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First of all, the state won't buy it in the first place because they're not big enough, and second, even if it's like some case scenario where they did, they can't mobilize the military against them because there's just so many of them in swades that are divided across so many points that they would be significantly overwhelmed by the sheer number and scale of these people. |
So they cannot succeed, and in the best case, and like in the worst-case scenario, none of these benefits actually manifest, so we win anyway. So why is this better than their best case? So we show you that these divisions don't necessarily exist between, to the point where they would not be willing enough to engage with other religious institutions. |
And I'm going to come on to that when I weigh against the opening because we can talk more about that. So like, even in the best case scenario that they give us about religious institutions having some kind of monopoly on state power and state narratives, we still win. |
So that's way against opening. Here, first of all, it's worth noting that we break the deadlock on opening half about overthrowing and whether or not it succeeds because opening couldn't decide. Teams couldn't decide, like, would you isolate or put off competing in other religious groups? We answered this. We don't put them off because they have a common interest because these movements are probably being suppressed at some level or like not being suppressed more. |
For instance, look at Nazi Germany and the fact that different sects of religions, like different sects of Christianity were suppressed first before Catholicism was eventually suppressed because there was enough conflict happening there. Look at the fact that eventually the religious monopoly power that happened with Zia in Pakistan eventually fell apart because there is so much conflict happening there. |
Like, ultimately, there is so much, like, these groups who are being suppressed disproportionately to other groups. As soon as they're united in their suppression, they have a common incentive to engage and struggle against authoritarian rule and resist it in a meaningful way because they can care more. They care more about their survival and their religious and political capital remaining intact than they do by the legitimacy of these other movements. |
They can't spread the word of God if their mosques are shut down and their Bibles are being burned. Now the second point about this deadlock, this overthrowing happens. We show you yes, it does because these groups are probably being suppressed to some extent. Like I said earlier, like Zia explaining with religious groups like the tomatoes Islamic due to theological disagreements and opposition to his actions. |
We showed you, Rachel showed you clear tipping point analysis as to why without the sheer number of movement, like sheer numbers that you get in the movement as a result of religious buy-in, this will not happen. Why is this first of all? Manpower because these religious institutions usually have such a hold over the population that the majority is religious to at least some extent. |
And that without the sort of hold back that you have on legitimacy, without having them buy in in the first place, that you won't get enough support to overthrow them in the first place. So any of the harms that OG give you are meaningless anyway, and the second thing is the resources of political communities like religious communities, rather. |
Like look at Martin Luther King and look at the sheer amount of power that medics would have or the fact that you have so many people they can have mass resistance on that economic level and on civil disobedience levels. The result of this is that ultimately what happens is that there is enough manpower and enough sort of resource buy-in for there to be able to be a meaningful counter to the state. |
This counter does not exist without the legitimacy of religious institutions, so it does not exist for opposition. So opposition says, like, this whole thing about it being bad for succession because these movements are seeking political capital at any given point. |
I will probably existing governments would take too much power. I'll tell you what's wrong with it. But first, like if opening I have anything. Okay, let's move on. So what's wrong with this? They don't analyze why religious groups want to get involved. Rachel tells you very clearly that they won't be the centerpiece of the movement, divine birthright won't necessarily be the controlling force. We're co-opting narratives of religion; we're not making this a religious protest. |
So what happens as a result? People may be religious, but they don't necessarily want theocracies because they're simply buying into the fact that they're fighting an illegitimate regime. So the best case where this argument from OO is true, religious institutions don't necessarily want autocracy or theocracy because they think they'll need to make compromises to have success in the political spheres. And religious institutions, since they have the epistemic value that OG talked about, they won't want to dilute. And the worst cases isn't true at all, and we see religious institutions called proper protest movements anyway because they're usually being suppressed in the status quo. |
We tell you that religious movements have clear incentives on moral grounds and political grounds because even against their best case, we show you why they won't discern the political capital but they'll want to get involved. This helps vulnerable and oppressed faiths in significant ways where they're not able to participate, and like they won't be able to engage in the struggle anyway because they're being oppressed at such an extent. |
And they won't be demoralized if they take out a leader because like martyrdom man. |
Okay, now let's go like, weigh up against the bench real quick. So they look like they went on the manpower argument. However, no, they can't access any of these benefits except for our analysis because we materialize how conservatives buy in, how we access a large and greater amount of resources and a greater amount of political capital because of all these people all over the spectrum of political capital and diversity that you have within religious movements. |
Look at white people and the world that they had in like swinging support from Martin Luther King and for like black movements in the 1960s. |
For all those reasons, opposed. |
</gw> |
<ow> |
Three figures in this speech. First of all, holistic overview of the debate where our case falls within it and how you should judge it. Second of all, dismantling GOV's individual cases even further beyond what we're going to do initially. And thirdly, if they have time, specifically weighing against OO. |
Let's talk about this debate then, right? So I think what's really important to note is all of the scenes in this debate talk generally about the impact on the protests, the efficacy, etc. This is fine, but this is only one half of the coin because we tell you that this protest group always exists in contrast to something else, which is the authoritarian regime, right. It exists to counter it, the regime exists to counter the group, etc. So I think to whatever extent the protest can get stronger, that's fine, but it only works so long as they are stronger in proportion to the regime, okay. So you always need to be considering with, like, regardless of what happens to the protest movement, its size, how does that also impact the size and power of the authoritarian regime? I think at the point at which we engage with this, we probably win this debate, right. |
Why do you think this is? Why do we think that the increase that we tell you that you get in the power of the authoritarian regime is disproportionate to any increase that you may get in the resources and power of the protest group, even if everything that GOV tells you is true? |
I think it's got a couple of reasons. One, that the resource gap in terms of how many resources the two have, right. So that the people who you're more likely to be recruiting to the protest group are likely to be more impoverished, because specifically, because there are people who have not been benefited by the state, but the people who are benefited by the state the most, i.e. the wealthiest people, are more likely to be in the pocket of the government. I think at the point in which these people believe that there's a kind of existential threat to their religion, something I'm going to tell you a bit more about later on, this is when they're more likely to do things like donating to the military, the government, etc. |
Brought back providing more resources behind them and using their media empires or whatever to recruit more people. I think there's a disparity in this. Second of all, even if you don't buy that, even we assume that there are equal resources on both sides, I'll take POI later. |
Note that leaders stay in power by co-opting the majority narrative anyway, right. Because that's the best way to do it. If you can have the majority narrative or at least a majority of the narratives, then you're more able to stay in power. It's just kind of common sense, and whether that's by divine rights of kings or some other mechanism, so to whatever extent you get active engagement increasing in the protest group and support there, I think that support increases in the regime more because they are seeing either one, an enemy religion if it's a different religion, or two, blasphemy if it is a different interpretation of the same religion. |
