text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Exfiltration modules that can access data from local files, volumes, and processes.[143][144] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used a variety of utilities, including WinRAR, to archive collected data with password protection.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0647
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turian
Turian can scan for removable media to collect data.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit local accounts permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [16] [17] These audits should check if new local accounts are created that have ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb can retrieve token signing certificates and token decryption certificates from a compromised AD FS server.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0653
ATT&CK Technique Name:xCaon
xCaon has added persistence via the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\load which causes the malware to run each time any user logs in.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER persists through a scheduled task that executes it every minute.[132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized privileged users can create and modify XDG autostart entries. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 I Am Whoever I Say I Am: Infiltrating Identity Providers Using a 0Click Exploit
Single Sign On (SSO) has become the dominant authentication scheme to login to several related, yet independent, software systems. At the core of this are the identity providers (IdP). Their role is to perform credentia... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sowbug
Sowbug extracted documents and bundled them into a RAR archive.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto collects information on bookmarks from Google Chrome.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor can hide its console window upon execution to decrease its visibility to a victim.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has conducted widespread scanning to identify public-facing systems vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228 in Log4j and ProxyShell vulnerabilities; CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 in on-premises MS Exchange Servers; and CVE-2018-1337... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0537
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperStack
HyperStack can use default credentials to connect to IPC$ shares on remote machines.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has exfiltrated internal documents, files, and other data from compromised hosts.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Perform integrity checks of firmware before uploading it on a device. Utilize cryptographic hashes to verify the firmware has not been tampered with by comparing it to a trusted hash of the firmware. This could be from trusted data sources (e.g., vendor site) or through a thi... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Breaking Firmware Trust From Pre-EFI: Exploiting Early Boot Phases
Vulnerabilities in System Management Mode (SMM) and more general UEFI applications/drivers (DXE) are receiving increased attention from security researchers. Over the last 9 months, the Binarly efiXplorer team disclosed 42 high-impac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole uses WinRAR to compress data that is intended to be exfiltrated.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can use a decryption algorithm for strings based on Rotate on Right (RoR) and Rotate on Left (RoL) functionality.[104] | secon |
title:botconf2014 The Many Faces of Mevade
Mevade (also known as Sefnit) is a botnet that engages in click-fraud and cryptocurrency mining. Mevade is noticeable for two reasons. Firstly, it is huge: at some point, several millions of computers had been infected. And secondly, when it hosted its C&C servers on Tor hidde... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy uses Python scripts for installing files and performing execution.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton can communicate with the implant utilizing the TriStation 'get main processor diagnostic data' command and looks for a specifically crafted packet body from which it extracts a command value and its arguments. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can use Nltest tools to obtain information about the domain.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT has been install via template injection through a malicious DLL embedded within a template RTF in a Word document.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the systeminfo command to gather details about a compromised system.[263] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0382
ATT&CK Technique Name:ServHelper
ServHelper contains a module for downloading and executing DLLs that leverages rundll32.exe.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman can query the Registry to determine if it has already been installed on the system.[31] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 ElectroVolt: Pwning Popular Desktop Apps While Uncovering New Attack Surface on Electron
Electron based apps are becoming a norm these days as it allows encapsulating web applications into a desktop app which is rendered using chromium. However, if Electron apps load remote content of attackers choi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0422
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anubis
Anubis can retrieve the C2 address from Twitter and Telegram.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Ensuring that the tty_tickets setting is enabled will prevent this leakage across tty sessions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.[27][28][29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can use a file exfiltration tool to copy files to C:\ProgramData\Adobe\temp prior to exfiltration.[82] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 About Directed Fuzzing and Use-After-Free: How to Find Complex & Silent Bugs?
Fuzzing is a popular and effective automated approach to vulnerability detection. Directed fuzzing focuses on automatically testing specific parts of the code by taking advantage of additional information such as bug stack... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0585
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kerrdown
Kerrdown has gained execution through victims opening malicious files.[24][119] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0362
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linux Rabbit
Linux Rabbit acquires valid SSH accounts through brute force. [43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has used C:\Windows\Debug and C:\Perflogs as staging directories.[49][50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony has attempted to lure targets into downloading an attached executable (ZIP, RAR, or CAB archives) or document (PDF or other MS Office format).[187] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has the ability to list all running processes.[199] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group malware can create a .lnk file and add a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used a legitimately signed executable to execute a malicious payload within a DLL file.[44][45][46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0211
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linfo
Linfo creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can list contents of drives and search for files.[179] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 enables the Remote Desktop Protocol for persistence.[4] APT3 has also interacted with compromised systems to browse and copy files through RDP sessions.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
Password stealer and NTLM stealer modules in CozyCar harvest stored credentials from the victim, including credentials used as part of Windows NTLM user authentication.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Trace Me if You Can: Bypassing Linux Syscall Tracing
In this talk, we will present novel vulnerabilities and exploitation techniques that reliably bypass Linux syscall tracing. A user mode program does not need any special privileges or capabilities to reliably avoid system call tracing detections ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can inject its backdoor as a portable executable into a target process.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Applications with known vulnerabilities or known shell escapes should not have the setuid or setgid bits set to reduce potential damage if an application is compromised. Additionally, the number of programs with setuid or setgid bits set should be min... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Fail Harder: Finding Critical 0-Days in Spite of Ourselves
Vulnerability researchers and bug hunters love to talk about their successful path to finding a critical vulnerability. However, this is rarely the Cinderella story people tell on stage. Failure, along with a healthy dose of persistence, ca... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot can collected the country code of a compromised machine.[14] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Demigod: The Art of Emulating Kernel Rootkits
