text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:S-Type
S-Type may save itself as a file named msdtc.exe, which is also the name of the legitimate Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator service binary.[100][101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0055
ATT&CK Technique Name:RARSTONE
After decrypting itself in memory, RARSTONE downloads a DLL file from its C2 server and loads it in the memory space of a hidden Internet Explorer process. This "downloaded" file is actually not dropped onto the system.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1636
ATT&CK Technique Name:Protected User Data
Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to collect data from permission-backed data stores on a device, such as the calendar or contact list. These permissions need to be declared ahead of time. On Android, they must be included in the application... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 can use Invoke-TokenManipulation for manipulating tokens.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
Security updates often contain patches for vulnerabilities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can obtain a list of running processes.[131][132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-1314
Threat Group-1314 actors used a victim's endpoint management platform, Altiris, for lateral movement.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Making an Impact from India to the Rest of the World by Building and Nurturing Women Infosec Community
India is one of the most diverse and fastest growing countries in the world and due to the fast growth, women often are left behind. The world average female literacy rate is 79.7%, while in India... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has decoded strings in the malware using XOR and RC4.[33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rover
Rover persists by creating a Registry entry in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\.[227] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has used PowerShell for execution.[134][135][136][137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1542.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROMMONkit
Adversaries may abuse the ROM Monitor (ROMMON) by loading an unauthorized firmware with adversary code to provide persistent access and manipulate device behavior that is difficult to detect. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used JuicyPotato to abuse the SeImpersonate token privilege to escalate from web application pool accounts to NT Authority\SYSTEM.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
GoldMax has written AES-encrypted and Base64-encoded configuration files to disk.[138][139] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0211
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linfo
Linfo creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve system information.[208] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD has the ability to list processes on the compromised host.[197] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.[112][113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0048
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has used search order hijacking to force TeamViewer to load a malicious DLL.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used legitimate executables such as winword.exe and igfxem.exe to side-load their malware.[34][35] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Reconstruct the World from Vanished Shadow: Recovering Deleted VSS Snapshots
Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) is a backup feature for recent Windows OSes. You can create storage snapshots by using VSS. If users refer to snapshots, they can recover its contents. VSS is one of the most important thin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1033
ATT&CK Technique Name:DCSrv
DCSrv has masqueraded its service as a legitimate svchost.exe process.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has disabled Purview Audit on targeted accounts prior to stealing emails from Microsoft 365 tenants.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN5
FIN5 has used legitimate VPN, Citrix, or VNC credentials to maintain access to a victim environment.[16][17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has used a keylogging tool that records keystrokes in encrypted files.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used spearphishing with Microsoft Office attachments to enable harvesting of user credentials.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0546
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharpStage
SharpStage has the ability to capture the victim's screen.[152][153] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used stolen domain admin accounts to compromise additional hosts.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0370
ATT&CK Technique Name:SamSam
SamSam has used garbage code to pad some of its malware components.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0399
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pallas
Pallas queries the device for metadata, such as device ID, OS version, and the number of cameras.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca used the command schtasks /Create /SC ONLOgon /TN WindowsUpdateCheck /TR "[file path]" /ru system for persistence.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher captures and exfiltrates SMS messages.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:DnsSystem
DnsSystem can exfiltrate collected data to its C2 server.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts.Limit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Admini... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0120
ATT&CK Technique Name:Evilnum
Evilnum has used the malware variant, TerraTV, to load a malicious DLL placed in the TeamViewer directory, instead of the original Windows DLL located in a system folder.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0101
ATT&CK Technique Name:ifconfig
ifconfig can be used to display adapter configuration on Unix systems, including information for TCP/IP, DNS, and DHCP. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda can launch remote scripts on the victim’s machine.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake can abuse device administrator permissions to ensure that it cannot be uninstalled until its permissions are revoked.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0258
ATT&CK Technique Name:RGDoor
RGDoor executes the whoami on the victim’s machine.[158] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can use certutil for propagation on Windows hosts within intranets.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson contains a module to collect data from removable drives.[7][8] | secon |
title:botconf2020 Tracking Unsafe Services that are Hosted by Bots using IP Reputation
In this talk, we present a system to identify and track unsafe services that are hosted on bots. The system operates by identifying services whose hosting IP address was marked as a bot by an IP reputation threat intelligence due to ... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Back-connect to the Connected Car. Search for Vulnerabilities in the VW Electric Car.
