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ATT&CK ID:T0837
ATT&CK Technique Name:Loss of Protection
Adversaries may compromise protective system functions designed to prevent the effects of faults and abnormal conditions. This can result in equipment damage, prolonged process disruptions and hazards to personnel. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Inside the Apple T2
Apple's T2 Security Chip promised to bring "a new level of integration and security" to new generation Mac systems. The T2 chip provides systems with a secure enclave coprocessor that is leveraged to protect Touch ID data, enable encrypted storage and provide secure boot capabil... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass application control. [44] Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through regsvr32 func... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Disable legacy authentication, which does not support MFA, and require the use of modern authentication protocols instead. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used JavaScript that communicates over HTTP or HTTPS to attacker controlled domains to download additional frameworks. The group has also used downloaded encrypted payloads over HTTP.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0470
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBK
BBK has the ability to inject shellcode into svchost.exe.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0029
ATT&CK Technique Name:PsExec
PsExec can leverage Windows services to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM with the -s argument.[98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0475
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackConfig
BackConfig has the ability to identify folders and files related to previous infections.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1544
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ingress Tool Transfer
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system onto a compromised device to facilitate follow-on actions. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the command and control channel or through alternate prot... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conficker
Conficker has obfuscated its code to prevent its removal from host machines.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton disables a firmware RAM/ROM consistency check after injects a payload (imain.bin) into the firmware memory region. [1] [2] [3] Triconex systems include continuous means of detection including checksums for firmware and program integrity, memory and memory reference in... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to use a reverse SOCKS proxy module.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.010
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppInit DLLs
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Softwa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Moses Staff
Moses Staff has used the commercial tool DiskCryptor.[75] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Let's Attack Let's Encrypt
Following the recent off-path attacks against PKI, Let’sEncrypt deployed in 2020 domain validation from multiple vantage points to ensure security even against the stronger on-path MitM adversaries. The idea behind such distributed domain validation is that even if the ad... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 They Hacked Thousands of Cloud Accounts Then Sent Us Weird GIFs
As organizations migrate their computing resources to cloud and container environments, attackers are taking notice -- and following. In August 2020, we discovered the first crypto-mining worm stealing AWS credentials. The attackers are... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0515
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMail
WellMail can use hard coded client and certificate authority certificates to communicate with C2 over mutual TLS.[65][66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can retrieve information from the infected machine.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore can download and execute new versions of itself.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat has used Windows API functions to install the service and shim.[153] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE creates a Registry start-up entry to establish persistence.[178][179][112][180] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS has executed a PowerShell command to download a file to the system.[248] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM has used Registry run keys to establish persistence.[205] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 has used a payload file named OneDrive.update to appear benign.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Small Sieve
Small Sieve can use variations of Microsoft and Outlook spellings, such as "Microsift", in its file names to avoid detection.[153] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:T9000
T9000 encrypts collected data using a single byte XOR key.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has a tool that exfiltrates data over the C2 channel.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0539
ATT&CK Technique Name:Red Alert 2.0
Red Alert 2.0 can collect the device’s contact list.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has deployed different types of containers into victim environments to facilitate execution.[8][9] TeamTNT has also transferred cryptocurrency mining software to Kubernetes clusters discovered within local IP address ranges.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin has mimicked the Cron binary to hide itself on compromised systems.[121] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used a tool to query the Registry for proxy settings.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
If a user sees a persistent notification they do not recognize, they should uninstall the source application and look for other unwanted applications or anomalies. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0672
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zox
Zox has the ability to leverage local and remote exploits to escalate privileges.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
The sudoers file should be strictly edited such that passwords are always required and that users can't spawn risky processes as users with higher privilege. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taint Shared Content
Adversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, sc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0513
ATT&CK Technique Name:LiteDuke
LiteDuke can use HTTP GET requests in C2 communications.[120] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Reverse Engineering the M1
The release of M1 Macs marked a turning point for the open-source operating system community on Apple hardware. Now, the whole hardware stack would be proprietary, with little hope of reusing drivers written for standard PC hardware. At the same time, it offered an unprece... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0350
ATT&CK Technique Name:zwShell
