text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0420
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dvmap
Dvmap can enable installation of apps from unknown sources.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0858
ATT&CK Technique Name:Change Operating Mode
Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has used UPX and Ezuri packer to pack its binaries.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell has a feature to create local user accounts.[25] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 An Unauthenticated Journey to Root: Pwning Your Company's Enterprise Software Servers
Often Fortune 1000 companies consist of a plethora of software, hardware, vendors, and solutions all operating to keep the business running and alive. With all this complexity, there is often a single vendor that'... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson can set a Registry key to determine how long it has been installed and possibly to indicate the version number.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0445
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRatReporter
ShimRatReporter had the ability to download additional payloads.[407] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can use a .NET-based DLL named RunPe6 for process injection.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0335
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbon
Carbon establishes persistence by creating a service and naming it based off the operating system version running on the current machine.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has used the LadonGo scanner to scan target networks.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0021
For C0021, the threat actors used legitimate but compromised domains to host malicious payloads.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
During FunnyDream, the threat actors used ipconfig for discovery on remote systems.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used net accounts and net accounts /domain to acquire password policy information.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 actors installed a credential logger on Microsoft Exchange servers. Threat Group-3390 also leveraged the reconnaissance framework, ScanBox, to capture keystrokes.[80][173][174] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used net view to enumerate domain machines.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for logon scripts that may lead to persistence. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has the ability save and execute files as alternate data streams (ADS).[19][20][21] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 AFL's Blindspot and How to Resist AFL Fuzzing for Arbitrary ELF Binaries
AFL has claimed many successes on fuzzing a wide range of applications. In the past few years, researchers have continuously generated new improvements to enhance AFL's ability to find bugs. However, less attentions were gi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
During FunnyDream, the threat actors used 7zr.exe to add collected files to an archive.[17] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Disinformation At Scale: Using GPT-3 Maliciously for Information Operations
Last year, OpenAI developed GPT-3—currently the largest and most powerful natural language model in the world. The select groups that were granted first access quickly demonstrated that it can write realistic text from almo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:KEYPLUG
KEYPLUG can obtain the current tick count of an infected computer.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's Find-AVSignature AntivirusBypass module can be used to locate single byte anti-virus signatures.[14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used VPNs and Outlook Web Access (OWA) to maintain access to victim networks.[14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has used Mimikatz to generate Kerberos golden tickets.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork has signed malware with self-signed certificates from fictitious and spoofed legitimate software companies.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used malware that can execute PowerShell scripts via DDE.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can add a CLSID key for payload execution through Registry.CurrentUser.CreateSubKey("Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\{" + clsid + "}\\InProcServer32").[13] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Can You Roll Your Own SIEM?
At Two Sigma, we had sunk over $1 million in licensing for a popular third-party SIEM product and were paying an additional $200,000 in annual maintenance. We were limited on what data sources we could leverage as our license was restricted to a low daily ingestion rate.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can register itself for execution and persistence via the Control Panel.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0633
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sliver
Sliver can upload files from the C2 server to the victim machine using the upload command.[414] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor can use wmic.exe as part of its effort to delete shadow copies.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used the AES256 algorithm with a SHA1 derived key to decrypt exploit code.[267] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat can sleep when instructed to do so by the C2.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can download and execute AdvancedRun.exe via sc.exe.[61][62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used newly-created Blogspot pages for credential harvesting operations.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0561
ATT&CK Technique Name:GuLoader
GuLoader has been spread in phishing campaigns using malicious web links.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has acquired credentials from the SAM/SECURITY registry hives.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0245
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADCALL
BADCALL modifies the firewall Registry key SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfileGloballyOpenPorts\List.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:T9000
T9000 performs checks for various antivirus and security products during installation.[101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0388
ATT&CK Technique Name:YAHOYAH
YAHOYAH encrypts its configuration file using a simple algorithm.[361] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
The NETWIRE client has been signed by fake and invalid digital certificates.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Exploiting Kernel Races through Taming Thread Interleaving
A kernel race condition vulnerability is difficult to exploit, because thread interleaving is non-deterministic and cannot be controlled. Thus, conventional exploitation techniques against kernel races simply attempt to brute force, i.e., ke... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has set up Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive to host malicious downloads.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro has shown a persistent notification to maintain access to device sensors.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 granted company administrator privileges to a newly created service principle.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:PingPull
PingPull variants have the ability to communicate with C2 servers using ICMP or TCP.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1623.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Unix Shell
Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the underlying command prompts on Android and iOS devices. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges that are only accessi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:WIRTE
WIRTE has obtained and used Empire for post-exploitation activities.[98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:Do Not Mitigate
Environmental Keying likely should not be mitigated with preventative controls because it may protect unintended targets from being compromised. If targeted, efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has collected the operating system version from the infected system.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin checks the running processes for evidence it may be running in a sandbox environment. It specifically enumerates processes for Wireshark and Sysinternals.[218] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon obtains the victim's operating system version and keyboard layout and sends the information to the C2 server.[329][330] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal collected file listings of all default Windows directories.[96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to execute a process using runas.[2] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 DNSSEC Downgrade Attacks
