instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.3k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int ttusbdecfe_dvbs_diseqc_send_master_cmd(struct dvb_frontend* fe, struct dvb_diseqc_master_cmd *cmd)
{
struct ttusbdecfe_state* state = (struct ttusbdecfe_state*) fe->demodulator_priv;
u8 b[] = { 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00 };
memcpy(&b[4], cmd->msg, cmd->msg_len);
state->config->send_command(fe, 0x72,
sizeof(b) - (6 - cmd->msg_len), b,
NULL, NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] ttusb-dec: buffer overflow in ioctl
We need to add a limit check here so we don't overflow the buffer.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int ttusbdecfe_dvbs_diseqc_send_master_cmd(struct dvb_frontend* fe, struct dvb_diseqc_master_cmd *cmd)
{
struct ttusbdecfe_state* state = (struct ttusbdecfe_state*) fe->demodulator_priv;
u8 b[] = { 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00 };
if (cmd->msg_len > sizeof(b) - 4)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(&b[4], cmd->msg, cmd->msg_len);
state->config->send_command(fe, 0x72,
sizeof(b) - (6 - cmd->msg_len), b,
NULL, NULL);
return 0;
}
| 166,241
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::generatorObjectLocation(v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { object };
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = callDebuggerMethod("getGeneratorObjectLocation", 1, argv).ToLocalChecked();
if (!location->IsObject())
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = m_debuggerContext.Get(m_isolate);
if (!markAsInternal(context, v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(location), V8InternalValueType::kLocation))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
return location;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
|
v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::generatorObjectLocation(v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::generatorObjectLocation(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { object };
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = callDebuggerMethod("getGeneratorObjectLocation", 1, argv).ToLocalChecked();
v8::Local<v8::Value> copied;
if (!copyValueFromDebuggerContext(m_isolate, debuggerContext(), context, location).ToLocal(&copied) || !copied->IsObject())
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!markAsInternal(context, v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(copied), V8InternalValueType::kLocation))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
return copied;
}
| 172,067
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendElement(StringBuilder& result, Element& element, Namespaces* namespaces)
{
if (element.hasTagName(HTMLNames::htmlTag)) {
result.append('\n');
MarkupFormatter::appendComment(result, String::format(" saved from url=(%04d)%s ",
static_cast<int>(document().url().string().utf8().length()),
document().url().string().utf8().data()));
result.append('\n');
}
if (element.hasTagName(HTMLNames::baseTag)) {
result.appendLiteral("<base href=\".\"");
if (!document().baseTarget().isEmpty()) {
result.appendLiteral(" target=\"");
MarkupFormatter::appendAttributeValue(result, document().baseTarget(), document().isHTMLDocument());
result.append('"');
}
if (document().isXHTMLDocument())
result.appendLiteral(" />");
else
result.appendLiteral(">");
} else {
SerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendElement(result, element, namespaces);
}
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendElement(StringBuilder& result, Element& element, Namespaces* namespaces)
{
if (element.hasTagName(HTMLNames::htmlTag)) {
result.append('\n');
MarkupFormatter::appendComment(result, PageSerializer::markOfTheWebDeclaration(document().url()));
result.append('\n');
}
if (element.hasTagName(HTMLNames::baseTag)) {
result.appendLiteral("<base href=\".\"");
if (!document().baseTarget().isEmpty()) {
result.appendLiteral(" target=\"");
MarkupFormatter::appendAttributeValue(result, document().baseTarget(), document().isHTMLDocument());
result.append('"');
}
if (document().isXHTMLDocument())
result.appendLiteral(" />");
else
result.appendLiteral(">");
} else {
SerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendElement(result, element, namespaces);
}
}
| 171,785
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
int ret= -1,inl;
int mdnid, pknid;
if (!pkey)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return -1;
}
if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
return -1;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
/* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm), &mdnid, &pknid))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if (mdnid == NID_undef)
{
if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->item_verify)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
ret = pkey->ameth->item_verify(&ctx, it, asn, a,
signature, pkey);
/* Return value of 2 means carry on, anything else means we
* exit straight away: either a fatal error of the underlying
* verification routine handles all verification.
*/
if (ret != 2)
goto err;
ret = -1;
}
else
{
const EVP_MD *type;
type=EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid);
if (type == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
/* Check public key OID matches public key type */
if (EVP_PKEY_type(pknid) != pkey->ameth->pkey_id)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&ctx, NULL, type, NULL, pkey))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
}
inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
if (buf_in == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ret = EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf_in,inl);
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
if (!ret)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = -1;
if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&ctx,signature->data,
(size_t)signature->length) <= 0)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
/* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked
* public information */
/* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
ret=1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: use correct function name
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
|
int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
int ret= -1,inl;
int mdnid, pknid;
if (!pkey)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return -1;
}
if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
return -1;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
/* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm), &mdnid, &pknid))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if (mdnid == NID_undef)
{
if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->item_verify)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
ret = pkey->ameth->item_verify(&ctx, it, asn, a,
signature, pkey);
/* Return value of 2 means carry on, anything else means we
* exit straight away: either a fatal error of the underlying
* verification routine handles all verification.
*/
if (ret != 2)
goto err;
ret = -1;
}
else
{
const EVP_MD *type;
type=EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid);
if (type == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
/* Check public key OID matches public key type */
if (EVP_PKEY_type(pknid) != pkey->ameth->pkey_id)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&ctx, NULL, type, NULL, pkey))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
}
inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
if (buf_in == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ret = EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf_in,inl);
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
if (!ret)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = -1;
if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&ctx,signature->data,
(size_t)signature->length) <= 0)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
/* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked
* public information */
/* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
ret=1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
| 166,793
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int php_stream_temp_seek(php_stream *stream, off_t offset, int whence, off_t *newoffs TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
int ret;
assert(ts != NULL);
if (!ts->innerstream) {
*newoffs = -1;
return -1;
}
ret = php_stream_seek(ts->innerstream, offset, whence);
*newoffs = php_stream_tell(ts->innerstream);
stream->eof = ts->innerstream->eof;
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int php_stream_temp_seek(php_stream *stream, off_t offset, int whence, off_t *newoffs TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
int ret;
assert(ts != NULL);
if (!ts->innerstream) {
*newoffs = -1;
return -1;
}
ret = php_stream_seek(ts->innerstream, offset, whence);
*newoffs = php_stream_tell(ts->innerstream);
stream->eof = ts->innerstream->eof;
return ret;
}
| 165,481
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: CryptohomeLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetCryptohomeLibrary() {
return crypto_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
CryptohomeLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetCryptohomeLibrary() {
| 170,622
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval *key, *data, **old_data;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(key);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&key, p, max, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_LONG && Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(data);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&data, p, max, var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
zval_dtor(data);
FREE_ZVAL(data);
return 0;
}
if (!objprops) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(key)) {
case IS_LONG:
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_index_update(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
case IS_STRING:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_symtable_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
}
} else {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(key);
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data,
sizeof data, NULL);
}
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for bug #68710 (Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's unserialize())
CWE ID:
|
static inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval *key, *data, **old_data;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(key);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&key, p, max, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_LONG && Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(data);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&data, p, max, var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
zval_dtor(data);
FREE_ZVAL(data);
return 0;
}
if (!objprops) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(key)) {
case IS_LONG:
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_index_update(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
case IS_STRING:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_symtable_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
}
} else {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(key);
if (zend_hash_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data,
sizeof data, NULL);
}
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
| 166,743
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void MaybeRestoreConnections() {
if (IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
return;
}
MaybeCreateIBus();
MaybeRestoreIBusConfig();
if (IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
ConnectPanelServiceSignals();
if (connection_change_handler_) {
LOG(INFO) << "Notifying Chrome that IBus is ready.";
connection_change_handler_(language_library_, true);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void MaybeRestoreConnections() {
if (IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
return;
}
MaybeCreateIBus();
MaybeRestoreIBusConfig();
if (IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
ConnectPanelServiceSignals();
VLOG(1) << "Notifying Chrome that IBus is ready.";
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_, OnConnectionChange(true));
}
}
| 170,542
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static ssize_t aio_run_iocb(struct kiocb *req, unsigned opcode,
char __user *buf, size_t len, bool compat)
{
struct file *file = req->ki_filp;
ssize_t ret;
unsigned long nr_segs;
int rw;
fmode_t mode;
aio_rw_op *rw_op;
rw_iter_op *iter_op;
struct iovec inline_vecs[UIO_FASTIOV], *iovec = inline_vecs;
struct iov_iter iter;
switch (opcode) {
case IOCB_CMD_PREAD:
case IOCB_CMD_PREADV:
mode = FMODE_READ;
rw = READ;
rw_op = file->f_op->aio_read;
iter_op = file->f_op->read_iter;
goto rw_common;
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITE:
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV:
mode = FMODE_WRITE;
rw = WRITE;
rw_op = file->f_op->aio_write;
iter_op = file->f_op->write_iter;
goto rw_common;
rw_common:
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & mode)))
return -EBADF;
if (!rw_op && !iter_op)
return -EINVAL;
if (opcode == IOCB_CMD_PREADV || opcode == IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV)
ret = aio_setup_vectored_rw(req, rw, buf, &nr_segs,
&len, &iovec, compat);
else
ret = aio_setup_single_vector(req, rw, buf, &nr_segs,
len, iovec);
if (!ret)
ret = rw_verify_area(rw, file, &req->ki_pos, len);
if (ret < 0) {
if (iovec != inline_vecs)
kfree(iovec);
return ret;
}
len = ret;
/* XXX: move/kill - rw_verify_area()? */
/* This matches the pread()/pwrite() logic */
if (req->ki_pos < 0) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (rw == WRITE)
file_start_write(file);
if (iter_op) {
iov_iter_init(&iter, rw, iovec, nr_segs, len);
ret = iter_op(req, &iter);
} else {
ret = rw_op(req, iovec, nr_segs, req->ki_pos);
}
if (rw == WRITE)
file_end_write(file);
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FDSYNC:
if (!file->f_op->aio_fsync)
return -EINVAL;
ret = file->f_op->aio_fsync(req, 1);
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FSYNC:
if (!file->f_op->aio_fsync)
return -EINVAL;
ret = file->f_op->aio_fsync(req, 0);
break;
default:
pr_debug("EINVAL: no operation provided\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (iovec != inline_vecs)
kfree(iovec);
if (ret != -EIOCBQUEUED) {
/*
* There's no easy way to restart the syscall since other AIO's
* may be already running. Just fail this IO with EINTR.
*/
if (unlikely(ret == -ERESTARTSYS || ret == -ERESTARTNOINTR ||
ret == -ERESTARTNOHAND ||
ret == -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK))
ret = -EINTR;
aio_complete(req, ret, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: aio: lift iov_iter_init() into aio_setup_..._rw()
the only non-trivial detail is that we do it before rw_verify_area(),
so we'd better cap the length ourselves in aio_setup_single_rw()
case (for vectored case rw_copy_check_uvector() will do that for us).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID:
|
static ssize_t aio_run_iocb(struct kiocb *req, unsigned opcode,
char __user *buf, size_t len, bool compat)
{
struct file *file = req->ki_filp;
ssize_t ret;
unsigned long nr_segs;
int rw;
fmode_t mode;
aio_rw_op *rw_op;
rw_iter_op *iter_op;
struct iovec inline_vecs[UIO_FASTIOV], *iovec = inline_vecs;
struct iov_iter iter;
switch (opcode) {
case IOCB_CMD_PREAD:
case IOCB_CMD_PREADV:
mode = FMODE_READ;
rw = READ;
rw_op = file->f_op->aio_read;
iter_op = file->f_op->read_iter;
goto rw_common;
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITE:
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV:
mode = FMODE_WRITE;
rw = WRITE;
rw_op = file->f_op->aio_write;
iter_op = file->f_op->write_iter;
goto rw_common;
rw_common:
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & mode)))
return -EBADF;
if (!rw_op && !iter_op)
return -EINVAL;
if (opcode == IOCB_CMD_PREADV || opcode == IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV)
ret = aio_setup_vectored_rw(req, rw, buf, &nr_segs,
&len, &iovec, compat, &iter);
else
ret = aio_setup_single_vector(req, rw, buf, &nr_segs,
len, iovec, &iter);
if (!ret)
ret = rw_verify_area(rw, file, &req->ki_pos, len);
if (ret < 0) {
if (iovec != inline_vecs)
kfree(iovec);
return ret;
}
len = ret;
/* XXX: move/kill - rw_verify_area()? */
/* This matches the pread()/pwrite() logic */
if (req->ki_pos < 0) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (rw == WRITE)
file_start_write(file);
if (iter_op) {
ret = iter_op(req, &iter);
} else {
ret = rw_op(req, iter.iov, iter.nr_segs, req->ki_pos);
}
if (rw == WRITE)
file_end_write(file);
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FDSYNC:
if (!file->f_op->aio_fsync)
return -EINVAL;
ret = file->f_op->aio_fsync(req, 1);
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FSYNC:
if (!file->f_op->aio_fsync)
return -EINVAL;
ret = file->f_op->aio_fsync(req, 0);
break;
default:
pr_debug("EINVAL: no operation provided\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (iovec != inline_vecs)
kfree(iovec);
if (ret != -EIOCBQUEUED) {
/*
* There's no easy way to restart the syscall since other AIO's
* may be already running. Just fail this IO with EINTR.
*/
if (unlikely(ret == -ERESTARTSYS || ret == -ERESTARTNOINTR ||
ret == -ERESTARTNOHAND ||
ret == -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK))
ret = -EINTR;
aio_complete(req, ret, 0);
}
return 0;
}
| 170,001
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BrowserCommandController::RemoveInterstitialObservers(
TabContents* contents) {
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void BrowserCommandController::RemoveInterstitialObservers(
WebContents* contents) {
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents));
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents));
}
| 171,510
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: restore_page_device(const gs_gstate * pgs_old, const gs_gstate * pgs_new)
{
gx_device *dev_old = gs_currentdevice(pgs_old);
gx_device *dev_new;
gx_device *dev_t1;
gx_device *dev_t2;
bool samepagedevice = obj_eq(dev_old->memory, &gs_int_gstate(pgs_old)->pagedevice,
&gs_int_gstate(pgs_new)->pagedevice);
if ((dev_t1 = (*dev_proc(dev_old, get_page_device)) (dev_old)) == 0)
return false;
/* If we are going to putdeviceparams in a callout, we need to */
/* unlock temporarily. The device will be re-locked as needed */
/* by putdeviceparams from the pgs_old->pagedevice dict state. */
dev_old->LockSafetyParams = false;
dev_new = gs_currentdevice(pgs_new);
dev_new = gs_currentdevice(pgs_new);
if (dev_old != dev_new) {
if ((dev_t2 = (*dev_proc(dev_new, get_page_device)) (dev_new)) == 0)
return false;
if (dev_t1 != dev_t2)
return true;
}
/*
* The current implementation of setpagedevice just sets new
* parameters in the same device object, so we have to check
* whether the page device dictionaries are the same.
*/
return !samepagedevice;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
|
restore_page_device(const gs_gstate * pgs_old, const gs_gstate * pgs_new)
static int
restore_page_device(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, const gs_gstate * pgs_old, const gs_gstate * pgs_new)
{
gx_device *dev_old = gs_currentdevice(pgs_old);
gx_device *dev_new;
gx_device *dev_t1;
gx_device *dev_t2;
bool samepagedevice = obj_eq(dev_old->memory, &gs_int_gstate(pgs_old)->pagedevice,
&gs_int_gstate(pgs_new)->pagedevice);
bool LockSafetyParams = dev_old->LockSafetyParams;
if ((dev_t1 = (*dev_proc(dev_old, get_page_device)) (dev_old)) == 0)
return 0;
/* If we are going to putdeviceparams in a callout, we need to */
/* unlock temporarily. The device will be re-locked as needed */
/* by putdeviceparams from the pgs_old->pagedevice dict state. */
dev_old->LockSafetyParams = false;
dev_new = gs_currentdevice(pgs_new);
dev_new = gs_currentdevice(pgs_new);
if (dev_old != dev_new) {
if ((dev_t2 = (*dev_proc(dev_new, get_page_device)) (dev_new)) == 0)
samepagedevice = true;
else if (dev_t1 != dev_t2)
samepagedevice = false;
}
if (LockSafetyParams && !samepagedevice) {
os_ptr op = osp;
const int max_ops = 512;
/* The %grestorepagedevice must complete: the biggest danger
is operand stack overflow. As we use get/putdeviceparams
that means pushing all the device params onto the stack,
pdfwrite having by far the largest number of parameters
at (currently) 212 key/value pairs - thus needing (currently)
424 entries on the op stack. Allowing for working stack
space, and safety margin.....
*/
if (max_ops > op - osbot) {
if (max_ops >= ref_stack_count(&o_stack))
return_error(gs_error_stackoverflow);
}
}
/*
* The current implementation of setpagedevice just sets new
* parameters in the same device object, so we have to check
* whether the page device dictionaries are the same.
*/
return samepagedevice ? 0 : 1;
}
| 164,690
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: newEntry(struct rx_call *call, char aname[], afs_int32 flag, afs_int32 oid,
afs_int32 *aid, afs_int32 *cid)
{
afs_int32 code;
struct ubik_trans *tt;
int admin;
char cname[PR_MAXNAMELEN];
stolower(aname);
code = Initdb();
if (code)
return code;
code = ubik_BeginTrans(dbase, UBIK_WRITETRANS, &tt);
if (code)
return code;
code = ubik_SetLock(tt, 1, 1, LOCKWRITE);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = read_DbHeader(tt);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
/* this is for cross-cell self registration. It is not added in the
* SPR_INewEntry because we want self-registration to only do
* automatic id assignment.
*/
code = WhoIsThisWithName(call, tt, cid, cname);
if (code != 2) { /* 2 specifies that this is a foreign cell request */
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
admin = IsAMemberOf(tt, *cid, SYSADMINID);
} else {
admin = ((!restricted && !strcmp(aname, cname))) || IsAMemberOf(tt, *cid, SYSADMINID);
oid = *cid = SYSADMINID;
}
if (!CreateOK(tt, *cid, oid, flag, admin))
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
if (code)
return code;
return PRSUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
newEntry(struct rx_call *call, char aname[], afs_int32 flag, afs_int32 oid,
afs_int32 *aid, afs_int32 *cid)
{
afs_int32 code;
struct ubik_trans *tt;
int admin;
char cname[PR_MAXNAMELEN];
stolower(aname);
code = Initdb();
if (code)
return code;
code = ubik_BeginTrans(dbase, UBIK_WRITETRANS, &tt);
if (code)
return code;
code = ubik_SetLock(tt, 1, 1, LOCKWRITE);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = read_DbHeader(tt);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
/* this is for cross-cell self registration. It is not added in the
* SPR_INewEntry because we want self-registration to only do
* automatic id assignment.
