text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:G0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackTech
BlackTech has used DLL side loading by giving DLLs hardcoded names and placing them in searched directories.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aoqin Dragon
Aoqin Dragon has used the Themida packer to obfuscate malicious payloads.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent Office applications from creating child processes and from writing potentially malicious executable content to disk. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0651
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoxCaon
BoxCaon can collect the victim's MAC address by using the GetAdaptersInfo API.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Determine if certain websites that can be used for spearphishing are necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0495
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDAT
RDAT can upload a file via HTTP POST response to the C2 split into 102,400-byte portions. RDAT can also download data from the C2 which is split into 81,920-byte portions.[15] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Reverse Engineering Compliance
A big part of reverse engineering is asking "how does this work?" That's usually a step on the way to asking "why does it work thatway?" or "how can I make this work for me?" And usually, we reverse machine code. But we can bring the same thinking to other things. W... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can collect the computer name, system architecture, default language, and processor frequency of a compromised host.[212] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication and limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by preventing Privilege Escalation opportunities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke can identify the MAC address on the target computer.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:The White Company
The White Company has the ability to delete its malware entirely from the target system.[239] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:DnsSystem
DnsSystem can direct queries to custom DNS servers and return C2 commands using TXT records.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has injected code into target processes via thread local storage callbacks.[2][3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0130
ATT&CK Technique Name:Unknown Logger
Unknown Logger is capable of downloading remote files.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea injects itself into explorer.exe.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0095
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete has created scheduled tasks to maintain Machete's persistence.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre has been delivered with encrypted resources and must be unpacked for execution.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1073
ATT&CK Technique Name:Royal
Royal can identify specific files and directories to exclude from the encryption process.[264][265][266] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0441
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShower
PowerShower sets up persistence with a Registry run key.[199] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT has modified the Windows firewall to allow itself to communicate through the firewall.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1552.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Credentials in Registry
Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentia... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1078.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, servi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0810
ATT&CK Technique Name:Out-of-Band Communications Channel
Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage [9]. Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technol... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0845
ATT&CK Technique Name:Program Upload
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maroochy Water Breach
In the Maroochy Water Breach, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0647
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turian
Turian can establish persistence by adding Registry Run keys.[267] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 created a Scheduled Task/Job that used regsvr32.exe to execute a COM scriptlet that dynamically downloaded a backdoor and injected it into memory. The group has also used regsvr32 to run their backdoor.[7][8][9] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 SirenJack: Cracking a 'Secure' Emergency Warning Siren System
SirenJack is a vulnerability that was found to affect radio-controlled emergency warning siren systems from ATI Systems. It allows a bad actor, with a $30 handheld radio and a laptop, to set off all sirens in a deployment. Hackers can tri... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used a renamed cmd.exe file to evade detection.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Resting on Feet of Clay: Securely Bootstrapping OPC UA Deployments
While most protocols in industrial control systems (ICS) rarely implement security features, the OPC Foundation's Unified Architecture (OPC UA) promises security features such as authentication, authorization, integrity, and confide... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metador
Metador has established persistence through the use of a WMI event subscription combined with unusual living-off-the-land binaries such as cdb.exe.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has gained access to internet-facing systems and applications, including virtual private network (VPN), remote desktop protocol (RDP), and virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) including Citrix. [26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. [43] Control flow integrity checking is a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0195
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDelete
SDelete deletes data in a way that makes it unrecoverable.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0360
ATT&CK Technique Name:BONDUPDATER
BONDUPDATER persists using a scheduled task that executes every minute.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has renamed certutil and moved it to a different location on the system to avoid detection based on use of the tool.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
DustySky achieves persistence by creating a Registry entry in HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0289
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for iOS
Pegasus for iOS monitors the connection state and tracks which types of networks the phone is connected to, potentially to determine the bandwidth and ability to send full data across the network.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0110
ATT&CK Technique Name:at
at can be used to schedule a task on a system to be executed at a specific date or time.[4][1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has used the Plink utility to create SSH tunnels.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
The Carbanak malware communicates to its command server using HTTP with an encrypted payload.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used scheduled tasks to stage its operation.[160] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can steal access tokens from exiting processes.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe has crafted VBS-based malicious documents.[158][159] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0630
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nebulae
Nebulae uses functions named StartUserModeBrowserInjection and StopUserModeBrowserInjection indicating that it's trying to imitate chrome_frame_helper.dll.[106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper Registry permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security/logging services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has the ability to enumerate the infected system's user name.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crutch
Crutch can exfiltrate files from compromised systems.[52] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Legal GNSS Spoofing and its Effects on Autonomous Vehicles
Many systems depend on accurate location information from Global Navigation System Satellites (GNSS) for normal operation. Public GNSS lacks integrity mechanisms and is vulnerable to spoofing. U.S. Federal law does not allow over-the-air sp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT has used AutoIt to compile the payload and main script into a single executable after delivery.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:ccf32
ccf32 can upload collected data and files to an FTP server.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used HTTP for C2 communications.[216][217] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Vulnerability Scanning
