text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has executed PowerShell commands in batch scripts.[225] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:macOS.OSAMiner
macOS.OSAMiner has used launchctl to restart the Launch Agent.[7] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Redback: Advanced Static Binary Injection
Static binary injection is a technique to permanently insert external code to an executable file, in order to observe or modify target behavior at run-time. From an attacker's perspective, this is helpful to enable persistent infection. For the defense sid... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideCopy
SideCopy has sent spearphishing emails with malicious hta file attachments.[205] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Routopsy: Modern Routing Protocol Vulnerability Analysis and Exploitation
An often-overlooked area of network security are the routing and redundancy protocols used between routing endpoints. Specifically, Dynamic Routing Protocols (DRP) such as OSPF, RIP, EIGRP, and First Hop Redundancy Protocols (... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wiper
It is believed that a patch management system for an anti-virus product commonly installed among targeted companies was used to distribute the Wiper malware.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team has used keylogging tools in their operations.[176] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0917
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored on local systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
When System Integrity Protection (SIP) is enabled in macOS, the aforementioned environment variables are ignored when executing protected binaries. Third-party applications can also leverage Apple’s Hardened Runtime, ensuring these environment variabl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec schedules the execution one of its modules by creating a new scheduler task.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX has used DLL side-loading to evade anti-virus.[4][27][51][36][52][17][53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used stolen credentials to connect to the victim's network via VPN.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis ran multiple system checks, looking for processor and register characteristics, to evade emulation and analysis.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Scan images before deployment, and block those that are not in compliance with security policies. In Kubernetes environments, the admission controller can be used to validate images after a container deployment request is authenticated but before the container is deployed.[11... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can implement DGA using the current date as a seed variable.[11] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Demystify Today's Binary Disassembling and How Modern ABI Makes it Easier
Disassembling is the process of restoring instructions and structure information from binary code, forming the foundation of nearly all the solutions for binary security. Incentivized by both industry needs and governmen... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the director... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used a Windows version of the Linux touch command to modify the date and time stamp on DLLs.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has deleted the target's systems and resources in the cloud to trigger the organization's incident and crisis response process.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. [7] Move system's root of trust to hardware to prevent tampering with the SPI flash memory.[5] Technologies such as Intel Boot Gu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ixeshe
Ixeshe has used registry values and file names associated with Adobe software, such as AcroRd32.exe.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike will break large data sets into smaller chunks for exfiltration.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Dirty Bin Cache: A New Code Injection Poisoning Binary Translation Cache
In recent years, Arm processors have become popular on laptops, not limited to embedded devices. For example, Apple announced the Mac transition from Intel to Arm-based Apple Silicon in 2020, which made a big splash. Apple Si... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk has used the FindNextFile command as part of its file deletion process.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used the legitimate mailing service Constant Contact to send phishing e-mails.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 places scripts in the startup folder for persistence.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon copies an executable payload to the target system by using SMB/Windows Admin Shares and then scheduling an unnamed task to execute the malware.[157][158] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0577
ATT&CK Technique Name:FrozenCell
FrozenCell has read SMS messages for exfiltration.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete’s collected files are exfiltrated automatically to remote servers.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can use WMI to deliver a payload to a remote host.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS is sometimes signed with an invalid Authenticode certificate in an apparent effort to make it look more legitimate.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can delete old binaries on a compromised host.[92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has created Windows services to execute encoded PowerShell commands.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0299
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotCompatible
NotCompatible has the capability to exploit systems on an enterprise network.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan has run C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c cmd /c dir c:\users\ /s 2>&1 to discover local accounts.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Amadey
Amadey has used a variety of Windows API calls, including GetComputerNameA, GetUserNameA, and CreateProcessA.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY can establish using a AppCertDLLs Registry key.[2] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Smashing the ML Stack for Fun and Lawsuits
Adversarial machine learning research is booming. ML researchers are increasingly targeting commercial ML systems such as those used by Facebook, Tesla, Microsoft, IBM, or Google to demonstrate vulnerabilities. But what legal risks are researchers running? ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used schtasks to register a scheduled task to execute malware during lateral movement.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, threat actors installed DLLs and backdoors as Windows services.[85] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 A General Approach to Bypassing Many Kernel Protections and its Mitigation
In the beginning, we will analyze an anecdotal exploit that bypasses KASLR using a flexible object in the Linux kernel implementation. In this talk, we extend the definition of flexible objects to elastic objects and demons... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole gathers information on the IP forwarding table, MAC address, configured proxy, and network SSID.[109][110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit the usage of local administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has attempted to get users to launch a malicious Microsoft Word attachment delivered via a spearphishing email.[126][127][128][129] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 The COW (Container On Windows) Who Escaped the Silo
Virtualization and containers are the foundations of cloud services. Containers should be isolated from the real host's settings to ensure the security of the host.In this talk we'll answer these questions: "Are Windows process-isolated containers ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
All devices or systems changes, including all administrative functions, should require authentication. Consider using access management technologies to enforce authorization on all management interface access attempts, especially when the device does not inherentl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1418
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of applications that are installed on a device. Adversaries may use the information from Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not to fully infect the target and/o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0946
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. [4] Move system's root of trust to hardware to prevent tampering with the SPI flash memory. [5] Technologies such as Intel Boot G... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0278
ATT&CK Technique Name:iKitten
iKitten adds an entry to the rc.common file for persistence.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0678
ATT&CK Technique Name:Torisma
Torisma can collect the current time on a victim machine.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0492