*/
code = WhoIsThisWithName(call, tt, cid, cname);
if (code && code != 2)
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
admin = IsAMemberOf(tt, *cid, SYSADMINID);
if (code == 2 /* foreign cell request */) {
if (!restricted && (strcmp(aname, cname) == 0)) {
/* can't autoregister while providing an owner id */
if (oid != 0)
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
admin = 1;
oid = SYSADMINID;
*cid = SYSADMINID;
}
}
if (!CreateOK(tt, *cid, oid, flag, admin))
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
if (code)
return code;
return PRSUCCESS;
}
| 165,179
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: TabGroupHeader::TabGroupHeader(const base::string16& group_title) {
constexpr gfx::Insets kPlaceholderInsets = gfx::Insets(4, 27);
SetBorder(views::CreateEmptyBorder(kPlaceholderInsets));
views::FlexLayout* layout =
SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::FlexLayout>());
layout->SetOrientation(views::LayoutOrientation::kHorizontal)
.SetCollapseMargins(true)
.SetMainAxisAlignment(views::LayoutAlignment::kStart)
.SetCrossAxisAlignment(views::LayoutAlignment::kCenter);
auto title = std::make_unique<views::Label>(group_title);
title->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_TO_HEAD);
title->SetElideBehavior(gfx::FADE_TAIL);
auto* title_ptr = AddChildView(std::move(title));
layout->SetFlexForView(title_ptr,
views::FlexSpecification::ForSizeRule(
views::MinimumFlexSizeRule::kScaleToZero,
views::MaximumFlexSizeRule::kUnbounded));
auto group_menu_button = views::CreateVectorImageButton(/*listener*/ nullptr);
views::SetImageFromVectorIcon(group_menu_button.get(), kBrowserToolsIcon);
AddChildView(std::move(group_menu_button));
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
TabGroupHeader::TabGroupHeader(const base::string16& group_title) {
TabGroupHeader::TabGroupHeader(TabController* controller, int group)
: controller_(controller), group_(group) {
DCHECK(controller);
constexpr gfx::Insets kPlaceholderInsets = gfx::Insets(4, 27);
SetBorder(views::CreateEmptyBorder(kPlaceholderInsets));
views::FlexLayout* layout =
SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::FlexLayout>());
layout->SetOrientation(views::LayoutOrientation::kHorizontal)
.SetCollapseMargins(true)
.SetMainAxisAlignment(views::LayoutAlignment::kStart)
.SetCrossAxisAlignment(views::LayoutAlignment::kCenter);
auto title = std::make_unique<views::Label>(GetGroupData()->title());
title->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_TO_HEAD);
title->SetElideBehavior(gfx::FADE_TAIL);
title_label_ = AddChildView(std::move(title));
layout->SetFlexForView(title_label_,
views::FlexSpecification::ForSizeRule(
views::MinimumFlexSizeRule::kScaleToZero,
views::MaximumFlexSizeRule::kUnbounded));
auto group_menu_button = views::CreateVectorImageButton(/*listener*/ nullptr);
views::SetImageFromVectorIcon(group_menu_button.get(), kBrowserToolsIcon);
AddChildView(std::move(group_menu_button));
}
| 172,519
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost;
u_char *pkblob, *sig;
size_t alen, blen, slen;
int r, pktype, authenticated = 0;
if (!authctxt->valid) {
debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
return 0;
}
/* XXX use sshkey_froms() */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, &alen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: packet parsing: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("%s: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %zu", __func__,
cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
debug("signature:");
sshbuf_dump_data(sig, siglen, stderr);
#endif
pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
__func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
error("%s: key_from_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (key == NULL) {
error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe "
"signature format");
goto done;
}
if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) {
logit("%s: key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes",
__func__, sshkey_type(key));
goto done;
}
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
/* reconstruct packet */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, cuser)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
auth2_record_info(authctxt,
"client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat)) == 0)
authenticated = 1;
auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
sshbuf_free(b);
done:
debug2("%s: authenticated %d", __func__, authenticated);
sshkey_free(key);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
free(cuser);
free(chost);
free(sig);
return authenticated;
}
Commit Message: delay bailout for invalid authenticating user until after the packet
containing the request has been fully parsed. Reported by Dariusz Tytko
and Michał Sajdak; ok deraadt
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost;
u_char *pkblob, *sig;
size_t alen, blen, slen;
int r, pktype, authenticated = 0;
/* XXX use sshkey_froms() */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, &alen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: packet parsing: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("%s: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %zu", __func__,
cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
debug("signature:");
sshbuf_dump_data(sig, siglen, stderr);
#endif
pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
__func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
error("%s: key_from_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (key == NULL) {
error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe "
"signature format");
goto done;
}
if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) {
logit("%s: key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes",
__func__, sshkey_type(key));
goto done;
}
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
goto done;
}
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
/* reconstruct packet */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, cuser)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
auth2_record_info(authctxt,
"client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat)) == 0)
authenticated = 1;
auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
sshbuf_free(b);
done:
debug2("%s: authenticated %d", __func__, authenticated);
sshkey_free(key);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
free(cuser);
free(chost);
free(sig);
return authenticated;
}
| 169,105
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
char *dest, *src;
char separator = '\0';
dest = src = a->name;
if (*src == '\0') {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid empty pathname");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
#if defined(__CYGWIN__)
cleanup_pathname_win(a);
#endif
/* Skip leading '/'. */
if (*src == '/')
separator = *src++;
/* Scan the pathname one element at a time. */
for (;;) {
/* src points to first char after '/' */
if (src[0] == '\0') {
break;
} else if (src[0] == '/') {
/* Found '//', ignore second one. */
src++;
continue;
} else if (src[0] == '.') {
if (src[1] == '\0') {
/* Ignore trailing '.' */
break;
} else if (src[1] == '/') {
/* Skip './'. */
src += 2;
continue;
} else if (src[1] == '.') {
if (src[2] == '/' || src[2] == '\0') {
/* Conditionally warn about '..' */
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Path contains '..'");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
}
/*
* Note: Under no circumstances do we
* remove '..' elements. In
* particular, restoring
* '/foo/../bar/' should create the
* 'foo' dir as a side-effect.
*/
}
}
/* Copy current element, including leading '/'. */
if (separator)
*dest++ = '/';
while (*src != '\0' && *src != '/') {
*dest++ = *src++;
}
if (*src == '\0')
break;
/* Skip '/' separator. */
separator = *src++;
}
/*
* We've just copied zero or more path elements, not including the
* final '/'.
*/
if (dest == a->name) {
/*
* Nothing got copied. The path must have been something
* like '.' or '/' or './' or '/././././/./'.
*/
if (separator)
*dest++ = '/';
else
*dest++ = '.';
}
/* Terminate the result. */
*dest = '\0';
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22
|
cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
char *dest, *src;
char separator = '\0';
dest = src = a->name;
if (*src == '\0') {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid empty pathname");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
#if defined(__CYGWIN__)
cleanup_pathname_win(a);
#endif
/* Skip leading '/'. */
if (*src == '/') {
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Path is absolute");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
separator = *src++;
}
/* Scan the pathname one element at a time. */
for (;;) {
/* src points to first char after '/' */
if (src[0] == '\0') {
break;
} else if (src[0] == '/') {
/* Found '//', ignore second one. */
src++;
continue;
} else if (src[0] == '.') {
if (src[1] == '\0') {
/* Ignore trailing '.' */
break;
} else if (src[1] == '/') {
/* Skip './'. */
src += 2;
continue;
} else if (src[1] == '.') {
if (src[2] == '/' || src[2] == '\0') {
/* Conditionally warn about '..' */
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Path contains '..'");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
}
/*
* Note: Under no circumstances do we
* remove '..' elements. In
* particular, restoring
* '/foo/../bar/' should create the
* 'foo' dir as a side-effect.
*/
}
}
/* Copy current element, including leading '/'. */
if (separator)
*dest++ = '/';
while (*src != '\0' && *src != '/') {
*dest++ = *src++;
}
if (*src == '\0')
break;
/* Skip '/' separator. */
separator = *src++;
}
/*
* We've just copied zero or more path elements, not including the
* final '/'.
*/
if (dest == a->name) {
/*
* Nothing got copied. The path must have been something
* like '.' or '/' or './' or '/././././/./'.
*/
if (separator)
*dest++ = '/';
else
*dest++ = '.';
}
/* Terminate the result. */
*dest = '\0';
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
| 166,681
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SubpelVarianceTest<SubpelVarianceFunctionType>::RefTest() {
for (int x = 0; x < 16; ++x) {
for (int y = 0; y < 16; ++y) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
src_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1; j++) {
ref_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
unsigned int var1;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var1 = subpel_variance_(ref_, width_ + 1, x, y,
src_, width_, &sse1));
const unsigned int var2 = subpel_variance_ref(ref_, src_, log2width_,
log2height_, x, y, &sse2);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
EXPECT_EQ(var1, var2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void SubpelVarianceTest<SubpelVarianceFunctionType>::RefTest() {
for (int x = 0; x < 8; ++x) {
for (int y = 0; y < 8; ++y) {
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
src_[j] = rnd_.Rand8();
}
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1; j++) {
ref_[j] = rnd_.Rand8();
}
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src_)[j] = rnd_.Rand16() & mask_;
}
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1; j++) {
CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref_)[j] = rnd_.Rand16() & mask_;
}
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
unsigned int var1;
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var1 = subpel_variance_(ref_, width_ + 1, x, y,
src_, width_, &sse1));
const unsigned int var2 = subpel_variance_ref(ref_, src_,
log2width_, log2height_,
x, y, &sse2,
use_high_bit_depth_,
bit_depth_);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
EXPECT_EQ(var1, var2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
}
}
}
| 174,587
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void send_auth(char *username, char *password) {
struct mt_packet data;
unsigned short width = 0;
unsigned short height = 0;
char *terminal = getenv("TERM");
char md5data[100];
unsigned char md5sum[17];
int plen;
md5_state_t state;
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(_POSIX_MEMLOCK_RANGE)
mlock(md5data, sizeof(md5data));
mlock(md5sum, sizeof(md5data));
#endif
/* Concat string of 0 + password + pass_salt */
md5data[0] = 0;
strncpy(md5data + 1, password, 82);
md5data[83] = '\0';
memcpy(md5data + 1 + strlen(password), pass_salt, 16);
/* Generate md5 sum of md5data with a leading 0 */
md5_init(&state);
md5_append(&state, (const md5_byte_t *)md5data, strlen(password) + 17);
md5_finish(&state, (md5_byte_t *)md5sum + 1);
md5sum[0] = 0;
/* Send combined packet to server */
init_packet(&data, MT_PTYPE_DATA, srcmac, dstmac, sessionkey, outcounter);
plen = add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_PASSWORD, md5sum, 17);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_USERNAME, username, strlen(username));
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_TYPE, terminal, strlen(terminal));
if (is_a_tty && get_terminal_size(&width, &height) != -1) {
width = htole16(width);
height = htole16(height);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_WIDTH, &width, 2);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_HEIGHT, &height, 2);
}
outcounter += plen;
/* TODO: handle result */
send_udp(&data, 1);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void send_auth(char *username, char *password) {
struct mt_packet data;
unsigned short width = 0;
unsigned short height = 0;
char *terminal = getenv("TERM");
char md5data[100];
unsigned char md5sum[17];
int plen, act_pass_len;
md5_state_t state;
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(_POSIX_MEMLOCK_RANGE)
mlock(md5data, sizeof(md5data));
mlock(md5sum, sizeof(md5data));
#endif
/* calculate the actual password's length */
act_pass_len = strnlen(password, 82);
/* Concat string of 0 + password + pass_salt */
md5data[0] = 0;
memcpy(md5data + 1, password, act_pass_len);
/* in case that password is long, calculate only using the used-up parts */
memcpy(md5data + 1 + act_pass_len, pass_salt, 16);
/* Generate md5 sum of md5data with a leading 0 */
md5_init(&state);
md5_append(&state, (const md5_byte_t *)md5data, 1 + act_pass_len + 16);
md5_finish(&state, (md5_byte_t *)md5sum + 1);
md5sum[0] = 0;
/* Send combined packet to server */
init_packet(&data, MT_PTYPE_DATA, srcmac, dstmac, sessionkey, outcounter);
plen = add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_PASSWORD, md5sum, 17);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_USERNAME, username, strlen(username));
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_TYPE, terminal, strlen(terminal));
if (is_a_tty && get_terminal_size(&width, &height) != -1) {
width = htole16(width);
height = htole16(height);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_WIDTH, &width, 2);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_HEIGHT, &height, 2);
}
outcounter += plen;
/* TODO: handle result */
send_udp(&data, 1);
}
| 166,963
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK
BUG_ON(task_stack_end_corrupted(prev));
#endif
if (unlikely(in_atomic_preempt_off())) {
__schedule_bug(prev);
preempt_count_set(PREEMPT_DISABLED);
}
rcu_sleep_check();
profile_hit(SCHED_PROFILING, __builtin_return_address(0));
schedstat_inc(this_rq(), sched_count);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK
if (task_stack_end_corrupted(prev))
panic("corrupted stack end detected inside scheduler\n");
#endif
if (unlikely(in_atomic_preempt_off())) {
__schedule_bug(prev);
preempt_count_set(PREEMPT_DISABLED);
}
rcu_sleep_check();
profile_hit(SCHED_PROFILING, __builtin_return_address(0));
schedstat_inc(this_rq(), sched_count);
}
| 167,445
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHPAPI char *php_unescape_html_entities(unsigned char *old, size_t oldlen, size_t *newlen, int all, int flags, char *hint_charset TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t retlen;
char *ret;
enum entity_charset charset;
const entity_ht *inverse_map = NULL;
size_t new_size = TRAVERSE_FOR_ENTITIES_EXPAND_SIZE(oldlen);
if (all) {
charset = determine_charset(hint_charset TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
charset = cs_8859_1; /* charset shouldn't matter, use ISO-8859-1 for performance */
}
/* don't use LIMIT_ALL! */
if (oldlen > new_size) {
/* overflow, refuse to do anything */
ret = estrndup((char*)old, oldlen);
retlen = oldlen;
goto empty_source;
}
ret = emalloc(new_size);
*ret = '\0';
retlen = oldlen;
if (retlen == 0) {
goto empty_source;
}
inverse_map = unescape_inverse_map(all, flags);
/* replace numeric entities */
traverse_for_entities(old, oldlen, ret, &retlen, all, flags, inverse_map, charset);
empty_source:
*newlen = retlen;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
PHPAPI char *php_unescape_html_entities(unsigned char *old, size_t oldlen, size_t *newlen, int all, int flags, char *hint_charset TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t retlen;
char *ret;
enum entity_charset charset;
const entity_ht *inverse_map = NULL;
size_t new_size = TRAVERSE_FOR_ENTITIES_EXPAND_SIZE(oldlen);
if (all) {
charset = determine_charset(hint_charset TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
charset = cs_8859_1; /* charset shouldn't matter, use ISO-8859-1 for performance */
}
/* don't use LIMIT_ALL! */
if (oldlen > new_size) {
/* overflow, refuse to do anything */
ret = estrndup((char*)old, oldlen);
retlen = oldlen;
goto empty_source;
}
ret = emalloc(new_size);
*ret = '\0';
retlen = oldlen;
if (retlen == 0) {
goto empty_source;
}
inverse_map = unescape_inverse_map(all, flags);
/* replace numeric entities */
traverse_for_entities(old, oldlen, ret, &retlen, all, flags, inverse_map, charset);
empty_source:
*newlen = retlen;
return ret;
}
| 167,176
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, current)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
} else if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object_create_type(0, intern, SPL_FS_INFO, NULL, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
RETURN_ZVAL(getThis(), 1, 0);
/*RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);*/
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, current)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
} else if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object_create_type(0, intern, SPL_FS_INFO, NULL, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
RETURN_ZVAL(getThis(), 1, 0);
/*RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);*/
}
}
| 167,036
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool SeekHead::ParseEntry(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long start,
long long size_,
Entry* pEntry)
{
if (size_ <= 0)
return false;
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size_;
long len;
const long long seekIdId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdId != 0x13AB) //SeekID ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume SeekID id
const long long seekIdSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume size of field
if ((pos + seekIdSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len); //payload
if (pEntry->id <= 0)
return false;
if (len != seekIdSize)
return false;
pos += seekIdSize; //consume SeekID payload
const long long seekPosId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosId != 0x13AC) //SeekPos ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume id
const long long seekPosSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume size
if ((pos + seekPosSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, seekPosSize);
if (pEntry->pos < 0)
return false;
pos += seekPosSize; //consume payload
if (pos != stop)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool SeekHead::ParseEntry(
bool SeekHead::ParseEntry(IMkvReader* pReader, long long start, long long size_,
Entry* pEntry) {
if (size_ <= 0)
return false;
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size_;
long len;
// parse the container for the level-1 element ID
const long long seekIdId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
// seekIdId;
if (seekIdId != 0x13AB) // SeekID ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume SeekID id
const long long seekIdSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume size of field
if ((pos + seekIdSize) > stop)
return false;
// Note that the SeekId payload really is serialized
// as a "Matroska integer", not as a plain binary value.
// In fact, Matroska requires that ID values in the
// stream exactly match the binary representation as listed
// in the Matroska specification.
//
// This parser is more liberal, and permits IDs to have
// any width. (This could make the representation in the stream
// different from what's in the spec, but it doesn't matter here,
// since we always normalize "Matroska integer" values.)
pEntry->id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len); // payload
if (pEntry->id <= 0)
return false;
if (len != seekIdSize)
return false;
pos += seekIdSize; // consume SeekID payload
const long long seekPosId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosId != 0x13AC) // SeekPos ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long seekPosSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume size
if ((pos + seekPosSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, seekPosSize);
if (pEntry->pos < 0)
return false;
pos += seekPosSize; // consume payload
if (pos != stop)
return false;
return true;
}
| 174,426
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void buffer_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
struct buffer_ref *ref = (struct buffer_ref *)buf->private;
ref->ref++;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
static void buffer_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
static bool buffer_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
struct buffer_ref *ref = (struct buffer_ref *)buf->private;
if (ref->ref > INT_MAX/2)
return false;
ref->ref++;
return true;
}
| 170,221
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BrowserEventRouter::DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(
WebContents* contents, DictionaryValue* changed_properties) {
DCHECK(changed_properties);
DCHECK(contents);
scoped_ptr<ListValue> args_base(new ListValue());
args_base->AppendInteger(ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabId(contents));
args_base->Append(changed_properties);
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(contents->GetBrowserContext());
scoped_ptr<Event> event(new Event(events::kOnTabUpdated, args_base.Pass()));
event->restrict_to_profile = profile;
event->user_gesture = EventRouter::USER_GESTURE_NOT_ENABLED;
event->will_dispatch_callback =
base::Bind(&WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent, contents);
ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->event_router()->BroadcastEvent(event.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void BrowserEventRouter::DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(
WebContents* contents, scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> changed_properties) {
DCHECK(changed_properties);
DCHECK(contents);
scoped_ptr<ListValue> args_base(new ListValue());
args_base->AppendInteger(ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabId(contents));
// Second arg: An object containing the changes to the tab state. Filled in
// by WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent as a copy of changed_properties, if the
// extension has the tabs permission.
