instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.3k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped");
base::ScopedClosureRunner scoped_completion_runner(
base::Bind(&AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompleted,
host_id_, params.route_id, params.surface_id,
true, base::TimeTicks(), base::TimeDelta()));
gfx::PluginWindowHandle handle =
GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->GetSurfaceWindowHandle(params.surface_id);
if (!handle) {
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "SurfaceIDNotFound_RoutingToUI",
"surface_id", params.surface_id);
#if defined(USE_AURA)
scoped_completion_runner.Release();
RouteOnUIThread(GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(params));
#endif
return;
}
scoped_refptr<AcceleratedPresenter> presenter(
AcceleratedPresenter::GetForWindow(handle));
if (!presenter) {
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "EarlyOut_NativeWindowNotFound", "handle", handle);
return;
}
scoped_completion_runner.Release();
presenter->AsyncPresentAndAcknowledge(
params.size,
params.surface_handle,
base::Bind(&AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompleted,
host_id_,
params.route_id,
params.surface_id));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped");
base::ScopedClosureRunner scoped_completion_runner(
base::Bind(&AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompleted,
host_id_, params.route_id, params.surface_id, params.surface_handle,
true, base::TimeTicks(), base::TimeDelta()));
gfx::PluginWindowHandle handle =
GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->GetSurfaceWindowHandle(params.surface_id);
if (!handle) {
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "SurfaceIDNotFound_RoutingToUI",
"surface_id", params.surface_id);
#if defined(USE_AURA)
scoped_completion_runner.Release();
RouteOnUIThread(GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(params));
#endif
return;
}
scoped_refptr<AcceleratedPresenter> presenter(
AcceleratedPresenter::GetForWindow(handle));
if (!presenter) {
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "EarlyOut_NativeWindowNotFound", "handle", handle);
return;
}
scoped_completion_runner.Release();
presenter->AsyncPresentAndAcknowledge(
params.size,
params.surface_handle,
base::Bind(&AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompleted,
host_id_,
params.route_id,
params.surface_id,
params.surface_handle));
}
| 171,356
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool AXARIAGridCell::isAriaColumnHeader() const {
const AtomicString& role = getAttribute(HTMLNames::roleAttr);
return equalIgnoringCase(role, "columnheader");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
bool AXARIAGridCell::isAriaColumnHeader() const {
const AtomicString& role = getAttribute(HTMLNames::roleAttr);
return equalIgnoringASCIICase(role, "columnheader");
}
| 171,901
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int vt_reset_keyboard(int fd) {
int kb;
/* If we can't read the default, then default to unicode. It's 2017 after all. */
kb = vt_default_utf8() != 0 ? K_UNICODE : K_XLATE;
if (ioctl(fd, KDSKBMODE, kb) < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255
|
int vt_reset_keyboard(int fd) {
int kb, r;
/* If we can't read the default, then default to unicode. It's 2017 after all. */
kb = vt_default_utf8() != 0 ? K_UNICODE : K_XLATE;
r = vt_verify_kbmode(fd);
if (r == -EBUSY) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Keyboard is not in XLATE or UNICODE mode, not resetting: %m");
return 0;
} else if (r < 0)
return r;
if (ioctl(fd, KDSKBMODE, kb) < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
| 169,776
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: juniper_atm2_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM2;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[7] & ATM2_PKT_TYPE_MASK) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (l2info.direction != JUNIPER_BPF_PKT_IN && /* ether-over-1483 encaps ? */
(EXTRACT_32BITS(l2info.cookie) & ATM2_GAP_COUNT_MASK)) {
ether_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if(juniper_ppp_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* PPPoA vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
juniper_atm2_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM2;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[7] & ATM2_PKT_TYPE_MASK) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 3);
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (l2info.direction != JUNIPER_BPF_PKT_IN && /* ether-over-1483 encaps ? */
(EXTRACT_32BITS(l2info.cookie) & ATM2_GAP_COUNT_MASK)) {
ether_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if(juniper_ppp_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* PPPoA vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|juniper_atm2]"));
return l2info.header_len;
}
| 167,915
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Chapters::Display::~Display()
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
Chapters::Display::~Display()
| 174,464
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void reference_32x32_dct_2d(const int16_t input[kNumCoeffs],
double output[kNumCoeffs]) {
for (int i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
double temp_in[32], temp_out[32];
for (int j = 0; j < 32; ++j)
temp_in[j] = input[j*32 + i];
reference_32x32_dct_1d(temp_in, temp_out, 1);
for (int j = 0; j < 32; ++j)
output[j * 32 + i] = temp_out[j];
}
for (int i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
double temp_in[32], temp_out[32];
for (int j = 0; j < 32; ++j)
temp_in[j] = output[j + i*32];
reference_32x32_dct_1d(temp_in, temp_out, 1);
for (int j = 0; j < 32; ++j)
output[j + i * 32] = temp_out[j] / 4;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void reference_32x32_dct_2d(const int16_t input[kNumCoeffs],
double output[kNumCoeffs]) {
for (int i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
double temp_in[32], temp_out[32];
for (int j = 0; j < 32; ++j)
temp_in[j] = input[j*32 + i];
reference_32x32_dct_1d(temp_in, temp_out);
for (int j = 0; j < 32; ++j)
output[j * 32 + i] = temp_out[j];
}
for (int i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
double temp_in[32], temp_out[32];
for (int j = 0; j < 32; ++j)
temp_in[j] = output[j + i*32];
reference_32x32_dct_1d(temp_in, temp_out);
for (int j = 0; j < 32; ++j)
output[j + i * 32] = temp_out[j] / 4;
}
}
| 174,533
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: base::WeakPtr<OTRBrowserContextImpl> GetWeakPtr() {
return weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
base::WeakPtr<OTRBrowserContextImpl> GetWeakPtr() {
| 165,415
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: RenderFrameObserverNatives::RenderFrameObserverNatives(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context), weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction(
"OnDocumentElementCreated",
base::Bind(&RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
RenderFrameObserverNatives::RenderFrameObserverNatives(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context), weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction(
"OnDocumentElementCreated", "app.window",
base::Bind(&RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,252
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: explicit ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout(
const base::Callback<void(const SkBitmap&)>& image_decoded_callback)
: image_decoded_callback_(image_decoded_callback),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
explicit ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout(
| 171,953
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Browser::SetWebContentsBlocked(content::WebContents* web_contents,
bool blocked) {
int index = tab_strip_model_->GetIndexOfWebContents(web_contents);
if (index == TabStripModel::kNoTab) {
return;
}
tab_strip_model_->SetTabBlocked(index, blocked);
bool browser_active = BrowserList::GetInstance()->GetLastActive() == this;
bool contents_is_active =
tab_strip_model_->GetActiveWebContents() == web_contents;
if (!blocked && contents_is_active && browser_active)
web_contents->Focus();
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void Browser::SetWebContentsBlocked(content::WebContents* web_contents,
bool blocked) {
int index = tab_strip_model_->GetIndexOfWebContents(web_contents);
if (index == TabStripModel::kNoTab) {
return;
}
// For security, if the WebContents is in fullscreen, have it drop fullscreen.
// This gives the user the context they need in order to make informed
// decisions.
if (web_contents->IsFullscreenForCurrentTab())
web_contents->ExitFullscreen(true);
tab_strip_model_->SetTabBlocked(index, blocked);
bool browser_active = BrowserList::GetInstance()->GetLastActive() == this;
bool contents_is_active =
tab_strip_model_->GetActiveWebContents() == web_contents;
if (!blocked && contents_is_active && browser_active)
web_contents->Focus();
}
| 172,664
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::IsEmulatedQueryTarget(GLenum target) const {
switch (target) {
case GL_COMMANDS_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_READBACK_SHADOW_COPIES_UPDATED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_COMMANDS_ISSUED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_LATENCY_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
case GL_ASYNC_PIXEL_PACK_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_GET_ERROR_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
bool GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::IsEmulatedQueryTarget(GLenum target) const {
switch (target) {
case GL_COMMANDS_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_READBACK_SHADOW_COPIES_UPDATED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_COMMANDS_ISSUED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_LATENCY_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
case GL_ASYNC_PIXEL_PACK_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_GET_ERROR_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
case GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
| 172,530
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: WebString WebPageSerializer::generateBaseTagDeclaration(const WebString& baseTarget)
{
if (baseTarget.isEmpty())
return String("<base href=\".\">");
String baseString = "<base href=\".\" target=\"" + static_cast<const String&>(baseTarget) + "\">";
return baseString;
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
WebString WebPageSerializer::generateBaseTagDeclaration(const WebString& baseTarget)
{
// TODO(yosin) We should call |PageSerializer::baseTagDeclarationOf()|.
if (baseTarget.isEmpty())
return String("<base href=\".\">");
String baseString = "<base href=\".\" target=\"" + static_cast<const String&>(baseTarget) + "\">";
return baseString;
}
| 171,786
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: on_handler_appeared(GDBusConnection *connection,
const gchar *name,
const gchar *name_owner,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler = user_data;
struct dbus_info *info = handler->opaque;
if (info->register_invocation) {
info->connection = connection;
tcmur_register_handler(handler);
dbus_export_handler(handler, G_CALLBACK(on_dbus_check_config));
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(info->register_invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", TRUE, "succeeded"));
info->register_invocation = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: only allow dynamic UnregisterHandler for external handlers, thereby fixing DoS
Trying to unregister an internal handler ended up in a SEGFAULT, because
the tcmur_handler->opaque was NULL. Way to reproduce:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:qcow
we use a newly introduced boolean in struct tcmur_handler for keeping
track of external handlers. As suggested by mikechristie adjusting the
public data structure is acceptable.
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
on_handler_appeared(GDBusConnection *connection,
const gchar *name,
const gchar *name_owner,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler = user_data;
struct dbus_info *info = handler->opaque;
if (info->register_invocation) {
info->connection = connection;
tcmur_register_dbus_handler(handler);
dbus_export_handler(handler, G_CALLBACK(on_dbus_check_config));
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(info->register_invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", TRUE, "succeeded"));
info->register_invocation = NULL;
}
}
| 167,631
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t* r_bin_dyldcache_from_bytes_new(const ut8* buf, ut64 size) {
struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t *bin;
if (!(bin = malloc (sizeof (struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t)))) {
return NULL;
}
memset (bin, 0, sizeof (struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t));
if (!buf) {
return r_bin_dyldcache_free (bin);
}
bin->b = r_buf_new();
if (!r_buf_set_bytes (bin->b, buf, size)) {
return r_bin_dyldcache_free (bin);
}
if (!r_bin_dyldcache_init (bin)) {
return r_bin_dyldcache_free (bin);
}
bin->size = size;
return bin;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12374 - oobread crash in truncated dyldcache ##bin
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t* r_bin_dyldcache_from_bytes_new(const ut8* buf, ut64 size) {
struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t *bin = R_NEW0 (struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t);
if (!bin) {
return NULL;
}
if (!buf) {
return r_bin_dyldcache_free (bin);
}
bin->b = r_buf_new ();
if (!bin->b || !r_buf_set_bytes (bin->b, buf, size)) {
return r_bin_dyldcache_free (bin);
}
if (!r_bin_dyldcache_init (bin)) {
return r_bin_dyldcache_free (bin);
}
bin->size = size;
return bin;
}
| 168,955
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: l2tp_framing_type_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_TYPE_ASYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_TYPE_SYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "S"));
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
l2tp_framing_type_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
l2tp_framing_type_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_TYPE_ASYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_TYPE_SYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "S"));
}
}
| 167,895
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: T42_Open_Face( T42_Face face )
{
T42_LoaderRec loader;
T42_Parser parser;
T1_Font type1 = &face->type1;
FT_Memory memory = face->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
t42_loader_init( &loader, face );
parser = &loader.parser;
if ( FT_ALLOC( face->ttf_data, 12 ) )
goto Exit;
error = t42_parser_init( parser,
face->root.stream,
memory,
if ( error )
goto Exit;
if ( type1->font_type != 42 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T42_Open_Face: cannot handle FontType %d\n",
type1->font_type ));
error = FT_THROW( Unknown_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
/* now, propagate the charstrings and glyphnames tables */
/* to the Type1 data */
type1->num_glyphs = loader.num_glyphs;
if ( !loader.charstrings.init )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T42_Open_Face: no charstrings array in face\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
loader.charstrings.init = 0;
type1->charstrings_block = loader.charstrings.block;
type1->charstrings = loader.charstrings.elements;
type1->charstrings_len = loader.charstrings.lengths;
/* we copy the glyph names `block' and `elements' fields; */
/* the `lengths' field must be released later */
type1->glyph_names_block = loader.glyph_names.block;
type1->glyph_names = (FT_String**)loader.glyph_names.elements;
loader.glyph_names.block = 0;
loader.glyph_names.elements = 0;
/* we must now build type1.encoding when we have a custom array */
if ( type1->encoding_type == T1_ENCODING_TYPE_ARRAY )
{
FT_Int charcode, idx, min_char, max_char;
FT_Byte* glyph_name;
/* OK, we do the following: for each element in the encoding */
/* table, look up the index of the glyph having the same name */
/* as defined in the CharStrings array. */
/* The index is then stored in type1.encoding.char_index, and */
/* the name in type1.encoding.char_name */
min_char = 0;
max_char = 0;
charcode = 0;
for ( ; charcode < loader.encoding_table.max_elems; charcode++ )
{
FT_Byte* char_name;
type1->encoding.char_index[charcode] = 0;
type1->encoding.char_name [charcode] = (char *)".notdef";
char_name = loader.encoding_table.elements[charcode];
if ( char_name )
for ( idx = 0; idx < type1->num_glyphs; idx++ )
{
glyph_name = (FT_Byte*)type1->glyph_names[idx];
if ( ft_strcmp( (const char*)char_name,
(const char*)glyph_name ) == 0 )
{
type1->encoding.char_index[charcode] = (FT_UShort)idx;
type1->encoding.char_name [charcode] = (char*)glyph_name;
/* Change min/max encoded char only if glyph name is */
/* not /.notdef */
if ( ft_strcmp( (const char*)".notdef",
(const char*)glyph_name ) != 0 )
{
if ( charcode < min_char )
min_char = charcode;
if ( charcode >= max_char )
max_char = charcode + 1;
}
break;
}
}
}
type1->encoding.code_first = min_char;
type1->encoding.code_last = max_char;
type1->encoding.num_chars = loader.num_chars;
}
Exit:
t42_loader_done( &loader );
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
|
T42_Open_Face( T42_Face face )
{
T42_LoaderRec loader;
T42_Parser parser;
T1_Font type1 = &face->type1;
FT_Memory memory = face->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
t42_loader_init( &loader, face );
parser = &loader.parser;
if ( FT_ALLOC( face->ttf_data, 12 ) )
goto Exit;
/* while parsing the font we always update `face->ttf_size' so that */
/* even in case of buggy data (which might lead to premature end of */
/* scanning without causing an error) the call to `FT_Open_Face' in */
/* `T42_Face_Init' passes the correct size */
face->ttf_size = 12;
error = t42_parser_init( parser,
face->root.stream,
memory,
if ( error )
goto Exit;
if ( type1->font_type != 42 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T42_Open_Face: cannot handle FontType %d\n",
type1->font_type ));
error = FT_THROW( Unknown_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
/* now, propagate the charstrings and glyphnames tables */
/* to the Type1 data */
type1->num_glyphs = loader.num_glyphs;
if ( !loader.charstrings.init )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T42_Open_Face: no charstrings array in face\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
loader.charstrings.init = 0;
type1->charstrings_block = loader.charstrings.block;
type1->charstrings = loader.charstrings.elements;
type1->charstrings_len = loader.charstrings.lengths;
/* we copy the glyph names `block' and `elements' fields; */
/* the `lengths' field must be released later */
type1->glyph_names_block = loader.glyph_names.block;
type1->glyph_names = (FT_String**)loader.glyph_names.elements;
loader.glyph_names.block = 0;
loader.glyph_names.elements = 0;
/* we must now build type1.encoding when we have a custom array */
if ( type1->encoding_type == T1_ENCODING_TYPE_ARRAY )
{
FT_Int charcode, idx, min_char, max_char;
FT_Byte* glyph_name;
/* OK, we do the following: for each element in the encoding */
/* table, look up the index of the glyph having the same name */
/* as defined in the CharStrings array. */
/* The index is then stored in type1.encoding.char_index, and */
/* the name in type1.encoding.char_name */
min_char = 0;
max_char = 0;
charcode = 0;
for ( ; charcode < loader.encoding_table.max_elems; charcode++ )
{
FT_Byte* char_name;
type1->encoding.char_index[charcode] = 0;
type1->encoding.char_name [charcode] = (char *)".notdef";
char_name = loader.encoding_table.elements[charcode];
if ( char_name )
for ( idx = 0; idx < type1->num_glyphs; idx++ )
{
glyph_name = (FT_Byte*)type1->glyph_names[idx];
if ( ft_strcmp( (const char*)char_name,
(const char*)glyph_name ) == 0 )
{
type1->encoding.char_index[charcode] = (FT_UShort)idx;
type1->encoding.char_name [charcode] = (char*)glyph_name;
/* Change min/max encoded char only if glyph name is */
/* not /.notdef */
if ( ft_strcmp( (const char*)".notdef",
(const char*)glyph_name ) != 0 )
{
if ( charcode < min_char )
min_char = charcode;
if ( charcode >= max_char )
max_char = charcode + 1;
}
break;
}
}
}
type1->encoding.code_first = min_char;
type1->encoding.code_last = max_char;
type1->encoding.num_chars = loader.num_chars;
}
Exit:
t42_loader_done( &loader );
return error;
}
| 164,861
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Chapters::Display::Clear()
{
delete[] m_string;
m_string = NULL;
delete[] m_language;
m_language = NULL;
delete[] m_country;
m_country = NULL;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void Chapters::Display::Clear()
| 174,246
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int __init sit_init(void)
{
int err;
printk(KERN_INFO "IPv6 over IPv4 tunneling driver\n");
if (xfrm4_tunnel_register(&sit_handler, AF_INET6) < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO "sit init: Can't add protocol\n");
return -EAGAIN;
}
err = register_pernet_device(&sit_net_ops);
if (err < 0)
xfrm4_tunnel_deregister(&sit_handler, AF_INET6);
return err;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
static int __init sit_init(void)
{
int err;
printk(KERN_INFO "IPv6 over IPv4 tunneling driver\n");
err = register_pernet_device(&sit_net_ops);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = xfrm4_tunnel_register(&sit_handler, AF_INET6);
if (err < 0) {
unregister_pernet_device(&sit_net_ops);
printk(KERN_INFO "sit init: Can't add protocol\n");
}
return err;
}
| 165,878
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: MagickExport int LocaleLowercase(const int c)
{
if (c < 0)
return(c);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(tolower_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(tolower((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
MagickExport int LocaleLowercase(const int c)
{
if (c == EOF)
return(c);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(tolower_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(tolower((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
| 170,235
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void vmx_complete_atomic_exit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
u32 exit_intr_info;
if (!(vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY
|| vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI))
return;
vmx->exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
exit_intr_info = vmx->exit_intr_info;
/* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
if (is_machine_check(exit_intr_info))
kvm_machine_check();
/* We need to handle NMIs before interrupts are enabled */
if ((exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) == INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR &&
(exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK)) {
kvm_before_handle_nmi(&vmx->vcpu);
asm("int $2");
kvm_after_handle_nmi(&vmx->vcpu);
}
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388
|
static void vmx_complete_atomic_exit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
u32 exit_intr_info;
if (!(vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY
|| vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI))
return;
vmx->exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
exit_intr_info = vmx->exit_intr_info;
/* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
if (is_machine_check(exit_intr_info))
kvm_machine_check();
/* We need to handle NMIs before interrupts are enabled */
if (is_nmi(exit_intr_info)) {
kvm_before_handle_nmi(&vmx->vcpu);
asm("int $2");
kvm_after_handle_nmi(&vmx->vcpu);
}
}
| 166,857
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct arpt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct arpt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
| 167,210
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ThreadHeap::WriteBarrier(void* value) {
DCHECK(thread_state_->IsIncrementalMarking());
DCHECK(value);
DCHECK_NE(value, reinterpret_cast<void*>(-1));
BasePage* const page = PageFromObject(value);
HeapObjectHeader* const header =
page->IsLargeObjectPage()
? static_cast<LargeObjectPage*>(page)->GetHeapObjectHeader()
: static_cast<NormalPage*>(page)->FindHeaderFromAddress(
reinterpret_cast<Address>(const_cast<void*>(value)));
if (header->IsMarked())
return;
header->Mark();
marking_worklist_->Push(
WorklistTaskId::MainThread,
{header->Payload(), ThreadHeap::GcInfo(header->GcInfoIndex())->trace_});
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void ThreadHeap::WriteBarrier(void* value) {
DCHECK(thread_state_->IsIncrementalMarking());
DCHECK(value);
DCHECK_NE(value, reinterpret_cast<void*>(-1));
BasePage* const page = PageFromObject(value);
HeapObjectHeader* const header =
page->IsLargeObjectPage()
? static_cast<LargeObjectPage*>(page)->GetHeapObjectHeader()
: static_cast<NormalPage*>(page)->FindHeaderFromAddress(
reinterpret_cast<Address>(const_cast<void*>(value)));
if (header->IsMarked())
return;
header->Mark();
marking_worklist_->Push(
WorklistTaskId::MainThread,
{header->Payload(),
