instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.3k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool NaClProcessHost::StartNaClExecution() {
NaClBrowser* nacl_browser = NaClBrowser::GetInstance();
nacl::NaClStartParams params;
params.validation_cache_enabled = nacl_browser->ValidationCacheIsEnabled();
params.validation_cache_key = nacl_browser->GetValidationCacheKey();
params.version = chrome::VersionInfo().CreateVersionString();
params.enable_exception_handling = enable_exception_handling_;
params.enable_debug_stub =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableNaClDebug);
params.enable_ipc_proxy = enable_ipc_proxy_;
base::PlatformFile irt_file = nacl_browser->IrtFile();
CHECK_NE(irt_file, base::kInvalidPlatformFileValue);
const ChildProcessData& data = process_->GetData();
for (size_t i = 0; i < internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.size(); i++) {
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle,
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr[i], true,
¶ms.handles)) {
return false;
}
}
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle, irt_file, false, ¶ms.handles))
return false;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::SharedMemory memory_buffer;
base::SharedMemoryCreateOptions options;
options.size = 1;
options.executable = true;
if (!memory_buffer.Create(options)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to allocate memory buffer";
return false;
}
nacl::FileDescriptor memory_fd;
memory_fd.fd = dup(memory_buffer.handle().fd);
if (memory_fd.fd < 0) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to dup() a file descriptor";
return false;
}
memory_fd.auto_close = true;
params.handles.push_back(memory_fd);
#endif
process_->Send(new NaClProcessMsg_Start(params));
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.clear();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool NaClProcessHost::StartNaClExecution() {
NaClBrowser* nacl_browser = NaClBrowser::GetInstance();
nacl::NaClStartParams params;
params.validation_cache_enabled = nacl_browser->ValidationCacheIsEnabled();
params.validation_cache_key = nacl_browser->GetValidationCacheKey();
params.version = chrome::VersionInfo().CreateVersionString();
params.enable_exception_handling = enable_exception_handling_;
params.enable_debug_stub =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableNaClDebug);
base::PlatformFile irt_file = nacl_browser->IrtFile();
CHECK_NE(irt_file, base::kInvalidPlatformFileValue);
const ChildProcessData& data = process_->GetData();
for (size_t i = 0; i < internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.size(); i++) {
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle,
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr[i], true,
¶ms.handles)) {
return false;
}
}
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle, irt_file, false, ¶ms.handles))
return false;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::SharedMemory memory_buffer;
base::SharedMemoryCreateOptions options;
options.size = 1;
options.executable = true;
if (!memory_buffer.Create(options)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to allocate memory buffer";
return false;
}
nacl::FileDescriptor memory_fd;
memory_fd.fd = dup(memory_buffer.handle().fd);
if (memory_fd.fd < 0) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to dup() a file descriptor";
return false;
}
memory_fd.auto_close = true;
params.handles.push_back(memory_fd);
#endif
process_->Send(new NaClProcessMsg_Start(params));
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.clear();
return true;
}
| 170,729
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void DidDownloadImage(const WebContents::ImageDownloadCallback& callback,
int id,
const GURL& image_url,
image_downloader::DownloadResultPtr result) {
DCHECK(result);
const std::vector<SkBitmap> images =
result->images.To<std::vector<SkBitmap>>();
const std::vector<gfx::Size> original_image_sizes =
result->original_image_sizes.To<std::vector<gfx::Size>>();
callback.Run(id, result->http_status_code, image_url, images,
original_image_sizes);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
|
static void DidDownloadImage(const WebContents::ImageDownloadCallback& callback,
| 172,209
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int read_data(void *opaque, uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
struct playlist *v = opaque;
HLSContext *c = v->parent->priv_data;
int ret, i;
int just_opened = 0;
restart:
if (!v->needed)
return AVERROR_EOF;
if (!v->input) {
int64_t reload_interval;
struct segment *seg;
/* Check that the playlist is still needed before opening a new
* segment. */
if (v->ctx && v->ctx->nb_streams) {
v->needed = 0;
for (i = 0; i < v->n_main_streams; i++) {
if (v->main_streams[i]->discard < AVDISCARD_ALL) {
v->needed = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!v->needed) {
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_INFO, "No longer receiving playlist %d\n",
v->index);
return AVERROR_EOF;
}
/* If this is a live stream and the reload interval has elapsed since
* the last playlist reload, reload the playlists now. */
reload_interval = default_reload_interval(v);
reload:
if (!v->finished &&
av_gettime_relative() - v->last_load_time >= reload_interval) {
if ((ret = parse_playlist(c, v->url, v, NULL)) < 0) {
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Failed to reload playlist %d\n",
v->index);
return ret;
}
/* If we need to reload the playlist again below (if
* there's still no more segments), switch to a reload
* interval of half the target duration. */
reload_interval = v->target_duration / 2;
}
if (v->cur_seq_no < v->start_seq_no) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"skipping %d segments ahead, expired from playlists\n",
v->start_seq_no - v->cur_seq_no);
v->cur_seq_no = v->start_seq_no;
}
if (v->cur_seq_no >= v->start_seq_no + v->n_segments) {
if (v->finished)
return AVERROR_EOF;
while (av_gettime_relative() - v->last_load_time < reload_interval) {
if (ff_check_interrupt(c->interrupt_callback))
return AVERROR_EXIT;
av_usleep(100*1000);
}
/* Enough time has elapsed since the last reload */
goto reload;
}
seg = current_segment(v);
/* load/update Media Initialization Section, if any */
ret = update_init_section(v, seg);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = open_input(c, v, seg);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ff_check_interrupt(c->interrupt_callback))
return AVERROR_EXIT;
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Failed to open segment of playlist %d\n",
v->index);
v->cur_seq_no += 1;
goto reload;
}
just_opened = 1;
}
if (v->init_sec_buf_read_offset < v->init_sec_data_len) {
/* Push init section out first before first actual segment */
int copy_size = FFMIN(v->init_sec_data_len - v->init_sec_buf_read_offset, buf_size);
memcpy(buf, v->init_sec_buf, copy_size);
v->init_sec_buf_read_offset += copy_size;
return copy_size;
}
ret = read_from_url(v, current_segment(v), buf, buf_size, READ_NORMAL);
if (ret > 0) {
if (just_opened && v->is_id3_timestamped != 0) {
/* Intercept ID3 tags here, elementary audio streams are required
* to convey timestamps using them in the beginning of each segment. */
intercept_id3(v, buf, buf_size, &ret);
}
return ret;
}
ff_format_io_close(v->parent, &v->input);
v->cur_seq_no++;
c->cur_seq_no = v->cur_seq_no;
goto restart;
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835
|
static int read_data(void *opaque, uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
struct playlist *v = opaque;
HLSContext *c = v->parent->priv_data;
int ret, i;
int just_opened = 0;
int reload_count = 0;
restart:
if (!v->needed)
return AVERROR_EOF;
if (!v->input) {
int64_t reload_interval;
struct segment *seg;
/* Check that the playlist is still needed before opening a new
* segment. */
if (v->ctx && v->ctx->nb_streams) {
v->needed = 0;
for (i = 0; i < v->n_main_streams; i++) {
if (v->main_streams[i]->discard < AVDISCARD_ALL) {
v->needed = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!v->needed) {
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_INFO, "No longer receiving playlist %d\n",
v->index);
return AVERROR_EOF;
}
/* If this is a live stream and the reload interval has elapsed since
* the last playlist reload, reload the playlists now. */
reload_interval = default_reload_interval(v);
reload:
reload_count++;
if (reload_count > c->max_reload)
return AVERROR_EOF;
if (!v->finished &&
av_gettime_relative() - v->last_load_time >= reload_interval) {
if ((ret = parse_playlist(c, v->url, v, NULL)) < 0) {
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Failed to reload playlist %d\n",
v->index);
return ret;
}
/* If we need to reload the playlist again below (if
* there's still no more segments), switch to a reload
* interval of half the target duration. */
reload_interval = v->target_duration / 2;
}
if (v->cur_seq_no < v->start_seq_no) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"skipping %d segments ahead, expired from playlists\n",
v->start_seq_no - v->cur_seq_no);
v->cur_seq_no = v->start_seq_no;
}
if (v->cur_seq_no >= v->start_seq_no + v->n_segments) {
if (v->finished)
return AVERROR_EOF;
while (av_gettime_relative() - v->last_load_time < reload_interval) {
if (ff_check_interrupt(c->interrupt_callback))
return AVERROR_EXIT;
av_usleep(100*1000);
}
/* Enough time has elapsed since the last reload */
goto reload;
}
seg = current_segment(v);
/* load/update Media Initialization Section, if any */
ret = update_init_section(v, seg);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = open_input(c, v, seg);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ff_check_interrupt(c->interrupt_callback))
return AVERROR_EXIT;
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Failed to open segment of playlist %d\n",
v->index);
v->cur_seq_no += 1;
goto reload;
}
just_opened = 1;
}
if (v->init_sec_buf_read_offset < v->init_sec_data_len) {
/* Push init section out first before first actual segment */
int copy_size = FFMIN(v->init_sec_data_len - v->init_sec_buf_read_offset, buf_size);
memcpy(buf, v->init_sec_buf, copy_size);
v->init_sec_buf_read_offset += copy_size;
return copy_size;
}
ret = read_from_url(v, current_segment(v), buf, buf_size, READ_NORMAL);
if (ret > 0) {
if (just_opened && v->is_id3_timestamped != 0) {
/* Intercept ID3 tags here, elementary audio streams are required
* to convey timestamps using them in the beginning of each segment. */
intercept_id3(v, buf, buf_size, &ret);
}
return ret;
}
ff_format_io_close(v->parent, &v->input);
v->cur_seq_no++;
c->cur_seq_no = v->cur_seq_no;
goto restart;
}
| 167,774
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int decode_getacl(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct rpc_rqst *req,
size_t *acl_len)
{
__be32 *savep;
uint32_t attrlen,
bitmap[3] = {0};
struct kvec *iov = req->rq_rcv_buf.head;
int status;
*acl_len = 0;
if ((status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_GETATTR)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_bitmap(xdr, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_length(xdr, &attrlen, &savep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_ACL - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_ACL)) {
size_t hdrlen;
u32 recvd;
/* We ignore &savep and don't do consistency checks on
* the attr length. Let userspace figure it out.... */
hdrlen = (u8 *)xdr->p - (u8 *)iov->iov_base;
recvd = req->rq_rcv_buf.len - hdrlen;
if (attrlen > recvd) {
dprintk("NFS: server cheating in getattr"
" acl reply: attrlen %u > recvd %u\n",
attrlen, recvd);
return -EINVAL;
}
xdr_read_pages(xdr, attrlen);
*acl_len = attrlen;
} else
status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
static int decode_getacl(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct rpc_rqst *req,
struct nfs_getaclres *res)
{
__be32 *savep, *bm_p;
uint32_t attrlen,
bitmap[3] = {0};
struct kvec *iov = req->rq_rcv_buf.head;
int status;
res->acl_len = 0;
if ((status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_GETATTR)) != 0)
goto out;
bm_p = xdr->p;
if ((status = decode_attr_bitmap(xdr, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_length(xdr, &attrlen, &savep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_ACL - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_ACL)) {
size_t hdrlen;
u32 recvd;
/* The bitmap (xdr len + bitmaps) and the attr xdr len words
* are stored with the acl data to handle the problem of
* variable length bitmaps.*/
xdr->p = bm_p;
res->acl_data_offset = be32_to_cpup(bm_p) + 2;
res->acl_data_offset <<= 2;
/* We ignore &savep and don't do consistency checks on
* the attr length. Let userspace figure it out.... */
hdrlen = (u8 *)xdr->p - (u8 *)iov->iov_base;
attrlen += res->acl_data_offset;
recvd = req->rq_rcv_buf.len - hdrlen;
if (attrlen > recvd) {
if (res->acl_flags & NFS4_ACL_LEN_REQUEST) {
/* getxattr interface called with a NULL buf */
res->acl_len = attrlen;
goto out;
}
dprintk("NFS: acl reply: attrlen %u > recvd %u\n",
attrlen, recvd);
return -EINVAL;
}
xdr_read_pages(xdr, attrlen);
res->acl_len = attrlen;
} else
status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
out:
return status;
}
| 165,719
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long Track::ParseContentEncodingsEntry(long long start, long long size) {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
assert(pReader);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
int count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) // ContentEncoding ID
++count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (count <= 0)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_ = new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding* [count];
if (!content_encoding_entries_)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_end_ = content_encoding_entries_;
pos = start;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) { // ContentEncoding ID
ContentEncoding* const content_encoding =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding();
if (!content_encoding)
return -1;
status = content_encoding->ParseContentEncodingEntry(pos, size, pReader);
if (status) {
delete content_encoding;
return status;
}
*content_encoding_entries_end_++ = content_encoding;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
long Track::ParseContentEncodingsEntry(long long start, long long size) {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
assert(pReader);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
int count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) // ContentEncoding ID
++count;
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (count <= 0)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_ = new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding*[count];
if (!content_encoding_entries_)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_end_ = content_encoding_entries_;
pos = start;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) { // ContentEncoding ID
ContentEncoding* const content_encoding =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding();
if (!content_encoding)
return -1;
status = content_encoding->ParseContentEncodingEntry(pos, size, pReader);
if (status) {
delete content_encoding;
return status;
}
*content_encoding_entries_end_++ = content_encoding;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
| 173,851
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void KioskNextHomeInterfaceBrokerImpl::GetAppController(
mojom::AppControllerRequest request) {
app_controller_->BindRequest(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void KioskNextHomeInterfaceBrokerImpl::GetAppController(
mojom::AppControllerRequest request) {
AppControllerService::Get(context_)->BindRequest(std::move(request));
}
| 172,090
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::CopyToTexture(
gpu::gles2::GLES2Interface* dest_gl,
GLenum dest_target,
GLuint dest_texture_id,
bool unpack_premultiply_alpha,
bool unpack_flip_y,
const IntPoint& dest_point,
const IntRect& source_sub_rectangle) {
CheckThread();
if (!IsValid())
return false;
DCHECK(texture_holder_->IsCrossThread() ||
dest_gl != ContextProviderWrapper()->ContextProvider()->ContextGL());
EnsureMailbox(kUnverifiedSyncToken, GL_NEAREST);
dest_gl->WaitSyncTokenCHROMIUM(
texture_holder_->GetSyncToken().GetConstData());
GLuint source_texture_id = dest_gl->CreateAndConsumeTextureCHROMIUM(
texture_holder_->GetMailbox().name);
dest_gl->CopySubTextureCHROMIUM(
source_texture_id, 0, dest_target, dest_texture_id, 0, dest_point.X(),
dest_point.Y(), source_sub_rectangle.X(), source_sub_rectangle.Y(),
source_sub_rectangle.Width(), source_sub_rectangle.Height(),
unpack_flip_y ? GL_FALSE : GL_TRUE, GL_FALSE,
unpack_premultiply_alpha ? GL_FALSE : GL_TRUE);
dest_gl->DeleteTextures(1, &source_texture_id);
gpu::SyncToken sync_token;
dest_gl->GenUnverifiedSyncTokenCHROMIUM(sync_token.GetData());
texture_holder_->UpdateSyncToken(sync_token);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::CopyToTexture(
gpu::gles2::GLES2Interface* dest_gl,
GLenum dest_target,
GLuint dest_texture_id,
bool unpack_premultiply_alpha,
bool unpack_flip_y,
const IntPoint& dest_point,
const IntRect& source_sub_rectangle) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (!IsValid())
return false;
DCHECK(texture_holder_->IsCrossThread() ||
dest_gl != ContextProviderWrapper()->ContextProvider()->ContextGL());
EnsureMailbox(kUnverifiedSyncToken, GL_NEAREST);
dest_gl->WaitSyncTokenCHROMIUM(
texture_holder_->GetSyncToken().GetConstData());
GLuint source_texture_id = dest_gl->CreateAndConsumeTextureCHROMIUM(
texture_holder_->GetMailbox().name);
dest_gl->CopySubTextureCHROMIUM(
source_texture_id, 0, dest_target, dest_texture_id, 0, dest_point.X(),
dest_point.Y(), source_sub_rectangle.X(), source_sub_rectangle.Y(),
source_sub_rectangle.Width(), source_sub_rectangle.Height(),
unpack_flip_y ? GL_FALSE : GL_TRUE, GL_FALSE,
unpack_premultiply_alpha ? GL_FALSE : GL_TRUE);
dest_gl->DeleteTextures(1, &source_texture_id);
gpu::SyncToken sync_token;
dest_gl->GenUnverifiedSyncTokenCHROMIUM(sync_token.GetData());
texture_holder_->UpdateSyncToken(sync_token);
return true;
}
| 172,591
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void StorageHandler::ClearDataForOrigin(
const std::string& origin,
const std::string& storage_types,
std::unique_ptr<ClearDataForOriginCallback> callback) {
if (!process_)
return callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
StoragePartition* partition = process_->GetStoragePartition();
std::vector<std::string> types = base::SplitString(
storage_types, ",", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_NONEMPTY);
std::unordered_set<std::string> set(types.begin(), types.end());
uint32_t remove_mask = 0;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Appcache))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_APPCACHE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Cookies))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_COOKIES;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::File_systems))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_FILE_SYSTEMS;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Indexeddb))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_INDEXEDDB;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Local_storage))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_LOCAL_STORAGE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Shader_cache))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_SHADER_CACHE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Websql))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_WEBSQL;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Service_workers))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_SERVICE_WORKERS;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Cache_storage))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_CACHE_STORAGE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::All))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_ALL;
if (!remove_mask) {
return callback->sendFailure(
Response::InvalidParams("No valid storage type specified"));
}
partition->ClearData(remove_mask,
StoragePartition::QUOTA_MANAGED_STORAGE_MASK_ALL,
GURL(origin), StoragePartition::OriginMatcherFunction(),
base::Time(), base::Time::Max(),
base::BindOnce(&ClearDataForOriginCallback::sendSuccess,
std::move(callback)));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void StorageHandler::ClearDataForOrigin(
const std::string& origin,
const std::string& storage_types,
std::unique_ptr<ClearDataForOriginCallback> callback) {
if (!storage_partition_)
return callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
std::vector<std::string> types = base::SplitString(
storage_types, ",", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_NONEMPTY);
std::unordered_set<std::string> set(types.begin(), types.end());
uint32_t remove_mask = 0;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Appcache))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_APPCACHE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Cookies))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_COOKIES;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::File_systems))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_FILE_SYSTEMS;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Indexeddb))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_INDEXEDDB;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Local_storage))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_LOCAL_STORAGE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Shader_cache))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_SHADER_CACHE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Websql))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_WEBSQL;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Service_workers))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_SERVICE_WORKERS;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Cache_storage))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_CACHE_STORAGE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::All))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_ALL;
if (!remove_mask) {
return callback->sendFailure(
Response::InvalidParams("No valid storage type specified"));
}
storage_partition_->ClearData(
remove_mask, StoragePartition::QUOTA_MANAGED_STORAGE_MASK_ALL,
GURL(origin), StoragePartition::OriginMatcherFunction(), base::Time(),
base::Time::Max(),
base::BindOnce(&ClearDataForOriginCallback::sendSuccess,
std::move(callback)));
}
| 172,770
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool HasPermissionsForFile(const FilePath& file, int permissions) {
FilePath current_path = file.StripTrailingSeparators();
FilePath last_path;
while (current_path != last_path) {
if (file_permissions_.find(current_path) != file_permissions_.end())
return (file_permissions_[current_path] & permissions) == permissions;
last_path = current_path;
current_path = current_path.DirName();
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Apply missing kParentDirectory check
BUG=161564
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11414046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
bool HasPermissionsForFile(const FilePath& file, int permissions) {
FilePath current_path = file.StripTrailingSeparators();
FilePath last_path;
int skip = 0;
while (current_path != last_path) {
FilePath base_name = current_path.BaseName();
if (base_name.value() == FilePath::kParentDirectory) {
++skip;
} else if (skip > 0) {
if (base_name.value() != FilePath::kCurrentDirectory)
--skip;
} else {
if (file_permissions_.find(current_path) != file_permissions_.end())
return (file_permissions_[current_path] & permissions) == permissions;
}
last_path = current_path;
current_path = current_path.DirName();
}
return false;
}
| 170,673
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int cma_req_handler(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id, struct ib_cm_event *ib_event)
{
struct rdma_id_private *listen_id, *conn_id;
struct rdma_cm_event event;
int offset, ret;
u8 smac[ETH_ALEN];
u8 alt_smac[ETH_ALEN];
u8 *psmac = smac;
u8 *palt_smac = alt_smac;
int is_iboe = ((rdma_node_get_transport(cm_id->device->node_type) ==
RDMA_TRANSPORT_IB) &&
(rdma_port_get_link_layer(cm_id->device,
ib_event->param.req_rcvd.port) ==
IB_LINK_LAYER_ETHERNET));
listen_id = cm_id->context;
if (!cma_check_req_qp_type(&listen_id->id, ib_event))
return -EINVAL;
if (cma_disable_callback(listen_id, RDMA_CM_LISTEN))
return -ECONNABORTED;
memset(&event, 0, sizeof event);
offset = cma_user_data_offset(listen_id);
event.event = RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST;
if (ib_event->event == IB_CM_SIDR_REQ_RECEIVED) {
conn_id = cma_new_udp_id(&listen_id->id, ib_event);
event.param.ud.private_data = ib_event->private_data + offset;
event.param.ud.private_data_len =
IB_CM_SIDR_REQ_PRIVATE_DATA_SIZE - offset;
} else {
conn_id = cma_new_conn_id(&listen_id->id, ib_event);
cma_set_req_event_data(&event, &ib_event->param.req_rcvd,
ib_event->private_data, offset);
}
if (!conn_id) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err1;
}
mutex_lock_nested(&conn_id->handler_mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
ret = cma_acquire_dev(conn_id, listen_id);
if (ret)
goto err2;
conn_id->cm_id.ib = cm_id;
cm_id->context = conn_id;
cm_id->cm_handler = cma_ib_handler;
/*
* Protect against the user destroying conn_id from another thread
* until we're done accessing it.
*/
atomic_inc(&conn_id->refcount);
ret = conn_id->id.event_handler(&conn_id->id, &event);
if (ret)
goto err3;
if (is_iboe) {
if (ib_event->param.req_rcvd.primary_path != NULL)
rdma_addr_find_smac_by_sgid(
&ib_event->param.req_rcvd.primary_path->sgid,
psmac, NULL);
else
psmac = NULL;
if (ib_event->param.req_rcvd.alternate_path != NULL)
rdma_addr_find_smac_by_sgid(
&ib_event->param.req_rcvd.alternate_path->sgid,
palt_smac, NULL);
else
palt_smac = NULL;
}
/*
* Acquire mutex to prevent user executing rdma_destroy_id()
* while we're accessing the cm_id.
*/
mutex_lock(&lock);
if (is_iboe)
ib_update_cm_av(cm_id, psmac, palt_smac);
if (cma_comp(conn_id, RDMA_CM_CONNECT) &&
(conn_id->id.qp_type != IB_QPT_UD))
ib_send_cm_mra(cm_id, CMA_CM_MRA_SETTING, NULL, 0);
mutex_unlock(&lock);
mutex_unlock(&conn_id->handler_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&listen_id->handler_mutex);
cma_deref_id(conn_id);
return 0;
err3:
cma_deref_id(conn_id);
/* Destroy the CM ID by returning a non-zero value. */
conn_id->cm_id.ib = NULL;
err2:
cma_exch(conn_id, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING);
mutex_unlock(&conn_id->handler_mutex);
err1:
mutex_unlock(&listen_id->handler_mutex);
if (conn_id)
rdma_destroy_id(&conn_id->id);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int cma_req_handler(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id, struct ib_cm_event *ib_event)
{
struct rdma_id_private *listen_id, *conn_id;
struct rdma_cm_event event;
int offset, ret;
listen_id = cm_id->context;
if (!cma_check_req_qp_type(&listen_id->id, ib_event))
return -EINVAL;
if (cma_disable_callback(listen_id, RDMA_CM_LISTEN))
return -ECONNABORTED;
memset(&event, 0, sizeof event);
offset = cma_user_data_offset(listen_id);
event.event = RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST;
if (ib_event->event == IB_CM_SIDR_REQ_RECEIVED) {
conn_id = cma_new_udp_id(&listen_id->id, ib_event);
event.param.ud.private_data = ib_event->private_data + offset;
event.param.ud.private_data_len =
IB_CM_SIDR_REQ_PRIVATE_DATA_SIZE - offset;
} else {
conn_id = cma_new_conn_id(&listen_id->id, ib_event);
cma_set_req_event_data(&event, &ib_event->param.req_rcvd,
ib_event->private_data, offset);
}
if (!conn_id) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err1;
}
mutex_lock_nested(&conn_id->handler_mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
ret = cma_acquire_dev(conn_id, listen_id);
if (ret)
goto err2;
conn_id->cm_id.ib = cm_id;
cm_id->context = conn_id;
cm_id->cm_handler = cma_ib_handler;
/*
* Protect against the user destroying conn_id from another thread
* until we're done accessing it.