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(contents->GetBrowserContext());
scoped_ptr<Event> event(new Event(events::kOnTabUpdated, args_base.Pass()));
event->restrict_to_profile = profile;
event->user_gesture = EventRouter::USER_GESTURE_NOT_ENABLED;
event->will_dispatch_callback =
base::Bind(&WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent,
contents, changed_properties.get());
ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->event_router()->BroadcastEvent(event.Pass());
}
| 171,449
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PPB_Buffer_Proxy::OnMsgCreate(
PP_Instance instance,
uint32_t size,
HostResource* result_resource,
ppapi::proxy::SerializedHandle* result_shm_handle) {
result_shm_handle->set_null_shmem();
HostDispatcher* dispatcher = HostDispatcher::GetForInstance(instance);
if (!dispatcher)
return;
thunk::EnterResourceCreation enter(instance);
if (enter.failed())
return;
PP_Resource local_buffer_resource = enter.functions()->CreateBuffer(instance,
size);
if (local_buffer_resource == 0)
return;
thunk::EnterResourceNoLock<thunk::PPB_BufferTrusted_API> trusted_buffer(
local_buffer_resource, false);
if (trusted_buffer.failed())
return;
int local_fd;
if (trusted_buffer.object()->GetSharedMemory(&local_fd) != PP_OK)
return;
result_resource->SetHostResource(instance, local_buffer_resource);
base::PlatformFile platform_file =
#if defined(OS_WIN)
reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(static_cast<intptr_t>(local_fd));
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
local_fd;
#else
#error Not implemented.
#endif
result_shm_handle->set_shmem(
dispatcher->ShareHandleWithRemote(platform_file, false), size);
}
Commit Message: Add permission checks for PPB_Buffer.
BUG=116317
TEST=browser_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11446075
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171951 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void PPB_Buffer_Proxy::OnMsgCreate(
PP_Instance instance,
uint32_t size,
HostResource* result_resource,
ppapi::proxy::SerializedHandle* result_shm_handle) {
result_shm_handle->set_null_shmem();
HostDispatcher* dispatcher = HostDispatcher::GetForInstance(instance);
if (!dispatcher)
return;
if (!dispatcher->permissions().HasPermission(ppapi::PERMISSION_DEV))
return;
thunk::EnterResourceCreation enter(instance);
if (enter.failed())
return;
PP_Resource local_buffer_resource = enter.functions()->CreateBuffer(instance,
size);
if (local_buffer_resource == 0)
return;
thunk::EnterResourceNoLock<thunk::PPB_BufferTrusted_API> trusted_buffer(
local_buffer_resource, false);
if (trusted_buffer.failed())
return;
int local_fd;
if (trusted_buffer.object()->GetSharedMemory(&local_fd) != PP_OK)
return;
result_resource->SetHostResource(instance, local_buffer_resource);
base::PlatformFile platform_file =
#if defined(OS_WIN)
reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(static_cast<intptr_t>(local_fd));
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
local_fd;
#else
#error Not implemented.
#endif
result_shm_handle->set_shmem(
dispatcher->ShareHandleWithRemote(platform_file, false), size);
}
| 171,341
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int generate_key(DH *dh)
{
int ok = 0;
int generate_new_key = 0;
unsigned l;
BN_CTX *ctx;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
generate_new_key = 1;
} else
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-320
|
static int generate_key(DH *dh)
{
int ok = 0;
int generate_new_key = 0;
unsigned l;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
generate_new_key = 1;
} else
| 165,332
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BrowserEventRouter::TabUpdated(WebContents* contents, bool did_navigate) {
TabEntry* entry = GetTabEntry(contents);
DictionaryValue* changed_properties = NULL;
DCHECK(entry);
if (did_navigate)
changed_properties = entry->DidNavigate(contents);
else
changed_properties = entry->UpdateLoadState(contents);
if (changed_properties)
DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(contents, changed_properties);
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void BrowserEventRouter::TabUpdated(WebContents* contents, bool did_navigate) {
TabEntry* entry = GetTabEntry(contents);
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> changed_properties;
DCHECK(entry);
if (did_navigate)
changed_properties.reset(entry->DidNavigate(contents));
else
changed_properties.reset(entry->UpdateLoadState(contents));
if (changed_properties)
DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(contents, changed_properties.Pass());
}
| 171,452
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_scale_16_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(colour_type)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return bit_depth > 8;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_png_set_scale_16_add(image_transform *this,
const image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(colour_type)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return bit_depth > 8;
}
| 173,645
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: png_get_uint_32(png_bytep buf)
{
png_uint_32 i = ((png_uint_32)(*buf) << 24) +
((png_uint_32)(*(buf + 1)) << 16) +
((png_uint_32)(*(buf + 2)) << 8) +
(png_uint_32)(*(buf + 3));
return (i);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
png_get_uint_32(png_bytep buf)
{
png_uint_32 i = ((png_uint_32)((*(buf )) & 0xff) << 24) +
((png_uint_32)((*(buf + 1)) & 0xff) << 16) +
((png_uint_32)((*(buf + 2)) & 0xff) << 8) +
((png_uint_32)((*(buf + 3)) & 0xff) );
return (i);
}
| 172,176
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::enableNativeBuffers(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL graphic, OMX_BOOL enable) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CLOG_CONFIG(enableNativeBuffers, "%s:%u%s, %d", portString(portIndex), portIndex,
graphic ? ", graphic" : "", enable);
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
graphic ? "OMX.google.android.index.enableAndroidNativeBuffers"
: "OMX.google.android.index.allocateNativeHandle");
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.enable = enable;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable);
if (!graphic) {
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] =
enable ? kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle : kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
} else if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeUnknown) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
}
}
} else {
CLOG_ERROR_IF(enable, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
if (!graphic) {
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
if (property_get("media.mediadrmservice.enable", value, NULL)
&& (!strcmp("1", value) || !strcasecmp("true", value))) {
CLOG_CONFIG(enableNativeBuffers, "system property override: using native-handles");
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle;
} else if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeUnknown) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
}
err = OMX_ErrorNone;
}
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: OMXNodeInstance: sanity check portIndex.
Bug: 31385713
Change-Id: Ib91d00eb5cc8c51c84d37f5d36d6b7ca594d201f
(cherry picked from commit f80a1f5075a7c6e1982d37c68bfed7c9a611bb20)
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::enableNativeBuffers(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL graphic, OMX_BOOL enable) {
if (portIndex >= NELEM(mSecureBufferType)) {
ALOGE("b/31385713, portIndex(%u)", portIndex);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "31385713");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CLOG_CONFIG(enableNativeBuffers, "%s:%u%s, %d", portString(portIndex), portIndex,
graphic ? ", graphic" : "", enable);
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
graphic ? "OMX.google.android.index.enableAndroidNativeBuffers"
: "OMX.google.android.index.allocateNativeHandle");
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.enable = enable;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable);
if (!graphic) {
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] =
enable ? kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle : kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
} else if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeUnknown) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
}
}
} else {
CLOG_ERROR_IF(enable, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
if (!graphic) {
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
if (property_get("media.mediadrmservice.enable", value, NULL)
&& (!strcmp("1", value) || !strcasecmp("true", value))) {
CLOG_CONFIG(enableNativeBuffers, "system property override: using native-handles");
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle;
} else if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeUnknown) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
}
err = OMX_ErrorNone;
}
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
| 173,385
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int insert_key(
sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,
const char *path,
unsigned char id,
unsigned char key_reference,
int key_length,
unsigned char auth_id,
const char *label
){
sc_card_t *card=p15card->card;
sc_context_t *ctx=p15card->card->ctx;
sc_file_t *f;
struct sc_pkcs15_prkey_info prkey_info;
struct sc_pkcs15_object prkey_obj;
int r, can_sign, can_crypt;
memset(&prkey_info, 0, sizeof(prkey_info));
prkey_info.id.len = 1;
prkey_info.id.value[0] = id;
prkey_info.native = 1;
prkey_info.key_reference = key_reference;
prkey_info.modulus_length = key_length;
sc_format_path(path, &prkey_info.path);
memset(&prkey_obj, 0, sizeof(prkey_obj));
strlcpy(prkey_obj.label, label, sizeof(prkey_obj.label));
prkey_obj.flags = SC_PKCS15_CO_FLAG_PRIVATE;
prkey_obj.auth_id.len = 1;
prkey_obj.auth_id.value[0] = auth_id;
can_sign=can_crypt=0;
if(card->type==SC_CARD_TYPE_TCOS_V3){
unsigned char buf[256];
int i, rec_no=0;
if(prkey_info.path.len>=2) prkey_info.path.len-=2;
sc_append_file_id(&prkey_info.path, 0x5349);
if(sc_select_file(card, &prkey_info.path, NULL)!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Select(%s) failed\n",
sc_print_path(&prkey_info.path));
return 1;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Searching for Key-Ref %02X\n", key_reference);
while((r=sc_read_record(card, ++rec_no, buf, sizeof(buf), SC_RECORD_BY_REC_NR))>0){
int found=0;
if(buf[0]!=0xA0) continue;
for(i=2;i<buf[1]+2;i+=2+buf[i+1]){
if(buf[i]==0x83 && buf[i+1]==1 && buf[i+2]==key_reference) ++found;
}
if(found) break;
}
if(r<=0){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,"No EF_KEYD-Record found\n");
return 1;
}
for(i=0;i<r;i+=2+buf[i+1]){
if(buf[i]==0xB6) can_sign++;
if(buf[i]==0xB8) can_crypt++;
}
} else {
if(sc_select_file(card, &prkey_info.path, &f)!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Select(%s) failed\n",
sc_print_path(&prkey_info.path));
return 1;
}
if (f->prop_attr[1] & 0x04) can_crypt=1;
if (f->prop_attr[1] & 0x08) can_sign=1;
sc_file_free(f);
}
prkey_info.usage= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_SIGN;
if(can_crypt) prkey_info.usage |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT|SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_DECRYPT;
if(can_sign) prkey_info.usage |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_NONREPUDIATION;
r=sc_pkcs15emu_add_rsa_prkey(p15card, &prkey_obj, &prkey_info);
if(r!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "sc_pkcs15emu_add_rsa_prkey(%s) failed\n", path);
return 4;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "%s: OK%s%s\n", path, can_sign ? ", Sign" : "", can_crypt ? ", Crypt" : "");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static int insert_key(
sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,
const char *path,
unsigned char id,
unsigned char key_reference,
int key_length,
unsigned char auth_id,
const char *label
){
sc_card_t *card=p15card->card;
sc_context_t *ctx=p15card->card->ctx;
sc_file_t *f;
struct sc_pkcs15_prkey_info prkey_info;
struct sc_pkcs15_object prkey_obj;
int r, can_sign, can_crypt;
memset(&prkey_info, 0, sizeof(prkey_info));
prkey_info.id.len = 1;
prkey_info.id.value[0] = id;
prkey_info.native = 1;
prkey_info.key_reference = key_reference;
prkey_info.modulus_length = key_length;
sc_format_path(path, &prkey_info.path);
memset(&prkey_obj, 0, sizeof(prkey_obj));
strlcpy(prkey_obj.label, label, sizeof(prkey_obj.label));
prkey_obj.flags = SC_PKCS15_CO_FLAG_PRIVATE;
prkey_obj.auth_id.len = 1;
prkey_obj.auth_id.value[0] = auth_id;
can_sign=can_crypt=0;
if(card->type==SC_CARD_TYPE_TCOS_V3){
unsigned char buf[256];
int i, rec_no=0;
if(prkey_info.path.len>=2) prkey_info.path.len-=2;
sc_append_file_id(&prkey_info.path, 0x5349);
if(sc_select_file(card, &prkey_info.path, NULL)!=SC_SUCCESS || !f->prop_attr){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Select(%s) failed\n",
sc_print_path(&prkey_info.path));
return 1;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Searching for Key-Ref %02X\n", key_reference);
while((r=sc_read_record(card, ++rec_no, buf, sizeof(buf), SC_RECORD_BY_REC_NR))>0){
int found=0;
if(buf[0]!=0xA0) continue;
for(i=2;i<buf[1]+2;i+=2+buf[i+1]){
if(buf[i]==0x83 && buf[i+1]==1 && buf[i+2]==key_reference) ++found;
}
if(found) break;
}
if(r<=0){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,"No EF_KEYD-Record found\n");
return 1;
}
for(i=0;i<r;i+=2+buf[i+1]){
if(buf[i]==0xB6) can_sign++;
if(buf[i]==0xB8) can_crypt++;
}
} else {
if(sc_select_file(card, &prkey_info.path, &f)!=SC_SUCCESS
|| !f->prop_attr || f->prop_attr_len < 2){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Select(%s) failed\n",
sc_print_path(&prkey_info.path));
return 1;
}
if (f->prop_attr[1] & 0x04) can_crypt=1;
if (f->prop_attr[1] & 0x08) can_sign=1;
sc_file_free(f);
}
prkey_info.usage= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_SIGN;
if(can_crypt) prkey_info.usage |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT|SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_DECRYPT;
if(can_sign) prkey_info.usage |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_NONREPUDIATION;
r=sc_pkcs15emu_add_rsa_prkey(p15card, &prkey_obj, &prkey_info);
if(r!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "sc_pkcs15emu_add_rsa_prkey(%s) failed\n", path);
return 4;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "%s: OK%s%s\n", path, can_sign ? ", Sign" : "", can_crypt ? ", Crypt" : "");
return 0;
}
| 169,067
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int fallocate_chunk(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t len,
int mode)
{
struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(inode);
struct buffer_head *dibh;
int error;
u64 start = offset >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
unsigned int start_offset = offset & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK;
u64 end = (offset + len - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
pgoff_t curr;
struct page *page;
unsigned int end_offset = (offset + len) & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK;
unsigned int from, to;
if (!end_offset)
end_offset = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
error = gfs2_meta_inode_buffer(ip, &dibh);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out;
gfs2_trans_add_bh(ip->i_gl, dibh, 1);
if (gfs2_is_stuffed(ip)) {
error = gfs2_unstuff_dinode(ip, NULL);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out;
}
curr = start;
offset = start << PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
from = start_offset;
to = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
while (curr <= end) {
page = grab_cache_page_write_begin(inode->i_mapping, curr,
AOP_FLAG_NOFS);
if (unlikely(!page)) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (curr == end)
to = end_offset;
error = write_empty_blocks(page, from, to, mode);
if (!error && offset + to > inode->i_size &&
!(mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)) {
i_size_write(inode, offset + to);
}
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
if (error)
goto out;
curr++;
offset += PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
from = 0;
}
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
brelse(dibh);
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int fallocate_chunk(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t len,
int mode)
{
struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(inode);
struct buffer_head *dibh;
int error;
unsigned int nr_blks;
sector_t lblock = offset >> inode->i_blkbits;
error = gfs2_meta_inode_buffer(ip, &dibh);
if (unlikely(error))
return error;
gfs2_trans_add_bh(ip->i_gl, dibh, 1);
if (gfs2_is_stuffed(ip)) {
error = gfs2_unstuff_dinode(ip, NULL);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out;
}
while (len) {
struct buffer_head bh_map = { .b_state = 0, .b_blocknr = 0 };
bh_map.b_size = len;
set_buffer_zeronew(&bh_map);
error = gfs2_block_map(inode, lblock, &bh_map, 1);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out;
len -= bh_map.b_size;
nr_blks = bh_map.b_size >> inode->i_blkbits;
lblock += nr_blks;
if (!buffer_new(&bh_map))
continue;
if (unlikely(!buffer_zeronew(&bh_map))) {
error = -EIO;
goto out;
}
}
if (offset + len > inode->i_size && !(mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE))
i_size_write(inode, offset + len);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
out:
brelse(dibh);
return error;
}
| 166,212
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: my_object_get_val (MyObject *obj, guint *ret, GError **error)
{
*ret = obj->val;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
my_object_get_val (MyObject *obj, guint *ret, GError **error)
| 165,103
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int SoundPool::load(const char* path, int priority __unused)
{
ALOGV("load: path=%s, priority=%d", path, priority);
Mutex::Autolock lock(&mLock);
sp<Sample> sample = new Sample(++mNextSampleID, path);
mSamples.add(sample->sampleID(), sample);
doLoad(sample);
return sample->sampleID();
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
int SoundPool::load(const char* path, int priority __unused)
{
ALOGV("load: path=%s, priority=%d", path, priority);
int sampleID;
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(&mLock);
sampleID = ++mNextSampleID;
sp<Sample> sample = new Sample(sampleID, path);
mSamples.add(sampleID, sample);
sample->startLoad();
}
// mDecodeThread->loadSample() must be called outside of mLock.
// mDecodeThread->loadSample() may block on mDecodeThread message queue space;
// the message queue emptying may block on SoundPool::findSample().
//
// It theoretically possible that sample loads might decode out-of-order.
mDecodeThread->loadSample(sampleID);
return sampleID;
}
| 173,961
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int v9fs_xattr_set_acl(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
const char *name, const void *value,
size_t size, int flags)
{
int retval;
struct posix_acl *acl;
struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses;
v9ses = v9fs_dentry2v9ses(dentry);
/*
* set the attribute on the remote. Without even looking at the
* xattr value. We leave it to the server to validate
*/
if ((v9ses->flags & V9FS_ACCESS_MASK) != V9FS_ACCESS_CLIENT)
return v9fs_xattr_set(dentry, handler->name, value, size,
flags);
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EPERM;
if (value) {
/* update the cached acl value */
acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, size);
if (IS_ERR(acl))
return PTR_ERR(acl);
else if (acl) {
retval = posix_acl_valid(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, acl);
if (retval)
goto err_out;
}
} else
acl = NULL;
switch (handler->flags) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
if (acl) {
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
retval = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
if (retval < 0)
goto err_out;
else {
struct iattr iattr;
if (retval == 0) {
/*
* ACL can be represented
* by the mode bits. So don't
* update ACL.
*/
acl = NULL;
value = NULL;
size = 0;
}
/* Updte the mode bits */
iattr.ia_mode = ((mode & S_IALLUGO) |
(inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO));
iattr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
/* FIXME should we update ctime ?
* What is the following setxattr update the
* mode ?
*/
v9fs_vfs_setattr_dotl(dentry, &iattr);
}
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
retval = acl ? -EINVAL : 0;
goto err_out;
}
break;
default:
BUG();
}
retval = v9fs_xattr_set(dentry, handler->name, value, size, flags);
if (!retval)
set_cached_acl(inode, handler->flags, acl);
err_out:
posix_acl_release(acl);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
|
static int v9fs_xattr_set_acl(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
const char *name, const void *value,
size_t size, int flags)
{
int retval;
struct posix_acl *acl;
struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses;
v9ses = v9fs_dentry2v9ses(dentry);
/*
* set the attribute on the remote. Without even looking at the
* xattr value. We leave it to the server to validate
*/
if ((v9ses->flags & V9FS_ACCESS_MASK) != V9FS_ACCESS_CLIENT)
return v9fs_xattr_set(dentry, handler->name, value, size,
flags);
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EPERM;
if (value) {
/* update the cached acl value */
acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, size);
if (IS_ERR(acl))
return PTR_ERR(acl);
else if (acl) {
retval = posix_acl_valid(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, acl);
if (retval)
goto err_out;
}
} else
acl = NULL;
switch (handler->flags) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
if (acl) {
struct iattr iattr;
retval = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &iattr.ia_mode, &acl);
if (retval)
goto err_out;
if (!acl) {
/*
* ACL can be represented
* by the mode bits. So don't
* update ACL.
*/
value = NULL;
size = 0;
}
iattr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
/* FIXME should we update ctime ?