GCInfoTable::Get().GCInfoFromIndex(header->GcInfoIndex())->trace_});
}
| 173,138
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::SetCommittedFirstRealLoad() {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
GetFrame()->Loader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedMultipleRealLoads);
GetFrame()->DidSendResourceTimingInfoToParent();
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void WebLocalFrameImpl::SetCommittedFirstRealLoad() {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
GetFrame()->Loader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedMultipleRealLoads);
GetFrame()->SetShouldSendResourceTimingInfoToParent(false);
}
| 172,655
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: extern "C" int EffectCreate(const effect_uuid_t *uuid,
int32_t sessionId,
int32_t ioId,
effect_handle_t *pHandle){
int ret;
int i;
int length = sizeof(gDescriptors) / sizeof(const effect_descriptor_t *);
const effect_descriptor_t *desc;
ALOGV("\t\nEffectCreate start");
if (pHandle == NULL || uuid == NULL){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : EffectCreate() called with NULL pointer");
return -EINVAL;
}
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
desc = gDescriptors[i];
if (memcmp(uuid, &desc->uuid, sizeof(effect_uuid_t))
== 0) {
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - UUID matched Reverb type %d, UUID = %x", i, desc->uuid.timeLow);
break;
}
}
if (i == length) {
return -ENOENT;
}
ReverbContext *pContext = new ReverbContext;
pContext->itfe = &gReverbInterface;
pContext->hInstance = NULL;
pContext->auxiliary = false;
if ((desc->flags & EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_AUXILIARY){
pContext->auxiliary = true;
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - AUX");
}else{
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - INS");
}
pContext->preset = false;
if (memcmp(&desc->type, SL_IID_PRESETREVERB, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0) {
pContext->preset = true;
pContext->curPreset = REVERB_PRESET_LAST + 1;
pContext->nextPreset = REVERB_DEFAULT_PRESET;
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - PRESET");
}else{
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - ENVIRONMENTAL");
}
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - Calling Reverb_init");
ret = Reverb_init(pContext);
if (ret < 0){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : EffectCreate() init failed");
delete pContext;
return ret;
}
*pHandle = (effect_handle_t)pContext;
#ifdef LVM_PCM
pContext->PcmInPtr = NULL;
pContext->PcmOutPtr = NULL;
pContext->PcmInPtr = fopen("/data/tmp/reverb_pcm_in.pcm", "w");
pContext->PcmOutPtr = fopen("/data/tmp/reverb_pcm_out.pcm", "w");
if((pContext->PcmInPtr == NULL)||
(pContext->PcmOutPtr == NULL)){
return -EINVAL;
}
#endif
pContext->InFrames32 = (LVM_INT32 *)malloc(LVREV_MAX_FRAME_SIZE * sizeof(LVM_INT32) * 2);
pContext->OutFrames32 = (LVM_INT32 *)malloc(LVREV_MAX_FRAME_SIZE * sizeof(LVM_INT32) * 2);
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate %p, size %zu", pContext, sizeof(ReverbContext));
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate end\n");
return 0;
} /* end EffectCreate */
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
extern "C" int EffectCreate(const effect_uuid_t *uuid,
int32_t sessionId __unused,
int32_t ioId __unused,
effect_handle_t *pHandle){
int ret;
int i;
int length = sizeof(gDescriptors) / sizeof(const effect_descriptor_t *);
const effect_descriptor_t *desc;
ALOGV("\t\nEffectCreate start");
if (pHandle == NULL || uuid == NULL){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : EffectCreate() called with NULL pointer");
return -EINVAL;
}
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
desc = gDescriptors[i];
if (memcmp(uuid, &desc->uuid, sizeof(effect_uuid_t))
== 0) {
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - UUID matched Reverb type %d, UUID = %x", i, desc->uuid.timeLow);
break;
}
}
if (i == length) {
return -ENOENT;
}
ReverbContext *pContext = new ReverbContext;
pContext->itfe = &gReverbInterface;
pContext->hInstance = NULL;
pContext->auxiliary = false;
if ((desc->flags & EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_AUXILIARY){
pContext->auxiliary = true;
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - AUX");
}else{
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - INS");
}
pContext->preset = false;
if (memcmp(&desc->type, SL_IID_PRESETREVERB, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0) {
pContext->preset = true;
pContext->curPreset = REVERB_PRESET_LAST + 1;
pContext->nextPreset = REVERB_DEFAULT_PRESET;
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - PRESET");
}else{
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - ENVIRONMENTAL");
}
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - Calling Reverb_init");
ret = Reverb_init(pContext);
if (ret < 0){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : EffectCreate() init failed");
delete pContext;
return ret;
}
*pHandle = (effect_handle_t)pContext;
#ifdef LVM_PCM
pContext->PcmInPtr = NULL;
pContext->PcmOutPtr = NULL;
pContext->PcmInPtr = fopen("/data/tmp/reverb_pcm_in.pcm", "w");
pContext->PcmOutPtr = fopen("/data/tmp/reverb_pcm_out.pcm", "w");
if((pContext->PcmInPtr == NULL)||
(pContext->PcmOutPtr == NULL)){
return -EINVAL;
}
#endif
pContext->InFrames32 = (LVM_INT32 *)malloc(LVREV_MAX_FRAME_SIZE * sizeof(LVM_INT32) * 2);
pContext->OutFrames32 = (LVM_INT32 *)malloc(LVREV_MAX_FRAME_SIZE * sizeof(LVM_INT32) * 2);
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate %p, size %zu", pContext, sizeof(ReverbContext));
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate end\n");
return 0;
} /* end EffectCreate */
| 173,349
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SocketStream::Connect() {
DCHECK(base::MessageLoop::current())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must exist";
DCHECK_EQ(base::MessageLoop::TYPE_IO, base::MessageLoop::current()->type())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must be TYPE_IO";
if (context_.get()) {
context_->ssl_config_service()->GetSSLConfig(&server_ssl_config_);
proxy_ssl_config_ = server_ssl_config_;
}
CheckPrivacyMode();
DCHECK_EQ(next_state_, STATE_NONE);
AddRef(); // Released in Finish()
next_state_ = STATE_BEFORE_CONNECT;
net_log_.BeginEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_SOCKET_STREAM_CONNECT,
NetLog::StringCallback("url", &url_.possibly_invalid_spec()));
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&SocketStream::DoLoop, this, OK));
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void SocketStream::Connect() {
DCHECK(base::MessageLoop::current())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must exist";
DCHECK_EQ(base::MessageLoop::TYPE_IO, base::MessageLoop::current()->type())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must be TYPE_IO";
if (context_) {
context_->ssl_config_service()->GetSSLConfig(&server_ssl_config_);
proxy_ssl_config_ = server_ssl_config_;
}
CheckPrivacyMode();
DCHECK_EQ(next_state_, STATE_NONE);
AddRef(); // Released in Finish()
next_state_ = STATE_BEFORE_CONNECT;
net_log_.BeginEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_SOCKET_STREAM_CONNECT,
NetLog::StringCallback("url", &url_.possibly_invalid_spec()));
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&SocketStream::DoLoop, this, OK));
}
| 171,252
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Cluster* Cluster::Create(Segment* pSegment, long idx, long long off)
{
assert(pSegment);
assert(off >= 0);
const long long element_start = pSegment->m_start + off;
Cluster* const pCluster = new Cluster(pSegment, idx, element_start);
assert(pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
Cluster* Cluster::Create(Segment* pSegment, long idx, long long off)
Cluster* Cluster::Create(Segment* pSegment, long idx, long long off) {
if (!pSegment || off < 0)
return NULL;
const long long element_start = pSegment->m_start + off;
Cluster* const pCluster =
new (std::nothrow) Cluster(pSegment, idx, element_start);
return pCluster;
}
| 173,804
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::RunJavaScriptDialog(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
const base::string16& message,
const base::string16& default_prompt,
const GURL& frame_url,
JavaScriptDialogType dialog_type,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
bool suppress_this_message =
ShowingInterstitialPage() || !delegate_ ||
delegate_->ShouldSuppressDialogs(this) ||
!delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
if (!suppress_this_message) {
is_showing_javascript_dialog_ = true;
dialog_manager_ = delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
dialog_manager_->RunJavaScriptDialog(
this, frame_url, dialog_type, message, default_prompt,
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnDialogClosed, base::Unretained(this),
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID(), reply_msg, false),
&suppress_this_message);
}
if (suppress_this_message) {
OnDialogClosed(render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID(), reply_msg,
true, false, base::string16());
}
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void WebContentsImpl::RunJavaScriptDialog(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
const base::string16& message,
const base::string16& default_prompt,
const GURL& frame_url,
JavaScriptDialogType dialog_type,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
// Running a dialog causes an exit to webpage-initiated fullscreen.
// http://crbug.com/728276
if (IsFullscreenForCurrentTab())
ExitFullscreen(true);
bool suppress_this_message =
ShowingInterstitialPage() || !delegate_ ||
delegate_->ShouldSuppressDialogs(this) ||
!delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
if (!suppress_this_message) {
is_showing_javascript_dialog_ = true;
dialog_manager_ = delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
dialog_manager_->RunJavaScriptDialog(
this, frame_url, dialog_type, message, default_prompt,
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnDialogClosed, base::Unretained(this),
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID(), reply_msg, false),
&suppress_this_message);
}
if (suppress_this_message) {
OnDialogClosed(render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID(), reply_msg,
true, false, base::string16());
}
}
| 172,316
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void gdImageJpegCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quality)
{
struct jpeg_compress_struct cinfo;
struct jpeg_error_mgr jerr;
int i, j, jidx;
/* volatile so we can gdFree it on return from longjmp */
volatile JSAMPROW row = 0;
JSAMPROW rowptr[1];
jmpbuf_wrapper jmpbufw;
JDIMENSION nlines;
char comment[255];
memset (&cinfo, 0, sizeof (cinfo));
memset (&jerr, 0, sizeof (jerr));
cinfo.err = jpeg_std_error (&jerr);
cinfo.client_data = &jmpbufw;
if (setjmp (jmpbufw.jmpbuf) != 0) {
/* we're here courtesy of longjmp */
if (row) {
gdFree (row);
}
return;
}
cinfo.err->error_exit = fatal_jpeg_error;
jpeg_create_compress (&cinfo);
cinfo.image_width = im->sx;
cinfo.image_height = im->sy;
cinfo.input_components = 3; /* # of color components per pixel */
cinfo.in_color_space = JCS_RGB; /* colorspace of input image */
jpeg_set_defaults (&cinfo);
cinfo.density_unit = 1;
cinfo.X_density = im->res_x;
cinfo.Y_density = im->res_y;
if (quality >= 0) {
jpeg_set_quality (&cinfo, quality, TRUE);
}
/* If user requests interlace, translate that to progressive JPEG */
if (gdImageGetInterlaced (im)) {
jpeg_simple_progression (&cinfo);
}
jpeg_gdIOCtx_dest (&cinfo, outfile);
row = (JSAMPROW) safe_emalloc(cinfo.image_width * cinfo.input_components, sizeof(JSAMPLE), 0);
memset(row, 0, cinfo.image_width * cinfo.input_components * sizeof(JSAMPLE));
rowptr[0] = row;
jpeg_start_compress (&cinfo, TRUE);
if (quality >= 0) {
snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment)-1, "CREATOR: gd-jpeg v%s (using IJG JPEG v%d), quality = %d\n", GD_JPEG_VERSION, JPEG_LIB_VERSION, quality);
} else {
snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment)-1, "CREATOR: gd-jpeg v%s (using IJG JPEG v%d), default quality\n", GD_JPEG_VERSION, JPEG_LIB_VERSION);
}
jpeg_write_marker (&cinfo, JPEG_COM, (unsigned char *) comment, (unsigned int) strlen (comment));
if (im->trueColor) {
#if BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 12
gd_error("gd-jpeg: error: jpeg library was compiled for 12-bit precision. This is mostly useless, because JPEGs on the web are 8-bit and such versions of the jpeg library won't read or write them. GD doesn't support these unusual images. Edit your jmorecfg.h file to specify the correct precision and completely 'make clean' and 'make install' libjpeg again. Sorry");
goto error;
#endif /* BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 12 */
for (i = 0; i < im->sy; i++) {
for (jidx = 0, j = 0; j < im->sx; j++) {
int val = im->tpixels[i][j];
row[jidx++] = gdTrueColorGetRed (val);
row[jidx++] = gdTrueColorGetGreen (val);
row[jidx++] = gdTrueColorGetBlue (val);
}
nlines = jpeg_write_scanlines (&cinfo, rowptr, 1);
if (nlines != 1) {
gd_error_ex(GD_WARNING, "gd_jpeg: warning: jpeg_write_scanlines returns %u -- expected 1", nlines);
}
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < im->sy; i++) {
for (jidx = 0, j = 0; j < im->sx; j++) {
int idx = im->pixels[i][j];
/* NB: Although gd RGB values are ints, their max value is
* 255 (see the documentation for gdImageColorAllocate())
* -- perfect for 8-bit JPEG encoding (which is the norm)
*/
#if BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 8
row[jidx++] = im->red[idx];
row[jidx++] = im->green[idx];
row[jidx++] = im->blue[idx];
#elif BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 12
row[jidx++] = im->red[idx] << 4;
row[jidx++] = im->green[idx] << 4;
row[jidx++] = im->blue[idx] << 4;
#else
#error IJG JPEG library BITS_IN_JSAMPLE value must be 8 or 12
#endif
}
nlines = jpeg_write_scanlines (&cinfo, rowptr, 1);
if (nlines != 1) {
gd_error_ex(GD_WARNING, "gd_jpeg: warning: jpeg_write_scanlines returns %u -- expected 1", nlines);
}
}
}
jpeg_finish_compress (&cinfo);
jpeg_destroy_compress (&cinfo);
gdFree (row);
}
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
CWE ID: CWE-415
|
void gdImageJpegCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quality)
{
_gdImageJpegCtx(im, outfile, quality);
}
/* returns 0 on success, 1 on failure */
static int _gdImageJpegCtx(gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx *outfile, int quality)
{
struct jpeg_compress_struct cinfo;
struct jpeg_error_mgr jerr;
int i, j, jidx;
/* volatile so we can gdFree it on return from longjmp */
volatile JSAMPROW row = 0;
JSAMPROW rowptr[1];
jmpbuf_wrapper jmpbufw;
JDIMENSION nlines;
char comment[255];
memset (&cinfo, 0, sizeof (cinfo));
memset (&jerr, 0, sizeof (jerr));
cinfo.err = jpeg_std_error (&jerr);
cinfo.client_data = &jmpbufw;
if (setjmp (jmpbufw.jmpbuf) != 0) {
/* we're here courtesy of longjmp */
if (row) {
gdFree (row);
}
return 1;
}
cinfo.err->error_exit = fatal_jpeg_error;
jpeg_create_compress (&cinfo);
cinfo.image_width = im->sx;
cinfo.image_height = im->sy;
cinfo.input_components = 3; /* # of color components per pixel */
cinfo.in_color_space = JCS_RGB; /* colorspace of input image */
jpeg_set_defaults (&cinfo);
cinfo.density_unit = 1;
cinfo.X_density = im->res_x;
cinfo.Y_density = im->res_y;
if (quality >= 0) {
jpeg_set_quality (&cinfo, quality, TRUE);
}
/* If user requests interlace, translate that to progressive JPEG */
if (gdImageGetInterlaced (im)) {
jpeg_simple_progression (&cinfo);
}
jpeg_gdIOCtx_dest (&cinfo, outfile);
row = (JSAMPROW) safe_emalloc(cinfo.image_width * cinfo.input_components, sizeof(JSAMPLE), 0);
memset(row, 0, cinfo.image_width * cinfo.input_components * sizeof(JSAMPLE));
rowptr[0] = row;
jpeg_start_compress (&cinfo, TRUE);
if (quality >= 0) {
snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment)-1, "CREATOR: gd-jpeg v%s (using IJG JPEG v%d), quality = %d\n", GD_JPEG_VERSION, JPEG_LIB_VERSION, quality);
} else {
snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment)-1, "CREATOR: gd-jpeg v%s (using IJG JPEG v%d), default quality\n", GD_JPEG_VERSION, JPEG_LIB_VERSION);
}
jpeg_write_marker (&cinfo, JPEG_COM, (unsigned char *) comment, (unsigned int) strlen (comment));
if (im->trueColor) {
#if BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 12
gd_error("gd-jpeg: error: jpeg library was compiled for 12-bit precision. This is mostly useless, because JPEGs on the web are 8-bit and such versions of the jpeg library won't read or write them. GD doesn't support these unusual images. Edit your jmorecfg.h file to specify the correct precision and completely 'make clean' and 'make install' libjpeg again. Sorry");
goto error;
#endif /* BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 12 */
for (i = 0; i < im->sy; i++) {
for (jidx = 0, j = 0; j < im->sx; j++) {
int val = im->tpixels[i][j];
row[jidx++] = gdTrueColorGetRed (val);
row[jidx++] = gdTrueColorGetGreen (val);
row[jidx++] = gdTrueColorGetBlue (val);
}
nlines = jpeg_write_scanlines (&cinfo, rowptr, 1);
if (nlines != 1) {
gd_error_ex(GD_WARNING, "gd_jpeg: warning: jpeg_write_scanlines returns %u -- expected 1", nlines);
}
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < im->sy; i++) {
for (jidx = 0, j = 0; j < im->sx; j++) {
int idx = im->pixels[i][j];
/* NB: Although gd RGB values are ints, their max value is
* 255 (see the documentation for gdImageColorAllocate())
* -- perfect for 8-bit JPEG encoding (which is the norm)
*/
#if BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 8
row[jidx++] = im->red[idx];
row[jidx++] = im->green[idx];
row[jidx++] = im->blue[idx];
#elif BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 12
row[jidx++] = im->red[idx] << 4;
row[jidx++] = im->green[idx] << 4;
row[jidx++] = im->blue[idx] << 4;
#else
#error IJG JPEG library BITS_IN_JSAMPLE value must be 8 or 12
#endif
}
nlines = jpeg_write_scanlines (&cinfo, rowptr, 1);
if (nlines != 1) {
gd_error_ex(GD_WARNING, "gd_jpeg: warning: jpeg_write_scanlines returns %u -- expected 1", nlines);
}
}
}
jpeg_finish_compress (&cinfo);
jpeg_destroy_compress (&cinfo);
gdFree (row);
return 0;
}
| 169,735
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
int type,
unsigned int flags,
RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg))
: OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
if (drbg == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg);
drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
drbg->parent = parent;
if (parent == NULL) {
drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
#ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce;
drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce;
#endif
drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
} else {
drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
/*
* Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will
* obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent.
*/
drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
}
if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0)
goto err;
if (parent != NULL) {
rand_drbg_lock(parent);
if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) {
/*
* We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
* 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
*/
rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
goto err;
}
rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
}
return drbg;
err:
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330
|
static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
int type,
unsigned int flags,
RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg))
: OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
if (drbg == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg);
drbg->fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
drbg->parent = parent;
if (parent == NULL) {
drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
#ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce;
drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce;
#endif
drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
} else {
drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
/*
* Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will
* obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent.
*/
drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
}
if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0)
goto err;
if (parent != NULL) {
rand_drbg_lock(parent);
if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) {
/*
* We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
* 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
*/
rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
goto err;
}
rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
}
return drbg;
err:
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
return NULL;
}
| 165,144
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void add_param_to_argv(char *parsestart, int line)
{
int quote_open = 0, escaped = 0, param_len = 0;
char param_buffer[1024], *curchar;
/* After fighting with strtok enough, here's now
* a 'real' parser. According to Rusty I'm now no
} else {
param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar;
for (curchar = parsestart; *curchar; curchar++) {
if (quote_open) {
if (escaped) {
param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar;
escaped = 0;
continue;
} else if (*curchar == '\\') {
}
switch (*curchar) {
quote_open = 0;
*curchar = '"';
} else {
param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar;
continue;
}
} else {
continue;
}
break;
default:
/* regular character, copy to buffer */
param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar;
if (param_len >= sizeof(param_buffer))
xtables_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM,
case ' ':
case '\t':
case '\n':
if (!param_len) {
/* two spaces? */
continue;
}
break;
default:
/* regular character, copy to buffer */
param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar;
if (param_len >= sizeof(param_buffer))
xtables_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM,
"Parameter too long!");
continue;
}
param_buffer[param_len] = '\0';
/* check if table name specified */
if ((param_buffer[0] == '-' &&
param_buffer[1] != '-' &&
strchr(param_buffer, 't')) ||
(!strncmp(param_buffer, "--t", 3) &&
!strncmp(param_buffer, "--table", strlen(param_buffer)))) {
xtables_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM,
"The -t option (seen in line %u) cannot be used in %s.\n",
line, xt_params->program_name);
}
add_argv(param_buffer, 0);
param_len = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void add_param_to_argv(char *parsestart, int line)
{
int quote_open = 0, escaped = 0;
struct xt_param_buf param = {};
char *curchar;
/* After fighting with strtok enough, here's now
* a 'real' parser. According to Rusty I'm now no
} else {
param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar;
for (curchar = parsestart; *curchar; curchar++) {
if (quote_open) {
if (escaped) {
add_param(¶m, curchar);
escaped = 0;
continue;
} else if (*curchar == '\\') {
}
switch (*curchar) {
quote_open = 0;
*curchar = '"';
} else {
add_param(¶m, curchar);
continue;
}
} else {
continue;
}
break;
default:
/* regular character, copy to buffer */
param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar;
if (param_len >= sizeof(param_buffer))
xtables_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM,
case ' ':
case '\t':
case '\n':
if (!param.len) {
/* two spaces? */
continue;
}
break;
default:
/* regular character, copy to buffer */
add_param(¶m, curchar);
continue;
}
param.buffer[param.len] = '\0';
/* check if table name specified */
if ((param.buffer[0] == '-' &&
param.buffer[1] != '-' &&
strchr(param.buffer, 't')) ||
(!strncmp(param.buffer, "--t", 3) &&
!strncmp(param.buffer, "--table", strlen(param.buffer)))) {
xtables_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM,
"The -t option (seen in line %u) cannot be used in %s.\n",
line, xt_params->program_name);
}
add_argv(param.buffer, 0);
param.len = 0;
}
| 164,750
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_mpi h;
if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
/* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx );
cleanup:
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
static int ecdsa_sign_det_internal( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
size_t),
void *p_rng_blind )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_mpi h;
/* Variables for deterministic blinding fallback */
const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT";
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind;
if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind );
/* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
if( f_rng_blind != NULL )
ret = ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx,
f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind );
else
{
/*
* To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a
* second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid
* reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the
* risk that they leak this way.
