text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors conducted a file listing discovery against multiple hosts to ensure locker encryption was successful.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin will connect to C2 only after sniffing a "magic packet" value in TCP or UDP packets matching specific conditions.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
A Patchwork .dll that contains BADNEWS is loaded and executed using DLL side-loading.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attestation
Device attestation can often detect jailbroken or rooted devices. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used rundll32.exe to execute malicious installers.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
Various implementations of CHOPSTICK communicate with C2 over SMTP and POP3.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:BITTER
BITTER has used scheduled tasks for persistence and execution.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0686
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuietSieve
QuietSieve can collect files from a compromised host.[152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0535
ATT&CK Technique Name:Golden Cup
Golden Cup has communicated with the C2 using MQTT and HTTP.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerLess
PowerLess is written in and executed via PowerShell without using powershell.exe.[179] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0339
ATT&CK Technique Name:Micropsia
Micropsia searches for anti-virus software and firewall products installed on the victim’s machine using WMI.[64][65] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Black Hat Europe 2019
At the close of this year's conference, join Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss and members of the esteemed Black Hat Review Board for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote will f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
During Operation Spalax, the threat actors sent phishing emails to victims that contained a malicious link.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:Credential Access Protection
Some embedded network devices are capable of storing passwords for local accounts in either plain-text or encrypted formats. Ensure that, where available, local passwords are always encrypted, per vendor recommendations. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Periodically check the integrity of images and containers used in cloud deployments to ensure they have not been modified to include malicious software. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can check for the Telegram installation directory by enumerating the files on disk.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has created the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell and sets the value to establish persistence.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has been known to add created accounts to local admin groups to maintain elevated access.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerLess
PowerLess can encrypt browser database files prior to exfiltration.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mongall
Mongall can establish persistence with the auto start function including using the value EverNoteTrayUService.[115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1437.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Web Protocols
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web protocols traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to remote mobile devices, and often the results of those commands, will be embed... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware creates a scheduled task entitled "IE Web Cache" to execute a malicious file hourly.[166] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:admin@338
admin@338 actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can directly download cloud user data such as OneDrive files.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has used parent PID spoofing to spawn a new cmd process using CreateProcessW and a handle to Taskmgr.exe.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0452
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBferry
USBferry can use netstat and nbtstat to detect active network connections.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan can establish persistence on a targeted host with scheduled tasks.[109][110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has attempted to run Darkside ransomware with the filename sleep.exe.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used pass-the-hash tools to obtain authenticated access to sensitive internal desktops and servers.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control where appropriate. PowerShell Constrained Language mode can be used to restrict access to sensitive or otherwise dangerous language elements such as those used to execute arbitrary Windows APIs or files (e.g., Add-Type).[251] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable the remote service (ex: SSH, RDP, etc.) if it is unnecessary. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT has a command to delete its Registry key and scheduled task.[192] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy uses HTTP POST request to contact external command and control servers. [1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY has the ability to set its window state to hidden.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Establish network access control policies, such as using device certificates and the 802.1x standard. [6] Restrict use of DHCP to registered devices to prevent unregistered devices from communicating with trusted systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has obtained and used open-source tools such as Mimikatz.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to collect data from USB devices.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Needing the DoH: The Ongoing Encryption and Centralization of DNS
Most connections on the Internet start with a DNS request. As the connections themselves increasingly have moved to encrypted methods (primarily HTTP to HTTPS), surveillance and data aggregation by service providers and nation states ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
Security updates frequently contain fixes for vulnerabilities that could be leveraged to modify protected operating system files. | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 When Everyone's Dog is Named Fluffy: Abusing the Brand New Security Questions in Windows 10 to Gain Domain-Wide Persistence
In Windows domain environments most attacks involve obtaining domain admin privileges. But that's not enough - once an attacker gets them, he has to make sure he doesn't l... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0445
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRatReporter
ShimRatReporter used the Windows function GetExtendedUdpTable to detect connected UDP endpoints.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used schtasks to register a scheduled task to execute malware during lateral movement.[32] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Deep Neural Networks for Hackers: Methods, Applications, and Open Source Tools
Anyone who keeps up with technology news has read about deep neural networks beating human champions at Go, achieving breakthrough accuracy at voice recognition, and generally driving today's major advances in artificial ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can use Tasklist to collect a list of running tasks.[25][259] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0226
ATT&CK Technique Name:Smoke Loader
Smoke Loader uses a simple one-byte XOR method to obfuscate values in the malware.[304][305] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shark
Shark can stop execution if the screen width of the targeted machine is not over 600 pixels.[52] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Black Hat Asia 2022
Join Black Hat Asia Review Board members Ryan Flores, Lidia Giuliano, Vandana Verma, and Stefano Zanero for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community, moderated by Jeff Moss. This Locknote w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Thread Local Storage