So not only do you get this sort of existential threat to their religion, which is more important than anything in the mortal life because it affects them for eternity going onward in the afterlife, but it also depersonalizes everyone else. But everyone else is just like evil in the eyes of this religion. So you get angus people; it turns people away from the protest group and towards this regime because of this monopoly on your religious media, etc., and that it's had, and also because just like that's what the majority religion looks like. You know, the kind of people you're going to be recruiting to this regime are probably people who weren't agreeing with the state anyway because if they were agreeing with the state anyway, then you're obviously not going to be able to get them onside. Okay, let's talk about the rebuttal, let me get to it. I think we get told essentially a couple things, around you're, it's not true and there is some kind of diversity within these groups. I think what's more than to note here is that there's still going to be some majority or some sort of larger scoop right and I think that even if you don't buy that, whenever you introduce some kind of antagonistic religion, this is what causes splintering, right. It doesn't matter what extent you put commonality of religions or united religions beforehan I think at the point in which you introduce an enemy that's when, that's when you, so, you've got disparate religions beforehand at the point which you introduce one antagonistic religion that is out to get everyone else which is how this is framed. I think everyone else is more able to unite and get behind it, right. I think this isn't about like diversity as CG tries to tell you our cases that's the OO case. This is about conflict and the extent to which these groups are able to be in conflict or unite with each other and tell you they're more able to unite against these protest groups when you're the, the motion happens. Additionally, we just don't get any mechanistic analysis, right. Now, that we give you like four or five mechanisms as to how militaries are able to construct their narrative to be ideologically more supportive than what this actually means they haven't engaged with any of these. This looks like the party framing their beliefs around their ideology, it looks like recruitment to the military, it looks like private religious being given to religious leaders, it looks like the divide and conquer policies no engagement on any of that. So, I think ultimately, we win this debate because we tell you why the side of the scales that no one else engages with is actually the more important side of the scales, to consider, in this sort of delicate balance of power between the authoritarian regime and the protest group. I'll take opening. |
<poi> |
why is your case of a majority oppressing the minority more likely than the case of soviet countries, where the majority is oppressed and in these countries where religion is key, why are democratic values on your side sufficient for a successful protest movement? |
</poi> |
Right I think a couple things I think one note that there is still the gap in terms of wealth and power so like power that you have over the media power that you have in terms of resources, which I think happens regardless of whether it's a majority or minority in terms of the population it's still a majority or minority and her majority like leading in terms of the resources and the capital so the point of which we also have a mechanism relating to that, I think that we can still stand even in these instances that you're talking about as well. |
Okay, let's talk a bit more about GOV specifically, right. Because they try to tell you that you get more people inside. The point at which you have religious people backing them, I think we're going to show that there's a pretty mitigatory. Why? Because I think one, note there's the wealth gap, which I've already talked about a fair bit. Two, note that the people who are probably going to be likely to join these groups would have been supported of them anyway, right, because you already have to disagree with the state in some way to even consider joining these groups. |
So I think these are probably the kinds of people who are still going to direct people to these groups; they might give some kind of backing to these groups already, and their followers are already. So these are the people who are already listening to these religious leaders. Their followers might be, are probably going to be reached by the group either way. |
The difference then is whether or not we platform them, we accept them, we integrate them into our protest groups. And I think that's when we tell you that you've got active harms because you synonymize the group; it's a religion as opposed to the religion just being one backer amongst many. |
And anyone else, I think this also beats the CG case, right. Why? Because one, note that when they tell you that people are held back from joining these groups by their religious beliefs, I think we tell you that you can still encourage joining without actively making this group, part of your religion, that your religious leaders are still likely to encourage joining us. |
That your religious leaders are still likely to encourage the ones who would have joined this group anyway, so likely to encourage joining us. We just don't have to platform them in return or integrate them. I think that this is probably the main thing that CG has, the only other thing that they have is the resource manpower stuff which one is sort of the rivers of og second of all again we give you the weighing terms, like the wealthiest elites and thirdly, even if that's not the case, we give you all the other stuff that I talked about earlier. Very briefly then on OG, I think we beat og because og tells you one about corrupting the movements, I think this is dependent on the movements actually winning in the first place so it's kind of secondary to us. Two, they fill you up putting off people from other religions, I think that, one, we give better mechanisms for what happens on the side of the scale such as protest movements at the point which we tell you about the symmetry in og. Second of all, we just engage uniquely on the other side of the scales which is more important anyway so we have to beat them in that regard,see you thank you. |
</ow> |
<PM> |
A couple of points of model before going into a bunch of arguments. One, the way this probably works is we cross-reference a particular policy within an election plan or program to the socio-economic and demographic situation of a particular person, e.g., Trump scraps Obamacare. We will calculate the harm of that to good individual person and reimburse them in that way. Secondly, we see this as an opt-out card from politics. Therefore, if people choose to engage in this option, they are banned from political activism. For example, if you are the owner or CEO of a company, if you choose to use this option for reimbursement, you are banned from donating money to political parties or influencing politics through lobbying. We say this is one or the other has to ensure that the system is not overburdened with financial influence. Let's move on to a very important principle frame, which feeds into the principle we want to run. We feel that there is no objectively good political outcome from elections, ideologically, insofar as you have no epistemic access to which ideology is the correct ideology. And when choosing between moral preferences, the very choice of the metric is in and of itself a subjective moral decision. But also in terms of what the correct allocation of preferences is, given that the system of one person, one vote cannot account for the intensity of preferences but also calculate the sum of the quantities means the system is necessarily skewed against creating the correct decision. Consequentially, we do not care what the outcome will be or whether Trump wins, insofar as they cannot prove that it is objectively the correct decision in the eyes of God. What we want to debate then about is the maximization of individual agency within the political system because insofar as there is no objective truth, the only thing we can regress towards is a subjective definition of happiness. Because every individual has the largest access to the full breadth of their experiences, desires, and wishes to be able to define that for themselves. Note, in the status quo, you practically cannot influence the outcome of elections as a single voter. Even in the most swingy swing states of the US, the difference in votes is like 10,000 or 20,000. So even if all of your family members vote, you are still not decisive in the election. This means that with greater collective action problem in which you essentially, as an individual, have no power. It is therefore rational for us to create a backup plan for you in situations where you know that your influence is not the decisive one. This is important because of the principle of recourse towards this thing, when the state is infinitely more powerful than you in a couple of regards. One, it controls your entire life through legislation: your welfare, education, your health care, and so on and so forth. Secondly, it has coerced it means to enforce its bidding, insofar as it can send the police and the military in to control your behavior if you disagree with it. But thirdly, you can never escape the yoke of the state. Right? You can move in between states, but you're always under the control of the state. This means that insofar as happiness and