text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
titleblackhat:us-20 Fooling Windows through Superfetch
Have you ever tried to hide your traces after doing some obscure stuff on a computer? We usually think about cleaning histories, file lefts, event viewer, DNS cache, and registry keys but have you ever thought about Superfetch?This is a Windows service whose purpos... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot obtains the IP address, location, and other relevant network information from the victim’s machine.[232][233][57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum's backdoor deletes files after they have been successfully uploaded to C2 servers.[164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can delete folders and files including overwriting its executable with legitimate programs.[189][190][191][184] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Stop that Release, There's a Vulnerability!
Software companies can have hundreds of software products in-market at any one time, all requiring support and security fixes with tight release timelines or no releases planned at all. At the same time, the velocity of open source vulnerabilities that ra... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 (Un)protected Broadcasts in Android 9 and 10
We discovered a systemic vulnerability affecting Android version 9, Android version 10, and Android version 11 Developer Preview that allowed third-party apps to spoof certain protected broadcast Intent messages, allowing the sending of unauthorized mes... | secon |
title:botconf2017 Cyber Threat Intel & Incident Response with TheHive, Cortex & MISP
Agenda:Cyber Threat Intel & Incident Response in 2017MISP, TheHive & Cortex Overview,Installing & configuring the product stack… Bringing it all togetherAn IR case study,Dealing with notifications,How CTI feeds IR,How IR feeds CTI,The ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used a customized PlugX variant which could spread through USB connections.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0058
ATT&CK Technique Name:SslMM
SslMM sends information to its hard-coded C2, including OS version, service pack information, processor speed, system name, and OS install date.[348] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX has a module to list the processes running on a machine.[198] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0418
ATT&CK Technique Name:ViceLeaker
ViceLeaker can download attacker-specified files.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Use Group Policy to disable screensavers if they are unnecessary.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0633
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sliver
Sliver can inject code into local and remote processes.[58][59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0355
ATT&CK Technique Name:Final1stspy
Final1stspy creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0698
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWizard
HermeticWizard can use a list of hardcoded credentials in attempt to authenticate to SMB shares.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan can use HTTPS for communication with C2.[210][176][211] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
After copying itself to a DLL file, a variant of Elise calls the DLL file using rundll32.exe.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has used JavaScript in its attacks.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has used VBScript to execute malicious code.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has monitored critical processes to ensure resiliency.[230] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke exploited Apache Struts, Oracle WebLogic (CVE-2017-10271), and Adobe ColdFusion (CVE-2017-3066) vulnerabilities to deliver malware.[51][52] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Store-to-Leak Forwarding: There and Back Again
In the past couple of years, we have seen many different attacks that allowed an attacker to leak data. One of these attacks is Meltdown, allowing an attacker to leak kernel memory. After it was fixed, everyone thought that the problem was solved. Unf... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can send phishing emails containing malicious links designed to collect users’ credentials.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1624.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Broadcast Receivers
Adversaries may establish persistence using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Mobile operating systems have means to subscribe to events such as receiving an SMS message, device boot completion, or other device activities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre has a command to download and executes additional files.[158] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum loader only executes the payload after the left mouse button has been pressed at least three times, in order to avoid being executed within virtualized or emulated environments.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT collects the CPU information, OS information, and system language.[302] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 MFA-ing the Un-MFA-ble: Protecting Auth Systems' Core Secrets
Compromised credentials have been APT groups' favorite tool for accessing, propagating and maintaining access to their victims' networks. Consequently, aware defenders mitigate this risk, by adding additional factors (MFA), so no secret i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can use ImprovedReflectiveDLLInjection to deploy components.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0021
During C0021, the threat actors used HTTP for some of their C2 communications.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0201
ATT&CK Technique Name:JPIN
JPIN checks for the presence of certain security-related processes and deletes its installer/uninstaller component if it identifies any of them.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
The password for the user's login keychain can be changed from the user's login password. This increases the complexity for an adversary because they need to know an additional password.Organizations may consider weighing the risk of storing credentials in passwor... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit
Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a UEFI BIOS rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team to persist remote access software on some targeted systems.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad has collected the PID of a malicious process.[225] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 The Future of ATO
Account Takeover (ATO) is the silent killer of online security. Between password megalists, massive PII breaches and ever more sophisticated attackers, it's becoming almost impossible to help regular users to thread the needle of a usable, but secure, experience. Coinbase is one of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer uses a custom DoS tool that leverages CVE-2015-5374 and targets hardcoded IP addresses of Siemens SIPROTEC devices.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda checks processes on the system and if they meet the necessary requirements, it injects into that process.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0256
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mosquito
Mosquito runs tasklist to obtain running processes.[175] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0627
ATT&CK Technique Name:SodaMaster
SodaMaster can search a list of running processes.[191] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors gathered a recursive directory listing to find files and directories of interest.[218] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can inject itself into running processes on a compromised host.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork ran a reverse shell with Meterpreter.[255] Patchwork used JavaScript code and .SCT files on victim machines.[36][256] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0643
ATT&CK Technique Name:Peppy
Peppy has the ability to automatically exfiltrate files and keylogs.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Support Provider
Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET searches firewall configuration files located in /Library/Preferences/ and uses csrutil status to determine if System Integrity Protection is enabled.[119] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0011
During C0011, Transparent Tribe relied on student targets to click on a malicious link sent via email.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for cloud accounts, especially privileged accounts. This can be implemented in a variety of forms (e.g. hardware, virtual, SMS), and can also be audited using administrative reporting features.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group executed malware with C:\\windows\system32\rundll32.exe "C:\ProgramData\ThumbNail\thumbnail.db", CtrlPanel S-6-81-3811-75432205-060098-6872 0 0 905.[72][73][74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0509
ATT&CK Technique Name:FakeSpy
