
/*
* swapgs was called at the kernel entry point. Thus,
* MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE will have the user-space GS base.
*/
rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, base);
else
base = 0;
return base;
}
/* In protected mode the segment selector cannot be null. */
if (!sel)
return -1L;
if (!get_desc(&desc, sel))
return -1L;
return get_desc_base(&desc);
}
| 169,610 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long VideoTrack::Seek(long long time_ns, const BlockEntry*& pResult) const {
const long status = GetFirst(pResult);
if (status < 0) // buffer underflow, etc
return status;
assert(pResult);
if (pResult->EOS())
return 0;
const Cluster* pCluster = pResult->GetCluster();
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() >= 0);
if (time_ns <= pResult->GetBlock()->GetTime(pCluster))
return 0;
Cluster** const clusters = m_pSegment->m_clusters;
assert(clusters);
const long count = m_pSegment->GetCount(); // loaded only, not pre-loaded
assert(count > 0);
Cluster** const i = clusters + pCluster->GetIndex();
assert(i);
assert(*i == pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
Cluster** const j = clusters + count;
Cluster** lo = i;
Cluster** hi = j;
while (lo < hi) {
Cluster** const mid = lo + (hi - lo) / 2;
assert(mid < hi);
pCluster = *mid;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() >= 0);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() == long(mid - m_pSegment->m_clusters));
const long long t = pCluster->GetTime();
if (t <= time_ns)
lo = mid + 1;
else
hi = mid;
assert(lo <= hi);
}
assert(lo == hi);
assert(lo > i);
assert(lo <= j);
pCluster = *--lo;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
pResult = pCluster->GetEntry(this, time_ns);
if ((pResult != 0) && !pResult->EOS()) // found a keyframe
return 0;
while (lo != i) {
pCluster = *--lo;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
#if 0
pResult = pCluster->GetMaxKey(this);
#else
pResult = pCluster->GetEntry(this, time_ns);
#endif
if ((pResult != 0) && !pResult->EOS())
return 0;
}
pResult = GetEOS();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long VideoTrack::Seek(long long time_ns, const BlockEntry*& pResult) const {
const long status = GetFirst(pResult);
if (status < 0) // buffer underflow, etc
return status;
assert(pResult);
if (pResult->EOS())
return 0;
const Cluster* pCluster = pResult->GetCluster();
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() >= 0);
if (time_ns <= pResult->GetBlock()->GetTime(pCluster))
return 0;
Cluster** const clusters = m_pSegment->m_clusters;
assert(clusters);
const long count = m_pSegment->GetCount(); // loaded only, not pre-loaded
assert(count > 0);
Cluster** const i = clusters + pCluster->GetIndex();
assert(i);
assert(*i == pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
Cluster** const j = clusters + count;
Cluster** lo = i;
Cluster** hi = j;
while (lo < hi) {
Cluster** const mid = lo + (hi - lo) / 2;
assert(mid < hi);
pCluster = *mid;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() >= 0);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() == long(mid - m_pSegment->m_clusters));
const long long t = pCluster->GetTime();
if (t <= time_ns)
lo = mid + 1;
else
hi = mid;
assert(lo <= hi);
}
assert(lo == hi);
assert(lo > i);
assert(lo <= j);
pCluster = *--lo;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
pResult = pCluster->GetEntry(this, time_ns);
if ((pResult != 0) && !pResult->EOS()) // found a keyframe
return 0;
while (lo != i) {
pCluster = *--lo;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
pResult = pCluster->GetEntry(this, time_ns);
if ((pResult != 0) && !pResult->EOS())
return 0;
}
pResult = GetEOS();
return 0;
}
| 173,863 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int ip_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff_head *queue,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int maxfraglen, unsigned int flags)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP fragmentation offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(queue)) == NULL) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return err;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb, fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb->csum = 0;
/* specify the length of each IP datagram fragment */
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = maxfraglen - fragheaderlen;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
__skb_queue_tail(queue, skb);
}
return skb_append_datato_frags(sk, skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
}
Commit Message: ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well
Now, if user application does:
sendto len<mtu flag MSG_MORE
sendto len>mtu flag 0
The skb is not treated as fragmented one because it is not initialized
that way. So move the initialization to fix this.
introduced by:
commit e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac "[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach"
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static inline int ip_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff_head *queue,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int maxfraglen, unsigned int flags)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP fragmentation offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(queue)) == NULL) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return err;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb, fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->csum = 0;
__skb_queue_tail(queue, skb);
} else if (skb_is_gso(skb)) {
goto append;
}
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
/* specify the length of each IP datagram fragment */
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = maxfraglen - fragheaderlen;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
append:
return skb_append_datato_frags(sk, skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
}
| 165,986 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: sf_open (const char *path, int mode, SF_INFO *sfinfo)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
/* Ultimate sanity check. */
assert (sizeof (sf_count_t) == 8) ;
if ((psf = calloc (1, sizeof (SF_PRIVATE))) == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
psf_init_files (psf) ;
psf_log_printf (psf, "File : %s\n", path) ;
if (copy_filename (psf, path) != 0)
{ sf_errno = psf->error ;
return NULL ;
} ;
psf->file.mode = mode ;
if (strcmp (path, "-") == 0)
psf->error = psf_set_stdio (psf) ;
else
psf->error = psf_fopen (psf) ;
return psf_open_file (psf, sfinfo) ;
} /* sf_open */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | sf_open (const char *path, int mode, SF_INFO *sfinfo)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
/* Ultimate sanity check. */
assert (sizeof (sf_count_t) == 8) ;
if ((psf = psf_allocate ()) == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
psf_init_files (psf) ;
psf_log_printf (psf, "File : %s\n", path) ;
if (copy_filename (psf, path) != 0)
{ sf_errno = psf->error ;
return NULL ;
} ;
psf->file.mode = mode ;
if (strcmp (path, "-") == 0)
psf->error = psf_set_stdio (psf) ;
else
psf->error = psf_fopen (psf) ;
return psf_open_file (psf, sfinfo) ;
} /* sf_open */
| 170,067 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bsg_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct bsg_device *bd = file->private_data;
ssize_t bytes_written;
int ret;
dprintk("%s: write %Zd bytes\n", bd->name, count);
bsg_set_block(bd, file);
bytes_written = 0;
ret = __bsg_write(bd, buf, count, &bytes_written,
file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE);
*ppos = bytes_written;
/*
* return bytes written on non-fatal errors
*/
if (!bytes_written || err_block_err(ret))
bytes_written = ret;
dprintk("%s: returning %Zd\n", bd->name, bytes_written);
return bytes_written;
}
Commit Message: sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | bsg_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct bsg_device *bd = file->private_data;
ssize_t bytes_written;
int ret;
dprintk("%s: write %Zd bytes\n", bd->name, count);
if (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)))
return -EINVAL;
bsg_set_block(bd, file);
bytes_written = 0;
ret = __bsg_write(bd, buf, count, &bytes_written,
file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE);
*ppos = bytes_written;
/*
* return bytes written on non-fatal errors
*/
if (!bytes_written || err_block_err(ret))
bytes_written = ret;
dprintk("%s: returning %Zd\n", bd->name, bytes_written);
return bytes_written;
}
| 166,840 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void UrlFetcherDownloader::StartURLFetch(const GURL& url) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (download_dir_.empty()) {
Result result;
result.error = -1;
DownloadMetrics download_metrics;
download_metrics.url = url;
download_metrics.downloader = DownloadMetrics::kUrlFetcher;
download_metrics.error = -1;
download_metrics.downloaded_bytes = -1;
download_metrics.total_bytes = -1;
download_metrics.download_time_ms = 0;
main_task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnDownloadComplete,
base::Unretained(this), false, result,
download_metrics));
return;
}
const auto file_path = download_dir_.AppendASCII(url.ExtractFileName());
network_fetcher_ = network_fetcher_factory_->Create();
network_fetcher_->DownloadToFile(
url, file_path,
base::BindOnce(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnResponseStarted,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindRepeating(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnDownloadProgress,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindOnce(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnNetworkFetcherComplete,
base::Unretained(this), file_path));
download_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
}
Commit Message: Fix error handling in the request sender and url fetcher downloader.