* What is the following setxattr update the
* mode ?
*/
v9fs_vfs_setattr_dotl(dentry, &iattr);
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
retval = acl ? -EINVAL : 0;
goto err_out;
}
break;
default:
BUG();
}
retval = v9fs_xattr_set(dentry, handler->name, value, size, flags);
if (!retval)
set_cached_acl(inode, handler->flags, acl);
err_out:
posix_acl_release(acl);
return retval;
}
| 166,966
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: png_set_IHDR(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
png_uint_32 width, png_uint_32 height, int bit_depth,
int color_type, int interlace_type, int compression_type,
int filter_type)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "IHDR");
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL)
return;
info_ptr->width = width;
info_ptr->height = height;
info_ptr->bit_depth = (png_byte)bit_depth;
info_ptr->color_type = (png_byte)color_type;
info_ptr->compression_type = (png_byte)compression_type;
info_ptr->filter_type = (png_byte)filter_type;
info_ptr->interlace_type = (png_byte)interlace_type;
png_check_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr->width, info_ptr->height,
info_ptr->bit_depth, info_ptr->color_type, info_ptr->interlace_type,
info_ptr->compression_type, info_ptr->filter_type);
if (info_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
info_ptr->channels = 1;
else if (info_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
info_ptr->channels = 3;
else
info_ptr->channels = 1;
if (info_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA)
info_ptr->channels++;
info_ptr->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(info_ptr->channels * info_ptr->bit_depth);
/* Check for potential overflow */
if (width > (PNG_UINT_32_MAX
>> 3) /* 8-byte RGBA pixels */
- 64 /* bigrowbuf hack */
- 1 /* filter byte */
- 7*8 /* rounding of width to multiple of 8 pixels */
- 8) /* extra max_pixel_depth pad */
info_ptr->rowbytes = (png_size_t)0;
else
info_ptr->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(info_ptr->pixel_depth, width);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
png_set_IHDR(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
png_uint_32 width, png_uint_32 height, int bit_depth,
int color_type, int interlace_type, int compression_type,
int filter_type)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "IHDR");
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL)
return;
info_ptr->width = width;
info_ptr->height = height;
info_ptr->bit_depth = (png_byte)bit_depth;
info_ptr->color_type = (png_byte)color_type;
info_ptr->compression_type = (png_byte)compression_type;
info_ptr->filter_type = (png_byte)filter_type;
info_ptr->interlace_type = (png_byte)interlace_type;
png_check_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr->width, info_ptr->height,
info_ptr->bit_depth, info_ptr->color_type, info_ptr->interlace_type,
info_ptr->compression_type, info_ptr->filter_type);
if (info_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
info_ptr->channels = 1;
else if (info_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
info_ptr->channels = 3;
else
info_ptr->channels = 1;
if (info_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA)
info_ptr->channels++;
info_ptr->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(info_ptr->channels * info_ptr->bit_depth);
/* Check for potential overflow */
if (width > (PNG_UINT_32_MAX
>> 3) /* 8-byte RGBA pixels */
- 64 /* bigrowbuf hack */
- 1 /* filter byte */
- 7*8 /* rounding of width to multiple of 8 pixels */
- 8) /* extra max_pixel_depth pad */
{
info_ptr->rowbytes = (png_size_t)0;
png_error(png_ptr, "Image width is too large for this architecture");
}
else
info_ptr->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(info_ptr->pixel_depth, width);
}
| 172,182
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void ikev2_parent_outI1_continue(struct pluto_crypto_req_cont *pcrc,
struct pluto_crypto_req *r,
err_t ugh)
{
struct ke_continuation *ke = (struct ke_continuation *)pcrc;
struct msg_digest *md = ke->md;
struct state *const st = md->st;
stf_status e;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("ikev2 parent outI1: calculated ke+nonce, sending I1"));
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"%s: Request was disconnected from state",
__FUNCTION__);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
return;
}
/* XXX should check out ugh */
passert(ugh == NULL);
passert(cur_state == NULL);
passert(st != NULL);
passert(st->st_suspended_md == ke->md);
set_suspended(st, NULL); /* no longer connected or suspended */
set_cur_state(st);
st->st_calculating = FALSE;
e = ikev2_parent_outI1_tail(pcrc, r);
if (ke->md != NULL) {
complete_v2_state_transition(&ke->md, e);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
}
reset_cur_state();
reset_globals();
passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static void ikev2_parent_outI1_continue(struct pluto_crypto_req_cont *pcrc,
struct pluto_crypto_req *r,
err_t ugh)
{
struct ke_continuation *ke = (struct ke_continuation *)pcrc;
struct msg_digest *md = ke->md;
struct state *const st = md->st;
stf_status e;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("ikev2 parent outI1: calculated ke+nonce, sending I1"));
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"%s: Request was disconnected from state",
__FUNCTION__);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
return;
}
/* XXX should check out ugh */
passert(ugh == NULL);
passert(cur_state == NULL);
passert(st != NULL);
passert(st->st_suspended_md == ke->md);
set_suspended(st, NULL); /* no longer connected or suspended */
set_cur_state(st);
st->st_calculating = FALSE;
e = ikev2_parent_outI1_tail(pcrc, r);
if (ke->md != NULL) {
complete_v2_state_transition(&ke->md, e);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
}
reset_cur_state();
reset_globals();
}
| 166,473
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int logi_dj_ll_raw_request(struct hid_device *hid,
unsigned char reportnum, __u8 *buf,
size_t count, unsigned char report_type,
int reqtype)
{
struct dj_device *djdev = hid->driver_data;
struct dj_receiver_dev *djrcv_dev = djdev->dj_receiver_dev;
u8 *out_buf;
int ret;
if (buf[0] != REPORT_TYPE_LEDS)
return -EINVAL;
out_buf = kzalloc(DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!out_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
if (count < DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 2)
count = DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 2;
out_buf[0] = REPORT_ID_DJ_SHORT;
out_buf[1] = djdev->device_index;
memcpy(out_buf + 2, buf, count);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(djrcv_dev->hdev, out_buf[0], out_buf,
DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, report_type, reqtype);
kfree(out_buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: HID: logitech: fix bounds checking on LED report size
The check on report size for REPORT_TYPE_LEDS in logi_dj_ll_raw_request()
is wrong; the current check doesn't make any sense -- the report allocated
by HID core in hid_hw_raw_request() can be much larger than
DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, and currently logi_dj_ll_raw_request() doesn't
handle this properly at all.
Fix the check by actually trimming down the report size properly if it is
too large.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int logi_dj_ll_raw_request(struct hid_device *hid,
unsigned char reportnum, __u8 *buf,
size_t count, unsigned char report_type,
int reqtype)
{
struct dj_device *djdev = hid->driver_data;
struct dj_receiver_dev *djrcv_dev = djdev->dj_receiver_dev;
u8 *out_buf;
int ret;
if (buf[0] != REPORT_TYPE_LEDS)
return -EINVAL;
out_buf = kzalloc(DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!out_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
if (count > DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 2)
count = DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 2;
out_buf[0] = REPORT_ID_DJ_SHORT;
out_buf[1] = djdev->device_index;
memcpy(out_buf + 2, buf, count);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(djrcv_dev->hdev, out_buf[0], out_buf,
DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, report_type, reqtype);
kfree(out_buf);
return ret;
}
| 166,376
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(recvfrom, int, fd, void __user *, ubuf, size_t, size,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int __user *, addr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct iovec iov;
struct msghdr msg;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err, err2;
int fput_needed;
if (size > INT_MAX)
size = INT_MAX;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
iov.iov_len = size;
iov.iov_base = ubuf;
iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, READ, &iov, 1, size);
/* Save some cycles and don't copy the address if not needed */
msg.msg_name = addr ? (struct sockaddr *)&address : NULL;
/* We assume all kernel code knows the size of sockaddr_storage */
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
err = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, size, flags);
if (err >= 0 && addr != NULL) {
err2 = move_addr_to_user(&address,
msg.msg_namelen, addr, addr_len);
if (err2 < 0)
err = err2;
}
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: validate the range we feed to iov_iter_init() in sys_sendto/sys_recvfrom
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE6(recvfrom, int, fd, void __user *, ubuf, size_t, size,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int __user *, addr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct iovec iov;
struct msghdr msg;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err, err2;
int fput_needed;
if (size > INT_MAX)
size = INT_MAX;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ubuf, size)))
return -EFAULT;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
iov.iov_len = size;
iov.iov_base = ubuf;
iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, READ, &iov, 1, size);
/* Save some cycles and don't copy the address if not needed */
msg.msg_name = addr ? (struct sockaddr *)&address : NULL;
/* We assume all kernel code knows the size of sockaddr_storage */
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
err = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, size, flags);
if (err >= 0 && addr != NULL) {
err2 = move_addr_to_user(&address,
msg.msg_namelen, addr, addr_len);
if (err2 < 0)
err = err2;
}
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
| 167,571
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: my_object_increment_retval (MyObject *obj, gint32 x)
{
return x + 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
my_object_increment_retval (MyObject *obj, gint32 x)
| 165,106
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head,
struct ctl_table *table)
{
struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls);
kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0);
kgid_t root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0);
/* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */
if (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) ||
uid_eq(root_uid, current_uid())) {
int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7;
return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode;
}
/* Allow netns root group to have the same access as the root group */
if (gid_eq(root_gid, current_gid())) {
int mode = (table->mode >> 3) & 7;
return (mode << 3) | mode;
}
return table->mode;
}
Commit Message: net: Update the sysctl permissions handler to test effective uid/gid
Modify the code to use current_euid(), and in_egroup_p, as in done
in fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:test_perm()
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head,
struct ctl_table *table)
{
struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls);
kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0);
kgid_t root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0);
/* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */
if (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) ||
uid_eq(root_uid, current_euid())) {
int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7;
return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode;
}
/* Allow netns root group to have the same access as the root group */
if (in_egroup_p(root_gid)) {
int mode = (table->mode >> 3) & 7;
return (mode << 3) | mode;
}
return table->mode;
}
| 165,994
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool LauncherView::IsShowingMenu() const {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
return (overflow_menu_runner_.get() &&
overflow_menu_runner_->IsRunning()) ||
(launcher_menu_runner_.get() &&
launcher_menu_runner_->IsRunning());
#endif
return false;
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool LauncherView::IsShowingMenu() const {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
return (launcher_menu_runner_.get() &&
launcher_menu_runner_->IsRunning());
#endif
return false;
}
| 170,891
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int write_empty_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned from, unsigned to,
int mode)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
unsigned start, end, next, blksize;
sector_t block = page->index << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
int ret;
blksize = 1 << inode->i_blkbits;
next = end = 0;
while (next < from) {
next += blksize;
block++;
}
start = next;
do {
next += blksize;
ret = needs_empty_write(block, inode);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
return ret;
if (ret == 0) {
if (end) {
ret = __block_write_begin(page, start, end - start,
gfs2_block_map);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
ret = empty_write_end(page, start, end, mode);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
end = 0;
}
start = next;
}
else
end = next;
block++;
} while (next < to);
if (end) {
ret = __block_write_begin(page, start, end - start, gfs2_block_map);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
ret = empty_write_end(page, start, end, mode);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int write_empty_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned from, unsigned to,
| 166,215
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SetBuildInfoAnnotations(std::map<std::string, std::string>* annotations) {
base::android::BuildInfo* info = base::android::BuildInfo::GetInstance();
(*annotations)["android_build_id"] = info->android_build_id();
(*annotations)["android_build_fp"] = info->android_build_fp();
(*annotations)["device"] = info->device();
(*annotations)["model"] = info->model();
(*annotations)["brand"] = info->brand();
(*annotations)["board"] = info->board();
(*annotations)["installer_package_name"] = info->installer_package_name();
(*annotations)["abi_name"] = info->abi_name();
(*annotations)["custom_themes"] = info->custom_themes();
(*annotations)["resources_verison"] = info->resources_version();
(*annotations)["gms_core_version"] = info->gms_version_code();
if (info->firebase_app_id()[0] != '\0') {
(*annotations)["package"] = std::string(info->firebase_app_id()) + " v" +
info->package_version_code() + " (" +
info->package_version_name() + ")";
}
}
Commit Message: Add Android SDK version to crash reports.
Bug: 911669
Change-Id: I62a97d76a0b88099a5a42b93463307f03be9b3e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1361104
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Conn <peconn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Michael van Ouwerkerk <mvanouwerkerk@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615851}
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
void SetBuildInfoAnnotations(std::map<std::string, std::string>* annotations) {
base::android::BuildInfo* info = base::android::BuildInfo::GetInstance();
(*annotations)["android_build_id"] = info->android_build_id();
(*annotations)["android_build_fp"] = info->android_build_fp();
(*annotations)["sdk"] = base::StringPrintf("%d", info->sdk_int());
(*annotations)["device"] = info->device();
(*annotations)["model"] = info->model();
(*annotations)["brand"] = info->brand();
(*annotations)["board"] = info->board();
(*annotations)["installer_package_name"] = info->installer_package_name();
(*annotations)["abi_name"] = info->abi_name();
(*annotations)["custom_themes"] = info->custom_themes();
(*annotations)["resources_verison"] = info->resources_version();
(*annotations)["gms_core_version"] = info->gms_version_code();
if (info->firebase_app_id()[0] != '\0') {
(*annotations)["package"] = std::string(info->firebase_app_id()) + " v" +
info->package_version_code() + " (" +
info->package_version_name() + ")";
}
}
| 172,546
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ReleaseAccelerator(ui::KeyboardCode keycode,
bool shift_pressed,
bool ctrl_pressed,
bool alt_pressed)
: ui::Accelerator(keycode, shift_pressed, ctrl_pressed, alt_pressed) {
set_type(ui::ET_KEY_RELEASED);
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
ReleaseAccelerator(ui::KeyboardCode keycode,
ReleaseAccelerator(ui::KeyboardCode keycode, int modifiers)
: ui::Accelerator(keycode, modifiers) {
set_type(ui::ET_KEY_RELEASED);
}
| 170,905
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::InsertSyncPointAndACK(
int32 route_id, int gpu_host_id, bool presented,
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
uint32 sync_point = 0;
if (compositor) {
ImageTransportFactory* factory = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance();
sync_point = factory->InsertSyncPoint();
}
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
route_id, gpu_host_id, presented, sync_point);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::InsertSyncPointAndACK(
const BufferPresentedParams& params) {
uint32 sync_point = 0;
// If we produced a texture, we have to synchronize with the consumer of
// that texture.