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address spac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used Visual Basic to download malicious payloads.[73][74][75][76] Kimsuky has also used malicious VBA macros within maldocs disguised as forms that trigger when a victim types any content into the lure.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker's custom crypter, CryptOne, leveraged the VirtualAlloc() API function to help execute the payload.[181] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta can delete shadow copies using vssadmin.exe.[12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro can obtain a list of installed applications.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0633
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sliver
Sliver can use AES-GCM-256 to encrypt a session key for C2 message exchange.[122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can add a plist file in the Library/LaunchDaemons to establish persistence.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackdoorDiplomacy
BackdoorDiplomacy has used NetCat and PortQry to enumerate network connections and display the status of related TCP and UDP ports.[17] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Spectra: Breaking Separation Between Wireless Chips
Nowadays wireless technologies are increasingly sharing spectrum. This is the case for Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, but also some LTE bands and harmonics. Operating on the same frequency means that these different technologies need to coordinate wireless ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used a custom .NET tool to collect documents from an organization's internal central database.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0800
ATT&CK Technique Name:Authorization Enforcement
All field controllers should restrict operating mode changes to only required authenticated users (e.g., engineers, field technicians), preferably through implementing a role-based access mechanism. Further, physical mechanisms (e.g., keys) can also be use... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0953
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [7], including the management of go... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0540
ATT&CK Technique Name:Asacub
Asacub can collect SMS messages as they are received.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0388
ATT&CK Technique Name:YAHOYAH
YAHOYAH decrypts downloaded files before execution.[262] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0529
ATT&CK Technique Name:CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal can silently accept an incoming phone call.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Create static ARP entries for networked devices. Implementing static ARP entries may be infeasible for large networks. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor uses RC4 to encrypt the message body of HTTP content.[133][134] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can use netstat to collect a list of network connections.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can use odbcconf.exe to run DLLs on targeted hosts.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0074
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sakula
Sakula uses single-byte XOR obfuscation to obfuscate many of its files.[285] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
Security updates frequently contain patches for known exploits. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Woke Hiring Won't Save Us: An Actionable Approach to Diversity Hiring and Retention
"Okay, so there are fewer women in infosec than there are men. Let's just hire more qualified women, right? ...Right? "Diversity hiring is a bandaid on top of broader, systemic issues. Compared to our male counterpar... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee has the ability to bypass UAC to deploy post exploitation tools with elevated privileges.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used a tool called GREASE to add a Windows admin account in order to allow them continued access via RDP.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0289
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for iOS
Pegasus for iOS monitors the victim for status and disables other access to the phone by other jailbreaking software.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 has gained execution through users opening malicious documents.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Consider disabling updating the ARP cache on gratuitous ARP replies. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0086
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZLib
ZLib has the ability to discover and manipulate Windows services.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0375
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi
Remexi encrypts and adds all gathered browser data into files for upload to C2.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used a tool called GREASE to add a Windows admin account in order to allow them continued access via RDP.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has leveraged dynamic DNS providers for C2 communications.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has enumerated files on a compromised host.[208][269] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0401
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux has a hardcoded location under systemd that it uses to achieve persistence if it is running as root.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke uses Windows services typically named "javamtsup" for persistence.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre has the ability to directly inject its code into the web browser process.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba has used several built-in API functions for discovery like GetIpNetTable and NetShareEnum.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore has used the ps command to list processes.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Allowlist MIB objects and implement SNMP views.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0375
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi
Remexi utilizes Run Registry keys in the HKLM hive as a persistence mechanism.[222] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe has used dynamic DNS services to set up C2.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs collects registered owner details by using the commands systeminfo and net config workstation.[92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used Wevtutil to remove PowerShell execution logs.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne and Mimikatz.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has gained execution through users opening malicious links.[79][80][81][82][83][84][85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner used SCP to update the miner from the C2.[267] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 ClusterFuzz: Fuzzing at Google Scale
Fuzzing is an effective way of finding security vulnerabilities, but it does not scale well for a defender trying to protect a complex software with several third-party dependencies. There are numerous daunting challenges that come into play which include writing... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0401
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux can uninstall its persistence mechanism and delete its configuration file.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can gather a list of logged on users.[168] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has used HTTP and HTTPs for C2 communications.[248] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to identify which anti-virus products, firewalls, and anti-spyware products are in use.[102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0441
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShower
PowerShower has added a registry key so future powershell.exe instances are spawned off-screen by default, and has removed all registry entries that are left behind during the dropper process.[122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:STARWHALE
STARWHALE can use the VBScript function GetRef as part of its persistence mechanism.[149] | secon |
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