That means handling the network errors by primarily looking at net_error.
Bug: 1028369
Change-Id: I8181bced25f8b56144ea336a03883d0dceea5108
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1935428
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sorin Jianu <sorin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#719199}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void UrlFetcherDownloader::StartURLFetch(const GURL& url) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (download_dir_.empty()) {
Result result;
result.error = -1;
DownloadMetrics download_metrics;
download_metrics.url = url;
download_metrics.downloader = DownloadMetrics::kUrlFetcher;
download_metrics.error = -1;
download_metrics.downloaded_bytes = -1;
download_metrics.total_bytes = -1;
download_metrics.download_time_ms = 0;
main_task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnDownloadComplete,
base::Unretained(this), false, result,
download_metrics));
return;
}
file_path_ = download_dir_.AppendASCII(url.ExtractFileName());
network_fetcher_ = network_fetcher_factory_->Create();
network_fetcher_->DownloadToFile(
url, file_path_,
base::BindOnce(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnResponseStarted,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindRepeating(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnDownloadProgress,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindOnce(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnNetworkFetcherComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
download_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
}
| 172,366 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long AudioTrack::GetChannels() const
{
return m_channels;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long AudioTrack::GetChannels() const
Track** i = m_trackEntries;
Track** const j = m_trackEntriesEnd;
while (i != j) {
Track* const pTrack = *i++;
if (pTrack == NULL)
continue;
if (tn == pTrack->GetNumber())
return pTrack;
}
return NULL; // not found
}
| 174,289 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: l2tp_q931_cc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
print_16bits_val(ndo, (const uint16_t *)dat);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %02x", dat[2]));
if (length > 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
print_string(ndo, dat+3, length-3);
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | l2tp_q931_cc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
if (length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
print_16bits_val(ndo, (const uint16_t *)dat);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %02x", dat[2]));
dat += 3;
length -= 3;
if (length != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
print_string(ndo, dat, length);
}
}
| 167,901 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ctrycatchfinally(JF, js_Ast *trystm, js_Ast *catchvar, js_Ast *catchstm, js_Ast *finallystm)
{
int L1, L2, L3;
L1 = emitjump(J, F, OP_TRY);
{
/* if we get here, we have caught an exception in the try block */
L2 = emitjump(J, F, OP_TRY);
{
/* if we get here, we have caught an exception in the catch block */
cstm(J, F, finallystm); /* inline finally block */
emit(J, F, OP_THROW); /* rethrow exception */
}
label(J, F, L2);
if (F->strict) {
checkfutureword(J, F, catchvar);
if (!strcmp(catchvar->string, "arguments"))
jsC_error(J, catchvar, "redefining 'arguments' is not allowed in strict mode");
if (!strcmp(catchvar->string, "eval"))
jsC_error(J, catchvar, "redefining 'eval' is not allowed in strict mode");
}
emitline(J, F, catchvar);
emitstring(J, F, OP_CATCH, catchvar->string);
cstm(J, F, catchstm);
emit(J, F, OP_ENDCATCH);
L3 = emitjump(J, F, OP_JUMP); /* skip past the try block to the finally block */
}
label(J, F, L1);
cstm(J, F, trystm);
emit(J, F, OP_ENDTRY);
label(J, F, L3);
cstm(J, F, finallystm);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700947: Add missing ENDTRY opcode in try/catch/finally byte code.
In one of the code branches in handling exceptions in the catch block
we forgot to call the ENDTRY opcode to pop the inner hidden try.