if (params.texture_to_produce) {
params.texture_to_produce->Produce();
sync_point = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance()->InsertSyncPoint();
}
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
params.route_id, params.gpu_host_id, params.surface_handle, sync_point);
}
| 171,379
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(AudioOutputIPCDelegate::State state) {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!stream_id_)
return;
if (state == AudioOutputIPCDelegate::kError) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(kError)";
base::AutoLock auto_lock_(audio_thread_lock_);
if (audio_thread_.get() && !audio_thread_->IsStopped())
callback_->OnRenderError();
}
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(AudioOutputIPCDelegate::State state) {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!stream_id_)
return;
if (state == AudioOutputIPCDelegate::kError) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(kError)";
if (!audio_thread_.IsStopped())
callback_->OnRenderError();
}
}
| 170,704
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int copy_cred(struct svc_cred *target, struct svc_cred *source)
{
int ret;
ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_principal, source->cr_principal);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_raw_principal,
source->cr_raw_principal);
if (ret)
return ret;
target->cr_flavor = source->cr_flavor;
target->cr_uid = source->cr_uid;
target->cr_gid = source->cr_gid;
target->cr_group_info = source->cr_group_info;
get_group_info(target->cr_group_info);
target->cr_gss_mech = source->cr_gss_mech;
if (source->cr_gss_mech)
gss_mech_get(source->cr_gss_mech);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
static int copy_cred(struct svc_cred *target, struct svc_cred *source)
{
target->cr_principal = kstrdup(source->cr_principal, GFP_KERNEL);
target->cr_raw_principal = kstrdup(source->cr_raw_principal,
GFP_KERNEL);
if ((source->cr_principal && ! target->cr_principal) ||
(source->cr_raw_principal && ! target->cr_raw_principal))
return -ENOMEM;
target->cr_flavor = source->cr_flavor;
target->cr_uid = source->cr_uid;
target->cr_gid = source->cr_gid;
target->cr_group_info = source->cr_group_info;
get_group_info(target->cr_group_info);
target->cr_gss_mech = source->cr_gss_mech;
if (source->cr_gss_mech)
gss_mech_get(source->cr_gss_mech);
return 0;
}
| 168,145
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SelectionEditor::NodeChildrenWillBeRemoved(ContainerNode& container) {
if (selection_.IsNone())
return;
const Position old_base = selection_.base_;
const Position old_extent = selection_.extent_;
const Position& new_base =
ComputePositionForChildrenRemoval(old_base, container);
const Position& new_extent =
ComputePositionForChildrenRemoval(old_extent, container);
if (new_base == old_base && new_extent == old_extent)
return;
selection_ = SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(new_base, new_extent)
.SetIsHandleVisible(selection_.IsHandleVisible())
.Build();
MarkCacheDirty();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void SelectionEditor::NodeChildrenWillBeRemoved(ContainerNode& container) {
if (selection_.IsNone())
return;
const Position old_base = selection_.base_;
const Position old_extent = selection_.extent_;
const Position& new_base =
ComputePositionForChildrenRemoval(old_base, container);
const Position& new_extent =
ComputePositionForChildrenRemoval(old_extent, container);
if (new_base == old_base && new_extent == old_extent)
return;
selection_ = SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(new_base, new_extent)
.Build();
MarkCacheDirty();
}
| 171,764
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: setElementTypePrefix(XML_Parser parser, ELEMENT_TYPE *elementType)
{
DTD * const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
const XML_Char *name;
for (name = elementType->name; *name; name++) {
if (*name == XML_T(ASCII_COLON)) {
PREFIX *prefix;
const XML_Char *s;
for (s = elementType->name; s != name; s++) {
if (!poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, *s))
return 0;
}
if (!poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, XML_T('\0')))
return 0;
prefix = (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes, poolStart(&dtd->pool),
sizeof(PREFIX));
if (!prefix)
return 0;
if (prefix->name == poolStart(&dtd->pool))
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
else
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
elementType->prefix = prefix;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
|
setElementTypePrefix(XML_Parser parser, ELEMENT_TYPE *elementType)
{
DTD * const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
const XML_Char *name;
for (name = elementType->name; *name; name++) {
if (*name == XML_T(ASCII_COLON)) {
PREFIX *prefix;
const XML_Char *s;
for (s = elementType->name; s != name; s++) {
if (!poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, *s))
return 0;
}
if (!poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, XML_T('\0')))
return 0;
prefix = (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes, poolStart(&dtd->pool),
sizeof(PREFIX));
if (!prefix)
return 0;
if (prefix->name == poolStart(&dtd->pool))
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
else
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
elementType->prefix = prefix;
break;
}
}
return 1;
}
| 169,775
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Dispatcher::AddStatus(const std::string& pattern) {
mg_set_uri_callback(context_, (root_ + pattern).c_str(), &SendStatus, NULL);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void Dispatcher::AddStatus(const std::string& pattern) {
void Dispatcher::AddHealthz(const std::string& pattern) {
mg_set_uri_callback(context_, (root_ + pattern).c_str(), &SendHealthz, NULL);
}
void Dispatcher::AddLog(const std::string& pattern) {
mg_set_uri_callback(context_, (root_ + pattern).c_str(), &SendLog, NULL);
}
| 170,455
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: process(register int code, unsigned char** fill)
{
int incode;
static unsigned char firstchar;
if (code == clear) {
codesize = datasize + 1;
codemask = (1 << codesize) - 1;
avail = clear + 2;
oldcode = -1;
return 1;
}
if (oldcode == -1) {
*(*fill)++ = suffix[code];
firstchar = oldcode = code;
return 1;
}
if (code > avail) {
fprintf(stderr, "code %d too large for %d\n", code, avail);
return 0;
}
incode = code;
if (code == avail) { /* the first code is always < avail */
*stackp++ = firstchar;
code = oldcode;
}
while (code > clear) {
*stackp++ = suffix[code];
code = prefix[code];
}
*stackp++ = firstchar = suffix[code];
prefix[avail] = oldcode;
suffix[avail] = firstchar;
avail++;
if (((avail & codemask) == 0) && (avail < 4096)) {
codesize++;
codemask += avail;
}
oldcode = incode;
do {
*(*fill)++ = *--stackp;
} while (stackp > stack);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fix possible OOB write in gif2tiff.c
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
process(register int code, unsigned char** fill)
{
int incode;
static unsigned char firstchar;
if (code == clear) {
codesize = datasize + 1;
codemask = (1 << codesize) - 1;
avail = clear + 2;
oldcode = -1;
return 1;
}
if (oldcode == -1) {
if (code >= clear) {
fprintf(stderr, "bad input: code=%d is larger than clear=%d\n",code, clear);
return 0;
}
*(*fill)++ = suffix[code];
firstchar = oldcode = code;
return 1;
}
if (code > avail) {
fprintf(stderr, "code %d too large for %d\n", code, avail);
return 0;
}
incode = code;
if (code == avail) { /* the first code is always < avail */
*stackp++ = firstchar;
code = oldcode;
}
while (code > clear) {
*stackp++ = suffix[code];
code = prefix[code];
}
*stackp++ = firstchar = suffix[code];
prefix[avail] = oldcode;
suffix[avail] = firstchar;
avail++;
if (((avail & codemask) == 0) && (avail < 4096)) {
codesize++;
codemask += avail;
}
oldcode = incode;
do {
*(*fill)++ = *--stackp;
} while (stackp > stack);
return 1;
}
| 166,011
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int ceph_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int ret = 0, size = 0;
const char *name = NULL;
char *value = NULL;
struct iattr newattrs;
umode_t new_mode = inode->i_mode, old_mode = inode->i_mode;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
ret = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &new_mode);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
if (ret == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
ret = acl ? -EINVAL : 0;
goto out;
}
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
value = kmalloc(size, GFP_NOFS);
if (!value) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_free;
}
if (new_mode != old_mode) {
newattrs.ia_mode = new_mode;
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
ret = __ceph_setattr(inode, &newattrs);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
}
ret = __ceph_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0);
if (ret) {
if (new_mode != old_mode) {
newattrs.ia_mode = old_mode;
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
__ceph_setattr(inode, &newattrs);
}
goto out_free;
}
ceph_set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
out_free:
kfree(value);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
|
int ceph_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int ret = 0, size = 0;
const char *name = NULL;
char *value = NULL;
struct iattr newattrs;
umode_t new_mode = inode->i_mode, old_mode = inode->i_mode;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
ret = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &new_mode, &acl);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
ret = acl ? -EINVAL : 0;
goto out;
}
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
value = kmalloc(size, GFP_NOFS);
if (!value) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_free;
}
if (new_mode != old_mode) {
newattrs.ia_mode = new_mode;
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
ret = __ceph_setattr(inode, &newattrs);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
}
ret = __ceph_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0);
if (ret) {
if (new_mode != old_mode) {
newattrs.ia_mode = old_mode;
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
__ceph_setattr(inode, &newattrs);
}
goto out_free;
}
ceph_set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
out_free:
kfree(value);
out:
return ret;
}
| 166,968
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::EnsureMailbox(MailboxSyncMode mode,
GLenum filter) {
if (!texture_holder_->IsMailboxTextureHolder()) {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::EnsureMailbox");
if (!original_skia_image_) {
RetainOriginalSkImage();
}
texture_holder_ = std::make_unique<MailboxTextureHolder>(
std::move(texture_holder_), filter);
}
texture_holder_->Sync(mode);
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::EnsureMailbox(MailboxSyncMode mode,
GLenum filter) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (!texture_holder_->IsMailboxTextureHolder()) {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::EnsureMailbox");
if (!original_skia_image_) {
RetainOriginalSkImage();
}
texture_holder_ = std::make_unique<MailboxTextureHolder>(
std::move(texture_holder_), filter);
}
texture_holder_->Sync(mode);
}
| 172,595
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::WillSendRequestInternal(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
String loader_id = loader ? IdentifiersFactory::LoaderId(loader) : "";
resources_data_->ResourceCreated(request_id, loader_id, request.Url());
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType type = InspectorPageAgent::kOtherResource;
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::xmlhttprequest) {
type = InspectorPageAgent::kXHRResource;
resources_data_->SetResourceType(request_id, type);
} else if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document) {
type = InspectorPageAgent::kDocumentResource;
resources_data_->SetResourceType(request_id, type);
}
String frame_id = loader && loader->GetFrame()
? IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(loader->GetFrame())
: "";
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Initiator> initiator_object =
BuildInitiatorObject(loader && loader->GetFrame()
? loader->GetFrame()->GetDocument()
: nullptr,
initiator_info);
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document) {
FrameNavigationInitiatorMap::iterator it =
frame_navigation_initiator_map_.find(frame_id);
if (it != frame_navigation_initiator_map_.end())
initiator_object = it->value->clone();
}
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Request> request_info(
BuildObjectForResourceRequest(request));
if (loader) {
request_info->setMixedContentType(MixedContentTypeForContextType(
MixedContentChecker::ContextTypeForInspector(loader->GetFrame(),
request)));
}
request_info->setReferrerPolicy(
GetReferrerPolicy(request.GetReferrerPolicy()));
if (initiator_info.is_link_preload)
request_info->setIsLinkPreload(true);
String resource_type = InspectorPageAgent::ResourceTypeJson(type);
String documentURL =
loader ? UrlWithoutFragment(loader->Url()).GetString()
: UrlWithoutFragment(execution_context->Url()).GetString();
Maybe<String> maybe_frame_id;
if (!frame_id.IsEmpty())
maybe_frame_id = frame_id;
GetFrontend()->requestWillBeSent(
request_id, loader_id, documentURL, std::move(request_info),
MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(), CurrentTime(), std::move(initiator_object),
BuildObjectForResourceResponse(redirect_response), resource_type,
std::move(maybe_frame_id));
if (pending_xhr_replay_data_ && !pending_xhr_replay_data_->Async())
GetFrontend()->flush();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void InspectorNetworkAgent::WillSendRequestInternal(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info,
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType type) {
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
String loader_id = loader ? IdentifiersFactory::LoaderId(loader) : "";
resources_data_->ResourceCreated(request_id, loader_id, request.Url());
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::xmlhttprequest)
type = InspectorPageAgent::kXHRResource;
resources_data_->SetResourceType(request_id, type);
String frame_id = loader && loader->GetFrame()
? IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(loader->GetFrame())
: "";
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Initiator> initiator_object =
BuildInitiatorObject(loader && loader->GetFrame()
? loader->GetFrame()->GetDocument()
: nullptr,
initiator_info);
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document) {
FrameNavigationInitiatorMap::iterator it =
frame_navigation_initiator_map_.find(frame_id);
if (it != frame_navigation_initiator_map_.end())
initiator_object = it->value->clone();
}
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Request> request_info(
BuildObjectForResourceRequest(request));
if (loader) {
request_info->setMixedContentType(MixedContentTypeForContextType(
MixedContentChecker::ContextTypeForInspector(loader->GetFrame(),
request)));
}
request_info->setReferrerPolicy(
GetReferrerPolicy(request.GetReferrerPolicy()));
if (initiator_info.is_link_preload)
request_info->setIsLinkPreload(true);
String resource_type = InspectorPageAgent::ResourceTypeJson(type);
String documentURL =
loader ? UrlWithoutFragment(loader->Url()).GetString()
: UrlWithoutFragment(execution_context->Url()).GetString();
Maybe<String> maybe_frame_id;
if (!frame_id.IsEmpty())
maybe_frame_id = frame_id;
GetFrontend()->requestWillBeSent(
request_id, loader_id, documentURL, std::move(request_info),
MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(), CurrentTime(), std::move(initiator_object),
BuildObjectForResourceResponse(redirect_response), resource_type,
std::move(maybe_frame_id));
if (pending_xhr_replay_data_ && !pending_xhr_replay_data_->Async())
GetFrontend()->flush();
}
| 172,468
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient::RetrieveRemoteConfig() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
CreateClientConfigRequest request;
std::string serialized_request;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
request.set_telephony_network_operator(
net::android::GetTelephonyNetworkOperator());
#endif
data_reduction_proxy::ConfigDeviceInfo* device_info =
request.mutable_device_info();
device_info->set_total_device_memory_kb(
base::SysInfo::AmountOfPhysicalMemory() / 1024);
const std::string& session_key = request_options_->GetSecureSession();
if (!session_key.empty())
request.set_session_key(request_options_->GetSecureSession());
request.set_dogfood_group(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kDogfood)
? CreateClientConfigRequest_DogfoodGroup_DOGFOOD
: CreateClientConfigRequest_DogfoodGroup_NONDOGFOOD);
data_reduction_proxy::VersionInfo* version_info =
request.mutable_version_info();
uint32_t build;
uint32_t patch;
util::GetChromiumBuildAndPatchAsInts(util::ChromiumVersion(), &build, &patch);
version_info->set_client(util::GetStringForClient(io_data_->client()));
version_info->set_build(build);
version_info->set_patch(patch);
version_info->set_channel(io_data_->channel());
request.SerializeToString(&serialized_request);
net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag traffic_annotation =
net::DefineNetworkTrafficAnnotation("data_reduction_proxy_config", R"(
semantics {
sender: "Data Reduction Proxy"
description:
"Requests a configuration that specifies how to connect to the "
"data reduction proxy."
trigger:
"Requested when Data Saver is enabled and the browser does not "
"have a configuration that is not older than a threshold set by "
"the server."
data: "None."
destination: GOOGLE_OWNED_SERVICE
}
policy {
cookies_allowed: NO
setting:
"Users can control Data Saver on Android via 'Data Saver' setting. "
"Data Saver is not available on iOS, and on desktop it is enabled "
"by insalling the Data Saver extension."
policy_exception_justification: "Not implemented."
})");
fetch_in_progress_ = true;
auto resource_request = std::make_unique<network::ResourceRequest>();
resource_request->url = config_service_url_;
resource_request->method = "POST";
resource_request->load_flags = net::LOAD_BYPASS_PROXY;
resource_request->allow_credentials = false;
url_loader_ = variations::CreateSimpleURLLoaderWithVariationsHeader(
std::move(resource_request), variations::InIncognito::kNo,
variations::SignedIn::kNo, traffic_annotation);
url_loader_->AttachStringForUpload(serialized_request,
"application/x-protobuf");
static const int kMaxRetries = 5;
url_loader_->SetRetryOptions(
kMaxRetries, network::SimpleURLLoader::RETRY_ON_NETWORK_CHANGE);
url_loader_->DownloadToStringOfUnboundedSizeUntilCrashAndDie(
url_loader_factory_.get(),
base::BindOnce(&DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient::OnURLLoadComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient::RetrieveRemoteConfig() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(!params::IsIncludedInHoldbackFieldTrial());
CreateClientConfigRequest request;
std::string serialized_request;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
request.set_telephony_network_operator(
net::android::GetTelephonyNetworkOperator());
#endif
data_reduction_proxy::ConfigDeviceInfo* device_info =
request.mutable_device_info();
device_info->set_total_device_memory_kb(
base::SysInfo::AmountOfPhysicalMemory() / 1024);
const std::string& session_key = request_options_->GetSecureSession();
if (!session_key.empty())
request.set_session_key(request_options_->GetSecureSession());
request.set_dogfood_group(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kDogfood)
? CreateClientConfigRequest_DogfoodGroup_DOGFOOD
: CreateClientConfigRequest_DogfoodGroup_NONDOGFOOD);
data_reduction_proxy::VersionInfo* version_info =
request.mutable_version_info();
uint32_t build;
uint32_t patch;
util::GetChromiumBuildAndPatchAsInts(util::ChromiumVersion(), &build, &patch);
version_info->set_client(util::GetStringForClient(io_data_->client()));
version_info->set_build(build);
version_info->set_patch(patch);
version_info->set_channel(io_data_->channel());
request.SerializeToString(&serialized_request);
net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag traffic_annotation =
net::DefineNetworkTrafficAnnotation("data_reduction_proxy_config", R"(
semantics {
sender: "Data Reduction Proxy"
description:
"Requests a configuration that specifies how to connect to the "
"data reduction proxy."
trigger:
"Requested when Data Saver is enabled and the browser does not "
"have a configuration that is not older than a threshold set by "
"the server."
data: "None."
destination: GOOGLE_OWNED_SERVICE
}
policy {
cookies_allowed: NO
setting:
"Users can control Data Saver on Android via 'Data Saver' setting. "
"Data Saver is not available on iOS, and on desktop it is enabled "
"by insalling the Data Saver extension."
policy_exception_justification: "Not implemented."
})");
fetch_in_progress_ = true;
auto resource_request = std::make_unique<network::ResourceRequest>();
resource_request->url = config_service_url_;
resource_request->method = "POST";
resource_request->load_flags = net::LOAD_BYPASS_PROXY;
resource_request->allow_credentials = false;
url_loader_ = variations::CreateSimpleURLLoaderWithVariationsHeader(
std::move(resource_request), variations::InIncognito::kNo,
variations::SignedIn::kNo, traffic_annotation);
url_loader_->AttachStringForUpload(serialized_request,
"application/x-protobuf");
static const int kMaxRetries = 5;
url_loader_->SetRetryOptions(
kMaxRetries, network::SimpleURLLoader::RETRY_ON_NETWORK_CHANGE);
url_loader_->DownloadToStringOfUnboundedSizeUntilCrashAndDie(
url_loader_factory_.get(),
base::BindOnce(&DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient::OnURLLoadComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,420
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item;
item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if (item)
{
/* Check if epoch is current. */
if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
{
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
return(0);
dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
}
}
/* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
* have been processed */
s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
return(1);
}
Commit Message: A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item;
item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if (item)
{
/* Check if epoch is current. */
if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
{
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
return(0);
if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
s->s3->rrec.seq_num)<0)
return -1;
}
}
/* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
* have been processed */
s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
return(1);
}
| 166,747
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidGetPrintedPagesCount(
int cookie, int number_pages) {
if (printer_.get())
printer_->SetPrintedPagesCount(cookie, number_pages);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidGetPrintedPagesCount(
int cookie, int number_pages) {
printer_->SetPrintedPagesCount(cookie, number_pages);
}
| 170,848
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static uint32_t select_lease_time(struct dhcp_packet *packet)
{
uint32_t lease_time_sec = server_config.max_lease_sec;
uint8_t *lease_time_opt = udhcp_get_option(packet, DHCP_LEASE_TIME);
if (lease_time_opt) {
move_from_unaligned32(lease_time_sec, lease_time_opt);
lease_time_sec = ntohl(lease_time_sec);
if (lease_time_sec > server_config.max_lease_sec)
lease_time_sec = server_config.max_lease_sec;
if (lease_time_sec < server_config.min_lease_sec)
lease_time_sec = server_config.min_lease_sec;
}
return lease_time_sec;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static uint32_t select_lease_time(struct dhcp_packet *packet)
{
uint32_t lease_time_sec = server_config.max_lease_sec;
uint8_t *lease_time_opt = udhcp_get_option32(packet, DHCP_LEASE_TIME);
if (lease_time_opt) {
move_from_unaligned32(lease_time_sec, lease_time_opt);
lease_time_sec = ntohl(lease_time_sec);
if (lease_time_sec > server_config.max_lease_sec)
lease_time_sec = server_config.max_lease_sec;
if (lease_time_sec < server_config.min_lease_sec)
lease_time_sec = server_config.min_lease_sec;
}
return lease_time_sec;
}
| 165,225
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline struct old_rng_alg *crypto_old_rng_alg(struct crypto_rng *tfm)
{
return &crypto_rng_tfm(tfm)->__crt_alg->cra_rng;
}
Commit Message: crypto: rng - Remove old low-level rng interface
Now that all rng implementations have switched over to the new
interface, we can remove the old low-level interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
static inline struct old_rng_alg *crypto_old_rng_alg(struct crypto_rng *tfm)
| 167,730
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
int len, int peek)
{
int al, i, j, ret;
unsigned int n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
/* Not initialized yet */
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
return (-1);
}
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
(peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/*
* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
*/
if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len)))
return ret;
/*
* Now s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if
* type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/*
* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
* SCTP.
*/
if ((!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
(BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))
&& ossl_statem_in_sctp_read_sock(s)
&& s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
#else
if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s))
#endif
{
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
}
start:
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
/*-
* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
*/
rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
/*
* We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
* during the last handshake in advance, if any.
*/
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
pitem *item;
item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
if (item) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
}
#endif
dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
}
/* Check for timeout */
if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
goto start;
/* get new packet if necessary */
if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
|| (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
if (ret <= 0) {
ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
/* anything other than a timeout is an error */
if (ret <= 0)
return (ret);
else
goto start;
}
}
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
goto start;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
|
int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
int len, int peek)
{
int al, i, j, ret;
unsigned int n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
/* Not initialized yet */
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
return (-1);
}
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
(peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/*
* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
*/
if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len)))
return ret;
/*
* Now s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if
* type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/*
* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
* SCTP.
*/
if ((!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
(BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))
&& ossl_statem_in_sctp_read_sock(s)
&& s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
#else
if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s))
#endif
{
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
}
start:
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
/*-
* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
*/
rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
/*
* We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
* during the last handshake in advance, if any.
*/
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
pitem *item;
item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
if (item) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
}
#endif
dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
}
/* Check for timeout */
if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
goto start;
/* get new packet if necessary */
if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
|| (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
if (ret <= 0) {
ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
/* anything other than a timeout is an error */
if (ret <= 0)
return (ret);
else
goto start;
}
}
/*
* Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
* record that isn't an alert.
*/
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
&& SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
goto start;
}
| 165,262
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), NULL, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
if (!tls_index.initialized())
tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"(^[\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|[a-z][\u0585\u0581]+$|)"
R"([a-z][\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|)"
R"(^[og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|[\p{scx=armn}][og]+$|)"
R"([\p{scx=armn}][og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=cans}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=cans}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339])",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
Commit Message: Block Tifinagh + Latin mix
BUG=chromium:722639
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDNToU*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2894313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#474199}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), NULL, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
if (!tls_index.initialized())
tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
// - Disalow mixing of Latin and Tifinagh.