The attack surface on modern connected cars is broad – Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, V2X, 2G/3G/4G, custom RF protocols, CAN, OBD2 interfaces, automotive Ethernet, USB ports, remote diagnostics, telematics, and mobile apps. Du... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid message... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0054
ATT&CK Technique Name:CloudDuke
CloudDuke downloads and executes additional malware from either a Web address or a Microsoft OneDrive account.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has signed payloads with code signing certificates from Thawte and Sectigo.[69][70][71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire contains some modules that leverage API hooking to carry out tasks, such as netripper.[8] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 A Hacker's Guide to Reducing Side-Channel Attack Surfaces Using Deep-Learning
In recent years, deep-learning based side-channel attacks have been proven to be very effective and opened the door to automated implementation techniques. Building on this line of work, this talk explores how to take the ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
A FinFisher variant uses DLL search order hijacking.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper has the ability to use scheduled tasks for execution.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Action RAT
Action RAT can use WMI to gather AV products installed on an infected host.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0637
ATT&CK Technique Name:NativeZone
NativeZone can check for the presence of KM.EkeyAlmaz1C.dll and will halt execution unless it is in the same directory as the rest of the malware's components.[5][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can collect the computer name and OS version from a compromised host.[148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can use icacls /reset and takeown /F to reset a targeted executable's permissions and then take ownership.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0659
ATT&CK Technique Name:Diavol
Diavol can receive configuration updates and additional payloads including wscpy.exe from C2.[144] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0555
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHEMISTGAMES
CHEMISTGAMES can collect files from the filesystem and account information from Google Chrome.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has obtained and used tools like Havij, sqlmap, Metasploit, Mimikatz, and Plink.[68][69][70][71][72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit the usage of local administrator and domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar has been spread via emails with embedded malicious links.[24][25][26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
Security updates may contain patches for devices that were compromised at the supply chain level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor can use Wevtutil to remove Security, System and Application Event Viewer logs.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent Office applications from creating child processes and from writing potentially malicious executable content to disk. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower can send additional modules over C2 encoded with base64.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has downloaded tools to compromised hosts.[32][33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:SeaDuke
Some SeaDuke samples have a module to extract email from Microsoft Exchange servers using compromised credentials.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Use of Secure Boot may prevent some implementations of modification to code signing policies.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0226
ATT&CK Technique Name:Smoke Loader
Smoke Loader injects into the Internet Explorer process.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0472
ATT&CK Technique Name:down_new
down_new has the ability to AES encrypt C2 communications.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy uses SMTP and POP3 for C2.[24][9][25][26][27][28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI can collect the IP address from the victim’s machine.[125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Certain signed scripts that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application control configured to block execution of these scripts if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell has a module to collect information from the local database.[36] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 New Norms and Policies in Cyber-Diplomacy
After the last round of the UN sponsored consultations on international cybersecurity collapsed in 2016, the international situation in cyber diplomacy has been in flux: will there be other UN rounds of discussion? Will private sector-organized initiatives c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has used malware that adds cryptocurrency miners as a service.[119] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has abused the PasswordChangeNotify to monitor for and capture account password changes.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0919
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Intelligence Program
Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower can delete created files from a compromised system.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used legitimate credentials to login to an external VPN, Citrix, SSH, and other remote services.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has included video recording in the malicious apps deployed as part of Operation BULL.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Modules can be pushed to and executed by Duqu that copy data to a staging area, compress it, and XOR encrypt it.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre registers itself as a service by adding several Registry keys.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1587.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploits
Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0522
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exobot
Exobot can show phishing popups when a targeted application is running.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0521
ATT&CK Technique Name:BloodHound
BloodHound can use .NET API calls in the SharpHound ingestor component to pull Active Directory data.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower can send victim data via FTP with credentials hardcoded in the script.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0530
ATT&CK Technique Name:Melcoz
Melcoz can use MSI files with embedded VBScript for execution.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA can enumerate files and directories.[279] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has the ability to list running processes on the infected host.[125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Limit credential overlap across accounts and systems by training users and administrators not to use the same password for multiple accounts. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Snooping on Cellular Gateways and Their Critical Role in ICS
To keep up with the growing demand of always-on and available-anywhere connectivity, the use of cellular, in comparison to its wireless mobile connectivity counterpart in the electromagnetic spectrum, is rapidly expanding. My research in ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
If Shamoon cannot access shares using current privileges, it attempts access using hard coded, domain-specific credentials gathered earlier in the intrusion.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury can deactivate PAM modules to tamper with the sshd configuration.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk can use stolen domain admin accounts to move laterally within a victim domain.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis can launch a remote shell to execute arbitrary commands on the victim’s machine.[102][21] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 DirectX: The New Hyper-V Attack Surface
In 2020, Hyper-V introduced a new feature of GPU-Paravirtualization, which is based on GPU virtualization technology. This technology is integrated into WDDM (Windows Display Driver Model) and all WDDMv2.5 or later drivers have native support for GPU virtuali... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0466
ATT&CK Technique Name:WindTail
WindTail has used icons mimicking MS Office files to mask payloads.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper is capable of enumerating the running processes on the system using pslist.[260][261] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has checked if the malware is running in a virtual environment with the anti-debug function GetTickCount() to compare the timing.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has the ability to communicate over HTTP.[223][224] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0462
ATT&CK Technique Name:CARROTBAT
CARROTBAT has the ability to delete downloaded files from a compromised host.[38] | secon |
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