This leads to an unbalanced exception stack which can cause a crash
due to us jumping to a stack frame that has already been exited.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void ctrycatchfinally(JF, js_Ast *trystm, js_Ast *catchvar, js_Ast *catchstm, js_Ast *finallystm)
{
int L1, L2, L3;
L1 = emitjump(J, F, OP_TRY);
{
/* if we get here, we have caught an exception in the try block */
L2 = emitjump(J, F, OP_TRY);
{
/* if we get here, we have caught an exception in the catch block */
cstm(J, F, finallystm); /* inline finally block */
emit(J, F, OP_THROW); /* rethrow exception */
}
label(J, F, L2);
if (F->strict) {
checkfutureword(J, F, catchvar);
if (!strcmp(catchvar->string, "arguments"))
jsC_error(J, catchvar, "redefining 'arguments' is not allowed in strict mode");
if (!strcmp(catchvar->string, "eval"))
jsC_error(J, catchvar, "redefining 'eval' is not allowed in strict mode");
}
emitline(J, F, catchvar);
emitstring(J, F, OP_CATCH, catchvar->string);
cstm(J, F, catchstm);
emit(J, F, OP_ENDCATCH);
emit(J, F, OP_ENDTRY);
L3 = emitjump(J, F, OP_JUMP); /* skip past the try block to the finally block */
}
label(J, F, L1);
cstm(J, F, trystm);
emit(J, F, OP_ENDTRY);
label(J, F, L3);
cstm(J, F, finallystm);
}
| 169,702 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ProcessUDPHeader(tTcpIpPacketParsingResult _res, PVOID pIpHeader, ULONG len, USHORT ipHeaderSize)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = _res;
ULONG udpDataStart = ipHeaderSize + sizeof(UDPHeader);
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpIncomplete;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsUDP;
res.XxpIpHeaderSize = udpDataStart;
if (len >= udpDataStart)
{
UDPHeader *pUdpHeader = (UDPHeader *)RtlOffsetToPointer(pIpHeader, ipHeaderSize);
USHORT datagramLength = swap_short(pUdpHeader->udp_length);
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
DPrintf(2, ("udp: len %d, datagramLength %d\n", len, datagramLength));
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ProcessUDPHeader(tTcpIpPacketParsingResult _res, PVOID pIpHeader, ULONG len, USHORT ipHeaderSize)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = _res;
ULONG udpDataStart = ipHeaderSize + sizeof(UDPHeader);
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsUDP;
res.XxpIpHeaderSize = udpDataStart;
if (len >= udpDataStart)
{
UDPHeader *pUdpHeader = (UDPHeader *)RtlOffsetToPointer(pIpHeader, ipHeaderSize);
USHORT datagramLength = swap_short(pUdpHeader->udp_length);
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
res.xxpFull = TRUE;
DPrintf(2, ("udp: len %d, datagramLength %d\n", len, datagramLength));
}
else
{
res.xxpFull = FALSE;
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpIncomplete;
}
return res;
}
| 168,890 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool asn1_write_DATA_BLOB_LDAPString(struct asn1_data *data, const DATA_BLOB *s)
{
asn1_write(data, s->data, s->length);
return !data->has_error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool asn1_write_DATA_BLOB_LDAPString(struct asn1_data *data, const DATA_BLOB *s)
{
return asn1_write(data, s->data, s->length);
}
| 164,588 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dophn_core(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off,
int num, size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags)
{
Elf32_Phdr ph32;
Elf64_Phdr ph64;
size_t offset, len;
unsigned char nbuf[BUFSIZ];
ssize_t bufsize;
if (size != xph_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted program header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Loop through all the program headers.
*/
for ( ; num; num--) {
if (pread(fd, xph_addr, xph_sizeof, off) < (ssize_t)xph_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xph_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
if (xph_type != PT_NOTE)
continue;
/*
* This is a PT_NOTE section; loop through all the notes
* in the section.
*/
len = xph_filesz < sizeof(nbuf) ? xph_filesz : sizeof(nbuf);
if ((bufsize = pread(fd, nbuf, len, xph_offset)) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
offset = 0;
for (;;) {
if (offset >= (size_t)bufsize)
break;
offset = donote(ms, nbuf, offset, (size_t)bufsize,
clazz, swap, 4, flags);
if (offset == 0)
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | dophn_core(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off,
int num, size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags, uint16_t *notecount)
{
Elf32_Phdr ph32;
Elf64_Phdr ph64;
size_t offset, len;
unsigned char nbuf[BUFSIZ];
ssize_t bufsize;
if (size != xph_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted program header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Loop through all the program headers.
*/
for ( ; num; num--) {
if (pread(fd, xph_addr, xph_sizeof, off) < (ssize_t)xph_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xph_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
if (xph_type != PT_NOTE)
continue;
/*
* This is a PT_NOTE section; loop through all the notes
* in the section.
*/
len = xph_filesz < sizeof(nbuf) ? xph_filesz : sizeof(nbuf);
if ((bufsize = pread(fd, nbuf, len, xph_offset)) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
offset = 0;
for (;;) {
if (offset >= (size_t)bufsize)
break;
offset = donote(ms, nbuf, offset, (size_t)bufsize,
clazz, swap, 4, flags, notecount);
if (offset == 0)
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 166,777 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: file_transfer_t *imcb_file_send_start(struct im_connection *ic, char *handle, char *file_name, size_t file_size)
{
bee_t *bee = ic->bee;
bee_user_t *bu = bee_user_by_handle(bee, ic, handle);
if (bee->ui->ft_in_start) {
return bee->ui->ft_in_start(bee, bu, file_name, file_size);
} else {
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: imcb_file_send_start: handle ft attempts from non-existing users
CWE ID: CWE-476 | file_transfer_t *imcb_file_send_start(struct im_connection *ic, char *handle, char *file_name, size_t file_size)
{
bee_t *bee = ic->bee;
bee_user_t *bu = bee_user_by_handle(bee, ic, handle);
if (bee->ui->ft_in_start && bu) {
return bee->ui->ft_in_start(bee, bu, file_name, file_size);
} else {
return NULL;
}
}
| 168,506 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info, int texel_size)
{
register ssize_t
i;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i = 1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) ((w + 3) / 4) * ((h + 3) / 4) * texel_size;
(void) SeekBlob(image, offset, SEEK_CUR);
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info, int texel_size)
static MagickBooleanType SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image,DDSInfo *dds_info,
int texel_size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register ssize_t
i;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i = 1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) ((w + 3) / 4) * ((h + 3) / 4) * texel_size;
(void) SeekBlob(image, offset, SEEK_CUR);
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
| 168,904 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct bt_security sec;
int len, err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (level == SOL_RFCOMM)
return rfcomm_sock_getsockopt_old(sock, optname, optval, optlen);
if (level != SOL_BLUETOOTH)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case BT_SECURITY:
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
sec.level = rfcomm_pi(sk)->sec_level;
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(sec));
if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *) &sec, len))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case BT_DEFER_SETUP:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (put_user(test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags),
(u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in getsockopt(BT_SECURITY)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the key_size member of struct
bt_security before copying it to userland -- that for leaking one
byte kernel stack. Initialize key_size with 0 to avoid the info
leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct bt_security sec;
int len, err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (level == SOL_RFCOMM)
return rfcomm_sock_getsockopt_old(sock, optname, optval, optlen);
if (level != SOL_BLUETOOTH)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case BT_SECURITY:
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
sec.level = rfcomm_pi(sk)->sec_level;
sec.key_size = 0;
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(sec));
if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *) &sec, len))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case BT_DEFER_SETUP:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (put_user(test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags),
(u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
| 169,897 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DevToolsUI::DevToolsUI(content::WebUI* web_ui)
: WebUIController(web_ui) {
web_ui->SetBindings(0);
Profile* profile = Profile::FromWebUI(web_ui);
content::URLDataSource::Add(
profile,
new DevToolsDataSource(profile->GetRequestContext()));
GURL url = web_ui->GetWebContents()->GetVisibleURL();
if (url.spec() != SanitizeFrontendURL(url).spec())
return;
if (profile->IsOffTheRecord()) {
GURL site = content::SiteInstance::GetSiteForURL(profile, url);
content::BrowserContext::GetStoragePartitionForSite(profile, site)->
GetFileSystemContext()->EnableTemporaryFileSystemInIncognito();
}
bindings_.reset(new DevToolsUIBindings(web_ui->GetWebContents()));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | DevToolsUI::DevToolsUI(content::WebUI* web_ui)
: WebUIController(web_ui), bindings_(web_ui->GetWebContents()) {
web_ui->SetBindings(0);
Profile* profile = Profile::FromWebUI(web_ui);
content::URLDataSource::Add(
profile,
new DevToolsDataSource(profile->GetRequestContext()));
if (!profile->IsOffTheRecord())
return;
GURL url = web_ui->GetWebContents()->GetVisibleURL();
GURL site = content::SiteInstance::GetSiteForURL(profile, url);
content::BrowserContext::GetStoragePartitionForSite(profile, site)->
GetFileSystemContext()->EnableTemporaryFileSystemInIncognito();
}
| 172,456 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: string16 ExtensionInstallUI::Prompt::GetDialogTitle(
const Extension* extension) const {
if (type_ == INSTALL_PROMPT) {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(extension->is_app() ?