the achieving of happiness is related to your ability to achieve your goals, this is directly related to the material conditions of your existence, which you can only control insofar as you control that which defines it through its legislation, which is the same. Which means that in order for you to ensure that you have a good life, or at least the best possible life, you need to have ability to operate within the boundaries of this state. Insofar as you cannot control the outcome of elections, but this policy ensures we at least compensate you. This amount of money is proportional to the harm that can be done to you, which means that it allows you to undertake planning for the next term of the elections, like four or five years. It enables you to keep up a business if that's the proportionality of the harm to pay for your health care, the essential basics you need for you to define your path in life, therefore your destiny. Through this, then we maximize the agency of people through allowing them to have the means necessary to control their life in the way they want subjectively, which is the truest moral definition we can have. Therefore, the only morally satisfactory outcome in this debate we already read it principally. Note that it's independent of practical outcomes, but let's move on to practical outcomes. We said this is also a self-moderating mechanism. Note that the people who are going to vote and not insure themselves against the win of a particular candidate are those who are relatively insured, regardless of which option wins, right? Who are not going to incur a large amount of costs if one or the other option is the true striatum in the election. This therefore likely means that the people who vote are moderate, center-right, and center-left who probably will not suffer a lot of harm, regardless of what happens. The reason why this is important is because it also moderates policy because it means that the people who vote do not have a preference for radical overhauls of the system with health care or education but rather the continuation of the current system with some incremental tweaks on one side or the other. This is important because policy consistency is incredibly key to the survival of a system, insofar as when we have radical changes of policy, this means there is a large sunk cost in debunking and destroying the underpinning of the policy that happened before, because it probably is underpinned by a different taxation policy, different logic of welfare payments, and so on and so forth. There's a huge sunk cost in destroying the infrastructure underpinning of the previous policy and crafting another one. As administrations changes sunk costs repeat over time, which means whenever we have a functional policy that has a time-tested system that has been incrementally adapted to the needs of the citizens, but rather a lot of time and capital is spent irreparably on shifting these policies around. On our side, we ensure that we have a consistent path-dependent system with incremental tweaks that are better adapted to reacting to the situation. But secondly, it also reduces polarization in the system, insofar as people have lower ideological clashes in between them because the system has less people on the far right or far left voting. This means that elections are more likely to revolve around policy rather than around ideological purity or other ways to get cheap political points that are not related to policy efficiency. Note that although we do claim there is no morally correct outcome, this argument shows that you have a pragmatically more efficient system and a system that is more responsive to the individual needs of each citizen, insofar as their unique moral actor that has equal rights for the politicians to represent their needs and their demands in political debate. So we win this in the practical as well. Before I move on to my last practical point, I will take closing opposition. |
<POI> |
Presumably, in the best case of this situation, you get one cycle of moderates voting, which leads to moderate policy reform, which means that the insurance that people get paid off is basically now because of the incrementalism. So this incentivizes increased circles in the future of polarization once people find that the vote is more important and more impactful in their lives. |
</POI> |
One, we say that moderate policies are not necessarily those that will incur low compensation, depending on your socio-economic and demographic status. But secondly, then the best that you can prove, if that's the case you're going to run, is status quo, in which case we still win because we have a principal benefit over status quo even if nothing changes, so that no change is not to win for opposition. Last argument, which is why this probably empowers underprivileged groups in this situation where a lot of people are not going to vote. Those who are underprivileged are likely to see a niche for them to finally influence the system. Know that you're most politically active at the point where relative deprivation decreases slightly. Have always been underfunded, underrepresented. Nobody has campaigned towards you. Finally, in the situation, you see something that has never happened before: the ability to influence an election. You're likely to want to utilize this opportunity insofar as you probably fear that it's going to go away. Also, community leaders and activists are probably riling you up to vote and framing this as a historical opportunity. This therefore means that you are more likely to take the vote, an individual white middle-class person, and probably get more representation, but also more campaigning towards you. Insta-party's politicians know that you are probably the decisive vote. This equalizes agency because everyone is a unique moral actor, and therefore we can prove that this shows more representation. First, people have comparatively less of it. This equalizes the game within the political system because they are another decisive vote. For all of those reasons. |
</PM> |
<LO> |
As we saw today, small margins matter in elections, and whereas the opening government says that means we don't know what people want, we say that if 30,000 people in Pennsylvania would have taken out insurance, that state might have gone in the other direction, leading to significantly more power for a person that doesn't represent the poor, ultimately robbing them of the agency the opening government so desires. Our case clashes directly with him. We're going to explain two things. First, when representations of poor will drastically decrease, and second, why this polarizes politics further, disenfranchising the poor. Why is this directly unclashed with the principle that they've brought in this debate? They basically say that we care about agency and people and to sort of maximize their preferences, and we're indifferent between this. We agree, but we think that we should care most about the agency and the preferences of the poor in this debate because on them, the policies of the government which they rely on simply have the most impact. What we're going to explain is what this policy does is it robs them of their agency to change that powerful tool that influences their material conditions, which they claim are important for freedom as well. I have two or three other points of the bottle before I move into the case. First, on this reimbursement, I think it's generally unrealistically high and not going to compensate if you really for Obamacare, which gives in order to compensate appropriately for it for how expensive care is. It would be millions of people to every person in the United States. We think it's likely therefore to be much lower because of the huge costs. But second, even if it was high, it's impossible to predict. For instance, will this person get sick? And that's true for a lot of particular policies, which you simply don't know the future of what's going to happen to people, hence why we think they never can be appropriately addressed, especially when another powerful person is voted in power. Second, we think that they make claims of our world. If you are in the middle of politics and if you go this side or that side of your rights, you are more likely to be indifferent between which option is going to be because you are closer to your ideal utility point. Hence why more and more men are much more likely to take out the insurance because they at least get the money, but the two other drops are slightly different. Hence why it's true people would want more per se, we have so much about politics but no amount of money. Thirdly, I think actually the opposite is true. The opposite happens because you know lots of other poor people aren't voting as well, hence why my individual vote is unlikely to change things because I don't have a coalition of poor voters, which creates the kind of path dependency in the opposite way because poor individuals are now then incentivized to also not vote for that particular reason. Moving into a case where I will further deal with them. So look. Right where for the third representation. It's very simple. We think poor individuals under their policy could have voted out politicians that pursue policies that harm them or don't help them, and now, for instance, will take out the insurance instead of incentivizing them to change them and instead will take the money even though they had the chance to win the election. Why would they take the money even if they had a chance to win the election or significantly increase the margin, which would also help them in a drastic