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title:blackhat:us-18 Windows Offender: Reverse Engineering Windows Defender's Antivirus Emulator
Windows Defender's mpengine.dll implements the core of Defender antivirus' functionality in an enormous ~11 MB, 45,000+ function DLL.
In this presentation, we'll look at Defender's emulator for analysis of potentially mali... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0680
ATT&CK Technique Name:LitePower
LitePower can use a PowerShell script to execute commands.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0857
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Firmware
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgra... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0289
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for iOS
Pegasus for iOS captures SMS messages that the victim sends or receives.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [3] [67] These audits should also include if default... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors compromised web servers to use for C2.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has infected victims using watering holes.[54][55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0360
ATT&CK Technique Name:BONDUPDATER
BONDUPDATER persists using a scheduled task that executes every minute.[31] | secon |
title:botconf2014 A New Look at Fast Flux Proxy Networks
Botnets that run on proxy service networks are not a new topic. We (and other researchers) have discussed this topic at various talks in years past, and it was also one of the main points in last year’s BotConf 2013 where we discussed the Kelihos network.Generall... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Keep system images and software updated and migrate to SNMPv3.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has collected files from victim machines, including certificates and cookies.[188] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has sent emails with malicious attachments to gain initial access.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0624
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ecipekac
Ecipekac can abuse the legitimate application policytool.exe to load a malicious DLL.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot downloaded several staged items onto the victim's machine.[266] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0272
ATT&CK Technique Name:NDiskMonitor
NDiskMonitor can download and execute a file from given URL.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has obtained specific Registry keys and values on a compromised host.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:DanBot
DanBot can delete its configuration file after installation.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has downloaded additional payloads and malicious scripts onto a compromised host.[211] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has obtained exploit code for various CVEs.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like Domain Fronting. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
The initial beacon packet for Mis-Type contains the operating system version and file system of the victim.[232] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 broke malicious binaries, including DEADEYE and KEYPLUG, into multiple sections on disk to evade detection.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has sent internal spearphishing emails for lateral movement after stealing victim information.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used valid credentials for privileged accounts with the goal of accessing domain controllers.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conti
Conti has loaded an encrypted DLL into memory and then executes it.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook has modules that are capable of capturing video from a victim's webcam.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has searched for rival malware and removes it if found.[254] TeamTNT has also searched for running processes containing the strings aliyun or liyun to identify machines running Alibaba Cloud Security tools.[255] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0636
ATT&CK Technique Name:VaporRage
VaporRage can use HTTP to download shellcode from compromised websites.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0241
ATT&CK Technique Name:RATANKBA
RATANKBA performs a reflective DLL injection using a given pid.[59][60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0678
ATT&CK Technique Name:Torisma
Torisma has encrypted its C2 communications using XOR and VEST-32.[136] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury has implemented a fallback mechanism to begin using a DGA when the attacker hasn't connected to the infected system for three days.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ixeshe
Ixeshe has a command to delete a file from the machine.[113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has attempted to install a scheduled task named "Java Maintenance64" on startup to establish persistence.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0616
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEATHRANSOM
DEATHRANSOM has the ability to use loop operations to enumerate network resources.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used Pastebin and Google Storage to host content for their operations.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1021.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Desktop Protocol
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
Newer variants of BACKSPACE will encode C2 communications with a custom system.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0505
ATT&CK Technique Name:Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion can encrypt exfiltrated data.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin created a shortcut in the Windows startup folder to launch a PowerShell script each time the user logs in to establish persistence.[226] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can retrieve information about a compromised system's running services.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0634
ATT&CK Technique Name:EnvyScout
EnvyScout can collect sensitive NTLM material from a compromised host.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has used process hollowing to inject into child processes.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has obfuscated malicious scripts to help avoid detection.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's Invoke-TokenManipulation Exfiltration module can be used to manipulate tokens.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Several Lazarus Group malware families encrypt C2 traffic using custom code that uses XOR with an ADD operation and XOR with a SUB operation. Another Lazarus Group malware sample XORs C2 traffic. Other Lazarus Group malware uses Caracachs encryption to encrypt C2 payl... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Whoops, I Accidentally Helped Start the Offensive Intel Branch of a Foreign Intel Service
When I left the service and the NSA, I was offered a job that seemed WAY too good to be true. Turns out it was. This talk will discuss how I came to work on the UAE's Project Raven, what signs I missed because... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1595
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Scanning
Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve ... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Vulnerability Intelligence
Attend a talk to learn tips to navigate the jungle of the vulnerabilities scene. Most likely the oldest task of a security specialist and still high on the agenda of any security organisation is prioritizing and mitigating weaknesses.What are the different standards and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team actors exploited vulnerabilities in GE's Cimplicity HMI and Advantech/Broadwin WebAccess HMI software which had been directly exposed to the internet. [1] [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has exfiltrated data to file sharing sites, including MEGA.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1187