*/
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx_blind, md_info,
data, 2 * grp_len );
ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( &rng_ctx_blind,
(const unsigned char*) blind_label,
strlen( blind_label ) );
if( ret != 0 )
goto cleanup;
/*
* Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and
* message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information
* through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL
* won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should
* be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed.
*/
ret = ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx_blind );
}
cleanup:
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );
return( ret );
}
| 170,181
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderViewTest::SetUp() {
if (!GetContentClient()->renderer())
GetContentClient()->set_renderer(&mock_content_renderer_client_);
if (!render_thread_.get())
render_thread_.reset(new MockRenderThread());
render_thread_->set_routing_id(kRouteId);
render_thread_->set_surface_id(kSurfaceId);
command_line_.reset(new CommandLine(CommandLine::NO_PROGRAM));
params_.reset(new content::MainFunctionParams(*command_line_));
platform_.reset(new RendererMainPlatformDelegate(*params_));
platform_->PlatformInitialize();
webkit_glue::SetJavaScriptFlags(" --expose-gc");
WebKit::initialize(&webkit_platform_support_);
mock_process_.reset(new MockRenderProcess);
RenderViewImpl* view = RenderViewImpl::Create(
0,
kOpenerId,
content::RendererPreferences(),
WebPreferences(),
new SharedRenderViewCounter(0),
kRouteId,
kSurfaceId,
kInvalidSessionStorageNamespaceId,
string16(),
1,
WebKit::WebScreenInfo());
view->AddRef();
view_ = view;
mock_keyboard_.reset(new MockKeyboard());
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void RenderViewTest::SetUp() {
if (!GetContentClient()->renderer())
GetContentClient()->set_renderer(&mock_content_renderer_client_);
if (!render_thread_.get())
render_thread_.reset(new MockRenderThread());
render_thread_->set_routing_id(kRouteId);
render_thread_->set_surface_id(kSurfaceId);
render_thread_->set_new_window_routing_id(kNewWindowRouteId);
command_line_.reset(new CommandLine(CommandLine::NO_PROGRAM));
params_.reset(new content::MainFunctionParams(*command_line_));
platform_.reset(new RendererMainPlatformDelegate(*params_));
platform_->PlatformInitialize();
webkit_glue::SetJavaScriptFlags(" --expose-gc");
WebKit::initialize(&webkit_platform_support_);
mock_process_.reset(new MockRenderProcess);
RenderViewImpl* view = RenderViewImpl::Create(
0,
kOpenerId,
content::RendererPreferences(),
WebPreferences(),
new SharedRenderViewCounter(0),
kRouteId,
kSurfaceId,
kInvalidSessionStorageNamespaceId,
string16(),
1,
WebKit::WebScreenInfo());
view->AddRef();
view_ = view;
mock_keyboard_.reset(new MockKeyboard());
}
| 171,025
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool PrivateScriptRunner::runDOMAttributeSetter(ScriptState* scriptState, ScriptState* scriptStateInUserScript, const char* className, const char* attributeName, v8::Local<v8::Value> holder, v8::Local<v8::Value> v8Value)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = scriptState->isolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> classObject = classObjectOfPrivateScript(scriptState, className);
v8::Local<v8::Value> descriptor;
if (!classObject->GetOwnPropertyDescriptor(scriptState->context(), v8String(isolate, attributeName)).ToLocal(&descriptor) || !descriptor->IsObject()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: Target DOM attribute setter was not found. (Class name = %s, Attribute name = %s)\n", className, attributeName);
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> setter;
if (!v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(descriptor)->Get(scriptState->context(), v8String(isolate, "set")).ToLocal(&setter) || !setter->IsFunction()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: Target DOM attribute setter was not found. (Class name = %s, Attribute name = %s)\n", className, attributeName);
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
initializeHolderIfNeeded(scriptState, classObject, holder);
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { v8Value };
v8::TryCatch block(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> result;
if (!V8ScriptRunner::callFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(setter), scriptState->getExecutionContext(), holder, WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(argv), argv, isolate).ToLocal(&result)) {
rethrowExceptionInPrivateScript(isolate, block, scriptStateInUserScript, ExceptionState::SetterContext, attributeName, className);
block.ReThrow();
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Blink-in-JS should not run micro tasks
If Blink-in-JS runs micro tasks, there's a risk of causing a UXSS bug
(see 645211 for concrete steps).
This CL makes Blink-in-JS use callInternalFunction (instead of callFunction)
to avoid running micro tasks after Blink-in-JS' callbacks.
BUG=645211
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2330843002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#417874}
CWE ID: CWE-79
|
bool PrivateScriptRunner::runDOMAttributeSetter(ScriptState* scriptState, ScriptState* scriptStateInUserScript, const char* className, const char* attributeName, v8::Local<v8::Value> holder, v8::Local<v8::Value> v8Value)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = scriptState->isolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> classObject = classObjectOfPrivateScript(scriptState, className);
v8::Local<v8::Value> descriptor;
if (!classObject->GetOwnPropertyDescriptor(scriptState->context(), v8String(isolate, attributeName)).ToLocal(&descriptor) || !descriptor->IsObject()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: Target DOM attribute setter was not found. (Class name = %s, Attribute name = %s)\n", className, attributeName);
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> setter;
if (!v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(descriptor)->Get(scriptState->context(), v8String(isolate, "set")).ToLocal(&setter) || !setter->IsFunction()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: Target DOM attribute setter was not found. (Class name = %s, Attribute name = %s)\n", className, attributeName);
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
initializeHolderIfNeeded(scriptState, classObject, holder);
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { v8Value };
v8::TryCatch block(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> result;
if (!V8ScriptRunner::callInternalFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(setter), holder, WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(argv), argv, isolate).ToLocal(&result)) {
rethrowExceptionInPrivateScript(isolate, block, scriptStateInUserScript, ExceptionState::SetterContext, attributeName, className);
block.ReThrow();
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 172,076
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: enum ImapAuthRes imap_auth_cram_md5(struct ImapData *idata, const char *method)
{
char ibuf[LONG_STRING * 2], obuf[LONG_STRING];
unsigned char hmac_response[MD5_DIGEST_LEN];
int len;
int rc;
if (!mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, ACRAM_MD5))
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
mutt_message(_("Authenticating (CRAM-MD5)..."));
/* get auth info */
if (mutt_account_getlogin(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
if (mutt_account_getpass(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
imap_cmd_start(idata, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
/* From RFC2195:
* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a presumptively
* arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the fully-qualified
* primary host name of the server. The syntax of the unencoded form must
* correspond to that of an RFC822 'msg-id' [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
*/
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_RESPOND)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Invalid response from server: %s\n", ibuf);
goto bail;
}
len = mutt_b64_decode(obuf, idata->buf + 2);
if (len == -1)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error decoding base64 response.\n");
goto bail;
}
obuf[len] = '\0';
mutt_debug(2, "CRAM challenge: %s\n", obuf);
/* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
* consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
* computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where the
* key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp (including
* angle-brackets).
*
* Note: The user name shouldn't be quoted. Since the digest can't contain
* spaces, there is no ambiguity. Some servers get this wrong, we'll work
* around them when the bug report comes in. Until then, we'll remain
* blissfully RFC-compliant.
*/
hmac_md5(idata->conn->account.pass, obuf, hmac_response);
/* dubious optimisation I saw elsewhere: make the whole string in one call */
int off = snprintf(obuf, sizeof(obuf), "%s ", idata->conn->account.user);
mutt_md5_toascii(hmac_response, obuf + off);
mutt_debug(2, "CRAM response: %s\n", obuf);
/* ibuf must be long enough to store the base64 encoding of obuf,
* plus the additional debris */
mutt_b64_encode(ibuf, obuf, strlen(obuf), sizeof(ibuf) - 2);
mutt_str_strcat(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf), "\r\n");
mutt_socket_send(idata->conn, ibuf);
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_OK)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error receiving server response.\n");
goto bail;
}
if (imap_code(idata->buf))
return IMAP_AUTH_SUCCESS;
bail:
mutt_error(_("CRAM-MD5 authentication failed."));
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
}
Commit Message: Check outbuf length in mutt_to_base64()
The obuf can be overflowed in auth_cram.c, and possibly auth_gss.c.
Thanks to Jeriko One for the bug report.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
enum ImapAuthRes imap_auth_cram_md5(struct ImapData *idata, const char *method)
{
char ibuf[LONG_STRING * 2], obuf[LONG_STRING];
unsigned char hmac_response[MD5_DIGEST_LEN];
int len;
int rc;
if (!mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, ACRAM_MD5))
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
mutt_message(_("Authenticating (CRAM-MD5)..."));
/* get auth info */
if (mutt_account_getlogin(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
if (mutt_account_getpass(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
imap_cmd_start(idata, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
/* From RFC2195:
* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a presumptively
* arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the fully-qualified
* primary host name of the server. The syntax of the unencoded form must
* correspond to that of an RFC822 'msg-id' [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
*/
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_RESPOND)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Invalid response from server: %s\n", ibuf);
goto bail;
}
len = mutt_b64_decode(obuf, idata->buf + 2, sizeof(obuf));
if (len == -1)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error decoding base64 response.\n");
goto bail;
}
obuf[len] = '\0';
mutt_debug(2, "CRAM challenge: %s\n", obuf);
/* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
* consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
* computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where the
* key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp (including
* angle-brackets).
*
* Note: The user name shouldn't be quoted. Since the digest can't contain
* spaces, there is no ambiguity. Some servers get this wrong, we'll work
* around them when the bug report comes in. Until then, we'll remain
* blissfully RFC-compliant.
*/
hmac_md5(idata->conn->account.pass, obuf, hmac_response);
/* dubious optimisation I saw elsewhere: make the whole string in one call */
int off = snprintf(obuf, sizeof(obuf), "%s ", idata->conn->account.user);
mutt_md5_toascii(hmac_response, obuf + off);
mutt_debug(2, "CRAM response: %s\n", obuf);
/* ibuf must be long enough to store the base64 encoding of obuf,
* plus the additional debris */
mutt_b64_encode(ibuf, obuf, strlen(obuf), sizeof(ibuf) - 2);
mutt_str_strcat(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf), "\r\n");
mutt_socket_send(idata->conn, ibuf);
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_OK)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error receiving server response.\n");
goto bail;
}
if (imap_code(idata->buf))
return IMAP_AUTH_SUCCESS;
bail:
mutt_error(_("CRAM-MD5 authentication failed."));
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
}
| 169,126
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: my_object_finalize (GObject *object)
{
MyObject *mobject = MY_OBJECT (object);
g_free (mobject->this_is_a_string);
(G_OBJECT_CLASS (my_object_parent_class)->finalize) (object);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
my_object_finalize (GObject *object)
| 165,099
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int ip6_mroute_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
int olr;
int val;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct mr6_table *mrt;
mrt = ip6mr_get_table(net, raw6_sk(sk)->ip6mr_table ? : RT6_TABLE_DFLT);
if (!mrt)
return -ENOENT;
switch (optname) {
case MRT6_VERSION:
val = 0x0305;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_PIMSM_V2
case MRT6_PIM:
val = mrt->mroute_do_pim;
break;
#endif
case MRT6_ASSERT:
val = mrt->mroute_do_assert;
break;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
if (get_user(olr, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
olr = min_t(int, olr, sizeof(int));
if (olr < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (put_user(olr, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, olr))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
int ip6_mroute_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
int olr;
int val;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct mr6_table *mrt;
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_RAW ||
inet_sk(sk)->inet_num != IPPROTO_ICMPV6)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
mrt = ip6mr_get_table(net, raw6_sk(sk)->ip6mr_table ? : RT6_TABLE_DFLT);
if (!mrt)
return -ENOENT;
switch (optname) {
case MRT6_VERSION:
val = 0x0305;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_PIMSM_V2
case MRT6_PIM:
val = mrt->mroute_do_pim;
break;
#endif
case MRT6_ASSERT:
val = mrt->mroute_do_assert;
break;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
if (get_user(olr, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
olr = min_t(int, olr, sizeof(int));
if (olr < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (put_user(olr, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, olr))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
| 169,857
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const Chapters::Display* Chapters::Atom::GetDisplay(int index) const
{
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
if (index >= m_displays_count)
return NULL;
return m_displays + index;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const Chapters::Display* Chapters::Atom::GetDisplay(int index) const
| 174,304
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AppShortcutManager::OnceOffCreateShortcuts() {
bool was_enabled = prefs_->GetBoolean(prefs::kAppShortcutsHaveBeenCreated);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
bool is_now_enabled = apps::IsAppShimsEnabled();
#else
bool is_now_enabled = true;
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (was_enabled != is_now_enabled)
prefs_->SetBoolean(prefs::kAppShortcutsHaveBeenCreated, is_now_enabled);
if (was_enabled || !is_now_enabled)
return;
extensions::ExtensionSystem* extension_system;
ExtensionServiceInterface* extension_service;
if (!(extension_system = extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)) ||
!(extension_service = extension_system->extension_service()))
return;
const extensions::ExtensionSet* apps = extension_service->extensions();
for (extensions::ExtensionSet::const_iterator it = apps->begin();
it != apps->end(); ++it) {
if (ShouldCreateShortcutFor(profile_, it->get()))
CreateShortcutsInApplicationsMenu(profile_, it->get());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void AppShortcutManager::OnceOffCreateShortcuts() {
if (prefs_->GetBoolean(prefs::kAppShortcutsHaveBeenCreated))
return;
prefs_->SetBoolean(prefs::kAppShortcutsHaveBeenCreated, true);
extensions::ExtensionSystem* extension_system;
ExtensionServiceInterface* extension_service;
if (!(extension_system = extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)) ||
!(extension_service = extension_system->extension_service()))
return;
const extensions::ExtensionSet* apps = extension_service->extensions();
for (extensions::ExtensionSet::const_iterator it = apps->begin();
it != apps->end(); ++it) {
if (ShouldCreateShortcutFor(profile_, it->get()))
CreateShortcutsInApplicationsMenu(profile_, it->get());
}
}
| 171,146
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void OomInterventionImpl::Check(TimerBase*) {
DCHECK(host_);
OomInterventionMetrics current_memory = GetCurrentMemoryMetrics();
bool oom_detected = false;
oom_detected |= detection_args_->blink_workload_threshold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_blink_usage_kb * 1024 >
detection_args_->blink_workload_threshold;
oom_detected |= detection_args_->private_footprint_threshold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_private_footprint_kb * 1024 >
detection_args_->private_footprint_threshold;
oom_detected |=
detection_args_->swap_threshold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_swap_kb * 1024 > detection_args_->swap_threshold;
oom_detected |= detection_args_->virtual_memory_thresold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_vm_size_kb * 1024 >
detection_args_->virtual_memory_thresold;
ReportMemoryStats(current_memory);
if (oom_detected) {
if (navigate_ads_enabled_) {
for (const auto& page : Page::OrdinaryPages()) {
if (page->MainFrame()->IsLocalFrame()) {
ToLocalFrame(page->MainFrame())
->GetDocument()
->NavigateLocalAdsFrames();
}
}
}
if (renderer_pause_enabled_) {
pauser_.reset(new ScopedPagePauser);
}
host_->OnHighMemoryUsage();
timer_.Stop();
V8GCForContextDispose::Instance().SetForcePageNavigationGC();
}
}
Commit Message: OomIntervention opt-out should work properly with 'show original'
OomIntervention should not be re-triggered on the same page if the user declines the intervention once.
This CL fixes the bug.
Bug: 889131, 887119
Change-Id: Idb9eebb2bb9f79756b63f0e010fe018ba5c490e8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1245019
Commit-Queue: Yuzu Saijo <yuzus@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594574}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void OomInterventionImpl::Check(TimerBase*) {
DCHECK(host_);
DCHECK(renderer_pause_enabled_ || navigate_ads_enabled_);
OomInterventionMetrics current_memory = GetCurrentMemoryMetrics();
bool oom_detected = false;
oom_detected |= detection_args_->blink_workload_threshold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_blink_usage_kb * 1024 >
detection_args_->blink_workload_threshold;
oom_detected |= detection_args_->private_footprint_threshold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_private_footprint_kb * 1024 >
detection_args_->private_footprint_threshold;
oom_detected |=
detection_args_->swap_threshold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_swap_kb * 1024 > detection_args_->swap_threshold;
oom_detected |= detection_args_->virtual_memory_thresold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_vm_size_kb * 1024 >
detection_args_->virtual_memory_thresold;
ReportMemoryStats(current_memory);
if (oom_detected) {
if (navigate_ads_enabled_) {
for (const auto& page : Page::OrdinaryPages()) {
if (page->MainFrame()->IsLocalFrame()) {
ToLocalFrame(page->MainFrame())
->GetDocument()
->NavigateLocalAdsFrames();
}
}
}
if (renderer_pause_enabled_) {
pauser_.reset(new ScopedPagePauser);
}
host_->OnHighMemoryUsage();
timer_.Stop();
V8GCForContextDispose::Instance().SetForcePageNavigationGC();
}
}
| 172,115
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
return( ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
/* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
return( ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
| 169,507
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: processInternalEntity(XML_Parser parser, ENTITY *entity, XML_Bool betweenDecl) {
const char *textStart, *textEnd;
const char *next;
enum XML_Error result;
OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *openEntity;
if (parser->m_freeInternalEntities) {
openEntity = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
} else {
openEntity
= (OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY));
if (! openEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
entity->open = XML_TRUE;
entity->processed = 0;
openEntity->next = parser->m_openInternalEntities;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity;
openEntity->entity = entity;
openEntity->startTagLevel = parser->m_tagLevel;
openEntity->betweenDecl = betweenDecl;
openEntity->internalEventPtr = NULL;
openEntity->internalEventEndPtr = NULL;
textStart = (char *)entity->textPtr;
textEnd = (char *)(entity->textPtr + entity->textLen);
/* Set a safe default value in case 'next' does not get set */
next = textStart;
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok
= XmlPrologTok(parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next);
result = doProlog(parser, parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd,
tok, next, &next, XML_FALSE);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
result = doContent(parser, parser->m_tagLevel, parser->m_internalEncoding,
textStart, textEnd, &next, XML_FALSE);
if (result == XML_ERROR_NONE) {
if (textEnd != next && parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED) {
entity->processed = (int)(next - textStart);
parser->m_processor = internalEntityProcessor;
} else {
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
/* put openEntity back in list of free instances */
openEntity->next = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity;
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
|
processInternalEntity(XML_Parser parser, ENTITY *entity, XML_Bool betweenDecl) {
const char *textStart, *textEnd;
const char *next;
enum XML_Error result;
OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *openEntity;
if (parser->m_freeInternalEntities) {
openEntity = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
} else {
openEntity
= (OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY));
if (! openEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
entity->open = XML_TRUE;
entity->processed = 0;
openEntity->next = parser->m_openInternalEntities;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity;
openEntity->entity = entity;
openEntity->startTagLevel = parser->m_tagLevel;
openEntity->betweenDecl = betweenDecl;
openEntity->internalEventPtr = NULL;
openEntity->internalEventEndPtr = NULL;
textStart = (char *)entity->textPtr;
textEnd = (char *)(entity->textPtr + entity->textLen);
/* Set a safe default value in case 'next' does not get set */
next = textStart;
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok
= XmlPrologTok(parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next);
result = doProlog(parser, parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd,
tok, next, &next, XML_FALSE, XML_FALSE);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
result = doContent(parser, parser->m_tagLevel, parser->m_internalEncoding,
textStart, textEnd, &next, XML_FALSE);
if (result == XML_ERROR_NONE) {
if (textEnd != next && parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED) {
entity->processed = (int)(next - textStart);
parser->m_processor = internalEntityProcessor;
} else {
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
/* put openEntity back in list of free instances */
openEntity->next = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity;
}
}
return result;
}
| 169,532
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void UrlFetcherDownloader::StartURLFetch(const GURL& url) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (download_dir_.empty()) {
Result result;
result.error = -1;
DownloadMetrics download_metrics;
download_metrics.url = url;
download_metrics.downloader = DownloadMetrics::kUrlFetcher;
download_metrics.error = -1;
download_metrics.downloaded_bytes = -1;
download_metrics.total_bytes = -1;
download_metrics.download_time_ms = 0;
main_task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnDownloadComplete,
base::Unretained(this), false, result,
download_metrics));
return;
}
const auto file_path = download_dir_.AppendASCII(url.ExtractFileName());
network_fetcher_ = network_fetcher_factory_->Create();
network_fetcher_->DownloadToFile(
url, file_path,
base::BindOnce(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnResponseStarted,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindRepeating(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnDownloadProgress,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindOnce(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnNetworkFetcherComplete,
base::Unretained(this), file_path));
download_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
}
Commit Message: Fix error handling in the request sender and url fetcher downloader.