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"(^[\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|[a-z][\u0585\u0581]+$|)"
R"([a-z][\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|)"
R"(^[og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|[\p{scx=armn}][og]+$|)"
R"([\p{scx=armn}][og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=cans}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=cans}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=tfng}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=tfng}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339])",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
| 172,363
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: gs_nulldevice(gs_gstate * pgs)
{
int code = 0;
if (pgs->device == 0 || !gx_device_is_null(pgs->device)) {
gx_device *ndev;
code = gs_copydevice(&ndev, (const gx_device *)&gs_null_device,
pgs->memory);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/*
* Internal devices have a reference count of 0, not 1,
* aside from references from graphics states.
to sort out how the icc profile is best handled with this device.
It seems to inherit properties from the current device if there
is one */
rc_init(ndev, pgs->memory, 0);
if (pgs->device != NULL) {
if ((code = dev_proc(pgs->device, get_profile)(pgs->device,
&(ndev->icc_struct))) < 0)
return code;
rc_increment(ndev->icc_struct);
set_dev_proc(ndev, get_profile, gx_default_get_profile);
}
if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0)
if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0)
gs_free_object(pgs->memory, ndev, "gs_copydevice(device)");
}
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
|
gs_nulldevice(gs_gstate * pgs)
{
int code = 0;
bool saveLockSafety = false;
if (pgs->device == 0 || !gx_device_is_null(pgs->device)) {
gx_device *ndev;
code = gs_copydevice(&ndev, (const gx_device *)&gs_null_device,
pgs->memory);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (gs_currentdevice_inline(pgs) != NULL)
saveLockSafety = gs_currentdevice_inline(pgs)->LockSafetyParams;
/*
* Internal devices have a reference count of 0, not 1,
* aside from references from graphics states.
to sort out how the icc profile is best handled with this device.
It seems to inherit properties from the current device if there
is one */
rc_init(ndev, pgs->memory, 0);
if (pgs->device != NULL) {
if ((code = dev_proc(pgs->device, get_profile)(pgs->device,
&(ndev->icc_struct))) < 0)
return code;
rc_increment(ndev->icc_struct);
set_dev_proc(ndev, get_profile, gx_default_get_profile);
}
if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0)
if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0)
gs_free_object(pgs->memory, ndev, "gs_copydevice(device)");
gs_currentdevice_inline(pgs)->LockSafetyParams = saveLockSafety;
}
return code;
}
| 164,687
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void *btif_hh_poll_event_thread(void *arg)
{
btif_hh_device_t *p_dev = arg;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Thread created fd = %d", __FUNCTION__, p_dev->fd);
struct pollfd pfds[1];
int ret;
pfds[0].fd = p_dev->fd;
pfds[0].events = POLLIN;
uhid_set_non_blocking(p_dev->fd);
while(p_dev->hh_keep_polling){
ret = poll(pfds, 1, 50);
if (ret < 0) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Cannot poll for fds: %s\n", __FUNCTION__, strerror(errno));
break;
}
if (pfds[0].revents & POLLIN) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hh_poll_event_thread: POLLIN");
ret = uhid_event(p_dev);
if (ret){
break;
}
}
}
p_dev->hh_poll_thread_id = -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
static void *btif_hh_poll_event_thread(void *arg)
{
btif_hh_device_t *p_dev = arg;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Thread created fd = %d", __FUNCTION__, p_dev->fd);
struct pollfd pfds[1];
int ret;
pfds[0].fd = p_dev->fd;
pfds[0].events = POLLIN;
uhid_set_non_blocking(p_dev->fd);
while(p_dev->hh_keep_polling){
ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(poll(pfds, 1, 50));
if (ret < 0) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Cannot poll for fds: %s\n", __FUNCTION__, strerror(errno));
break;
}
if (pfds[0].revents & POLLIN) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hh_poll_event_thread: POLLIN");
ret = uhid_event(p_dev);
if (ret){
break;
}
}
}
p_dev->hh_poll_thread_id = -1;
return 0;
}
| 173,431
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void DecrementUntilZero(int* count) {
(*count)--;
if (!(*count))
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::RunLoop::QuitCurrentWhenIdleClosureDeprecated());
}
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
CWE ID: CWE-94
|
static void DecrementUntilZero(int* count) {
{
base::RunLoop run_loop;
cloud_print_proxy->GetCloudPrintProxyInfo(
base::BindOnce([](base::OnceClosure done, bool, const std::string&,
const std::string&) { std::move(done).Run(); },
run_loop.QuitClosure()));
run_loop.Run();
}
}
| 172,049
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Segment::Segment(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long elem_start,
long long start,
long long size) :
m_pReader(pReader),
m_element_start(elem_start),
m_start(start),
m_size(size),
m_pos(start),
m_pUnknownSize(0),
m_pSeekHead(NULL),
m_pInfo(NULL),
m_pTracks(NULL),
m_pCues(NULL),
m_pChapters(NULL),
m_clusters(NULL),
m_clusterCount(0),
m_clusterPreloadCount(0),
m_clusterSize(0)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
Segment::Segment(
| 174,438
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: AccessibilityButtonState AXObject::checkboxOrRadioValue() const {
const AtomicString& checkedAttribute =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kChecked);
if (equalIgnoringCase(checkedAttribute, "true"))
return ButtonStateOn;
if (equalIgnoringCase(checkedAttribute, "mixed")) {
AccessibilityRole role = ariaRoleAttribute();
if (role == CheckBoxRole || role == MenuItemCheckBoxRole)
return ButtonStateMixed;
}
return ButtonStateOff;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
AccessibilityButtonState AXObject::checkboxOrRadioValue() const {
const AtomicString& checkedAttribute =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kChecked);
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(checkedAttribute, "true"))
return ButtonStateOn;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(checkedAttribute, "mixed")) {
AccessibilityRole role = ariaRoleAttribute();
if (role == CheckBoxRole || role == MenuItemCheckBoxRole)
return ButtonStateMixed;
}
return ButtonStateOff;
}
| 171,924
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: MYSQLND_METHOD(mysqlnd_conn_data, set_server_option)(MYSQLND_CONN_DATA * const conn, enum_mysqlnd_server_option option TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t this_func = STRUCT_OFFSET(struct st_mysqlnd_conn_data_methods, set_server_option);
zend_uchar buffer[2];
enum_func_status ret = FAIL;
DBG_ENTER("mysqlnd_conn_data::set_server_option");
if (PASS == conn->m->local_tx_start(conn, this_func TSRMLS_CC)) {
int2store(buffer, (unsigned int) option);
ret = conn->m->simple_command(conn, COM_SET_OPTION, buffer, sizeof(buffer), PROT_EOF_PACKET, FALSE, TRUE TSRMLS_CC);
conn->m->local_tx_end(conn, this_func, ret TSRMLS_CC);
}
DBG_RETURN(ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
MYSQLND_METHOD(mysqlnd_conn_data, set_server_option)(MYSQLND_CONN_DATA * const conn, enum_mysqlnd_server_option option TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t this_func = STRUCT_OFFSET(struct st_mysqlnd_conn_data_methods, set_server_option);
zend_uchar buffer[2];
enum_func_status ret = FAIL;
DBG_ENTER("mysqlnd_conn_data::set_server_option");
if (PASS == conn->m->local_tx_start(conn, this_func TSRMLS_CC)) {
int2store(buffer, (unsigned int) option);
ret = conn->m->simple_command(conn, COM_SET_OPTION, buffer, sizeof(buffer), PROT_EOF_PACKET, FALSE, TRUE TSRMLS_CC);
conn->m->local_tx_end(conn, this_func, ret TSRMLS_CC);
}
DBG_RETURN(ret);
}
| 165,274
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ChangeCurrentInputMethodFromId(const std::string& input_method_id) {
const chromeos::InputMethodDescriptor* descriptor =
chromeos::input_method::GetInputMethodDescriptorFromId(
input_method_id);
if (descriptor) {
ChangeCurrentInputMethod(*descriptor);
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Descriptor is not found for: " << input_method_id;
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void ChangeCurrentInputMethodFromId(const std::string& input_method_id) {
const input_method::InputMethodDescriptor* descriptor =
input_method::GetInputMethodDescriptorFromId(
input_method_id);
if (descriptor) {
ChangeCurrentInputMethod(*descriptor);
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Descriptor is not found for: " << input_method_id;
}
}
| 170,479
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int my_csr_reader( const char* i_csr_file_in,
unsigned int** o_row_idx,
unsigned int** o_column_idx,
REALTYPE** o_values,
unsigned int* o_row_count,
unsigned int* o_column_count,
unsigned int* o_element_count ) {
FILE *l_csr_file_handle;
const unsigned int l_line_length = 512;
char l_line[512/*l_line_length*/+1];
unsigned int l_header_read = 0;
unsigned int* l_row_idx_id = NULL;
unsigned int l_i = 0;
l_csr_file_handle = fopen( i_csr_file_in, "r" );
if ( l_csr_file_handle == NULL ) {
fprintf( stderr, "cannot open CSR file!\n" );
return -1;
}
while (fgets(l_line, l_line_length, l_csr_file_handle) != NULL) {
if ( strlen(l_line) == l_line_length ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not read file length!\n" );
return -1;
}
/* check if we are still reading comments header */
if ( l_line[0] == '%' ) {
continue;
} else {
/* if we are the first line after comment header, we allocate our data structures */
if ( l_header_read == 0 ) {
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %u", o_row_count, o_column_count, o_element_count) == 3 ) {
/* allocate CSC datastructure matching mtx file */
*o_column_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_element_count));
*o_row_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count + 1));
*o_values = (REALTYPE*) malloc(sizeof(double) * (*o_element_count));
l_row_idx_id = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count));
/* check if mallocs were successful */
if ( ( *o_row_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_column_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_values == NULL ) ||
( l_row_idx_id == NULL ) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not allocate sp data!\n" );
return -1;
}
/* set everything to zero for init */
memset(*o_row_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_row_count + 1));
memset(*o_column_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_element_count));
memset(*o_values, 0, sizeof(double)*(*o_element_count));
memset(l_row_idx_id, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_row_count));
/* init column idx */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_row_count + 1); l_i++)
(*o_row_idx)[l_i] = (*o_element_count);
/* init */
(*o_row_idx)[0] = 0;
l_i = 0;
l_header_read = 1;
} else {
fprintf( stderr, "could not csr description!\n" );
return -1;
}
/* now we read the actual content */
} else {
unsigned int l_row, l_column;
REALTYPE l_value;
/* read a line of content */
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %lf", &l_row, &l_column, &l_value) != 3 ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not read element!\n" );
return -1;
}
/* adjust numbers to zero termination */
l_row--;
l_column--;
/* add these values to row and value structure */
(*o_column_idx)[l_i] = l_column;
(*o_values)[l_i] = l_value;
l_i++;
/* handle columns, set id to own for this column, yeah we need to handle empty columns */
l_row_idx_id[l_row] = 1;
(*o_row_idx)[l_row+1] = l_i;
}
}
}
/* close mtx file */
fclose( l_csr_file_handle );
/* check if we read a file which was consistent */
if ( l_i != (*o_element_count) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "we were not able to read all elements!\n" );
return -1;
}
/* let's handle empty rows */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_row_count); l_i++) {
if ( l_row_idx_id[l_i] == 0 ) {
(*o_row_idx)[l_i+1] = (*o_row_idx)[l_i];
}
}
/* free helper data structure */
if ( l_row_idx_id != NULL ) {
free( l_row_idx_id );
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Issue #287: made CSR/CSC readers more robust against invalid input (case #1).
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
int my_csr_reader( const char* i_csr_file_in,
unsigned int** o_row_idx,
unsigned int** o_column_idx,
REALTYPE** o_values,
unsigned int* o_row_count,
unsigned int* o_column_count,
unsigned int* o_element_count ) {
FILE *l_csr_file_handle;
const unsigned int l_line_length = 512;
char l_line[512/*l_line_length*/+1];
unsigned int l_header_read = 0;
unsigned int* l_row_idx_id = NULL;
unsigned int l_i = 0;
l_csr_file_handle = fopen( i_csr_file_in, "r" );
if ( l_csr_file_handle == NULL ) {
fprintf( stderr, "cannot open CSR file!\n" );
return -1;
}
while (fgets(l_line, l_line_length, l_csr_file_handle) != NULL) {
if ( strlen(l_line) == l_line_length ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not read file length!\n" );
return -1;
}
/* check if we are still reading comments header */
if ( l_line[0] == '%' ) {
continue;
} else {
/* if we are the first line after comment header, we allocate our data structures */
if ( l_header_read == 0 ) {
if (3 == sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %u", o_row_count, o_column_count, o_element_count) &&
0 != *o_row_count && 0 != *o_column_count && 0 != *o_element_count)
{
/* allocate CSC datastructure matching mtx file */
*o_column_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_element_count));
*o_row_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count + 1));
*o_values = (REALTYPE*) malloc(sizeof(double) * (*o_element_count));
l_row_idx_id = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count));
/* check if mallocs were successful */
if ( ( *o_row_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_column_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_values == NULL ) ||
( l_row_idx_id == NULL ) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not allocate sp data!\n" );
return -1;
}
/* set everything to zero for init */
memset(*o_row_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_row_count + 1));
memset(*o_column_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_element_count));
memset(*o_values, 0, sizeof(double)*(*o_element_count));
memset(l_row_idx_id, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_row_count));
/* init column idx */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_row_count + 1); l_i++)
(*o_row_idx)[l_i] = (*o_element_count);
/* init */
(*o_row_idx)[0] = 0;
l_i = 0;
l_header_read = 1;
} else {
fprintf( stderr, "could not csr description!\n" );
return -1;
}
/* now we read the actual content */
} else {
unsigned int l_row, l_column;
REALTYPE l_value;
/* read a line of content */
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %lf", &l_row, &l_column, &l_value) != 3 ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not read element!\n" );
return -1;
}
/* adjust numbers to zero termination */
l_row--;
l_column--;
/* add these values to row and value structure */
(*o_column_idx)[l_i] = l_column;
(*o_values)[l_i] = l_value;
l_i++;
/* handle columns, set id to own for this column, yeah we need to handle empty columns */
l_row_idx_id[l_row] = 1;
(*o_row_idx)[l_row+1] = l_i;
}
}
}
/* close mtx file */
fclose( l_csr_file_handle );
/* check if we read a file which was consistent */
if ( l_i != (*o_element_count) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "we were not able to read all elements!\n" );
return -1;
}
/* let's handle empty rows */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_row_count); l_i++) {
if ( l_row_idx_id[l_i] == 0 ) {
(*o_row_idx)[l_i+1] = (*o_row_idx)[l_i];
}
}
/* free helper data structure */
if ( l_row_idx_id != NULL ) {
free( l_row_idx_id );
}
return 0;
}
| 168,949
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: MagickExport unsigned char *DetachBlob(BlobInfo *blob_info)
{
unsigned char
*data;
assert(blob_info != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
if (blob_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
if (blob_info->mapped != MagickFalse)
{
(void) UnmapBlob(blob_info->data,blob_info->length);
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,blob_info->length);
}
blob_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
blob_info->length=0;
blob_info->offset=0;
blob_info->eof=MagickFalse;
blob_info->error=0;
blob_info->exempt=MagickFalse;
blob_info->type=UndefinedStream;
blob_info->file_info.file=(FILE *) NULL;
data=blob_info->data;
blob_info->data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
blob_info->stream=(StreamHandler) NULL;
return(data);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
MagickExport unsigned char *DetachBlob(BlobInfo *blob_info)
{
unsigned char
*data;
assert(blob_info != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
if (blob_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
if (blob_info->mapped != MagickFalse)
{
(void) UnmapBlob(blob_info->data,blob_info->length);
blob_info->data=NULL;
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,blob_info->length);
}
blob_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
blob_info->length=0;
blob_info->offset=0;
blob_info->eof=MagickFalse;
blob_info->error=0;
blob_info->exempt=MagickFalse;
blob_info->type=UndefinedStream;
blob_info->file_info.file=(FILE *) NULL;
data=blob_info->data;
blob_info->data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
blob_info->stream=(StreamHandler) NULL;
return(data);
}
| 169,563
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool Track::GetLacing() const
{
return m_info.lacing;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool Track::GetLacing() const
| 174,334
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ContentEncoding::ContentCompression::ContentCompression()
: algo(0),
settings(NULL),
settings_len(0) {
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
ContentEncoding::ContentCompression::ContentCompression()
| 174,250
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static rsRetVal initZMQ(instanceData* pData) {
DEFiRet;
/* create the context if necessary. */
if (NULL == s_context) {
zsys_handler_set(NULL);
s_context = zctx_new();
if (s_workerThreads > 0) zctx_set_iothreads(s_context, s_workerThreads);
}
pData->socket = zsocket_new(s_context, pData->type);
if (NULL == pData->socket) {
errmsg.LogError(0, RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE,
"omzmq3: zsocket_new failed for %s: %s",
pData->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE);
}
/* use czmq defaults for these, unless set to non-default values */
if(pData->identity) zsocket_set_identity(pData->socket, (char*)pData->identity);
if(pData->sndBuf > -1) zsocket_set_sndbuf(pData->socket, pData->sndBuf);
if(pData->rcvBuf > -1) zsocket_set_sndbuf(pData->socket, pData->rcvBuf);
if(pData->linger > -1) zsocket_set_linger(pData->socket, pData->linger);
if(pData->backlog > -1) zsocket_set_backlog(pData->socket, pData->backlog);
if(pData->sndTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_sndtimeo(pData->socket, pData->sndTimeout);
if(pData->rcvTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_rcvtimeo(pData->socket, pData->rcvTimeout);
if(pData->maxMsgSize > -1) zsocket_set_maxmsgsize(pData->socket, pData->maxMsgSize);
if(pData->rate > -1) zsocket_set_rate(pData->socket, pData->rate);
if(pData->recoveryIVL > -1) zsocket_set_recovery_ivl(pData->socket, pData->recoveryIVL);
if(pData->multicastHops > -1) zsocket_set_multicast_hops(pData->socket, pData->multicastHops);
if(pData->reconnectIVL > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl(pData->socket, pData->reconnectIVL);
if(pData->reconnectIVLMax > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl_max(pData->socket, pData->reconnectIVLMax);
if(pData->ipv4Only > -1) zsocket_set_ipv4only(pData->socket, pData->ipv4Only);
if(pData->affinity != 1) zsocket_set_affinity(pData->socket, pData->affinity);
if(pData->rcvHWM > -1) zsocket_set_rcvhwm(pData->socket, pData->rcvHWM);
if(pData->sndHWM > -1) zsocket_set_sndhwm(pData->socket, pData->sndHWM);
/* bind or connect to it */
if (pData->action == ACTION_BIND) {
/* bind asserts, so no need to test return val here
which isn't the greatest api -- oh well */
if(-1 == zsocket_bind(pData->socket, (char*)pData->description)) {
errmsg.LogError(0, RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE, "omzmq3: bind failed for %s: %s",
pData->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE);
}
DBGPRINTF("omzmq3: bind to %s successful\n",pData->description);
} else {
if(-1 == zsocket_connect(pData->socket, (char*)pData->description)) {
errmsg.LogError(0, RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE, "omzmq3: connect failed for %s: %s",
pData->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE);
}
DBGPRINTF("omzmq3: connect to %s successful", pData->description);
}
finalize_it:
RETiRet;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1565 from Whissi/fix-format-security-issue-in-zmq-modules
Fix format security issue in zmq3 modules
CWE ID: CWE-134
|
static rsRetVal initZMQ(instanceData* pData) {
DEFiRet;
/* create the context if necessary. */
if (NULL == s_context) {
zsys_handler_set(NULL);
s_context = zctx_new();
if (s_workerThreads > 0) zctx_set_iothreads(s_context, s_workerThreads);
}
pData->socket = zsocket_new(s_context, pData->type);
if (NULL == pData->socket) {
errmsg.LogError(0, RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE,
"omzmq3: zsocket_new failed for %s: %s",
pData->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE);
}
/* use czmq defaults for these, unless set to non-default values */
if(pData->identity) zsocket_set_identity(pData->socket, (char*)pData->identity);
if(pData->sndBuf > -1) zsocket_set_sndbuf(pData->socket, pData->sndBuf);
if(pData->rcvBuf > -1) zsocket_set_sndbuf(pData->socket, pData->rcvBuf);
if(pData->linger > -1) zsocket_set_linger(pData->socket, pData->linger);
if(pData->backlog > -1) zsocket_set_backlog(pData->socket, pData->backlog);
if(pData->sndTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_sndtimeo(pData->socket, pData->sndTimeout);
if(pData->rcvTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_rcvtimeo(pData->socket, pData->rcvTimeout);
if(pData->maxMsgSize > -1) zsocket_set_maxmsgsize(pData->socket, pData->maxMsgSize);
if(pData->rate > -1) zsocket_set_rate(pData->socket, pData->rate);
if(pData->recoveryIVL > -1) zsocket_set_recovery_ivl(pData->socket, pData->recoveryIVL);
if(pData->multicastHops > -1) zsocket_set_multicast_hops(pData->socket, pData->multicastHops);
if(pData->reconnectIVL > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl(pData->socket, pData->reconnectIVL);
if(pData->reconnectIVLMax > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl_max(pData->socket, pData->reconnectIVLMax);
if(pData->ipv4Only > -1) zsocket_set_ipv4only(pData->socket, pData->ipv4Only);
if(pData->affinity != 1) zsocket_set_affinity(pData->socket, pData->affinity);
if(pData->rcvHWM > -1) zsocket_set_rcvhwm(pData->socket, pData->rcvHWM);
if(pData->sndHWM > -1) zsocket_set_sndhwm(pData->socket, pData->sndHWM);
/* bind or connect to it */
if (pData->action == ACTION_BIND) {
/* bind asserts, so no need to test return val here
which isn't the greatest api -- oh well */
if(-1 == zsocket_bind(pData->socket, "%s", (char*)pData->description)) {
errmsg.LogError(0, RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE, "omzmq3: bind failed for %s: %s",
pData->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE);
}
DBGPRINTF("omzmq3: bind to %s successful\n",pData->description);
} else {
if(-1 == zsocket_connect(pData->socket, "%s", (char*)pData->description)) {
errmsg.LogError(0, RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE, "omzmq3: connect failed for %s: %s",
pData->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_NO_ERRCODE);
}
DBGPRINTF("omzmq3: connect to %s successful", pData->description);
}
finalize_it:
RETiRet;
}
| 167,984
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: parse_array(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem)
{
/*
* an array is a possibly empty sequence of array elements, separated by
* commas and surrounded by square brackets.