*/
atomic_inc(&conn_id->refcount);
ret = conn_id->id.event_handler(&conn_id->id, &event);
if (ret)
goto err3;
/*
* Acquire mutex to prevent user executing rdma_destroy_id()
* while we're accessing the cm_id.
*/
mutex_lock(&lock);
if (cma_comp(conn_id, RDMA_CM_CONNECT) &&
(conn_id->id.qp_type != IB_QPT_UD))
ib_send_cm_mra(cm_id, CMA_CM_MRA_SETTING, NULL, 0);
mutex_unlock(&lock);
mutex_unlock(&conn_id->handler_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&listen_id->handler_mutex);
cma_deref_id(conn_id);
return 0;
err3:
cma_deref_id(conn_id);
/* Destroy the CM ID by returning a non-zero value. */
conn_id->cm_id.ib = NULL;
err2:
cma_exch(conn_id, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING);
mutex_unlock(&conn_id->handler_mutex);
err1:
mutex_unlock(&listen_id->handler_mutex);
if (conn_id)
rdma_destroy_id(&conn_id->id);
return ret;
}
| 166,390
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static ssize_t __nfs4_get_acl_uncached(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct page *pages[NFS4ACL_MAXPAGES] = {NULL, };
struct nfs_getaclargs args = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.acl_pages = pages,
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct nfs_getaclres res = {
.acl_len = buflen,
};
void *resp_buf;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_GETACL],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
int ret = -ENOMEM, npages, i, acl_len = 0;
npages = (buflen + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/* As long as we're doing a round trip to the server anyway,
* let's be prepared for a page of acl data. */
if (npages == 0)
npages = 1;
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pages[i])
goto out_free;
}
if (npages > 1) {
/* for decoding across pages */
res.acl_scratch = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!res.acl_scratch)
goto out_free;
}
args.acl_len = npages * PAGE_SIZE;
args.acl_pgbase = 0;
/* Let decode_getfacl know not to fail if the ACL data is larger than
* the page we send as a guess */
if (buf == NULL)
res.acl_flags |= NFS4_ACL_LEN_REQUEST;
resp_buf = page_address(pages[0]);
dprintk("%s buf %p buflen %zu npages %d args.acl_len %zu\n",
__func__, buf, buflen, npages, args.acl_len);
ret = nfs4_call_sync(NFS_SERVER(inode)->client, NFS_SERVER(inode),
&msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
acl_len = res.acl_len - res.acl_data_offset;
if (acl_len > args.acl_len)
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, NULL, acl_len);
else
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, resp_buf + res.acl_data_offset,
acl_len);
if (buf) {
ret = -ERANGE;
if (acl_len > buflen)
goto out_free;
_copy_from_pages(buf, pages, res.acl_data_offset,
res.acl_len);
}
ret = acl_len;
out_free:
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++)
if (pages[i])
__free_page(pages[i]);
if (res.acl_scratch)
__free_page(res.acl_scratch);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
static ssize_t __nfs4_get_acl_uncached(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct page *pages[NFS4ACL_MAXPAGES] = {NULL, };
struct nfs_getaclargs args = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.acl_pages = pages,
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct nfs_getaclres res = {
.acl_len = buflen,
};
void *resp_buf;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_GETACL],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
int ret = -ENOMEM, npages, i, acl_len = 0;
npages = (buflen + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/* As long as we're doing a round trip to the server anyway,
* let's be prepared for a page of acl data. */
if (npages == 0)
npages = 1;
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pages[i])
goto out_free;
}
if (npages > 1) {
/* for decoding across pages */
res.acl_scratch = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!res.acl_scratch)
goto out_free;
}
args.acl_len = npages * PAGE_SIZE;
args.acl_pgbase = 0;
/* Let decode_getfacl know not to fail if the ACL data is larger than
* the page we send as a guess */
if (buf == NULL)
res.acl_flags |= NFS4_ACL_LEN_REQUEST;
resp_buf = page_address(pages[0]);
dprintk("%s buf %p buflen %zu npages %d args.acl_len %zu\n",
__func__, buf, buflen, npages, args.acl_len);
ret = nfs4_call_sync(NFS_SERVER(inode)->client, NFS_SERVER(inode),
&msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
acl_len = res.acl_len - res.acl_data_offset;
if (acl_len > args.acl_len)
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, NULL, acl_len);
else
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, resp_buf + res.acl_data_offset,
acl_len);
if (buf) {
ret = -ERANGE;
if (acl_len > buflen)
goto out_free;
_copy_from_pages(buf, pages, res.acl_data_offset,
acl_len);
}
ret = acl_len;
out_free:
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++)
if (pages[i])
__free_page(pages[i]);
if (res.acl_scratch)
__free_page(res.acl_scratch);
return ret;
}
| 165,598
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int snd_compress_check_input(struct snd_compr_params *params)
{
/* first let's check the buffer parameter's */
if (params->buffer.fragment_size == 0 ||
params->buffer.fragments > SIZE_MAX / params->buffer.fragment_size)
return -EINVAL;
/* now codec parameters */
if (params->codec.id == 0 || params->codec.id > SND_AUDIOCODEC_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if (params->codec.ch_in == 0 || params->codec.ch_out == 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
|
static int snd_compress_check_input(struct snd_compr_params *params)
{
/* first let's check the buffer parameter's */
if (params->buffer.fragment_size == 0 ||
params->buffer.fragments > INT_MAX / params->buffer.fragment_size)
return -EINVAL;
/* now codec parameters */
if (params->codec.id == 0 || params->codec.id > SND_AUDIOCODEC_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if (params->codec.ch_in == 0 || params->codec.ch_out == 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
| 167,574
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_generic_init)
{
char *key, *iv;
int key_len, iv_len;
zval *mcryptind;
unsigned char *key_s, *iv_s;
int max_key_size, key_size, iv_size;
php_mcrypt *pm;
int result = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rss", &mcryptind, &key, &key_len, &iv, &iv_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pm, php_mcrypt *, &mcryptind, -1, "MCrypt", le_mcrypt);
max_key_size = mcrypt_enc_get_key_size(pm->td);
iv_size = mcrypt_enc_get_iv_size(pm->td);
if (key_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Key size is 0");
}
key_s = emalloc(key_len);
memset(key_s, 0, key_len);
iv_s = emalloc(iv_size + 1);
memset(iv_s, 0, iv_size + 1);
if (key_len > max_key_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Key size too large; supplied length: %d, max: %d", key_len, max_key_size);
key_size = max_key_size;
} else {
key_size = key_len;
}
memcpy(key_s, key, key_len);
if (iv_len != iv_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Iv size incorrect; supplied length: %d, needed: %d", iv_len, iv_size);
if (iv_len > iv_size) {
iv_len = iv_size;
}
}
memcpy(iv_s, iv, iv_len);
mcrypt_generic_deinit(pm->td);
result = mcrypt_generic_init(pm->td, key_s, key_size, iv_s);
/* If this function fails, close the mcrypt module to prevent crashes
* when further functions want to access this resource */
if (result < 0) {
zend_list_delete(Z_LVAL_P(mcryptind));
switch (result) {
case -3:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Key length incorrect");
break;
case -4:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Memory allocation error");
break;
case -1:
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown error");
break;
}
} else {
pm->init = 1;
}
RETVAL_LONG(result);
efree(iv_s);
efree(key_s);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_generic_init)
{
char *key, *iv;
int key_len, iv_len;
zval *mcryptind;
unsigned char *key_s, *iv_s;
int max_key_size, key_size, iv_size;
php_mcrypt *pm;
int result = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rss", &mcryptind, &key, &key_len, &iv, &iv_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pm, php_mcrypt *, &mcryptind, -1, "MCrypt", le_mcrypt);
max_key_size = mcrypt_enc_get_key_size(pm->td);
iv_size = mcrypt_enc_get_iv_size(pm->td);
if (key_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Key size is 0");
}
key_s = emalloc(key_len);
memset(key_s, 0, key_len);
iv_s = emalloc(iv_size + 1);
memset(iv_s, 0, iv_size + 1);
if (key_len > max_key_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Key size too large; supplied length: %d, max: %d", key_len, max_key_size);
key_size = max_key_size;
} else {
key_size = key_len;
}
memcpy(key_s, key, key_len);
if (iv_len != iv_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Iv size incorrect; supplied length: %d, needed: %d", iv_len, iv_size);
if (iv_len > iv_size) {
iv_len = iv_size;
}
}
memcpy(iv_s, iv, iv_len);
mcrypt_generic_deinit(pm->td);
result = mcrypt_generic_init(pm->td, key_s, key_size, iv_s);
/* If this function fails, close the mcrypt module to prevent crashes
* when further functions want to access this resource */
if (result < 0) {
zend_list_delete(Z_LVAL_P(mcryptind));
switch (result) {
case -3:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Key length incorrect");
break;
case -4:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Memory allocation error");
break;
case -1:
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown error");
break;
}
} else {
pm->init = 1;
}
RETVAL_LONG(result);
efree(iv_s);
efree(key_s);
}
| 167,090
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: horAcc8(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
unsigned char* cp = (unsigned char*) cp0;
assert((cc%stride)==0);
if (cc > stride) {
/*
* Pipeline the most common cases.
*/
if (stride == 3) {
unsigned int cr = cp[0];
unsigned int cg = cp[1];
unsigned int cb = cp[2];
cc -= 3;
cp += 3;
while (cc>0) {
cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
cc -= 3;
cp += 3;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
unsigned int cr = cp[0];
unsigned int cg = cp[1];
unsigned int cb = cp[2];
unsigned int ca = cp[3];
cc -= 4;
cp += 4;
while (cc>0) {
cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
cp[3] = (unsigned char) ((ca += cp[3]) & 0xff);
cc -= 4;
cp += 4;
}
} else {
cc -= stride;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] =
(unsigned char) ((cp[stride] + *cp) & 0xff); cp++)
cc -= stride;
} while (cc>0);
}
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
horAcc8(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
unsigned char* cp = (unsigned char*) cp0;
if((cc%stride)!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "horAcc8",
"%s", "(cc%stride)!=0");
return 0;
}
if (cc > stride) {
/*
* Pipeline the most common cases.
*/
if (stride == 3) {
unsigned int cr = cp[0];
unsigned int cg = cp[1];
unsigned int cb = cp[2];
cc -= 3;
cp += 3;
while (cc>0) {
cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
cc -= 3;
cp += 3;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
unsigned int cr = cp[0];
unsigned int cg = cp[1];
unsigned int cb = cp[2];
unsigned int ca = cp[3];
cc -= 4;
cp += 4;
while (cc>0) {
cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
cp[3] = (unsigned char) ((ca += cp[3]) & 0xff);
cc -= 4;
cp += 4;
}
} else {
cc -= stride;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] =
(unsigned char) ((cp[stride] + *cp) & 0xff); cp++)
cc -= stride;
} while (cc>0);
}
}
return 1;
}
| 166,884
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void MaybeReportDownloadDeepScanningVerdict(
Profile* profile,
const GURL& url,
const std::string& file_name,
const std::string& download_digest_sha256,
BinaryUploadService::Result result,
DeepScanningClientResponse response) {
if (response.malware_scan_verdict().verdict() ==
MalwareDeepScanningVerdict::UWS ||
response.malware_scan_verdict().verdict() ==
MalwareDeepScanningVerdict::MALWARE) {
extensions::SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouterFactory::GetForProfile(profile)
->OnDangerousDeepScanningResult(url, file_name, download_digest_sha256);
}
}
Commit Message: Add reporting for DLP deep scanning
For each triggered rule in the DLP response, we report the download as
violating that rule.
This also implements the UnsafeReportingEnabled enterprise policy, which
controls whether or not we do any reporting.
Bug: 980777
Change-Id: I48100cfb4dd5aa92ed80da1f34e64a6e393be2fa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1772381
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691371}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void MaybeReportDownloadDeepScanningVerdict(
Profile* profile,
const GURL& url,
const std::string& file_name,
const std::string& download_digest_sha256,
BinaryUploadService::Result result,
DeepScanningClientResponse response) {
if (result != BinaryUploadService::Result::SUCCESS)
return;
if (!g_browser_process->local_state()->GetBoolean(
policy::policy_prefs::kUnsafeEventsReportingEnabled))
return;
if (response.malware_scan_verdict().verdict() ==
MalwareDeepScanningVerdict::UWS ||
response.malware_scan_verdict().verdict() ==
MalwareDeepScanningVerdict::MALWARE) {
extensions::SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouterFactory::GetForProfile(profile)
->OnDangerousDeepScanningResult(url, file_name, download_digest_sha256);
}
if (response.dlp_scan_verdict().status() == DlpDeepScanningVerdict::SUCCESS) {
if (!response.dlp_scan_verdict().triggered_rules().empty()) {
extensions::SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouterFactory::GetForProfile(profile)
->OnSensitiveDataEvent(response.dlp_scan_verdict(), url, file_name,
download_digest_sha256);
}
}
}
| 172,413
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int git_delta_apply(
void **out,
size_t *out_len,
const unsigned char *base,
size_t base_len,
const unsigned char *delta,
size_t delta_len)
{
const unsigned char *delta_end = delta + delta_len;
size_t base_sz, res_sz, alloc_sz;
unsigned char *res_dp;
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
/*
* Check that the base size matches the data we were given;
* if not we would underflow while accessing data from the
* base object, resulting in data corruption or segfault.
*/
if ((hdr_sz(&base_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) || (base_sz != base_len)) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
if (hdr_sz(&res_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloc_sz, res_sz, 1);
res_dp = git__malloc(alloc_sz);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(res_dp);
res_dp[res_sz] = '\0';
*out = res_dp;
*out_len = res_sz;
while (delta < delta_end) {
unsigned char cmd = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x80) {
/* cmd is a copy instruction; copy from the base. */
size_t off = 0, len = 0;
if (cmd & 0x01) off = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x02) off |= *delta++ << 8UL;
if (cmd & 0x04) off |= *delta++ << 16UL;
if (cmd & 0x08) off |= ((unsigned) *delta++ << 24UL);
if (cmd & 0x10) len = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x20) len |= *delta++ << 8UL;
if (cmd & 0x40) len |= *delta++ << 16UL;
if (!len) len = 0x10000;
if (base_len < off + len || res_sz < len)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, base + off, len);
res_dp += len;
res_sz -= len;
} else if (cmd) {
/*
* cmd is a literal insert instruction; copy from
* the delta stream itself.
*/
if (delta_end - delta < cmd || res_sz < cmd)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, delta, cmd);
delta += cmd;
res_dp += cmd;
res_sz -= cmd;
} else {
/* cmd == 0 is reserved for future encodings. */
goto fail;
}
}
if (delta != delta_end || res_sz)
goto fail;
return 0;
fail:
git__free(*out);
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta");
return -1;
}
Commit Message: delta: fix out-of-bounds read of delta
When computing the offset and length of the delta base, we repeatedly
increment the `delta` pointer without checking whether we have advanced
past its end already, which can thus result in an out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by repeatedly checking whether we have reached the end. Add a
test which would cause Valgrind to produce an error.
Reported-by: Riccardo Schirone <rschiron@redhat.com>
Test-provided-by: Riccardo Schirone <rschiron@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
int git_delta_apply(
void **out,
size_t *out_len,
const unsigned char *base,
size_t base_len,
const unsigned char *delta,
size_t delta_len)
{
const unsigned char *delta_end = delta + delta_len;
size_t base_sz, res_sz, alloc_sz;
unsigned char *res_dp;
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
/*
* Check that the base size matches the data we were given;
* if not we would underflow while accessing data from the
* base object, resulting in data corruption or segfault.
*/
if ((hdr_sz(&base_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) || (base_sz != base_len)) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
if (hdr_sz(&res_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloc_sz, res_sz, 1);
res_dp = git__malloc(alloc_sz);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(res_dp);
res_dp[res_sz] = '\0';
*out = res_dp;
*out_len = res_sz;
while (delta < delta_end) {
unsigned char cmd = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x80) {
/* cmd is a copy instruction; copy from the base. */
size_t off = 0, len = 0;
#define ADD_DELTA(o, shift) { if (delta < delta_end) (o) |= ((unsigned) *delta++ << shift); else goto fail; }
if (cmd & 0x01) ADD_DELTA(off, 0UL);
if (cmd & 0x02) ADD_DELTA(off, 8UL);
if (cmd & 0x04) ADD_DELTA(off, 16UL);
if (cmd & 0x08) ADD_DELTA(off, 24UL);
if (cmd & 0x10) ADD_DELTA(len, 0UL);
if (cmd & 0x20) ADD_DELTA(len, 8UL);
if (cmd & 0x40) ADD_DELTA(len, 16UL);
if (!len) len = 0x10000;
#undef ADD_DELTA
if (base_len < off + len || res_sz < len)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, base + off, len);
res_dp += len;
res_sz -= len;
} else if (cmd) {
/*
* cmd is a literal insert instruction; copy from
* the delta stream itself.
*/
if (delta_end - delta < cmd || res_sz < cmd)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, delta, cmd);
delta += cmd;
res_dp += cmd;
res_sz -= cmd;
} else {
/* cmd == 0 is reserved for future encodings. */
goto fail;
}
}
if (delta != delta_end || res_sz)
goto fail;
return 0;
fail:
git__free(*out);
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta");
return -1;
}
| 169,244
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GpuChannel::OnInitialize(base::ProcessHandle renderer_process) {
DCHECK(!renderer_process_);
if (base::GetProcId(renderer_process) == renderer_pid_)
renderer_process_ = renderer_process;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void GpuChannel::OnInitialize(base::ProcessHandle renderer_process) {
| 170,934
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, portIndex);
return updateGraphicBufferInMeta_l(
portIndex, graphicBuffer, buffer, header,
portIndex == kPortIndexOutput /* updateCodecBuffer */);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, portIndex);
return updateGraphicBufferInMeta_l(
portIndex, graphicBuffer, buffer, header,
true /* updateCodecBuffer */);
}
| 174,141
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int Track::Info::CopyStr(char* Info::*str, Info& dst_) const
{
if (str == static_cast<char* Info::*>(NULL))
return -1;
char*& dst = dst_.*str;
if (dst) //should be NULL already
return -1;
const char* const src = this->*str;
if (src == NULL)
return 0;
const size_t len = strlen(src);
dst = new (std::nothrow) char[len+1];
if (dst == NULL)
return -1;
strcpy(dst, src);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
int Track::Info::CopyStr(char* Info::*str, Info& dst_) const
if (src == NULL)
return 0;
const size_t len = strlen(src);
dst = new (std::nothrow) char[len + 1];
if (dst == NULL)
return -1;
strcpy(dst, src);
return 0;
}
| 174,254
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: DWORD UnprivilegedProcessDelegate::GetExitCode() {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DWORD exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
if (worker_process_.IsValid()) {
if (!::GetExitCodeProcess(worker_process_, &exit_code)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(INFO)
<< "Failed to query the exit code of the worker process";
exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
}
}
return exit_code;
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
DWORD UnprivilegedProcessDelegate::GetExitCode() {
DWORD UnprivilegedProcessDelegate::GetProcessId() const {
if (worker_process_.IsValid()) {
return ::GetProcessId(worker_process_);
} else {
return 0;
}
}
bool UnprivilegedProcessDelegate::IsPermanentError(int failure_count) const {
// Get exit code of the worker process if it is available.
DWORD exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
if (worker_process_.IsValid()) {
if (!::GetExitCodeProcess(worker_process_, &exit_code)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(INFO)
<< "Failed to query the exit code of the worker process";
exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
}
}
// Stop trying to restart the worker process if it exited due to
// misconfiguration.