That means handling the network errors by primarily looking at net_error.
Bug: 1028369
Change-Id: I8181bced25f8b56144ea336a03883d0dceea5108
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1935428
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sorin Jianu <sorin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#719199}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void UrlFetcherDownloader::StartURLFetch(const GURL& url) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (download_dir_.empty()) {
Result result;
result.error = -1;
DownloadMetrics download_metrics;
download_metrics.url = url;
download_metrics.downloader = DownloadMetrics::kUrlFetcher;
download_metrics.error = -1;
download_metrics.downloaded_bytes = -1;
download_metrics.total_bytes = -1;
download_metrics.download_time_ms = 0;
main_task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnDownloadComplete,
base::Unretained(this), false, result,
download_metrics));
return;
}
file_path_ = download_dir_.AppendASCII(url.ExtractFileName());
network_fetcher_ = network_fetcher_factory_->Create();
network_fetcher_->DownloadToFile(
url, file_path_,
base::BindOnce(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnResponseStarted,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindRepeating(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnDownloadProgress,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindOnce(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnNetworkFetcherComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
download_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
}
| 172,366
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
const u_char *ssh1key, *ivin, *ivout, *keyin, *keyout, *input, *output;
size_t ssh1keylen, rlen, slen, ilen, olen;
int r;
u_int ssh1cipher = 0;
if (!compat20) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ssh1cipher)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ssh1key, &ssh1keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivout, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivin, &rlen)) != 0)
return r;
if (ssh1cipher > INT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(ssh, ssh1key, ssh1keylen,
(int)ssh1cipher);
if (cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->send_context) != (int)slen ||
cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->receive_context) != (int)rlen)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if ((r = cipher_set_keyiv(state->send_context, ivout)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_set_keyiv(state->receive_context, ivin)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
return r;
/*
* We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we
* count from the completion of the authentication.
*/
state->rekey_time = monotime();
/* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */
if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0)
return r;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyout, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyin, &rlen)) != 0)
return r;
if (cipher_get_keycontext(state->send_context, NULL) != (int)slen ||
cipher_get_keycontext(state->receive_context, NULL) != (int)rlen)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
cipher_set_keycontext(state->send_context, keyout);
cipher_set_keycontext(state->receive_context, keyin);
if ((r = ssh_packet_set_compress_state(ssh, m)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
sshbuf_reset(state->input);
sshbuf_reset(state->output);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &input, &ilen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &output, &olen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(state->input, input, ilen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(state->output, output, olen)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshbuf_len(m))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
const u_char *ssh1key, *ivin, *ivout, *keyin, *keyout, *input, *output;
size_t ssh1keylen, rlen, slen, ilen, olen;
int r;
u_int ssh1cipher = 0;
if (!compat20) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ssh1cipher)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ssh1key, &ssh1keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivout, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivin, &rlen)) != 0)
return r;
if (ssh1cipher > INT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(ssh, ssh1key, ssh1keylen,
(int)ssh1cipher);
if (cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->send_context) != (int)slen ||
cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->receive_context) != (int)rlen)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if ((r = cipher_set_keyiv(state->send_context, ivout)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_set_keyiv(state->receive_context, ivin)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
return r;
/*
* We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we
* count from the completion of the authentication.
*/
state->rekey_time = monotime();
/* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */
if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0)
return r;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyout, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyin, &rlen)) != 0)
return r;
if (cipher_get_keycontext(state->send_context, NULL) != (int)slen ||
cipher_get_keycontext(state->receive_context, NULL) != (int)rlen)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
cipher_set_keycontext(state->send_context, keyout);
cipher_set_keycontext(state->receive_context, keyin);
if ((r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
sshbuf_reset(state->input);
sshbuf_reset(state->output);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &input, &ilen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &output, &olen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(state->input, input, ilen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(state->output, output, olen)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshbuf_len(m))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
return 0;
}
| 168,656
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void cJSON_DeleteItemFromArray( cJSON *array, int which )
{
cJSON_Delete( cJSON_DetachItemFromArray( array, which ) );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void cJSON_DeleteItemFromArray( cJSON *array, int which )
| 167,282
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static PassRefPtr<Uint8Array> copySkImageData(SkImage* input,
const SkImageInfo& info) {
size_t width = static_cast<size_t>(input->width());
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer =
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(width * input->height(), info.bytesPerPixel());
if (!dstBuffer)
return nullptr;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
input->readPixels(info, dstPixels->data(), width * info.bytesPerPixel(), 0,
0);
return dstPixels;
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
static PassRefPtr<Uint8Array> copySkImageData(SkImage* input,
const SkImageInfo& info) {
// width * height * bytesPerPixel will never overflow unsigned.
unsigned width = static_cast<unsigned>(input->width());
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer =
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(width * input->height(), info.bytesPerPixel());
if (!dstBuffer)
return nullptr;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
input->readPixels(info, dstPixels->data(), width * info.bytesPerPixel(), 0,
0);
return dstPixels;
}
| 172,499
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexdh_init){
int rc;
(void)type;
(void)user;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET,"Received SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
if(session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_INIT){
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE,"Invalid state for SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
goto error;
}
switch(session->next_crypto->kex_type){
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP1_SHA1:
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA1:
rc=ssh_server_kexdh_init(session, packet);
break;
#ifdef HAVE_ECDH
case SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256:
rc = ssh_server_ecdh_init(session, packet);
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CURVE25519
case SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_LIBSSH_ORG:
rc = ssh_server_curve25519_init(session, packet);
break;
#endif
default:
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"Wrong kex type in ssh_packet_kexdh_init");
rc = SSH_ERROR;
}
if (rc == SSH_ERROR)
session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
error:
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
|
SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexdh_init){
int rc = SSH_ERROR;
(void)type;
(void)user;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET,"Received SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
if(session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_INIT){
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE,"Invalid state for SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
goto error;
}
switch(session->next_crypto->kex_type){
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP1_SHA1:
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA1:
rc=ssh_server_kexdh_init(session, packet);
break;
#ifdef HAVE_ECDH
case SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256:
rc = ssh_server_ecdh_init(session, packet);
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CURVE25519
case SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_LIBSSH_ORG:
rc = ssh_server_curve25519_init(session, packet);
break;
#endif
default:
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"Wrong kex type in ssh_packet_kexdh_init");
rc = SSH_ERROR;
}
error:
if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
}
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
| 165,325
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: png_write_start_row(png_structp png_ptr)
{
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* Arrays to facilitate easy interlacing - use pass (0 - 6) as index */
/* Start of interlace block */
int png_pass_start[7] = {0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0};
/* Offset to next interlace block */
int png_pass_inc[7] = {8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1};
/* Start of interlace block in the y direction */
int png_pass_ystart[7] = {0, 0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1};
/* Offset to next interlace block in the y direction */
int png_pass_yinc[7] = {8, 8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2};
#endif
png_size_t buf_size;
png_debug(1, "in png_write_start_row");
buf_size = (png_size_t)(PNG_ROWBYTES(
png_ptr->usr_channels*png_ptr->usr_bit_depth, png_ptr->width) + 1);
/* Set up row buffer */
png_ptr->row_buf = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)buf_size);
png_ptr->row_buf[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_NONE;
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
/* Set up filtering buffer, if using this filter */
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_SUB)
{
png_ptr->sub_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->sub_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_SUB;
}
/* We only need to keep the previous row if we are using one of these. */
if (png_ptr->do_filter & (PNG_FILTER_AVG | PNG_FILTER_UP | PNG_FILTER_PAETH))
{
/* Set up previous row buffer */
png_ptr->prev_row = (png_bytep)png_calloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)buf_size);
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_UP)
{
png_ptr->up_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->up_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_UP;
}
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_AVG)
{
png_ptr->avg_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->avg_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_AVG;
}
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_PAETH)
{
png_ptr->paeth_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->paeth_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_PAETH;
}
}
#endif /* PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED */
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* If interlaced, we need to set up width and height of pass */
if (png_ptr->interlaced)
{
if (!(png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INTERLACE))
{
png_ptr->num_rows = (png_ptr->height + png_pass_yinc[0] - 1 -
png_pass_ystart[0]) / png_pass_yinc[0];
png_ptr->usr_width = (png_ptr->width + png_pass_inc[0] - 1 -
png_pass_start[0]) / png_pass_inc[0];
}
else
{
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->usr_width = png_ptr->width;
}
}
else
#endif
{
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->usr_width = png_ptr->width;
}
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = (uInt)png_ptr->zbuf_size;
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
png_write_start_row(png_structp png_ptr)
{
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
#ifndef PNG_USE_GLOBAL_ARRAYS
/* Arrays to facilitate easy interlacing - use pass (0 - 6) as index */
/* Start of interlace block */
int png_pass_start[7] = {0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0};
/* Offset to next interlace block */
int png_pass_inc[7] = {8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1};
/* Start of interlace block in the y direction */
int png_pass_ystart[7] = {0, 0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1};
/* Offset to next interlace block in the y direction */
int png_pass_yinc[7] = {8, 8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2};
#endif
#endif
png_size_t buf_size;
png_debug(1, "in png_write_start_row");
buf_size = (png_size_t)(PNG_ROWBYTES(
png_ptr->usr_channels*png_ptr->usr_bit_depth, png_ptr->width) + 1);
/* Set up row buffer */
png_ptr->row_buf = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)buf_size);
png_ptr->row_buf[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_NONE;
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
/* Set up filtering buffer, if using this filter */
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_SUB)
{
png_ptr->sub_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->sub_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_SUB;
}
/* We only need to keep the previous row if we are using one of these. */
if (png_ptr->do_filter & (PNG_FILTER_AVG | PNG_FILTER_UP | PNG_FILTER_PAETH))
{
/* Set up previous row buffer */
png_ptr->prev_row = (png_bytep)png_calloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)buf_size);
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_UP)
{
png_ptr->up_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->up_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_UP;
}
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_AVG)
{
png_ptr->avg_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->avg_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_AVG;
}
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_PAETH)
{
png_ptr->paeth_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->paeth_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_PAETH;
}
}
#endif /* PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED */
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* If interlaced, we need to set up width and height of pass */
if (png_ptr->interlaced)
{
if (!(png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INTERLACE))
{
png_ptr->num_rows = (png_ptr->height + png_pass_yinc[0] - 1 -
png_pass_ystart[0]) / png_pass_yinc[0];
png_ptr->usr_width = (png_ptr->width + png_pass_inc[0] - 1 -
png_pass_start[0]) / png_pass_inc[0];
}
else
{
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->usr_width = png_ptr->width;
}
}
else
#endif
{
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->usr_width = png_ptr->width;
}
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = (uInt)png_ptr->zbuf_size;
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
}
| 172,196
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: MagickExport const char *GetMagickFeatures(void)
{
return "DPC"
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_BUILD_MODULES) || defined(_DLL)
" Modules"
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HDRI_SUPPORT)
" HDRI"
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENCL_SUPPORT)
" OpenCL"
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
" OpenMP"
#endif
;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
MagickExport const char *GetMagickFeatures(void)
{
return "DPC"
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINDOWS_SUPPORT) && defined(_DEBUG)
" Debug"
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CIPHER_SUPPORT)
" Cipher"
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HDRI_SUPPORT)
" HDRI"
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_BUILD_MODULES) || defined(_DLL)
" Modules"
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENCL_SUPPORT)
" OpenCL"
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
" OpenMP"
#endif
#if defined(ZERO_CONFIGURATION_SUPPORT)
" Zero-configuration"
#endif
;
}
| 168,861
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* CMSEXPORT cmsAllocNamedColorList(cmsContext ContextID, cmsUInt32Number n, cmsUInt32Number ColorantCount, const char* Prefix, const char* Suffix)
{
cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* v = (cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST*) _cmsMallocZero(ContextID, sizeof(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST));
if (v == NULL) return NULL;
v ->List = NULL;
v ->nColors = 0;
v ->ContextID = ContextID;
while (v -> Allocated < n)
GrowNamedColorList(v);
strncpy(v ->Prefix, Prefix, sizeof(v ->Prefix));
strncpy(v ->Suffix, Suffix, sizeof(v ->Suffix));
v->Prefix[32] = v->Suffix[32] = 0;
v -> ColorantCount = ColorantCount;
return v;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID:
|
cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* CMSEXPORT cmsAllocNamedColorList(cmsContext ContextID, cmsUInt32Number n, cmsUInt32Number ColorantCount, const char* Prefix, const char* Suffix)
{
cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* v = (cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST*) _cmsMallocZero(ContextID, sizeof(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST));
if (v == NULL) return NULL;
v ->List = NULL;
v ->nColors = 0;
v ->ContextID = ContextID;
while (v -> Allocated < n)
GrowNamedColorList(v);
strncpy(v ->Prefix, Prefix, sizeof(v ->Prefix)-1);
strncpy(v ->Suffix, Suffix, sizeof(v ->Suffix)-1);
v->Prefix[32] = v->Suffix[32] = 0;
v -> ColorantCount = ColorantCount;
return v;
}
| 166,541
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, set_cpu_used_);
}
if (cfg_.ts_number_layers > 1) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP9E_SET_SVC, 1);
}
vpx_svc_layer_id_t layer_id = {0, 0};
layer_id.spatial_layer_id = 0;
frame_flags_ = SetFrameFlags(video->frame(), cfg_.ts_number_layers);
layer_id.temporal_layer_id = SetLayerId(video->frame(),
cfg_.ts_number_layers);
if (video->frame() > 0) {
encoder->Control(VP9E_SET_SVC_LAYER_ID, &layer_id);
}
}
const vpx_rational_t tb = video->timebase();
timebase_ = static_cast<double>(tb.num) / tb.den;
duration_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 0)
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, set_cpu_used_);
if (denoiser_offon_test_) {
ASSERT_GT(denoiser_offon_period_, 0)
<< "denoiser_offon_period_ is not positive.";
if ((video->frame() + 1) % denoiser_offon_period_ == 0) {
// Flip denoiser_on_ periodically
denoiser_on_ ^= 1;
}
}
encoder->Control(VP9E_SET_NOISE_SENSITIVITY, denoiser_on_);
if (cfg_.ts_number_layers > 1) {
if (video->frame() == 0) {
encoder->Control(VP9E_SET_SVC, 1);
}
vpx_svc_layer_id_t layer_id;
layer_id.spatial_layer_id = 0;
frame_flags_ = SetFrameFlags(video->frame(), cfg_.ts_number_layers);
layer_id.temporal_layer_id = SetLayerId(video->frame(),
cfg_.ts_number_layers);
encoder->Control(VP9E_SET_SVC_LAYER_ID, &layer_id);
}
const vpx_rational_t tb = video->timebase();
timebase_ = static_cast<double>(tb.num) / tb.den;
duration_ = 0;
}
| 174,516
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int DefragMfIpv4Test(void)
{
int retval = 0;
int ip_id = 9;
Packet *p = NULL;
DefragInit();
Packet *p1 = BuildTestPacket(ip_id, 2, 1, 'C', 8);
Packet *p2 = BuildTestPacket(ip_id, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
Packet *p3 = BuildTestPacket(ip_id, 1, 0, 'B', 8);
if (p1 == NULL || p2 == NULL || p3 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL);
if (p != NULL) {
goto end;
}
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL);
if (p != NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* This should return a packet as MF=0. */
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p3, NULL);
if (p == NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* Expected IP length is 20 + 8 + 8 = 36 as only 2 of the
* fragments should be in the re-assembled packet. */
if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(p) != 36) {
goto end;
}
retval = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL) {
SCFree(p1);
}
if (p2 != NULL) {
SCFree(p2);
}
if (p3 != NULL) {
SCFree(p3);
}
if (p != NULL) {
SCFree(p);
}
DefragDestroy();
return retval;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358
|
static int DefragMfIpv4Test(void)
{
int retval = 0;
int ip_id = 9;
Packet *p = NULL;
DefragInit();
Packet *p1 = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, ip_id, 2, 1, 'C', 8);
Packet *p2 = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, ip_id, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
Packet *p3 = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, ip_id, 1, 0, 'B', 8);
if (p1 == NULL || p2 == NULL || p3 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL);
if (p != NULL) {
goto end;
}
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL);
if (p != NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* This should return a packet as MF=0. */
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p3, NULL);
if (p == NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* Expected IP length is 20 + 8 + 8 = 36 as only 2 of the
* fragments should be in the re-assembled packet. */
if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(p) != 36) {
goto end;
}
retval = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL) {
SCFree(p1);
}
if (p2 != NULL) {
SCFree(p2);
}
if (p3 != NULL) {
SCFree(p3);
}
if (p != NULL) {
SCFree(p);
}
DefragDestroy();
return retval;
}
| 168,299
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void handle_data_packet(struct mt_connection *curconn, struct mt_mactelnet_hdr *pkthdr, int data_len) {
struct mt_mactelnet_control_hdr cpkt;
struct mt_packet pdata;
unsigned char *data = pkthdr->data;
unsigned int act_size = 0;
int got_user_packet = 0;
int got_pass_packet = 0;
int got_width_packet = 0;
int got_height_packet = 0;
int success;
/* Parse first control packet */
success = parse_control_packet(data, data_len - MT_HEADER_LEN, &cpkt);
while (success) {
if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_BEGINAUTH) {
int plen,i;
if (!curconn->have_pass_salt) {
for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
curconn->pass_salt[i] = rand() % 256;
}
curconn->have_pass_salt = 1;
memset(curconn->trypassword, 0, sizeof(curconn->trypassword));
}
init_packet(&pdata, MT_PTYPE_DATA, pkthdr->dstaddr, pkthdr->srcaddr, pkthdr->seskey, curconn->outcounter);
plen = add_control_packet(&pdata, MT_CPTYPE_PASSSALT, (curconn->pass_salt), 16);
curconn->outcounter += plen;
send_udp(curconn, &pdata);
/* Don't change the username after the state is active */
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_USERNAME && curconn->state != STATE_ACTIVE) {
memcpy(curconn->username, cpkt.data, act_size = (cpkt.length > MT_MNDP_MAX_STRING_SIZE - 1 ? MT_MNDP_MAX_STRING_SIZE - 1 : cpkt.length));
curconn->username[act_size] = 0;
got_user_packet = 1;
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_TERM_WIDTH && cpkt.length >= 2) {
unsigned short width;
memcpy(&width, cpkt.data, 2);
curconn->terminal_width = le16toh(width);
got_width_packet = 1;
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_TERM_HEIGHT && cpkt.length >= 2) {
unsigned short height;
memcpy(&height, cpkt.data, 2);
curconn->terminal_height = le16toh(height);
got_height_packet = 1;
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_TERM_TYPE) {
memcpy(curconn->terminal_type, cpkt.data, act_size = (cpkt.length > 30 - 1 ? 30 - 1 : cpkt.length));
curconn->terminal_type[act_size] = 0;
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PASSWORD) {
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(_POSIX_MEMLOCK_RANGE)
mlock(curconn->trypassword, 17);
#endif
memcpy(curconn->trypassword, cpkt.data, 17);
got_pass_packet = 1;
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PLAINDATA) {
/* relay data from client to shell */
if (curconn->state == STATE_ACTIVE && curconn->ptsfd != -1) {
write(curconn->ptsfd, cpkt.data, cpkt.length);
}
} else {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("(%d) Unhandeled control packet type: %d"), curconn->seskey, cpkt.cptype);
}
/* Parse next control packet */
success = parse_control_packet(NULL, 0, &cpkt);
}
if (got_user_packet && got_pass_packet) {
user_login(curconn, pkthdr);
}
if (curconn->state == STATE_ACTIVE && (got_width_packet || got_height_packet)) {
set_terminal_size(curconn->ptsfd, curconn->terminal_width, curconn->terminal_height);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void handle_data_packet(struct mt_connection *curconn, struct mt_mactelnet_hdr *pkthdr, int data_len) {
struct mt_mactelnet_control_hdr cpkt;
struct mt_packet pdata;
unsigned char *data = pkthdr->data;
unsigned int act_size = 0;
int got_user_packet = 0;
int got_pass_packet = 0;
int got_width_packet = 0;
int got_height_packet = 0;
int success;
/* Parse first control packet */
success = parse_control_packet(data, data_len - MT_HEADER_LEN, &cpkt);
while (success) {
if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_BEGINAUTH) {
int plen,i;
if (!curconn->have_pass_salt) {
for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
curconn->pass_salt[i] = rand() % 256;
}
curconn->have_pass_salt = 1;
memset(curconn->trypassword, 0, sizeof(curconn->trypassword));
}
init_packet(&pdata, MT_PTYPE_DATA, pkthdr->dstaddr, pkthdr->srcaddr, pkthdr->seskey, curconn->outcounter);
plen = add_control_packet(&pdata, MT_CPTYPE_PASSSALT, (curconn->pass_salt), 16);
curconn->outcounter += plen;
send_udp(curconn, &pdata);
/* Don't change the username after the state is active */
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_USERNAME && curconn->state != STATE_ACTIVE) {
memcpy(curconn->username, cpkt.data, act_size = (cpkt.length > MT_MNDP_MAX_STRING_SIZE - 1 ? MT_MNDP_MAX_STRING_SIZE - 1 : cpkt.length));
curconn->username[act_size] = 0;
got_user_packet = 1;
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_TERM_WIDTH && cpkt.length >= 2) {
unsigned short width;
memcpy(&width, cpkt.data, 2);
curconn->terminal_width = le16toh(width);
got_width_packet = 1;
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_TERM_HEIGHT && cpkt.length >= 2) {
unsigned short height;
memcpy(&height, cpkt.data, 2);
curconn->terminal_height = le16toh(height);
got_height_packet = 1;
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_TERM_TYPE) {
memcpy(curconn->terminal_type, cpkt.data, act_size = (cpkt.length > 30 - 1 ? 30 - 1 : cpkt.length));
curconn->terminal_type[act_size] = 0;
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PASSWORD && cpkt.length == 17) {
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(_POSIX_MEMLOCK_RANGE)
mlock(curconn->trypassword, 17);
#endif
memcpy(curconn->trypassword, cpkt.data, 17);
got_pass_packet = 1;
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PLAINDATA) {
/* relay data from client to shell */
if (curconn->state == STATE_ACTIVE && curconn->ptsfd != -1) {
write(curconn->ptsfd, cpkt.data, cpkt.length);
}
} else {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("(%d) Unhandeled control packet type: %d, length: %d"), curconn->seskey, cpkt.cptype, cpkt.length);
}
/* Parse next control packet */
success = parse_control_packet(NULL, 0, &cpkt);
}
if (got_user_packet && got_pass_packet) {
user_login(curconn, pkthdr);
}
if (curconn->state == STATE_ACTIVE && (got_width_packet || got_height_packet)) {
set_terminal_size(curconn->ptsfd, curconn->terminal_width, curconn->terminal_height);
}
}
| 166,964
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool AppCacheBackendImpl::SelectCacheForWorker(
int host_id, int parent_process_id, int parent_host_id) {
AppCacheHost* host = GetHost(host_id);
if (!host || host->was_select_cache_called())
return false;
host->SelectCacheForWorker(parent_process_id, parent_host_id);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID:
|
bool AppCacheBackendImpl::SelectCacheForWorker(
int host_id, int parent_process_id, int parent_host_id) {
AppCacheHost* host = GetHost(host_id);
if (!host)
return false;
return host->SelectCacheForWorker(parent_process_id, parent_host_id);
}
| 171,738
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int java_switch_op(RAnal *anal, RAnalOp *op, ut64 addr, const ut8 *data, int len) {
ut8 op_byte = data[0];
ut64 offset = addr - java_get_method_start ();
ut8 pos = (offset+1)%4 ? 1 + 4 - (offset+1)%4 : 1;
if (op_byte == 0xaa) {
if (pos + 8 > len) {
return op->size;
}
int min_val = (ut32)(UINT (data, pos + 4)),
max_val = (ut32)(UINT (data, pos + 8));
ut32 default_loc = (ut32) (UINT (data, pos)), cur_case = 0;
op->switch_op = r_anal_switch_op_new (addr, min_val, default_loc);
RAnalCaseOp *caseop = NULL;
pos += 12;
if (max_val > min_val && ((max_val - min_val)<(UT16_MAX/4))) {
for (cur_case = 0; cur_case <= max_val - min_val; pos += 4, cur_case++) {
if (pos + 4 >= len) {
break;
}
int offset = (int)(ut32)(R_BIN_JAVA_UINT (data, pos));
caseop = r_anal_switch_op_add_case (op->switch_op,
addr + pos, cur_case + min_val, addr + offset);
if (caseop) {
caseop->bb_ref_to = addr+offset;
caseop->bb_ref_from = addr; // TODO figure this one out
}
}
} else {
eprintf ("Invalid switch boundaries at 0x%"PFMT64x"\n", addr);
}
}
op->size = pos;
return op->size;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10296 - Heap out of bounds read in java_switch_op()
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static int java_switch_op(RAnal *anal, RAnalOp *op, ut64 addr, const ut8 *data, int len) {
ut8 op_byte = data[0];
ut64 offset = addr - java_get_method_start ();
ut8 pos = (offset+1)%4 ? 1 + 4 - (offset+1)%4 : 1;
if (op_byte == 0xaa) {
if (pos + 8 + 8 > len) {
return op->size;
}
const int min_val = (ut32)(UINT (data, pos + 4));
const int max_val = (ut32)(UINT (data, pos + 8));
ut32 default_loc = (ut32) (UINT (data, pos)), cur_case = 0;
op->switch_op = r_anal_switch_op_new (addr, min_val, default_loc);
RAnalCaseOp *caseop = NULL;
pos += 12;
if (max_val > min_val && ((max_val - min_val)<(UT16_MAX/4))) {
for (cur_case = 0; cur_case <= max_val - min_val; pos += 4, cur_case++) {
if (pos + 4 >= len) {
break;
}
int offset = (int)(ut32)(R_BIN_JAVA_UINT (data, pos));
caseop = r_anal_switch_op_add_case (op->switch_op,
addr + pos, cur_case + min_val, addr + offset);
if (caseop) {
caseop->bb_ref_to = addr+offset;
caseop->bb_ref_from = addr; // TODO figure this one out
}
}
} else {
eprintf ("Invalid switch boundaries at 0x%"PFMT64x"\n", addr);
}
}
op->size = pos;
return op->size;
}
| 169,198
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static UINT drdynvc_process_capability_request(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, int Sp,
int cbChId, wStream* s)
{
UINT status;
if (!drdynvc)
return CHANNEL_RC_BAD_INIT_HANDLE;
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_TRACE, "capability_request Sp=%d cbChId=%d", Sp, cbChId);
Stream_Seek(s, 1); /* pad */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->version);
/* RDP8 servers offer version 3, though Microsoft forgot to document it
* in their early documents. It behaves the same as version 2.