*/
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
if (astart != NULL)
(*astart) (sem->semstate);
* array end.
*/
lex->lex_level++;
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_START, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_START);
if (lex_peek(lex) != JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END)
{
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
while (lex_accept(lex, JSON_TOKEN_COMMA, NULL))
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
}
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_NEXT, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END);
lex->lex_level--;
if (aend != NULL)
(*aend) (sem->semstate);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
parse_array(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem)
{
/*
* an array is a possibly empty sequence of array elements, separated by
* commas and surrounded by square brackets.
*/
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
check_stack_depth();
if (astart != NULL)
(*astart) (sem->semstate);
* array end.
*/
lex->lex_level++;
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_START, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_START);
if (lex_peek(lex) != JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END)
{
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
while (lex_accept(lex, JSON_TOKEN_COMMA, NULL))
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
}
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_NEXT, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END);
lex->lex_level--;
if (aend != NULL)
(*aend) (sem->semstate);
}
| 164,679
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: CastStreamingNativeHandler::CastStreamingNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context),
last_transport_id_(1),
weak_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction("CreateSession",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::CreateCastSession,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("DestroyCastRtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::DestroyCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction(
"GetSupportedParamsCastRtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::GetSupportedParamsCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("StartCastRtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::StartCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("StopCastRtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::StopCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("DestroyCastUdpTransport",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::DestroyCastUdpTransport,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction(
"SetDestinationCastUdpTransport",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::SetDestinationCastUdpTransport,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction(
"SetOptionsCastUdpTransport",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::SetOptionsCastUdpTransport,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("ToggleLogging",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::ToggleLogging,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("GetRawEvents",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::GetRawEvents,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("GetStats", base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::GetStats,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("StartCastRtpReceiver",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::StartCastRtpReceiver,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
|
CastStreamingNativeHandler::CastStreamingNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context),
last_transport_id_(1),
weak_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction("CreateSession", "cast.streaming.session",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::CreateCastSession,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("DestroyCastRtpStream", "cast.streaming.rtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::DestroyCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction(
"GetSupportedParamsCastRtpStream", "cast.streaming.rtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::GetSupportedParamsCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("StartCastRtpStream", "cast.streaming.rtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::StartCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("StopCastRtpStream", "cast.streaming.rtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::StopCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("DestroyCastUdpTransport", "cast.streaming.udpTransport",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::DestroyCastUdpTransport,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction(
"SetDestinationCastUdpTransport", "cast.streaming.udpTransport",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::SetDestinationCastUdpTransport,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction(
"SetOptionsCastUdpTransport", "cast.streaming.udpTransport",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::SetOptionsCastUdpTransport,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("ToggleLogging", "cast.streaming.rtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::ToggleLogging,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("GetRawEvents", "cast.streaming.rtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::GetRawEvents,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("GetStats", "cast.streaming.rtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::GetStats,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("StartCastRtpReceiver", "cast.streaming.receiverSession",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::StartCastRtpReceiver,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
| 173,270
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: juniper_atm1_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[0] == 0x80) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1, l2info.caplen - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
juniper_atm1_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[0] == 0x80) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
}
| 167,948
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void *jas_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
{
void *result;
JAS_DBGLOG(101, ("jas_realloc called with %x,%zu\n", ptr, size));
result = realloc(ptr, size);
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_realloc(%p, %zu) -> %p\n", ptr, size, result));
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem.
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
void *jas_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
{
void *result;
JAS_DBGLOG(101, ("jas_realloc(%x, %zu)\n", ptr, size));
result = realloc(ptr, size);
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_realloc(%p, %zu) -> %p\n", ptr, size, result));
return result;
}
| 168,475
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: size_t mptsas_config_ioc_0(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
PCIDeviceClass *pcic = PCI_DEVICE_GET_CLASS(s);
return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(0, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_IOC, 0x01,
"*l*lwwb*b*b*blww",
pcic->vendor_id, pcic->device_id, pcic->revision,
pcic->subsystem_vendor_id,
pcic->subsystem_id);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
size_t mptsas_config_ioc_0(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
PCIDeviceClass *pcic = PCI_DEVICE_GET_CLASS(s);
return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(0, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_IOC, 0x01,
"*l*lwwb*b*b*blww",
pcic->vendor_id, pcic->device_id, pcic->revision,
pcic->class_id, pcic->subsystem_vendor_id,
pcic->subsystem_id);
}
| 164,934
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int enable(void) {
LOG_INFO("%s", __func__);
if (!interface_ready())
return BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
stack_manager_get_interface()->start_up_stack_async();
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int enable(void) {
static int enable(bool start_restricted) {
LOG_INFO(LOG_TAG, "%s: start restricted = %d", __func__, start_restricted);
restricted_mode = start_restricted;
if (!interface_ready())
return BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
stack_manager_get_interface()->start_up_stack_async();
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
| 173,551
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: size_t compile_tree(struct filter_op **fop)
{
int i = 1;
struct filter_op *array = NULL;
struct unfold_elm *ue;
BUG_IF(tree_root == NULL);
fprintf(stdout, " Unfolding the meta-tree ");
fflush(stdout);
/* start the recursion on the tree */
unfold_blk(&tree_root);
fprintf(stdout, " done.\n\n");
/* substitute the virtual labels with real offsets */
labels_to_offsets();
/* convert the tailq into an array */
TAILQ_FOREACH(ue, &unfolded_tree, next) {
/* label == 0 means a real instruction */
if (ue->label == 0) {
SAFE_REALLOC(array, i * sizeof(struct filter_op));
memcpy(&array[i - 1], &ue->fop, sizeof(struct filter_op));
i++;
}
}
/* always append the exit function to a script */
SAFE_REALLOC(array, i * sizeof(struct filter_op));
array[i - 1].opcode = FOP_EXIT;
/* return the pointer to the array */
*fop = array;
return (i);
}
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
size_t compile_tree(struct filter_op **fop)
{
int i = 1;
struct filter_op *array = NULL;
struct unfold_elm *ue;
// invalid file
if (tree_root == NULL)
return 0;
fprintf(stdout, " Unfolding the meta-tree ");
fflush(stdout);
/* start the recursion on the tree */
unfold_blk(&tree_root);
fprintf(stdout, " done.\n\n");
/* substitute the virtual labels with real offsets */
labels_to_offsets();
/* convert the tailq into an array */
TAILQ_FOREACH(ue, &unfolded_tree, next) {
/* label == 0 means a real instruction */
if (ue->label == 0) {
SAFE_REALLOC(array, i * sizeof(struct filter_op));
memcpy(&array[i - 1], &ue->fop, sizeof(struct filter_op));
i++;
}
}
/* always append the exit function to a script */
SAFE_REALLOC(array, i * sizeof(struct filter_op));
array[i - 1].opcode = FOP_EXIT;
/* return the pointer to the array */
*fop = array;
return (i);
}
| 168,336
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void InspectorClientImpl::clearBrowserCache()
{
if (WebDevToolsAgentImpl* agent = devToolsAgent())
agent->clearBrowserCache();
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
|
void InspectorClientImpl::clearBrowserCache()
| 171,346
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static struct nfs4_opendata *nfs4_opendata_alloc(struct path *path,
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp, int flags,
const struct iattr *attrs)
{
struct dentry *parent = dget_parent(path->dentry);
struct inode *dir = parent->d_inode;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs4_opendata *p;
p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
if (p == NULL)
goto err;
p->o_arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&sp->so_seqid);
if (p->o_arg.seqid == NULL)
goto err_free;
p->path.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
p->path.dentry = dget(path->dentry);
p->dir = parent;
p->owner = sp;
atomic_inc(&sp->so_count);
p->o_arg.fh = NFS_FH(dir);
p->o_arg.open_flags = flags,
p->o_arg.clientid = server->nfs_client->cl_clientid;
p->o_arg.id = sp->so_owner_id.id;
p->o_arg.name = &p->path.dentry->d_name;
p->o_arg.server = server;
p->o_arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
p->o_arg.claim = NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_NULL;
if (flags & O_EXCL) {
u32 *s = (u32 *) p->o_arg.u.verifier.data;
s[0] = jiffies;
s[1] = current->pid;
} else if (flags & O_CREAT) {
p->o_arg.u.attrs = &p->attrs;
memcpy(&p->attrs, attrs, sizeof(p->attrs));
}
p->c_arg.fh = &p->o_res.fh;
p->c_arg.stateid = &p->o_res.stateid;
p->c_arg.seqid = p->o_arg.seqid;
nfs4_init_opendata_res(p);
kref_init(&p->kref);
return p;
err_free:
kfree(p);
err:
dput(parent);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
|
static struct nfs4_opendata *nfs4_opendata_alloc(struct path *path,
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp, fmode_t fmode, int flags,
const struct iattr *attrs)
{
struct dentry *parent = dget_parent(path->dentry);
struct inode *dir = parent->d_inode;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs4_opendata *p;
p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
if (p == NULL)
goto err;
p->o_arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&sp->so_seqid);
if (p->o_arg.seqid == NULL)
goto err_free;
p->path.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
p->path.dentry = dget(path->dentry);
p->dir = parent;
p->owner = sp;
atomic_inc(&sp->so_count);
p->o_arg.fh = NFS_FH(dir);
p->o_arg.open_flags = flags;
p->o_arg.fmode = fmode & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE);
p->o_arg.clientid = server->nfs_client->cl_clientid;
p->o_arg.id = sp->so_owner_id.id;
p->o_arg.name = &p->path.dentry->d_name;
p->o_arg.server = server;
p->o_arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
p->o_arg.claim = NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_NULL;
if (flags & O_EXCL) {
u32 *s = (u32 *) p->o_arg.u.verifier.data;
s[0] = jiffies;
s[1] = current->pid;
} else if (flags & O_CREAT) {
p->o_arg.u.attrs = &p->attrs;
memcpy(&p->attrs, attrs, sizeof(p->attrs));
}
p->c_arg.fh = &p->o_res.fh;
p->c_arg.stateid = &p->o_res.stateid;
p->c_arg.seqid = p->o_arg.seqid;
nfs4_init_opendata_res(p);
kref_init(&p->kref);
return p;
err_free:
kfree(p);
err:
dput(parent);
return NULL;
}
| 165,700
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ContentEncoding::~ContentEncoding() {
ContentCompression** comp_i = compression_entries_;
ContentCompression** const comp_j = compression_entries_end_;
while (comp_i != comp_j) {
ContentCompression* const comp = *comp_i++;
delete comp;
}
delete [] compression_entries_;
ContentEncryption** enc_i = encryption_entries_;
ContentEncryption** const enc_j = encryption_entries_end_;
while (enc_i != enc_j) {
ContentEncryption* const enc = *enc_i++;
delete enc;
}
delete [] encryption_entries_;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
ContentEncoding::~ContentEncoding() {
ContentCompression** comp_i = compression_entries_;
ContentCompression** const comp_j = compression_entries_end_;
while (comp_i != comp_j) {
ContentCompression* const comp = *comp_i++;
delete comp;
}
delete[] compression_entries_;
ContentEncryption** enc_i = encryption_entries_;
ContentEncryption** const enc_j = encryption_entries_end_;
while (enc_i != enc_j) {
ContentEncryption* const enc = *enc_i++;
delete enc;
}
delete[] encryption_entries_;
}
| 174,460
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: FileReaderLoader::FileReaderLoader(ReadType read_type,
FileReaderLoaderClient* client)
: read_type_(read_type),
client_(client),
handle_watcher_(FROM_HERE, mojo::SimpleWatcher::ArmingPolicy::AUTOMATIC),
binding_(this) {}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in FileReaderLoader.
Anything that calls out to client_ can cause FileReaderLoader to be
destroyed, so make sure to check for that situation.
Bug: 835639
Change-Id: I57533d41b7118c06da17abec28bbf301e1f50646
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1024450
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552807}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
FileReaderLoader::FileReaderLoader(ReadType read_type,
FileReaderLoaderClient* client)
: read_type_(read_type),
client_(client),
handle_watcher_(FROM_HERE, mojo::SimpleWatcher::ArmingPolicy::AUTOMATIC),
| 173,217
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: header_put_le_8byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, sf_count_t x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 8)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
} ;
} /* header_put_le_8byte */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
header_put_le_8byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, sf_count_t x)
| 170,055
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: print_prefix(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *prefix, u_int max_length)
{
int plenbytes;
char buf[sizeof("xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx::/128")];
if (prefix[0] >= 96 && max_length >= IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN + 1 &&
is_ipv4_mapped_address(&prefix[1])) {
struct in_addr addr;
u_int plen;
plen = prefix[0]-96;
if (32 < plen)
return -1;
max_length -= 1;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
plenbytes = (plen + 7) / 8;
if (max_length < (u_int)plenbytes + IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN)
return -3;
memcpy(&addr, &prefix[1 + IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN], plenbytes);
if (plen % 8) {
((u_char *)&addr)[plenbytes - 1] &=
((0xff00 >> (plen % 8)) & 0xff);
}
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%d", ipaddr_string(ndo, &addr), plen);
plenbytes += 1 + IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN;
} else {
plenbytes = decode_prefix6(ndo, prefix, max_length, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", buf));
return plenbytes;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16228/HNCP: make buffer access safer
print_prefix() has a buffer and does not initialize it. It may call
decode_prefix6(), which also does not initialize the buffer on invalid
input. When that happens, make sure to return from print_prefix() before
trying to print the [still uninitialized] buffer.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Wang Junjie of 360 ESG
Codesafe Team.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
print_prefix(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *prefix, u_int max_length)
{
int plenbytes;
char buf[sizeof("xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx::/128")];
if (prefix[0] >= 96 && max_length >= IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN + 1 &&
is_ipv4_mapped_address(&prefix[1])) {
struct in_addr addr;
u_int plen;
plen = prefix[0]-96;
if (32 < plen)
return -1;
max_length -= 1;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
plenbytes = (plen + 7) / 8;
if (max_length < (u_int)plenbytes + IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN)
return -3;
memcpy(&addr, &prefix[1 + IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN], plenbytes);
if (plen % 8) {
((u_char *)&addr)[plenbytes - 1] &=
((0xff00 >> (plen % 8)) & 0xff);
}
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%d", ipaddr_string(ndo, &addr), plen);
plenbytes += 1 + IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN;
} else {
plenbytes = decode_prefix6(ndo, prefix, max_length, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (plenbytes < 0)
return plenbytes;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", buf));
return plenbytes;
}
| 169,820
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void add_bytes_l2_c(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src1, uint8_t *src2, int w)
{
long i;
for (i = 0; i <= w - sizeof(long); i += sizeof(long)) {
long a = *(long *)(src1 + i);
long b = *(long *)(src2 + i);
*(long *)(dst + i) = ((a & pb_7f) + (b & pb_7f)) ^ ((a ^ b) & pb_80);
}
for (; i < w; i++)
dst[i] = src1[i] + src2[i];
}
Commit Message: avcodec/pngdsp: fix (un)signed type in end comparission
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2919
Found_by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
static void add_bytes_l2_c(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src1, uint8_t *src2, int w)
{
long i;
for (i = 0; i <= w - (int)sizeof(long); i += sizeof(long)) {
long a = *(long *)(src1 + i);
long b = *(long *)(src2 + i);
*(long *)(dst + i) = ((a & pb_7f) + (b & pb_7f)) ^ ((a ^ b) & pb_80);
}
for (; i < w; i++)
dst[i] = src1[i] + src2[i];
}
| 165,925
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int do_siocgstampns(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *up)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
struct timespec kts;
int err;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, (unsigned long)&kts);
set_fs(old_fs);
if (!err)
err = compat_put_timespec(up, &kts);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static int do_siocgstampns(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *up)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
struct timespec kts;
int err;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, (unsigned long)&kts);
set_fs(old_fs);
if (!err)
err = compat_put_timespec(&kts, up);
return err;
}
| 165,537
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *frame)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FieldOrderContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
int h, plane, line_step, line_size, line;
uint8_t *data;
if (!frame->interlaced_frame ||
frame->top_field_first == s->dst_tff)
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, frame);
av_dlog(ctx,
"picture will move %s one line\n",
s->dst_tff ? "up" : "down");
h = frame->height;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane]; plane++) {
line_step = frame->linesize[plane];
line_size = s->line_size[plane];
data = frame->data[plane];
if (s->dst_tff) {
/** Move every line up one line, working from
* the top to the bottom of the frame.