way? Four reasons. One, it's incredibly uncertain what is going to happen. The polls are close, and you don't know which one is likely to be true, but there could be enormous amounts of changes as well into the future in terms of the economy or what will happen, for instance, with the particular country or with that particular politician who you don't know very well. So it's very uncertain if your vote what will actually happen with that, but the amount of money is extremely certain. That's why you have a big incentive to take it. Second of all, it is in your individual interests. Look, if everyone would vote out, for instance, the politician that pursues policies against the poor, that is obviously an interest of all poor people and better than the amount of money that they will give them. But your individual interest is better served if you take the money. So you often think enough other people will vote for it; I can simply take the money and have my cake and eat it too because I get both the money and the politician out. When everyone thinks that, that ultimately leads to a collective action problem in which politicians that will pursue policies against their interests are elected. Third of all, the amount of money is way more concrete. You don't know what the exact policies are going to be. It is an election relatively far away, and you can feel the money right now. There are particular things that you could do with it straight away, hence a much more concrete option is much more easier to visualize for people, hence why they will take it even if a realistic path for change was on the table. And fourth of all, other campaigns will abuse this to scare voters. What if you lose out on the money? What if, for instance, it doesn't matter and then you could have, for example, gotten all this money to go on a vacation with? For instance, those particular scare tactics on social media by hyper, like using that data to like target voters in a hyper-specific way are likely to change people's opinions. Why does this matter? At first, when established why this matters, even if you don't win the election, because even if you increase the amount of poor people that vote, it drastically can change policy because it creates an incentive for politicians to cater to that group because they see that they turn about the election that they're not taking out the insurance, and that is a block that they can win in the future. Hence why they change their incentive. But also you get more bargaining power. If you increase your representation in the parliament or you win certain local seats, you can already pursue policy because your bargaining chip on a national level and on a local level has increased and massively improves their lives. But in some cases, we actually think you will win the election because, as we've seen, small margins matter and hence why a large amount of people taking out this particular deal will lead to politicians being attacked. This is by far the biggest impact in the debate for these people. For instance, a subsidy or welfare or cheaper health care can drastically change life; you could literally make the difference between life and death to a severe struggle or having a day without unrest and terrible worry because these people depend on those particular policies. Hence why we think this is the most important impact in the bench. I'm going to further explain why this further polarizes things in two particular ways after the election happened. It is for two reasons. First, there is now much more legitimacy to disenfranchise the other side. Why? Because the other side has taken out the money. We can take away policies from them. We cannot care about them because they got the enormous amount of money that the opening government promised them in the first place. Hence why it feels kind of fair they have gotten their compensation, hence why we don't have to think about them. We don't think that the amount of compensation can level up to the amount of disenfranchisement that those guys will create on their side of the house, hence why it's a clear loss. Okay, this will create massive amounts of extra polarization for the following reason: if you now a politician, what is easier? You could make the other side hate you so much that they will take out insurance instead of voting against your competitor. Now they are obviously going to the incentive is the opposite. You don't want people to take out insurance but instead vote for you. But think about it, what is easier for Trump versus Democrats to convince Democrats to join his side or to hate him so much that they will simply take out insurance instead of voting for Biden? The second is way more plausible in already heavily polarized worlds where people, through misinformation and echo chambers, often are very hard to change their particular opinion. But instead, it's much easier to convince them to hate the other side so much that you rather take on insurance and vote for someone else. Hence why this is the easier option for politicians. Why is that polarization problematic? I think it also just generally disenfranchises voters because the policies picked do not represent the majority, defeating them on their metric but also are way more problematic often for poor people who say to go to much more extreme ends in hurting them after the work election outcomes for poor individuals that robs them of the agency. That's why I'll post. |
</LO> |
<DPM> |
I think that the opposition in this debate assumes that, first of all, poor people vote unanimously for one party or the other party, that one candidate is better for people, even though maybe some other people might vote him in, and that's generally what we should prioritize in this debate. I think we will win on this grounds too, but I'm not sure that they've proven you, except for the idea that there are people who are less economically, how do you say, stable than other folks, that they should have more rights in the democratic system than the same folks who have the same citizenship as they have. But first of all, I think with the technical rebuttal, we will just pay for their insurance premium. I think that that solves the issue of we don't know if they're gonna get sick or not, and this is generally the tendency to which we're gonna compensate. So if you lose something, you get something in return for this if the policy is as follows. And secondly, I don't think that, how to say, when we talk about the poor folks generally, I want to first engage with this idea, you don't know whether you will win the election or not with your vote. I think this is crucial. Even if we assume good polling, and polling is shit right now, even in the country with the best democratic tradition of voting, and whatever, and such small differences, there is no way you can gauge whether you're gonna help someone win or help someone lose the election. In order for you to win the election, your vote needs to be crucial in your district, and your district needs to be crucial for the whole election. This means that the difference, I know, between in Pennsylvania is one vote. This was your vote, and Pennsylvania decided the national elections. Other than that, there is no meaningful individual agency for you to change the course of the election. Other than that, voting is largely irrational and done on the basis of other things and not necessarily that you have a rational expectation that you're going to change the system, even if you believe so. I've just proven that there's no way that you can know this, so this is still irrational. Secondly, I contest that people who are of low economic situation vote unanimously. I think there's a lot of people who voted for Trump who are poor currently in the Midwest, and I don't think that they that you can put them in the same take over they want to vote for Democrats because Democrats offer maybe a more beneficial welfare state. I contest that they have a lot of power today because of disenfranchisement that happens because of tendency to be angry at politics and emotional at politics because they have every right to be so because they are not given the cozy solutions that the middle class has and the, how they say, the candidates that represent them because of a tendency to be apathetic, not vote, or not to engage in elections in so ever. I also contest the idea that just because the government could do a lot to you and probably won't, because otherwise there would be no poverty and this would be already alleviated, you have more rights than other folks to which the government has, let's say, a lesser influence on life. But that's the potential influence, right? Without them proving that you can actually influence the outcomes of the election by just voting, that means that, how to say, they have no impact on their side of the house. And this is where I want to go into our case and reinforce it because I think I'm more or less done with the attacks in this part. All mechanisms of checks and balances, the bills of rights that we have, limits on terms, all of this, this ensures limited political influence on an individual right. So this protects you from the political process. It also gives you some rights in terms of engaging with the political process but it also limits the, I don't know, the idea of how much an executive can influence their power to you and so on and so on. Here's why this is mitigatory, right? Because the influence and the harms that are done to you are to some extent mitigated by the rules that we have and by the limitations of power. However, they are not compensated, which means that