text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used malware to set LoadAppInit_DLLs in the Registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows in order to establish persistence.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake abuses the accessibility service to prevent removing administrator permissions, accessibility permissions, and to set itself as the default SMS handler.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts, particularly between network and non-network platforms, such a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0695
ATT&CK Technique Name:Donut
Donut can generate shellcode outputs that execute via Python.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0204
ATT&CK Technique Name:Briba
Briba uses rundll32 within Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder entries to execute malicious DLLs.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0549
ATT&CK Technique Name:SilkBean
SilkBean can retrieve files from external storage and can collect browser data.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0545
ATT&CK Technique Name:TERRACOTTA
TERRACOTTA can download additional modules at runtime via JavaScript eval statements.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Use least privilege and protect administrative access to the Domain Controller and Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server. Do not create service accounts with administrative privileges. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has XOR-encrypted collected system information prior to sending to a C2. AppleJeus has also used the open source ADVObfuscation library for its components.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0339
ATT&CK Technique Name:Micropsia
Micropsia creates a new hidden directory to store all components' outputs in a dedicated sub-folder for each.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can send collected victim data to its C2 server.[143] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used "ipconfig" to identify the network configuration of a victim machine.[250] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0598
ATT&CK Technique Name:P.A.S. Webshell
P.A.S. Webshell has the ability to create reverse shells with Perl scripts.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0437
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kivars
Kivars has the ability to list drives on the infected host.[170] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware has used VBS scripts for execution.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit access to the root account and prevent users from modifying PAM components through proper privilege separation (ex SELinux, grsecurity, AppArmor, etc.) and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group tools have registered Run keys in the registry to give malicious VBS files persistence.[98][99][100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser abuses the Windows DLL load order by using a legitimate Symantec anti-virus binary, VPDN_LU.exe, to load a malicious DLL that mimics a legitimate Symantec DLL, navlu.dll.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1027.009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Embedded Payloads
Adversaries may embed payloads within other files to conceal malicious content from defenses. Otherwise seemingly benign files (such as scripts and executables) may be abused to carry and obfuscate malicious payloads and content. In some cases, embedded payloa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be wary of granting applications dangerous or privacy-intrusive permissions, such as keyboard registration or accessibility service access. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has collected the username from the victim's machine.[113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0205
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naid
Naid collects a unique identifier (UID) from a compromised host.[245] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
If Shamoon cannot access shares using current privileges, it attempts access using hard coded, domain-specific credentials gathered earlier in the intrusion.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1036
ATT&CK Technique Name:Masquerading
Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evad... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 Remote Memory-Deduplication Attacks
Cloud providers use memory deduplication to reduce the memory utilization of their systems. Memory deduplication merges memory pages with identical content and maps them under a copy-on-write semantic. Previous work showed that memory deduplication can be exploi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used fast flux to mask botnets by distributing payloads across multiple IPs.[8] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 1
At the end of day one of this year's virtual conference, join Black Hat Review Board members Mika Devonshire, Ty Miller, Pamela O'Shea and Fyodor Yarochkin for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. Th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used netstat -oan to obtain information about the victim network connections.[37] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Walking Your Dog in Multiple Forests - Breaking AD Trust Boundaries through Kerberos Vulnerabilities
In larger enterprise environments multiple Active Directory forests are often in use to separate different environments or parts of the business. To enable integration between the different environ... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Reverse Engineering Custom ASICs by Exploiting Potential Supply-Chain Leaks
Many industry specific solutions in the field of SCADA consist of unknown custom chips without public documentation. These Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) are often simple System on Chip (SoC) solutions w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0105
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkVishnya
DarkVishnya performed port scanning to obtain the list of active services.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Review changes to the cron schedule. cron execution can be reviewed within the /var/log directory. To validate the location of the cron log file, check the syslog config at /etc/rsyslog.conf or /etc/syslog.conf | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY contains a number of modules that can bypass UAC, including through Window's Device Manager, Manage Optional Features, and an image hijack on the .msc file extension.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used an unnamed post-exploitation tool to steal cookies from the Chrome browser.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has used an encrypted configuration file for its loader.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1562.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impair Command History Logging
Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used mshta.exe to execute malicious payloads.[33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0220
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaos
Chaos provides a reverse shell is triggered upon receipt of a packet with a special string, sent to any port.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sys10
Sys10 collects the account name of the logged-in user and sends it to the C2.[178] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Abusing Azure Active Directory: From MFA Bypass to Listing Global Administrators
The majority of Fortune 500 organizations are using Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) as Identity and Access Management (IAM) solution. The high adoption rate makes Azure AD a lucrative target for threat actors, inclu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict read/write access to systemd .timer unit files to only select privileged users who have a legitimate need to manage system services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has created a Registry Run key named Dropbox Update Setup to establish persistence for a malicious Python binary.[286] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
The TrickBot downloader has used an icon to appear as a Microsoft Word document.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can encrypt and encode its configuration file.[247] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used mshta.exe to run malicious scripts on the system.[18][12][19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has created a scheduled task to execute additional malicious software, as well as maintain persistence.[113][114][115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0169
ATT&CK Technique Name:RawPOS
RawPOS encodes credit card data it collected from the victim with XOR.[32][33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT tests if it can reach its C2 server by first attempting a direct connection, and if it fails, obtaining proxy settings and sending the connection through a proxy, and finally injecting code into a running browser if the proxy method fails.[23] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 A New Class of DNS Vulnerabilities Affecting Many DNS-as-Service Platforms
We present a novel class of DNS vulnerabilities that affect multiple DNS-as-a-Service (DNSaaS) providers. The vulnerabilities have been proven and successfully exploited on three major cloud providers including AWS Route 53 ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0199
ATT&CK Technique Name:TURNEDUP
TURNEDUP is capable of injecting code into the APC queue of a created Rundll32 process as part of an "Early Bird injection."[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used mshta to execute DLLs.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 malware has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[59][60][61][62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can attempt to run the program as admin, then show a fake error message and a legitimate UAC bypass prompt to the user in an attempt to socially engineer the user into escalating privileges.[54] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 How We Organize Large-Scale DDoS Exercises in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, following a large number of DDoS attacks experienced in January 2018, it was apparent that things needed to change. Specifically, we decided to implement the concept of cooperative DDoS mitigation at the national leve... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has hidden payloads in Flash directories and fake installer files.[172] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom has been observed using SQL injection to gain access to systems.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has created a scheduled SYSTEM task that runs when a user logs in.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy adds itself to the startup folder or adds itself to the Registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[209] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can decrypt and parse instructions sent from C2.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0445
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRatReporter
ShimRatReporter spoofed itself as AlphaZawgyl_font.exe, a specialized Unicode font.[147] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti Group
Winnti Group has downloaded an auxiliary program named ff.exe to infected machines.[481] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 MFA-ing the Un-MFA-ble: Protecting Auth Systems' Core Secrets
Compromised credentials have been APT groups' favorite tool for accessing, propagating and maintaining access to their victims' networks. Consequently, aware defenders mitigate this risk, by adding additional factors (MFA), so no secret ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0642
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADFLICK
BADFLICK has searched for files on the infected host.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has exploited the Microsoft SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2019-0604 and CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 in Exchange Server.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has been observed turning off Windows Security Center and can hide the AV software window from the view of the infected user.[46][47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can zip and encrypt data collected on a target system.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Stuxnet-in-a-Box: In-Field Emulation and Fuzzing of PLCs to Uncover the Next Zero-Day Threat in Industrial Control Systems