return (kMinPermanentErrorExitCode <= exit_code &&
exit_code <= kMaxPermanentErrorExitCode);
}
| 171,545
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool extractPages (const char *srcFileName, const char *destFileName) {
char pathName[1024];
GooString *gfileName = new GooString (srcFileName);
PDFDoc *doc = new PDFDoc (gfileName, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!doc->isOk()) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "Could not extract page(s) from damaged file ('{0:s}')", srcFileName);
return false;
}
if (firstPage == 0 && lastPage == 0) {
firstPage = 1;
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
}
if (lastPage == 0)
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
if (firstPage == 0)
firstPage = 1;
if (firstPage != lastPage && strstr(destFileName, "%d") == NULL) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "'{0:s}' must contain '%%d' if more than one page should be extracted", destFileName);
return false;
}
for (int pageNo = firstPage; pageNo <= lastPage; pageNo++) {
sprintf (pathName, destFileName, pageNo);
GooString *gpageName = new GooString (pathName);
int errCode = doc->savePageAs(gpageName, pageNo);
if ( errCode != errNone) {
delete gpageName;
delete gfileName;
return false;
}
delete gpageName;
}
delete gfileName;
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool extractPages (const char *srcFileName, const char *destFileName) {
char pathName[4096];
GooString *gfileName = new GooString (srcFileName);
PDFDoc *doc = new PDFDoc (gfileName, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!doc->isOk()) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "Could not extract page(s) from damaged file ('{0:s}')", srcFileName);
return false;
}
if (firstPage == 0 && lastPage == 0) {
firstPage = 1;
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
}
if (lastPage == 0)
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
if (firstPage == 0)
firstPage = 1;
if (firstPage != lastPage && strstr(destFileName, "%d") == NULL) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "'{0:s}' must contain '%%d' if more than one page should be extracted", destFileName);
return false;
}
for (int pageNo = firstPage; pageNo <= lastPage; pageNo++) {
snprintf (pathName, sizeof (pathName) - 1, destFileName, pageNo);
GooString *gpageName = new GooString (pathName);
int errCode = doc->savePageAs(gpageName, pageNo);
if ( errCode != errNone) {
delete gpageName;
delete gfileName;
return false;
}
delete gpageName;
}
delete gfileName;
return true;
}
| 164,654
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void php_mcrypt_module_dtor(zend_rsrc_list_entry *rsrc TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_mcrypt *pm = (php_mcrypt *) rsrc->ptr;
if (pm) {
mcrypt_generic_deinit(pm->td);
mcrypt_module_close(pm->td);
efree(pm);
pm = NULL;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static void php_mcrypt_module_dtor(zend_rsrc_list_entry *rsrc TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_mcrypt *pm = (php_mcrypt *) rsrc->ptr;
if (pm) {
mcrypt_generic_deinit(pm->td);
mcrypt_module_close(pm->td);
efree(pm);
pm = NULL;
}
}
/* }}} */
| 167,114
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PowerLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetPowerLibrary() {
return power_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
PowerLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetPowerLibrary() {
| 170,628
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long Cluster::CreateBlock(
long long id,
long long pos, //absolute pos of payload
long long size,
long long discard_padding)
{
assert((id == 0x20) || (id == 0x23)); //BlockGroup or SimpleBlock
if (m_entries_count < 0) //haven't parsed anything yet
{
assert(m_entries == NULL);
assert(m_entries_size == 0);
m_entries_size = 1024;
m_entries = new BlockEntry*[m_entries_size];
m_entries_count = 0;
}
else
{
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count <= m_entries_size);
if (m_entries_count >= m_entries_size)
{
const long entries_size = 2 * m_entries_size;
BlockEntry** const entries = new BlockEntry*[entries_size];
assert(entries);
BlockEntry** src = m_entries;
BlockEntry** const src_end = src + m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** dst = entries;
while (src != src_end)
*dst++ = *src++;
delete[] m_entries;
m_entries = entries;
m_entries_size = entries_size;
}
}
if (id == 0x20) //BlockGroup ID
return CreateBlockGroup(pos, size, discard_padding);
else //SimpleBlock ID
return CreateSimpleBlock(pos, size);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long Cluster::CreateBlock(
if (status < 0) { // error
pFirst = NULL;
return status;
}
if (m_entries_count <= 0) { // empty cluster
pFirst = NULL;
return 0;
}
}
assert(m_entries);
pFirst = m_entries[0];
assert(pFirst);
return 0; // success
}
| 174,257
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: char *suhosin_encrypt_single_cookie(char *name, int name_len, char *value, int value_len, char *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buffer[4096];
char buffer2[4096];
char *buf = buffer, *buf2 = buffer2, *d, *d_url;
int l;
if (name_len > sizeof(buffer)-2) {
buf = estrndup(name, name_len);
} else {
memcpy(buf, name, name_len);
buf[name_len] = 0;
}
name_len = php_url_decode(buf, name_len);
normalize_varname(buf);
name_len = strlen(buf);
if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist)) {
if (zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
encrypt_return_plain:
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
return estrndup(value, value_len);
}
} else if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist)) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
goto encrypt_return_plain;
}
}
if (strlen(value) <= sizeof(buffer2)-2) {
memcpy(buf2, value, value_len);
buf2[value_len] = 0;
} else {
buf2 = estrndup(value, value_len);
}
value_len = php_url_decode(buf2, value_len);
d = suhosin_encrypt_string(buf2, value_len, buf, name_len, key TSRMLS_CC);
d_url = php_url_encode(d, strlen(d), &l);
efree(d);
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
if (buf2 != buffer2) {
efree(buf2);
}
return d_url;
}
Commit Message: Fixed stack based buffer overflow in transparent cookie encryption (see separate advisory)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
char *suhosin_encrypt_single_cookie(char *name, int name_len, char *value, int value_len, char *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
char *buf, *buf2, *d, *d_url;
int l;
buf = estrndup(name, name_len);
name_len = php_url_decode(buf, name_len);
normalize_varname(buf);
name_len = strlen(buf);
if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist)) {
if (zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
encrypt_return_plain:
efree(buf);
return estrndup(value, value_len);
}
} else if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist)) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
goto encrypt_return_plain;
}
}
buf2 = estrndup(value, value_len);
value_len = php_url_decode(buf2, value_len);
d = suhosin_encrypt_string(buf2, value_len, buf, name_len, key TSRMLS_CC);
d_url = php_url_encode(d, strlen(d), &l);
efree(d);
efree(buf);
efree(buf2);
return d_url;
}
| 165,650
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void mpage_put_bnr_to_bhs(struct mpage_da_data *mpd, sector_t logical,
struct buffer_head *exbh)
{
struct inode *inode = mpd->inode;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
int blocks = exbh->b_size >> inode->i_blkbits;
sector_t pblock = exbh->b_blocknr, cur_logical;
struct buffer_head *head, *bh;
pgoff_t index, end;
struct pagevec pvec;
int nr_pages, i;
index = logical >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
end = (logical + blocks - 1) >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
cur_logical = index << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
pagevec_init(&pvec, 0);
while (index <= end) {
/* XXX: optimize tail */
nr_pages = pagevec_lookup(&pvec, mapping, index, PAGEVEC_SIZE);
if (nr_pages == 0)
break;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
index = page->index;
if (index > end)
break;
index++;
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
BUG_ON(PageWriteback(page));
BUG_ON(!page_has_buffers(page));
bh = page_buffers(page);
head = bh;
/* skip blocks out of the range */
do {
if (cur_logical >= logical)
break;
cur_logical++;
} while ((bh = bh->b_this_page) != head);
do {
if (cur_logical >= logical + blocks)
break;
if (buffer_delay(bh) ||
buffer_unwritten(bh)) {
BUG_ON(bh->b_bdev != inode->i_sb->s_bdev);
if (buffer_delay(bh)) {
clear_buffer_delay(bh);
bh->b_blocknr = pblock;
} else {
/*
* unwritten already should have
* blocknr assigned. Verify that
*/
clear_buffer_unwritten(bh);
BUG_ON(bh->b_blocknr != pblock);
}
} else if (buffer_mapped(bh))
BUG_ON(bh->b_blocknr != pblock);
cur_logical++;
pblock++;
} while ((bh = bh->b_this_page) != head);
}
pagevec_release(&pvec);
}
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
|
static void mpage_put_bnr_to_bhs(struct mpage_da_data *mpd, sector_t logical,
struct buffer_head *exbh)
{
struct inode *inode = mpd->inode;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
int blocks = exbh->b_size >> inode->i_blkbits;
sector_t pblock = exbh->b_blocknr, cur_logical;
struct buffer_head *head, *bh;
pgoff_t index, end;
struct pagevec pvec;
int nr_pages, i;
index = logical >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
end = (logical + blocks - 1) >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
cur_logical = index << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
pagevec_init(&pvec, 0);
while (index <= end) {
/* XXX: optimize tail */
nr_pages = pagevec_lookup(&pvec, mapping, index, PAGEVEC_SIZE);
if (nr_pages == 0)
break;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
index = page->index;
if (index > end)
break;
index++;
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
BUG_ON(PageWriteback(page));
BUG_ON(!page_has_buffers(page));
bh = page_buffers(page);
head = bh;
/* skip blocks out of the range */
do {
if (cur_logical >= logical)
break;
cur_logical++;
} while ((bh = bh->b_this_page) != head);
do {
if (cur_logical >= logical + blocks)
break;
if (buffer_delay(bh) ||
buffer_unwritten(bh)) {
BUG_ON(bh->b_bdev != inode->i_sb->s_bdev);
if (buffer_delay(bh)) {
clear_buffer_delay(bh);
bh->b_blocknr = pblock;
} else {
/*
* unwritten already should have
* blocknr assigned. Verify that
*/
clear_buffer_unwritten(bh);
BUG_ON(bh->b_blocknr != pblock);
}
} else if (buffer_mapped(bh))
BUG_ON(bh->b_blocknr != pblock);
if (buffer_uninit(exbh))
set_buffer_uninit(bh);
cur_logical++;
pblock++;
} while ((bh = bh->b_this_page) != head);
}
pagevec_release(&pvec);
}
}
| 167,552
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: _PUBLIC_ char *strupper_talloc_n_handle(struct smb_iconv_handle *iconv_handle,
TALLOC_CTX *ctx, const char *src, size_t n)
{
size_t size=0;
char *dest;
if (!src) {
return NULL;
}
/* this takes advantage of the fact that upper/lower can't
change the length of a character by more than 1 byte */
dest = talloc_array(ctx, char, 2*(n+1));
if (dest == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
while (n-- && *src) {
size_t c_size;
codepoint_t c = next_codepoint_handle(iconv_handle, src, &c_size);
src += c_size;
c = toupper_m(c);
c_size = push_codepoint_handle(iconv_handle, dest+size, c);
if (c_size == -1) {
talloc_free(dest);
return NULL;
}
size += c_size;
}
dest[size] = 0;
/* trim it so talloc_append_string() works */
dest = talloc_realloc(ctx, dest, char, size+1);
talloc_set_name_const(dest, dest);
return dest;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
_PUBLIC_ char *strupper_talloc_n_handle(struct smb_iconv_handle *iconv_handle,
TALLOC_CTX *ctx, const char *src, size_t n)
{
size_t size=0;
char *dest;
if (!src) {
return NULL;
}
/* this takes advantage of the fact that upper/lower can't
change the length of a character by more than 1 byte */
dest = talloc_array(ctx, char, 2*(n+1));
if (dest == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
while (n-- && *src) {
size_t c_size;
codepoint_t c = next_codepoint_handle_ext(iconv_handle, src, n,
CH_UNIX, &c_size);
src += c_size;
c = toupper_m(c);
c_size = push_codepoint_handle(iconv_handle, dest+size, c);
if (c_size == -1) {
talloc_free(dest);
return NULL;
}
size += c_size;
}
dest[size] = 0;
/* trim it so talloc_append_string() works */
dest = talloc_realloc(ctx, dest, char, size+1);
talloc_set_name_const(dest, dest);
return dest;
}
| 164,672
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: standard_display_init(standard_display *dp, png_store* ps, png_uint_32 id,
int do_interlace, int use_update_info)
{
memset(dp, 0, sizeof *dp);
dp->ps = ps;
dp->colour_type = COL_FROM_ID(id);
dp->bit_depth = DEPTH_FROM_ID(id);
if (dp->bit_depth < 1 || dp->bit_depth > 16)
internal_error(ps, "internal: bad bit depth");
if (dp->colour_type == 3)
dp->red_sBIT = dp->blue_sBIT = dp->green_sBIT = dp->alpha_sBIT = 8;
else
dp->red_sBIT = dp->blue_sBIT = dp->green_sBIT = dp->alpha_sBIT =
dp->bit_depth;
dp->interlace_type = INTERLACE_FROM_ID(id);
check_interlace_type(dp->interlace_type);
dp->id = id;
/* All the rest are filled in after the read_info: */
dp->w = 0;
dp->h = 0;
dp->npasses = 0;
dp->pixel_size = 0;
dp->bit_width = 0;
dp->cbRow = 0;
dp->do_interlace = do_interlace;
dp->is_transparent = 0;
dp->speed = ps->speed;
dp->use_update_info = use_update_info;
dp->npalette = 0;
/* Preset the transparent color to black: */
memset(&dp->transparent, 0, sizeof dp->transparent);
/* Preset the palette to full intensity/opaque througout: */
memset(dp->palette, 0xff, sizeof dp->palette);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
standard_display_init(standard_display *dp, png_store* ps, png_uint_32 id,
int do_interlace, int use_update_info)
{
memset(dp, 0, sizeof *dp);
dp->ps = ps;
dp->colour_type = COL_FROM_ID(id);
dp->bit_depth = DEPTH_FROM_ID(id);
if (dp->bit_depth < 1 || dp->bit_depth > 16)
internal_error(ps, "internal: bad bit depth");
if (dp->colour_type == 3)
dp->red_sBIT = dp->blue_sBIT = dp->green_sBIT = dp->alpha_sBIT = 8;
else
dp->red_sBIT = dp->blue_sBIT = dp->green_sBIT = dp->alpha_sBIT =
dp->bit_depth;
dp->interlace_type = INTERLACE_FROM_ID(id);
check_interlace_type(dp->interlace_type);
dp->id = id;
/* All the rest are filled in after the read_info: */
dp->w = 0;
dp->h = 0;
dp->npasses = 0;
dp->pixel_size = 0;
dp->bit_width = 0;
dp->cbRow = 0;
dp->do_interlace = do_interlace;
dp->littleendian = 0;
dp->is_transparent = 0;
dp->speed = ps->speed;
dp->use_update_info = use_update_info;
dp->npalette = 0;
/* Preset the transparent color to black: */
memset(&dp->transparent, 0, sizeof dp->transparent);
/* Preset the palette to full intensity/opaque througout: */
memset(dp->palette, 0xff, sizeof dp->palette);
}
| 173,697
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static spl_filesystem_object * spl_filesystem_object_create_type(int ht, spl_filesystem_object *source, int type, zend_class_entry *ce, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
zend_bool use_include_path = 0;
zval *arg1, *arg2;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
switch (source->type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
case SPL_FS_FILE:
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
if (!source->u.dir.entry.d_name[0]) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Could not open file");
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return NULL;
}
}
switch (type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
ce = ce ? ce : source->info_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(source TSRMLS_CC);
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileInfo) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, source->file_name, source->file_name_len, 1);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
} else {
intern->file_name = estrndup(source->file_name, source->file_name_len);
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->_path = spl_filesystem_object_get_path(source, &intern->_path_len TSRMLS_CC);
intern->_path = estrndup(intern->_path, intern->_path_len);
}
break;
case SPL_FS_FILE:
ce = ce ? ce : source->file_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(source TSRMLS_CC);
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileObject) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg2);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, source->file_name, source->file_name_len, 1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg2, "r", 1, 1);
zend_call_method_with_2_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1, arg2);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg2);
} else {
intern->file_name = source->file_name;
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->_path = spl_filesystem_object_get_path(source, &intern->_path_len TSRMLS_CC);
intern->_path = estrndup(intern->_path, intern->_path_len);
intern->u.file.open_mode = "r";
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 1;
if (ht && zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|sbr",
&intern->u.file.open_mode, &intern->u.file.open_mode_len,
&use_include_path, &intern->u.file.zcontext) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->file_name = NULL;
zval_dtor(return_value);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_NULL;
return NULL;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_open(intern, use_include_path, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(return_value);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_NULL;
return NULL;
}
}
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Operation not supported");
return NULL;
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return NULL;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static spl_filesystem_object * spl_filesystem_object_create_type(int ht, spl_filesystem_object *source, int type, zend_class_entry *ce, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
zend_bool use_include_path = 0;
zval *arg1, *arg2;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
switch (source->type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
case SPL_FS_FILE:
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
if (!source->u.dir.entry.d_name[0]) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Could not open file");
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return NULL;
}
}
switch (type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
ce = ce ? ce : source->info_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(source TSRMLS_CC);
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileInfo) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, source->file_name, source->file_name_len, 1);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
} else {
intern->file_name = estrndup(source->file_name, source->file_name_len);
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->_path = spl_filesystem_object_get_path(source, &intern->_path_len TSRMLS_CC);
intern->_path = estrndup(intern->_path, intern->_path_len);
}
break;
case SPL_FS_FILE:
ce = ce ? ce : source->file_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(source TSRMLS_CC);
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileObject) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg2);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, source->file_name, source->file_name_len, 1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg2, "r", 1, 1);
zend_call_method_with_2_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1, arg2);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg2);
} else {
intern->file_name = source->file_name;
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->_path = spl_filesystem_object_get_path(source, &intern->_path_len TSRMLS_CC);
intern->_path = estrndup(intern->_path, intern->_path_len);
intern->u.file.open_mode = "r";
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 1;
if (ht && zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|sbr",
&intern->u.file.open_mode, &intern->u.file.open_mode_len,
&use_include_path, &intern->u.file.zcontext) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->file_name = NULL;
zval_dtor(return_value);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_NULL;
return NULL;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_open(intern, use_include_path, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(return_value);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_NULL;
return NULL;
}
}
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Operation not supported");
return NULL;
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return NULL;
} /* }}} */
| 167,082
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void _xml_unparsedEntityDeclHandler(void *userData,
const XML_Char *entityName,
const XML_Char *base,
const XML_Char *systemId,
const XML_Char *publicId,
const XML_Char *notationName)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
if (parser && parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler) {
zval *retval, *args[6];
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(entityName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[2] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(base, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[3] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(systemId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[4] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(publicId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[5] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(notationName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler, parser->unparsedEntityDeclPtr, 6, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void _xml_unparsedEntityDeclHandler(void *userData,
void _xml_unparsedEntityDeclHandler(void *userData,
const XML_Char *entityName,
const XML_Char *base,
const XML_Char *systemId,
const XML_Char *publicId,
const XML_Char *notationName)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
if (parser && parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler) {
zval *retval, *args[6];
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(entityName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[2] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(base, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[3] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(systemId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[4] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(publicId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[5] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(notationName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler, parser->unparsedEntityDeclPtr, 6, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
}
| 165,043
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnAllowBindings(int enabled_bindings_flags) {
enabled_bindings_ |= enabled_bindings_flags;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void RenderViewImpl::OnAllowBindings(int enabled_bindings_flags) {
enabled_bindings_ |= enabled_bindings_flags;
// Keep track of the total bindings accumulated in this process.
RenderProcess::current()->AddBindings(enabled_bindings_flags);
}
| 171,018
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int ff_amf_get_field_value(const uint8_t *data, const uint8_t *data_end,
const uint8_t *name, uint8_t *dst, int dst_size)
{
int namelen = strlen(name);
int len;
while (*data != AMF_DATA_TYPE_OBJECT && data < data_end) {
len = ff_amf_tag_size(data, data_end);
if (len < 0)
len = data_end - data;
data += len;
}
if (data_end - data < 3)
return -1;
data++;
for (;;) {
int size = bytestream_get_be16(&data);
if (!size)
break;
if (size < 0 || size >= data_end - data)
return -1;
data += size;
if (size == namelen && !memcmp(data-size, name, namelen)) {
switch (*data++) {
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_NUMBER:
snprintf(dst, dst_size, "%g", av_int2double(AV_RB64(data)));
break;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_BOOL:
snprintf(dst, dst_size, "%s", *data ? "true" : "false");
break;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_STRING:
len = bytestream_get_be16(&data);
av_strlcpy(dst, data, FFMIN(len+1, dst_size));
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
len = ff_amf_tag_size(data, data_end);
if (len < 0 || len >= data_end - data)
return -1;
data += len;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rtmppkt: Convert ff_amf_get_field_value() to bytestream2
Fixes: out of array accesses
Found-by: JunDong Xie of Ant-financial Light-Year Security Lab
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
int ff_amf_get_field_value(const uint8_t *data, const uint8_t *data_end,
static int amf_get_field_value2(GetByteContext *gb,
const uint8_t *name, uint8_t *dst, int dst_size)
{
int namelen = strlen(name);
int len;
while (bytestream2_peek_byte(gb) != AMF_DATA_TYPE_OBJECT && bytestream2_get_bytes_left(gb) > 0) {
int ret = amf_tag_skip(gb);
if (ret < 0)
return -1;
}
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(gb) < 3)
return -1;
bytestream2_get_byte(gb);
for (;;) {
int size = bytestream2_get_be16(gb);
if (!size)
break;
if (size < 0 || size >= bytestream2_get_bytes_left(gb))
return -1;
bytestream2_skip(gb, size);
if (size == namelen && !memcmp(gb->buffer-size, name, namelen)) {
switch (bytestream2_get_byte(gb)) {
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_NUMBER:
snprintf(dst, dst_size, "%g", av_int2double(bytestream2_get_be64(gb)));
break;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_BOOL:
snprintf(dst, dst_size, "%s", bytestream2_get_byte(gb) ? "true" : "false");
break;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_STRING:
len = bytestream2_get_be16(gb);
if (dst_size < 1)
return -1;
if (dst_size < len + 1)
len = dst_size - 1;
bytestream2_get_buffer(gb, dst, len);
dst[len] = 0;
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
len = amf_tag_skip(gb);
if (len < 0 || bytestream2_get_bytes_left(gb) <= 0)
return -1;
}
return -1;
}
| 168,001
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void php_zip_get_from(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int type) /* {{{ */
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *self = getThis();
struct zip_stat sb;
struct zip_file *zf;
zend_long index = -1;
zend_long flags = 0;
zend_long len = 0;
zend_string *filename;
zend_string *buffer;
int n = 0;
if (!self) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, self);
if (type == 1) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "P|ll", &filename, &len, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
PHP_ZIP_STAT_PATH(intern, ZSTR_VAL(filename), ZSTR_LEN(filename), flags, sb);
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "l|ll", &index, &len, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
PHP_ZIP_STAT_INDEX(intern, index, 0, sb);
}
if (sb.size < 1) {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
if (len < 1) {
len = sb.size;
}
if (index >= 0) {
zf = zip_fopen_index(intern, index, flags);
} else {
zf = zip_fopen(intern, ZSTR_VAL(filename), flags);
}
if (zf == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
buffer = zend_string_alloc(len, 0);
n = zip_fread(zf, ZSTR_VAL(buffer), ZSTR_LEN(buffer));
if (n < 1) {
zend_string_free(buffer);
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
zip_fclose(zf);
ZSTR_VAL(buffer)[n] = '\0';
ZSTR_LEN(buffer) = n;
RETURN_NEW_STR(buffer);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static void php_zip_get_from(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int type) /* {{{ */
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *self = getThis();
struct zip_stat sb;
struct zip_file *zf;
zend_long index = -1;
zend_long flags = 0;
zend_long len = 0;
zend_string *filename;
zend_string *buffer;
int n = 0;
if (!self) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, self);
if (type == 1) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "P|ll", &filename, &len, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
PHP_ZIP_STAT_PATH(intern, ZSTR_VAL(filename), ZSTR_LEN(filename), flags, sb);
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "l|ll", &index, &len, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
PHP_ZIP_STAT_INDEX(intern, index, 0, sb);
}
if (sb.size < 1) {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
if (len < 1) {
len = sb.size;
}
if (index >= 0) {
zf = zip_fopen_index(intern, index, flags);
} else {
zf = zip_fopen(intern, ZSTR_VAL(filename), flags);
}
if (zf == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
buffer = zend_string_safe_alloc(1, len, 0, 0);
n = zip_fread(zf, ZSTR_VAL(buffer), ZSTR_LEN(buffer));
if (n < 1) {
zend_string_free(buffer);
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
zip_fclose(zf);
ZSTR_VAL(buffer)[n] = '\0';
ZSTR_LEN(buffer) = n;
RETURN_NEW_STR(buffer);
}
/* }}} */
| 167,381
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CloudPolicyController::SetState(
CloudPolicyController::ControllerState new_state) {
state_ = new_state;
backend_.reset(); // Discard any pending requests.
base::Time now(base::Time::NowFromSystemTime());
base::Time refresh_at;
base::Time last_refresh(cache_->last_policy_refresh_time());
if (last_refresh.is_null())
last_refresh = now;
bool inform_notifier_done = false;
switch (state_) {
case STATE_TOKEN_UNMANAGED:
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::UNMANAGED,
CloudPolicySubsystem::NO_DETAILS,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
break;
case STATE_TOKEN_UNAVAILABLE:
case STATE_TOKEN_VALID:
refresh_at = now;
break;
case STATE_POLICY_VALID:
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ =
kPolicyRefreshErrorDelayInMilliseconds;
refresh_at =
last_refresh + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(GetRefreshDelay());
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::SUCCESS,
CloudPolicySubsystem::NO_DETAILS,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
break;
case STATE_TOKEN_ERROR:
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR,
CloudPolicySubsystem::BAD_DMTOKEN,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
inform_notifier_done = true;
case STATE_POLICY_ERROR:
if (!inform_notifier_done) {
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR,
CloudPolicySubsystem::POLICY_NETWORK_ERROR,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
}
refresh_at = now + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_);
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ =
std::min(effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ * 2,
policy_refresh_rate_ms_);
break;
case STATE_POLICY_UNAVAILABLE:
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ = policy_refresh_rate_ms_;
refresh_at = now + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_);
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR,
CloudPolicySubsystem::POLICY_NETWORK_ERROR,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
break;
}
scheduler_->CancelDelayedWork();
if (!refresh_at.is_null()) {
int64 delay = std::max<int64>((refresh_at - now).InMilliseconds(), 0);
scheduler_->PostDelayedWork(
base::Bind(&CloudPolicyController::DoWork, base::Unretained(this)),
delay);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void CloudPolicyController::SetState(
CloudPolicyController::ControllerState new_state) {
state_ = new_state;
backend_.reset(); // Stop any pending requests.
