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title:blackhat:us-20 About Directed Fuzzing and Use-After-Free: How to Find Complex & Silent Bugs?
Fuzzing is a popular and effective automated approach to vulnerability detection. Directed fuzzing focuses on automatically testing specific parts of the code by taking advantage of additional information such as bug stac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 has a number of modules that leverage pass the hash for lateral movement.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mori
Mori can use DNS tunneling to communicate with C2.[42][43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0048
ATT&CK Technique Name:PinchDuke
PinchDuke steals credentials from compromised hosts. PinchDuke's credential stealing functionality is believed to be based on the source code of the Pinch credential stealing malware (also known as LdPinch). Credentials targeted by PinchDuke include ones associated many s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:CostaRicto
For CostaRicto, the threat actors used custom malware, including PS1, CostaBricks, and SombRAT.[12] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Compression Oracle Attacks on VPN Networks
Security researchers have done a good amount of practical attacks in the past using chosen plain-text attacks on compressed traffic to steal sensitive data. In spite of how popular CRIME and BREACH were, little was talked about how this class of attacks was... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 deployed a Monero cryptocurrency mining tool in a victim’s environment.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0028
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHIPSHAPE
SHIPSHAPE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the Startup folder.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used multiple web shells to gain execution.[25][26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. can manipulate clipboard data to replace cryptocurrency addresses.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0258
ATT&CK Technique Name:RGDoor
RGDoor uploads and downloads files to and from the victim’s machine.[385] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1577
ATT&CK Technique Name:Compromise Application Executable
Adversaries may modify applications installed on a device to establish persistent access to a victim. These malicious modifications can be used to make legitimate applications carry out adversary tasks when these applications are in use. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Hacking Public Opinion
Online disinformation has reached fever pitch: grifters pushing fake cures for COVID-19, nation states spinning pandemic conspiracies, domestic ideologues coordinating to push manipulative videos about presidential candidates. Malign actors are finding and exploiting divisions... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETEAGLE
NETEAGLE allows adversaries to execute shell commands on the infected host.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0686
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuietSieve
QuietSieve can use HTTPS in C2 communications.[264] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1589.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Credentials
Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords ac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Avoid PowerShell profiles if not needed. Use the -No Profile flag with when executing PowerShell scripts remotely to prevent local profiles and scripts from being executed. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1218.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:CMSTP
Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has executed commands through Microsoft security vulnerabilities, including CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2012-0158.[89][90] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 A SSLippery Slope: Unraveling the Hidden Dangers of Certificate Misuse
Digital signatures are fundamental for verifying the authenticity and integrity of untrusted data in the digital world. They ensure that software, firmware, and other digital content are not tampered with during transmission or ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke uses Windows services typically named "javamtsup" for persistence.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can find a process owned by a specific user and impersonate the associated token.[13] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 A New Attack Interface in Java Applications
It is known to us that Java language has an integrated ecosystem. With the development of cloud computing, more and more cloud-native systems increasingly consist of Java applications. In the meanwhile, the potential new attack surface for Java applicat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0161
ATT&CK Technique Name:XAgentOSX
XAgentOSX contains keylogging functionality that will monitor for active application windows and write them to the log, it can handle special characters, and it will buffer by default 50 characters before sending them out over the C2 infrastructure.[181] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS has checked the OS version using wmic.exe and the find command.[194] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession has the ability to use TCP and UDP in C2 communications.[16][57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Restrict unauthorized devices from accessing serial comm ports. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0215
ATT&CK Technique Name:KARAE
KARAE can upload and download files, including second-stage malware.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has a command to delete a file from the system. OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D deletes the app bundle and dropper after execution.[169][170] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has the capability to enumerate services.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis encodes the data sent to the server in Base64.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharkBot
SharkBot can use a Domain Generation Algorithm to decode the C2 server location.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0283
ATT&CK Technique Name:jRAT
jRAT has the capability to log keystrokes from the victim’s machine, both offline and online.[84][85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear can scramble functions not to be executed again with random values.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0282
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacSpy
MacSpy can capture screenshots of the desktop over multiple monitors.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE concatenates then decompresses multiple resources to load an embedded .Net Framework assembly.[160] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ixeshe
Ixeshe collects the computer name of the victim's system during the initial infection.[176] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 I'm a Hacker Get Me Out of Here! Breaking Network Segregation Using Esoteric Command & Control Channels
This talk will explore the weaponization of esoteric internal command and control (C2) channels and their use for lateral movement. James, an attack simulation consultant with F-Secure Co... | secon |
title:botconf2016 LURK – The Story about Five Years of Activity
Lurk activity was solely in Russia slince late 2011, but the technologies they use became noisy, when it appeared in the “World Market” years later. We were able to track activity despite the low detection by AV vendors. We will comment the activity of the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Limit communications with the container service to managed and secured channels, such as local Unix sockets or remote access via SSH. Require secure port access to communicate with the APIs over TLS by disabling unauthenticated access to the Do... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used macros to execute PowerShell scripts to download malware on victim's machines.[244] It has also used PowerShell to execute commands and move laterally through a victim network.[245][246][247] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be taught the dangers of rooting or jailbreaking their device. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Interconnection Filtering
Filtering requests by checking request origin information may provide some defense against spurious operators.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used side loading to place malicious DLLs in memory.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has added extra spaces between JavaScript code characters to increase the overall file size.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARDUMP
SUGARDUMP's scheduled task has been named MicrosoftInternetExplorerCrashRepoeterTaskMachineUA or MicrosoftEdgeCrashRepoeterTaskMachineUA, depending on the Windows OS version.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1542.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Component Firmware
Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeroaccess
Some variants of the Zeroaccess Trojan have been known to store data in Extended Attributes.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER typically use ping and Net to enumerate systems.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0614
ATT&CK Technique Name:CostaBricks
CostaBricks can inject a payload into the memory of a compromised host.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used batch scripts to enumerate network information, including information about trusts, zones, and the domain.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee has gained execution through luring users into opening malicious attachments.[50][51][52][53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0365
ATT&CK Technique Name:Olympic Destroyer
Olympic Destroyer uses the API call ChangeServiceConfigW to disable all services on the affected system.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has created a hidden directory under C:\ProgramData\Apple\Updates\ and C:\Users\Public\Documents\Flash\.[49][50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 used sticky-keys to obtain unauthenticated, privileged console access.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has used administrator credentials for lateral movement in compromised networks.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used a valid account to maintain persistence via scheduled task.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has removed system logs from /var/log/syslog.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0504
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anchor
Anchor has been signed with valid certificates to evade detection by security tools.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Data Storage
Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Data Storage
Automatically forward mail data and events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Consider updating Windows to the latest version and patch level to utilize the latest protective measures against UAC bypass.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
The Backdoor.Oldrea RAT is distributed through a trojanized installer attached to emails. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries will likely need to place new binaries in locations to be executed through this weakness. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed path interception by using application control tools, like Windows Defender Application Control, App... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackdoorDiplomacy
BackdoorDiplomacy has disguised their backdoor droppers with naming conventions designed to blend into normal operations.[9] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 eBPF ELFs JMPing Through the Windows
eBPF tracing is a hot new technology in the EDR and infrastructure space which provides high speed instrumentation and telemetry on events, processes, and network connections. eBPF is natively supported in the Linux kernel and is used in endpoint security product... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Consider automatically relaunching forwarding mechanisms at recurring intervals (ex: temporal, on-logon, etc.) as well as applying appropriate change management to firewall rules and other related system configurations. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Devils Are in the File Descriptors: It Is Time To Catch Them All
"Everything is a file" describes an important feature of Unix. File descriptor or fd is widely used in the Linux kernel. Exporting an fd to user space and importing an fd from user space are very common and basic operations in the Lin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0486
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bonadan
Bonadan has discovered the OS version, CPU model, and RAM size of the system it has been installed on.[66] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 The Inside Story: There are Apps in Apps and Here is How to Break Them
With the rapid development of mobile internet, apps have become more and more complex. However, their most used functions are limited to a few pages.Enter instant app. Instant apps have many advantages over normal apps, such a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metador
Metador has quickly deleted cbd.exe from a compromised host following the successful deployment of their malware.[145] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has been obfuscated with a XOR-based algorithm.[308][309] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can use BITS Utility to connect with the C2 server.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK can switch to a new C2 channel if the current one is broken.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1057
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Loss Prevention
Data loss prevention can detect and block sensitive data being uploaded via web browsers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Amadey
Amadey has checked for a variety of antivirus products.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deep Panda
Deep Panda uses net.exe to connect to network shares using net use commands with compromised credentials.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0380
ATT&CK Technique Name:StoneDrill
StoneDrill has relied on injecting its payload directly into the process memory of the victim's preferred browser.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 uses a module to receive a notification every time a USB mass storage device is inserted into a victim.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla can access the victim’s webcam and record video.[2][3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 Mirage: Cyber Deception Against Autonomous Cyber Attacks
It was once thought to be impossible or simply decades away. But, in 2016, enhancements in search and neural network classifiers, as well as computing advancements, led to the creation of the AlphaGo system, which is capable of outperforming ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM established persistence for PoisonIvy by created a scheduled task.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0698
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWizard
HermeticWizard can use WMI to create a new process on a remote machine via C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c start C:\windows\system32\\regsvr32.exe /s /iC:\windows\<filename>.dll.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer can use an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence and replaces the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
For Operation Honeybee, at least one identified persona was used to register for a free account for a control server.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0464
ATT&CK Technique Name:SYSCON
SYSCON has the ability to use Tasklist to list running processes.[248] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can launch itself from a hollowed svchost.exe process.[32][15][33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer can establish persistence by setting the value "Shell" with "explorer.exe, %malware_pathfile%" under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has used cmd.exe to execute arbitrary commands on the infected host across different stages of the infection chain.[183][184][185] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Perform integrity checks of firmware before uploading it on a device. Utilize cryptographic hashes to verify the firmware has not been tampered with by comparing it to a trusted hash of the firmware. This could be from trusted data sources (e.g., vendor site) or through a thi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0537
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperStack
HyperStack can use Windows API's ConnectNamedPipe and WNetAddConnection2 to detect incoming connections and connect to remote shares.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group performed brute force attacks against administrator accounts.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has gathered system information using systeminfo.[244] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0683
ATT&CK Technique Name:Peirates
Peirates can use stolen service account tokens to perform its operations.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can store its configuration information in the Registry under HKCU:\Software\Netwire.[13] | secon |
title:botconf2017 Math + GPU + DNS = Cracking Locky Seeds in Real Time without Analyzing Samples
We propose and implement a sublinear hash-collision method on a GPU to search for dynamic Locky DGA seed in real-time DNS query traffic. By combining real-time DNS traffic and this fast search method, we successfully detect... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM compressed and staged files in multi-part archives in the Recycle Bin prior to exfiltration.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0636
ATT&CK Technique Name:VaporRage
VaporRage has the ability to download malicious shellcode to compromised systems.[74] | secon |
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