ATT&CK Technique Name:Forced Authentication
Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used process hollowing in iexplore.exe to load the RedLeaves implant.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic encrypts commands from the C2 server using a hardcoded key.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Limit communications with the container service to managed and secured channels, such as local Unix sockets or remote access via SSH. Require secure port access to communicate with the APIs over TLS by disabling unauthenticated access to the Do... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0479
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEFENSOR ID
DEFENSOR ID can abuse the accessibility service to perform actions on behalf of the user, including launching attacker-specified applications to steal data.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0514
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMess
WellMess can write files to a compromised host.[21][471] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0283
ATT&CK Technique Name:jRAT
jRAT has a function to delete files from the victim’s machine.[117] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 ERROR: BadAlloc! - Broken Memory Allocators Led to Millions of Vulnerable IoT and Embedded Devices
"BadAlloc" is our code name for a class of integer-overflow related security issues found in popular memory allocators' core functions such as malloc and calloc. BadAlloc vulnerabilities affect 17 dif... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 has the ability to use SMB to pivot in compromised networks.[13][14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has attempted to get users to click on Office attachments with malicious macros embedded.[96][97][98][99][100][101][102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can check the compromised host for the presence of multiple executables associated with analysis tools and halt execution if any are found.[43][44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell has a module to download and upload files to the system.[98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideCopy
SideCopy has identified the IP address of a compromised host.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0459
ATT&CK Technique Name:MechaFlounder
MechaFlounder has been downloaded as a file named lsass.exe, which matches the legitimate Windows file.[96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher uses token manipulation with NtFilterToken as part of UAC bypass.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has the ability to compress archived screenshots.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has modified ComSysApp service to load the malicious DLL payload.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 established persistence by loading malicious libraries via modifications to the Import Address Table (IAT) within legitimate Microsoft binaries.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0540
ATT&CK Technique Name:Asacub
Asacub has communicated with the C2 using HTTP POST requests.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Cutting Edge: Microsoft Browser Security — From People Who Owned It
Microsoft Edge, the new default browser for Windows 10, is heavily sandboxed. In fact, it is probably the only browser with its main process running inside a sandbox. Microsoft even goes to great length to design and implement platf... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic can retrieve the contents of the IP routing table as well as information about the Windows domain.[122][123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0318
ATT&CK Technique Name:XLoader for Android
XLoader for Android requests Android Device Administrator access.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has used SSL and TLS in communications with C2.[28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS can use JavaScript code for execution.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan can identify users registered to a targeted machine.[115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya encrypts user files and disk structures like the MBR with 2048-bit RSA.[60][3][61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's Invoke-WmiCommand CodeExecution module uses WMI to execute and retrieve the output from a PowerShell payload.[100][101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can establish an SSH connection from a compromised host to a server.[29] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 MINimum Failure - Stealing Bitcoins with Electromagnetic Fault Injection
How secure is a typical hardware bitcoin wallet? Surely such a device would not pin the security on the execution of a single instruction, that if mis-executed would immediately reveal the critical recovery seed, right? Right??... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to use RDP to connect to victim's machines.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0350
ATT&CK Technique Name:zwShell
zwShell can obtain the name of the logged-in user on the victim.[128] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack packs collected data into a password protected archive.[17] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Rope: Bypassing Behavioral Detection of Malware with Distributed ROP-Driven Execution
Distributed malware concepts challenge the behavioral detection of AV and EDR solutions by diluting the temporal and spatial features of a malicious execution across multiple processes. Several notable families alr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Amadey
Amadey has modified the :Zone.Identifier in the ADS area to zero.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 A Little Less Speculation, a Little More Action: A Deep Dive into Fuchsia's Mitigations for Specific CPU Side-Channel Attacks
We know the story by now: researchers find a new side-channel attack and disclose it under embargo. Vendors build patches and ship them. We read about it on $TechSite and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET adds malicious code to a host's Xcode projects by enumerating CocoaPods target_integrator.rb files under the /Library/Ruby/Gems folder or enumerates all .xcodeproj folders under a given directory. XCSSET then downloads a script and Mach-O file into the Xcode project f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control where appropriate. For example, PowerShell Constrained Language mode can be used to restrict access to sensitive or otherwise dangerous language elements such as those used to execute arbitrary Windows APIs or files (e.g., Add-Type).[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS can use VBScript (VBE) code for execution.[93][120] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, the threat actors used uncommon high ports for its backdoor C2, including ports 25667 and 47000.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0257
ATT&CK Technique Name:VERMIN
VERMIN gathers the username from the victim’s machine.[196] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can mark its binary code for deletion after reboot.[201] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy uses the Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) protocol to download remote payloads.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dynamic-link Library Injection
Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live proc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0605
ATT&CK Technique Name:EKANS
EKANS removes backups of Volume Shadow Copies to disable any restoration capabilities.[28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta has established persistence by creating a new service named FAX after deleting the legitimate service by the same name.[12][13][14] | secon |
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