text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group persistence mechanisms have used forfiles.exe to execute .htm files.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Consider reducing the default BITS job lifetime in Group Policy or by editing the JobInactivityTimeout and MaxDownloadTime Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\BITS.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum establishes persistence by creating a .lnk shortcut to itself in the Startup folder.[186] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Update software regularly to include patches that fix DLL side-loading vulnerabilities. | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 POSWorld. Should You be Afraid of Hands-On Payment Devices?
The dark market is full of cloned Point of Sales terminals and offers for fake merchant accounts. But how do they get there if every terminal is built to have anti-tampering mechanisms, segregated memory for private crypto keys, and multipl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0124
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windigo
Windigo has used a Perl script for information gathering.[10] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Exploring the New World : Remote Exploitation of SQLite and Curl
Over the past years, our team has used several new approaches to identify multiple critical vulnerabilities in SQLite and Curl, two of the most widely used basic software libraries. These two sets of vulnerabilities, which we named "Ma... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 can perform brute force attacks to obtain credentials.[2][3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang performs account discovery using commands such as net localgroup administrators and net group "REDACTED" /domain on specific permissions groups.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1027.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stripped Payloads
Adversaries may attempt to make a payload difficult to analyze by removing symbols, strings, and other human readable information. Scripts and executables may contain variables names and other strings that help developers document code functionality. Symbols a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0586
ATT&CK Technique Name:TAINTEDSCRIBE
TAINTEDSCRIBE can execute FileRecvWriteRand to append random bytes to the end of a file received from C2.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK used a proxy server between victims and the C2 server.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:netsh
netsh can be used to disable local firewall settings.[27][28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher injects itself into various processes depending on whether it is low integrity or high integrity.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain account permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups acros... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0569
ATT&CK Technique Name:Explosive
Explosive has a function to write itself to Registry values.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0349
ATT&CK Technique Name:LaZagne
LaZagne can use the <PID>/maps and <PID>/mem files to identify regex patterns to dump cleartext passwords from the browser's process memory.[5][1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0339
ATT&CK Technique Name:Micropsia
Micropsia can download and execute an executable from the C2 server.[291][292] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Use anti-spoofing and email authentication mechanisms to filter messages based on validity checks of the sender domain (using SPF) and integrity of messages (using DKIM). Enabling these mechanisms within an organization (through policies such as DMARC) may en... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0328
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Mango
Stealth Mango can perform GPS location tracking as well as capturing coordinates as when an SMS message or call is received.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. [60] Control flow integrity checking is a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can login to Omron PLCs using hardcoded credentials, which is documented in CVE-2022-34151.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0058
ATT&CK Technique Name:SslMM
To establish persistence, SslMM identifies the Start Menu Startup directory and drops a link to its own executable disguised as an "Office Start," "Yahoo Talk," "MSN Gaming Z0ne," or "MSN Talk" shortcut.[250] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0341
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbash
Xbash can execute malicious JavaScript payloads on the victim’s machine.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0244
ATT&CK Technique Name:Comnie
Comnie appends a total of 64MB of garbage data to a file to deter any security products in place that may be scanning files on disk.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1037.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Logon Script (Windows)
Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system. This is done via adding a path to a scr... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Elevating Kerberos to the Next Level
Kerberos is the primary authentication protocol for on-premise Windows enterprise networks. As it's so crucial for enterprise security a lot of research has focused on exploiting it for remote access and lateral movement such as the well known Golden/Silver ticke... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created scheduled tasks to set a periodic execution of a remote XSL script.[126] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2011-0611, Microsoft Windows Help vulnerability CVE-2010-1885, and several Internet Explorer vulnerabilities, including CVE-2011-1255, CVE-2012-1889, and CVE-2014-0322.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin decodes an embedded executable using base64 and decompresses it.[200] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Black Hat Europe 2021
Join Black Hat Europe Review Board members for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote will feature a candid discussion on the key takeaways coming out of the conference and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0691
ATT&CK Technique Name:Neoichor
Neoichor can check for Internet connectivity by contacting bing[.]com with the request format bing[.]com?id=<GetTickCount>.[8] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Detecting Access Token Manipulation
Windows access token manipulation attacks are well known and abused from an offensive perspective, but rely on an extensive body of arcane Windows security internals: logon sessions, access tokens, UAC, and network authentication protocols, such as Kerberos and NT... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has encrypted data and files prior to exfiltration.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1071
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rubeus
Rubeus can gather information about domain trusts.[26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Use the principal of least privilege and protect administrative access to domain trusts. | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Dirty Vanity: A New Approach to Code Injection & EDR Bypass
This talk showcases yet another new code injection technique (I know, bear with me), nicknamed "Dirty Vanity". This technique challenges current injection detection and prevention means while opening a wider spectrum of attacks that ch... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
The BlackEnergy 3 variant drops its main DLL component and then creates a .lnk shortcut to that file in the startup folder.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0326
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedDrop
RedDrop uses ads or other links within websites to encourage users to download the malicious apps using a complex content distribution network (CDN) and series of network redirects. RedDrop also downloads additional components (APKs, JAR files) from different C2 servers.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 established persistence by loading malicious libraries via modifications to the Import Address Table (IAT) within legitimate Microsoft binaries.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can use DNS over HTTPS for C2.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can decrypt its C2 address upon execution.[138] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0075
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rancor
Rancor has downloaded additional malware, including by using certutil.[141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0800
ATT&CK Technique Name:Authorization Enforcement
All field controllers should restrict the modification of programs to only certain users (e.g., engineers, field technician), preferably through implementing a role-based access mechanism. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0583
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pysa