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALL_APP_PROMPT_TITLE :
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALL_EXTENSION_PROMPT_TITLE);
} else if (type_ == INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT) {
return l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
kTitleIds[type_], l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_SHORT_PRODUCT_NAME));
} else {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(kTitleIds[type_]);
}
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | string16 ExtensionInstallUI::Prompt::GetDialogTitle(
const Extension* extension) const {
if (type_ == INSTALL_PROMPT) {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(extension->is_app() ?
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALL_APP_PROMPT_TITLE :
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALL_EXTENSION_PROMPT_TITLE);
} else {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(kTitleIds[type_]);
}
}
| 170,981 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::FlipVertically(
uint8* framebuffer,
unsigned int width,
unsigned int height) {
uint8* scanline = scanline_.get();
if (!scanline)
return;
unsigned int row_bytes = width * 4;
unsigned int count = height / 2;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
uint8* row_a = framebuffer + i * row_bytes;
uint8* row_b = framebuffer + (height - i - 1) * row_bytes;
memcpy(scanline, row_b, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_b, row_a, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_a, scanline, row_bytes);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix mismanagement in handling of temporary scanline for vertical flip.
BUG=116637
TEST=manual test from bug report with ASAN
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9617038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125301 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::FlipVertically(
uint8* framebuffer,
unsigned int width,
unsigned int height) {
if (width == 0)
return;
scanline_.resize(width * 4);
uint8* scanline = &scanline_[0];
unsigned int row_bytes = width * 4;
unsigned int count = height / 2;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
uint8* row_a = framebuffer + i * row_bytes;
uint8* row_b = framebuffer + (height - i - 1) * row_bytes;
memcpy(scanline, row_b, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_b, row_a, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_a, scanline, row_bytes);
}
}
| 171,063 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ProcessTCPHeader(tTcpIpPacketParsingResult _res, PVOID pIpHeader, ULONG len, USHORT ipHeaderSize)
{
ULONG tcpipDataAt;
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = _res;
tcpipDataAt = ipHeaderSize + sizeof(TCPHeader);
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpIncomplete;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsTCP;
if (len >= tcpipDataAt)
{
TCPHeader *pTcpHeader = (TCPHeader *)RtlOffsetToPointer(pIpHeader, ipHeaderSize);
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
tcpipDataAt = ipHeaderSize + TCP_HEADER_LENGTH(pTcpHeader);
res.XxpIpHeaderSize = tcpipDataAt;
}
else
{
DPrintf(2, ("tcp: %d < min headers %d\n", len, tcpipDataAt));
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ProcessTCPHeader(tTcpIpPacketParsingResult _res, PVOID pIpHeader, ULONG len, USHORT ipHeaderSize)
{
ULONG tcpipDataAt;
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = _res;
tcpipDataAt = ipHeaderSize + sizeof(TCPHeader);
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsTCP;
if (len >= tcpipDataAt)
{
TCPHeader *pTcpHeader = (TCPHeader *)RtlOffsetToPointer(pIpHeader, ipHeaderSize);
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
res.xxpFull = TRUE;
tcpipDataAt = ipHeaderSize + TCP_HEADER_LENGTH(pTcpHeader);
res.XxpIpHeaderSize = tcpipDataAt;
}
else
{
DPrintf(2, ("tcp: %d < min headers %d\n", len, tcpipDataAt));
res.xxpFull = FALSE;
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpIncomplete;
}
return res;
}
| 168,889 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlDocPtr soap_xmlParseMemory(const void *buf, size_t buf_size)
{
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = NULL;
xmlDocPtr ret;
/*
xmlInitParser();
*/
ctxt = xmlCreateMemoryParserCtxt(buf, buf_size);
if (ctxt) {
ctxt->options -= XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD;
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = soap_ignorableWhitespace;
ctxt->sax->comment = soap_Comment;
ctxt->sax->warning = NULL;
ctxt->sax->error = NULL;
/*ctxt->sax->fatalError = NULL;*/
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20703
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_HUGE;
#endif
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if (ctxt->wellFormed) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
if (ret->URL == NULL && ctxt->directory != NULL) {
ret->URL = xmlCharStrdup(ctxt->directory);
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
} else {
ret = NULL;
}
/*
xmlCleanupParser();
*/
/*
if (ret) {
cleanup_xml_node((xmlNodePtr)ret);
}
*/
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | xmlDocPtr soap_xmlParseMemory(const void *buf, size_t buf_size)
{
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = NULL;
xmlDocPtr ret;
/*
xmlInitParser();
*/
ctxt = xmlCreateMemoryParserCtxt(buf, buf_size);
if (ctxt) {
ctxt->options &= ~XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD;
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = soap_ignorableWhitespace;
ctxt->sax->comment = soap_Comment;
ctxt->sax->warning = NULL;
ctxt->sax->error = NULL;
/*ctxt->sax->fatalError = NULL;*/
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20703
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_HUGE;
#endif
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if (ctxt->wellFormed) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
if (ret->URL == NULL && ctxt->directory != NULL) {
ret->URL = xmlCharStrdup(ctxt->directory);
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
} else {
ret = NULL;
}
/*
xmlCleanupParser();
*/
/*
if (ret) {
cleanup_xml_node((xmlNodePtr)ret);
}
*/
return ret;
}
| 164,726 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ApiDefinitionsNatives::ApiDefinitionsNatives(Dispatcher* dispatcher,
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context), dispatcher_(dispatcher) {
RouteFunction(
"GetExtensionAPIDefinitionsForTest",
base::Bind(&ApiDefinitionsNatives::GetExtensionAPIDefinitionsForTest,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | ApiDefinitionsNatives::ApiDefinitionsNatives(Dispatcher* dispatcher,
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context), dispatcher_(dispatcher) {
RouteFunction(
"GetExtensionAPIDefinitionsForTest", "test",
base::Bind(&ApiDefinitionsNatives::GetExtensionAPIDefinitionsForTest,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,246 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Track::GetNext(
const BlockEntry* pCurrEntry,
const BlockEntry*& pNextEntry) const
{
assert(pCurrEntry);
assert(!pCurrEntry->EOS()); //?