base::Time now(base::Time::NowFromSystemTime());
base::Time refresh_at;
base::Time last_refresh(cache_->last_policy_refresh_time());
if (last_refresh.is_null())
last_refresh = now;
bool inform_notifier_done = false;
switch (state_) {
case STATE_TOKEN_UNMANAGED:
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::UNMANAGED,
CloudPolicySubsystem::NO_DETAILS,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
break;
case STATE_TOKEN_UNAVAILABLE:
case STATE_TOKEN_VALID:
refresh_at = now;
break;
case STATE_POLICY_VALID:
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ =
kPolicyRefreshErrorDelayInMilliseconds;
refresh_at =
last_refresh + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(GetRefreshDelay());
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::SUCCESS,
CloudPolicySubsystem::NO_DETAILS,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
break;
case STATE_TOKEN_ERROR:
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR,
CloudPolicySubsystem::BAD_DMTOKEN,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
inform_notifier_done = true;
case STATE_POLICY_ERROR:
if (!inform_notifier_done) {
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR,
CloudPolicySubsystem::POLICY_NETWORK_ERROR,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
}
refresh_at = now + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_);
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ =
std::min(effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ * 2,
policy_refresh_rate_ms_);
break;
case STATE_POLICY_UNAVAILABLE:
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ = policy_refresh_rate_ms_;
refresh_at = now + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_);
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR,
CloudPolicySubsystem::POLICY_NETWORK_ERROR,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
break;
}
scheduler_->CancelDelayedWork();
if (!refresh_at.is_null()) {
int64 delay = std::max<int64>((refresh_at - now).InMilliseconds(), 0);
scheduler_->PostDelayedWork(
base::Bind(&CloudPolicyController::DoWork, base::Unretained(this)),
delay);
}
}
| 170,281
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ProcXFixesSetCursorName(ClientPtr client)
{
CursorPtr pCursor;
char *tchar;
REQUEST(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
REQUEST(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
Atom atom;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
VERIFY_CURSOR(pCursor, stuff->cursor, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
tchar = (char *) &stuff[1];
atom = MakeAtom(tchar, stuff->nbytes, TRUE);
return BadAlloc;
pCursor->name = atom;
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
ProcXFixesSetCursorName(ClientPtr client)
{
CursorPtr pCursor;
char *tchar;
REQUEST(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
REQUEST(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
Atom atom;
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq, stuff->nbytes);
VERIFY_CURSOR(pCursor, stuff->cursor, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
tchar = (char *) &stuff[1];
atom = MakeAtom(tchar, stuff->nbytes, TRUE);
return BadAlloc;
pCursor->name = atom;
return Success;
}
| 165,439
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: LockContentsView::UserState::UserState(AccountId account_id)
: account_id(account_id) {}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
|
LockContentsView::UserState::UserState(AccountId account_id)
| 172,198
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishRequest::EstablishRequest()
: event(false, false),
gpu_process_handle(base::kNullProcessHandle) {
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishRequest::EstablishRequest()
: event(false, false) {
}
| 170,918
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ExtensionService::IsDownloadFromGallery(const GURL& download_url,
const GURL& referrer_url) {
if (IsDownloadFromMiniGallery(download_url) &&
StartsWithASCII(referrer_url.spec(),
extension_urls::kMiniGalleryBrowsePrefix, false)) {
return true;
}
const Extension* download_extension = GetExtensionByWebExtent(download_url);
const Extension* referrer_extension = GetExtensionByWebExtent(referrer_url);
const Extension* webstore_app = GetWebStoreApp();
bool referrer_valid = (referrer_extension == webstore_app);
bool download_valid = (download_extension == webstore_app);
GURL store_url =
GURL(CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kAppsGalleryURL));
if (!store_url.is_empty()) {
std::string store_tld =
net::RegistryControlledDomainService::GetDomainAndRegistry(store_url);
if (!referrer_valid) {
std::string referrer_tld =
net::RegistryControlledDomainService::GetDomainAndRegistry(
referrer_url);
referrer_valid = referrer_url.is_empty() || (referrer_tld == store_tld);
}
if (!download_valid) {
std::string download_tld =
net::RegistryControlledDomainService::GetDomainAndRegistry(
download_url);
download_valid = (download_tld == store_tld);
}
}
return (referrer_valid && download_valid);
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
bool ExtensionService::IsDownloadFromGallery(const GURL& download_url,
const GURL& referrer_url) {
if (IsDownloadFromMiniGallery(download_url) &&
StartsWithASCII(referrer_url.spec(),
extension_urls::kMiniGalleryBrowsePrefix, false)) {
return true;
}
const Extension* download_extension = GetExtensionByWebExtent(download_url);
const Extension* referrer_extension = GetExtensionByWebExtent(referrer_url);
const Extension* webstore_app = GetWebStoreApp();
bool referrer_valid = (referrer_extension == webstore_app);
bool download_valid = (download_extension == webstore_app);
// We also allow the download to be from a small set of trusted paths.
if (!download_valid) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kAllowedDownloadURLPatterns); i++) {
URLPattern pattern(URLPattern::SCHEME_HTTPS,
kAllowedDownloadURLPatterns[i]);
if (pattern.MatchesURL(download_url)) {
download_valid = true;
break;
}
}
}
GURL store_url =
GURL(CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kAppsGalleryURL));
if (!store_url.is_empty()) {
std::string store_tld =
net::RegistryControlledDomainService::GetDomainAndRegistry(store_url);
if (!referrer_valid) {
std::string referrer_tld =
net::RegistryControlledDomainService::GetDomainAndRegistry(
referrer_url);
referrer_valid = referrer_url.is_empty() || (referrer_tld == store_tld);
}
if (!download_valid) {
std::string download_tld =
net::RegistryControlledDomainService::GetDomainAndRegistry(
download_url);
download_valid = (download_tld == store_tld);
}
}
return (referrer_valid && download_valid);
}
| 170,320
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintingDone(bool success) {
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false;
if (!success)
LOG(ERROR) << "Failure in OnPrintingDone";
DidFinishPrinting(success ? OK : FAIL_PRINT);
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
|
void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintingDone(bool success) {
CHECK_LE(ipc_nesting_level_, 1);
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false;
if (!success)
LOG(ERROR) << "Failure in OnPrintingDone";
DidFinishPrinting(success ? OK : FAIL_PRINT);
}
| 171,877
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: gray_render_span( int y,
int count,
const FT_Span* spans,
PWorker worker )
{
unsigned char* p;
FT_Bitmap* map = &worker->target;
/* first of all, compute the scanline offset */
p = (unsigned char*)map->buffer - y * map->pitch;
if ( map->pitch >= 0 )
p += ( map->rows - 1 ) * map->pitch;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, spans++ )
{
unsigned char coverage = spans->coverage;
if ( coverage )
{
/* For small-spans it is faster to do it by ourselves than
* calling `memset'. This is mainly due to the cost of the
* function call.
*/
if ( spans->len >= 8 )
FT_MEM_SET( p + spans->x, (unsigned char)coverage, spans->len );
else
{
unsigned char* q = p + spans->x;
switch ( spans->len )
{
case 7: *q++ = (unsigned char)coverage;
case 6: *q++ = (unsigned char)coverage;
case 5: *q++ = (unsigned char)coverage;
case 4: *q++ = (unsigned char)coverage;
case 3: *q++ = (unsigned char)coverage;
case 2: *q++ = (unsigned char)coverage;
case 1: *q = (unsigned char)coverage;
default:
;
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
gray_render_span( int y,
int count,
const FT_Span* spans,
PWorker worker )
{
unsigned char* p;
FT_Bitmap* map = &worker->target;
/* first of all, compute the scanline offset */
p = (unsigned char*)map->buffer - y * map->pitch;
if ( map->pitch >= 0 )
p += (unsigned)( ( map->rows - 1 ) * map->pitch );
for ( ; count > 0; count--, spans++ )
{
unsigned char coverage = spans->coverage;
if ( coverage )
{
/* For small-spans it is faster to do it by ourselves than
* calling `memset'. This is mainly due to the cost of the
* function call.
*/
if ( spans->len >= 8 )
FT_MEM_SET( p + spans->x, (unsigned char)coverage, spans->len );
else
{
unsigned char* q = p + spans->x;
switch ( spans->len )
{
case 7: *q++ = (unsigned char)coverage;
case 6: *q++ = (unsigned char)coverage;
case 5: *q++ = (unsigned char)coverage;
case 4: *q++ = (unsigned char)coverage;
case 3: *q++ = (unsigned char)coverage;
case 2: *q++ = (unsigned char)coverage;
case 1: *q = (unsigned char)coverage;
default:
;
}
}
}
}
}
| 165,004
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int trigger_fpga_config(void)
{
int ret = 0;
/* if the FPGA is already configured, we do not want to
* reconfigure it */
skip = 0;
if (fpga_done()) {
printf("PCIe FPGA config: skipped\n");
skip = 1;
return 0;
}
if (check_boco2()) {
/* we have a BOCO2, this has to be triggered here */
/* make sure the FPGA_can access the EEPROM */
ret = boco_clear_bits(SPI_REG, CFG_EEPROM);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* trigger the config start */
ret = boco_clear_bits(SPI_REG, FPGA_PROG | FPGA_INIT_B);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* small delay for the pulse */
udelay(10);
/* up signal for pulse end */
ret = boco_set_bits(SPI_REG, FPGA_PROG);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* finally, raise INIT_B to remove the config delay */
ret = boco_set_bits(SPI_REG, FPGA_INIT_B);
if (ret)
return ret;
} else {
/* we do it the old way, with the gpio pin */
kw_gpio_set_valid(KM_XLX_PROGRAM_B_PIN, 1);
kw_gpio_direction_output(KM_XLX_PROGRAM_B_PIN, 0);
/* small delay for the pulse */
udelay(10);
kw_gpio_direction_input(KM_XLX_PROGRAM_B_PIN);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
int trigger_fpga_config(void)
{
int ret = 0;
skip = 0;
#ifndef CONFIG_KM_FPGA_FORCE_CONFIG
/* if the FPGA is already configured, we do not want to
* reconfigure it */
skip = 0;
if (fpga_done()) {
printf("PCIe FPGA config: skipped\n");
skip = 1;
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KM_FPGA_FORCE_CONFIG */
if (check_boco2()) {
/* we have a BOCO2, this has to be triggered here */
/* make sure the FPGA_can access the EEPROM */
ret = boco_clear_bits(SPI_REG, CFG_EEPROM);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* trigger the config start */
ret = boco_clear_bits(SPI_REG, FPGA_PROG | FPGA_INIT_B);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* small delay for the pulse */
udelay(10);
/* up signal for pulse end */
ret = boco_set_bits(SPI_REG, FPGA_PROG);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* finally, raise INIT_B to remove the config delay */
ret = boco_set_bits(SPI_REG, FPGA_INIT_B);
if (ret)
return ret;
} else {
/* we do it the old way, with the gpio pin */
kw_gpio_set_valid(KM_XLX_PROGRAM_B_PIN, 1);
kw_gpio_direction_output(KM_XLX_PROGRAM_B_PIN, 0);
/* small delay for the pulse */
udelay(10);
kw_gpio_direction_input(KM_XLX_PROGRAM_B_PIN);
}
return 0;
}
| 169,627
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: AppCacheDispatcherHost::AppCacheDispatcherHost(
ChromeAppCacheService* appcache_service,
int process_id)
: BrowserMessageFilter(AppCacheMsgStart),
appcache_service_(appcache_service),
frontend_proxy_(this),
process_id_(process_id) {
}
Commit Message: AppCache: Use WeakPtr<> to fix a potential uaf bug.
BUG=554908
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1441683004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359930}
CWE ID:
|
AppCacheDispatcherHost::AppCacheDispatcherHost(
ChromeAppCacheService* appcache_service,
int process_id)
: BrowserMessageFilter(AppCacheMsgStart),
appcache_service_(appcache_service),
frontend_proxy_(this),
process_id_(process_id),
weak_factory_(this) {
}
| 171,744
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ShowExtensionInstallDialogImpl(
ExtensionInstallPromptShowParams* show_params,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::Delegate* delegate,
scoped_refptr<ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt> prompt) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
ExtensionInstallDialogView* dialog =
new ExtensionInstallDialogView(show_params->profile(),
show_params->GetParentWebContents(),
delegate,
prompt);
constrained_window::CreateBrowserModalDialogViews(
dialog, show_params->GetParentWindow())->Show();
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17
|
void ShowExtensionInstallDialogImpl(
ExtensionInstallPromptShowParams* show_params,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::Delegate* delegate,
scoped_refptr<ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt> prompt) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
ExtensionInstallDialogView* dialog =
new ExtensionInstallDialogView(show_params->profile(),
show_params->GetParentWebContents(),
delegate,
prompt);
if (prompt->ShouldUseTabModalDialog()) {
content::WebContents* parent_web_contents =
show_params->GetParentWebContents();
if (parent_web_contents)
constrained_window::ShowWebModalDialogViews(dialog, parent_web_contents);
} else {
constrained_window::CreateBrowserModalDialogViews(
dialog, show_params->GetParentWindow())
->Show();
}
}
| 172,208
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int iwgif_read_image(struct iwgifrcontext *rctx)
{
int retval=0;
struct lzwdeccontext d;
size_t subblocksize;
int has_local_ct;
int local_ct_size;
unsigned int root_codesize;
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,9)) goto done;
rctx->image_left = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[0]);
rctx->image_top = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[2]);
rctx->image_width = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[4]);
rctx->image_height = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[6]);
rctx->interlaced = (int)((rctx->rbuf[8]>>6)&0x01);
has_local_ct = (int)((rctx->rbuf[8]>>7)&0x01);
if(has_local_ct) {
local_ct_size = (int)(rctx->rbuf[8]&0x07);
rctx->colortable.num_entries = 1<<(1+local_ct_size);
}
if(has_local_ct) {
if(!iwgif_read_color_table(rctx,&rctx->colortable)) goto done;
}
if(rctx->has_transparency) {
rctx->colortable.entry[rctx->trans_color_index].a = 0;
}
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,1)) goto done;
root_codesize = (unsigned int)rctx->rbuf[0];
if(root_codesize<2 || root_codesize>11) {
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Invalid LZW minimum code size");
goto done;
}
if(!iwgif_init_screen(rctx)) goto done;
rctx->total_npixels = (size_t)rctx->image_width * (size_t)rctx->image_height;
if(!iwgif_make_row_pointers(rctx)) goto done;
lzw_init(&d,root_codesize);
lzw_clear(&d);
while(1) {
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,1)) goto done;
subblocksize = (size_t)rctx->rbuf[0];
if(subblocksize==0) break;
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,subblocksize)) goto done;
if(!lzw_process_bytes(rctx,&d,rctx->rbuf,subblocksize)) goto done;
if(d.eoi_flag) break;
if(rctx->pixels_set >= rctx->total_npixels) break;
}
retval=1;
done:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a GIF decoding bug (divide by zero)
Fixes issue #15
CWE ID: CWE-369
|
static int iwgif_read_image(struct iwgifrcontext *rctx)
{
int retval=0;
struct lzwdeccontext d;
size_t subblocksize;
int has_local_ct;
int local_ct_size;
unsigned int root_codesize;
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,9)) goto done;
rctx->image_left = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[0]);
rctx->image_top = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[2]);
rctx->image_width = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[4]);
rctx->image_height = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[6]);
if(rctx->image_width<1 || rctx->image_height<1) {
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx, "Invalid image dimensions");
goto done;
}
rctx->interlaced = (int)((rctx->rbuf[8]>>6)&0x01);
has_local_ct = (int)((rctx->rbuf[8]>>7)&0x01);
if(has_local_ct) {
local_ct_size = (int)(rctx->rbuf[8]&0x07);
rctx->colortable.num_entries = 1<<(1+local_ct_size);
}
if(has_local_ct) {
if(!iwgif_read_color_table(rctx,&rctx->colortable)) goto done;
}
if(rctx->has_transparency) {
rctx->colortable.entry[rctx->trans_color_index].a = 0;
}
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,1)) goto done;
root_codesize = (unsigned int)rctx->rbuf[0];
if(root_codesize<2 || root_codesize>11) {
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Invalid LZW minimum code size");
goto done;
}
if(!iwgif_init_screen(rctx)) goto done;
rctx->total_npixels = (size_t)rctx->image_width * (size_t)rctx->image_height;
if(!iwgif_make_row_pointers(rctx)) goto done;
lzw_init(&d,root_codesize);
lzw_clear(&d);
while(1) {
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,1)) goto done;
subblocksize = (size_t)rctx->rbuf[0];
if(subblocksize==0) break;
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,subblocksize)) goto done;
if(!lzw_process_bytes(rctx,&d,rctx->rbuf,subblocksize)) goto done;
if(d.eoi_flag) break;
if(rctx->pixels_set >= rctx->total_npixels) break;
}
retval=1;
done:
return retval;
}
| 168,231
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: modify_policy_2_svc(mpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_MODIFY, NULL, NULL)) {
log_unauth("kadm5_modify_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_modify_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_modify_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
modify_policy_2_svc(mpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_MODIFY, NULL, NULL)) {
log_unauth("kadm5_modify_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_modify_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_modify_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,520
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void SetUpTestCase() {
source_data_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, kDataBlockSize));
reference_data_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, kDataBufferSize));
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void SetUpTestCase() {
source_data8_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, kDataBlockSize));
reference_data8_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, kDataBufferSize));
second_pred8_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, 64*64));
source_data16_ = reinterpret_cast<uint16_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, kDataBlockSize*sizeof(uint16_t)));
reference_data16_ = reinterpret_cast<uint16_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, kDataBufferSize*sizeof(uint16_t)));
second_pred16_ = reinterpret_cast<uint16_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, 64*64*sizeof(uint16_t)));
}
| 174,578
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::DisplayPasskey(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
uint32 passkey,
uint16 entered) {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(device_path == object_path_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": DisplayPasskey: " << passkey
<< " (" << entered << " entered)";
if (entered == 0)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_DISPLAY_PASSKEY,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
if (entered == 0)
pairing_delegate_->DisplayPasskey(this, passkey);
pairing_delegate_->KeysEntered(this, entered);
pairing_delegate_used_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::DisplayPasskey(
| 171,222
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void IBusBusConnectedCallback(IBusBus* bus, gpointer user_data) {
LOG(WARNING) << "IBus connection is recovered.";
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->MaybeRestoreConnections();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void IBusBusConnectedCallback(IBusBus* bus, gpointer user_data) {
void IBusBusConnected(IBusBus* bus) {
LOG(WARNING) << "IBus connection is recovered.";
MaybeRestoreConnections();
}
| 170,536
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CoordinatorImpl::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
const GetVmRegionsForHeapProfilerCallback& callback) {
RequestGlobalMemoryDump(
MemoryDumpType::EXPLICITLY_TRIGGERED,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::VM_REGIONS_ONLY_FOR_HEAP_PROFILER, {}, callback);
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
|
void CoordinatorImpl::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
const GetVmRegionsForHeapProfilerCallback& callback) {
// This merely strips out the |dump_guid| argument.
auto adapter = [](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t dump_guid,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr global_memory_dump) {
callback.Run(success, std::move(global_memory_dump));
};
QueuedRequest::Args args(
MemoryDumpType::EXPLICITLY_TRIGGERED,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::VM_REGIONS_ONLY_FOR_HEAP_PROFILER, {},
false /* add_to_trace */, base::kNullProcessId);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
| 172,914
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::parseAttribute(const QualifiedName& name, const AtomicString& value)
{
if (name == nameAttr) {
removeFromRadioButtonGroup();
m_name = value;
addToRadioButtonGroup();
HTMLTextFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
} else if (name == autocompleteAttr) {
if (equalIgnoringCase(value, "off"))
m_autocomplete = Off;
else {
if (value.isEmpty())
m_autocomplete = Uninitialized;
else
m_autocomplete = On;
}
} else if (name == typeAttr)
updateType();
else if (name == valueAttr) {
if (!hasDirtyValue()) {
updatePlaceholderVisibility(false);
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
}
setFormControlValueMatchesRenderer(false);
setNeedsValidityCheck();
m_valueAttributeWasUpdatedAfterParsing = !m_parsingInProgress;
m_inputType->valueAttributeChanged();
} else if (name == checkedAttr) {
if (!m_parsingInProgress && m_reflectsCheckedAttribute) {
setChecked(!value.isNull());
m_reflectsCheckedAttribute = true;
}
} else if (name == maxlengthAttr)
parseMaxLengthAttribute(value);
else if (name == sizeAttr) {
int oldSize = m_size;
int valueAsInteger = value.toInt();
m_size = valueAsInteger > 0 ? valueAsInteger : defaultSize;
if (m_size != oldSize && renderer())
renderer()->setNeedsLayoutAndPrefWidthsRecalc();
} else if (name == altAttr)
m_inputType->altAttributeChanged();
else if (name == srcAttr)
m_inputType->srcAttributeChanged();
else if (name == usemapAttr || name == accesskeyAttr) {
} else if (name == onsearchAttr) {
setAttributeEventListener(eventNames().searchEvent, createAttributeEventListener(this, name, value));
} else if (name == resultsAttr) {
int oldResults = m_maxResults;
m_maxResults = !value.isNull() ? std::min(value.toInt(), maxSavedResults) : -1;
if (m_maxResults != oldResults && (m_maxResults <= 0 || oldResults <= 0))
lazyReattachIfAttached();
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::ResultsAttribute);
} else if (name == incrementalAttr) {
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::IncrementalAttribute);
} else if (name == minAttr) {
m_inputType->minOrMaxAttributeChanged();
setNeedsValidityCheck();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::MinAttribute);
} else if (name == maxAttr) {
m_inputType->minOrMaxAttributeChanged();
setNeedsValidityCheck();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::MaxAttribute);
} else if (name == multipleAttr) {
m_inputType->multipleAttributeChanged();
setNeedsValidityCheck();
} else if (name == stepAttr) {
m_inputType->stepAttributeChanged();
setNeedsValidityCheck();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::StepAttribute);
} else if (name == patternAttr) {
setNeedsValidityCheck();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::PatternAttribute);
} else if (name == precisionAttr) {
setNeedsValidityCheck();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::PrecisionAttribute);
} else if (name == disabledAttr) {
HTMLTextFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
m_inputType->disabledAttributeChanged();
} else if (name == readonlyAttr) {
HTMLTextFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
m_inputType->readonlyAttributeChanged();
} else if (name == listAttr) {
m_hasNonEmptyList = !value.isEmpty();
if (m_hasNonEmptyList) {
resetListAttributeTargetObserver();
listAttributeTargetChanged();
}
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::ListAttribute);
}
#if ENABLE(INPUT_SPEECH)
else if (name == webkitspeechAttr) {
if (renderer()) {
detach();
m_inputType->destroyShadowSubtree();
m_inputType->createShadowSubtree();
if (!attached())
attach();
} else {
m_inputType->destroyShadowSubtree();
m_inputType->createShadowSubtree();
}
setFormControlValueMatchesRenderer(false);
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::PrefixedSpeechAttribute);
} else if (name == onwebkitspeechchangeAttr)
setAttributeEventListener(eventNames().webkitspeechchangeEvent, createAttributeEventListener(this, name, value));
#endif
else if (name == webkitdirectoryAttr) {
HTMLTextFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::PrefixedDirectoryAttribute);
}
else
HTMLTextFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
m_inputType->attributeChanged();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void HTMLInputElement::parseAttribute(const QualifiedName& name, const AtomicString& value)
{
if (name == nameAttr) {
removeFromRadioButtonGroup();
m_name = value;
addToRadioButtonGroup();
HTMLTextFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
} else if (name == autocompleteAttr) {
if (equalIgnoringCase(value, "off"))
m_autocomplete = Off;
else {
if (value.isEmpty())
m_autocomplete = Uninitialized;
else
m_autocomplete = On;
}
} else if (name == typeAttr)
updateType();
else if (name == valueAttr) {
if (!hasDirtyValue()) {
updatePlaceholderVisibility(false);
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
}
setFormControlValueMatchesRenderer(false);
setNeedsValidityCheck();
m_valueAttributeWasUpdatedAfterParsing = !m_parsingInProgress;
m_inputType->valueAttributeChanged();
} else if (name == checkedAttr) {
if (!m_parsingInProgress && m_reflectsCheckedAttribute) {
setChecked(!value.isNull());
m_reflectsCheckedAttribute = true;
}
} else if (name == maxlengthAttr)
parseMaxLengthAttribute(value);
else if (name == sizeAttr) {
int oldSize = m_size;
int valueAsInteger = value.toInt();
m_size = valueAsInteger > 0 ? valueAsInteger : defaultSize;
if (m_size != oldSize && renderer())
renderer()->setNeedsLayoutAndPrefWidthsRecalc();
} else if (name == altAttr)
m_inputType->altAttributeChanged();
else if (name == srcAttr)
m_inputType->srcAttributeChanged();
else if (name == usemapAttr || name == accesskeyAttr) {
} else if (name == onsearchAttr) {
setAttributeEventListener(eventNames().searchEvent, createAttributeEventListener(this, name, value));
} else if (name == resultsAttr) {
int oldResults = m_maxResults;
m_maxResults = !value.isNull() ? std::min(value.toInt(), maxSavedResults) : -1;
if (m_maxResults != oldResults && (m_maxResults <= 0 || oldResults <= 0))
lazyReattachIfAttached();
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::ResultsAttribute);
} else if (name == incrementalAttr) {
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::IncrementalAttribute);
} else if (name == minAttr) {
m_inputType->minOrMaxAttributeChanged();
setNeedsValidityCheck();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::MinAttribute);
} else if (name == maxAttr) {
m_inputType->minOrMaxAttributeChanged();
setNeedsValidityCheck();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::MaxAttribute);
} else if (name == multipleAttr) {
m_inputType->multipleAttributeChanged();
setNeedsValidityCheck();
} else if (name == stepAttr) {
m_inputType->stepAttributeChanged();
setNeedsValidityCheck();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::StepAttribute);
} else if (name == patternAttr) {
setNeedsValidityCheck();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::PatternAttribute);
} else if (name == precisionAttr) {
setNeedsValidityCheck();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::PrecisionAttribute);
} else if (name == disabledAttr) {
HTMLTextFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
m_inputType->disabledAttributeChanged();
} else if (name == readonlyAttr) {
HTMLTextFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
m_inputType->readonlyAttributeChanged();
} else if (name == listAttr) {
m_hasNonEmptyList = !value.isEmpty();
if (m_hasNonEmptyList) {
resetListAttributeTargetObserver();
listAttributeTargetChanged();
}
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::ListAttribute);
}
#if ENABLE(INPUT_SPEECH)
else if (name == webkitspeechAttr) {
if (renderer()) {
m_inputType->destroyShadowSubtree();
detach();
m_inputType->createShadowSubtree();
if (!attached())
attach();
} else {
m_inputType->destroyShadowSubtree();
m_inputType->createShadowSubtree();
}
setFormControlValueMatchesRenderer(false);
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::PrefixedSpeechAttribute);
} else if (name == onwebkitspeechchangeAttr)
setAttributeEventListener(eventNames().webkitspeechchangeEvent, createAttributeEventListener(this, name, value));
#endif
else if (name == webkitdirectoryAttr) {
HTMLTextFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::PrefixedDirectoryAttribute);
}
else
HTMLTextFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
m_inputType->attributeChanged();
}
| 171,265
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT5(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
ssize_t
j,
y;
MagickSizeType
alpha_bits;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
unsigned char
a0,
a1;
size_t
alpha,
bits,
code,
alpha_code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, Min(4, dds_info->width - x),
Min(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read alpha values (8 bytes) */
a0 = (unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
a1 = (unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
alpha_bits = (MagickSizeType)ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
alpha_bits = alpha_bits | ((MagickSizeType)ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 32);
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickTrue);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (bits >> ((4*j+i)*2)) & 0x3;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
/* Extract alpha value */
alpha_code = (size_t) (alpha_bits >> (3*(4*j+i))) & 0x7;
if (alpha_code == 0)
alpha = a0;
else if (alpha_code == 1)
alpha = a1;
else if (a0 > a1)
alpha = ((8-alpha_code) * a0 + (alpha_code-1) * a1) / 7;
else if (alpha_code == 6)
alpha = 0;
else if (alpha_code == 7)
alpha = 255;
else
alpha = (((6-alpha_code) * a0 + (alpha_code-1) * a1) / 5);
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
alpha));
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
SkipDXTMipmaps(image, dds_info, 16);
return MagickTrue;
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT5(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
ssize_t
j,
y;
MagickSizeType
alpha_bits;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
unsigned char
a0,
a1;
size_t
alpha,
bits,
code,
alpha_code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, MagickMin(4, dds_info->width - x),
MagickMin(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read alpha values (8 bytes) */
a0 = (unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
a1 = (unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
alpha_bits = (MagickSizeType)ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
alpha_bits = alpha_bits | ((MagickSizeType)ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 32);
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickTrue);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (bits >> ((4*j+i)*2)) & 0x3;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
/* Extract alpha value */
alpha_code = (size_t) (alpha_bits >> (3*(4*j+i))) & 0x7;
if (alpha_code == 0)
alpha = a0;
else if (alpha_code == 1)
alpha = a1;
else if (a0 > a1)
alpha = ((8-alpha_code) * a0 + (alpha_code-1) * a1) / 7;
else if (alpha_code == 6)
alpha = 0;
else if (alpha_code == 7)
alpha = 255;
else
alpha = (((6-alpha_code) * a0 + (alpha_code-1) * a1) / 5);
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
alpha));
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
return(SkipDXTMipmaps(image,dds_info,16,exception));
}
| 168,901
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool PPB_ImageData_Impl::Init(PP_ImageDataFormat format,
int width, int height,
bool init_to_zero) {
if (!IsImageDataFormatSupported(format))
return false; // Only support this one format for now.