Kernel rootkit is considered the most dangerous malware that may infect computers. Operating at ring 0, the highest privilege level in the system, this super malware has unrestricted power to control the whole machine, thus can defeat all the defensive ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rover
Rover automatically searches for files on local drives based on a predefined list of file extensions and sends them to the command and control server every 60 minutes. Rover also automatically sends keylogger files and screenshots to the C2 server on a regular timeframe.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy that prevents use of unauthorized external services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:admin@338
admin@338 actors used the following commands following exploitation of a machine with LOWBALL malware to enumerate user accounts: net user >> %temp%\download net user /domain >> %temp%\download[1] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Permission Mining in GCP
Do you know exactly what each user can do in your Google Cloud Platform (GCP) environment? Do you know if you have users who can assume other identities to escalate their privileges? Do you know the effective permissions the users would have if they assume other identities? ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has downloaded additional scripts that build and run Monero cryptocurrency miners.[215] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:4H RAT
4H RAT obfuscates C2 communication using a 1-byte XOR with the key 0xBE.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has obfuscated code using base64 and gzip compression.[197] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has controlled POWERSTATS from behind a proxy network to obfuscate the C2 location.[15] MuddyWater has used a series of compromised websites that victims connected to randomly to relay information to command and control (C2).[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Filter network traffic to prevent use of protocols across the network boundary that are unnecessary. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can register a device to Azure AD.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0616
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEATHRANSOM
DEATHRANSOM can enumerate logical drives on a target system.[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0228
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanHaiShu
NanHaiShu executes additional VBScript code on the victim's machine.[101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can user PowerView to execute "net user" commands and create domain accounts.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has set up and operated websites to gather information and deliver malware.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor can use WinAPI to remove a victim machine from an Active Directory domain.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell can use ports 1985 and 1986 in HTTP/S communication.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aquatic Panda
Aquatic Panda has acquired and used njRAT in its operations.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has used SSH to connect back to victim machines.[15] TeamTNT has also used SSH to transfer tools and payloads onto victim hosts and execute them.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBStealer
USBStealer mimics a legitimate Russian program called USB Disk Security.[174] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBSRAT
BBSRAT has been loaded through DLL side-loading of a legitimate Citrix executable that is set to persist through the Registry Run key location HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ssonsvr.exe. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows can use Native API to create a new process and to start services.[186] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:Misdat
Misdat has collected files and data from a compromised host.[121] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0116
ATT&CK Technique Name:UACMe
UACMe contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0204
ATT&CK Technique Name:Briba
Briba installs a service pointing to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
The Ke3chang group has been known to compress data before exfiltration.[26] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Optimistic Dissatisfaction with the Status Quo: Steps We Must Take to Improve Security in Complex Landscapes
Working in security is a principled decision. Many of us do this because we want to help make technology more reliable and safer for our friends, our family - for humanity. Your skills got y... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used Tor and a variety of commercial VPN services to route brute force authentication attempts.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sowbug
Sowbug obtained OS version and hardware configuration from a victim.[343] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork has used spearphishing with an attachment to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.[174][175][176][177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attestation
Device attestation could detect unauthorized operating system modifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury can deactivate PAM modules to tamper with the sshd configuration.[6] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Attacking and Defending the Microsoft Cloud (Office 365 & Azure AD)
The allure of the "Cloud" is indisputable. Organizations are moving into the cloud at a rapid pace. Even companies that have said no to the Cloud in the past have started migrating services and resources. The Cloud is a new paradi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
The QakBot proxy module can encapsulate SOCKS5 protocol within its own proxy protocol.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest uses the function kill_unwanted to obtain a list of running processes and kills each process matching a list of security related processes.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has used compromised credentials to access cloud assets within a target organization.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors enumerated sessions and users on a remote host, and identified privileged users logged into a targeted system.[138] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0487
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kessel
Kessel has exfiltrated data via hexadecimal-encoded subdomain fields of DNS queries.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson has the ability to determine the date and time on a compromised host.[28] | secon |
title:botconf2019 Emotet : WordPress Compromises at Scale
The Emotet banking trojan has been studied by many researchers since it was first discovered in 2014. In particular, the infection scheme and the Command & Control architecture are both pretty well documented. However, few researchers investigated the way the pa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1587.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Digital Certificates
Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an en... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0509
ATT&CK Technique Name:FakeSpy
FakeSpy can collect a list of installed applications.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton's argument-setting and inject.bin shellcode are added to the program table on the Tricon so that they are executed by the firmware once each cycle. [4] [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Web proxies can be used to enforce an external network communication policy that prevents use of unauthorized external services. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Worm Charming: Harvesting Malware Lures for Fun and Profit
It's no secret that client-side attacks are a common source of compromise for many organizations. Web browser and e-mail borne malware campaigns target users by way of phishing, social engineering, and exploitation. Office suites from vendo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 sent spear phishing emails containing links to HTML application files, which were embedded with malicious code. [4] APT33 has conducted targeted spear phishing campaigns against U.S. government agencies and private sector companies. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used compromised credentials to log on to other systems.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Use network appliances and host-based security software to block network traffic that is not necessary within the environment, such as legacy protocols that may be leveraged for AiTM conditions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain has authenticated itself to a different implant, Cryshell, through a port knocking and handshake procedure.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can use a custom binary scheme to encode messages with specific commands and parameters to be executed.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0436
ATT&CK Technique Name:TSCookie
TSCookie has the ability to decrypt, load, and execute a DLL and its resources.[238] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can use DNS for C2 communications.[28][29] | secon |
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