Continuous monitoring of vulnerability sources and the use of automatic and manual code review tools should also be implemented as well.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict the permissions on sensitive files such as /proc/[pid]/maps or /proc/[pid]/mem. | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Thinking Outside the JIT Compiler: Understanding and Bypassing StructureID Randomization with Generic and Old-School Methods
In the last two years, lots of JIT compiler bugs have been found in the major browsers. For Safari, the most common way of exploiting a JIT bug in the JavaScriptCore engine i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0254
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLAINTEE
PLAINTEE collects general system enumeration data about the infected machine and checks the OS version.[278] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has created scheduled tasks to run malicious scripts on a compromised host.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can obtain proxy information from a victim's machine using system environment variables.[96][97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher uses DLL side-loading to load malicious programs.[22][23] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 It's Not What You Know, It's What You Do: How Data Can Shape Security Engagement
When it comes to security training, one size does not fit all. Company-wide and even role-based security trainings do not acknowledge the strengths and weaknesses in an individual's security performance. It is ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used a tool called GREASE to add a Windows admin account in order to allow them continued access via RDP.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
The Netwalker DLL has been injected reflectively into the memory of a legitimate running process.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM infrastructure and follow WinRM best practices on use of host firewalls to restrict WinRM access to allow communication only to/from specific devices.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure critical system files as well as those known to be abused by adversaries have restrictive permissions and are owned by an appropriately privileged account, especially if access is not required by users nor will inhibit system functionality. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 has used search order hijacking to execute malicious payloads, such as Winnti RAT.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
An APT19 HTTP malware variant decrypts strings using single-byte XOR keys.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1090.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Fronting
Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. Domain fronting involves using differe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla has established persistence via the Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Run registry key and by creating a .lnk shortcut file in the Windows startup folder.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Users need to be trained to not authorize third-party applications they don’t recognize. The user should pay particular attention to the redirect URL: if the URL is a misspelled or convoluted sequence of words related to an expected service or SaaS application, the we... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Ensure that MFA and MFA policies and requirements are properly implemented for existing and deactivated or dormant accounts and devices. If possible, consider configuring MFA solutions to "fail closed" rather than grant access in case of serious errors. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable cloud-delivered protection and Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to block the execution of files that resemble ransomware. [95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0341
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbash
Xbash can collect IP addresses and local intranet information from a victim’s machine.[252] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0665
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThreatNeedle
ThreatNeedle can be loaded into the Startup folder (%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\OneDrives.lnk) as a Shortcut file for persistence.[260] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Two-Factor Authentication, Usable or Not? A Two-Phase Usability Study of the FIDO U2F Security Key
Why do people choose to use (or not use) Two Factor Authentication (2FA)? We report on some surprising results from a two-phase study on the Yubico Security Key working with Yubico. Despite the Yubico ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer has attempted to brute force TCP ports 135 (RPC) and 1433 (MSSQL) with the default username or list of usernames and passwords.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0445
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRatReporter
ShimRatReporter used LZ compression to compress initial reconnaissance reports before sending to the C2.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD has the ability to list drives and files on the compromised host.[170][229] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves can enumerate drives and Remote Desktop sessions.[73] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 No More Secret Sauce!: How We Can Power Real Security Machine Learning Progress Through Open Algorithms and Benchmarks
While we've recently seen game-changing machine learning breakthroughs in the domains of language, vision, and robotics, it's no secret that security ML progress remains fettered b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment and control software movement between business and OT environments by way of one directional DMZs. Web access should be restricted from the OT environment. Engineering workstations, including transient cyber assets (TCAs) should have minimal connectivit... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 DeepPhish: Simulating Malicious AI
91% of cybercrimes and attacks start with a phishing email. This means that cyber security researchers must focus on detecting phishing in all of its settings and uses. However, they face many challenges as they go up against sophisticated and intelligent attackers... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 Unsafe At Any Speed: CISA's Plan to Foster Tech Ecosystem Security
In 1965, Ralph Nader published "Unsafe at Any Speed", a survey of automobile safety from design, to delivery, to maintenance. The parallels to the safety of modern technology are startling. In this talk, we'll explore how products ca... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Forge Web Credentials
Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used a Batch file to automate frequently executed post compromise cleanup activities.[126] FIN8 has also executed commands remotely via cmd.[127][128] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has been delivered as archived Windows executable files masquerading as PDF documents.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used local account credentials found during the intrusion for lateral movement and privilege escalation.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0472
ATT&CK Technique Name:down_new
down_new has the ability to base64 encode C2 communications.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Variants of Emissary have used rundll32.exe in Registry values added to establish persistence.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0255
ATT&CK Technique Name:DDKONG
DDKONG downloads and uploads files on the victim’s machine.[141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used the Get-ManagementRoleAssignment PowerShell cmdlet to enumerate Exchange management role assignments through an Exchange Management Shell.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can modify the Registry to store its components.[62] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Investigating Malware Using Memory Forensics - A Practical Approach
The number of cyber attacks is undoubtedly on the rise targeting government, military, public and private sectors. Most of these cyber attacks make use of malicious programs (Malware) for financial theft, espionage, intellectual ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0329
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tangelo
Tangelo contains functionality to gather GPS coordinates.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot modifies the time of a file as specified by the control server.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer is able to block serial COM channels temporarily causing a denial of view. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has pushed additional malicious tools onto an infected system to steal user credentials, move laterally, and destroy data.[395][396] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has used history -c to clear script shell logs.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has the ability to store information regarding the C2 server and downloads in the Registry key HKCU\Software\ApplicationContainer\Appsw64.[37][38][39] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.