ATT&CK Technique Name:CookieMiner
CookieMiner can steal Google Chrome and Apple Safari browser cookies from the victim’s machine. [8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
If msxsl.exe is unnecessary, then block its execution to prevent abuse by adversaries. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has obfuscated strings with base64 encoding.[199] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used modified versions of PHProxy to examine web traffic between the victim and the accessed website.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used DLL side-loading to launch versions of Mimikatz and PwDump6 as well as UPPERCUT.[36][37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has frequently used compromised WordPress sites for C2 infrastructure.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell can upload files over the C2 channel.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0562
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNSPOT
SUNSPOT monitored running processes for instances of MsBuild.exe by hashing the name of each running process and comparing it to the corresponding value 0x53D525. It also extracted command-line arguments and individual arguments from the running MsBuild.exe process to ident... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has used the AD Explorer tool to enumerate users on a victim's network.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Use user training as a way to bring awareness and raise suspicion for potentially malicious events and dialog boxes (ex: Office documents prompting for credentials). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drinik
Drinik has C2 commands that can move the malware in and out of the foreground. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
The Industroyer SIPROTEC DoS module exploits the CVE-2015-5374 vulnerability in order to render a Siemens SIPROTEC device unresponsive. Once this vulnerability is successfully exploited, the target device stops responding to any commands until it is rebooted manually. [... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proxy Through Victim
Adversaries may use a compromised device as a proxy server to the Internet. By utilizing a proxy, adversaries hide the true IP address of their C2 server and associated infrastructure from the destination of the network traffic. This masquerades an adversary’s ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for remote logins.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0481
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ragnar Locker
Ragnar Locker encrypts files on the local machine and mapped drives prior to displaying a note demanding a ransom.[67][68] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 PMFault: Voltage Fault Injection on Server Platforms Through the PMBus
Hardware-based attacks like voltage glitching have been a threat to embedded processors like smartcards for decades. More recently, attacks like Clkscrew, Plundervolt, VoltJockey, and V0ltPwn, have shown that desktop and server... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1197
ATT&CK Technique Name:BITS Jobs
Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute code and perform various background tasks. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows sets its DLL file as a new service in the Registry to establish persistence.[139] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0698
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWizard
HermeticWizard can find machines on the local network by gathering known local IP addresses through DNSGetCacheDataTable, GetIpNetTable,WNetOpenEnumW(RESOURCE_GLOBALNET, RESOURCETYPE_ANY),NetServerEnum,GetTcpTable, and GetAdaptersAddresses.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0647
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turian
Turian can disguise as a legitimate service to blend into normal operations.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
For the Outlook methods, blocking macros may be ineffective as the Visual Basic engine used for these features is separate from the macro scripting engine.[4] Microsoft has released patches to try to address each issue. Ensure KB3191938 which blocks Outlook Visual B... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has used scheduled tasks to execute additional payloads and to gain persistence on a compromised host.[175][176][177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.010
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppInit DLLs
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Softwa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has spread through emails with malicious links.[88][89][90][91][92][93][94] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Lamphone: Real-Time Passive Reconstruction of Speech Using Light Emitted from Lamps
Recent studies have suggested various side-channel attacks for eavesdropping sound by analyzing the side effects of sound waves on nearby objects (e.g., a bag of chips and window) and devices (e.g., motion sensors).... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner started the cryptomining virtual machine as a service on the infected machine.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deep Panda
Deep Panda has used ping to identify other machines of interest.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang performs service discovery using net start commands.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:PyDCrypt
PyDCrypt has modified firewall rules to allow incoming SMB, NetBIOS, and RPC connections using netsh.exe on remote machines.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has used Kerberoasting for credential access and to enable lateral movement.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:BITTER
BITTER has executed OLE objects using Microsoft Equation Editor to download and run malicious payloads.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0578
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUPERNOVA
SUPERNOVA had to receive an HTTP GET request containing a specific set of parameters in order to execute.[325][326] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:Antivirus/Antimalware
Anti-virus can be used to automatically quarantine suspicious files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest uses AppleScript's osascript -e command to launch ThiefQuest's persistence via Launch Agent and Launch Daemon. [8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team used a backdoor to enumerate information about the infected system's operating system.[325][326] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0425
ATT&CK Technique Name:Corona Updates
Corona Updates can track the device’s location.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
On iOS, the allowEnterpriseAppTrust and allowEnterpriseAppTrustModification configuration profile restrictions can be used to prevent users from installing apps signed using enterprise distribution keys. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS typically loads its DLL file into a legitimate signed Java or VMware executable.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0279
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proton
Proton uses macOS' .command file type to script actions.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0509
ATT&CK Technique Name:FakeSpy
FakeSpy can collect device networking information, including phone number, IMEI, and IMSI.[13] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 (Long) Dragon Tails – Measuring Dependence on International Vulnerability Research
This talk will present results of a study on the reliance of critical proprietary and open source software on Chinese software vulnerability disclosures. The increasingly difficult environment for Chinese security re... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0953
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [7], including the management of gol... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor's has a plugin that captures screenshots of the target applications.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0463
ATT&CK Technique Name:INSOMNIA
INSOMNIA can collect the device’s phone number, ICCID, IMEI, and the currently active network interface (Wi-Fi or cellular).[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:macOS.OSAMiner
macOS.OSAMiner has used curl to download a Stripped Payloads from a public facing adversary-controlled webpage. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can scan victim drives to look for specific banking software on the machine to determine next actions.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0665
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThreatNeedle
ThreatNeedle can obtain file and directory information.[302] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1542.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROMMONkit
Adversaries may abuse the ROM Monitor (ROMMON) by loading an unauthorized firmware with adversary code to provide persistent access and manipulate device behavior that is difficult to detect. | secon |
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