if (width <= 0 || height <= 0)
return false;
if (static_cast<int64>(width) * static_cast<int64>(height) * 4 >=
std::numeric_limits<int32>::max())
return false; // Prevent overflow of signed 32-bit ints.
format_ = format;
width_ = width;
height_ = height;
return backend_->Init(this, format, width, height, init_to_zero);
}
Commit Message: Security fix: integer overflow on checking image size
Test is left in another CL (codereview.chromiu,.org/11274036) to avoid conflict there. Hope it's fine.
BUG=160926
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11410081
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167882 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
bool PPB_ImageData_Impl::Init(PP_ImageDataFormat format,
int width, int height,
bool init_to_zero) {
if (!IsImageDataFormatSupported(format))
return false; // Only support this one format for now.
if (width <= 0 || height <= 0)
return false;
if (static_cast<int64>(width) * static_cast<int64>(height) >=
std::numeric_limits<int32>::max() / 4)
return false; // Prevent overflow of signed 32-bit ints.
format_ = format;
width_ = width;
height_ = height;
return backend_->Init(this, format, width, height, init_to_zero);
}
| 170,672
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int create_fixed_stream_quirk(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
struct usb_interface *iface,
struct usb_driver *driver,
const struct snd_usb_audio_quirk *quirk)
{
struct audioformat *fp;
struct usb_host_interface *alts;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *altsd;
int stream, err;
unsigned *rate_table = NULL;
fp = kmemdup(quirk->data, sizeof(*fp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fp) {
usb_audio_err(chip, "cannot memdup\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (fp->nr_rates > MAX_NR_RATES) {
kfree(fp);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (fp->nr_rates > 0) {
rate_table = kmemdup(fp->rate_table,
sizeof(int) * fp->nr_rates, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rate_table) {
kfree(fp);
return -ENOMEM;
}
fp->rate_table = rate_table;
}
stream = (fp->endpoint & USB_DIR_IN)
? SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE : SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK;
err = snd_usb_add_audio_stream(chip, stream, fp);
if (err < 0) {
kfree(fp);
kfree(rate_table);
return err;
}
if (fp->iface != get_iface_desc(&iface->altsetting[0])->bInterfaceNumber ||
fp->altset_idx >= iface->num_altsetting) {
kfree(fp);
kfree(rate_table);
return -EINVAL;
}
alts = &iface->altsetting[fp->altset_idx];
altsd = get_iface_desc(alts);
fp->protocol = altsd->bInterfaceProtocol;
if (fp->datainterval == 0)
fp->datainterval = snd_usb_parse_datainterval(chip, alts);
if (fp->maxpacksize == 0)
fp->maxpacksize = le16_to_cpu(get_endpoint(alts, 0)->wMaxPacketSize);
usb_set_interface(chip->dev, fp->iface, 0);
snd_usb_init_pitch(chip, fp->iface, alts, fp);
snd_usb_init_sample_rate(chip, fp->iface, alts, fp, fp->rate_max);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
|
static int create_fixed_stream_quirk(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
struct usb_interface *iface,
struct usb_driver *driver,
const struct snd_usb_audio_quirk *quirk)
{
struct audioformat *fp;
struct usb_host_interface *alts;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *altsd;
int stream, err;
unsigned *rate_table = NULL;
fp = kmemdup(quirk->data, sizeof(*fp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fp) {
usb_audio_err(chip, "cannot memdup\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (fp->nr_rates > MAX_NR_RATES) {
kfree(fp);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (fp->nr_rates > 0) {
rate_table = kmemdup(fp->rate_table,
sizeof(int) * fp->nr_rates, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rate_table) {
kfree(fp);
return -ENOMEM;
}
fp->rate_table = rate_table;
}
stream = (fp->endpoint & USB_DIR_IN)
? SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE : SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK;
err = snd_usb_add_audio_stream(chip, stream, fp);
if (err < 0) {
kfree(fp);
kfree(rate_table);
return err;
}
if (fp->iface != get_iface_desc(&iface->altsetting[0])->bInterfaceNumber ||
fp->altset_idx >= iface->num_altsetting) {
kfree(fp);
kfree(rate_table);
return -EINVAL;
}
alts = &iface->altsetting[fp->altset_idx];
altsd = get_iface_desc(alts);
if (altsd->bNumEndpoints < 1) {
kfree(fp);
kfree(rate_table);
return -EINVAL;
}
fp->protocol = altsd->bInterfaceProtocol;
if (fp->datainterval == 0)
fp->datainterval = snd_usb_parse_datainterval(chip, alts);
if (fp->maxpacksize == 0)
fp->maxpacksize = le16_to_cpu(get_endpoint(alts, 0)->wMaxPacketSize);
usb_set_interface(chip->dev, fp->iface, 0);
snd_usb_init_pitch(chip, fp->iface, alts, fp);
snd_usb_init_sample_rate(chip, fp->iface, alts, fp, fp->rate_max);
return 0;
}
| 167,434
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: struct tcp_sock_t *tcp_open(uint16_t port)
{
struct tcp_sock_t *this = calloc(1, sizeof *this);
if (this == NULL) {
ERR("callocing this failed");
goto error;
}
this->sd = -1;
this->sd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (this->sd < 0) {
ERR("sockect open failed");
goto error;
}
struct sockaddr_in6 addr;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof addr);
addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
addr.sin6_port = htons(port);
addr.sin6_addr = in6addr_any;
if (bind(this->sd,
(struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof addr) < 0) {
if (g_options.only_desired_port == 1)
ERR("Bind on port failed. "
"Requested port may be taken or require root permissions.");
goto error;
}
if (listen(this->sd, HTTP_MAX_PENDING_CONNS) < 0) {
ERR("listen failed on socket");
goto error;
}
return this;
error:
if (this != NULL) {
if (this->sd != -1) {
close(this->sd);
}
free(this);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY FIX: Actually restrict the access to the printer to localhost
Before, any machine in any network connected by any of the interfaces (as
listed by "ifconfig") could access to an IPP-over-USB printer on the assigned
port, allowing users on remote machines to print and to access the web
configuration interface of a IPP-over-USB printer in contrary to conventional
USB printers which are only accessible locally.
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
struct tcp_sock_t *tcp_open(uint16_t port)
{
struct tcp_sock_t *this = calloc(1, sizeof *this);
if (this == NULL) {
ERR("IPv4: callocing this failed");
goto error;
}
// Open [S]ocket [D]escriptor
this->sd = -1;
this->sd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (this->sd < 0) {
ERR("IPv4 socket open failed");
goto error;
}
// Configure socket params
struct sockaddr_in addr;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof addr);
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr.sin_port = htons(port);
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(0x7F000001);
// Bind to localhost
if (bind(this->sd,
(struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof addr) < 0) {
if (g_options.only_desired_port == 1)
ERR("IPv4 bind on port failed. "
"Requested port may be taken or require root permissions.");
goto error;
}
// Let kernel over-accept max number of connections
if (listen(this->sd, HTTP_MAX_PENDING_CONNS) < 0) {
ERR("IPv4 listen failed on socket");
goto error;
}
return this;
error:
if (this != NULL) {
if (this->sd != -1) {
close(this->sd);
}
free(this);
}
return NULL;
}
struct tcp_sock_t *tcp6_open(uint16_t port)
{
struct tcp_sock_t *this = calloc(1, sizeof *this);
if (this == NULL) {
ERR("IPv6: callocing this failed");
goto error;
}
this->sd = -1;
this->sd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (this->sd < 0) {
ERR("Ipv6 socket open failed");
goto error;
}
struct sockaddr_in6 addr;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof addr);
addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
addr.sin6_port = htons(port);
addr.sin6_addr = in6addr_loopback;
if (bind(this->sd,
(struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof addr) < 0) {
if (g_options.only_desired_port == 1)
ERR("IPv6 bind on port failed. "
"Requested port may be taken or require root permissions.");
goto error;
}
if (listen(this->sd, HTTP_MAX_PENDING_CONNS) < 0) {
ERR("IPv6 listen failed on socket");
goto error;
}
return this;
error:
if (this != NULL) {
if (this->sd != -1) {
close(this->sd);
}
free(this);
}
return NULL;
}
| 166,590
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool adapter_enable_disable() {
int error;
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->enable(), adapter_state_changed);
TASSERT(error == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, "Error enabling Bluetooth: %d", error);
TASSERT(adapter_get_state() == BT_STATE_ON, "Adapter did not turn on.");
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->disable(), adapter_state_changed);
TASSERT(error == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, "Error disabling Bluetooth: %d", error);
TASSERT(adapter_get_state() == BT_STATE_OFF, "Adapter did not turn off.");
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool adapter_enable_disable() {
int error;
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->enable(false), adapter_state_changed);
TASSERT(error == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, "Error enabling Bluetooth: %d", error);
TASSERT(adapter_get_state() == BT_STATE_ON, "Adapter did not turn on.");
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->disable(), adapter_state_changed);
TASSERT(error == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, "Error disabling Bluetooth: %d", error);
TASSERT(adapter_get_state() == BT_STATE_OFF, "Adapter did not turn off.");
return true;
}
| 173,556
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void InputMethodChangedHandler(
void* object,
const chromeos::InputMethodDescriptor& current_input_method) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->ChangeCurrentInputMethod(current_input_method);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void InputMethodChangedHandler(
// IBusController override.
virtual void OnCurrentInputMethodChanged(
const input_method::InputMethodDescriptor& current_input_method) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
ChangeCurrentInputMethod(current_input_method);
}
| 170,495
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static ssize_t ucma_process_join(struct ucma_file *file,
struct rdma_ucm_join_mcast *cmd, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_create_id_resp resp;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
struct ucma_multicast *mc;
struct sockaddr *addr;
int ret;
u8 join_state;
if (out_len < sizeof(resp))
return -ENOSPC;
addr = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd->addr;
if (cmd->addr_size != rdma_addr_size(addr))
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else
return -EINVAL;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx_dev(file, cmd->id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
mutex_lock(&file->mut);
mc = ucma_alloc_multicast(ctx);
if (!mc) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err1;
}
mc->join_state = join_state;
mc->uid = cmd->uid;
memcpy(&mc->addr, addr, cmd->addr_size);
ret = rdma_join_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)&mc->addr,
join_state, mc);
if (ret)
goto err2;
resp.id = mc->id;
if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->response),
&resp, sizeof(resp))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err3;
}
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return 0;
err3:
rdma_leave_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &mc->addr);
ucma_cleanup_mc_events(mc);
err2:
mutex_lock(&mut);
idr_remove(&multicast_idr, mc->id);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
list_del(&mc->list);
kfree(mc);
err1:
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@beyondsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
static ssize_t ucma_process_join(struct ucma_file *file,
struct rdma_ucm_join_mcast *cmd, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_create_id_resp resp;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
struct ucma_multicast *mc;
struct sockaddr *addr;
int ret;
u8 join_state;
if (out_len < sizeof(resp))
return -ENOSPC;
addr = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd->addr;
if (cmd->addr_size != rdma_addr_size(addr))
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else
return -EINVAL;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx_dev(file, cmd->id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
mutex_lock(&file->mut);
mc = ucma_alloc_multicast(ctx);
if (!mc) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err1;
}
mc->join_state = join_state;
mc->uid = cmd->uid;
memcpy(&mc->addr, addr, cmd->addr_size);
ret = rdma_join_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)&mc->addr,
join_state, mc);
if (ret)
goto err2;
resp.id = mc->id;
if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->response),
&resp, sizeof(resp))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err3;
}
mutex_lock(&mut);
idr_replace(&multicast_idr, mc, mc->id);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return 0;
err3:
rdma_leave_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &mc->addr);
ucma_cleanup_mc_events(mc);
err2:
mutex_lock(&mut);
idr_remove(&multicast_idr, mc->id);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
list_del(&mc->list);
kfree(mc);
err1:
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
| 169,110
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int WebContentsImpl::DownloadImage(
const GURL& url,
bool is_favicon,
uint32_t max_bitmap_size,
bool bypass_cache,
const WebContents::ImageDownloadCallback& callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
static int next_image_download_id = 0;
const image_downloader::ImageDownloaderPtr& mojo_image_downloader =
GetMainFrame()->GetMojoImageDownloader();
const int download_id = ++next_image_download_id;
if (!mojo_image_downloader) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&WebContents::ImageDownloadCallback::Run,
base::Owned(new ImageDownloadCallback(callback)),
download_id, 400, url, std::vector<SkBitmap>(),
std::vector<gfx::Size>()));
return download_id;
}
image_downloader::DownloadRequestPtr req =
image_downloader::DownloadRequest::New();
req->url = mojo::String::From(url);
req->is_favicon = is_favicon;
req->max_bitmap_size = max_bitmap_size;
req->bypass_cache = bypass_cache;
mojo_image_downloader->DownloadImage(
std::move(req),
base::Bind(&DidDownloadImage, callback, download_id, url));
return download_id;
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
|
int WebContentsImpl::DownloadImage(
const GURL& url,
bool is_favicon,
uint32_t max_bitmap_size,
bool bypass_cache,
const WebContents::ImageDownloadCallback& callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
static int next_image_download_id = 0;
const image_downloader::ImageDownloaderPtr& mojo_image_downloader =
GetMainFrame()->GetMojoImageDownloader();
const int download_id = ++next_image_download_id;
if (!mojo_image_downloader) {
image_downloader::DownloadResultPtr result =
image_downloader::DownloadResult::New();
result->http_status_code = 400;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnDidDownloadImage,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), callback, download_id, url,
base::Passed(&result)));
return download_id;
}
image_downloader::DownloadRequestPtr req =
image_downloader::DownloadRequest::New();
req->url = mojo::String::From(url);
req->is_favicon = is_favicon;
req->max_bitmap_size = max_bitmap_size;
req->bypass_cache = bypass_cache;
mojo_image_downloader->DownloadImage(
std::move(req), base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnDidDownloadImage,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), callback,
download_id, url));
return download_id;
}
| 172,210
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void FrameSelection::MoveRangeSelectionExtent(const IntPoint& contents_point) {
if (ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().IsNone())
return;
SetSelection(
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder(
GetGranularityStrategy()->UpdateExtent(contents_point, frame_))
.SetIsHandleVisible(true)
.Build(),
SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.SetDoNotClearStrategy(true)
.SetSetSelectionBy(SetSelectionBy::kUser)
.Build());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void FrameSelection::MoveRangeSelectionExtent(const IntPoint& contents_point) {
if (ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().IsNone())
return;
SetSelection(
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder(
GetGranularityStrategy()->UpdateExtent(contents_point, frame_))
.Build(),
SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.SetDoNotClearStrategy(true)
.SetSetSelectionBy(SetSelectionBy::kUser)
.SetShouldShowHandle(true)
.Build());
}
| 171,758
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SaveTestFileSystem() {
GDataRootDirectoryProto root;
GDataDirectoryProto* root_dir = root.mutable_gdata_directory();
GDataEntryProto* file_base = root_dir->mutable_gdata_entry();
PlatformFileInfoProto* platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("drive");
platform_info->set_is_directory(true);
GDataFileProto* file = root_dir->add_child_files();
file_base = file->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("File1");
platform_info->set_is_directory(false);
platform_info->set_size(1048576);
GDataDirectoryProto* dir1 = root_dir->add_child_directories();
file_base = dir1->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("Dir1");
platform_info->set_is_directory(true);
file = dir1->add_child_files();
file_base = file->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("File2");
platform_info->set_is_directory(false);
platform_info->set_size(555);
GDataDirectoryProto* dir2 = dir1->add_child_directories();
file_base = dir2->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("SubDir2");
platform_info->set_is_directory(true);
file = dir2->add_child_files();
file_base = file->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("File3");
platform_info->set_is_directory(false);
platform_info->set_size(12345);
std::string serialized_proto;
ASSERT_TRUE(root.SerializeToString(&serialized_proto));
ASSERT_TRUE(!serialized_proto.empty());
FilePath cache_dir_path = profile_->GetPath().Append(
FILE_PATH_LITERAL("GCache/v1/meta/"));
ASSERT_TRUE(file_util::CreateDirectory(cache_dir_path));
const int file_size = static_cast<int>(serialized_proto.length());
ASSERT_EQ(file_util::WriteFile(cache_dir_path.Append("file_system.pb"),
serialized_proto.data(), file_size), file_size);
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void SaveTestFileSystem() {
GDataRootDirectoryProto root;
GDataDirectoryProto* root_dir = root.mutable_gdata_directory();
GDataEntryProto* file_base = root_dir->mutable_gdata_entry();
PlatformFileInfoProto* platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("drive");
file_base->set_resource_id(kGDataRootDirectoryResourceId);
platform_info->set_is_directory(true);
GDataFileProto* file = root_dir->add_child_files();
file_base = file->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("File1");
platform_info->set_is_directory(false);
platform_info->set_size(1048576);
GDataDirectoryProto* dir1 = root_dir->add_child_directories();
file_base = dir1->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("Dir1");
platform_info->set_is_directory(true);
file = dir1->add_child_files();
file_base = file->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("File2");
platform_info->set_is_directory(false);
platform_info->set_size(555);
GDataDirectoryProto* dir2 = dir1->add_child_directories();
file_base = dir2->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("SubDir2");
platform_info->set_is_directory(true);
file = dir2->add_child_files();
file_base = file->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("File3");
platform_info->set_is_directory(false);
platform_info->set_size(12345);
std::string serialized_proto;
ASSERT_TRUE(root.SerializeToString(&serialized_proto));
ASSERT_TRUE(!serialized_proto.empty());
FilePath cache_dir_path = profile_->GetPath().Append(
FILE_PATH_LITERAL("GCache/v1/meta/"));
ASSERT_TRUE(file_util::CreateDirectory(cache_dir_path));
const int file_size = static_cast<int>(serialized_proto.length());
ASSERT_EQ(file_util::WriteFile(cache_dir_path.Append("file_system.pb"),
serialized_proto.data(), file_size), file_size);
}
| 170,776
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AppListController::Init(Profile* initial_profile) {
if (win8::IsSingleWindowMetroMode())
return;
PrefService* prefs = g_browser_process->local_state();
if (prefs->HasPrefPath(prefs::kRestartWithAppList) &&
prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kRestartWithAppList)) {
prefs->SetBoolean(prefs::kRestartWithAppList, false);
AppListController::GetInstance()->
ShowAppListDuringModeSwitch(initial_profile);
}
AppListController::GetInstance();
ScheduleWarmup();
MigrateAppLauncherEnabledPref();
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAppList))
EnableAppList();
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAppList))
DisableAppList();
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void AppListController::Init(Profile* initial_profile) {
if (win8::IsSingleWindowMetroMode())
return;
PrefService* prefs = g_browser_process->local_state();
if (prefs->HasPrefPath(prefs::kRestartWithAppList) &&
prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kRestartWithAppList)) {
prefs->SetBoolean(prefs::kRestartWithAppList, false);
AppListController::GetInstance()->
ShowAppListDuringModeSwitch(initial_profile);
}
// Migrate from legacy app launcher if we are on a non-canary and non-chromium
// build.
#if defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
if (!InstallUtil::IsChromeSxSProcess() &&
!chrome_launcher_support::GetAnyAppHostPath().empty()) {
chrome_launcher_support::InstallationState state =
chrome_launcher_support::GetAppLauncherInstallationState();
if (state == chrome_launcher_support::NOT_INSTALLED) {
// If app_host.exe is found but can't be located in the registry,
// skip the migration as this is likely a developer build.
return;
} else if (state == chrome_launcher_support::INSTALLED_AT_SYSTEM_LEVEL) {
chrome_launcher_support::UninstallLegacyAppLauncher(
chrome_launcher_support::SYSTEM_LEVEL_INSTALLATION);
} else if (state == chrome_launcher_support::INSTALLED_AT_USER_LEVEL) {
chrome_launcher_support::UninstallLegacyAppLauncher(
chrome_launcher_support::USER_LEVEL_INSTALLATION);
}
EnableAppList();
}
#endif
AppListController::GetInstance();
ScheduleWarmup();
MigrateAppLauncherEnabledPref();
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAppList))
EnableAppList();
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAppList))
DisableAppList();
}
| 171,337
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
struct hid_report *report, u8 *data, int size)
{
struct magicmouse_sc *msc = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct input_dev *input = msc->input;
int x = 0, y = 0, ii, clicks = 0, npoints;
switch (data[0]) {
case TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID:
/* Expect four bytes of prefix, and N*9 bytes of touch data. */
if (size < 4 || ((size - 4) % 9) != 0)
return 0;
npoints = (size - 4) / 9;
msc->ntouches = 0;
for (ii = 0; ii < npoints; ii++)
magicmouse_emit_touch(msc, ii, data + ii * 9 + 4);
clicks = data[1];
/* The following bits provide a device specific timestamp. They
* are unused here.