const Block* const pCurrBlock = pCurrEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pCurrBlock && pCurrBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number);
if (!pCurrBlock || pCurrBlock->GetTrackNumber() != m_info.number)
return -1;
const Cluster* pCluster = pCurrEntry->GetCluster();
assert(pCluster);
assert(!pCluster->EOS());
long status = pCluster->GetNext(pCurrEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
for (int i = 0; ; )
{
while (pNextEntry)
{
const Block* const pNextBlock = pNextEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pNextBlock);
if (pNextBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number)
return 0;
pCurrEntry = pNextEntry;
status = pCluster->GetNext(pCurrEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
}
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
if (pCluster == NULL)
{
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
if (pCluster->EOS())
{
#if 0
if (m_pSegment->Unparsed() <= 0) //all clusters have been loaded
{
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#else
if (m_pSegment->DoneParsing())
{
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#endif
pNextEntry = NULL;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
status = pCluster->GetFirst(pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (pNextEntry == NULL) //empty cluster
continue;
++i;
if (i >= 100)
break;
}
pNextEntry = GetEOS(); //so we can return a non-NULL value
return 1;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Track::GetNext(
for (;;) {
const Block* const pBlock = pBlockEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
const long long tn = pBlock->GetTrackNumber();
if ((tn == m_info.number) && VetEntry(pBlockEntry))
return 0;
const BlockEntry* pNextEntry;
status = pCluster->GetNext(pBlockEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pNextEntry == 0)
break;
pBlockEntry = pNextEntry;
}
++i;
if (i >= 100)
break;
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
}
// NOTE: if we get here, it means that we didn't find a block with
// a matching track number. We interpret that as an error (which
// might be too conservative).
pBlockEntry = GetEOS(); // so we can return a non-NULL value
return 1;
}
long Track::GetNext(const BlockEntry* pCurrEntry,
const BlockEntry*& pNextEntry) const {
assert(pCurrEntry);
assert(!pCurrEntry->EOS()); //?
const Block* const pCurrBlock = pCurrEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pCurrBlock && pCurrBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number);
if (!pCurrBlock || pCurrBlock->GetTrackNumber() != m_info.number)
return -1;
const Cluster* pCluster = pCurrEntry->GetCluster();
assert(pCluster);
assert(!pCluster->EOS());
long status = pCluster->GetNext(pCurrEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
for (int i = 0;;) {
while (pNextEntry) {
const Block* const pNextBlock = pNextEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pNextBlock);
if (pNextBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number)
return 0;
pCurrEntry = pNextEntry;
status = pCluster->GetNext(pCurrEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
if (pCluster == NULL) {
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
if (pCluster->EOS()) {
#if 0
if (m_pSegment->Unparsed() <= 0) //all clusters have been loaded
{
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#else
if (m_pSegment->DoneParsing()) {
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#endif
// TODO: there is a potential O(n^2) problem here: we tell the
// caller to (pre)load another cluster, which he does, but then he
// calls GetNext again, which repeats the same search. This is
// a pathological case, since the only way it can happen is if
// there exists a long sequence of clusters none of which contain a
// block from this track. One way around this problem is for the
// caller to be smarter when he loads another cluster: don't call
// us back until you have a cluster that contains a block from this
// track. (Of course, that's not cheap either, since our caller
// would have to scan the each cluster as it's loaded, so that
// would just push back the problem.)
pNextEntry = NULL;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
status = pCluster->GetFirst(pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pNextEntry == NULL) // empty cluster
continue;
++i;
if (i >= 100)
break;
}
// NOTE: if we get here, it means that we didn't find a block with
// a matching track number after lots of searching, so we give
// up trying.
pNextEntry = GetEOS(); // so we can return a non-NULL value
return 1;
}
| 174,344 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"[æӕ] > ae; [þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋпԥก] > n; œ > ce;"
"[ŧтҭԏ] > t; [ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщพฟພຟ] > w;"
"[мӎ] > m; [єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f;"
"[ҫင] > c; ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടรຣຮ] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зҙӡვဒ] > 3; [บບ] > u"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Map U+10DE to 3 when checking for confusables
Georgian letter U+10DE (პ) looks similar to the number 3. This cl adds
U+10DE to the mapping to 3 when determining whether to fall back to
punycode when displaying URLs.
Bug: 895207
Change-Id: I49713d7772428f8d364f371850a42913669acc4b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1284396
Commit-Queue: Livvie Lin <livvielin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600193}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
// - {U+0437 (з), U+0499 (ҙ), U+04E1 (ӡ), U+1012 (ဒ), U+10D5 (ვ),
// U+10DE (პ)} => 3
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"[æӕ] > ae; [þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋпԥก] > n; œ > ce;"
"[ŧтҭԏ] > t; [ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщพฟພຟ] > w;"
"[мӎ] > m; [єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f;"
"[ҫင] > c; ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടรຣຮ] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зҙӡဒვპ] > 3; [บບ] > u"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
| 172,639 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int send_reply(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma,
struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct page *page,
struct rpcrdma_msg *rdma_resp,
struct svc_rdma_req_map *vec,
int byte_count,
u32 inv_rkey)
{
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
struct ib_send_wr send_wr;
u32 xdr_off;
int sge_no;
int sge_bytes;
int page_no;
int pages;
int ret = -EIO;
/* Prepare the context */
ctxt = svc_rdma_get_context(rdma);
ctxt->direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
ctxt->pages[0] = page;
ctxt->count = 1;
/* Prepare the SGE for the RPCRDMA Header */
ctxt->sge[0].lkey = rdma->sc_pd->local_dma_lkey;
ctxt->sge[0].length =
svc_rdma_xdr_get_reply_hdr_len((__be32 *)rdma_resp);
ctxt->sge[0].addr =
ib_dma_map_page(rdma->sc_cm_id->device, page, 0,
ctxt->sge[0].length, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (ib_dma_mapping_error(rdma->sc_cm_id->device, ctxt->sge[0].addr))
goto err;
svc_rdma_count_mappings(rdma, ctxt);
ctxt->direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
/* Map the payload indicated by 'byte_count' */
xdr_off = 0;
for (sge_no = 1; byte_count && sge_no < vec->count; sge_no++) {
sge_bytes = min_t(size_t, vec->sge[sge_no].iov_len, byte_count);
byte_count -= sge_bytes;
ctxt->sge[sge_no].addr =
dma_map_xdr(rdma, &rqstp->rq_res, xdr_off,
sge_bytes, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
xdr_off += sge_bytes;
if (ib_dma_mapping_error(rdma->sc_cm_id->device,
ctxt->sge[sge_no].addr))
goto err;
svc_rdma_count_mappings(rdma, ctxt);
ctxt->sge[sge_no].lkey = rdma->sc_pd->local_dma_lkey;
ctxt->sge[sge_no].length = sge_bytes;
}
if (byte_count != 0) {
pr_err("svcrdma: Could not map %d bytes\n", byte_count);
goto err;
}
/* Save all respages in the ctxt and remove them from the
* respages array. They are our pages until the I/O
* completes.
