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ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus can collect system drive information, the computer name, the size of the disk, OS version, and OS architecture information.[256] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has created a file named "startup_vrun.bat" in the Startup folder of a virtual machine to establish persistence.[157] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic has 2 methods for elevating integrity. It can bypass UAC through eventvwr.exe and sdclt.exe.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's Get-TimedScreenshot Exfiltration module can take screenshots at regular intervals.[123][124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN4
FIN4 has used legitimate credentials to hijack email communications.[24][25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0337
ATT&CK Technique Name:BadPatch
BadPatch stores collected data in log files before exfiltration.[13] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 PASTA: Portable Automotive Security Testbed with Adaptability
For accelerating the development of sophisticated driving-assist technologies such as automated driving, securing vehicles against cyberattacks is challenging. To promote the development of security-measurement methods, a company's ele... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
During FunnyDream, the threat actors used wmiexec.vbs to run remote commands.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY can gather system information such as computer names.[288] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell has a command to modify a Registry key.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor's has a plugin that is capable of recording audio using available input sound devices.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used DYEPACK to create, delete, and alter records in databases used for SWIFT transactions.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has searched the Image File Execution Options registry key for "Debugger" within every subkey.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Create static ARP entries for networked devices. Implementing static ARP entries may be infeasible for large networks. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover files in specific locations on the hard disk %TEMP% directory, the current user's desktop, the Program Files directory, and Recent.[120][309] Turla RPC backdoors have also searched for files matching the lPH*.dll pattern.[310] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Is the Mafia Taking Over Cybercrime?
Claims abound that the Mafia is not only getting involved in cybercrime, but taking a leading role in the enterprise. One can find such arguments regularly in media articles, on blogs, and in discussions with members of the information security industry. In some... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security
Thunderbolt is a high-bandwidth interconnect promoted by Intel and included in laptops, desktops, and other systems. Being PCIe-based, Thunderbolt devices possess Direct Memory Access (DMA)-enabled I/O. In an "evil maid" DMA attack, wher... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure proper process and file permissions are in place to inhibit adversaries from disabling or interfering with critical services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used compromised credentials to access other systems on a victim network.[49][50][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0513
ATT&CK Technique Name:LiteDuke
LiteDuke can enumerate the CPUID and BIOS version on a compromised system.[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla can collect the timestamp from the victim’s machine.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Regularly check component software on critical services that adversaries may target for persistence to verify the integrity of the systems and identify if unexpected changes have been made. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can obtain the computer name, OS version, and default language identifier.[322] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0191
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winexe
Winexe installs a service on the remote system, executes the command, then uninstalls the service.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0074
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sakula
Some Sakula samples install themselves as services for persistence by calling WinExec with the net start argument.[106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hybrid Identity
Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0654
ATT&CK Technique Name:ProLock
ProLock can use BITS jobs to download its malicious payload.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has used multiple native Windows APIs to execute and conduct process injections.[133] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:SeaDuke
SeaDuke is capable of persisting via a .lnk file stored in the Startup directory.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer used a tool called MailSniper to search for files on the desktop and another utility called Sobolsoft to extract attachments from EML files.[178] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0075
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rancor
Rancor launched a scheduled task to gain persistence using the schtasks /create /sc command.[147] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0200
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dipsind
A Dipsind variant registers as a Winlogon Event Notify DLL to establish persistence.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0328
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Mango
Stealth Mango can record audio using the device microphone.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has created new social media accounts for targeting efforts.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Application developers uploading to public code repositories should be careful to avoid publishing sensitive information such as credentials and API keys. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has also used PowerSploit's Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1 to reflectively load a PowerShell payload into a random process on the victim system.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0585
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kerrdown
Kerrdown has gained execution through victims opening malicious links.[9] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 CnCHunter: An MITM-Approach to Identify Live CnC Servers
How can we identify active CnC servers? Answering this question is critical for containing and combating botnets. Finding CnC servers is not trivial because: CnC servers can change locations expressly to avoid detection, use proprietary commun... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0138
ATT&CK Technique Name:OLDBAIT
OLDBAIT collects credentials from several email clients.[30] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Perimeter Breached! Hacking an Access Control System
The first critical component to any attack is an entry point. As we lock down our firewalls and sophisticated routers, it can be easy to overlook the network-connected physical access control systems. According to a study done by IBM in 2021, the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with LaZagne.[25][26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0528
ATT&CK Technique Name:Javali
Javali has achieved execution through victims opening malicious attachments, including MSI files with embedded VBScript.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest installs a launch item using an embedded encrypted launch agent property list template. The plist file is installed in the ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ folder and configured with the path to the persistent binary located in the ~/Library/ folder.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has installed a systemd service script to maintain persistence.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon can use parent PID spoofing to elevate privileges.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used cmd.exe likely as a password changing mechanism.[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot collects a list of install programs and services on the system’s machine.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0233
ATT&CK Technique Name:MURKYTOP
MURKYTOP has the capability to scan for open ports on hosts in a connected network.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can collect data and files from a compromised host.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke exfiltrates collected files automatically over FTP to remote servers.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment networks and systems appropriately to reduce access to critical system and services communications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [3] [4] These audits should also include if default ... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Thermanator and the Thermal Residue Attack