if the harm is 10 with these protections that exist right now, the harm can be lowered to five, but you still lose five of utility if you're losing if you lose the election. This is why on our side of the house, it's through being anti-political and this ensures that you can be anti-political to the extent by refusing to accept an outcome that might happen or refusing to live under the influence of an outcome that might happen. The only freedom from politics is actually achieved. And given that structurally, I think that a large part of opening opposition's case proves this, that politics is maybe screwing some people, they're not giving them a chance, they're not giving them a decent life, and all of these things. The ultimate right which every individual should then have, irregardless of the outcome of the elections, is the idea that there's going to be some more agency in the political process because I don't care if 80% of poor people vote for Democrats and 20% vote for Republicans. If on their side of the house they have a bigger turnout and the 80% are good, the 20% are still very much screwed, right? On our side of the house, every one of them can ensure for the outcome that they are going to lose their sort of utility. On the idea that there exists a collective action problem that exists in the status quo, guys, right? I mean, there is, how do you say, there are more folks, there are more people in the United States than the poor folks, I guess, who the government can fuck up more is the people who are, let's say, of less economic, how do you say, status. But this is actually ensuring that you are able to, how do you say, cope with this because right now the collective action problem is that you depend on other folks, right? You depend on other folks right, you depend on folks in other states or in other jurisdictions in the voting, so this is the collective action problem that you're facing in the status quo. But the problem is that even if they say that we make the collective action problem worse because people are just going to be inclined to take the choice that benefits them individually, we say that's a benefit compared to the status quo that they have to uphold in this debate because you still have to say the score of collective action problem and depending on other folks and what they are going to do in this specific issue. But you have no way of ensuring that you are going to somehow be kept safe. I want to take closing opposition before I finish with two more points. |
<POI> |
So I'm curious, in your world, what exactly is the difference between, for example, fighting for more welfare policies for the poor or for that matter, on the flip side, why then do you stand for vote at all if you believe that they are all irrational? |
</POI> |
Because I think that inherently voting is irrational, and what gives voting the ability to be rational is that you can hedge against the said irrationality, right? Because there's other people who are influencing your decision, and you, as an individual, cannot do anything about it. That means that folks are most likely to use this as a means of political activity are the folks who are disenfranchised, who have the most to use. But in the end, this means, as Tiny has already contested, and this hasn't been engaged with this, that you're going to have moderate folks who don't have to lose so much who are going to be deciding elections. Closing opposition's response to this is there's going to be cycles of radicalization. I think it is ex-ex in this new system it is really expensive and dangerous for people to start going on the idea of emotional, how do you say, the influences on the electorate and to go into the radicalization part where they are going to influence their identity a lot. And why is that? Because in this sort of situation where you know that voters are going to act more rationally, they're going to hedge against the potential of the other person being elected. They're less likely to just base this on the emotion and all of this and go and vote against the person, right? Because this is the only choice that they have in the status quo, and this is why radicalization is possible because you get both turnout on the other side and the other side. I think we break this deadlock. This is why you won't have cycles of radicalization. Thank you. |
</DPM> |
<DLO> |
Before I go into more extensive rebuttal against Opening Government, let me start with bashing their model. What they want to do is compensate individuals exactly for the harm that they incur. There are three responses I have to this model why I think that is unrealistic. The first one is you simply cannot do this. The policy that will be taken and the policy questions for which a government will stand are completely uncertain. The effects of those policy choices are completely uncertain, and the life that individuals are going to lead for the next four years are completely uncertain. So I think that model is a cop-out out of this debate. But even if you accept that model, I have two more responses to this. The first one of those other two, so I guess my second response, is that the harm that is incurred by those people from that person getting into government will likely increase during the time that that person is in government. Why? Because that person has more legitimacy and will increase the number of harms that are sort of put on these people during that time in government when he's there. The motion I know says you don't know who voted against your insured against you, but you kind of know, right? You don't know the individuals; you don't know their identity, etc. But Trump knows that Black people don't like him, right? Or you know which photo groups are against you or afraid of you. You've seen the stuff on Facebook, online, etc. Why then do these people get the significantly worse time during your time as president or parliament or whatever? First of all, you have an incentive to screw these people over, right? Because these people aren't part of your voter base anyway. They're not part of the opponent's voter base anyway, and you can simply get money by for example either taxing them or saving money on education or something that's provided for them. And now you also have the legitimacy to do this because these people have been bought off in the first place. We think that is problematic because the harm will increase during those four years and not be the exact same. Third of all, you have second-order impacts, not just first-order impacts. The result is on the lives of people isn't just this election cycle and this government policy. First of all, you have the political importance of your group, of your ethnicity or something like that in the next elections, right? Seeing that these people are either voting a lot for certain people or not voting at all decides whether people are likely to design more policy for them and trying to activate them into their political base, right? That has large implications in the future. It is other implications are who gets appointed in other positions and what are their actions going to be during those four years and all the time after. It is the general political climate of your country and what happens in that—all those things change at the moment of vote gets different. So therefore, we don't think you can compensate people exactly for the harm that is put onto them that is likely in the future to be significantly larger versus a short-term gain that you can get now from the money that you're getting. That is the debate that we're having today, not some kind of fictional fairyland that Opening Government is trying to propose. Then a few other points of rebuttal to the general case that Opening Government is bringing today. The first one is that there is no actual rational reason to want to vote, and therefore this is good for individuals. Here, Opening Government makes a crucial thinking mistake because they are right on the individual level; as an individual voter, there is no incentive to vote. But this question is not given that the system exists. Should you, as an individual voter, take out insurance? The question is, should we implement this system? And therefore we have to look at the aggregate level, right? And at the aggregate level, because all these different people have incentives not to vote, all the lives of those individuals are going to change because suddenly all those other people are changing it as well, and the government is going to be different, right? That is very important because that means the implications for you are going to be significantly more severe, even though initially for you as an individual it is a dominant strategy not to vote anymore. We think that is bad for the future of your group, of your community, of your society. Second of all, they said you have a principal right to insure yourself. Note that they never explained why that insurance has to be in you of your ability to vote. If you want to give everyone a society insurance against what happens with the government, we're completely fine with that, right? We have a problem with taking away people's right to vote, especially at the moment they are people that need money, right? Because those people are the ones that are not going to vote and are going to get screwed over more and more and are going to disappear more and more to the political background, those large long-term effects are going to accumulate, and they will get screwed over. Then they try to run the case, but not really, but a little bit that you only get functional policy under their side of the