*/
if ((drdynvc->version == 2) || (drdynvc->version == 3))
{
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge0);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge1);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge2);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge3);
}
status = drdynvc_send_capability_response(drdynvc);
drdynvc->state = DRDYNVC_STATE_READY;
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID:
|
static UINT drdynvc_process_capability_request(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, int Sp,
int cbChId, wStream* s)
{
UINT status;
if (!drdynvc)
return CHANNEL_RC_BAD_INIT_HANDLE;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 3)
return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_TRACE, "capability_request Sp=%d cbChId=%d", Sp, cbChId);
Stream_Seek(s, 1); /* pad */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->version);
/* RDP8 servers offer version 3, though Microsoft forgot to document it
* in their early documents. It behaves the same as version 2.
*/
if ((drdynvc->version == 2) || (drdynvc->version == 3))
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 8)
return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge0);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge1);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge2);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge3);
}
status = drdynvc_send_capability_response(drdynvc);
drdynvc->state = DRDYNVC_STATE_READY;
return status;
}
| 168,934
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int rose_parse_ccitt(unsigned char *p, struct rose_facilities_struct *facilities, int len)
{
unsigned char l, n = 0;
char callsign[11];
do {
switch (*p & 0xC0) {
case 0x00:
p += 2;
n += 2;
len -= 2;
break;
case 0x40:
p += 3;
n += 3;
len -= 3;
break;
case 0x80:
p += 4;
n += 4;
len -= 4;
break;
case 0xC0:
l = p[1];
if (*p == FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP) {
memcpy(&facilities->source_addr, p + 7, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
memcpy(callsign, p + 12, l - 10);
callsign[l - 10] = '\0';
asc2ax(&facilities->source_call, callsign);
}
if (*p == FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP) {
memcpy(&facilities->dest_addr, p + 7, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
memcpy(callsign, p + 12, l - 10);
callsign[l - 10] = '\0';
asc2ax(&facilities->dest_call, callsign);
}
p += l + 2;
n += l + 2;
len -= l + 2;
break;
}
} while (*p != 0x00 && len > 0);
return n;
}
Commit Message: ROSE: prevent heap corruption with bad facilities
When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's possible for
a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected, resulting in
heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent overflows, and
abort facilities parsing on failure.
Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and
FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide a length
of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy size, causing a
kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length of greater than
20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign array. Abort facilities
parsing on these invalid length values.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int rose_parse_ccitt(unsigned char *p, struct rose_facilities_struct *facilities, int len)
{
unsigned char l, n = 0;
char callsign[11];
do {
switch (*p & 0xC0) {
case 0x00:
p += 2;
n += 2;
len -= 2;
break;
case 0x40:
p += 3;
n += 3;
len -= 3;
break;
case 0x80:
p += 4;
n += 4;
len -= 4;
break;
case 0xC0:
l = p[1];
/* Prevent overflows*/
if (l < 10 || l > 20)
return -1;
if (*p == FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP) {
memcpy(&facilities->source_addr, p + 7, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
memcpy(callsign, p + 12, l - 10);
callsign[l - 10] = '\0';
asc2ax(&facilities->source_call, callsign);
}
if (*p == FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP) {
memcpy(&facilities->dest_addr, p + 7, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
memcpy(callsign, p + 12, l - 10);
callsign[l - 10] = '\0';
asc2ax(&facilities->dest_call, callsign);
}
p += l + 2;
n += l + 2;
len -= l + 2;
break;
}
} while (*p != 0x00 && len > 0);
return n;
}
| 165,671
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ~CreateFileResult()
{
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
~CreateFileResult()
| 171,416
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void vrend_clear(struct vrend_context *ctx,
unsigned buffers,
const union pipe_color_union *color,
double depth, unsigned stencil)
{
GLbitfield bits = 0;
if (ctx->in_error)
return;
if (ctx->ctx_switch_pending)
vrend_finish_context_switch(ctx);
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT, ctx->sub->fb_id);
vrend_update_frontface_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->stencil_state_dirty)
vrend_update_stencil_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->scissor_state_dirty)
vrend_update_scissor_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->viewport_state_dirty)
vrend_update_viewport_state(ctx);
vrend_use_program(ctx, 0);
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_COLOR) {
if (ctx->sub->nr_cbufs && ctx->sub->surf[0] && vrend_format_is_emulated_alpha(ctx->sub->surf[0]->format)) {
glClearColor(color->f[3], 0.0, 0.0, 0.0);
} else {
glClearColor(color->f[0], color->f[1], color->f[2], color->f[3]);
}
}
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_DEPTH) {
/* gallium clears don't respect depth mask */
glDepthMask(GL_TRUE);
glClearDepth(depth);
}
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_STENCIL)
glClearStencil(stencil);
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_COLOR) {
uint32_t mask = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->sub->nr_cbufs; i++) {
if (ctx->sub->surf[i])
mask |= (1 << i);
}
if (mask != (buffers >> 2)) {
mask = buffers >> 2;
while (mask) {
i = u_bit_scan(&mask);
if (util_format_is_pure_uint(ctx->sub->surf[i]->format))
glClearBufferuiv(GL_COLOR,
i, (GLuint *)color);
else if (util_format_is_pure_sint(ctx->sub->surf[i]->format))
glClearBufferiv(GL_COLOR,
i, (GLint *)color);
else
glClearBufferfv(GL_COLOR,
i, (GLfloat *)color);
}
}
else
bits |= GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT;
}
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_DEPTH)
bits |= GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT;
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_STENCIL)
bits |= GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT;
if (bits)
glClear(bits);
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_DEPTH)
if (!ctx->sub->dsa_state.depth.writemask)
glDepthMask(GL_FALSE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
void vrend_clear(struct vrend_context *ctx,
unsigned buffers,
const union pipe_color_union *color,
double depth, unsigned stencil)
{
GLbitfield bits = 0;
if (ctx->in_error)
return;
if (ctx->ctx_switch_pending)
vrend_finish_context_switch(ctx);
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT, ctx->sub->fb_id);
vrend_update_frontface_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->stencil_state_dirty)
vrend_update_stencil_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->scissor_state_dirty)
vrend_update_scissor_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->viewport_state_dirty)
vrend_update_viewport_state(ctx);
vrend_use_program(ctx, 0);
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_COLOR) {
if (ctx->sub->nr_cbufs && ctx->sub->surf[0] && vrend_format_is_emulated_alpha(ctx->sub->surf[0]->format)) {
glClearColor(color->f[3], 0.0, 0.0, 0.0);
} else {
glClearColor(color->f[0], color->f[1], color->f[2], color->f[3]);
}
}
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_DEPTH) {
/* gallium clears don't respect depth mask */
glDepthMask(GL_TRUE);
glClearDepth(depth);
}
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_STENCIL)
glClearStencil(stencil);
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_COLOR) {
uint32_t mask = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->sub->nr_cbufs; i++) {
if (ctx->sub->surf[i])
mask |= (1 << i);
}
if (mask != (buffers >> 2)) {
mask = buffers >> 2;
while (mask) {
i = u_bit_scan(&mask);
if (i < PIPE_MAX_COLOR_BUFS && ctx->sub->surf[i] && util_format_is_pure_uint(ctx->sub->surf[i] && ctx->sub->surf[i]->format))
glClearBufferuiv(GL_COLOR,
i, (GLuint *)color);
else if (i < PIPE_MAX_COLOR_BUFS && ctx->sub->surf[i] && util_format_is_pure_sint(ctx->sub->surf[i] && ctx->sub->surf[i]->format))
glClearBufferiv(GL_COLOR,
i, (GLint *)color);
else
glClearBufferfv(GL_COLOR,
i, (GLfloat *)color);
}
}
else
bits |= GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT;
}
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_DEPTH)
bits |= GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT;
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_STENCIL)
bits |= GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT;
if (bits)
glClear(bits);
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_DEPTH)
if (!ctx->sub->dsa_state.depth.writemask)
glDepthMask(GL_FALSE);
}
| 164,958
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::setBuffers(
bool audio, Vector<MediaBuffer *> &buffers) {
if (mIsSecure && !audio) {
return mVideoTrack.mSource->setBuffers(buffers);
}
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::setBuffers(
bool audio, Vector<MediaBuffer *> &buffers) {
if (mIsWidevine && !audio && mVideoTrack.mSource != NULL) {
return mVideoTrack.mSource->setBuffers(buffers);
}
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
| 173,763
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void build_l4proto_icmp(const struct nf_conntrack *ct, struct nethdr *n)
{
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_ICMP_TYPE, n, NTA_ICMP_TYPE);
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_ICMP_CODE, n, NTA_ICMP_CODE);
ct_build_u16(ct, ATTR_ICMP_ID, n, NTA_ICMP_ID);
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_ORIG_PORT, n, NTA_PORT,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_port));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
|
static void build_l4proto_icmp(const struct nf_conntrack *ct, struct nethdr *n)
{
/* This is also used by ICMPv6 and nf_conntrack_ipv6 is optional */
if (!nfct_attr_is_set(ct, ATTR_ICMP_TYPE))
return;
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_ICMP_TYPE, n, NTA_ICMP_TYPE);
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_ICMP_CODE, n, NTA_ICMP_CODE);
ct_build_u16(ct, ATTR_ICMP_ID, n, NTA_ICMP_ID);
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_ORIG_PORT, n, NTA_PORT,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_port));
}
| 164,630
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnRegisterAgent(
const base::Closure& callback,
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback) {
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Agent registered, now pairing";
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->
Pair(object_path_,
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPair,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
callback, error_callback),
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPairError,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
error_callback));
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnRegisterAgent(
| 171,229
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void EnsureInitializeForAndroidLayoutTests() {
CHECK(CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kDumpRenderTree));
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
content::NestedMessagePumpAndroid::RegisterJni(env);
content::RegisterNativesImpl(env);
bool success = base::MessageLoop::InitMessagePumpForUIFactory(
&CreateMessagePumpForUI);
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the message pump for Android.";
base::FilePath files_dir(GetTestFilesDirectory(env));
base::FilePath stdout_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("test.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdout_fifo);
base::FilePath stderr_fifo(
files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stderr.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stderr_fifo);
base::FilePath stdin_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stdin.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdin_fifo);
success = base::android::RedirectStream(stdout, stdout_fifo, "w") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stdin, stdin_fifo, "r") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stderr, stderr_fifo, "w");
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the Android FIFOs.";
}
Commit Message: Content Shell: Move shell_layout_tests_android into layout_tests/.
BUG=420994
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/661743002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299892}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void EnsureInitializeForAndroidLayoutTests() {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
content::NestedMessagePumpAndroid::RegisterJni(env);
content::RegisterNativesImpl(env);
bool success = base::MessageLoop::InitMessagePumpForUIFactory(
&CreateMessagePumpForUI);
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the message pump for Android.";
base::FilePath files_dir(GetTestFilesDirectory(env));
base::FilePath stdout_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("test.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdout_fifo);
base::FilePath stderr_fifo(
files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stderr.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stderr_fifo);
base::FilePath stdin_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stdin.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdin_fifo);
success = base::android::RedirectStream(stdout, stdout_fifo, "w") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stdin, stdin_fifo, "r") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stderr, stderr_fifo, "w");
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the Android FIFOs.";
}
| 171,161
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static char *print_array( cJSON *item, int depth, int fmt )
{
char **entries;
char *out = 0, *ptr, *ret;
int len = 5;
cJSON *child = item->child;
int numentries = 0, i = 0, fail = 0;
/* How many entries in the array? */
while ( child ) {
++numentries;
child = child->next;
}
/* Allocate an array to hold the values for each. */
if ( ! ( entries = (char**) cJSON_malloc( numentries * sizeof(char*) ) ) )
return 0;
memset( entries, 0, numentries * sizeof(char*) );
/* Retrieve all the results. */
child = item->child;
while ( child && ! fail ) {
ret = print_value( child, depth + 1, fmt );
entries[i++] = ret;
if ( ret )
len += strlen( ret ) + 2 + ( fmt ? 1 : 0 );
else
fail = 1;
child = child -> next;
}
/* If we didn't fail, try to malloc the output string. */
if ( ! fail ) {
out = (char*) cJSON_malloc( len );
if ( ! out )
fail = 1;
}
/* Handle failure. */
if ( fail ) {
for ( i = 0; i < numentries; ++i )
if ( entries[i] )
cJSON_free( entries[i] );
cJSON_free( entries );
return 0;
}
/* Compose the output array. */
*out = '[';
ptr = out + 1;
*ptr = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < numentries; ++i ) {
strcpy( ptr, entries[i] );
ptr += strlen( entries[i] );
if ( i != numentries - 1 ) {
*ptr++ = ',';
if ( fmt )
*ptr++ = ' ';
*ptr = 0;
}
cJSON_free( entries[i] );
}
cJSON_free( entries );
*ptr++ = ']';
*ptr++ = 0;
return out;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static char *print_array( cJSON *item, int depth, int fmt )
static char *print_array(cJSON *item,int depth,int fmt,printbuffer *p)
{
char **entries;
char *out=0,*ptr,*ret;int len=5;
cJSON *child=item->child;
int numentries=0,i=0,fail=0;
size_t tmplen=0;
/* How many entries in the array? */
while (child) numentries++,child=child->next;
/* Explicitly handle numentries==0 */
if (!numentries)
{
if (p) out=ensure(p,3);
else out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(3);
if (out) strcpy(out,"[]");
return out;
}
if (p)
{
/* Compose the output array. */
i=p->offset;
ptr=ensure(p,1);if (!ptr) return 0; *ptr='['; p->offset++;
child=item->child;
while (child && !fail)
{
print_value(child,depth+1,fmt,p);
p->offset=update(p);
if (child->next) {len=fmt?2:1;ptr=ensure(p,len+1);if (!ptr) return 0;*ptr++=',';if(fmt)*ptr++=' ';*ptr=0;p->offset+=len;}
child=child->next;
}
ptr=ensure(p,2);if (!ptr) return 0; *ptr++=']';*ptr=0;
out=(p->buffer)+i;
}
else
{
/* Allocate an array to hold the values for each */
entries=(char**)cJSON_malloc(numentries*sizeof(char*));
if (!entries) return 0;
memset(entries,0,numentries*sizeof(char*));
/* Retrieve all the results: */
child=item->child;
while (child && !fail)
{
ret=print_value(child,depth+1,fmt,0);
entries[i++]=ret;
if (ret) len+=strlen(ret)+2+(fmt?1:0); else fail=1;
child=child->next;
}
/* If we didn't fail, try to malloc the output string */
if (!fail) out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(len);
/* If that fails, we fail. */
if (!out) fail=1;
/* Handle failure. */
if (fail)
{
for (i=0;i<numentries;i++) if (entries[i]) cJSON_free(entries[i]);
cJSON_free(entries);
return 0;
}
/* Compose the output array. */
*out='[';
ptr=out+1;*ptr=0;
for (i=0;i<numentries;i++)
{
tmplen=strlen(entries[i]);memcpy(ptr,entries[i],tmplen);ptr+=tmplen;
if (i!=numentries-1) {*ptr++=',';if(fmt)*ptr++=' ';*ptr=0;}
cJSON_free(entries[i]);
}
cJSON_free(entries);
*ptr++=']';*ptr++=0;
}
return out;
}
| 167,306
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: emit_string(const char *str, FILE *out)
/* Print a string with spaces replaced by '_' and non-printing characters by
* an octal escape.
*/
{
for (; *str; ++str)
if (isgraph(UCHAR_MAX & *str))
putc(*str, out);
else if (isspace(UCHAR_MAX & *str))
putc('_', out);
else
fprintf(out, "\\%.3o", *str);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
emit_string(const char *str, FILE *out)
/* Print a string with spaces replaced by '_' and non-printing characters by
* an octal escape.