*
* ts = data[1] >> 6 | data[2] << 2 | data[3] << 10;
*/
break;
case MOUSE_REPORT_ID:
/* Expect six bytes of prefix, and N*8 bytes of touch data. */
if (size < 6 || ((size - 6) % 8) != 0)
return 0;
npoints = (size - 6) / 8;
msc->ntouches = 0;
for (ii = 0; ii < npoints; ii++)
magicmouse_emit_touch(msc, ii, data + ii * 8 + 6);
/* When emulating three-button mode, it is important
* to have the current touch information before
* generating a click event.
*/
x = (int)(((data[3] & 0x0c) << 28) | (data[1] << 22)) >> 22;
y = (int)(((data[3] & 0x30) << 26) | (data[2] << 22)) >> 22;
clicks = data[3];
/* The following bits provide a device specific timestamp. They
* are unused here.
*
* ts = data[3] >> 6 | data[4] << 2 | data[5] << 10;
*/
break;
case DOUBLE_REPORT_ID:
/* Sometimes the trackpad sends two touch reports in one
* packet.
*/
magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2, data[1]);
magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2 + data[1],
size - 2 - data[1]);
break;
default:
return 0;
}
if (input->id.product == USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICMOUSE) {
magicmouse_emit_buttons(msc, clicks & 3);
input_report_rel(input, REL_X, x);
input_report_rel(input, REL_Y, y);
} else { /* USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICTRACKPAD */
input_report_key(input, BTN_MOUSE, clicks & 1);
input_mt_report_pointer_emulation(input, true);
}
input_sync(input);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: HID: magicmouse: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that
magicmouse_emit_touch() gets only valid values of raw_id.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <scvitti@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
struct hid_report *report, u8 *data, int size)
{
struct magicmouse_sc *msc = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct input_dev *input = msc->input;
int x = 0, y = 0, ii, clicks = 0, npoints;
switch (data[0]) {
case TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID:
/* Expect four bytes of prefix, and N*9 bytes of touch data. */
if (size < 4 || ((size - 4) % 9) != 0)
return 0;
npoints = (size - 4) / 9;
if (npoints > 15) {
hid_warn(hdev, "invalid size value (%d) for TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID\n",
size);
return 0;
}
msc->ntouches = 0;
for (ii = 0; ii < npoints; ii++)
magicmouse_emit_touch(msc, ii, data + ii * 9 + 4);
clicks = data[1];
/* The following bits provide a device specific timestamp. They
* are unused here.
*
* ts = data[1] >> 6 | data[2] << 2 | data[3] << 10;
*/
break;
case MOUSE_REPORT_ID:
/* Expect six bytes of prefix, and N*8 bytes of touch data. */
if (size < 6 || ((size - 6) % 8) != 0)
return 0;
npoints = (size - 6) / 8;
if (npoints > 15) {
hid_warn(hdev, "invalid size value (%d) for MOUSE_REPORT_ID\n",
size);
return 0;
}
msc->ntouches = 0;
for (ii = 0; ii < npoints; ii++)
magicmouse_emit_touch(msc, ii, data + ii * 8 + 6);
/* When emulating three-button mode, it is important
* to have the current touch information before
* generating a click event.
*/
x = (int)(((data[3] & 0x0c) << 28) | (data[1] << 22)) >> 22;
y = (int)(((data[3] & 0x30) << 26) | (data[2] << 22)) >> 22;
clicks = data[3];
/* The following bits provide a device specific timestamp. They
* are unused here.
*
* ts = data[3] >> 6 | data[4] << 2 | data[5] << 10;
*/
break;
case DOUBLE_REPORT_ID:
/* Sometimes the trackpad sends two touch reports in one
* packet.
*/
magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2, data[1]);
magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2 + data[1],
size - 2 - data[1]);
break;
default:
return 0;
}
if (input->id.product == USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICMOUSE) {
magicmouse_emit_buttons(msc, clicks & 3);
input_report_rel(input, REL_X, x);
input_report_rel(input, REL_Y, y);
} else { /* USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICTRACKPAD */
input_report_key(input, BTN_MOUSE, clicks & 1);
input_mt_report_pointer_emulation(input, true);
}
input_sync(input);
return 1;
}
| 166,379
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int check_line_charstring(void)
{
char *p = line;
while (isspace(*p))
p++;
return (*p == '/' || (p[0] == 'd' && p[1] == 'u' && p[2] == 'p'));
}
Commit Message: Security fixes.
- Don't overflow the small cs_start buffer (reported by Niels
Thykier via the debian tracker (Jakub Wilk), found with a
fuzzer ("American fuzzy lop")).
- Cast arguments to <ctype.h> functions to unsigned char.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int check_line_charstring(void)
{
char *p = line;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *p))
p++;
return (*p == '/' || (p[0] == 'd' && p[1] == 'u' && p[2] == 'p'));
}
| 166,620
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void locationWithExceptionAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* proxyImp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationWithException());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHrefThrows(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void locationWithExceptionAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* proxyImp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<TestNode> imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationWithException());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHrefThrows(cppValue);
}
| 171,684
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: MagickExport int LocaleLowercase(const int c)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(tolower_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(tolower((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
MagickExport int LocaleLowercase(const int c)
{
if (c < 0)
return(c);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(tolower_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(tolower((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
| 169,711
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT1(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
bits;
ssize_t
j,
y;
unsigned char
code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, Min(4, dds_info->width - x),
Min(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickFalse);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (unsigned char) ((bits >> ((j*4+i)*2)) & 0x3);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.a[code]));
if (colors.a[code] && image->matte == MagickFalse)
/* Correct matte */
image->matte = MagickTrue;
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
SkipDXTMipmaps(image, dds_info, 8);
return MagickTrue;
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT1(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
bits;
ssize_t
j,
y;
unsigned char
code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, MagickMin(4, dds_info->width - x),
MagickMin(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickFalse);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (unsigned char) ((bits >> ((j*4+i)*2)) & 0x3);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.a[code]));
if (colors.a[code] && image->matte == MagickFalse)
/* Correct matte */
image->matte = MagickTrue;
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
return(SkipDXTMipmaps(image,dds_info,8,exception));
}
| 168,899
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void start_auth_request(PgSocket *client, const char *username)
{
int res;
PktBuf *buf;
client->auth_user = client->db->auth_user;
/* have to fetch user info from db */
client->pool = get_pool(client->db, client->db->auth_user);
if (!find_server(client)) {
client->wait_for_user_conn = true;
return;
}
slog_noise(client, "Doing auth_conn query");
client->wait_for_user_conn = false;
client->wait_for_user = true;
if (!sbuf_pause(&client->sbuf)) {
release_server(client->link);
disconnect_client(client, true, "pause failed");
return;
}
client->link->ready = 0;
res = 0;
buf = pktbuf_dynamic(512);
if (buf) {
pktbuf_write_ExtQuery(buf, cf_auth_query, 1, username);
res = pktbuf_send_immediate(buf, client->link);
pktbuf_free(buf);
/*
* Should do instead:
* res = pktbuf_send_queued(buf, client->link);
* but that needs better integration with SBuf.
*/
}
if (!res)
disconnect_server(client->link, false, "unable to send login query");
}
Commit Message: Remove too early set of auth_user
When query returns 0 rows (user not found),
this user stays as login user...
Should fix #69.
CWE ID: CWE-287
|
static void start_auth_request(PgSocket *client, const char *username)
{
int res;
PktBuf *buf;
/* have to fetch user info from db */
client->pool = get_pool(client->db, client->db->auth_user);
if (!find_server(client)) {
client->wait_for_user_conn = true;
return;
}
slog_noise(client, "Doing auth_conn query");
client->wait_for_user_conn = false;
client->wait_for_user = true;
if (!sbuf_pause(&client->sbuf)) {
release_server(client->link);
disconnect_client(client, true, "pause failed");
return;
}
client->link->ready = 0;
res = 0;
buf = pktbuf_dynamic(512);
if (buf) {
pktbuf_write_ExtQuery(buf, cf_auth_query, 1, username);
res = pktbuf_send_immediate(buf, client->link);
pktbuf_free(buf);
/*
* Should do instead:
* res = pktbuf_send_queued(buf, client->link);
* but that needs better integration with SBuf.
*/
}
if (!res)
disconnect_server(client->link, false, "unable to send login query");
}
| 168,871
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void LauncherView::SetAlignment(ShelfAlignment alignment) {
if (alignment_ == alignment)
return;
alignment_ = alignment;
UpdateFirstButtonPadding();
LayoutToIdealBounds();
tooltip_->SetArrowLocation(alignment_);
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void LauncherView::SetAlignment(ShelfAlignment alignment) {
if (alignment_ == alignment)
return;
alignment_ = alignment;
UpdateFirstButtonPadding();
LayoutToIdealBounds();
tooltip_->SetArrowLocation(alignment_);
if (overflow_bubble_.get())
overflow_bubble_->Hide();
}
| 170,895
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Editor::Transpose() {
if (!CanEdit())
//// TODO(yosin): We should move |Transpose()| into |ExecuteTranspose()| in
//// "EditorCommand.cpp"
return;
GetFrame().GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(GetFrame());
if (range.IsNull())
return;
const String& text = PlainText(range);
if (text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& transposed = text.Right(1) + text.Left(1);
if (DispatchBeforeInputInsertText(
EventTargetNodeForDocument(GetFrame().GetDocument()), transposed,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose,
new StaticRangeVector(1, StaticRange::Create(range))) !=
DispatchEventResult::kNotCanceled)
return;
if (frame_->GetDocument()->GetFrame() != frame_)
return;
GetFrame().GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& new_range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(GetFrame());
if (new_range.IsNull())
return;
const String& new_text = PlainText(new_range);
if (new_text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& new_transposed = new_text.Right(1) + new_text.Left(1);
const SelectionInDOMTree& new_selection =
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder().SetBaseAndExtent(new_range).Build();
if (CreateVisibleSelection(new_selection) !=
GetFrame().Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree())
GetFrame().Selection().SetSelection(new_selection);
ReplaceSelectionWithText(new_transposed, false, false,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
|
void Editor::Transpose() {
//// TODO(yosin): We should move |Transpose()| into |ExecuteTranspose()| in
//// "EditorCommand.cpp"
void Transpose(LocalFrame& frame) {
Editor& editor = frame.GetEditor();
if (!editor.CanEdit())
return;
Document* const document = frame.GetDocument();
document->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(frame);
if (range.IsNull())
return;
const String& text = PlainText(range);
if (text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& transposed = text.Right(1) + text.Left(1);
if (DispatchBeforeInputInsertText(
EventTargetNodeForDocument(document), transposed,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose,
new StaticRangeVector(1, StaticRange::Create(range))) !=
DispatchEventResult::kNotCanceled)
return;
// 'beforeinput' event handler may destroy document->
if (frame.GetDocument() != document)
return;
document->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& new_range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(frame);
if (new_range.IsNull())
return;
const String& new_text = PlainText(new_range);
if (new_text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& new_transposed = new_text.Right(1) + new_text.Left(1);
const SelectionInDOMTree& new_selection =
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder().SetBaseAndExtent(new_range).Build();
if (CreateVisibleSelection(new_selection) !=
frame.Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree())
frame.Selection().SetSelection(new_selection);
editor.ReplaceSelectionWithText(new_transposed, false, false,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose);
}
| 172,011
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SoftAVC::drainOneOutputBuffer(int32_t picId, uint8_t* data) {
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = mPicToHeaderMap.valueFor(picId);
outHeader->nTimeStamp = header->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nFlags = header->nFlags;
outHeader->nFilledLen = mWidth * mHeight * 3 / 2;
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset;
const uint8_t *srcY = data;
const uint8_t *srcU = srcY + mWidth * mHeight;
const uint8_t *srcV = srcU + mWidth * mHeight / 4;
size_t srcYStride = mWidth;
size_t srcUStride = mWidth / 2;
size_t srcVStride = srcUStride;
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
mPicToHeaderMap.removeItem(picId);
delete header;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (h263|h264)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I0fd599b3da431425d89236ffdd9df423c11947c0
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void SoftAVC::drainOneOutputBuffer(int32_t picId, uint8_t* data) {
bool SoftAVC::drainOneOutputBuffer(int32_t picId, uint8_t* data) {
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
OMX_U32 frameSize = mWidth * mHeight * 3 / 2;
if (outHeader->nAllocLen - outHeader->nOffset < frameSize) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27833616");
return false;
}
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = mPicToHeaderMap.valueFor(picId);
outHeader->nTimeStamp = header->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nFlags = header->nFlags;
outHeader->nFilledLen = frameSize;
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset;
const uint8_t *srcY = data;
const uint8_t *srcU = srcY + mWidth * mHeight;
const uint8_t *srcV = srcU + mWidth * mHeight / 4;
size_t srcYStride = mWidth;
size_t srcUStride = mWidth / 2;
size_t srcVStride = srcUStride;
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
mPicToHeaderMap.removeItem(picId);
delete header;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return true;
}
| 174,177
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_@_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_png_set_@_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
| 173,601
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool PermissionsRemoveFunction::RunImpl() {
scoped_ptr<Remove::Params> params(Remove::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> permissions =
helpers::UnpackPermissionSet(params->permissions, &error_);
if (!permissions.get())
return false;
const extensions::Extension* extension = GetExtension();
APIPermissionSet apis = permissions->apis();
for (APIPermissionSet::const_iterator i = apis.begin();
i != apis.end(); ++i) {
if (!i->info()->supports_optional()) {
error_ = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kNotWhitelistedError, i->name());
return false;
}
}
const PermissionSet* required = extension->required_permission_set();
scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> intersection(
PermissionSet::CreateIntersection(permissions.get(), required));
if (!intersection->IsEmpty()) {
error_ = kCantRemoveRequiredPermissionsError;
results_ = Remove::Results::Create(false);
return false;
}
PermissionsUpdater(profile()).RemovePermissions(extension, permissions.get());
results_ = Remove::Results::Create(true);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
bool PermissionsRemoveFunction::RunImpl() {
scoped_ptr<Remove::Params> params(Remove::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params);
ExtensionPrefs* prefs = ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_prefs();
scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> permissions =
helpers::UnpackPermissionSet(params->permissions,
prefs->AllowFileAccess(extension_->id()),
&error_);
if (!permissions.get())
return false;
const extensions::Extension* extension = GetExtension();
APIPermissionSet apis = permissions->apis();
for (APIPermissionSet::const_iterator i = apis.begin();
i != apis.end(); ++i) {
if (!i->info()->supports_optional()) {
error_ = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kNotWhitelistedError, i->name());
return false;
}
}
const PermissionSet* required = extension->required_permission_set();
scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> intersection(
PermissionSet::CreateIntersection(permissions.get(), required));
if (!intersection->IsEmpty()) {
error_ = kCantRemoveRequiredPermissionsError;
results_ = Remove::Results::Create(false);
return false;
}
PermissionsUpdater(profile()).RemovePermissions(extension, permissions.get());
results_ = Remove::Results::Create(true);
return true;
}
| 171,443
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: MediaRecorder::MediaRecorder(const String16& opPackageName) : mSurfaceMediaSource(NULL)
{
ALOGV("constructor");
const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& service(getMediaPlayerService());
if (service != NULL) {
mMediaRecorder = service->createMediaRecorder(opPackageName);
}
if (mMediaRecorder != NULL) {
mCurrentState = MEDIA_RECORDER_IDLE;
}
doCleanUp();
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
MediaRecorder::MediaRecorder(const String16& opPackageName) : mSurfaceMediaSource(NULL)
{
ALOGV("constructor");
const sp<IMediaPlayerService> service(getMediaPlayerService());
if (service != NULL) {
mMediaRecorder = service->createMediaRecorder(opPackageName);
}
if (mMediaRecorder != NULL) {
mCurrentState = MEDIA_RECORDER_IDLE;
}
doCleanUp();
}
| 173,540
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WebPluginDelegateProxy::SendUpdateGeometry(
bool bitmaps_changed) {
PluginMsg_UpdateGeometry_Param param;
param.window_rect = plugin_rect_;
param.clip_rect = clip_rect_;
param.windowless_buffer0 = TransportDIB::DefaultHandleValue();
param.windowless_buffer1 = TransportDIB::DefaultHandleValue();
param.windowless_buffer_index = back_buffer_index();
param.background_buffer = TransportDIB::DefaultHandleValue();
param.transparent = transparent_;
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
if (bitmaps_changed)
#endif
{
if (transport_stores_[0].dib.get())
CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(transport_stores_[0].dib->handle(),
¶m.windowless_buffer0);
if (transport_stores_[1].dib.get())
CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(transport_stores_[1].dib->handle(),
¶m.windowless_buffer1);
if (background_store_.dib.get())
CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(background_store_.dib->handle(),
¶m.background_buffer);
}
IPC::Message* msg;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (UseSynchronousGeometryUpdates()) {
msg = new PluginMsg_UpdateGeometrySync(instance_id_, param);
} else // NOLINT
#endif
{
msg = new PluginMsg_UpdateGeometry(instance_id_, param);
msg->set_unblock(true);
}
Send(msg);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void WebPluginDelegateProxy::SendUpdateGeometry(
bool bitmaps_changed) {
PluginMsg_UpdateGeometry_Param param;
param.window_rect = plugin_rect_;
param.clip_rect = clip_rect_;
param.windowless_buffer0 = TransportDIB::DefaultHandleValue();
param.windowless_buffer1 = TransportDIB::DefaultHandleValue();
param.windowless_buffer_index = back_buffer_index();
param.background_buffer = TransportDIB::DefaultHandleValue();
param.transparent = transparent_;
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
if (bitmaps_changed)
#endif
{
if (transport_stores_[0].dib.get())
CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(transport_stores_[0].dib->handle(),
¶m.windowless_buffer0,
channel_host_->peer_pid());
if (transport_stores_[1].dib.get())
CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(transport_stores_[1].dib->handle(),
¶m.windowless_buffer1,
channel_host_->peer_pid());
if (background_store_.dib.get())
CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(background_store_.dib->handle(),
¶m.background_buffer,
channel_host_->peer_pid());
}
IPC::Message* msg;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (UseSynchronousGeometryUpdates()) {
msg = new PluginMsg_UpdateGeometrySync(instance_id_, param);
} else // NOLINT
#endif
{
msg = new PluginMsg_UpdateGeometry(instance_id_, param);
msg->set_unblock(true);
}
Send(msg);
}
| 170,956
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void fht16x16_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fht16x16_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void fht16x16_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
void idct16x16_ref(const tran_low_t *in, uint8_t *dest, int stride,
int /*tx_type*/) {
vpx_idct16x16_256_add_c(in, dest, stride);
}
void fht16x16_ref(const int16_t *in, tran_low_t *out, int stride,
int tx_type) {
vp9_fht16x16_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
| 174,530
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: modify_principal_2_svc(mprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->rec.principal, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_MODIFY,
arg->rec.principal, &rp)
|| kadm5int_acl_impose_restrictions(handle->context,
&arg->rec, &arg->mask, rp)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
log_unauth("kadm5_modify_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_modify_principal((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_modify_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
modify_principal_2_svc(mprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->rec.principal, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_MODIFY,
arg->rec.principal, &rp)
|| kadm5int_acl_impose_restrictions(handle->context,
&arg->rec, &arg->mask, rp)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
log_unauth("kadm5_modify_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_modify_principal((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_modify_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,521
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: print_attr_string(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *data, u_int length, u_short attr_code)
{
register u_int i;
ND_TCHECK2(data[0],length);
switch(attr_code)
{
case TUNNEL_PASS:
if (length < 3)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
if (*data && (*data <=0x1F) )
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Tag[%u] ", *data));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Tag[Unused] "));
data++;
length--;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Salt %u ", EXTRACT_16BITS(data)));
data+=2;
length-=2;
break;
case TUNNEL_CLIENT_END:
case TUNNEL_SERVER_END:
case TUNNEL_PRIV_GROUP:
case TUNNEL_ASSIGN_ID:
case TUNNEL_CLIENT_AUTH:
case TUNNEL_SERVER_AUTH:
if (*data <= 0x1F)
{
if (length < 1)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
if (*data)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Tag[%u] ", *data));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Tag[Unused] "));
data++;
length--;
}
break;
case EGRESS_VLAN_NAME:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (0x%02x) ",
tok2str(rfc4675_tagged,"Unknown tag",*data),
*data));
data++;
length--;
break;
}
for (i=0; *data && i < length ; i++, data++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", (*data < 32 || *data > 126) ? '.' : *data));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13032/RADIUS: Check whether a byte exists before testing its value.
Reverse the test in a for loop to test the length before testing whether
we have a null byte.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Clean up other length tests while we're at it.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
print_attr_string(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *data, u_int length, u_short attr_code)
{
register u_int i;
ND_TCHECK2(data[0],length);
switch(attr_code)
{
case TUNNEL_PASS:
if (length < 3)
goto trunc;
if (*data && (*data <=0x1F) )
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Tag[%u] ", *data));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Tag[Unused] "));
data++;
length--;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Salt %u ", EXTRACT_16BITS(data)));
data+=2;
length-=2;
break;
case TUNNEL_CLIENT_END:
case TUNNEL_SERVER_END:
case TUNNEL_PRIV_GROUP:
case TUNNEL_ASSIGN_ID:
case TUNNEL_CLIENT_AUTH:
case TUNNEL_SERVER_AUTH:
if (*data <= 0x1F)
{
if (length < 1)
goto trunc;
if (*data)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Tag[%u] ", *data));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Tag[Unused] "));
data++;
length--;
}
break;
case EGRESS_VLAN_NAME:
if (length < 1)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (0x%02x) ",
tok2str(rfc4675_tagged,"Unknown tag",*data),
*data));
data++;
length--;
break;
}
for (i=0; i < length && *data; i++, data++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", (*data < 32 || *data > 126) ? '.' : *data));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
| 167,851
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int gs_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct gs_usb *dev;
int rc = -ENOMEM;
unsigned int icount, i;
struct gs_host_config hconf = {
.byte_order = 0x0000beef,
};
struct gs_device_config dconf;
/* send host config */
rc = usb_control_msg(interface_to_usbdev(intf),
usb_sndctrlpipe(interface_to_usbdev(intf), 0),
GS_USB_BREQ_HOST_FORMAT,
USB_DIR_OUT|USB_TYPE_VENDOR|USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
1,
intf->altsetting[0].desc.bInterfaceNumber,
&hconf,
sizeof(hconf),
1000);
if (rc < 0) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Couldn't send data format (err=%d)\n",
rc);
return rc;
}
/* read device config */
rc = usb_control_msg(interface_to_usbdev(intf),
usb_rcvctrlpipe(interface_to_usbdev(intf), 0),
GS_USB_BREQ_DEVICE_CONFIG,
USB_DIR_IN|USB_TYPE_VENDOR|USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
1,
intf->altsetting[0].desc.bInterfaceNumber,
&dconf,
sizeof(dconf),
1000);
if (rc < 0) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Couldn't get device config: (err=%d)\n",
rc);
return rc;
}
icount = dconf.icount + 1;
dev_info(&intf->dev, "Configuring for %d interfaces\n", icount);
if (icount > GS_MAX_INTF) {
dev_err(&intf->dev,
"Driver cannot handle more that %d CAN interfaces\n",
GS_MAX_INTF);
return -EINVAL;
}
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
init_usb_anchor(&dev->rx_submitted);
atomic_set(&dev->active_channels, 0);
usb_set_intfdata(intf, dev);
dev->udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
for (i = 0; i < icount; i++) {
dev->canch[i] = gs_make_candev(i, intf, &dconf);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dev->canch[i])) {
/* save error code to return later */
rc = PTR_ERR(dev->canch[i]);
/* on failure destroy previously created candevs */
icount = i;
for (i = 0; i < icount; i++)
gs_destroy_candev(dev->canch[i]);
usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->rx_submitted);
kfree(dev);
return rc;
}
dev->canch[i]->parent = dev;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: can: gs_usb: Don't use stack memory for USB transfers
Fixes: 05ca5270005c can: gs_usb: add ethtool set_phys_id callback to locate physical device
The gs_usb driver is performing USB transfers using buffers allocated on
the stack. This causes the driver to not function with vmapped stacks.