FakeSpy can detect if it is running in an emulator and adjust its behavior accordingly.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 1
At the end of day one of this year's virtual conference, join Black Hat Review Board members Ryan Flores, Lidia Giuliano, Ty Miller, and Ashley Shen for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Lock... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can be configured to use TCP, ICMP, and UDP for C2 communications.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher hooks processes by modifying IAT pointers to CreateWindowEx.[9][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
All field controllers should require users to authenticate for all remote or local management sessions. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can schedule tasks via the Windows COM API to maintain persistence.[146] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has used external remote services such as virtual private networks (VPN) to gain initial access.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0099
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT-C-36
APT-C-36 has used ConfuserEx to obfuscate its variant of Imminent Monitor, compressed payload and RAT packages, and password protected encrypted email attachments to avoid detection.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used multiple types of encryption and encoding for their payloads, including AES, Caracachs, RC4, XOR, Base64, and other tricks such as creating aliases in code for Native API function names.[191][192][193][194][91][195][196] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390's malware can create a new service, sometimes naming it after the config information, to gain persistence.[122][123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts, particularly between network and non-network platforms, such a... | secon |
title:botconf2013 Malware Calling
Zitmo (ZeuS in the MObile) is a mutation of ZeuS that appeared for the first time in early 2011, targeting bank customers in Poland and Spain, infecting unknown numbers of users. Zitmo consists of two parts: spyware installed od PC and an application installed on mobile device. At the ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has used HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.[309] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Unix Shell Configuration Modification
Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User Unix Shells execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a u... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can use HTTP in C2 communications.[65][270] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Virtually Private Networks
Is Secure Remote Access like the emperor’s new clothes?Enterprise businesses equip staff with mobile devices such as laptops and smart phones to perform daily tasks. This makes the workforce much more mobile but places an implicit burden on the staff to ensure that they ar... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can perform reconnaissance commands on a victim machine via a cmd.exe process.[335] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can can remove all system restore points.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0160
ATT&CK Technique Name:certutil
certutil can be used to download files from a given URL.[99][100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Ensure wireless networks require the authentication of all devices, and that all wireless devices also authenticate network infrastructure devices (i.e., mutual authentication). For defense-in-depth purposes, utilize VPNs or ensure that ap... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used a malicious HTA file that contained a mix of HTML and JavaScript/VBScript code.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:IceApple
The IceApple OWA credential logger can monitor for OWA authentication requests and log the credentials.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER can execute commands from its C2 server.[241] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
For FunnyDream, the threat actors likely established an identified email account to register a variety of domains that were used during the campaign.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has modified Registry settings for default file associations to enable all macros and for persistence.[77][78][79][80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group malware can decode contents from a payload that was Base64 encoded and write the contents to a file.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1073
ATT&CK Technique Name:Royal
Royal uses a multi-threaded encryption process that can partially encrypt targeted files with the OpenSSL library and the AES256 algorithm.[78][79][80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can detect system information--including disk names, total space, and remaining space--to create a hardware profile GUID which acts as a system identifier for operators.[294][295] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0335
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbon
Carbon can list the processes on the victim’s machine.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has relied upon users to execute a malicious attachment delivered via spearphishing.[208][79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has the ability to enumerate domain admin accounts.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can record keystrokes from both the keyboard and virtual keyboard.[160][161] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has used the open source UPX executable packer.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Many vulnerabilities related to injecting code into existing applications have been patched in previous Android releases. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0812
ATT&CK Technique Name:Default Credentials
Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aquatic Panda
Aquatic Panda has attempted to harvest credentials through LSASS memory dumping.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, the threat actors used WMIC to modify administrative settings on both a local and a remote host, likely as part of the first stages for their lateral movement; they also used WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe) to execute a variety of encoded PowerShell scripts usi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowGoop
PowGoop has disguised a PowerShell script as a .dat file (goopdate.dat).[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0561
ATT&CK Technique Name:GuLoader
The GuLoader executable has been retrieved via embedded macros in malicious Word documents.[105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0048
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has used spearphishing attachments to distribute its malware.[199] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware uses PowerShell commands to perform various functions, including gathering system information via WMI and executing commands from its C2 server.[218] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1204.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Malicious File
An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can use a hardcoded server public RSA key to encrypt the first request to C2.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0242
ATT&CK Technique Name:SynAck
SynAck parses the export tables of system DLLs to locate and call various Windows API functions.[165][166] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the SBOM
Despite its simplicity, the "software bill of materials" (SBOM) has been met with apathy and hostility, especially in policy circles. Why has this common industrial concept been so unpopular when translated into the information security context, and h... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1036.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Masquerade File Type
Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate files through changes to the payload's formatting, including the file’s signature, extension, and contents. Various file types have a typical standard format, including how they are encoded and org... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption property is set to disabled unless there are application requirements.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used environment variable string substitution for obfuscation.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1593.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Social Media
Adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, an... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 MINimum Failure - Stealing Bitcoins with Electromagnetic Fault Injection
How secure is a typical hardware bitcoin wallet? Surely such a device would not pin the security on the execution of a single instruction, that if mis-executed would immediately reveal the critical recovery seed, right? Right?... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0110
ATT&CK Technique Name:at
at can be used to schedule a task on a system to be executed at a specific date or time.[4][1] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.