*/
{
for (; *str; ++str)
if (isgraph(UCHAR_MAX & *str))
putc(*str, out);
else if (isspace(UCHAR_MAX & *str))
putc('_', out);
else
fprintf(out, "\\%.3o", *str);
}
| 173,731
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BlockEntry::Kind Track::EOSBlock::GetKind() const
{
return kBlockEOS;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
BlockEntry::Kind Track::EOSBlock::GetKind() const
| 174,331
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ext2_xattr_cache_insert(struct buffer_head *bh)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_hash);
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
int error;
ce = mb_cache_entry_alloc(ext2_xattr_cache, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ce)
return -ENOMEM;
error = mb_cache_entry_insert(ce, bh->b_bdev, bh->b_blocknr, hash);
if (error) {
mb_cache_entry_free(ce);
if (error == -EBUSY) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "already in cache (%d cache entries)",
atomic_read(&ext2_xattr_cache->c_entry_count));
error = 0;
}
} else {
ea_bdebug(bh, "inserting [%x] (%d cache entries)", (int)hash,
atomic_read(&ext2_xattr_cache->c_entry_count));
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19
|
ext2_xattr_cache_insert(struct buffer_head *bh)
ext2_xattr_cache_insert(struct mb2_cache *cache, struct buffer_head *bh)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_hash);
int error;
error = mb2_cache_entry_create(cache, GFP_NOFS, hash, bh->b_blocknr);
if (error) {
if (error == -EBUSY) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "already in cache (%d cache entries)",
atomic_read(&ext2_xattr_cache->c_entry_count));
error = 0;
}
} else
ea_bdebug(bh, "inserting [%x]", (int)hash);
return error;
}
| 169,978
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RunInvTxfm(int16_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
inv_txfm_(out, dst, stride, tx_type_);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void RunInvTxfm(int16_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
void RunInvTxfm(tran_low_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
inv_txfm_(out, dst, stride, tx_type_);
}
| 174,525
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ContentEncoding::ContentEncryption::~ContentEncryption() {
delete [] key_id;
delete [] signature;
delete [] sig_key_id;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
ContentEncoding::ContentEncryption::~ContentEncryption() {
delete[] key_id;
delete[] signature;
delete[] sig_key_id;
}
| 174,461
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int accept_server_socket(int s)
{
struct sockaddr_un client_address;
socklen_t clen;
int fd = accept(s, (struct sockaddr*)&client_address, &clen);
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("accepted fd:%d for server fd:%d", fd, s);
return fd;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
static inline int accept_server_socket(int s)
{
struct sockaddr_un client_address;
socklen_t clen;
int fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(accept(s, (struct sockaddr*)&client_address, &clen));
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("accepted fd:%d for server fd:%d", fd, s);
return fd;
}
| 173,459
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int CLASS ljpeg_start (struct jhead *jh, int info_only)
{
int c, tag, len;
uchar data[0x10000];
const uchar *dp;
memset (jh, 0, sizeof *jh);
jh->restart = INT_MAX;
fread (data, 2, 1, ifp);
if (data[1] != 0xd8) return 0;
do {
fread (data, 2, 2, ifp);
tag = data[0] << 8 | data[1];
len = (data[2] << 8 | data[3]) - 2;
if (tag <= 0xff00) return 0;
fread (data, 1, len, ifp);
switch (tag) {
case 0xffc3:
jh->sraw = ((data[7] >> 4) * (data[7] & 15) - 1) & 3;
case 0xffc0:
jh->bits = data[0];
jh->high = data[1] << 8 | data[2];
jh->wide = data[3] << 8 | data[4];
jh->clrs = data[5] + jh->sraw;
if (len == 9 && !dng_version) getc(ifp);
break;
case 0xffc4:
if (info_only) break;
for (dp = data; dp < data+len && (c = *dp++) < 4; )
jh->free[c] = jh->huff[c] = make_decoder_ref (&dp);
break;
case 0xffda:
jh->psv = data[1+data[0]*2];
jh->bits -= data[3+data[0]*2] & 15;
break;
case 0xffdd:
jh->restart = data[0] << 8 | data[1];
}
} while (tag != 0xffda);
if (info_only) return 1;
FORC(5) if (!jh->huff[c+1]) jh->huff[c+1] = jh->huff[c];
if (jh->sraw) {
FORC(4) jh->huff[2+c] = jh->huff[1];
FORC(jh->sraw) jh->huff[1+c] = jh->huff[0];
}
jh->row = (ushort *) calloc (jh->wide*jh->clrs, 4);
merror (jh->row, "ljpeg_start()");
return zero_after_ff = 1;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
int CLASS ljpeg_start (struct jhead *jh, int info_only)
{
int c, tag;
ushort len;
uchar data[0x10000];
const uchar *dp;
memset (jh, 0, sizeof *jh);
jh->restart = INT_MAX;
fread (data, 2, 1, ifp);
if (data[1] != 0xd8) return 0;
do {
fread (data, 2, 2, ifp);
tag = data[0] << 8 | data[1];
len = (data[2] << 8 | data[3]) - 2;
if (tag <= 0xff00) return 0;
fread (data, 1, len, ifp);
switch (tag) {
case 0xffc3:
jh->sraw = ((data[7] >> 4) * (data[7] & 15) - 1) & 3;
case 0xffc0:
jh->bits = data[0];
jh->high = data[1] << 8 | data[2];
jh->wide = data[3] << 8 | data[4];
jh->clrs = data[5] + jh->sraw;
if (len == 9 && !dng_version) getc(ifp);
break;
case 0xffc4:
if (info_only) break;
for (dp = data; dp < data+len && (c = *dp++) < 4; )
jh->free[c] = jh->huff[c] = make_decoder_ref (&dp);
break;
case 0xffda:
jh->psv = data[1+data[0]*2];
jh->bits -= data[3+data[0]*2] & 15;
break;
case 0xffdd:
jh->restart = data[0] << 8 | data[1];
}
} while (tag != 0xffda);
if (info_only) return 1;
FORC(5) if (!jh->huff[c+1]) jh->huff[c+1] = jh->huff[c];
if (jh->sraw) {
FORC(4) jh->huff[2+c] = jh->huff[1];
FORC(jh->sraw) jh->huff[1+c] = jh->huff[0];
}
jh->row = (ushort *) calloc (jh->wide*jh->clrs, 4);
merror (jh->row, "ljpeg_start()");
return zero_after_ff = 1;
}
| 166,622
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ExtensionResourceRequestPolicy::CanRequestResource(
const GURL& resource_url,
const GURL& frame_url,
const ExtensionSet* loaded_extensions) {
CHECK(resource_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme));
const Extension* extension =
loaded_extensions->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(ExtensionURLInfo(resource_url));
if (!extension) {
return true;
}
std::string resource_root_relative_path =
resource_url.path().empty() ? "" : resource_url.path().substr(1);
if (extension->is_hosted_app() &&
!extension->icons().ContainsPath(resource_root_relative_path)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Denying load of " << resource_url.spec() << " from "
<< "hosted app.";
return false;
}
if (!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableExtensionsResourceWhitelist) &&
!frame_url.is_empty() &&
!frame_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme) &&
!extension->IsResourceWebAccessible(resource_url.path())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Denying load of " << resource_url.spec() << " which "
<< "is not a web accessible resource.";
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Do not require DevTools extension resources to be white-listed in manifest.
Currently, resources used by DevTools extensions need to be white-listed as web_accessible_resources in manifest. This is quite inconvenitent and appears to be an overkill, given the fact that DevTools front-end is
(a) trusted and
(b) picky on the frames it loads.
This change adds resources that belong to DevTools extensions and are being loaded into a DevTools front-end page to the list of exceptions from web_accessible_resources check.
BUG=none
TEST=DevToolsExtensionTest.*
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9663076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool ExtensionResourceRequestPolicy::CanRequestResource(
const GURL& resource_url,
const WebKit::WebFrame* frame,
const ExtensionSet* loaded_extensions) {
CHECK(resource_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme));
const Extension* extension =
loaded_extensions->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(ExtensionURLInfo(resource_url));
if (!extension) {
return true;
}
std::string resource_root_relative_path =
resource_url.path().empty() ? "" : resource_url.path().substr(1);
if (extension->is_hosted_app() &&
!extension->icons().ContainsPath(resource_root_relative_path)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Denying load of " << resource_url.spec() << " from "
<< "hosted app.";
return false;
}
GURL frame_url = frame->document().url();
GURL page_url = frame->top()->document().url();
// - devtools (chrome-extension:// URLs are loaded into frames of devtools
// to support the devtools extension APIs)
if (!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableExtensionsResourceWhitelist) &&
!frame_url.is_empty() &&
!frame_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme) &&
!(page_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeDevToolsScheme) &&
!extension->devtools_url().is_empty()) &&
!extension->IsResourceWebAccessible(resource_url.path())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Denying load of " << resource_url.spec() << " which "
<< "is not a web accessible resource.";
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 171,001
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::clearBrowserCache()
{
m_client->clearBrowserCache();
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
|
void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::clearBrowserCache()
| 171,348
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: std::string Backtrace::GetFunctionName(uintptr_t pc, uintptr_t* offset) {
std::string func_name = GetFunctionNameRaw(pc, offset);
if (!func_name.empty()) {
#if defined(__APPLE__)
if (func_name[0] != '_') {
return func_name;
}
#endif
char* name = __cxa_demangle(func_name.c_str(), 0, 0, 0);
if (name) {
func_name = name;
free(name);
}
}
return func_name;
}
Commit Message: Don't demangle symbol names.
Bug: http://b/27299236
Change-Id: I26ef47f80d4d6048a316ba51e83365ff65d70439
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
std::string Backtrace::GetFunctionName(uintptr_t pc, uintptr_t* offset) {
std::string func_name = GetFunctionNameRaw(pc, offset);
return func_name;
}
| 173,887
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
int i;
a = BN_new();
b = BN_new();
c = BN_new();
d = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
BN_one(a);
BN_one(b);
BN_zero(c);
if (BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
return 0;
}
BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
if (!BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx))
return (0);
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
BN_print(bp, b);
BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
BN_print(bp, c);
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
}
BN_print(bp, d);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
}
BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx);
BN_sub(e, e, d);
BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx);
if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n");
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
BN_zero(c);
if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with zero modulus "
"succeeded\n");
return 0;
}
BN_set_word(c, 16);
if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with even modulus "
"succeeded\n");
return 0;
}
BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL))
return (00);
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
BN_print(bp, b);
BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
BN_print(bp, c);
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
}
BN_print(bp, d);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
}
BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx);
BN_sub(e, e, d);
BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx);
if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n");
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
BN_free(d);
BN_free(e);
return (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
int i;
a = BN_new();
b = BN_new();
c = BN_new();
d = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
BN_one(a);
BN_one(b);
BN_zero(c);
if (BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
return 0;
}
BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
if (!BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx))
return (0);
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
BN_print(bp, b);
BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
BN_print(bp, c);
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
}
BN_print(bp, d);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
}
BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx);
BN_sub(e, e, d);
BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx);
if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n");
return 0;
}
}
/* Regression test for carry propagation bug in sqr8x_reduction */
BN_hex2bn(&a, "050505050505");
BN_hex2bn(&b, "02");
BN_hex2bn(&c,
"4141414141414141414141274141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
"4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
"4141414141414141414141800000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001");
BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx);
BN_mul(e, a, a, ctx);
if (BN_cmp(d, e)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp and BN_mul produce different results!\n");
return 0;
}
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
BN_zero(c);
if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with zero modulus "
"succeeded\n");
return 0;
}
BN_set_word(c, 16);
if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with even modulus "
"succeeded\n");
return 0;
}
BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL))
return (00);
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
BN_print(bp, b);
BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
BN_print(bp, c);
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
}
BN_print(bp, d);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
}
BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx);
BN_sub(e, e, d);
BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx);
if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n");
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
BN_free(d);
BN_free(e);
return (1);
}
| 164,721
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void TreeNodesAdded(TreeModel* model, TreeModelNode* parent,
int start, int count) {
added_count_++;
}
Commit Message: Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
R=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
virtual void TreeNodesAdded(TreeModel* model, TreeModelNode* parent,
virtual void TreeNodesAdded(TreeModel* model,
TreeModelNode* parent,
int start,
int count) OVERRIDE {
added_count_++;
}
| 170,470
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static size_t read_entry(
git_index_entry **out,
git_index *index,
const void *buffer,
size_t buffer_size,
const char *last)
{
size_t path_length, entry_size;
const char *path_ptr;
struct entry_short source;
git_index_entry entry = {{0}};
bool compressed = index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP;
char *tmp_path = NULL;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + minimal_entry_size > buffer_size)
return 0;
/* buffer is not guaranteed to be aligned */
memcpy(&source, buffer, sizeof(struct entry_short));
entry.ctime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.ctime.seconds);
entry.ctime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.ctime.nanoseconds);
entry.mtime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.mtime.seconds);
entry.mtime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.mtime.nanoseconds);
entry.dev = ntohl(source.dev);
entry.ino = ntohl(source.ino);
entry.mode = ntohl(source.mode);
entry.uid = ntohl(source.uid);
entry.gid = ntohl(source.gid);
entry.file_size = ntohl(source.file_size);
git_oid_cpy(&entry.id, &source.oid);
entry.flags = ntohs(source.flags);
if (entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_EXTENDED) {
uint16_t flags_raw;
size_t flags_offset;
flags_offset = offsetof(struct entry_long, flags_extended);
memcpy(&flags_raw, (const char *) buffer + flags_offset,
sizeof(flags_raw));
flags_raw = ntohs(flags_raw);
memcpy(&entry.flags_extended, &flags_raw, sizeof(flags_raw));
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_long, path);
} else
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_short, path);
if (!compressed) {
path_length = entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_NAMEMASK;
/* if this is a very long string, we must find its
* real length without overflowing */
if (path_length == 0xFFF) {
const char *path_end;
path_end = memchr(path_ptr, '\0', buffer_size);
if (path_end == NULL)
return 0;
path_length = path_end - path_ptr;
}
entry_size = index_entry_size(path_length, 0, entry.flags);
entry.path = (char *)path_ptr;
} else {
size_t varint_len;
size_t strip_len = git_decode_varint((const unsigned char *)path_ptr,
&varint_len);
size_t last_len = strlen(last);
size_t prefix_len = last_len - strip_len;
size_t suffix_len = strlen(path_ptr + varint_len);
size_t path_len;
if (varint_len == 0)
return index_error_invalid("incorrect prefix length");
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, prefix_len, suffix_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, path_len, 1);
tmp_path = git__malloc(path_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(tmp_path);
memcpy(tmp_path, last, prefix_len);
memcpy(tmp_path + prefix_len, path_ptr + varint_len, suffix_len + 1);
entry_size = index_entry_size(suffix_len, varint_len, entry.flags);
entry.path = tmp_path;
}
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + entry_size > buffer_size)
return 0;
if (index_entry_dup(out, index, &entry) < 0) {
git__free(tmp_path);
return 0;
}
git__free(tmp_path);
return entry_size;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
|
static size_t read_entry(
static int read_entry(
git_index_entry **out,
size_t *out_size,
git_index *index,
const void *buffer,
size_t buffer_size,
const char *last)
{
size_t path_length, entry_size;
const char *path_ptr;
struct entry_short source;
git_index_entry entry = {{0}};
bool compressed = index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP;
char *tmp_path = NULL;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + minimal_entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
/* buffer is not guaranteed to be aligned */
memcpy(&source, buffer, sizeof(struct entry_short));
entry.ctime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.ctime.seconds);
entry.ctime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.ctime.nanoseconds);
entry.mtime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.mtime.seconds);
entry.mtime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.mtime.nanoseconds);
entry.dev = ntohl(source.dev);
entry.ino = ntohl(source.ino);
entry.mode = ntohl(source.mode);
entry.uid = ntohl(source.uid);
entry.gid = ntohl(source.gid);
entry.file_size = ntohl(source.file_size);
git_oid_cpy(&entry.id, &source.oid);
entry.flags = ntohs(source.flags);
if (entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_EXTENDED) {
uint16_t flags_raw;
size_t flags_offset;
flags_offset = offsetof(struct entry_long, flags_extended);
memcpy(&flags_raw, (const char *) buffer + flags_offset,
sizeof(flags_raw));
flags_raw = ntohs(flags_raw);
memcpy(&entry.flags_extended, &flags_raw, sizeof(flags_raw));
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_long, path);
} else
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_short, path);
if (!compressed) {
path_length = entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_NAMEMASK;
/* if this is a very long string, we must find its
* real length without overflowing */
if (path_length == 0xFFF) {
const char *path_end;
path_end = memchr(path_ptr, '\0', buffer_size);
if (path_end == NULL)
return -1;
path_length = path_end - path_ptr;
}
entry_size = index_entry_size(path_length, 0, entry.flags);
entry.path = (char *)path_ptr;
} else {
size_t varint_len;
size_t strip_len = git_decode_varint((const unsigned char *)path_ptr,
&varint_len);
size_t last_len = strlen(last);
size_t prefix_len = last_len - strip_len;
size_t suffix_len = strlen(path_ptr + varint_len);
size_t path_len;
if (varint_len == 0)
return index_error_invalid("incorrect prefix length");
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, prefix_len, suffix_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, path_len, 1);
tmp_path = git__malloc(path_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(tmp_path);
memcpy(tmp_path, last, prefix_len);
memcpy(tmp_path + prefix_len, path_ptr + varint_len, suffix_len + 1);
entry_size = index_entry_size(suffix_len, varint_len, entry.flags);
entry.path = tmp_path;
}
if (entry_size == 0)
return -1;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
if (index_entry_dup(out, index, &entry) < 0) {
git__free(tmp_path);
return -1;
}
git__free(tmp_path);
*out_size = entry_size;
return 0;
}
| 169,300
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: USHORT CNB::QueryL4HeaderOffset(PVOID PacketData, ULONG IpHeaderOffset) const
{
USHORT Res;
auto ppr = ParaNdis_ReviewIPPacket(RtlOffsetToPointer(PacketData, IpHeaderOffset),
GetDataLength(), __FUNCTION__);
if (ppr.ipStatus != ppresNotIP)
{
Res = static_cast<USHORT>(IpHeaderOffset + ppr.ipHeaderSize);
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] ERROR: NOT an IP packet - expected troubles!\n", __FUNCTION__));
Res = 0;
}
return Res;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
USHORT CNB::QueryL4HeaderOffset(PVOID PacketData, ULONG IpHeaderOffset) const
{
USHORT Res;
auto ppr = ParaNdis_ReviewIPPacket(RtlOffsetToPointer(PacketData, IpHeaderOffset),
GetDataLength(), FALSE, __FUNCTION__);
if (ppr.ipStatus != ppresNotIP)
{
Res = static_cast<USHORT>(IpHeaderOffset + ppr.ipHeaderSize);
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] ERROR: NOT an IP packet - expected troubles!\n", __FUNCTION__));
Res = 0;
}
return Res;
}
| 170,141
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ikev1_ke_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_KE)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," key len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_KE)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
ikev1_ke_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_KE)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," key len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
/* Print the entire payload in hex */
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_KE)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,792
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::Shutdown() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderProcessObserver, observers_, OnRenderProcessShutdown());
ChildThread::Shutdown();
if (memory_observer_) {
message_loop()->RemoveTaskObserver(memory_observer_.get());
memory_observer_.reset();
}
if (webkit_platform_support_) {
webkit_platform_support_->web_database_observer_impl()->
WaitForAllDatabasesToClose();
}
if (devtools_agent_message_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(devtools_agent_message_filter_.get());
devtools_agent_message_filter_ = NULL;
}
RemoveFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_input_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = NULL;
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
RTCPeerConnectionHandler::DestructAllHandlers();
peer_connection_factory_.reset();
#endif
RemoveFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
vc_manager_.reset();
RemoveFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
db_message_filter_ = NULL;
if (file_thread_)
file_thread_->Stop();
if (compositor_output_surface_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(compositor_output_surface_filter_.get());
compositor_output_surface_filter_ = NULL;
}
media_thread_.reset();
compositor_thread_.reset();
input_handler_manager_.reset();
if (input_event_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(input_event_filter_.get());
input_event_filter_ = NULL;
}
embedded_worker_dispatcher_.reset();
main_thread_indexed_db_dispatcher_.reset();
if (webkit_platform_support_)
blink::shutdown();
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
NPChannelBase::CleanupChannels();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void RenderThreadImpl::Shutdown() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderProcessObserver, observers_, OnRenderProcessShutdown());
ChildThread::Shutdown();
if (memory_observer_) {
message_loop()->RemoveTaskObserver(memory_observer_.get());
memory_observer_.reset();
}
if (webkit_platform_support_) {
// WaitForAllDatabasesToClose might run a nested message loop. To avoid
// processing timer events while we're already in the process of shutting
// down blink, put a ScopePageLoadDeferrer on the stack.