house with only some small tweaks. First of all, note that they're saying that it is better because, you know, you have massive cost transaction costs switching your policies. But people know this when they are voting in an election, right? And they can take this into account, but apparently they still find it more preferable to change the political sort of leader and accept those transaction costs because they care more about that other thing than at that point. I don't see why that is a problem because apparently people change their mind; they change their views on what they want on the future, and that is completely logical. Second of all, I'm just not sure why you're going to get more moderate and more stable futures, fears, etc. change too. It is still volatile which people are going to share them, which candidates are going to come up, which what party the moderate voters or something are going to vote for. I'm not sure why that is so stable as they are claiming. Third of all, Flores explains to you why you actually want other voters not to vote for their candidate but to vote against you because that way you can actually guarantee that you are going to get in power, right? Because at the moment you take away votes from the other candidate because they are so afraid of you, that means you're more likely to win your position. Therefore, we think politics is going to be more divisive. You have an incentive to make people fear you or hate you because then they are not going to vote for you. We think therefore it is likely to be more radical. Fourth of all, we think at the moment you have less people in society voting in general, many groups who are out of the democratic sort of system because they would more likely want to take the money. That means there is less democratic control on the actions that you take. That means you can do more crazy shit, take more risks, screw more people over. We don't think it's going to be the good policy that's going to survive. The last thing that they're saying is your vote is going to be bad anyway. We think, so therefore it doesn't matter for an individual. We think that a super nuanced people's votes aren't perfect; they don't know anything, everything, but they're pretty good, especially at the moment you look at the aggregate level and all the noise gets compensated. You get a pretty clear picture of the preferences of a country, and we think that matters because it might win you the majority, but even if it doesn't, it can win you house seats; it can win you political importance for the next elections. Panel, incredibly proud to oppose. |
</DLO> |
<MG> |
One point of extension from CG today: why you will have way more moderate parties and policies and why that's indeed so important. Notably, the stakes are over Opening Government because why they perhaps give some access to why moderate policy might happen. They didn't explain why it's important, whether they're all or there's no absolute truth to feel. But secondly, it'll be a more concrete practical impact that will be exchanged and more important than the principal idea of the agency because indeed, agency in the status quo is not gonna aim for you principal in the first place, you trade off your consequential impacts all the time because in the absence of good policy or largely less harmful policy, individual agency of the poor and of people has already been compromised. Crucially, this will also challenge ODE more directly simply because, well, we showed you why in the vast majority of cases elections aren't actually quite close. The liberals don't actually win in most cases. You don't have liberals in the first place and how this will ensure that you don't have politicians towards the right, as Trump, in the first place. So let's begin: why would you converge around having moderate policies and moderate parties? I think there's a huge incentive to converge, and so inspires a huge sum of money has to be paid. Or, trying to remember that if they say no, will it really be that large? I would just encourage them to read the info slide, which clearly says you'll compensate them for the degree of harm. Encourage them to fire policies like health care and so no one can have large degrees of harm. Yes, it will per unit be very large. I think that's yet to that. I think OG set it up quite nicely. This crucially means that lots of people that you otherwise would just shove off as perhaps people who are not significant enough to change the outcomes of an election, you can't shove off anymore because that's what twenty, thirty thousand, fifty thousand people can now detrimentally screw your wealth you have as a need. This is crucial because obviously the less amount of government resources you have, the all the problems amplify. More, you're more likely to go into debt; you're more likely to spend on resources—all of which means you can't implement your policies as much, which affects directly the amount of voters would be in the next election cycle. This clue should take down your weird idea. Oh no, you'll actually make them vote, like, make them like they can choose against you rather than trying to converse. No, it's a huge sum of money. You ensure that you don't take someone off to the extent that they actually take insurance against you. Surely this won't be literally any random person, all people taking insurance against you. It would be a lot reasonable some, but I think lots of people, the vast majority, will still vote. A couple of reasons why: one, lots of people recognize, like the importance of voting, and surprise, they want one party to come and over the other. Secondly, simply speaking, lots of people subscribe to the culture of personality or have been long-term parts of political parties, like people in the PPP or people in the PTI. They simply won't grow away, even if there's a self-interest related to them, which means they will still largely vote. And indeed, their leaders will still encourage them to vote for them as opposed to take out insurance. So sure, there'll be a reasonably large sum of people who will take control, but it's not like this one with anyone. Lots of people, the majority, will still vote. Notice then, because I showed you why the sum of insurances is likely to be high, this means that the incentive towards all parties to actually ensure appears in the chat and take you later actually ensure that you have stuff like, you know, moderate policies and things of that sort. What does this ministry look like? This looks like ensuring that you will take off people to the point of which they'd rather take insurance against you than vote for their own political party, who they have leavings against. This looks like you reaching out to the most disenfranchised people, who you otherwise would have screwed the most, i.e., pre-post elections, all things of that sort. What does this look like, and why is this important? Taking over OG on this particular metric, firstly, you are likely to focus on common policies as opposed to policies that only affect the selection. I would like to know, sure, all policy cannot be common, but there are large things that do have common interests in society. Stuff like better economic situations, stuff like more access to health care. But even, I mean, I think that's only contestant in the US, which is a pretty up country. But I think even as opposed to that in the developing world, notices, which is a large amount of debate, stuff like anti-corruption sentiments are really predominant parts, and pretty much all quality people believe in it, which means that there are common policies that you can focus on. The comparative is you will only focus on their side of the house: people who actually give you votes and donations specifically because you only need to focus on the 50 plus one. You don't need to give a rat test about anyone else. The example of this is the PML party in Pakistan who only focus on the province of Punjab, screwed over everyone below, just like literally all political parties in particular screwed up on instant. You can't do that anymore. And surprise, all of these people in Balochistan can literally ask for insurance against you, which means that while you might not necessarily prioritize them, you have an incentive to have most common policies. This is truly a huge impact, and so far you get benefits economically or otherwise, your infrastructure, at the very least, that was only restricted to a particular ethnicity, particularly a group that has now happened even more. The second thing I want to note is this much less antagonistic shit and much less, like, you know, like hate speech or just like calling out one particular ethnicity over the other. This might seem weird for people who are like, you know, white countries and so on, but it largely happens in like the South Asia and subcontinent in Africa, all of these places where democracies are relatively weaker. So it's important, crucially notice here on in status quo, you have an incentive to shoot on, like the most vulnerable group, i.e. in Pakistan, you see literally all parties—and that's the point. It's extraordinary. I don't exist like any meaningful left-wing party because the democracy is so shit. All parties should run the remedies and call them out in their particular campaign slogans. Simply not because they're not, they're completely small, simply because there is this racist tendency that exists sentiment against them. You often use how much shit against the minorities, like the Shias or the Ahmadis, as a metric to get more elections in status quo. All of this means that in their side, they have incentives to further hate speech or further screw over the minorities. On our side, you do not have those incentives of society and minorities can actually have insurance against you, which I've explained why it'll be so important. There's a few impacts to this, but before that. |