zwShell has deleted itself after creating a service as well as deleted a temporary file when the system reboots.[262] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa installs a com.apple.softwareupdate.plist file in the /LaunchAgents folder with the RunAtLoad value set to true. Upon user login, MacMa is executed from /var/root/.local/softwareupdate with root privileges. Some variations also include the LimitLoadToSessionType key wit... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Arm'd and Dangerous
Apple's new M1 systems offer a myriad of benefits ...for both macOS users, and unfortunately, to malware authors as well.In this talk we detail the first malicious programs compiled to natively target Apple Silicon (M1/arm64), focusing on methods of analysis. We'll start with a ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
The Mimikatz credential dumper contains an implementation of an SSP.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
The Clambling dropper can use PowerShell to download the malware.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used a compromised account to access an organization's VPN infrastructure.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0857
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Firmware
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgra... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0304
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/Chuli.A
Android/Chuli.A used SMS to receive command and control messages.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0478
ATT&CK Technique Name:EventBot
EventBot can download new libraries when instructed to.[13] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Sweet Dreams: Abusing Sleep Mode to Break Wi-Fi Encryption and Disrupt WPA2/3 Networks
This presentation introduces two novel attacks that abuse the power-save (sleep) functionality of Wi-Fi. In our first attack, we target a protected Wi-Fi network and abuse sleep mode to leak frames in plaintext.... | secon |
title:botconf2017 Use Your Enemies: Tracking Botnets with Bots
Botnets are a curious thing for malware researchers. Although we’re constantly trying to shut them down and stop the responsible people, we’re also focusing a lot of attention on studying and analysing their inner workings in order to learn more about how t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer attempts to remove the backup shadow files from the host using vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has lured targets to click on malicious links to gain execution in the target environment.[87][88][89][90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig used the Plink utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can modify the Linux iptables firewall to enable C2 communication via a stored list of port numbers.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has checked the language of the machine with function GetUserDefaultUILanguage and terminated execution if the language matches with an entry in the predefined list.[16] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Anti-Forensics: Reverse Engineering a Leading Phone Forensic Tool
How can vulnerabilities in forensic software affect cases brought to the courts? That question was the impetus of what kicked off my research on the Cellebrite UFED - a widely-used phone forensic tool. This talk will cover what my r... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0434
ATT&CK Technique Name:Imminent Monitor
Imminent Monitor has a remote microphone monitoring capability.[14][15] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Automation Techniques in C++ Reverse Engineering
This presentation will discuss several generic, automated dynamic analysis techniques based on DLL injection for type analysis while reverse engineering C++ code. We focus on discovering the locations where structures are used within a C++ program th... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Simple Spyware: Androids Invisible Foreground Services and How to (Ab)use Them
With the releases of Android Oreo and Pie, Google introduced some background execution limits for Android apps [1],[2]. In order to save battery life and prevent sensor access, apps were restricted in how they were capab... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0328
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Mango
Stealth Mango uploads contact lists for various third-party applications such as Yahoo, AIM, GoogleTalk, Skype, QQ, and others.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM established persistence for PoisonIvy by created a scheduled task.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats has sent malicious links via email trick users into opening a RAR archive and running an executable.[57][58] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Playback: A TLS 1.3 Story
TLS 1.3 is the new secure communication protocol that should be already with us. One of its new features is 0-RTT (Zero Round Trip Time Resumption) that could potentially allow replay attacks. This is a known issue acknowledged by the TLS 1.3 specification, as the protocol... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor can identify removable media attached to victim's machines.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0421
ATT&CK Technique Name:GolfSpy
GolfSpy can obtain the device’s battery level, network operator, connection information, sensor information, and information about the device’s storage and memory.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has created a scheduled task to execute a .vbe file multiple times a day.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, the threat actors used AvosLocker ransomware to encrypt files on the compromised network.[13][32] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Afternoon Refreshment Break (Briefings)
Open to Briefings Passholders. Please wear your badge. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0324
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpyDealer
SpyDealer enables remote control of the victim through SMS channels.[13] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 President's Cup Cyber Competition: Finding the Best Cyber Talent in the US Government
In 2019, the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) held the first cybersecurity competition for the Federal workforce. Dubbed the President's Cup Cybersecurity Co... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard was executed through the kubelet API run command and by executing commands on running containers.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:PittyTiger
PittyTiger attempts to obtain legitimate credentials during operations.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Token Manipulation
Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain registered a WMI event subscription consumer called "hard_disk_stat" to establish persistence.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0338
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobian RAT
Cobian RAT has a feature to access the webcam on the victim’s machine.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy has conducted port scans on a host.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0267
ATT&CK Technique Name:FELIXROOT
FELIXROOT deletes the Registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\Applications\rundll32.exe\shell\open.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware gathers passwords from the Windows Credential Vault.[16] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 HPE iLO5 Firmware Security - Go Home Cryptoprocessor, You're Drunk!
