text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has spread through emails with malicious attachments.[181][182][183][184][185][186][187][188] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0590
ATT&CK Technique Name:NBTscan
NBTscan can dump and print whole packet content.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete's collected data is encrypted with AES before exfiltration.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has created accounts disguised as legitimate backup and service accounts as well as an email administration account.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0574
ATT&CK Technique Name:BendyBear
BendyBear is designed to download an implant from a C2 server.[62] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 The Science of Hiring and Retaining Female Cybersecurity Engineers
The wisdom on why it is difficult to recruit and retain women in the industry has changed over the past decade; the speaker will share the latest information about the most successful approaches and results from a recent working gro... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mori
Mori can resolve networking APIs from strings that are ADD-encrypted.[152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth checks for the presence of Avast antivirus in the C:\Program\Files\ folder. [9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0436
ATT&CK Technique Name:TSCookie
TSCookie can multiple protocols including HTTP and HTTPS in communication with command and control (C2) servers.[347][348] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
Helminth can provide a remote shell. One version of Helminth uses batch scripting.[151] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa has stored collected files locally before exfiltration.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
A Patchwork file stealer can run a TaskScheduler DLL to add persistence.[128] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used sslip.io, a free IP to domain mapping service that also makes SSL certificate generation easier for traffic encryption, as part of their command and control.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, the threat actors ran nslookup and Advanced IP Scanner on the target network.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0463
ATT&CK Technique Name:INSOMNIA
INSOMNIA exploits a WebKit vulnerability to achieve root access on the device.[10] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Paging All Windows Geeks – Finding Evil in Windows 10 Compressed Memory
FireEye's FLARE team analyzed the Windows 10 memory compression implementation to enable access to data in the newly introduced (and undocumented) virtual store. This closes the door to malware evading detection during memory fo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0167
ATT&CK Technique Name:Matryoshka
Matryoshka is capable of performing screen captures.[103][104] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0425
ATT&CK Technique Name:Corona Updates
Corona Updates communicates with the C2 server using HTTP requests.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can RC4 encrypt strings in C2 communication.[110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky created and used a mailing toolkit to use in spearphishing attacks.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Library Loading
Disallow loading of remote DLLs. This is included by default in Windows Server 2012+ and is available by patch for XP+ and Server 2003+.Enable Safe DLL Search Mode to force search for system DLLs in directories with greater restrictions (e.g. %SYSTEMROOT%)t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has added a registry key in the hive for persistence.[196] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used JavaScript code.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS can retrieve usernames from compromised hosts.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to capture keystrokes on an infected host.[171] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk uses VMProtect to make reverse engineering the malware more difficult.[184] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used a proprietary tool to intercept one time passwords required for two-factor authentication.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
In the Ukraine 2015 Incident, Sandworm Team used the credentials of valid accounts to interact with client applications and access employee workstations hosting HMI applications. [6][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0582
ATT&CK Technique Name:LookBack
LookBack can enumerate services on the victim machine.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has added batch scripts to the startup folder.[257] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
The QakBot dropper can delay dropping the payload to evade detection.[34][35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth logs keystrokes from the victim's machine. [22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0511
ATT&CK Technique Name:RegDuke
RegDuke can store its encryption key in the Registry.[17] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 RustZone: Writing Trusted Applications in Rust
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are present in many devices today, and are used to perform security critical computation in an isolated environment. ARM's TrustZone is one of the most widely used TEEs in the world today, present in nearly every m... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used stolen credentials to access administrative accounts within the domain.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0511
ATT&CK Technique Name:RegDuke
RegDuke can extract and execute PowerShell scripts from C2 communications.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0504
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anchor
Anchor can establish persistence by creating a service.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1635
ATT&CK Technique Name:Steal Application Access Token
Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. This can occur through social engineering or URI hijacking and typically requires user action to grant access, such as thr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0611
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clop
Clop has checked the keyboard language using the GetKeyboardLayout() function to avoid installation on Russian-language or other Commonwealth of Independent States-language machines; it will also check the GetTextCharset function.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun can test a connection to a specified network IP address over a specified port number.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0504
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anchor
Anchor can create and execute services to load its payload.[3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
When running with root privileges after a Launch Agent is installed, ThiefQuest installs a plist file to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder with the RunAtLoad key set to true establishing persistence as a Launch Daemon. [18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0176
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wingbird
Wingbird checks the victim OS version after executing to determine where to drop files based on whether the victim is 32-bit or 64-bit.[397] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs collects network adapter and interface information by using the commands ipconfig /all, arp -a and route print. It also collects the system's MAC address with getmac and domain configuration with net config workstation.[126] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure that any accounts used by third-party providers to access these systems are traceable to the third-party and are not used throughout the network or used by other third-party providers in the same environment. Ensure there are regular reviews of accoun... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat's loader has been packed with the compressed ShimRat core DLL and the legitimate DLL for it to hijack.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST encrypted C2 traffic using a single-byte-XOR cipher.[130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1073
ATT&CK Technique Name:Royal
Royal establishes a TCP socket for C2 communication using the API WSASocketW.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak can determine if a compromised host has security products installed.[110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin can use the command code do_vslist to send file names, size, and status to C2.[226] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT can obtain passwords from common web browsers.[75][76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors collected data from compromised hosts.[130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM tries to add a scheduled task to establish persistence.[151][152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1053.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:At