<POI> |
Yeah, you don't just you are the only one who is getting compensated. All the people that still voted and were hopeful and now lost because you opted out of that election are getting screwed over without getting any compensation. How's that legitimate? |
</POI> |
This presumes that in the absence of this policy you would have won. I'm gonna talk about that in just a second. A couple of hints here. Firstly, in lots of the developing world, you don't actually have people who are standing for the lecture the common man simply because there's weak democracy. Then there's not actually a fully functioning system that lots of poor people don't vote, but they might show up to collect insurance. Secondly, right-wing people like parties are dominating elections across the world. Maybe the US is a minute example, especially in the developing world, simply because there are a few structural reasons why they're always going to vote. You might as well bring them towards the center as we do on our side. One, it surprises. They're more pro-corporation and stuff of that sort. They automatically get more lobbying power and more donations. There. Secondly, and so far they've historically been in power, especially the developing world, they're likely to stay in power. And surprise, they manage to recruit money and corrupt and invest their money and engage in corruption practices and things of that sort. But third is crucially speaking, they often tap into the racist tendencies and the insular tendency of people, so like ostomy majorities in Pakistan and things of that sort. And surprise, there usually is like a big ethnic majority and a small ethnic minority. This seems like writing parties are always like you to win, like in the vast majority of cases. This means that while your impact might stand in the US, for example, I don't see why the impact stands across the board. This then wins simply because, well, you know, insofar as writing parties are going to win most of the time, maybe on the US, maybe not even in the UK, although they are kind of now, when the vast majority of the developing world, which is the most important stakeholder in any debate, we socially bring them towards the center, which means they focus on common policies. But which crucially focus they don't focus their rhetoric, and they think of on extreme hate speech against a particular minority, which inspires on-the-ground discrimination, which inspires underground violence and aid against Shias and Ahmadis, which indeed makes them seen even shittier. All of this means that if you're writing our life to win anyways, might as well bring us towards the center and recruits with huge practical benefits. So proud |
</MG> |
<MO> |
OG might be trivially true that many things in this world aren't things we can control. But just as the belief in self-determinism and self-flow is important for us in making good decisions in our lives, we think at the worst case, the illusion of agency is key to believing in the democratic system and creating a functional society. That probably brings me to two extensions in this speech. Firstly, how the belief in the democratic system normatively is key to shaping and solving a lot of the problems in the side of the house that government talks about and why you shatter and destroy that and create far more worse things, particularly in developing countries that CG wants to talk about. But secondly, and importantly, we will actually map out the counter factor of how democracy improves and repairs, because without this, OO does some harm analysis but doesn't do a lot of positive contribution in terms of why, for instance, the poor who fairly asserts our disadvantage in any ways get representation or why things are particularly better on our side. Before that, I have four responses to CG's extension, which is basically, "Ah, you know, money insurance is expensive; therefore, financial incentive to do good things." First response, it's contradictory because on one hand, they assert that quite a lot of people would probably vote anyway to exercise their preferences, which means logically that the amount of sum that you dole out won't be as significant on the budget such as to allow for government to incentively change policy. But the second reason this is extremely crucial, right? This doesn't trade off the next game that politicians have to get into power. That's structurally far more short-term and far more important than some long-term thing that they cognitively can map their head around about losing a specific amount of budget that's uncertain anyway down the line. But I'm pretty sure if you look at things that are expensive in the short term, things that literally go into war, countries always do to amp up nationalistic sentiment and get elected and to seem strong. I'm unclear why a long-term budgetary constraint is not important. But thirdly, structuring, there is also a time lag to this, right? Brought you in, these policies from people would probably take certain cycles and probably will be phased after the current election anyway, which means that it's unclear why this specifically affects people so much. For instance, if you have a disease ten years down the line and you claim based on the policy your institution back then, it's not the current government that's responsible anyway. We're doling out that insurance; politicians can have the hands feed they can also blame this exact policy and blame and demonize the opposition for costing so much fiscal budget, which means that they won't be put at a policy disadvantage anyway. I'm broadly so unclear as to why this is a tipping point for why politicians actually make policy. But even more importantly, right, and this is the last response to this, the premise of that argument is there'll be moderate politics, and I think I responded to this immediately from a POI to OG, which is to say at most if you have one cycle of moderate policies in your best case, which means that people broadly who ensure get no compensation and don't benefit from it, it broadly means every advantage that government does only is structurally hinged on one cycle because after that, people are going to vote and going to be divisive anyway. It broadly recreates all the harms that we talk about anyway. I'm unclear why this wins the debate. First extension, therefore, why is the illusion of autonomy and control in democracy key and believing in the system? And this is very simple, right? To the extent that democracy that we tell people through medium like education, through politicians' speeches, through things like learning about civic society that our vote matters and we could be a tipping point structurally, what this is, it empowers people and makes people believe that the democratic process is the only means through which they should vent their disagreements. They should seek negotiation and they should seek agreement. Now, government might say that this is trivially untrue, given the way that democracies are, might be dysfunctional. But the first thing, one point is we need an aggregate of how this world functions. For every America, there are broadly functional societies, socialist countries, systems, and democracies in Northern Europe, for instance, there are broadly healthy and well-functioning democracies. The more important thing here is this: it is that to the extent that government has to push for this policy, it literally delegitimizes the existence of democracy and devotes as the only option that people have to change political preferences. That is to say to the extent that you give people an alternative to expressing your opinions through the vote and the policy justification for that quite often are the exact arguments that OG asserts about how voting is meaningless, how you should not be enfranchising the political system, how this ultimately can't change much, it necessarily disenfranchises and makes people lose faith and shatters the ability for democracy to function at all. Why is this extremely problematic on several levels? I think the first reason why this is problematic is because it largely skills the ability for countries and democracies to function well because now people are unwilling to proactively participate politically and actively put their preferences to the table. It means that, for instance, a policy decision-making amount of raw data that you collected but different to implement good things excuse because people simply lose hope and lose faith that government can do anything for them. They would rather take the easy option now to ensure. But the second argument here, and this is also important, is that broadly, it just leads to the inability for politicians to see countries as a cohesive unit normatively. That is to say, to the extent that you see this group of people as always insuring and people that would not be politically significant in your calculus means that you necessarily alienate them because you don't see them as people that you want to care about anymore because of the fact that they're insured anyway. What this means is broadly and what happens is if CG is correct in saying that there are sort of tyranny of the majority to a certain extent, I'll explain later why this is unlikely to happen on our side, becomes far worse because now that tyranny gets entrenched and perpetuated through the fact that the minority will always choose to ensure rather than try to push for changes in policy or try to get political representation as well. But lastly, and this is extremely crucial in developing countries as well, to the extent that CG talks about this, right? The alternative, even in countries like the US, but also extremely poorly in developing countries that often have existing ethnic tensions and ethnic tribes and have arbitrarily drawn borders to dispute resolutions through democracy, it's violence and destruction of society. If you look at how the disillusion of democracy in the US has already led to people going up to arms and complaining of the electoral fraud, the literal alternative in places that CG talks about is civil war and people not opting to resolve things on orderly elections and inheritance of things like voting in the blood rocks because they think that this is meaningless and they would rather ensure anyway. What this literally leads to is humongous impacts beyond the policy level stuff that all talks about, literally social unrest, economies not functioning, people losing jobs and dying, being unable to access any agency. OG, I'll take OG. Yes, go for it. |