As warm-blooded mammals, humans routinely leave thermal residue on various objects with which they come in contact. This includes common input devices, such as keyboards, that are used for entering (among other things) secret information: passwords and PINs... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Review privileged cloud account permission levels routinely to look for those that could allow an adversary to gain wide access, such as Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator in Azure AD.[14][15][16] These reviews should also check if ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer used Microsoft’s Sysinternals tools to gather detailed information about remote systems.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network/Host intrusion prevention systems, antivirus, and detonation chambers can be employed to prevent documents from fetching and/or executing malicious payloads.[7] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Applied Self-Driving Car Security
In the not too distant future, we'll live in a world where computers are driving our cars. Soon, cars may not even have steering wheels or brake pedals. But, in this scenario, should we be worried about cyber attack of these vehicles? In this talk, two researcher... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1057
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Loss Prevention
Data loss prevention can restrict access to sensitive data and detect sensitive data that is unencrypted. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Implement network-based filtering restrictions to prohibit data transfers to untrusted VPCs. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0611
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clop
Clop can search for processes with antivirus and antimalware product names.[19][20] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Portable Data exFiltration: XSS for PDFs
PDF documents and PDF generators are ubiquitous on the web, and so are injection vulnerabilities. Did you know that controlling a measly HTTP hyperlink can provide a foothold into the inner workings of a PDF? In this session, you will learn how to use a sing... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin establishes persistence by creating a shortcut (.LNK file) in the Windows startup folder to run a script each time the user logs in.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan has saved files prior to upload from a compromised host to folders beginning with the characters a9850d2f.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Disable legacy authentication, which does not support MFA, and require the use of modern authentication protocols instead. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team utilized net use to connect to network shares.[4] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Store-to-Leak Forwarding: There and Back Again
In the past couple of years, we have seen many different attacks that allowed an attacker to leak data. One of these attacks is Meltdown, allowing an attacker to leak kernel memory. After it was fixed, everyone thought that the problem was solved. Un... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0414
ATT&CK Technique Name:BabyShark
BabyShark has used scheduled tasks to maintain persistence.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has scanned for vulnerabilities in IoT devices and other related resources such as the Docker API.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can remove files from a targeted system.[193] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Zombie Ant Farming: Practical Tips for Playing Hide and Seek with Linux EDRs
EDR solutions have landed in Linux. With the ever increasing footprint of Linux machines deployed in data centers, offensive operators have to answer the call.
In the first part of the talk we will share practical tips and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink has the ability to use the Linux API function utime to change the timestamps of modified firmware update images.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Applications may send push notifications to verify a login as a form of multi-factor authentication (MFA). Train users to only accept valid push notifications and to report suspicious push notifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used FTP to download additional malware to the target machine.[6] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Fingerprint-Jacking: Practical Fingerprint Authorization Hijacking in Android Apps
Many mobile devices carry a fingerprint scanner nowadays. Mobile apps utilize the fingerprint scanner to facilitate operations such as account login and payment authorization. Despite its security-critical nature, re... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Lessons and Lulz: The 4th Annual Black Hat USA NOC Report
Back with another year of soul crushing statistics, the Black Hat NOC team will be sharing all of the data that keeps us equally puzzled, and entertained, year after year. We'll let you know all the tools and techniques we're using to set up... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Strengthening Cyber Resiliency in a Time of Geopolitical Crises: Applying Threat Intelligence & Active Defense to Protecting Critical Information Infrastructures
The basis of our presentation is the long-term monitoring of the development of the attackers on the Russian scene, their maturity an... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Selling 0-Days to Governments and Offensive Security Companies
Selling 0-days is a fascinating process that not a lot of people are familiar with. This talk will discuss a vulnerability brokerage company called Q-recon and provide a glimpse of how this market works. In the presentation the following... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment and control software movement between business and OT environments by way of one directional DMZs. Web access should be restricted from the OT environment. Engineering workstations, including transient cyber assets (TCAs) should have minimal connectivit... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore can execute JavaScript by injecting it into the victim's browser.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell has used rundll32.exe to execute other DLLs and named pipes.[102] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Lateral Movement and Privilege Escalation in GCP; Compromise any Organization without Dropping an Implant
Google Cloud's security model in many ways is quite different from AWS. Spark jobs, Cloud Functions, Jupyter Notebooks, and more default to having administrative capabilities over cloud API's. I... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0165
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSInfo
OSInfo has enumerated the local administrators group.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT1
APT1 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.[8] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 Lost Control: Breaking Hardware-Assisted Kernel Control-Flow Integrity with Page-Oriented Programming
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) has been widely spreading from applications to the kernel to prevent Code Reuse Attacks (CRAs) such as ret2libc and Return-Oriented Programming (ROP). The CFI mechanism... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0404
ATT&CK Technique Name:esentutl
esentutl can be used to copy files to/from a remote share.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBSRAT
BBSRAT has been seen loaded into msiexec.exe through process hollowing to hide its execution.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conficker
Conficker exploits Windows drive shares. Once it has infected a computer, Conficker automatically copies itself to all visible open drive shares on other computers inside the network. [11] Nuclear power plant officials suspect someone brought in Conficker by accident on a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used the commands net view /all /domain and ping to discover remote systems. They also used PowerView's PowerShell Invoke-ShareFinder script for file share enumeration.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson contains a command to list processes.[66][67][68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar gathers information on the system and local drives.[182] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can call WTSQueryUserToken and CreateProcessAsUser to start a new process with local system privileges.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus can exfiltrate files from the system using a documents collector tool.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has nltest /domain_trusts to identify domain trust relationships.[15] | secon |
title:botconf2016 Challenges for a cross-jurisdictional botnet takedown
Practical case: how legislation can improve Law Enforcement effectiveness in pursuing criminals acting in an international environment.What to do when criminals act as if they were multinational enterprises, delocalizing their criminal services acr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:DLL Side-Loading
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking, side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 can perform port scans from an infected host.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM has used the systeminfo command on a compromised host.[338] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0849
ATT&CK Technique Name:Masquerading
Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configurati... | secon |