WebView::willEnterModalLoop();
webkit_platform_support_->web_database_observer_impl()->
WaitForAllDatabasesToClose();
WebView::didExitModalLoop();
}
if (devtools_agent_message_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(devtools_agent_message_filter_.get());
devtools_agent_message_filter_ = NULL;
}
RemoveFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_input_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = NULL;
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
RTCPeerConnectionHandler::DestructAllHandlers();
peer_connection_factory_.reset();
#endif
RemoveFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
vc_manager_.reset();
RemoveFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
db_message_filter_ = NULL;
if (file_thread_)
file_thread_->Stop();
if (compositor_output_surface_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(compositor_output_surface_filter_.get());
compositor_output_surface_filter_ = NULL;
}
media_thread_.reset();
compositor_thread_.reset();
input_handler_manager_.reset();
if (input_event_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(input_event_filter_.get());
input_event_filter_ = NULL;
}
embedded_worker_dispatcher_.reset();
main_thread_indexed_db_dispatcher_.reset();
if (webkit_platform_support_)
blink::shutdown();
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
NPChannelBase::CleanupChannels();
#endif
}
| 171,176
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ForeignSessionHelper::SetInvalidationsForSessionsEnabled(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
jboolean enabled) {
browser_sync::ProfileSyncService* service =
ProfileSyncServiceFactory::GetInstance()->GetForProfile(profile_);
if (!service)
return;
service->SetInvalidationsForSessionsEnabled(enabled);
}
Commit Message: Prefer SyncService over ProfileSyncService in foreign_session_helper
SyncService is the interface, ProfileSyncService is the concrete
implementation. Generally no clients should need to use the conrete
implementation - for one, testing will be much easier once everyone
uses the interface only.
Bug: 924508
Change-Id: Ia210665f8f02512053d1a60d627dea0f22758387
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1461119
Auto-Submit: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yaron Friedman <yfriedman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yaron Friedman <yfriedman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630662}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
void ForeignSessionHelper::SetInvalidationsForSessionsEnabled(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
jboolean enabled) {
syncer::SyncService* service =
ProfileSyncServiceFactory::GetSyncServiceForProfile(profile_);
if (!service)
return;
service->SetInvalidationsForSessionsEnabled(enabled);
}
| 172,058
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static aura::Window* OpenTestWindow(aura::Window* parent, bool modal) {
DCHECK(!modal || (modal && parent));
views::Widget* widget =
views::Widget::CreateWindowWithParent(new TestWindow(modal), parent);
widget->Show();
return widget->GetNativeView();
}
Commit Message: Removed requirement for ash::Window::transient_parent() presence for system modal dialogs.
BUG=130420
TEST=SystemModalContainerLayoutManagerTest.ModalTransientAndNonTransient
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10514012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@140647 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static aura::Window* OpenTestWindow(aura::Window* parent, bool modal) {
views::Widget* widget =
views::Widget::CreateWindowWithParent(new TestWindow(modal), parent);
widget->Show();
return widget->GetNativeView();
}
| 170,802
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int mutt_b64_decode(char *out, const char *in)
{
int len = 0;
unsigned char digit4;
do
{
const unsigned char digit1 = in[0];
if ((digit1 > 127) || (base64val(digit1) == BAD))
return -1;
const unsigned char digit2 = in[1];
if ((digit2 > 127) || (base64val(digit2) == BAD))
return -1;
const unsigned char digit3 = in[2];
if ((digit3 > 127) || ((digit3 != '=') && (base64val(digit3) == BAD)))
return -1;
digit4 = in[3];
if ((digit4 > 127) || ((digit4 != '=') && (base64val(digit4) == BAD)))
return -1;
in += 4;
/* digits are already sanity-checked */
*out++ = (base64val(digit1) << 2) | (base64val(digit2) >> 4);
len++;
if (digit3 != '=')
{
*out++ = ((base64val(digit2) << 4) & 0xf0) | (base64val(digit3) >> 2);
len++;
if (digit4 != '=')
{
*out++ = ((base64val(digit3) << 6) & 0xc0) | base64val(digit4);
len++;
}
}
} while (*in && digit4 != '=');
return len;
}
Commit Message: Check outbuf length in mutt_to_base64()
The obuf can be overflowed in auth_cram.c, and possibly auth_gss.c.
Thanks to Jeriko One for the bug report.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
int mutt_b64_decode(char *out, const char *in)
int mutt_b64_decode(char *out, const char *in, size_t olen)
{
int len = 0;
unsigned char digit4;
do
{
const unsigned char digit1 = in[0];
if ((digit1 > 127) || (base64val(digit1) == BAD))
return -1;
const unsigned char digit2 = in[1];
if ((digit2 > 127) || (base64val(digit2) == BAD))
return -1;
const unsigned char digit3 = in[2];
if ((digit3 > 127) || ((digit3 != '=') && (base64val(digit3) == BAD)))
return -1;
digit4 = in[3];
if ((digit4 > 127) || ((digit4 != '=') && (base64val(digit4) == BAD)))
return -1;
in += 4;
/* digits are already sanity-checked */
if (len == olen)
return len;
*out++ = (base64val(digit1) << 2) | (base64val(digit2) >> 4);
len++;
if (digit3 != '=')
{
if (len == olen)
return len;
*out++ = ((base64val(digit2) << 4) & 0xf0) | (base64val(digit3) >> 2);
len++;
if (digit4 != '=')
{
if (len == olen)
return len;
*out++ = ((base64val(digit3) << 6) & 0xc0) | base64val(digit4);
len++;
}
}
} while (*in && digit4 != '=');
return len;
}
| 169,128
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: file_ms_alloc(int flags)
{
struct magic_set *ms;
size_t i, len;
if ((ms = CAST(struct magic_set *, calloc((size_t)1,
sizeof(struct magic_set)))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (magic_setflags(ms, flags) == -1) {
errno = EINVAL;
goto free;
}
ms->o.buf = ms->o.pbuf = NULL;
len = (ms->c.len = 10) * sizeof(*ms->c.li);
if ((ms->c.li = CAST(struct level_info *, malloc(len))) == NULL)
goto free;
ms->event_flags = 0;
ms->error = -1;
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++)
ms->mlist[i] = NULL;
ms->file = "unknown";
ms->line = 0;
ms->indir_max = FILE_INDIR_MAX;
ms->name_max = FILE_NAME_MAX;
ms->elf_shnum_max = FILE_ELF_SHNUM_MAX;
ms->elf_phnum_max = FILE_ELF_PHNUM_MAX;
return ms;
free:
free(ms);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
file_ms_alloc(int flags)
{
struct magic_set *ms;
size_t i, len;
if ((ms = CAST(struct magic_set *, calloc((size_t)1,
sizeof(struct magic_set)))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (magic_setflags(ms, flags) == -1) {
errno = EINVAL;
goto free;
}
ms->o.buf = ms->o.pbuf = NULL;
len = (ms->c.len = 10) * sizeof(*ms->c.li);
if ((ms->c.li = CAST(struct level_info *, malloc(len))) == NULL)
goto free;
ms->event_flags = 0;
ms->error = -1;
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++)
ms->mlist[i] = NULL;
ms->file = "unknown";
ms->line = 0;
ms->indir_max = FILE_INDIR_MAX;
ms->name_max = FILE_NAME_MAX;
ms->elf_shnum_max = FILE_ELF_SHNUM_MAX;
ms->elf_phnum_max = FILE_ELF_PHNUM_MAX;
ms->elf_notes_max = FILE_ELF_NOTES_MAX;
return ms;
free:
free(ms);
return NULL;
}
| 166,773
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: mwifiex_set_uap_rates(struct mwifiex_uap_bss_param *bss_cfg,
struct cfg80211_ap_settings *params)
{
struct ieee_types_header *rate_ie;
int var_offset = offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u.beacon.variable);
const u8 *var_pos = params->beacon.head + var_offset;
int len = params->beacon.head_len - var_offset;
u8 rate_len = 0;
rate_ie = (void *)cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_SUPP_RATES, var_pos, len);
if (rate_ie) {
memcpy(bss_cfg->rates, rate_ie + 1, rate_ie->len);
rate_len = rate_ie->len;
}
rate_ie = (void *)cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_EXT_SUPP_RATES,
params->beacon.tail,
params->beacon.tail_len);
if (rate_ie)
memcpy(bss_cfg->rates + rate_len, rate_ie + 1, rate_ie->len);
return;
}
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <huangwenabc@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <gbhat@marvell.comg>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-120
|
mwifiex_set_uap_rates(struct mwifiex_uap_bss_param *bss_cfg,
struct cfg80211_ap_settings *params)
{
struct ieee_types_header *rate_ie;
int var_offset = offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u.beacon.variable);
const u8 *var_pos = params->beacon.head + var_offset;
int len = params->beacon.head_len - var_offset;
u8 rate_len = 0;
rate_ie = (void *)cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_SUPP_RATES, var_pos, len);
if (rate_ie) {
if (rate_ie->len > MWIFIEX_SUPPORTED_RATES)
return;
memcpy(bss_cfg->rates, rate_ie + 1, rate_ie->len);
rate_len = rate_ie->len;
}
rate_ie = (void *)cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_EXT_SUPP_RATES,
params->beacon.tail,
params->beacon.tail_len);
if (rate_ie) {
if (rate_ie->len > MWIFIEX_SUPPORTED_RATES - rate_len)
return;
memcpy(bss_cfg->rates + rate_len, rate_ie + 1, rate_ie->len);
}
return;
}
| 169,576
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: tChecksumCheckResult ParaNdis_CheckRxChecksum(
PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext,
ULONG virtioFlags,
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pPacketPages,
ULONG ulPacketLength,
ULONG ulDataOffset)
{
tOffloadSettingsFlags f = pContext->Offload.flags;
tChecksumCheckResult res;
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ppr;
ULONG flagsToCalculate = 0;
res.value = 0;
if (f.fRxIPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrIpChecksum; // check only
if (!(virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID))
{
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM)
{
flagsToCalculate |= pcrFixXxpChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrUdpChecksum;
}
else
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV6Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV6Checksum;
}
}
ppr = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(pPacketPages, ulPacketLength - ETH_HEADER_SIZE, ulDataOffset + ETH_HEADER_SIZE, flagsToCalculate, __FUNCTION__);
if (ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresIPTooShort || ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpIncomplete)
{
res.flags.IpOK = FALSE;
res.flags.IpFailed = TRUE;
return res;
}
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID)
{
pContext->extraStatistics.framesRxCSHwOK++;
ppr.xxpCheckSum = ppresCSOK;
}
if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV4 && !ppr.IsFragment)
{
if (f.fRxIPChecksum)
{
res.flags.IpOK = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSOK;
res.flags.IpFailed = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSBad;
}
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
else if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
tChecksumCheckResult ParaNdis_CheckRxChecksum(
PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext,
ULONG virtioFlags,
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pPacketPages,
ULONG ulPacketLength,
ULONG ulDataOffset,
BOOLEAN verifyLength)
{
tOffloadSettingsFlags f = pContext->Offload.flags;
tChecksumCheckResult res;
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ppr;
ULONG flagsToCalculate = 0;
res.value = 0;
if (f.fRxIPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrIpChecksum; // check only
if (!(virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID))
{
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM)
{
flagsToCalculate |= pcrFixXxpChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrUdpChecksum;
}
else
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV6Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV6Checksum;
}
}
ppr = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(pPacketPages, ulPacketLength - ETH_HEADER_SIZE, ulDataOffset + ETH_HEADER_SIZE, flagsToCalculate,
verifyLength, __FUNCTION__);
if (ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresIPTooShort || ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpIncomplete)
{
res.flags.IpOK = FALSE;
res.flags.IpFailed = TRUE;
return res;
}
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID)
{
pContext->extraStatistics.framesRxCSHwOK++;
ppr.xxpCheckSum = ppresCSOK;
}
if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV4 && !ppr.IsFragment)
{
if (f.fRxIPChecksum)
{
res.flags.IpOK = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSOK;
res.flags.IpFailed = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSBad;
}
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
else if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
return res;
}
| 170,139
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static Image *ReadPNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
MngInfo
*mng_info;
char
magic_number[MaxTextExtent];
ssize_t
count;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Enter ReadPNGImage()");
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
mng_info=(MngInfo *) NULL;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile");
/*
Verify PNG signature.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (count < 8 || memcmp(magic_number,"\211PNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Allocate a MngInfo structure.
*/
mng_info=(MngInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(MngInfo));
if (mng_info == (MngInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Initialize members of the MngInfo structure.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(mng_info,0,sizeof(MngInfo));
mng_info->image=image;
image=ReadOnePNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
mng_info=MngInfoFreeStruct(mng_info);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error.");
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
if ((IssRGBColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
((image->gamma < .45) || (image->gamma > .46)) &&
!(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x>0.6399f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x<0.6401f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y>0.3299f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y<0.3301f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x>0.2999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x<0.3001f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y>0.5999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y<0.6001f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x>0.1499f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x<0.1501f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y>0.0599f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y<0.0601f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x>0.3126f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x<0.3128f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y>0.3289f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y<0.3291f))
SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" page.w: %.20g, page.h: %.20g,page.x: %.20g, page.y: %.20g.",
(double) image->page.width,(double) image->page.height,
(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"exit ReadPNGImage()");
return(image);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-754
|
static Image *ReadPNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
MngInfo
*mng_info;
char
magic_number[MaxTextExtent];
ssize_t
count;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Enter ReadPNGImage()");
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
mng_info=(MngInfo *) NULL;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile");
/*
Verify PNG signature.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (count < 8 || memcmp(magic_number,"\211PNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Verify that file size large enough to contain a PNG datastream.
*/
if (GetBlobSize(image) < 61)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
/*
Allocate a MngInfo structure.
*/
mng_info=(MngInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(MngInfo));
if (mng_info == (MngInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Initialize members of the MngInfo structure.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(mng_info,0,sizeof(MngInfo));
mng_info->image=image;
image=ReadOnePNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
mng_info=MngInfoFreeStruct(mng_info);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error.");
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
if ((IssRGBColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
((image->gamma < .45) || (image->gamma > .46)) &&
!(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x>0.6399f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x<0.6401f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y>0.3299f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y<0.3301f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x>0.2999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x<0.3001f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y>0.5999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y<0.6001f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x>0.1499f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x<0.1501f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y>0.0599f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y<0.0601f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x>0.3126f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x<0.3128f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y>0.3289f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y<0.3291f))
SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" page.w: %.20g, page.h: %.20g,page.x: %.20g, page.y: %.20g.",
(double) image->page.width,(double) image->page.height,
(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"exit ReadPNGImage()");
return(image);
}
| 167,812
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool CreateIpcChannel(
const std::string& channel_name,
const std::string& pipe_security_descriptor,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> io_task_runner,
IPC::Listener* delegate,
scoped_ptr<IPC::ChannelProxy>* channel_out) {
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes;
security_attributes.nLength = sizeof(security_attributes);
security_attributes.bInheritHandle = FALSE;
ULONG security_descriptor_length = 0;
if (!ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptor(
UTF8ToUTF16(pipe_security_descriptor).c_str(),
SDDL_REVISION_1,
reinterpret_cast<PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR*>(
&security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor),
&security_descriptor_length)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) <<
"Failed to create a security descriptor for the Chromoting IPC channel";
return false;
}
std::string pipe_name(kChromePipeNamePrefix);
pipe_name.append(channel_name);
base::win::ScopedHandle pipe;
pipe.Set(CreateNamedPipe(
UTF8ToUTF16(pipe_name).c_str(),
PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX | FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED | FILE_FLAG_FIRST_PIPE_INSTANCE,
PIPE_TYPE_BYTE | PIPE_READMODE_BYTE,
1,
IPC::Channel::kReadBufferSize,
IPC::Channel::kReadBufferSize,
5000,
&security_attributes));
if (!pipe.IsValid()) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) <<
"Failed to create the server end of the Chromoting IPC channel";
LocalFree(security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor);
return false;
}
LocalFree(security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor);
channel_out->reset(new IPC::ChannelProxy(
IPC::ChannelHandle(pipe),
IPC::Channel::MODE_SERVER,
delegate,
io_task_runner));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool CreateIpcChannel(
const std::string& channel_name,
const std::string& pipe_security_descriptor,
base::win::ScopedHandle* pipe_out) {
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes;
security_attributes.nLength = sizeof(security_attributes);
security_attributes.bInheritHandle = FALSE;
ULONG security_descriptor_length = 0;
if (!ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptor(
UTF8ToUTF16(pipe_security_descriptor).c_str(),
SDDL_REVISION_1,
reinterpret_cast<PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR*>(
&security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor),
&security_descriptor_length)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) <<
"Failed to create a security descriptor for the Chromoting IPC channel";
return false;
}
std::string pipe_name(kChromePipeNamePrefix);
pipe_name.append(channel_name);
base::win::ScopedHandle pipe;
pipe.Set(CreateNamedPipe(
UTF8ToUTF16(pipe_name).c_str(),
PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX | FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED | FILE_FLAG_FIRST_PIPE_INSTANCE,
PIPE_TYPE_BYTE | PIPE_READMODE_BYTE,
1,
IPC::Channel::kReadBufferSize,
IPC::Channel::kReadBufferSize,
5000,
&security_attributes));
if (!pipe.IsValid()) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) <<
"Failed to create the server end of the Chromoting IPC channel";
LocalFree(security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor);
return false;
}
LocalFree(security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor);
*pipe_out = pipe.Pass();
return true;
}
| 171,543
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: stringprep_utf8_nfkc_normalize (const char *str, ssize_t len)
{
return g_utf8_normalize (str, len, G_NORMALIZE_NFKC);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
stringprep_utf8_nfkc_normalize (const char *str, ssize_t len)
{
size_t n;
if (len < 0)
n = strlen (str);
else
n = len;
if (u8_check ((const uint8_t *) str, n))
return NULL;
return g_utf8_normalize (str, len, G_NORMALIZE_NFKC);
}
| 164,984
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static struct sock *sctp_v6_create_accept_sk(struct sock *sk,
struct sctp_association *asoc,
bool kern)
{
struct sock *newsk;
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sctp6_sock *newsctp6sk;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
newsk = sk_alloc(sock_net(sk), PF_INET6, GFP_KERNEL, sk->sk_prot, kern);
if (!newsk)
goto out;
sock_init_data(NULL, newsk);
sctp_copy_sock(newsk, sk, asoc);
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
newsctp6sk = (struct sctp6_sock *)newsk;
inet_sk(newsk)->pinet6 = &newsctp6sk->inet6;
sctp_sk(newsk)->v4mapped = sctp_sk(sk)->v4mapped;
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
rcu_read_lock();
opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
if (opt)
opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt);
rcu_read_unlock();
/* Initialize sk's sport, dport, rcv_saddr and daddr for getsockname()
* and getpeername().
*/
sctp_v6_to_sk_daddr(&asoc->peer.primary_addr, newsk);
newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(newsk);
if (newsk->sk_prot->init(newsk)) {
sk_common_release(newsk);
newsk = NULL;
}
out:
return newsk;
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not inherit ipv6_{mc|ac|fl}_list from parent
SCTP needs fixes similar to 83eaddab4378 ("ipv6/dccp: do not inherit
ipv6_mc_list from parent"), otherwise bad things can happen.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
|
static struct sock *sctp_v6_create_accept_sk(struct sock *sk,
struct sctp_association *asoc,
bool kern)
{
struct sock *newsk;
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sctp6_sock *newsctp6sk;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
newsk = sk_alloc(sock_net(sk), PF_INET6, GFP_KERNEL, sk->sk_prot, kern);
if (!newsk)
goto out;
sock_init_data(NULL, newsk);
sctp_copy_sock(newsk, sk, asoc);
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
newsctp6sk = (struct sctp6_sock *)newsk;
inet_sk(newsk)->pinet6 = &newsctp6sk->inet6;
sctp_sk(newsk)->v4mapped = sctp_sk(sk)->v4mapped;
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
newnp->ipv6_mc_list = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
if (opt)
opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt);
rcu_read_unlock();
/* Initialize sk's sport, dport, rcv_saddr and daddr for getsockname()
* and getpeername().
*/
sctp_v6_to_sk_daddr(&asoc->peer.primary_addr, newsk);
newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(newsk);
if (newsk->sk_prot->init(newsk)) {
sk_common_release(newsk);
newsk = NULL;
}
out:
return newsk;
}
| 168,129
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: extract_header_length(uint16_t fc)
{
int len = 0;
switch ((fc >> 10) & 0x3) {
case 0x00:
if (fc & (1 << 6)) /* intra-PAN with none dest addr */
return -1;
break;
case 0x01:
return -1;
case 0x02:
len += 4;
break;
case 0x03:
len += 10;
break;
}
switch ((fc >> 14) & 0x3) {
case 0x00:
break;
case 0x01:
return -1;
case 0x02:
len += 4;
break;
case 0x03:
len += 10;
break;
}
if (fc & (1 << 6)) {
if (len < 2)
return -1;
len -= 2;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13000/IEEE 802.15.4: Add more bounds checks.