Instead, allocate memory for the transfer buffers.
Signed-off-by: Ethan Zonca <e@ethanzonca.com>
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # >= v4.8
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int gs_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct gs_usb *dev;
int rc = -ENOMEM;
unsigned int icount, i;
struct gs_host_config *hconf;
struct gs_device_config *dconf;
hconf = kmalloc(sizeof(*hconf), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hconf)
return -ENOMEM;
hconf->byte_order = 0x0000beef;
/* send host config */
rc = usb_control_msg(interface_to_usbdev(intf),
usb_sndctrlpipe(interface_to_usbdev(intf), 0),
GS_USB_BREQ_HOST_FORMAT,
USB_DIR_OUT|USB_TYPE_VENDOR|USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
1,
intf->altsetting[0].desc.bInterfaceNumber,
hconf,
sizeof(*hconf),
1000);
kfree(hconf);
if (rc < 0) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Couldn't send data format (err=%d)\n",
rc);
return rc;
}
dconf = kmalloc(sizeof(*dconf), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dconf)
return -ENOMEM;
/* read device config */
rc = usb_control_msg(interface_to_usbdev(intf),
usb_rcvctrlpipe(interface_to_usbdev(intf), 0),
GS_USB_BREQ_DEVICE_CONFIG,
USB_DIR_IN|USB_TYPE_VENDOR|USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
1,
intf->altsetting[0].desc.bInterfaceNumber,
dconf,
sizeof(*dconf),
1000);
if (rc < 0) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Couldn't get device config: (err=%d)\n",
rc);
kfree(dconf);
return rc;
}
icount = dconf->icount + 1;
dev_info(&intf->dev, "Configuring for %d interfaces\n", icount);
if (icount > GS_MAX_INTF) {
dev_err(&intf->dev,
"Driver cannot handle more that %d CAN interfaces\n",
GS_MAX_INTF);
kfree(dconf);
return -EINVAL;
}
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev) {
kfree(dconf);
return -ENOMEM;
}
init_usb_anchor(&dev->rx_submitted);
atomic_set(&dev->active_channels, 0);
usb_set_intfdata(intf, dev);
dev->udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
for (i = 0; i < icount; i++) {
dev->canch[i] = gs_make_candev(i, intf, dconf);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dev->canch[i])) {
/* save error code to return later */
rc = PTR_ERR(dev->canch[i]);
/* on failure destroy previously created candevs */
icount = i;
for (i = 0; i < icount; i++)
gs_destroy_candev(dev->canch[i]);
usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->rx_submitted);
kfree(dconf);
kfree(dev);
return rc;
}
dev->canch[i]->parent = dev;
}
kfree(dconf);
return 0;
}
| 168,220
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ScriptPromise Bluetooth::requestDevice(ScriptState* script_state,
const RequestDeviceOptions* options,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
ExecutionContext* context = ExecutionContext::From(script_state);
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID) && !defined(OS_MACOSX) && \
!defined(OS_WIN)
context->AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
mojom::ConsoleMessageSource::kJavaScript,
mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kInfo,
"Web Bluetooth is experimental on this platform. See "
"https://github.com/WebBluetoothCG/web-bluetooth/blob/gh-pages/"
"implementation-status.md"));
#endif
CHECK(context->IsSecureContext());
auto& doc = *To<Document>(context);
auto* frame = doc.GetFrame();
if (!frame) {
return ScriptPromise::Reject(
script_state, V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(
script_state->GetIsolate(), "Document not active"));
}
if (!LocalFrame::HasTransientUserActivation(frame)) {
return ScriptPromise::RejectWithDOMException(
script_state,
MakeGarbageCollected<DOMException>(
DOMExceptionCode::kSecurityError,
"Must be handling a user gesture to show a permission request."));
}
if (!service_) {
frame->GetInterfaceProvider().GetInterface(mojo::MakeRequest(
&service_, context->GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kMiscPlatformAPI)));
}
auto device_options = mojom::blink::WebBluetoothRequestDeviceOptions::New();
ConvertRequestDeviceOptions(options, device_options, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return ScriptPromise();
Platform::Current()->RecordRapporURL("Bluetooth.APIUsage.Origin", doc.Url());
auto* resolver = MakeGarbageCollected<ScriptPromiseResolver>(script_state);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->Promise();
service_->RequestDevice(
std::move(device_options),
WTF::Bind(&Bluetooth::RequestDeviceCallback, WrapPersistent(this),
WrapPersistent(resolver)));
return promise;
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
ScriptPromise Bluetooth::requestDevice(ScriptState* script_state,
const RequestDeviceOptions* options,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
ExecutionContext* context = ExecutionContext::From(script_state);
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID) && !defined(OS_MACOSX) && \
!defined(OS_WIN)
context->AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
mojom::ConsoleMessageSource::kJavaScript,
mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kInfo,
"Web Bluetooth is experimental on this platform. See "
"https://github.com/WebBluetoothCG/web-bluetooth/blob/gh-pages/"
"implementation-status.md"));
#endif
CHECK(context->IsSecureContext());
auto& doc = *To<Document>(context);
auto* frame = doc.GetFrame();
if (!frame) {
return ScriptPromise::Reject(
script_state, V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(
script_state->GetIsolate(), "Document not active"));
}
if (!LocalFrame::HasTransientUserActivation(frame)) {
return ScriptPromise::RejectWithDOMException(
script_state,
MakeGarbageCollected<DOMException>(
DOMExceptionCode::kSecurityError,
"Must be handling a user gesture to show a permission request."));
}
EnsureServiceConnection();
auto device_options = mojom::blink::WebBluetoothRequestDeviceOptions::New();
ConvertRequestDeviceOptions(options, device_options, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return ScriptPromise();
Platform::Current()->RecordRapporURL("Bluetooth.APIUsage.Origin", doc.Url());
auto* resolver = MakeGarbageCollected<ScriptPromiseResolver>(script_state);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->Promise();
service_->RequestDevice(
std::move(device_options),
WTF::Bind(&Bluetooth::RequestDeviceCallback, WrapPersistent(this),
WrapPersistent(resolver)));
return promise;
}
| 172,448
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: __xml_acl_post_process(xmlNode * xml)
{
xmlNode *cIter = __xml_first_child(xml);
xml_private_t *p = xml->_private;
if(is_set(p->flags, xpf_created)) {
xmlAttr *xIter = NULL;
/* Always allow new scaffolding, ie. node with no attributes or only an 'id' */
for (xIter = crm_first_attr(xml); xIter != NULL; xIter = xIter->next) {
const char *prop_name = (const char *)xIter->name;
if (strcmp(prop_name, XML_ATTR_ID) == 0) {
/* Delay the acl check */
continue;
} else if(__xml_acl_check(xml, NULL, xpf_acl_write)) {
crm_trace("Creation of %s=%s is allowed", crm_element_name(xml), ID(xml));
break;
} else {
char *path = xml_get_path(xml);
crm_trace("Cannot add new node %s at %s", crm_element_name(xml), path);
if(xml != xmlDocGetRootElement(xml->doc)) {
xmlUnlinkNode(xml);
xmlFreeNode(xml);
}
free(path);
return;
}
}
}
while (cIter != NULL) {
xmlNode *child = cIter;
cIter = __xml_next(cIter); /* In case it is free'd */
__xml_acl_post_process(child);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
__xml_acl_post_process(xmlNode * xml)
{
xmlNode *cIter = __xml_first_child(xml);
xml_private_t *p = xml->_private;
if(is_set(p->flags, xpf_created)) {
xmlAttr *xIter = NULL;
char *path = xml_get_path(xml);
/* Always allow new scaffolding, ie. node with no attributes or only an 'id'
* Except in the ACLs section
*/
for (xIter = crm_first_attr(xml); xIter != NULL; xIter = xIter->next) {
const char *prop_name = (const char *)xIter->name;
if (strcmp(prop_name, XML_ATTR_ID) == 0 && strstr(path, "/"XML_CIB_TAG_ACLS"/") == NULL) {
/* Delay the acl check */
continue;
} else if(__xml_acl_check(xml, NULL, xpf_acl_write)) {
crm_trace("Creation of %s=%s is allowed", crm_element_name(xml), ID(xml));
break;
} else {
crm_trace("Cannot add new node %s at %s", crm_element_name(xml), path);
if(xml != xmlDocGetRootElement(xml->doc)) {
xmlUnlinkNode(xml);
xmlFreeNode(xml);
}
free(path);
return;
}
}
free(path);
}
while (cIter != NULL) {
xmlNode *child = cIter;
cIter = __xml_next(cIter); /* In case it is free'd */
__xml_acl_post_process(child);
}
}
| 166,684
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ExtensionTtsController::Stop() {
if (current_utterance_ && !current_utterance_->extension_id().empty()) {
current_utterance_->profile()->GetExtensionEventRouter()->
DispatchEventToExtension(
current_utterance_->extension_id(),
events::kOnStop,
"[]",
current_utterance_->profile(),
GURL());
} else {
GetPlatformImpl()->clear_error();
GetPlatformImpl()->StopSpeaking();
}
if (current_utterance_)
current_utterance_->set_error(kSpeechInterruptedError);
FinishCurrentUtterance();
ClearUtteranceQueue();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void ExtensionTtsController::Stop() {
double volume = 1.0;
if (options->HasKey(constants::kVolumeKey)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetDouble(constants::kVolumeKey, &volume));
if (volume < 0.0 || volume > 1.0) {
error_ = constants::kErrorInvalidVolume;
return false;
}
}
| 170,391
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: CURLcode Curl_smtp_escape_eob(struct connectdata *conn, const ssize_t nread)
{
/* When sending a SMTP payload we must detect CRLF. sequences making sure
they are sent as CRLF.. instead, as a . on the beginning of a line will
be deleted by the server when not part of an EOB terminator and a
genuine CRLF.CRLF which isn't escaped will wrongly be detected as end of
data by the server
*/
ssize_t i;
ssize_t si;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
struct SMTP *smtp = data->req.protop;
char *scratch = data->state.scratch;
char *newscratch = NULL;
char *oldscratch = NULL;
size_t eob_sent;
/* Do we need to allocate a scratch buffer? */
if(!scratch || data->set.crlf) {
oldscratch = scratch;
scratch = newscratch = malloc(2 * data->set.buffer_size);
if(!newscratch) {
failf(data, "Failed to alloc scratch buffer!");
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
}
/* Have we already sent part of the EOB? */
eob_sent = smtp->eob;
/* This loop can be improved by some kind of Boyer-Moore style of
approach but that is saved for later... */
for(i = 0, si = 0; i < nread; i++) {
if(SMTP_EOB[smtp->eob] == data->req.upload_fromhere[i]) {
smtp->eob++;
/* Is the EOB potentially the terminating CRLF? */
if(2 == smtp->eob || SMTP_EOB_LEN == smtp->eob)
smtp->trailing_crlf = TRUE;
else
smtp->trailing_crlf = FALSE;
}
else if(smtp->eob) {
/* A previous substring matched so output that first */
memcpy(&scratch[si], &SMTP_EOB[eob_sent], smtp->eob - eob_sent);
si += smtp->eob - eob_sent;
/* Then compare the first byte */
if(SMTP_EOB[0] == data->req.upload_fromhere[i])
smtp->eob = 1;
else
smtp->eob = 0;
eob_sent = 0;
/* Reset the trailing CRLF flag as there was more data */
smtp->trailing_crlf = FALSE;
}
/* Do we have a match for CRLF. as per RFC-5321, sect. 4.5.2 */
if(SMTP_EOB_FIND_LEN == smtp->eob) {
/* Copy the replacement data to the target buffer */
memcpy(&scratch[si], &SMTP_EOB_REPL[eob_sent],
SMTP_EOB_REPL_LEN - eob_sent);
si += SMTP_EOB_REPL_LEN - eob_sent;
smtp->eob = 0;
eob_sent = 0;
}
else if(!smtp->eob)
scratch[si++] = data->req.upload_fromhere[i];
}
if(smtp->eob - eob_sent) {
/* A substring matched before processing ended so output that now */
memcpy(&scratch[si], &SMTP_EOB[eob_sent], smtp->eob - eob_sent);
si += smtp->eob - eob_sent;
}
/* Only use the new buffer if we replaced something */
if(si != nread) {
/* Upload from the new (replaced) buffer instead */
data->req.upload_fromhere = scratch;
/* Save the buffer so it can be freed later */
data->state.scratch = scratch;
/* Free the old scratch buffer */
free(oldscratch);
/* Set the new amount too */
data->req.upload_present = si;
}
else
free(newscratch);
return CURLE_OK;
}
Commit Message: smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
CURLcode Curl_smtp_escape_eob(struct connectdata *conn, const ssize_t nread)
{
/* When sending a SMTP payload we must detect CRLF. sequences making sure
they are sent as CRLF.. instead, as a . on the beginning of a line will
be deleted by the server when not part of an EOB terminator and a
genuine CRLF.CRLF which isn't escaped will wrongly be detected as end of
data by the server
*/
ssize_t i;
ssize_t si;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
struct SMTP *smtp = data->req.protop;
char *scratch = data->state.scratch;
char *newscratch = NULL;
char *oldscratch = NULL;
size_t eob_sent;
/* Do we need to allocate a scratch buffer? */
if(!scratch || data->set.crlf) {
oldscratch = scratch;
scratch = newscratch = malloc(2 * UPLOAD_BUFSIZE);
if(!newscratch) {
failf(data, "Failed to alloc scratch buffer!");
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
}
DEBUGASSERT(UPLOAD_BUFSIZE >= nread);
/* Have we already sent part of the EOB? */
eob_sent = smtp->eob;
/* This loop can be improved by some kind of Boyer-Moore style of
approach but that is saved for later... */
for(i = 0, si = 0; i < nread; i++) {
if(SMTP_EOB[smtp->eob] == data->req.upload_fromhere[i]) {
smtp->eob++;
/* Is the EOB potentially the terminating CRLF? */
if(2 == smtp->eob || SMTP_EOB_LEN == smtp->eob)
smtp->trailing_crlf = TRUE;
else
smtp->trailing_crlf = FALSE;
}
else if(smtp->eob) {
/* A previous substring matched so output that first */
memcpy(&scratch[si], &SMTP_EOB[eob_sent], smtp->eob - eob_sent);
si += smtp->eob - eob_sent;
/* Then compare the first byte */
if(SMTP_EOB[0] == data->req.upload_fromhere[i])
smtp->eob = 1;
else
smtp->eob = 0;
eob_sent = 0;
/* Reset the trailing CRLF flag as there was more data */
smtp->trailing_crlf = FALSE;
}
/* Do we have a match for CRLF. as per RFC-5321, sect. 4.5.2 */
if(SMTP_EOB_FIND_LEN == smtp->eob) {
/* Copy the replacement data to the target buffer */
memcpy(&scratch[si], &SMTP_EOB_REPL[eob_sent],
SMTP_EOB_REPL_LEN - eob_sent);
si += SMTP_EOB_REPL_LEN - eob_sent;
smtp->eob = 0;
eob_sent = 0;
}
else if(!smtp->eob)
scratch[si++] = data->req.upload_fromhere[i];
}
if(smtp->eob - eob_sent) {
/* A substring matched before processing ended so output that now */
memcpy(&scratch[si], &SMTP_EOB[eob_sent], smtp->eob - eob_sent);
si += smtp->eob - eob_sent;
}
/* Only use the new buffer if we replaced something */
if(si != nread) {
/* Upload from the new (replaced) buffer instead */
data->req.upload_fromhere = scratch;
/* Save the buffer so it can be freed later */
data->state.scratch = scratch;
/* Free the old scratch buffer */
free(oldscratch);
/* Set the new amount too */
data->req.upload_present = si;
}
else
free(newscratch);
return CURLE_OK;
}
| 169,365
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost::OnUnlockRequest(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
if (current_lock_) {
NotifyLockError(current_lock_->request_id,
blink::WebLockOrientationErrorCanceled);
}
if (!provider_.get())
return;
provider_->UnlockOrientation();
}
Commit Message: Cleanups in ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost.
BUG=None
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/408213003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost::OnUnlockRequest(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
if (current_lock_) {
NotifyLockError(current_lock_->request_id,
blink::WebLockOrientationErrorCanceled);
}
if (!provider_)
return;
provider_->UnlockOrientation();
}
| 171,178
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: logger_get_mask_expanded (struct t_gui_buffer *buffer, const char *mask)
{
char *mask2, *mask_decoded, *mask_decoded2, *mask_decoded3, *mask_decoded4;
char *mask_decoded5;
const char *dir_separator;
int length;
time_t seconds;
struct tm *date_tmp;
mask2 = NULL;
mask_decoded = NULL;
mask_decoded2 = NULL;
mask_decoded3 = NULL;
mask_decoded4 = NULL;
mask_decoded5 = NULL;
dir_separator = weechat_info_get ("dir_separator", "");
if (!dir_separator)
return NULL;
/*
* we first replace directory separator (commonly '/') by \01 because
* buffer mask can contain this char, and will be replaced by replacement
* char ('_' by default)
*/
mask2 = weechat_string_replace (mask, dir_separator, "\01");
if (!mask2)
goto end;
mask_decoded = weechat_buffer_string_replace_local_var (buffer, mask2);
if (!mask_decoded)
goto end;
mask_decoded2 = weechat_string_replace (mask_decoded,
dir_separator,
weechat_config_string (logger_config_file_replacement_char));
if (!mask_decoded2)
goto end;
#ifdef __CYGWIN__
mask_decoded3 = weechat_string_replace (mask_decoded2, "\\",
weechat_config_string (logger_config_file_replacement_char));
#else
mask_decoded3 = strdup (mask_decoded2);
#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
if (!mask_decoded3)
goto end;
/* restore directory separator */
mask_decoded4 = weechat_string_replace (mask_decoded3,
"\01", dir_separator);
if (!mask_decoded4)
goto end;
/* replace date/time specifiers in mask */
length = strlen (mask_decoded4) + 256 + 1;
mask_decoded5 = malloc (length);
if (!mask_decoded5)
goto end;
seconds = time (NULL);
date_tmp = localtime (&seconds);
mask_decoded5[0] = '\0';
strftime (mask_decoded5, length - 1, mask_decoded4, date_tmp);
/* convert to lower case? */
if (weechat_config_boolean (logger_config_file_name_lower_case))
weechat_string_tolower (mask_decoded5);
if (weechat_logger_plugin->debug)
{
weechat_printf_date_tags (NULL, 0, "no_log",
"%s: buffer = \"%s\", mask = \"%s\", "
"decoded mask = \"%s\"",
LOGGER_PLUGIN_NAME,
weechat_buffer_get_string (buffer, "name"),
mask, mask_decoded5);
}
end:
if (mask2)
free (mask2);
if (mask_decoded)
free (mask_decoded);
if (mask_decoded2)
free (mask_decoded2);
if (mask_decoded3)
free (mask_decoded3);
if (mask_decoded4)
free (mask_decoded4);
return mask_decoded5;
}
Commit Message: logger: call strftime before replacing buffer local variables
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
logger_get_mask_expanded (struct t_gui_buffer *buffer, const char *mask)
{
char *mask2, *mask3, *mask4, *mask5, *mask6, *mask7;
const char *dir_separator;
int length;
time_t seconds;
struct tm *date_tmp;
mask2 = NULL;
mask3 = NULL;
mask4 = NULL;
mask5 = NULL;
mask6 = NULL;
mask7 = NULL;
dir_separator = weechat_info_get ("dir_separator", "");
if (!dir_separator)
return NULL;
/* replace date/time specifiers in mask */
length = strlen (mask) + 256 + 1;
mask2 = malloc (length);
if (!mask2)
goto end;
seconds = time (NULL);
date_tmp = localtime (&seconds);
mask2[0] = '\0';
if (strftime (mask2, length - 1, mask, date_tmp) == 0)
mask2[0] = '\0';
/*
* we first replace directory separator (commonly '/') by \01 because
* buffer mask can contain this char, and will be replaced by replacement
* char ('_' by default)
*/
mask3 = weechat_string_replace (mask2, dir_separator, "\01");
if (!mask3)
goto end;
mask4 = weechat_buffer_string_replace_local_var (buffer, mask3);
if (!mask4)
goto end;
mask5 = weechat_string_replace (mask4,
dir_separator,
weechat_config_string (logger_config_file_replacement_char));
if (!mask5)
goto end;
#ifdef __CYGWIN__
mask6 = weechat_string_replace (mask5, "\\",
weechat_config_string (logger_config_file_replacement_char));
#else
mask6 = strdup (mask5);
#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
if (!mask6)
goto end;
/* restore directory separator */
mask7 = weechat_string_replace (mask6,
"\01", dir_separator);
if (!mask7)
goto end;
/* convert to lower case? */
if (weechat_config_boolean (logger_config_file_name_lower_case))
weechat_string_tolower (mask7);
if (weechat_logger_plugin->debug)
{
weechat_printf_date_tags (NULL, 0, "no_log",
"%s: buffer = \"%s\", mask = \"%s\", "
"decoded mask = \"%s\"",
LOGGER_PLUGIN_NAME,
weechat_buffer_get_string (buffer, "name"),
mask, mask7);
}
end:
if (mask2)
free (mask2);
if (mask3)
free (mask3);
if (mask4)
free (mask4);
if (mask5)
free (mask5);
if (mask6)
free (mask6);
return mask7;
}
| 167,745
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: TabStyle::TabColors GM2TabStyle::CalculateColors() const {
const ui::ThemeProvider* theme_provider = tab_->GetThemeProvider();
constexpr float kMinimumActiveContrastRatio = 6.05f;
constexpr float kMinimumInactiveContrastRatio = 4.61f;
constexpr float kMinimumHoveredContrastRatio = 5.02f;
constexpr float kMinimumPressedContrastRatio = 4.41f;
float expected_opacity = 0.0f;
if (tab_->IsActive()) {
expected_opacity = 1.0f;
} else if (tab_->IsSelected()) {
expected_opacity = kSelectedTabOpacity;
} else if (tab_->mouse_hovered()) {
expected_opacity = GetHoverOpacity();
}
const SkColor bg_color = color_utils::AlphaBlend(
tab_->controller()->GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_ACTIVE),
tab_->controller()->GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_INACTIVE),
expected_opacity);
SkColor title_color = tab_->controller()->GetTabForegroundColor(
expected_opacity > 0.5f ? TAB_ACTIVE : TAB_INACTIVE, bg_color);
title_color = color_utils::GetColorWithMinimumContrast(title_color, bg_color);
const SkColor base_hovered_color = theme_provider->GetColor(
ThemeProperties::COLOR_TAB_CLOSE_BUTTON_BACKGROUND_HOVER);
const SkColor base_pressed_color = theme_provider->GetColor(
ThemeProperties::COLOR_TAB_CLOSE_BUTTON_BACKGROUND_PRESSED);
const auto get_color_for_contrast_ratio = [](SkColor fg_color,
SkColor bg_color,
float contrast_ratio) {
const SkAlpha blend_alpha = color_utils::GetBlendValueWithMinimumContrast(
bg_color, fg_color, bg_color, contrast_ratio);
return color_utils::AlphaBlend(fg_color, bg_color, blend_alpha);
};
const SkColor generated_icon_color = get_color_for_contrast_ratio(
title_color, bg_color,
tab_->IsActive() ? kMinimumActiveContrastRatio
: kMinimumInactiveContrastRatio);
const SkColor generated_hovered_color = get_color_for_contrast_ratio(
base_hovered_color, bg_color, kMinimumHoveredContrastRatio);
const SkColor generated_pressed_color = get_color_for_contrast_ratio(
base_pressed_color, bg_color, kMinimumPressedContrastRatio);
const SkColor generated_hovered_icon_color =
color_utils::GetColorWithMinimumContrast(title_color,
generated_hovered_color);
const SkColor generated_pressed_icon_color =
color_utils::GetColorWithMinimumContrast(title_color,
generated_pressed_color);
return {bg_color,
title_color,
generated_icon_color,
generated_hovered_icon_color,
generated_pressed_icon_color,
generated_hovered_color,
generated_pressed_color};
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
TabStyle::TabColors GM2TabStyle::CalculateColors() const {
const ui::ThemeProvider* theme_provider = tab_->GetThemeProvider();
constexpr float kMinimumActiveContrastRatio = 6.05f;
constexpr float kMinimumInactiveContrastRatio = 4.61f;
constexpr float kMinimumHoveredContrastRatio = 5.02f;
constexpr float kMinimumPressedContrastRatio = 4.41f;
float expected_opacity = 0.0f;
if (tab_->IsActive()) {
expected_opacity = 1.0f;
} else if (tab_->IsSelected()) {
expected_opacity = kSelectedTabOpacity;
} else if (tab_->mouse_hovered()) {
expected_opacity = GetHoverOpacity();
}
const SkColor bg_color = color_utils::AlphaBlend(
GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_ACTIVE), GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_INACTIVE),
expected_opacity);
SkColor title_color = tab_->controller()->GetTabForegroundColor(
expected_opacity > 0.5f ? TAB_ACTIVE : TAB_INACTIVE, bg_color);
title_color = color_utils::GetColorWithMinimumContrast(title_color, bg_color);
const SkColor base_hovered_color = theme_provider->GetColor(
ThemeProperties::COLOR_TAB_CLOSE_BUTTON_BACKGROUND_HOVER);
const SkColor base_pressed_color = theme_provider->GetColor(
ThemeProperties::COLOR_TAB_CLOSE_BUTTON_BACKGROUND_PRESSED);
const auto get_color_for_contrast_ratio = [](SkColor fg_color,
SkColor bg_color,
float contrast_ratio) {
const SkAlpha blend_alpha = color_utils::GetBlendValueWithMinimumContrast(
bg_color, fg_color, bg_color, contrast_ratio);
return color_utils::AlphaBlend(fg_color, bg_color, blend_alpha);
};
const SkColor generated_icon_color = get_color_for_contrast_ratio(
title_color, bg_color,
tab_->IsActive() ? kMinimumActiveContrastRatio
: kMinimumInactiveContrastRatio);
const SkColor generated_hovered_color = get_color_for_contrast_ratio(
base_hovered_color, bg_color, kMinimumHoveredContrastRatio);
const SkColor generated_pressed_color = get_color_for_contrast_ratio(
base_pressed_color, bg_color, kMinimumPressedContrastRatio);
const SkColor generated_hovered_icon_color =
color_utils::GetColorWithMinimumContrast(title_color,
generated_hovered_color);
const SkColor generated_pressed_icon_color =
color_utils::GetColorWithMinimumContrast(title_color,
generated_pressed_color);
return {bg_color,
title_color,
generated_icon_color,
generated_hovered_icon_color,
generated_pressed_icon_color,
generated_hovered_color,
generated_pressed_color};
}
| 172,521
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: AccessControlStatus ScriptResource::CalculateAccessControlStatus() const {
if (GetCORSStatus() == CORSStatus::kServiceWorkerOpaque)
return kOpaqueResource;
if (IsSameOriginOrCORSSuccessful())
return kSharableCrossOrigin;
return kNotSharableCrossOrigin;
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
AccessControlStatus ScriptResource::CalculateAccessControlStatus() const {
AccessControlStatus ScriptResource::CalculateAccessControlStatus(
const SecurityOrigin* security_origin) const {
if (GetResponse().WasFetchedViaServiceWorker()) {
if (GetCORSStatus() == CORSStatus::kServiceWorkerOpaque)
return kOpaqueResource;
return kSharableCrossOrigin;
}
if (security_origin && PassesAccessControlCheck(*security_origin))
return kSharableCrossOrigin;
return kNotSharableCrossOrigin;
}
| 172,889
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ikev1_nonce_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_NONCE)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," n len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
} else if (1 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, (const u_char *)(const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ep))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_NONCE)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12990/Fix printing of ISAKMPv1 Notification payload data.