*/
pages = rqstp->rq_next_page - rqstp->rq_respages;
for (page_no = 0; page_no < pages; page_no++) {
ctxt->pages[page_no+1] = rqstp->rq_respages[page_no];
ctxt->count++;
rqstp->rq_respages[page_no] = NULL;
}
rqstp->rq_next_page = rqstp->rq_respages + 1;
if (sge_no > rdma->sc_max_sge) {
pr_err("svcrdma: Too many sges (%d)\n", sge_no);
goto err;
}
memset(&send_wr, 0, sizeof send_wr);
ctxt->cqe.done = svc_rdma_wc_send;
send_wr.wr_cqe = &ctxt->cqe;
send_wr.sg_list = ctxt->sge;
send_wr.num_sge = sge_no;
if (inv_rkey) {
send_wr.opcode = IB_WR_SEND_WITH_INV;
send_wr.ex.invalidate_rkey = inv_rkey;
} else
send_wr.opcode = IB_WR_SEND;
send_wr.send_flags = IB_SEND_SIGNALED;
ret = svc_rdma_send(rdma, &send_wr);
if (ret)
goto err;
return 0;
err:
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | static int send_reply(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma,
static int svc_rdma_send_reply_msg(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma,
__be32 *rdma_argp, __be32 *rdma_resp,
struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
__be32 *wr_lst, __be32 *rp_ch)
{
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
u32 inv_rkey;
int ret;
dprintk("svcrdma: sending %s reply: head=%zu, pagelen=%u, tail=%zu\n",
(rp_ch ? "RDMA_NOMSG" : "RDMA_MSG"),
rqstp->rq_res.head[0].iov_len,
rqstp->rq_res.page_len,
rqstp->rq_res.tail[0].iov_len);
ctxt = svc_rdma_get_context(rdma);
ret = svc_rdma_map_reply_hdr(rdma, ctxt, rdma_resp,
svc_rdma_reply_hdr_len(rdma_resp));
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
if (!rp_ch) {
ret = svc_rdma_map_reply_msg(rdma, ctxt,
&rqstp->rq_res, wr_lst);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
}
svc_rdma_save_io_pages(rqstp, ctxt);
inv_rkey = 0;
if (rdma->sc_snd_w_inv)
inv_rkey = svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey(rdma_argp, wr_lst, rp_ch);
ret = svc_rdma_post_send_wr(rdma, ctxt, 1 + ret, inv_rkey);
if (ret)
goto err;
return 0;
err:
pr_err("svcrdma: failed to post Send WR (%d)\n", ret);
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
return ret;
}
/* Given the client-provided Write and Reply chunks, the server was not
* able to form a complete reply. Return an RDMA_ERROR message so the
* client can retire this RPC transaction. As above, the Send completion
* routine releases payload pages that were part of a previous RDMA Write.
*
* Remote Invalidation is skipped for simplicity.
*/
static int svc_rdma_send_error_msg(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma,
__be32 *rdma_resp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
__be32 *p;
int ret;
ctxt = svc_rdma_get_context(rdma);
/* Replace the original transport header with an
* RDMA_ERROR response. XID etc are preserved.
*/
p = rdma_resp + 3;
*p++ = rdma_error;
*p = err_chunk;
ret = svc_rdma_map_reply_hdr(rdma, ctxt, rdma_resp, 20);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
svc_rdma_save_io_pages(rqstp, ctxt);
ret = svc_rdma_post_send_wr(rdma, ctxt, 1 + ret, 0);
if (ret)
goto err;
return 0;
err:
pr_err("svcrdma: failed to post Send WR (%d)\n", ret);
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
return ret;
}
| 168,167 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::DidBlockRequest(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
const ResourceRequest& request,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info,
ResourceRequestBlockedReason reason) {
unsigned long identifier = CreateUniqueIdentifier();
WillSendRequestInternal(execution_context, identifier, loader, request,
ResourceResponse(), initiator_info);
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
String protocol_reason = BuildBlockedReason(reason);
GetFrontend()->loadingFailed(
request_id, MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(),
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceTypeJson(
resources_data_->GetResourceType(request_id)),
String(), false, protocol_reason);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void InspectorNetworkAgent::DidBlockRequest(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
const ResourceRequest& request,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info,
ResourceRequestBlockedReason reason,
Resource::Type resource_type) {
unsigned long identifier = CreateUniqueIdentifier();
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType type =
InspectorPageAgent::ToResourceType(resource_type);
WillSendRequestInternal(execution_context, identifier, loader, request,
ResourceResponse(), initiator_info, type);
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
String protocol_reason = BuildBlockedReason(reason);
GetFrontend()->loadingFailed(
request_id, MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(),
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceTypeJson(
resources_data_->GetResourceType(request_id)),
String(), false, protocol_reason);
}
| 172,465 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int readpng_init(FILE *infile, ulg *pWidth, ulg *pHeight)
{
uch sig[8];
/* first do a quick check that the file really is a PNG image; could
* have used slightly more general png_sig_cmp() function instead */
fread(sig, 1, 8, infile);
if (png_sig_cmp(sig, 0, 8))
return 1; /* bad signature */
/* could pass pointers to user-defined error handlers instead of NULLs: */
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!png_ptr)
return 4; /* out of memory */
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
return 4; /* out of memory */
}
/* we could create a second info struct here (end_info), but it's only
* useful if we want to keep pre- and post-IDAT chunk info separated
* (mainly for PNG-aware image editors and converters) */
/* setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a PNG-reading