* The original top line is lost.
* The new last line is created as a copy of the
* penultimate line from that field. */
for (line = 0; line < h; line++) {
if (1 + line < frame->height) {
memcpy(data, data + line_step, line_size);
} else {
memcpy(data, data - line_step - line_step, line_size);
}
data += line_step;
}
} else {
/** Move every line down one line, working from
* the bottom to the top of the frame.
* The original bottom line is lost.
* The new first line is created as a copy of the
* second line from that field. */
data += (h - 1) * line_step;
for (line = h - 1; line >= 0 ; line--) {
if (line > 0) {
memcpy(data, data - line_step, line_size);
} else {
memcpy(data, data + line_step + line_step, line_size);
}
data -= line_step;
}
}
}
frame->top_field_first = s->dst_tff;
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, frame);
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *frame)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FieldOrderContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
int h, plane, line_step, line_size, line;
uint8_t *data;
if (!frame->interlaced_frame ||
frame->top_field_first == s->dst_tff)
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, frame);
av_dlog(ctx,
"picture will move %s one line\n",
s->dst_tff ? "up" : "down");
h = frame->height;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane] && frame->linesize[plane]; plane++) {
line_step = frame->linesize[plane];
line_size = s->line_size[plane];
data = frame->data[plane];
if (s->dst_tff) {
/** Move every line up one line, working from
* the top to the bottom of the frame.
* The original top line is lost.
* The new last line is created as a copy of the
* penultimate line from that field. */
for (line = 0; line < h; line++) {
if (1 + line < frame->height) {
memcpy(data, data + line_step, line_size);
} else {
memcpy(data, data - line_step - line_step, line_size);
}
data += line_step;
}
} else {
/** Move every line down one line, working from
* the bottom to the top of the frame.
* The original bottom line is lost.
* The new first line is created as a copy of the
* second line from that field. */
data += (h - 1) * line_step;
for (line = h - 1; line >= 0 ; line--) {
if (line > 0) {
memcpy(data, data - line_step, line_size);
} else {
memcpy(data, data + line_step + line_step, line_size);
}
data -= line_step;
}
}
}
frame->top_field_first = s->dst_tff;
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, frame);
}
| 166,000
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long ContentEncoding::ParseCompressionEntry(
long long start,
long long size,
IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentCompression* compression) {
assert(pReader);
assert(compression);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
bool valid = false;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x254) {
long long algo = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (algo < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
compression->algo = algo;
valid = true;
} else if (id == 0x255) {
if (size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const size_t buflen = static_cast<size_t>(size);
typedef unsigned char* buf_t;
const buf_t buf = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[buflen];
if (buf == NULL)
return -1;
const int read_status = pReader->Read(pos, buflen, buf);
if (read_status) {
delete [] buf;
return status;
}
compression->settings = buf;
compression->settings_len = buflen;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (!valid)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long ContentEncoding::ParseCompressionEntry(
long ContentEncoding::ParseCompressionEntry(long long start, long long size,
IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentCompression* compression) {
assert(pReader);
assert(compression);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
bool valid = false;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x254) {
long long algo = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (algo < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
compression->algo = algo;
valid = true;
} else if (id == 0x255) {
if (size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const size_t buflen = static_cast<size_t>(size);
typedef unsigned char* buf_t;
const buf_t buf = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[buflen];
if (buf == NULL)
return -1;
const int read_status =
pReader->Read(pos, static_cast<long>(buflen), buf);
if (read_status) {
delete[] buf;
return status;
}
compression->settings = buf;
compression->settings_len = buflen;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (!valid)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
| 174,417
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::BluetoothDeviceChromeOS(
BluetoothAdapterChromeOS* adapter,
const dbus::ObjectPath& object_path)
: adapter_(adapter),
object_path_(object_path),
num_connecting_calls_(0),
pairing_delegate_(NULL),
pairing_delegate_used_(false),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::BluetoothDeviceChromeOS(
BluetoothAdapterChromeOS* adapter,
const dbus::ObjectPath& object_path)
: adapter_(adapter),
object_path_(object_path),
num_connecting_calls_(0),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
}
| 171,217
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void jpc_qmfb_split_colgrp(jpc_fix_t *a, int numrows, int stride,
int parity)
{
int bufsize = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(numrows, 1);
jpc_fix_t splitbuf[QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE * JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE];
jpc_fix_t *buf = splitbuf;
jpc_fix_t *srcptr;
jpc_fix_t *dstptr;
register jpc_fix_t *srcptr2;
register jpc_fix_t *dstptr2;
register int n;
register int i;
int m;
int hstartcol;
/* Get a buffer. */
if (bufsize > QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE) {
if (!(buf = jas_alloc2(bufsize, sizeof(jpc_fix_t)))) {
/* We have no choice but to commit suicide in this case. */
abort();
}
}
if (numrows >= 2) {
hstartcol = (numrows + 1 - parity) >> 1;
m = numrows - hstartcol;
/* Save the samples destined for the highpass channel. */
n = m;
dstptr = buf;
srcptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
srcptr += stride << 1;
}
/* Copy the appropriate samples into the lowpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
srcptr = &a[(2 - parity) * stride];
n = numrows - m - (!parity);
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += stride;
srcptr += stride << 1;
}
/* Copy the saved samples into the highpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[hstartcol * stride];
srcptr = buf;
n = m;
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += stride;
srcptr += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
}
}
/* If the split buffer was allocated on the heap, free this memory. */
if (buf != splitbuf) {
jas_free(buf);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void jpc_qmfb_split_colgrp(jpc_fix_t *a, int numrows, int stride,
int parity)
{
int bufsize = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(numrows, 1);
jpc_fix_t splitbuf[QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE * JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE];
jpc_fix_t *buf = splitbuf;
jpc_fix_t *srcptr;
jpc_fix_t *dstptr;
register jpc_fix_t *srcptr2;
register jpc_fix_t *dstptr2;
register int n;
register int i;
int m;
int hstartrow;
/* Get a buffer. */
if (bufsize > QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE) {
if (!(buf = jas_alloc3(bufsize, JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE,
sizeof(jpc_fix_t)))) {
/* We have no choice but to commit suicide in this case. */
abort();
}
}
if (numrows >= 2) {
hstartrow = (numrows + 1 - parity) >> 1;
// ORIGINAL (WRONG): m = (parity) ? hstartrow : (numrows - hstartrow);
m = numrows - hstartrow;
/* Save the samples destined for the highpass channel. */
n = m;
dstptr = buf;
srcptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
srcptr += stride << 1;
}
/* Copy the appropriate samples into the lowpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
srcptr = &a[(2 - parity) * stride];
n = numrows - m - (!parity);
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += stride;
srcptr += stride << 1;
}
/* Copy the saved samples into the highpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[hstartrow * stride];
srcptr = buf;
n = m;
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += stride;
srcptr += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
}
}
/* If the split buffer was allocated on the heap, free this memory. */
if (buf != splitbuf) {
jas_free(buf);
}
}
| 169,446
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int flush_completed_IO(struct inode *inode)
{
ext4_io_end_t *io;
int ret = 0;
int ret2 = 0;
if (list_empty(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_list))
return ret;
dump_completed_IO(inode);
while (!list_empty(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_list)){
io = list_entry(EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_list.next,
ext4_io_end_t, list);
/*
* Calling ext4_end_io_nolock() to convert completed
* IO to written.
*
* When ext4_sync_file() is called, run_queue() may already
* about to flush the work corresponding to this io structure.
* It will be upset if it founds the io structure related
* to the work-to-be schedule is freed.
*
* Thus we need to keep the io structure still valid here after
* convertion finished. The io structure has a flag to
* avoid double converting from both fsync and background work
* queue work.
*/
ret = ext4_end_io_nolock(io);
if (ret < 0)
ret2 = ret;
else
list_del_init(&io->list);
}
return (ret2 < 0) ? ret2 : 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
|
int flush_completed_IO(struct inode *inode)
{
ext4_io_end_t *io;
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
int ret2 = 0;
if (list_empty(&ei->i_completed_io_list))
return ret;
dump_completed_IO(inode);
spin_lock_irqsave(&ei->i_completed_io_lock, flags);
while (!list_empty(&ei->i_completed_io_list)){
io = list_entry(ei->i_completed_io_list.next,
ext4_io_end_t, list);
/*
* Calling ext4_end_io_nolock() to convert completed
* IO to written.
*
* When ext4_sync_file() is called, run_queue() may already
* about to flush the work corresponding to this io structure.
* It will be upset if it founds the io structure related
* to the work-to-be schedule is freed.
*
* Thus we need to keep the io structure still valid here after
* convertion finished. The io structure has a flag to
* avoid double converting from both fsync and background work
* queue work.
*/
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ei->i_completed_io_lock, flags);
ret = ext4_end_io_nolock(io);
spin_lock_irqsave(&ei->i_completed_io_lock, flags);
if (ret < 0)
ret2 = ret;
else
list_del_init(&io->list);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ei->i_completed_io_lock, flags);
return (ret2 < 0) ? ret2 : 0;
}
| 167,550
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: exsltFuncRegisterImportFunc (exsltFuncFunctionData *data,
exsltFuncImportRegData *ch,
const xmlChar *URI, const xmlChar *name,
ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED const xmlChar *ignored) {
exsltFuncFunctionData *func=NULL;
if ((data == NULL) || (ch == NULL) || (URI == NULL) || (name == NULL))
return;
if (ch->ctxt == NULL || ch->hash == NULL)
return;
/* Check if already present */
func = (exsltFuncFunctionData*)xmlHashLookup2(ch->hash, URI, name);
if (func == NULL) { /* Not yet present - copy it in */
func = exsltFuncNewFunctionData();
memcpy(func, data, sizeof(exsltFuncFunctionData));
if (xmlHashAddEntry2(ch->hash, URI, name, func) < 0) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"Failed to register function {%s}%s\n",
URI, name);
} else { /* Do the registration */
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"exsltFuncRegisterImportFunc: register {%s}%s\n",
URI, name);
xsltRegisterExtFunction(ch->ctxt, name, URI,
exsltFuncFunctionFunction);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
exsltFuncRegisterImportFunc (exsltFuncFunctionData *data,
exsltFuncImportRegData *ch,
const xmlChar *URI, const xmlChar *name,
ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED const xmlChar *ignored) {
exsltFuncFunctionData *func=NULL;
if ((data == NULL) || (ch == NULL) || (URI == NULL) || (name == NULL))
return;
if (ch->ctxt == NULL || ch->hash == NULL)
return;
/* Check if already present */
func = (exsltFuncFunctionData*)xmlHashLookup2(ch->hash, URI, name);
if (func == NULL) { /* Not yet present - copy it in */
func = exsltFuncNewFunctionData();
if (func == NULL)
return;
memcpy(func, data, sizeof(exsltFuncFunctionData));
if (xmlHashAddEntry2(ch->hash, URI, name, func) < 0) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"Failed to register function {%s}%s\n",
URI, name);
} else { /* Do the registration */
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"exsltFuncRegisterImportFunc: register {%s}%s\n",
URI, name);
xsltRegisterExtFunction(ch->ctxt, name, URI,
exsltFuncFunctionFunction);
}
}
}
| 173,294
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::GetGPUProcessID() {
return host_ ? host_->gpu_process_id() : 0;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
int WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::GetGPUProcessID() {
return host_ ? host_->gpu_host_id() : 0;
}
| 170,930
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DownloadRequestLimiter::TabDownloadState::DidStartNavigation(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsInMainFrame())
return;
download_seen_ = false;
ui_status_ = DOWNLOAD_UI_DEFAULT;
if (navigation_handle->IsRendererInitiated() &&
(status_ == PROMPT_BEFORE_DOWNLOAD || status_ == DOWNLOADS_NOT_ALLOWED)) {
return;
}
if (status_ == DownloadRequestLimiter::ALLOW_ALL_DOWNLOADS ||
status_ == DownloadRequestLimiter::DOWNLOADS_NOT_ALLOWED) {
if (!initial_page_host_.empty() &&
navigation_handle->GetURL().host_piece() == initial_page_host_) {
return;
}
}
NotifyCallbacks(false);
host_->Remove(this, web_contents());
}
Commit Message: Don't reset TabDownloadState on history back/forward
Currently performing forward/backward on a tab will reset the TabDownloadState.
Which allows javascript code to do trigger multiple downloads.
This CL disables that behavior by not resetting the TabDownloadState on
forward/back.
It is still possible to reset the TabDownloadState through user gesture
or using browser initiated download.
BUG=848535
Change-Id: I7f9bf6e8fb759b4dcddf5ac0c214e8c6c9f48863
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1108959
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#574437}
CWE ID:
|
void DownloadRequestLimiter::TabDownloadState::DidStartNavigation(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsInMainFrame())
return;
download_seen_ = false;
ui_status_ = DOWNLOAD_UI_DEFAULT;
if (status_ == PROMPT_BEFORE_DOWNLOAD || status_ == DOWNLOADS_NOT_ALLOWED) {
std::string host = navigation_handle->GetURL().host();
// If the navigation is renderer-initiated (but not user-initiated), ensure
// that a prompting or blocking limiter state is not reset, so
// window.location.href or meta refresh can't be abused to avoid the
// limiter.
if (navigation_handle->IsRendererInitiated()) {
if (!host.empty())
restricted_hosts_.emplace(host);
return;
}
// If this is a forward/back navigation, also don't reset a prompting or
// blocking limiter state unless a new host is encounted. This prevents a
// page to use history forward/backward to trigger multiple downloads.
if (IsNavigationRestricted(navigation_handle))
return;
}
if (status_ == DownloadRequestLimiter::ALLOW_ALL_DOWNLOADS ||
status_ == DownloadRequestLimiter::DOWNLOADS_NOT_ALLOWED) {
if (!initial_page_host_.empty() &&
navigation_handle->GetURL().host_piece() == initial_page_host_) {
return;
}
}
NotifyCallbacks(false);
host_->Remove(this, web_contents());
}
| 173,189
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int process_cmd_sock(int h)
{
sock_cmd_t cmd = {-1, 0, 0, 0, 0};
int fd = ts[h].cmd_fdr;
if(recv(fd, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), MSG_WAITALL) != sizeof(cmd))
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("recv cmd errno:%d", errno);
return FALSE;
}
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("cmd.id:%d", cmd.id);
switch(cmd.id)
{
case CMD_ADD_FD:
add_poll(h, cmd.fd, cmd.type, cmd.flags, cmd.user_id);
break;
case CMD_REMOVE_FD:
for (int i = 1; i < MAX_POLL; ++i)
{
poll_slot_t *poll_slot = &ts[h].ps[i];
if (poll_slot->pfd.fd == cmd.fd)
{
remove_poll(h, poll_slot, poll_slot->flags);
break;
}
}
close(cmd.fd);
break;
case CMD_WAKEUP:
break;
case CMD_USER_PRIVATE:
asrt(ts[h].cmd_callback);
if(ts[h].cmd_callback)
ts[h].cmd_callback(fd, cmd.type, cmd.flags, cmd.user_id);
break;
case CMD_EXIT:
return FALSE;
default:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("unknown cmd: %d", cmd.id);
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
static int process_cmd_sock(int h)
{
sock_cmd_t cmd = {-1, 0, 0, 0, 0};
int fd = ts[h].cmd_fdr;
if(TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(recv(fd, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), MSG_WAITALL)) != sizeof(cmd))
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("recv cmd errno:%d", errno);
return FALSE;
}
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("cmd.id:%d", cmd.id);
switch(cmd.id)
{
case CMD_ADD_FD:
add_poll(h, cmd.fd, cmd.type, cmd.flags, cmd.user_id);
break;
case CMD_REMOVE_FD:
for (int i = 1; i < MAX_POLL; ++i)
{
poll_slot_t *poll_slot = &ts[h].ps[i];
if (poll_slot->pfd.fd == cmd.fd)
{
remove_poll(h, poll_slot, poll_slot->flags);
break;
}
}
close(cmd.fd);
break;
case CMD_WAKEUP:
break;
case CMD_USER_PRIVATE:
asrt(ts[h].cmd_callback);
if(ts[h].cmd_callback)
ts[h].cmd_callback(fd, cmd.type, cmd.flags, cmd.user_id);
break;
case CMD_EXIT:
return FALSE;
default:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("unknown cmd: %d", cmd.id);
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
| 173,465
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xfs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int error = 0;
if (!acl)
goto set_acl;
error = -E2BIG;
if (acl->a_count > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES(XFS_M(inode->i_sb)))
return error;
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
if (error <= 0) {
acl = NULL;
if (error < 0)
return error;
}
error = xfs_set_mode(inode, mode);
if (error)
return error;
}
set_acl:
return __xfs_set_acl(inode, type, acl);
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
|
xfs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int error = 0;
if (!acl)
goto set_acl;
error = -E2BIG;
if (acl->a_count > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES(XFS_M(inode->i_sb)))
return error;
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
umode_t mode;
error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &mode, &acl);
if (error)
return error;
error = xfs_set_mode(inode, mode);
if (error)
return error;
}
set_acl:
return __xfs_set_acl(inode, type, acl);
}
| 166,979
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void parse_content_range(URLContext *h, const char *p)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
const char *slash;
if (!strncmp(p, "bytes ", 6)) {
p += 6;
s->off = strtoll(p, NULL, 10);
if ((slash = strchr(p, '/')) && strlen(slash) > 0)
s->filesize = strtoll(slash + 1, NULL, 10);
}
if (s->seekable == -1 && (!s->is_akamai || s->filesize != 2147483647))
h->is_streamed = 0; /* we _can_ in fact seek */
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void parse_content_range(URLContext *h, const char *p)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
const char *slash;
if (!strncmp(p, "bytes ", 6)) {
p += 6;
s->off = strtoull(p, NULL, 10);
if ((slash = strchr(p, '/')) && strlen(slash) > 0)
s->filesize = strtoull(slash + 1, NULL, 10);
}
if (s->seekable == -1 && (!s->is_akamai || s->filesize != 2147483647))
h->is_streamed = 0; /* we _can_ in fact seek */
}
| 168,503
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void LocalFileSystem::resolveURLInternal(
PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> context,
const KURL& fileSystemURL,
PassRefPtr<CallbackWrapper> callbacks)
{
if (!fileSystem()) {
fileSystemNotAvailable(context, callbacks);
return;
}
fileSystem()->resolveURL(fileSystemURL, callbacks->release());
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void LocalFileSystem::resolveURLInternal(
PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> context,
const KURL& fileSystemURL,
CallbackWrapper* callbacks)
{
if (!fileSystem()) {
fileSystemNotAvailable(context, callbacks);
return;
}
fileSystem()->resolveURL(fileSystemURL, callbacks->release());
}
| 171,431
|
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