While we're at it, add a bunch of macros for the frame control field's
subfields, have the reserved frame types show the frame type value, use
the same code path for processing source and destination addresses
regardless of whether -v was specified (just leave out the addresses in
non-verbose mode), and return the header length in all cases.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
extract_header_length(uint16_t fc)
| 170,029
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int read_entry(
git_index_entry **out,
size_t *out_size,
git_index *index,
const void *buffer,
size_t buffer_size,
const char *last)
{
size_t path_length, entry_size;
const char *path_ptr;
struct entry_short source;
git_index_entry entry = {{0}};
bool compressed = index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP;
char *tmp_path = NULL;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + minimal_entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
/* buffer is not guaranteed to be aligned */
memcpy(&source, buffer, sizeof(struct entry_short));
entry.ctime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.ctime.seconds);
entry.ctime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.ctime.nanoseconds);
entry.mtime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.mtime.seconds);
entry.mtime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.mtime.nanoseconds);
entry.dev = ntohl(source.dev);
entry.ino = ntohl(source.ino);
entry.mode = ntohl(source.mode);
entry.uid = ntohl(source.uid);
entry.gid = ntohl(source.gid);
entry.file_size = ntohl(source.file_size);
git_oid_cpy(&entry.id, &source.oid);
entry.flags = ntohs(source.flags);
if (entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_EXTENDED) {
uint16_t flags_raw;
size_t flags_offset;
flags_offset = offsetof(struct entry_long, flags_extended);
memcpy(&flags_raw, (const char *) buffer + flags_offset,
sizeof(flags_raw));
flags_raw = ntohs(flags_raw);
memcpy(&entry.flags_extended, &flags_raw, sizeof(flags_raw));
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_long, path);
} else
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_short, path);
if (!compressed) {
path_length = entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_NAMEMASK;
/* if this is a very long string, we must find its
* real length without overflowing */
if (path_length == 0xFFF) {
const char *path_end;
path_end = memchr(path_ptr, '\0', buffer_size);
if (path_end == NULL)
return -1;
path_length = path_end - path_ptr;
}
entry_size = index_entry_size(path_length, 0, entry.flags);
entry.path = (char *)path_ptr;
} else {
size_t varint_len;
size_t strip_len = git_decode_varint((const unsigned char *)path_ptr,
&varint_len);
size_t last_len = strlen(last);
size_t prefix_len = last_len - strip_len;
size_t suffix_len = strlen(path_ptr + varint_len);
size_t path_len;
if (varint_len == 0)
return index_error_invalid("incorrect prefix length");
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, prefix_len, suffix_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, path_len, 1);
tmp_path = git__malloc(path_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(tmp_path);
memcpy(tmp_path, last, prefix_len);
memcpy(tmp_path + prefix_len, path_ptr + varint_len, suffix_len + 1);
entry_size = index_entry_size(suffix_len, varint_len, entry.flags);
entry.path = tmp_path;
}
if (entry_size == 0)
return -1;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
if (index_entry_dup(out, index, &entry) < 0) {
git__free(tmp_path);
return -1;
}
git__free(tmp_path);
*out_size = entry_size;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: index: fix out-of-bounds read with invalid index entry prefix length
The index format in version 4 has prefix-compressed entries, where every
index entry can compress its path by using a path prefix of the previous
entry. Since implmenting support for this index format version in commit
5625d86b9 (index: support index v4, 2016-05-17), though, we do not
correctly verify that the prefix length that we want to reuse is
actually smaller or equal to the amount of characters than the length of
the previous index entry's path. This can lead to a an integer underflow
and subsequently to an out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by verifying that the prefix is actually smaller than the
previous entry's path length.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static int read_entry(
git_index_entry **out,
size_t *out_size,
git_index *index,
const void *buffer,
size_t buffer_size,
const char *last)
{
size_t path_length, entry_size;
const char *path_ptr;
struct entry_short source;
git_index_entry entry = {{0}};
bool compressed = index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP;
char *tmp_path = NULL;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + minimal_entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
/* buffer is not guaranteed to be aligned */
memcpy(&source, buffer, sizeof(struct entry_short));
entry.ctime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.ctime.seconds);
entry.ctime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.ctime.nanoseconds);
entry.mtime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.mtime.seconds);
entry.mtime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.mtime.nanoseconds);
entry.dev = ntohl(source.dev);
entry.ino = ntohl(source.ino);
entry.mode = ntohl(source.mode);
entry.uid = ntohl(source.uid);
entry.gid = ntohl(source.gid);
entry.file_size = ntohl(source.file_size);
git_oid_cpy(&entry.id, &source.oid);
entry.flags = ntohs(source.flags);
if (entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_EXTENDED) {
uint16_t flags_raw;
size_t flags_offset;
flags_offset = offsetof(struct entry_long, flags_extended);
memcpy(&flags_raw, (const char *) buffer + flags_offset,
sizeof(flags_raw));
flags_raw = ntohs(flags_raw);
memcpy(&entry.flags_extended, &flags_raw, sizeof(flags_raw));
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_long, path);
} else
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_short, path);
if (!compressed) {
path_length = entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_NAMEMASK;
/* if this is a very long string, we must find its
* real length without overflowing */
if (path_length == 0xFFF) {
const char *path_end;
path_end = memchr(path_ptr, '\0', buffer_size);
if (path_end == NULL)
return -1;
path_length = path_end - path_ptr;
}
entry_size = index_entry_size(path_length, 0, entry.flags);
entry.path = (char *)path_ptr;
} else {
size_t varint_len, last_len, prefix_len, suffix_len, path_len;
uintmax_t strip_len;
strip_len = git_decode_varint((const unsigned char *)path_ptr, &varint_len);
last_len = strlen(last);
if (varint_len == 0 || last_len < strip_len)
return index_error_invalid("incorrect prefix length");
prefix_len = last_len - strip_len;
suffix_len = strlen(path_ptr + varint_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, prefix_len, suffix_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, path_len, 1);
tmp_path = git__malloc(path_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(tmp_path);
memcpy(tmp_path, last, prefix_len);
memcpy(tmp_path + prefix_len, path_ptr + varint_len, suffix_len + 1);
entry_size = index_entry_size(suffix_len, varint_len, entry.flags);
entry.path = tmp_path;
}
if (entry_size == 0)
return -1;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
if (index_entry_dup(out, index, &entry) < 0) {
git__free(tmp_path);
return -1;
}
git__free(tmp_path);
*out_size = entry_size;
return 0;
}
| 169,301
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct arpt_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
t = compat_arpt_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_ARP, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto out;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(NFPROTO_ARP, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto release_target;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
release_target:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct arpt_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
t = compat_arpt_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_ARP, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto out;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(NFPROTO_ARP, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto release_target;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
release_target:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
out:
return ret;
}
| 167,209
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ParseJSONDictionary(const std::string& json, DictionaryValue** dict,
std::string* error) {
int error_code = 0;
Value* params =
base::JSONReader::ReadAndReturnError(json, true, &error_code, error);
if (error_code != 0) {
VLOG(1) << "Could not parse JSON object, " << *error;
if (params)
delete params;
return false;
}
if (!params || params->GetType() != Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY) {
*error = "Data passed in URL must be of type dictionary.";
VLOG(1) << "Invalid type to parse";
if (params)
delete params;
return false;
}
*dict = static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(params);
return true;
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool ParseJSONDictionary(const std::string& json, DictionaryValue** dict,
| 170,466
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: pango_glyph_string_set_size (PangoGlyphString *string, gint new_len)
{
g_return_if_fail (new_len >= 0);
while (new_len > string->space)
{
if (string->space == 0)
string->space = 1;
else
string->space *= 2;
if (string->space < 0)
{
g_warning ("glyph string length overflows maximum integer size, truncated");
new_len = string->space = G_MAXINT - 8;
}
}
string->glyphs = g_realloc (string->glyphs, string->space * sizeof (PangoGlyphInfo));
string->log_clusters = g_realloc (string->log_clusters, string->space * sizeof (gint));
string->num_glyphs = new_len;
}
Commit Message: [glyphstring] Handle overflow with very long glyphstrings
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
pango_glyph_string_set_size (PangoGlyphString *string, gint new_len)
{
g_return_if_fail (new_len >= 0);
while (new_len > string->space)
{
if (string->space == 0)
{
string->space = 4;
}
else
{
const guint max_space =
MIN (G_MAXINT, G_MAXSIZE / MAX (sizeof(PangoGlyphInfo), sizeof(gint)));
guint more_space = (guint)string->space * 2;
if (more_space > max_space)
{
more_space = max_space;
if ((guint)new_len > max_space)
{
g_error ("%s: failed to allocate glyph string of length %i\n",
G_STRLOC, new_len);
}
}
string->space = more_space;
}
}
string->glyphs = g_realloc (string->glyphs, string->space * sizeof (PangoGlyphInfo));
string->log_clusters = g_realloc (string->log_clusters, string->space * sizeof (gint));
string->num_glyphs = new_len;
}
| 165,514
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int cJSON_strcasecmp( const char *s1, const char *s2 )
{
if ( ! s1 )
return ( s1 == s2 ) ? 0 : 1;
if ( ! s2 )
return 1;
for ( ; tolower(*s1) == tolower(*s2); ++s1, ++s2)
if( *s1 == 0 )
return 0;
return tolower(*(const unsigned char *)s1) - tolower(*(const unsigned char *)s2);
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int cJSON_strcasecmp( const char *s1, const char *s2 )
static int cJSON_strcasecmp(const char *s1,const char *s2)
{
if (!s1) return (s1==s2)?0:1;if (!s2) return 1;
for(; tolower(*s1) == tolower(*s2); ++s1, ++s2) if(*s1 == 0) return 0;
return tolower(*(const unsigned char *)s1) - tolower(*(const unsigned char *)s2);
}
| 167,297
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_dh_reply){
int rc;
(void)type;
(void)user;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL,"Received SSH_KEXDH_REPLY");
if(session->session_state!= SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH &&
session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_INIT_SENT){
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"ssh_packet_dh_reply called in wrong state : %d:%d",
session->session_state,session->dh_handshake_state);
goto error;
}
switch(session->next_crypto->kex_type){
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP1_SHA1:
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA1:
rc=ssh_client_dh_reply(session, packet);
break;
#ifdef HAVE_ECDH
case SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256:
rc = ssh_client_ecdh_reply(session, packet);
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CURVE25519
case SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_LIBSSH_ORG:
rc = ssh_client_curve25519_reply(session, packet);
break;
#endif
default:
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"Wrong kex type in ssh_packet_dh_reply");
goto error;
}
if(rc==SSH_OK) {
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
error:
session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
|
SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_dh_reply){
int rc;
(void)type;
(void)user;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL,"Received SSH_KEXDH_REPLY");
if (session->session_state != SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH ||
session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_INIT_SENT){
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"ssh_packet_dh_reply called in wrong state : %d:%d",
session->session_state,session->dh_handshake_state);
goto error;
}
switch(session->next_crypto->kex_type){
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP1_SHA1:
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA1:
rc=ssh_client_dh_reply(session, packet);
break;
#ifdef HAVE_ECDH
case SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256:
rc = ssh_client_ecdh_reply(session, packet);
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CURVE25519
case SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_LIBSSH_ORG:
rc = ssh_client_curve25519_reply(session, packet);
break;
#endif
default:
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"Wrong kex type in ssh_packet_dh_reply");
goto error;
}
if(rc==SSH_OK) {
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
error:
session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
| 165,323
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: safe_fprintf(FILE *f, const char *fmt, ...)
{
char fmtbuff_stack[256]; /* Place to format the printf() string. */
char outbuff[256]; /* Buffer for outgoing characters. */
char *fmtbuff_heap; /* If fmtbuff_stack is too small, we use malloc */
char *fmtbuff; /* Pointer to fmtbuff_stack or fmtbuff_heap. */
int fmtbuff_length;
int length, n;
va_list ap;
const char *p;
unsigned i;
wchar_t wc;
char try_wc;
/* Use a stack-allocated buffer if we can, for speed and safety. */
fmtbuff_heap = NULL;
fmtbuff_length = sizeof(fmtbuff_stack);
fmtbuff = fmtbuff_stack;
/* Try formatting into the stack buffer. */
va_start(ap, fmt);
length = vsnprintf(fmtbuff, fmtbuff_length, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
/* If the result was too large, allocate a buffer on the heap. */
while (length < 0 || length >= fmtbuff_length) {
if (length >= fmtbuff_length)
fmtbuff_length = length+1;
else if (fmtbuff_length < 8192)
fmtbuff_length *= 2;
else if (fmtbuff_length < 1000000)
fmtbuff_length += fmtbuff_length / 4;
else {
length = fmtbuff_length;
fmtbuff_heap[length-1] = '\0';
break;
}
free(fmtbuff_heap);
fmtbuff_heap = malloc(fmtbuff_length);
/* Reformat the result into the heap buffer if we can. */
if (fmtbuff_heap != NULL) {
fmtbuff = fmtbuff_heap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
length = vsnprintf(fmtbuff, fmtbuff_length, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
} else {
/* Leave fmtbuff pointing to the truncated
* string in fmtbuff_stack. */
length = sizeof(fmtbuff_stack) - 1;
break;
}
}
/* Note: mbrtowc() has a cleaner API, but mbtowc() seems a bit
* more portable, so we use that here instead. */
if (mbtowc(NULL, NULL, 1) == -1) { /* Reset the shift state. */
/* mbtowc() should never fail in practice, but
* handle the theoretical error anyway. */
free(fmtbuff_heap);
return;
}
/* Write data, expanding unprintable characters. */
p = fmtbuff;
i = 0;
try_wc = 1;
while (*p != '\0') {
/* Convert to wide char, test if the wide
* char is printable in the current locale. */
if (try_wc && (n = mbtowc(&wc, p, length)) != -1) {
length -= n;
if (iswprint(wc) && wc != L'\\') {
/* Printable, copy the bytes through. */
while (n-- > 0)
outbuff[i++] = *p++;
} else {
/* Not printable, format the bytes. */
while (n-- > 0)
i += (unsigned)bsdtar_expand_char(
outbuff, i, *p++);
}
} else {
/* After any conversion failure, don't bother
* trying to convert the rest. */
i += (unsigned)bsdtar_expand_char(outbuff, i, *p++);
try_wc = 0;
}
/* If our output buffer is full, dump it and keep going. */
if (i > (sizeof(outbuff) - 20)) {
outbuff[i] = '\0';
fprintf(f, "%s", outbuff);
i = 0;
}
}
outbuff[i] = '\0';
fprintf(f, "%s", outbuff);
/* If we allocated a heap-based formatting buffer, free it now. */
free(fmtbuff_heap);
}
Commit Message: Issue #767: Buffer overflow printing a filename
The safe_fprintf function attempts to ensure clean output for an
arbitrary sequence of bytes by doing a trial conversion of the
multibyte characters to wide characters -- if the resulting wide
character is printable then we pass through the corresponding bytes
unaltered, otherwise, we convert them to C-style ASCII escapes.
The stack trace in Issue #767 suggest that the 20-byte buffer
was getting overflowed trying to format a non-printable multibyte
character. This should only happen if there is a valid multibyte
character of more than 5 bytes that was unprintable. (Each byte
would get expanded to a four-charcter octal-style escape of the form
"\123" resulting in >20 characters for the >5 byte multibyte character.)
I've not been able to reproduce this, but have expanded the conversion
buffer to 128 bytes on the belief that no multibyte character set
has a single character of more than 32 bytes.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
safe_fprintf(FILE *f, const char *fmt, ...)
{
char fmtbuff_stack[256]; /* Place to format the printf() string. */
char outbuff[256]; /* Buffer for outgoing characters. */
char *fmtbuff_heap; /* If fmtbuff_stack is too small, we use malloc */
char *fmtbuff; /* Pointer to fmtbuff_stack or fmtbuff_heap. */
int fmtbuff_length;
int length, n;
va_list ap;
const char *p;
unsigned i;
wchar_t wc;
char try_wc;
/* Use a stack-allocated buffer if we can, for speed and safety. */
fmtbuff_heap = NULL;
fmtbuff_length = sizeof(fmtbuff_stack);
fmtbuff = fmtbuff_stack;
/* Try formatting into the stack buffer. */
va_start(ap, fmt);
length = vsnprintf(fmtbuff, fmtbuff_length, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
/* If the result was too large, allocate a buffer on the heap. */
while (length < 0 || length >= fmtbuff_length) {
if (length >= fmtbuff_length)
fmtbuff_length = length+1;
else if (fmtbuff_length < 8192)
fmtbuff_length *= 2;
else if (fmtbuff_length < 1000000)
fmtbuff_length += fmtbuff_length / 4;
else {
length = fmtbuff_length;
fmtbuff_heap[length-1] = '\0';
break;
}
free(fmtbuff_heap);
fmtbuff_heap = malloc(fmtbuff_length);
/* Reformat the result into the heap buffer if we can. */
if (fmtbuff_heap != NULL) {
fmtbuff = fmtbuff_heap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
length = vsnprintf(fmtbuff, fmtbuff_length, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
} else {
/* Leave fmtbuff pointing to the truncated
* string in fmtbuff_stack. */
length = sizeof(fmtbuff_stack) - 1;
break;
}
}
/* Note: mbrtowc() has a cleaner API, but mbtowc() seems a bit
* more portable, so we use that here instead. */
if (mbtowc(NULL, NULL, 1) == -1) { /* Reset the shift state. */
/* mbtowc() should never fail in practice, but
* handle the theoretical error anyway. */
free(fmtbuff_heap);
return;
}
/* Write data, expanding unprintable characters. */
p = fmtbuff;
i = 0;
try_wc = 1;
while (*p != '\0') {
/* Convert to wide char, test if the wide
* char is printable in the current locale. */
if (try_wc && (n = mbtowc(&wc, p, length)) != -1) {
length -= n;
if (iswprint(wc) && wc != L'\\') {
/* Printable, copy the bytes through. */
while (n-- > 0)
outbuff[i++] = *p++;
} else {
/* Not printable, format the bytes. */
while (n-- > 0)
i += (unsigned)bsdtar_expand_char(
outbuff, i, *p++);
}
} else {
/* After any conversion failure, don't bother
* trying to convert the rest. */
i += (unsigned)bsdtar_expand_char(outbuff, i, *p++);
try_wc = 0;
}
/* If our output buffer is full, dump it and keep going. */
if (i > (sizeof(outbuff) - 128)) {
outbuff[i] = '\0';
fprintf(f, "%s", outbuff);
i = 0;
}
}
outbuff[i] = '\0';
fprintf(f, "%s", outbuff);
/* If we allocated a heap-based formatting buffer, free it now. */
free(fmtbuff_heap);
}
| 168,766
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: selaGetCombName(SELA *sela,
l_int32 size,
l_int32 direction)
{
char *selname;
char combname[L_BUF_SIZE];
l_int32 i, nsels, sx, sy, found;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selaGetCombName");
if (!sela)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sela not defined", procName, NULL);
if (direction != L_HORIZ && direction != L_VERT)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("invalid direction", procName, NULL);
/* Derive the comb name we're looking for */
if (direction == L_HORIZ)
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dh", size);
else /* direction == L_VERT */
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dv", size);
found = FALSE;
nsels = selaGetCount(sela);
for (i = 0; i < nsels; i++) {
sel = selaGetSel(sela, i);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, NULL, NULL);
if (sy != 1 && sx != 1) /* 2-D; not a comb */
continue;
selname = selGetName(sel);
if (!strcmp(selname, combname)) {
found = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (found)
return stringNew(selname);
else
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sel not found", procName, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
selaGetCombName(SELA *sela,
l_int32 size,
l_int32 direction)
{
char *selname;
char combname[L_BUFSIZE];
l_int32 i, nsels, sx, sy, found;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selaGetCombName");
if (!sela)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sela not defined", procName, NULL);
if (direction != L_HORIZ && direction != L_VERT)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("invalid direction", procName, NULL);
/* Derive the comb name we're looking for */
if (direction == L_HORIZ)
snprintf(combname, L_BUFSIZE, "sel_comb_%dh", size);
else /* direction == L_VERT */
snprintf(combname, L_BUFSIZE, "sel_comb_%dv", size);
found = FALSE;
nsels = selaGetCount(sela);
for (i = 0; i < nsels; i++) {
sel = selaGetSel(sela, i);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, NULL, NULL);
if (sy != 1 && sx != 1) /* 2-D; not a comb */
continue;
selname = selGetName(sel);
if (!strcmp(selname, combname)) {
found = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (found)
return stringNew(selname);
else
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sel not found", procName, NULL);
}
| 169,330
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
return -EINVAL;
ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e, e->target_offset,
e->next_offset);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct arpt_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
t = compat_arpt_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_ARP, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto out;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(NFPROTO_ARP, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto release_target;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
release_target:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
return -EINVAL;
ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems, e->target_offset,
e->next_offset);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct arpt_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
t = compat_arpt_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_ARP, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto out;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(NFPROTO_ARP, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto release_target;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
release_target:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
out:
return ret;
}
| 167,215
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadUncompressedRGB(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
x, y;
unsigned short
color;
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 8)
(void) SetImageType(image,GrayscaleType);
else if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 16 && !IsBitMask(
dds_info->pixelformat,0xf800,0x07e0,0x001f,0x0000))
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImageTypeNotSupported",
image->filename);
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y++)
{
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, 0, y, dds_info->width, 1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x++)
{
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 8)
SetPixelGray(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ReadBlobByte(image)));
else if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 16)
{
color=ReadBlobShort(image);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(((color >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 5) >> 10)/63.0)*255)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 11) >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
}
else
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 32)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
SetPixelAlpha(q,QuantumRange);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
SkipRGBMipmaps(image, dds_info, 3);
return MagickTrue;
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static MagickBooleanType ReadUncompressedRGB(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
x, y;
unsigned short
color;
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 8)
(void) SetImageType(image,GrayscaleType);
else if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 16 && !IsBitMask(
dds_info->pixelformat,0xf800,0x07e0,0x001f,0x0000))
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImageTypeNotSupported",
image->filename);
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y++)
{
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, 0, y, dds_info->width, 1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x++)
{
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 8)
SetPixelGray(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ReadBlobByte(image)));
else if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 16)
{
color=ReadBlobShort(image);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(((color >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 5) >> 10)/63.0)*255)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 11) >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
}
else
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 32)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
SetPixelAlpha(q,QuantumRange);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
return(SkipRGBMipmaps(image,dds_info,3,exception));
}
| 168,902
|
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