Adversaries may abuse the at utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The at utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of Sc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0617
ATT&CK Technique Name:HELLOKITTY
HELLOKITTY can use WMI to delete volume shadow copies.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can load additional files and tools, including Mimikatz.[412] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS installs a registry Run key to establish persistence.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Utilize Yama (ex: /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope) to mitigate ptrace based process injection by restricting the use of ptrace to privileged users only. Other mitigation controls involve the deployment of security kernel modules that provide advance... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0230
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZeroT
ZeroT can download additional payloads onto the victim.[489] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum's payload is encrypted and embedded within its loader, or within a legitimate PNG file.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational network and systems to restrict access to critical system functions to predetermined management systems. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0436
ATT&CK Technique Name:TSCookie
TSCookie has the ability to proxy communications with command and control (C2) servers.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET adds malicious file paths to the DYLD_FRAMEWORK_PATH and DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variables to execute malicious code.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell has a command to perform video device spying.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has included system information enumeration in the malicious apps deployed as part of Operation BULL and Operation ROCK.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBSRAT
BBSRAT uses Expand to decompress a CAB file into executable content.[31] | secon |
title:botconf2014 How to Dismantle a Botnet: the Legal Behind the Scenes
Security experts have accomplished significant knowledge on how the most impenetrable botnets operate. While botnet intelligence gathering and disruptive tools are fast evolving, the legal mechanisms that enable investigation and prosecution of cy... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used encoded PowerShell scripts uploaded to CozyCar installations to download and install SeaDuke.[13][14][15][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has used the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM account to create files on Exchange servers.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0443
ATT&CK Technique Name:MESSAGETAP
MESSAGETAP uses the libpcap library to listen to all traffic and parses network protocols starting with Ethernet and IP layers. It continues parsing protocol layers including SCTP, SCCP, and TCAP and finally extracts SMS message data and routing metadata. [19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon uses commands such as netsh advfirewall firewall to discover local firewall settings.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing was executed in an Ubuntu container deployed via an open Docker daemon API.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0882
ATT&CK Technique Name:Theft of Operational Information
Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has harvested valid administrative credentials for lateral movement.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0253
ATT&CK Technique Name:RunningRAT
RunningRAT adds itself to the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence upon reboot.[106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0165
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSInfo
OSInfo enumerates the current network connections similar to net use .[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0814
ATT&CK Technique Name:Static Network Configuration
Statically defined ARP entries can prevent manipulation and sniffing of switched network traffic, as some AiTM techniques depend on sending spoofed ARP messages to manipulate network host's dynamic ARP tables. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer used a tool called Imecab to set up a persistent remote access account on the victim machine.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used administrative accounts, including Domain Admin, to move laterally within a victim network.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0337
ATT&CK Technique Name:BadPatch
BadPatch searches for files with specific file extensions.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0401
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux can execute commands with high privileges via a specific binary with setuid functionality.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:SSL/TLS Inspection
If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be domain fronting. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1568.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Generation Algorithms
Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much ha... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT has the capability to grab passwords from numerous web browsers as well as from Outlook and Thunderbird email clients.[93][94] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Embedding a Human-Centric Approach Into a Global Cyber Security Program
Humans are the weakest link in cyber security – or so the famous saying goes! This talk will challenge this age old expression to focus on the human elements of the protection pillars; people, process, and technology.Organisat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has sent emails with URLs pointing to malicious documents.[33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton's injector, inject.bin, masquerades as a standard compiled PowerPC program for the Tricon. [5]Triton was configured to masquerade as trilog.exe, which is the Triconex software for analyzing SIS logs.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use known credentials to run commands and spawn processes as a local user account.[2][3] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Cross-Site Escape: Pwning macOS Safari Sandbox the Unusual Way
Sandbox escape plays a vital role in a full chain exploit. For the past few years, we've seen several favorite targets of researchers like WindowServer have fallen apart on Pwn2Own. Most of them are memory safety issues in IPC endpoints ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
For C0017, APT41 obtained publicly available tools such as YSoSerial.NET, ConfuserEx, and BadPotato.[28] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Breaking Samsung's Root of Trust: Exploiting Samsung S10 Secure Boot
Being the highest market share smartphone manufacturer, Samsung conducts a series of protection on Android called Knox Platform to ensure the security of its smartphones. During the booting process, Samsung uses S-boot (Secure Boo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0502
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drovorub
Drovorub can use kernel modules to establish persistence.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom has used previously compromised administrative accounts to escalate privileges.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has the ability to disable Microsoft Outlook's security policies to disable macro warnings.[37] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 Dynamic Process Isolation
Cloud computing enables flexible, scalable and high-performant solutions for services in the cloud. However, sharing hardware resources between customers introduces the risk of potential vulnerabilities in both soft- and hardware. To ensure high-performance customer requi... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 TLBleed: When Protecting Your CPU Caches is Not Enough
We present TLBleed, a novel side-channel attack that leaks information out of Translation Lookaside Buffers (TLBs). TLBleed shows a reliable side channel without relying on the CPU data or instruction caches. This therefore bypasses several prop... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict read/write access to systemd unit files to only select privileged users who have a legitimate need to manage system services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used several code packing methods such as Themida, Enigma, VMProtect, and Obsidium, to pack their implants.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has the ability to identify the domain and the MAC and IP addresses of an infected machine.[243] | secon |
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