text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:T1553.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM can continuously capture keystrokes.[166][167] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0055
ATT&CK Technique Name:RARSTONE
RARSTONE obtains installer properties from Uninstall Registry Key entries to obtain information about installed applications and how to uninstall certain applications.[244] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot grabs a user token using WTSQueryUserToken and then creates a process by impersonating a logged-on user.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sibot
Sibot has queried the registry for proxy server information.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group conducted internal spearphishing from within a compromised organization.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used Google Chrome browser extensions to infect victims and to steal passwords and cookies.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor has the ability to search for Kaspersky Antivirus on a victim's machine.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can create a memory dump of LSASS via the MiniDumpWriteDump Win32 API call.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar has a plugin that can retrieve credentials from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge using vaultcmd.exe and another that can collect RDP access credentials using the CredEnumerateW function.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0357
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impacket
SecretsDump and Mimikatz modules within Impacket can perform credential dumping to obtain account and password information from NTDS.dit.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can perform COM hijacking by setting the path to itself to the HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command key with a DelegateExecute parameter.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has the ability to replace the pam_unix.so file on an infected machine with its own malicious version that accepts a specific backdoor password for all users.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has collected data from local victim systems.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can create system services to aid in executing the payload.[23][24][25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0814
ATT&CK Technique Name:Static Network Configuration
Statically defined ARP entries can prevent manipulation and sniffing of switched network traffic, as some AiTM techniques depend on sending spoofed ARP messages to manipulate network host's dynamic ARP tables. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing has created and run a Bitcoin cryptocurrency miner.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group leveraged an open-source tool called SoftPerfect Network Scanner to perform network scanning.[17][18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can collect a Chrome encryption key used to protect browser cookies.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0123
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volatile Cedar
Volatile Cedar has performed vulnerability scans of the target server.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1067
ATT&CK Technique Name:FluBot
FluBot can intercept SMS messages and USSD messages from Telcom operators.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT can enumerate the username and account type.[151] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has encoded binary data with Base64 and ASCII.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
An adversary must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1566.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spearphishing Link
Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of l... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Choo Choo, Network Train - The One to Rule Your Perimeter
I hear you saying: "MQTT again, that's an old and stale topic." It's actually not old or stale. MQTT is still out there and many servers are still open to attack. But even more interesting, what other devices are connected to those open serv... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has been distributed as malicious attachments within spearphishing emails.[200][78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0678
ATT&CK Technique Name:Torisma
Torisma is only delivered to a compromised host if the victim's IP address is on an allow-list.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure proper file permissions are set and harden system to prevent root privilege escalation opportunities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
To protect against AiTM, authentication mechanisms should not send credentials across the network in plaintext and should also implement mechanisms to prevent replay attacks (such as nonces or timestamps). Challenge-response based authenti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has run a tool that steals passwords saved in victim email.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:IceApple
IceApple's Credential Dumper module can dump encrypted password hashes from SAM registry keys, including HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\F and HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\*\V.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0475
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackConfig
BackConfig has the ability to use scheduled tasks to repeatedly execute malicious payloads on a compromised host.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group gathered victim organization information to identify specific targets.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can download files via HTTP and HTTPS.[86][87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0630
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nebulae
Nebulae can use DLL side-loading to gain execution.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has installed an "init.d" startup script to maintain persistence.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Limit credential overlap across accounts and systems by training users and administrators not to use the same password for multiple accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has obtained an ARP spoofing tool from GitHub.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN has executed commands via cmd.exe.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0390
ATT&CK Technique Name:SQLRat
SQLRat has used SQL to execute JavaScript and VB scripts on the host system.[125] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Back-connect to the Connected Car. Search for Vulnerabilities in the VW Electric Car.