At the core of HPE Gen10 servers lies the Integrated Lights Out 5 (iLO 5) out-of-band management technology. Coming with new hardware and software, it introduced a cornerstone feature described as a "silicon root of trust". When... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Improving Mental Models of End-to-End Encrypted Communication
Research has repeatedly established that although many messaging apps (WhatsApp, iMessage, Signal etc.) have incorporated end-to-end encryption (E2EE) as a feature, user understandings of E2EE communications are not completely accurate. A... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1070.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Share Connection Removal
Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and SMB/Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Internal Server Error: Exploiting Inter-Process Communication in SAP's HTTP Server
More than 400,000 organizations, including 90% of Fortune 500 companies, rely on SAP's software to keep their business up and running. At the core of every SAP deployment is the Internet Communication Manager (ICM), t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has injected itself into remote processes to encrypt files using a combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor can use spoofed DNS requests to create a bidirectional tunnel between a compromised host and its C2 servers.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
After encrypting C2 data, BADNEWS converts it into a hexadecimal representation and then encodes it into base64.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Deception at Scale: How Malware Abuses Trust
The attackers actively use techniques to disguise malware files as legitimate, including reliable distribution channels, stolen certificates, hiding malicious files in legitimate applications, or using system tools to deploy malicious activity. At Viru... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 From Zero to Sixty: The Story of North Korea's Rapid Ascent to Becoming a Global Cyber Superpower
In a relatively short period of time, North Korea has evolved its offensive cyber capability from that of a fledgling nation to a global cyber superpower. Having shifted their focus from purely destruct... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware can take a screenshot and upload the file to its C2 server.[101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0942
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Ensure remote commands that enable device shutdown are disabled if they are not necessary. Examples include DNP3's 0x0D function code or unnecessary device management functions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0504
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anchor
Anchor can support windows execution via SMB shares.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence can create, delete, or modify a specified Registry key or value.[147] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 1
At the end of day one of this year's virtual conference, join Black Hat Review Board members Mika Devonshire, Ty Miller, Pamela O'Shea and Fyodor Yarochkin for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. T... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1543.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Launch Agent
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0228
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanHaiShu
NanHaiShu can download additional files from URLs.[260] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.[72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun has identified the OS product name from a compromised host by searching the registry for SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\Windows NT\ CurrentVersion | ProductName.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1596
ATT&CK Technique Name:Search Open Technical Databases
Adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in online databases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/certificate... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT1
APT1 used the commands net localgroup,net user, and net group to find accounts on the system.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0405
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exodus
Exodus Two can extract the GPS coordinates of the device.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0549
ATT&CK Technique Name:SilkBean
SilkBean has hidden malicious functionality in a second stage file and has encrypted C2 server information.[8] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Container Attack Surface Reduction Beyond Name Space Isolation
Public container images are riddled with vulnerabilities. We've analyzed the top 100 official Docker images present on DockerHub and found thousands of vulnerabilities and misconfigurations. Many of these vulnerabilities lie not within ... | secon |
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