In this talk, we show that the cryptographic agility in DNSSEC, although critical for making DNS secure with strong cryptography, also introduces a severe vulnerability. We demonstrate that adversaries, by manipulating the cryptographic material in signed DNS responses, can... | secon |
title:botconf2014 Chinese Chicken: Multiplatform DDoS Botnets
One of capabilities of a malicious botnet is to perform a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. Attacks can be performed by various methods like volumetric flooding, slow HTTP attacks or TCP protocol misuse. A DNS amplification is an example of volume... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can use multiple domains and protocols in C2.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0550
ATT&CK Technique Name:DoubleAgent
DoubleAgent has used an AES encrypted file in the assets folder with an unsuspecting name (e.g. ‘GoogleMusic.png’) for holding configuration and C2 information.[8] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Lunch Break
Lunch will be served in Shoreline (South Convention Center, Level 2) at 12:00 PM - 1:30 PM.Please wear your badge. Open to Briefings pass holders. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Applications may send push notifications to verify a login as a form of multi-factor authentication (MFA). Train users to only accept valid push notifications and to report suspicious push notifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to identify running processes and associated plugins on an infected host.[252] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon accesses network share(s), enables share access to the target device, copies an executable payload to the target system, and uses a Scheduled Task/Job to execute the malware.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0546
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharpStage
SharpStage has used a legitimate web service for evading detection.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has created forged Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets to maintain administrative access.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0420
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dvmap
Dvmap checks the Android version to determine which system library to patch.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used COM scriptlets to download Cobalt Strike beacons.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has used VBS scripts and XLS macros for execution.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
A module in Prikormka collects information from the victim about Windows OS version, computer name, battery info, and physical memory.[287] | secon |
title:botconf2016 Language Agnostic Botnet Detection Based on ESOM and DNS
Botnets enable various cyber-criminal activities, like DDoS, banking fraud, data theft and extortion. Current botnet detection approaches face many challenges, for example, peer-to-peer infrastructures and domain fast-flux or encrypt the command... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron exfiltrates data over its email C2 channel.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can load drivers by creating a new service using the CreateServiceW API.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has used malicious documents containing exploits for CVE-2021-40444 affecting Microsoft MSHTML.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda checks to see if anti-virus, anti-spyware, or firewall products are installed in the victim’s environment.[121][122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0492
ATT&CK Technique Name:CookieMiner
CookieMiner has used a Unix shell script to run a series of commands targeting macOS.[11] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 The Cyber Shell Game – War, Information Warfare, and the Darkening Web
This year we celebrate a dubious anniversary – it’s been 20 years since the first major resolution on “information security” was submitted in the United Nations, and it was the first of many. But this is not the “information secu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has used web services including Paste.ee to host payloads.[26] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Breaking Bootloaders on the Cheap
One of the challenges in securing embedded devices is to protect the flash memory storing code, data, and cryptographic secrets against malicious read/write access. Therefore, most microcontroller vendors decided to implement code read protection mechanisms (usually... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0107
ATT&CK Technique Name:Whitefly
Whitefly has used Mimikatz to obtain credentials.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea collects information about running processes.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0099
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT-C-36
APT-C-36 has embedded a VBScript within a malicious Word document which is executed upon the document opening.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has used the net view command.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Refer to NIST guidelines when creating password policies. [12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack used hard-coded credentials to gain access to a network share.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus can collect the host IP address from the victim’s machine.[161] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sibot
Sibot has used WMI to discover network connections and configurations. Sibot has also used the Win32_Process class to execute a malicious DLL.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0480
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cerberus
Cerberus can generate fake notifications and launch overlay attacks against attacker-specified applications.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can use advanced web injects to steal web banking credentials.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:S-Type
S-Type has attempted to determine if a compromised system was using a Japanese keyboard via the GetKeyboardType API call.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot establishes persistence by creating an autostart service that allows it to run whenever the machine boots.[126] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1630.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Uninstall Malicious Application
Adversaries may include functionality in malware that uninstalls the malicious application from the device. This can be achieved by: | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can download files from its C2 server, including the .NET DLLs, WoodySharpExecutor and WoodyPowerSession.[483] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0271
ATT&CK Technique Name:KEYMARBLE
KEYMARBLE has the capability to collect the computer name, language settings, the OS version, CPU information, disk devices, and time elapsed since system start.[189] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 What the Log?! So Many Events, so Little Time...
Detecting adversaries in your environment is a challenging task: Most organizations need at least several months to detect them... IF they detect them at all.Many companies have started to investigate Windows Event Log to improve their detection. B... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has used obfuscated PowerShell scripts for staging.[106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Data Storage
If the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotel... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0585
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kerrdown
Kerrdown has been distributed via e-mails containing a malicious link.[19] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 The 8th Annual Black Hat USA NOC Report
Back with another year of soul-crushing statistics, the Black Hat NOC team will be sharing all of the data that keeps us equally puzzled, and entertained, year after year. We'll let you know all the tools and techniques we're using to set up, stabilize, and s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware gathers the registered user and primary owner name via WMI.[181] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 How Embedded TCP/IP Stacks Breed Critical Vulnerabilities
In the past few years, there's been a rise in critical vulnerabilities affecting embedded TCP/IP stacks which had remained undiscovered for over a decade. The direct, unauthenticated and sometimes cross-perimeter network exposure of these sta... | secon |
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