The attack surface on modern connected cars is broad – Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, V2X, 2G/3G/4G, custom RF protocols, CAN, OBD2 interfaces, automotive Ethernet, USB ports, remote diagnostics, telematics, and mobile apps. D... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Legal Pitfalls to Avoid in Security Incidents
Privilege, two-track investigations, OFAC, insurance coverage, and preserving evidence... Lawyers think about this stuff from the jump in a security incident, and you should be aware of them too. Often, attorneys are brought into a security incident aft... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) for RDP traffic.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0391
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAWKBALL
HAWKBALL has created a cmd.exe reverse shell, executed commands, and uploaded output via the command line.[149] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1541
ATT&CK Technique Name:Foreground Persistence
Adversaries may abuse Android's startForeground() API method to maintain continuous sensor access. Beginning in Android 9, idle applications running in the background no longer have access to device sensors, such as the camera, microphone, and gyroscope. Appl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0546
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharpStage
SharpStage has the ability to create persistence for the malware using the Registry autorun key and startup folder.[164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTRAN
HTRAN can install a rootkit to hide network connections from the host OS.[19] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Booting the iOS Kernel to an Interactive Bash Shell on QEMU
Booting the iOS kernel on QEMU with an interactive bash shell and a live debugger attached to the kernel. A major step forward in the direction of having a full iOS open source system emulator on QEMU. The research details and demo will be... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Ghost
For Operation Ghost, APT29 registered domains for use in C2 including some crafted to appear as existing legitimate domains.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0138
ATT&CK Technique Name:Andariel
Andariel has limited its watering hole attacks to specific IP address ranges.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling has been delivered to victim's machines through malicious e-mail attachments.[57] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Graph Convolutional Network-Based Suspicious Communication Pair Estimation for Industrial Control Systems
Whitelisting is considered an effective security monitoring method for networks used in industrial control systems, where the whitelists consist of observed tuples of the IP address of the serv... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can use PowerShell to download files and execute commands.[236][237] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used legitimate local admin account credentials.[1] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 The Cost of Complexity: Different Vulnerabilities While Implementing the Same RFC
Our presentation discusses a simple question: What is the security cost of complexity and ambiguity? We analyze this as measured in terms of vulnerable implementations.To explore this question, we analyzed a very sp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can gather information on the mapped drives, OS version, computer name, DEP policy, memory size, and system volume serial number.[174][175] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
Authenticate all access to field controllers before authorizing access to, or modification of, a device's state, logic, or programs. Centralized authentication techniques can help manage the large number of field controller accounts needed across the ICS. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1557
ATT&CK Technique Name:Adversary-in-the-Middle
Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing or Transmitted Data Manipulation. By abusing features of common net... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has added persistence via the Registry key software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run\microsoft windows html help.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro has been used to execute the net localgroup administrators command on a targeted system.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI can steal profiles (containing credential information) from Firefox, Chrome, and Opera.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1005
ATT&CK Technique Name:POLONIUM
POLONIUM has used valid compromised credentials to gain access to victim environments.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can bypass UAC to elevate process privileges on a compromised host.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0544
ATT&CK Technique Name:HenBox
HenBox can steal data from various sources, including chat, communication, and social media apps.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor performs the injection by attaching its code into the APC queue using NtQueueApcThread API.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has created shortcuts in the Startup folder to establish persistence.[264][265] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Inside Out - The Cloud has Never been so Close
The public cloud infrastructure adds new management layer and security challenges that need to be well understood and secured. The fact that cloud provider application programming interfaces (API) are accessible through the internet has opened a new win... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST checked the domain name of the compromised host to verify it was running in a real environment.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can deliver Beacon payloads for lateral movement by leveraging remote COM execution.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0478
ATT&CK Technique Name:EventBot
EventBot dynamically loads its malicious functionality at runtime from an RC4-encrypted TTF file. EventBot also utilizes ProGuard to obfuscate the generated APK file.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:PingPull
PingPull can retrieve the hostname of a compromised host.[275] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
Mis-Type may create a file containing the results of the command cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all.[143] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group exfiltrated data from a compromised host to actor-controlled C2 servers.[94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has the ability to enumerate the infected system's user name via GetUserNameW.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre can detect sandbox analysis environments by inspecting the process list and Registry.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0550
ATT&CK Technique Name:DoubleAgent
DoubleAgent has used both FTP and TCP sockets for data exfiltration.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST created an Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry value for the process dllhost.exe to trigger the installation of Cobalt Strike.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can inject itself into another process to avoid detection including use of a technique called ListPlanting that customizes the sorting algorithm in a ListView structure.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior.[4] Control flow integrity checking is ano... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy issues the command reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" to achieve persistence.[7] [8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:XTunnel
XTunnel is capable of accessing locally stored passwords on victims.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has used a keylogging tool that records keystrokes in encrypted files.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0516
ATT&CK Technique Name:SoreFang
SoreFang has the ability to encode and RC6 encrypt data sent to C2.[306] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has used multiple Windows APIs including HttpInitialize, HttpCreateHttpHandle, and HttpAddUrl.[176] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0243
ATT&CK Technique Name:DealersChoice
DealersChoice leverages vulnerable versions of Flash to perform execution.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can set persistence with a Registry run key.[111] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Dive into Apple IO80211FamilyV2
Starting from macOS Catalina Beta, Apple refactored the architecture of the 80211 Wi-Fi client drivers and renamed the new generation design to IO80211FamilyV2. Compared with IO80211Family (V1), modules such as Version 2 and AppleBCMWLANCore integrate the original Air... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used PowerShell to execute commands and other operational tasks.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used the commercially available tool RemoteExec for agentless remote code execution.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0627
ATT&CK Technique Name:SodaMaster
SodaMaster has the ability to put itself to "sleep" for a specified time.[32] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Arm IDA and Cross Check: Reversing the Boeing 787's Core Network
In 2008 the FAA issued several Special Conditions for The Boeing 787 Dreamliner. There were serious safety and security concerns about the brand-new network design Boeing had implemented, which provided the Dreamliner with some "e-... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has used open-source C2 frameworks, including Covenant.[151] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assig... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit’s infpub.dat file creates a scheduled task to launch a malicious executable.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0130
ATT&CK Technique Name:Unknown Logger
Unknown Logger is capable of recording keystrokes.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0646
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpicyOmelette
SpicyOmelette has been executed through malicious links within spearphishing emails.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:CreepySnail
CreepySnail can use stolen credentials to authenticate on target networks.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0311
ATT&CK Technique Name:YiSpecter
YiSpecter is believed to have initially infected devices using internet traffic hijacking to generate abnormal popups.[4] | secon |
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