Pysa has executed a malicious executable by naming it svchost.exe.[132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 injects its malware variant, ROKRAT, into the cmd.exe process.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not allow administrator accounts that have permissions to add component software on these services to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor has encrypted data symmetrically using a randomly generated Blowfish (OFB) key which is encrypted with a public RSA key.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0324
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpyDealer
SpyDealer uses the commercial rooting app Baidu Easy Root to gain root privilege and maintain persistence on the victim.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0568
ATT&CK Technique Name:EVILNUM
EVILNUM has a function called "DeleteLeftovers" to remove certain artifacts of the attack.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can implement use of proxies to pivot traffic.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideCopy
SideCopy has executed malware by calling the API function CreateProcessW.[154] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Detecting (un)Intentionally Hidden Injected Code by Examining Page Table Entries
Malware utilizes code injection techniques to either manipulate other processes (e.g. done by banking trojans) or hide its existence. With some exceptions, such as ROP gadgets, the injected code needs to be executable b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing was executed in an Ubuntu container deployed via an open Docker daemon API.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, threat actors installed DLLs and backdoors as Windows services.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
A BlackEnergy 2 plug-in uses WMI to gather victim host details.[17] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Black Hat Asia 2022
Join Black Hat Asia Review Board members Ryan Flores, Lidia Giuliano, Vandana Verma, and Stefano Zanero for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community, moderated by Jeff Moss. This Locknote wi... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Compromising the macOS Kernel through Safari by Chaining Six Vulnerabilities
Compromising a kernel through a browser is the ultimate goal for offensive security researchers. Because of continuous efforts to eliminate vulnerabilities and introduce various mitigations, a remote kernel exploit from a ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maroochy Water Breach
In the Maroochy Water Breach, the adversary temporarily shut an investigator out of the network preventing them from issuing any controls.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has created a scheduled task named "Maintenance" to establish persistence.[154] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Black Hat Europe 2019
At the close of this year's conference, join Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss and members of the esteemed Black Hat Review Board for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote will ... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 LTE Network Automation Under Threat
The control and management of mobile networks is shifting from manual to automatic in order to boost performance and efficiency and reduce expenditures. Especially, base stations in today's 4G/LTE networks can automatically configure and operate themselves which i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. can use the open-source project RetroFit for C2 communication.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has used the Fodhelper UAC bypass technique to gain elevated privileges.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for uniq... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT1
APT1 has been known to use credential dumping using Mimikatz.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors edited variable names within the Impacket suite to avoid automated detection.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Authenticate connections fromsoftware and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid message... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Emissary is capable of configuring itself as a service.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has attempted to adjust its token privileges to have the SeDebugPrivilege.[21] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Sleight of ARM: Demystifying Intel Houdini
ARM is taking over the computer industry. In recent years, we have seen some of the major players in the industry switch from x86-based processors to ARM processors. Most notable is Apple, which has supported the transition to ARM from x86 with a binary tr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used cmd.exe /c to execute commands on remote machines.[25]APT41 used a batch file to install persistence for the Cobalt Strike BEACON loader.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0918
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only designated administrators or engineers can interact with alarm management and alarm configuration thresholds. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lslsass
Lslsass can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:S-Type
S-Type has deleted files it has created on a compromised host.[150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Limit credential overlap across accounts and systems by training users and administrators not to use the same password for multiple accounts. | secon |
title:botconf2019 Guildma: Timers Sent from Hell
For several months now, we have been tracking a malware campaign called Guildma. Guildma is powerful combination of a RAT (remote access tool), spyware, password stealer and banker malware, mainly distributed via malicious attachments in phishing emails. The cybercrimina... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0525
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/AdDisplay.Ashas
Android/AdDisplay.Ashas has registered to receive the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast intent to activate on device startup.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
Security updates may contain patches to integrity checking mechanisms that can detect unauthorized hardware modifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0881
ATT&CK Technique Name:Service Stop
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Serv... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil has been distributed via malicious e-mail attachments including MS Word Documents.[191][192][193][194][195] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can conduct an initial scan for Microsoft Word documents on the local system, removable media, and connected network drives, before tagging and collecting them. It can continue tagging documents to collect with follow up scans.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0433
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rifdoor
Rifdoor has created a new registry entry at HKEY_CURRENT_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Graphics with a value of C:\ProgramData\Initech\Initech.exe /run.[224] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0028
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHIPSHAPE
SHIPSHAPE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the Startup folder.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0107
ATT&CK Technique Name:Whitefly
Whitefly has used search order hijacking to run the loader Vcrodat.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0421
ATT&CK Technique Name:GolfSpy
GolfSpy can obtain a list of installed applications.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Leverage services provided by Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations to filter traffic upstream from services.[10] Filter boundary traffic by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being ta... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton has the capability to reprogram the SIS logic to allow unsafe conditions to persist or reprogram the SIS to allow an unsafe state while using the DCS to create an unsafe state or hazard. [1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0414
ATT&CK Technique Name:BabyShark
BabyShark has downloaded additional files from the C2.[46][47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used a brute-force/password-spray tooling that operated in two modes: in password-spraying mode it conducted approximately four authentication attempts per hour per targeted account over the course of several days or weeks.[3][4] APT28 has also used a Kubernetes clu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor can detect whether it is executed in some virtualized or emulated environment by searching for specific artifacts, such as communication with I/O ports and using VM-specific instructions.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Enforce registration and execution of only legitimately signed service drivers where possible. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0380
ATT&CK Technique Name:StoneDrill
StoneDrill has a disk wiper module that targets files other than those in the Windows directory.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0151
ATT&CK Technique Name:HALFBAKED
HALFBAKED can use WMI queries to gather system information.[56] | secon |
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