The closest thing to a specification for the contents of the payload
data is draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04, and nothing in there says that it
is ever a complete ISAKMP message, so don't dissect types we don't have
specific code for as a complete ISAKMP message.
While we're at it, fix a comment, and clean up printing of V1 Nonce,
V2 Authentication payloads, and v2 Notice payloads.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-835
|
ikev1_nonce_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_NONCE)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
/*
* Our caller has ensured that the length is >= 4.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo," n len=%u", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (ntohs(e.len) > 4) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
} else if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, (const u_char *)(ext + 1), ep))
goto trunc;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_NONCE)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,925
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::releaseEncoder() {
if (!mStarted) {
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
PVCleanUpVideoEncoder(mHandle);
free(mInputFrameData);
mInputFrameData = NULL;
delete mEncParams;
mEncParams = NULL;
delete mHandle;
mHandle = NULL;
mStarted = false;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID:
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::releaseEncoder() {
if (mEncParams) {
delete mEncParams;
mEncParams = NULL;
}
if (mHandle) {
delete mHandle;
mHandle = NULL;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
| 174,010
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SoundPool::doLoad(sp<Sample>& sample)
{
ALOGV("doLoad: loading sample sampleID=%d", sample->sampleID());
sample->startLoad();
mDecodeThread->loadSample(sample->sampleID());
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void SoundPool::doLoad(sp<Sample>& sample)
int sampleID;
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(&mLock);
sampleID = ++mNextSampleID;
sp<Sample> sample = new Sample(sampleID, fd, offset, length);
mSamples.add(sampleID, sample);
sample->startLoad();
}
// mDecodeThread->loadSample() must be called outside of mLock.
// mDecodeThread->loadSample() may block on mDecodeThread message queue space;
// the message queue emptying may block on SoundPool::findSample().
//
// It theoretically possible that sample loads might decode out-of-order.
mDecodeThread->loadSample(sampleID);
return sampleID;
}
| 173,960
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: test_standard(png_modifier* PNG_CONST pm, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
int bdlo, int PNG_CONST bdhi)
{
for (; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo)
{
int interlace_type;
for (interlace_type = PNG_INTERLACE_NONE;
interlace_type < INTERLACE_LAST; ++interlace_type)
{
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
interlace_type, 0, 0, 0), 0/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
}
}
return 1; /* keep going */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
test_standard(png_modifier* PNG_CONST pm, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
test_standard(png_modifier* const pm, png_byte const colour_type,
int bdlo, int const bdhi)
{
for (; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo)
{
int interlace_type;
for (interlace_type = PNG_INTERLACE_NONE;
interlace_type < INTERLACE_LAST; ++interlace_type)
{
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
interlace_type, 0, 0, 0), do_read_interlace, pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
}
}
return 1; /* keep going */
}
| 173,710
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static dma_addr_t dma_map_xdr(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
struct xdr_buf *xdr,
u32 xdr_off, size_t len, int dir)
{
struct page *page;
dma_addr_t dma_addr;
if (xdr_off < xdr->head[0].iov_len) {
/* This offset is in the head */
xdr_off += (unsigned long)xdr->head[0].iov_base & ~PAGE_MASK;
page = virt_to_page(xdr->head[0].iov_base);
} else {
xdr_off -= xdr->head[0].iov_len;
if (xdr_off < xdr->page_len) {
/* This offset is in the page list */
xdr_off += xdr->page_base;
page = xdr->pages[xdr_off >> PAGE_SHIFT];
xdr_off &= ~PAGE_MASK;
} else {
/* This offset is in the tail */
xdr_off -= xdr->page_len;
xdr_off += (unsigned long)
xdr->tail[0].iov_base & ~PAGE_MASK;
page = virt_to_page(xdr->tail[0].iov_base);
}
}
dma_addr = ib_dma_map_page(xprt->sc_cm_id->device, page, xdr_off,
min_t(size_t, PAGE_SIZE, len), dir);
return dma_addr;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
static dma_addr_t dma_map_xdr(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
/* The client provided a Write list in the Call message. Fill in
* the segments in the first Write chunk in the Reply's transport
* header with the number of bytes consumed in each segment.
* Remaining chunks are returned unused.
*
* Assumptions:
* - Client has provided only one Write chunk
*/
static void svc_rdma_xdr_encode_write_list(__be32 *rdma_resp, __be32 *wr_ch,
unsigned int consumed)
{
unsigned int nsegs;
__be32 *p, *q;
/* RPC-over-RDMA V1 replies never have a Read list. */
p = rdma_resp + rpcrdma_fixed_maxsz + 1;
q = wr_ch;
while (*q != xdr_zero) {
nsegs = xdr_encode_write_chunk(p, q, consumed);
q += 2 + nsegs * rpcrdma_segment_maxsz;
p += 2 + nsegs * rpcrdma_segment_maxsz;
consumed = 0;
}
/* Terminate Write list */
*p++ = xdr_zero;
/* Reply chunk discriminator; may be replaced later */
*p = xdr_zero;
}
/* The client provided a Reply chunk in the Call message. Fill in
* the segments in the Reply chunk in the Reply message with the
* number of bytes consumed in each segment.
*
* Assumptions:
* - Reply can always fit in the provided Reply chunk
*/
static void svc_rdma_xdr_encode_reply_chunk(__be32 *rdma_resp, __be32 *rp_ch,
unsigned int consumed)
{
__be32 *p;
/* Find the Reply chunk in the Reply's xprt header.
* RPC-over-RDMA V1 replies never have a Read list.
*/
p = rdma_resp + rpcrdma_fixed_maxsz + 1;
/* Skip past Write list */
while (*p++ != xdr_zero)
p += 1 + be32_to_cpup(p) * rpcrdma_segment_maxsz;
xdr_encode_write_chunk(p, rp_ch, consumed);
}
| 168,166
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebp (gdImagePtr im, FILE * outFile)
{
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewFileCtx(outFile);
if (out == NULL) {
return;
}
gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, -1);
out->gd_free(out);
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6912
CWE ID: CWE-415
|
BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebp (gdImagePtr im, FILE * outFile)
{
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewFileCtx(outFile);
if (out == NULL) {
return;
}
_gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, -1);
out->gd_free(out);
}
| 168,816
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: CastCastView::CastCastView(CastConfigDelegate* cast_config_delegate)
: cast_config_delegate_(cast_config_delegate) {
set_background(views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kBackgroundColor));
ui::ResourceBundle& bundle = ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
SetLayoutManager(new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal,
kTrayPopupPaddingHorizontal, 0,
kTrayPopupPaddingBetweenItems));
icon_ = new FixedSizedImageView(0, kTrayPopupItemHeight);
icon_->SetImage(
bundle.GetImageNamed(IDR_AURA_UBER_TRAY_CAST_ENABLED).ToImageSkia());
AddChildView(icon_);
label_container_ = new views::View;
label_container_->SetLayoutManager(
new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kVertical, 0, 0, 0));
title_ = new views::Label;
title_->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
title_->SetFontList(bundle.GetFontList(ui::ResourceBundle::BoldFont));
label_container_->AddChildView(title_);
details_ = new views::Label;
details_->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
details_->SetMultiLine(false);
details_->SetEnabledColor(kHeaderTextColorNormal);
label_container_->AddChildView(details_);
AddChildView(label_container_);
base::string16 stop_button_text =
ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetLocalizedString(
IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_CAST_STOP);
stop_button_ = new TrayPopupLabelButton(this, stop_button_text);
AddChildView(stop_button_);
UpdateLabel();
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79
|
CastCastView::CastCastView(CastConfigDelegate* cast_config_delegate)
: cast_config_delegate_(cast_config_delegate) {
set_background(views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kBackgroundColor));
ui::ResourceBundle& bundle = ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
SetLayoutManager(new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal,
kTrayPopupPaddingHorizontal, 0,
kTrayPopupPaddingBetweenItems));
icon_ = new FixedSizedImageView(0, kTrayPopupItemHeight);
icon_->SetImage(
bundle.GetImageNamed(IDR_AURA_UBER_TRAY_CAST_ENABLED).ToImageSkia());
AddChildView(icon_);
label_container_ = new views::View;
label_container_->SetLayoutManager(
new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kVertical, 0, 0, 0));
title_ = new views::Label;
title_->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
title_->SetFontList(bundle.GetFontList(ui::ResourceBundle::BoldFont));
title_->SetText(
bundle.GetLocalizedString(IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_CAST_UNKNOWN_CAST_TYPE));
label_container_->AddChildView(title_);
details_ = new views::Label;
details_->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
details_->SetMultiLine(false);
details_->SetEnabledColor(kHeaderTextColorNormal);
details_->SetText(
bundle.GetLocalizedString(IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_CAST_UNKNOWN_RECEIVER));
label_container_->AddChildView(details_);
AddChildView(label_container_);
base::string16 stop_button_text =
ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetLocalizedString(
IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_CAST_STOP);
stop_button_ = new TrayPopupLabelButton(this, stop_button_text);
AddChildView(stop_button_);
UpdateLabel();
}
| 171,624
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageaffinematrixconcat)
{
double m1[6];
double m2[6];
double mr[6];
zval **tmp;
zval *z_m1;
zval *z_m2;
int i, nelems;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "aa", &z_m1, &z_m2) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (((nelems = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m1))) != 6) || (nelems = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m2))) != 6) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Affine arrays must have six elements");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m1), i, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp)) {
case IS_LONG:
m1[i] = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
m1[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_STRING:
convert_to_double_ex(tmp);
m1[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %i", i);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m2), i, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp)) {
case IS_LONG:
m2[i] = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
m2[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_STRING:
convert_to_double_ex(tmp);
m2[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %i", i);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
if (gdAffineConcat (mr, m1, m2) != GD_TRUE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
add_index_double(return_value, i, mr[i]);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #66356 (Heap Overflow Vulnerability in imagecrop())
And also fixed the bug: arguments are altered after some calls
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
PHP_FUNCTION(imageaffinematrixconcat)
{
double m1[6];
double m2[6];
double mr[6];
zval **tmp;
zval *z_m1;
zval *z_m2;
int i, nelems;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "aa", &z_m1, &z_m2) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (((nelems = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m1))) != 6) || (nelems = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m2))) != 6) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Affine arrays must have six elements");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m1), i, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp)) {
case IS_LONG:
m1[i] = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
m1[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_STRING:
{
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
m1[i] = Z_DVAL(dval);
}
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %i", i);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m2), i, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp)) {
case IS_LONG:
m2[i] = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
m2[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_STRING:
{
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
m2[i] = Z_DVAL(dval);
}
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %i", i);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
if (gdAffineConcat (mr, m1, m2) != GD_TRUE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
add_index_double(return_value, i, mr[i]);
}
}
| 166,430
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: mark_trusted_task_done (GObject *source_object,
GAsyncResult *res,
gpointer user_data)
{
MarkTrustedJob *job = user_data;
g_object_unref (job->file);
if (job->done_callback)
{
job->done_callback (!job_aborted ((CommonJob *) job),
job->done_callback_data);
}
finalize_common ((CommonJob *) job);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
mark_trusted_task_done (GObject *source_object,
mark_desktop_file_executable_task_done (GObject *source_object,
GAsyncResult *res,
gpointer user_data)
{
MarkTrustedJob *job = user_data;
g_object_unref (job->file);
if (job->done_callback)
{
job->done_callback (!job_aborted ((CommonJob *) job),
job->done_callback_data);
}
finalize_common ((CommonJob *) job);
}
| 167,749
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: JBIG2Bitmap::JBIG2Bitmap(Guint segNumA, JBIG2Bitmap *bitmap):
JBIG2Segment(segNumA)
{
w = bitmap->w;
h = bitmap->h;
line = bitmap->line;
if (w <= 0 || h <= 0 || line <= 0 || h >= (INT_MAX - 1) / line) {
error(-1, "invalid width/height");
data = NULL;
return;
}
data = (Guchar *)gmalloc(h * line + 1);
memcpy(data, bitmap->data, h * line);
data[h * line] = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
JBIG2Bitmap::JBIG2Bitmap(Guint segNumA, JBIG2Bitmap *bitmap):
JBIG2Segment(segNumA)
{
w = bitmap->w;
h = bitmap->h;
line = bitmap->line;
if (w <= 0 || h <= 0 || line <= 0 || h >= (INT_MAX - 1) / line) {
error(-1, "invalid width/height");
data = NULL;
return;
}
data = (Guchar *)gmallocn(h, line + 1);
memcpy(data, bitmap->data, h * line);
data[h * line] = 0;
}
| 164,613
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_accept_from_http)
{
UEnumeration *available;
char *http_accept = NULL;
int http_accept_len;
UErrorCode status = 0;
int len;
char resultLocale[INTL_MAX_LOCALE_LEN+1];
UAcceptResult outResult;
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &http_accept, &http_accept_len) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_accept_from_http: unable to parse input parameters", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
available = ures_openAvailableLocales(NULL, &status);
INTL_CHECK_STATUS(status, "locale_accept_from_http: failed to retrieve locale list");
len = uloc_acceptLanguageFromHTTP(resultLocale, INTL_MAX_LOCALE_LEN,
&outResult, http_accept, available, &status);
uenum_close(available);
INTL_CHECK_STATUS(status, "locale_accept_from_http: failed to find acceptable locale");
if (len < 0 || outResult == ULOC_ACCEPT_FAILED) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(resultLocale, len, 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
PHP_FUNCTION(locale_accept_from_http)
{
UEnumeration *available;
char *http_accept = NULL;
int http_accept_len;
UErrorCode status = 0;
int len;
char resultLocale[INTL_MAX_LOCALE_LEN+1];
UAcceptResult outResult;
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &http_accept, &http_accept_len) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_accept_from_http: unable to parse input parameters", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
available = ures_openAvailableLocales(NULL, &status);
INTL_CHECK_STATUS(status, "locale_accept_from_http: failed to retrieve locale list");
len = uloc_acceptLanguageFromHTTP(resultLocale, INTL_MAX_LOCALE_LEN,
&outResult, http_accept, available, &status);
uenum_close(available);
INTL_CHECK_STATUS(status, "locale_accept_from_http: failed to find acceptable locale");
if (len < 0 || outResult == ULOC_ACCEPT_FAILED) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(resultLocale, len, 1);
}
| 167,195
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CtcpHandler::handlePing(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m) {
Q_UNUSED(target)
if(ctcptype == CtcpQuery) {
if(_ignoreListManager->ctcpMatch(prefix, network()->networkName(), "PING"))
return;
reply(nickFromMask(prefix), "PING", param);
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP PING request from %1").arg(prefix));
} else {
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP TIME request by %1").arg(prefix));
}
else {
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP TIME answer from %1: %2")
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void CtcpHandler::handlePing(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m) {
void CtcpHandler::handlePing(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m, QString &reply) {
Q_UNUSED(target)
if(ctcptype == CtcpQuery) {
reply = param;
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP PING request from %1").arg(prefix));
} else {
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP TIME request by %1").arg(prefix));
}
else {
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP TIME answer from %1: %2")
}
}
| 164,878
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int ahci_populate_sglist(AHCIDevice *ad, QEMUSGList *sglist, int offset)
{
AHCICmdHdr *cmd = ad->cur_cmd;
uint32_t opts = le32_to_cpu(cmd->opts);
int sglist_alloc_hint = opts >> AHCI_CMD_HDR_PRDT_LEN;
dma_addr_t prdt_len = (sglist_alloc_hint * sizeof(AHCI_SG));
dma_addr_t real_prdt_len = prdt_len;
uint8_t *prdt;
uint8_t *prdt;
int i;
int r = 0;
int sum = 0;
int off_idx = -1;
int off_pos = -1;
int tbl_entry_size;
IDEBus *bus = &ad->port;
BusState *qbus = BUS(bus);
if (!sglist_alloc_hint) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "no sg list given by guest: 0x%08x\n", opts);
return -1;
if (prdt_len < real_prdt_len) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "mapped less than expected\n");
r = -1;
goto out;
}
/* Get entries in the PRDT, init a qemu sglist accordingly */
if (sglist_alloc_hint > 0) {
AHCI_SG *tbl = (AHCI_SG *)prdt;
sum = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sglist_alloc_hint; i++) {
/* flags_size is zero-based */
tbl_entry_size = prdt_tbl_entry_size(&tbl[i]);
if (offset <= (sum + tbl_entry_size)) {
off_idx = i;
off_pos = offset - sum;
break;
}
sum += tbl_entry_size;
}
if ((off_idx == -1) || (off_pos < 0) || (off_pos > tbl_entry_size)) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "%s: Incorrect offset! "
"off_idx: %d, off_pos: %d\n",
__func__, off_idx, off_pos);
r = -1;
goto out;
}
}
if ((off_idx == -1) || (off_pos < 0) || (off_pos > tbl_entry_size)) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "%s: Incorrect offset! "
"off_idx: %d, off_pos: %d\n",
__func__, off_idx, off_pos);
r = -1;
goto out;
qemu_sglist_add(sglist, le64_to_cpu(tbl[i].addr),
prdt_tbl_entry_size(&tbl[i]));
}
}
out:
dma_memory_unmap(ad->hba->as, prdt, prdt_len,
DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE, prdt_len);
/* flags_size is zero-based */
qemu_sglist_add(sglist, le64_to_cpu(tbl[i].addr),
prdt_tbl_entry_size(&tbl[i]));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static int ahci_populate_sglist(AHCIDevice *ad, QEMUSGList *sglist, int offset)
static int ahci_populate_sglist(AHCIDevice *ad, QEMUSGList *sglist,
int32_t offset)
{
AHCICmdHdr *cmd = ad->cur_cmd;
uint32_t opts = le32_to_cpu(cmd->opts);
int sglist_alloc_hint = opts >> AHCI_CMD_HDR_PRDT_LEN;
dma_addr_t prdt_len = (sglist_alloc_hint * sizeof(AHCI_SG));
dma_addr_t real_prdt_len = prdt_len;
uint8_t *prdt;
uint8_t *prdt;
int i;
int r = 0;
uint64_t sum = 0;
int off_idx = -1;
int64_t off_pos = -1;
int tbl_entry_size;
IDEBus *bus = &ad->port;
BusState *qbus = BUS(bus);
/*
* Note: AHCI PRDT can describe up to 256GiB. SATA/ATA only support
* transactions of up to 32MiB as of ATA8-ACS3 rev 1b, assuming a
* 512 byte sector size. We limit the PRDT in this implementation to
* a reasonably large 2GiB, which can accommodate the maximum transfer
* request for sector sizes up to 32K.
*/
if (!sglist_alloc_hint) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "no sg list given by guest: 0x%08x\n", opts);
return -1;
if (prdt_len < real_prdt_len) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "mapped less than expected\n");
r = -1;
goto out;
}
/* Get entries in the PRDT, init a qemu sglist accordingly */
if (sglist_alloc_hint > 0) {
AHCI_SG *tbl = (AHCI_SG *)prdt;
sum = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sglist_alloc_hint; i++) {
/* flags_size is zero-based */
tbl_entry_size = prdt_tbl_entry_size(&tbl[i]);
if (offset <= (sum + tbl_entry_size)) {
off_idx = i;
off_pos = offset - sum;
break;
}
sum += tbl_entry_size;
}
if ((off_idx == -1) || (off_pos < 0) || (off_pos > tbl_entry_size)) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "%s: Incorrect offset! "
"off_idx: %d, off_pos: %d\n",
__func__, off_idx, off_pos);
r = -1;
goto out;
}
}
if ((off_idx == -1) || (off_pos < 0) || (off_pos > tbl_entry_size)) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "%s: Incorrect offset! "
"off_idx: %d, off_pos: %"PRId64"\n",
__func__, off_idx, off_pos);
r = -1;
goto out;
qemu_sglist_add(sglist, le64_to_cpu(tbl[i].addr),
prdt_tbl_entry_size(&tbl[i]));
}
}
out:
dma_memory_unmap(ad->hba->as, prdt, prdt_len,
DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE, prdt_len);
/* flags_size is zero-based */
qemu_sglist_add(sglist, le64_to_cpu(tbl[i].addr),
prdt_tbl_entry_size(&tbl[i]));
if (sglist->size > INT32_MAX) {
error_report("AHCI Physical Region Descriptor Table describes "
"more than 2 GiB.\n");
qemu_sglist_destroy(sglist);
r = -1;
goto out;
}
}
| 164,838
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Cluster* Cluster::Create(
Segment* pSegment,
long idx,
long long off)
{
assert(pSegment);
assert(off >= 0);
const long long element_start = pSegment->m_start + off;
Cluster* const pCluster = new Cluster(pSegment,
idx,
element_start);
assert(pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
Cluster* Cluster::Create(
| 174,256
|
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