* libpng function */
if (setjmp(png_jmpbuf(png_ptr))) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return 2;
}
png_init_io(png_ptr, infile);
png_set_sig_bytes(png_ptr, 8); /* we already read the 8 signature bytes */
png_read_info(png_ptr, info_ptr); /* read all PNG info up to image data */
/* alternatively, could make separate calls to png_get_image_width(),
* etc., but want bit_depth and color_type for later [don't care about
* compression_type and filter_type => NULLs] */
png_get_IHDR(png_ptr, info_ptr, &width, &height, &bit_depth, &color_type,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
*pWidth = width;
*pHeight = height;
/* OK, that's all we need for now; return happy */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | int readpng_init(FILE *infile, ulg *pWidth, ulg *pHeight)
{
uch sig[8];
/* first do a quick check that the file really is a PNG image; could
* have used slightly more general png_sig_cmp() function instead */
fread(sig, 1, 8, infile);
if (png_sig_cmp(sig, 0, 8))
return 1; /* bad signature */
/* could pass pointers to user-defined error handlers instead of NULLs: */
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(png_get_libpng_ver(NULL), NULL, NULL,
NULL);
if (!png_ptr)
return 4; /* out of memory */
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
return 4; /* out of memory */
}
/* we could create a second info struct here (end_info), but it's only
* useful if we want to keep pre- and post-IDAT chunk info separated
* (mainly for PNG-aware image editors and converters) */
/* setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a PNG-reading
* libpng function */
if (setjmp(png_jmpbuf(png_ptr))) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return 2;
}
png_init_io(png_ptr, infile);
png_set_sig_bytes(png_ptr, 8); /* we already read the 8 signature bytes */
png_read_info(png_ptr, info_ptr); /* read all PNG info up to image data */
/* alternatively, could make separate calls to png_get_image_width(),
* etc., but want bit_depth and color_type for later [don't care about
* compression_type and filter_type => NULLs] */
png_get_IHDR(png_ptr, info_ptr, &width, &height, &bit_depth, &color_type,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
*pWidth = width;
*pHeight = height;
/* OK, that's all we need for now; return happy */
return 0;
}
| 173,567 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ScopedRequest(PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper* owner,
const Delegate::EnumerateDevicesCallback& callback)
: owner_(owner),
callback_(callback),
requested_(false),
request_id_(0),
sync_call_(false) {
if (!owner_->document_url_.is_valid())
return;
requested_ = true;
sync_call_ = true;
request_id_ = owner_->delegate_->EnumerateDevices(
owner_->device_type_,
owner_->document_url_,
base::Bind(&ScopedRequest::EnumerateDevicesCallbackBody, AsWeakPtr()));
sync_call_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | ScopedRequest(PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper* owner,
const Delegate::EnumerateDevicesCallback& callback)
: owner_(owner),
callback_(callback),
requested_(false),
request_id_(0),
sync_call_(false) {
if (!owner_->document_url_.is_valid())
return;
requested_ = true;
sync_call_ = true;
DCHECK(owner_->delegate_);
request_id_ = owner_->delegate_->EnumerateDevices(
owner_->device_type_,
owner_->document_url_,
base::Bind(&ScopedRequest::EnumerateDevicesCallbackBody, AsWeakPtr()));
sync_call_ = false;
}
| 171,605 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: LoginLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetLoginLibrary() {
return login_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | LoginLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetLoginLibrary() {
| 170,625 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ExprResolveBoolean(struct xkb_context *ctx, const ExprDef *expr,
bool *set_rtrn)
{
bool ok = false;
const char *ident;
switch (expr->expr.op) {
case EXPR_VALUE:
if (expr->expr.value_type != EXPR_TYPE_BOOLEAN) {
log_err(ctx,
"Found constant of type %s where boolean was expected\n",
expr_value_type_to_string(expr->expr.value_type));
return false;
}
*set_rtrn = expr->boolean.set;
return true;
case EXPR_IDENT:
ident = xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->ident.ident);
if (ident) {
if (istreq(ident, "true") ||
istreq(ident, "yes") ||
istreq(ident, "on")) {
*set_rtrn = true;
return true;
}
else if (istreq(ident, "false") ||
istreq(ident, "no") ||
istreq(ident, "off")) {
*set_rtrn = false;
return true;
}
}
log_err(ctx, "Identifier \"%s\" of type boolean is unknown\n", ident);
return false;
case EXPR_FIELD_REF:
log_err(ctx, "Default \"%s.%s\" of type boolean is unknown\n",
xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->field_ref.element),
xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->field_ref.field));
return false;
case EXPR_INVERT:
case EXPR_NOT:
ok = ExprResolveBoolean(ctx, expr, set_rtrn);
if (ok)
*set_rtrn = !*set_rtrn;
return ok;
case EXPR_ADD:
case EXPR_SUBTRACT:
case EXPR_MULTIPLY:
case EXPR_DIVIDE:
case EXPR_ASSIGN:
case EXPR_NEGATE:
case EXPR_UNARY_PLUS:
log_err(ctx, "%s of boolean values not permitted\n",
expr_op_type_to_string(expr->expr.op));
break;
default:
log_wsgo(ctx, "Unknown operator %d in ResolveBoolean\n",
expr->expr.op);
break;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: fix stack overflow when evaluating boolean negation
The expression evaluator would go into an infinite recursion when
evaluating something like this as a boolean: `!True`. Instead of
recursing to just `True` and negating, it recursed to `!True` itself
again.
Bug inherited from xkbcomp.
Caught with the afl fuzzer.