Recent years have been pivotal in the field of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) security, with a large number of high-profile attacks exposing the lack of a design-for-securit... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\Windows\System32. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit the user accounts that have access to backups to only those required. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon obtains the target's IP address and local network segment.[207][208] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used malware like WhiskeyAlfa to overwrite the first 64MB of every drive with a mix of static and random buffers. A similar process is then used to wipe content in logical drives and, finally, attempt to wipe every byte of every sector on every drive... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq creates new services to establish persistence.[63][64][65] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Video Killed the Text Star: OSINT Approach
In 1979 The Buggles launched the hit song "Video Killed the Radio Star." Nowadays The Buggles could write a new song titled "Video Killed the Text Star." Social networks are growing around video content. This means that if OSINT (Open Source INTelligence) ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has searched the entire target system for DOC, DOCX, PPT, PPTX, XLS, XLSX, and PDF files.[203] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa can collect information about a compromised computer, including: Hardware UUID, Mac serial number, macOS version, and disk sizes.[214] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher enumerates directories and scans for certain files.[124][125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton communicates with Triconex controllers using a custom component framework written entirely in Python. The modules that implement the TriStation communication protocol and other supporting components are found in a separate file -- library.zip -- the main script that e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq connects to a predefined domain on port 443 to exfil gathered information.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1036.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Masquerade Task or Service
Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description. Windows services will have a servic... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
BACKSPACE attempts to avoid detection by checking a first stage command and control server to determine if it should connect to the second stage server, which performs "louder" interactions with the malware.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
A Gamaredon Group file stealer can gather the victim's computer name and drive serial numbers to send to a C2 server.[142][143][144] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used a file injector DLL to spawn a benign process on the victim's system and inject the malicious payload into it via process hollowing.[23] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Keynote - Cybersecurity: The Next Generation
The pursuit and practice of cybersecurity is now entering its second generation. With the massive adoption of connected technologies in every part of our lives, the ability to secure these technologies is not just big business, it also has huge relevance... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Automated Discovery of Deserialization Gadget Chains
Although vulnerabilities stemming from the deserialization of untrusted data have been understood for many years, unsafe deserialization continues to be a vulnerability class that isn't going away. Attention on Java deserialization vulnerabilities... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Remotely Attacking System Firmware
In recent years, we have been witnessing a steady increase in security vulnerabilities in firmware. Nearly all of these issues require local (often privileged) or physical access to exploit. In this talk, we will present novel *remote* attacks on system firmware. I... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 ChaosDB: How We Hacked Databases of Thousands of Azure Customers
In August 2021, the Wiz Research Team uncovered ChaosDB - a critical cross-tenant vulnerability in Azure Cosmos DB, Azure's flagship managed database solution which is used by countless organizations. This vulnerability is every comp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0611
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clop
Clop can use cmd.exe to help execute commands on the system.[73] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Use & Abuse of Personal Information
Virtually any meaningful interaction occurring across the Internet requires the establishment of a user profile, which in turn requires entry of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) as a way for service providers to verify and support/track user activity. Suc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Consider disabling or restricting NTLM.[24] Consider disabling WDigest authentication.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has included location tracking capabilities in the malicious apps deployed as part of Operation BULL and Operation ROCK.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has the ability to enumerate running processes on a compromised host.[266] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1003.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cached Domain Credentials
Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet executes malicious SQL commands in the WinCC database server to propagate to remote systems. The malicious SQL commands include xp_cmdshell, sp_dumpdbilog, and sp_addextendedproc. [11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0916
ATT&CK Technique Name:Vulnerability Scanning
Implement continuous monitoring of vulnerability sources. Also, use automatic and manual code review tools. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0279
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proton
Proton modifies the tty_tickets line in the sudoers file.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS has used useless code blocks to counter analysis.[31] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Human or Not: Can You Really Detect the Fake Voices?
Voice is an essential medium for humans to transfer information and build trust, and the trustworthiness of voice is of great importance to humans. With the development of deep learning technologies, attackers have started to use AI techniques to ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used a tool to enumerate proxy settings in the target environment.[256] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Refer to NIST guidelines when creating password policies. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:OutSteel
OutSteel has relied on a user to click a malicious link within a spearphishing email.[30] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.