Signed-off-by: Ran Benita <ran234@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | ExprResolveBoolean(struct xkb_context *ctx, const ExprDef *expr,
bool *set_rtrn)
{
bool ok = false;
const char *ident;
switch (expr->expr.op) {
case EXPR_VALUE:
if (expr->expr.value_type != EXPR_TYPE_BOOLEAN) {
log_err(ctx,
"Found constant of type %s where boolean was expected\n",
expr_value_type_to_string(expr->expr.value_type));
return false;
}
*set_rtrn = expr->boolean.set;
return true;
case EXPR_IDENT:
ident = xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->ident.ident);
if (ident) {
if (istreq(ident, "true") ||
istreq(ident, "yes") ||
istreq(ident, "on")) {
*set_rtrn = true;
return true;
}
else if (istreq(ident, "false") ||
istreq(ident, "no") ||
istreq(ident, "off")) {
*set_rtrn = false;
return true;
}
}
log_err(ctx, "Identifier \"%s\" of type boolean is unknown\n", ident);
return false;
case EXPR_FIELD_REF:
log_err(ctx, "Default \"%s.%s\" of type boolean is unknown\n",
xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->field_ref.element),
xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->field_ref.field));
return false;
case EXPR_INVERT:
case EXPR_NOT:
ok = ExprResolveBoolean(ctx, expr->unary.child, set_rtrn);
if (ok)
*set_rtrn = !*set_rtrn;
return ok;
case EXPR_ADD:
case EXPR_SUBTRACT:
case EXPR_MULTIPLY:
case EXPR_DIVIDE:
case EXPR_ASSIGN:
case EXPR_NEGATE:
case EXPR_UNARY_PLUS:
log_err(ctx, "%s of boolean values not permitted\n",
expr_op_type_to_string(expr->expr.op));
break;
default:
log_wsgo(ctx, "Unknown operator %d in ResolveBoolean\n",
expr->expr.op);
break;
}
return false;
}
| 169,096 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int http_read_stream(URLContext *h, uint8_t *buf, int size)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
int err, new_location, read_ret;
int64_t seek_ret;
if (!s->hd)
return AVERROR_EOF;
if (s->end_chunked_post && !s->end_header) {
err = http_read_header(h, &new_location);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (s->chunksize >= 0) {
if (!s->chunksize) {
char line[32];
do {
if ((err = http_get_line(s, line, sizeof(line))) < 0)
return err;
} while (!*line); /* skip CR LF from last chunk */
s->chunksize = strtoll(line, NULL, 16);
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_TRACE, "Chunked encoding data size: %"PRId64"'\n",
s->chunksize);
if (!s->chunksize)
return 0;
}
size = FFMIN(size, s->chunksize);
}
#if CONFIG_ZLIB
if (s->compressed)
return http_buf_read_compressed(h, buf, size);
#endif /* CONFIG_ZLIB */
read_ret = http_buf_read(h, buf, size);
if ( (read_ret < 0 && s->reconnect && (!h->is_streamed || s->reconnect_streamed) && s->filesize > 0 && s->off < s->filesize)
|| (read_ret == 0 && s->reconnect_at_eof && (!h->is_streamed || s->reconnect_streamed))) {
int64_t target = h->is_streamed ? 0 : s->off;
if (s->reconnect_delay > s->reconnect_delay_max)
return AVERROR(EIO);
av_log(h, AV_LOG_INFO, "Will reconnect at %"PRId64" error=%s.\n", s->off, av_err2str(read_ret));
av_usleep(1000U*1000*s->reconnect_delay);
s->reconnect_delay = 1 + 2*s->reconnect_delay;
seek_ret = http_seek_internal(h, target, SEEK_SET, 1);
if (seek_ret != target) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Failed to reconnect at %"PRId64".\n", target);
return read_ret;
}
read_ret = http_buf_read(h, buf, size);
} else
s->reconnect_delay = 0;
return read_ret;
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int http_read_stream(URLContext *h, uint8_t *buf, int size)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
int err, new_location, read_ret;
int64_t seek_ret;
if (!s->hd)
return AVERROR_EOF;
if (s->end_chunked_post && !s->end_header) {
err = http_read_header(h, &new_location);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (s->chunksize != UINT64_MAX) {
if (!s->chunksize) {
char line[32];
do {
if ((err = http_get_line(s, line, sizeof(line))) < 0)
return err;
} while (!*line); /* skip CR LF from last chunk */
s->chunksize = strtoull(line, NULL, 16);
av_log(h, AV_LOG_TRACE,
"Chunked encoding data size: %"PRIu64"'\n",
s->chunksize);
if (!s->chunksize)
return 0;
else if (s->chunksize == UINT64_MAX) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid chunk size %"PRIu64"\n",
s->chunksize);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
}
size = FFMIN(size, s->chunksize);
}
#if CONFIG_ZLIB
if (s->compressed)
return http_buf_read_compressed(h, buf, size);
#endif /* CONFIG_ZLIB */
read_ret = http_buf_read(h, buf, size);
if ( (read_ret < 0 && s->reconnect && (!h->is_streamed || s->reconnect_streamed) && s->filesize > 0 && s->off < s->filesize)
|| (read_ret == 0 && s->reconnect_at_eof && (!h->is_streamed || s->reconnect_streamed))) {
uint64_t target = h->is_streamed ? 0 : s->off;
if (s->reconnect_delay > s->reconnect_delay_max)
return AVERROR(EIO);
av_log(h, AV_LOG_INFO, "Will reconnect at %"PRIu64" error=%s.\n", s->off, av_err2str(read_ret));
av_usleep(1000U*1000*s->reconnect_delay);
s->reconnect_delay = 1 + 2*s->reconnect_delay;
seek_ret = http_seek_internal(h, target, SEEK_SET, 1);
if (seek_ret != target) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Failed to reconnect at %"PRIu64".\n", target);
return read_ret;
}
read_ret = http_buf_read(h, buf, size);
} else
s->reconnect_delay = 0;
return read_ret;
}
| 168,501 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool GesturePoint::IsInSecondClickTimeWindow() const {
double duration = last_touch_time_ - last_tap_time_;
return duration < kMaximumSecondsBetweenDoubleClick;
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool GesturePoint::IsInSecondClickTimeWindow() const {
double duration = last_touch_time_ - last_tap_time_;
return duration < GestureConfiguration::max_seconds_between_double_click();
}
| 171,043 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: htc_request_check_host_hdr(struct http *hp)
{
int u;
int seen_host = 0;
for (u = HTTP_HDR_FIRST; u < hp->nhd; u++) {
if (hp->hd[u].b == NULL)
continue;
AN(hp->hd[u].b);
AN(hp->hd[u].e);
if (http_IsHdr(&hp->hd[u], H_Host)) {
if (seen_host) {
return (400);
}
seen_host = 1;
}
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID: | htc_request_check_host_hdr(struct http *hp)
htc_request_check_hdrs(struct sess *sp, struct http *hp)
{
int u;
int seen_host = 0;
int seen_cl = 0;
for (u = HTTP_HDR_FIRST; u < hp->nhd; u++) {
if (hp->hd[u].b == NULL)
continue;
AN(hp->hd[u].b);
AN(hp->hd[u].e);
if (http_IsHdr(&hp->hd[u], H_Host)) {
if (seen_host) {
WSP(sp, SLT_Error, "Duplicated Host header");
return (400);
}
seen_host = 1;
}
if (http_IsHdr(&hp->hd[u], H_Content_Length)) {
if (seen_cl) {
WSP(sp, SLT_Error,
"Duplicated Content-Length header");
return (400);
}
seen_cl = 1;
}
}
return (0);
}
| 167,478 |
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