<POI> |
Given that even in countries like Germany, last waves of people do not vote, your impacts are marginal in that situation. Why is it an illegitimate political preference to be protected from politics if your metric is literally an expression of preferences? |
</POI> |
Perfect. The reason why we think that broadly this short term is expression of presence is illegitimate is because it significantly harms the long-term outlook of that person to the extent that society can't function and people literally can't express any preference whatsoever, as I explained earlier. So yes, people might have a choice to do certain things. The reason why, for instance, a state makes you do education, have seat belt laws, is because they want to preserve your choices in the future because those matter and you compromise that as well. Why is the alternative better on our side? It's very simple. To the extent that people believe in democracy and that's the key premise here people who see erosions in democracy have an incentive to fix that through the aggregation of preferences. And this is key because I think it's correct for OG to point out broadly that small numbers matter in elections and in particular in tight parliaments and with things like, for instance, coalition bonding, small minority votes have the key decision-swaying power in the political process. That's how you avoid the tyranny of the majority because literally, when your only option is to vote, it literally empowers each and every person, regardless of their background, to be politically important and empowers people to aggregate your preferences towards the center because you need these votes to win over other people as well through policy differentiation. That's how you get, for instance, the squad in the US Senate right now, which leads to better democracy. I'm very proud to stand in closing. |
</MO> |
<GW> |
I'm unsure if CO believes that a large number of people will take this insurance option or a large number of people will not, because presumably their ideas about like social discourse collapsing about the inability to ever get any kind of political gradual change is contingent about the idea that lots of people will choose this sort of policy and then be subsequently alienated from the political process even more than they already are. Which means then again, because it is contingent on so many people taking this option, does that not support Essan's extension, where he argued that once politicians see that they are in danger, that their future policies are going to be in danger because of the fact that lots of people are going to become are going to to stake a claim onto the budget that they have to work with, why will then not those parties that end up winning try to cater to those people who potentially will be taking this insurance, right? Secondly, I think it's unfair to assume that parties care or like politicians care about the short term. I think that's untrue, because parties want to be able to win re-election consistently, to the point that they can be entrenched within the political system so that they can lay their groundwork there solidly, so that they can continue to win elections and just compound on each effort that they engage in. Which means that they necessarily have technocrats and advisors and PhD advisors who tell them that if you do XYZ thing right now, this will have subsequent consequences for your re-election campaign four years later, eight years later, twelve years later. This is particularly important in most countries where political parties want to be important, right? I don't think just because you argue that Trump might be short-sighted doesn't mean that the vast majority of politicians, especially in weaker democracies that again are the dominant number of majorities in the dominant number of democracies in the world, are right. So they want to necessarily be entrenched, which means again they're much more likely to cater to whether or not the economic policy that they're proposing is something that's going to benefit a large number of people, because even if in the first election they have a negative policy that people even then some people don't like, even if let's say in one election the insurance option doesn't hang over them like a Damocles sword, it's likely to do so in the second election or in the third. The ones where they're probably going to try and continue the same policies that they did, which then are going to increasingly have less appeal to the people because of the fact that those policies haven't necessarily solved their problems. Right, secondly, I again have a question to opening opposition here as well. If in your characterization poor people are rational, like people in general are rational enough to be willing, or for example, that opposition parties are viable alternatives to like entrenched politics or entrenched demagogues who are very bad for politics, especially in developing countries where Essan told you that necessarily there's an entrenched system of parties and then just a very weak opposition that actually tries to care about people but is never elected. If this opposition is viable and if poor people are rational enough to see that this opposition is viable, then they are not going to necessarily take that insurance scheme, right? Again, this is operating on the sort of characterization they're always talking about. But what exactly was the extension that SN brought in? Why was it the most important thing, right? One, I think the argument wasn't necessarily contended by CO when we argued that right-wing parties in the status quo tend to dominate. Right-wing are just generally parties that don’t care very much about the people or the policies that right now even like that's the vast majority of circumstances in this world, like developing countries with weak democracies, even like the United States and United Kingdom to some degree are suffering from their democratic standing, right? Which means that these are likely to be elected, and the way that they are elected is by trying to exclude certain communities, right? So when their policies, for example, are going to exclude people who need the most amount of health care or they're going to exclude people who are racial minorities simply because of the fact that they can then rile up or like use xenophobic or like racial tendencies or like racial ideas from the majority to try and rally up those particular kind of votes, right? The reason they’re able to do this—and then before that I'll take a point. |
<POI> |
What we explain to you is that actually at the moment people, at the moment, sort of the government isn't representative, that has very long-term sort of spin-off effects. Why then don't you think that people's individual short-term incentives is worth more than the long-term incentives of the group that they represent and exist? |
</POI> |
Well, I think like on a principal level, if there is a large body politic that necessarily feels disenfranchised from the political system, I think like on a principal level, and this is to some degree Opening Government's characterization, like you should be willing to give them the option of opting out of politics or opting out of needing to support someone whom they just genuinely believe they don't want to support or believe they just don't want to necessarily cater to those policies, right? But the point here is that even if, let's say, the insure like the void that necessarily works is the incentive model that we're talking about, right? So the only incentives then that you can give to parties that are right-wing or parties that necessarily want to exclude certain communities is by arguing that this is going to be a financial burden on you that you need to then cater to. I think like opposition bench both argued that this gives demagogues and entrenched politicians a lot more legitimacy to, like, shit on the opposition or, like, shit on waters. One in weaker democracies, this is a problem that is largely symmetric, simply because of the fact that, for example, people often look to their like the entrenched party or the demagogue looks at their opposition waters and says that these waters are ideologically subservient to the opposition party or, in some extreme cases, like in my country, that these people are anti-state or they just generally don't want the benefit of the populace, right? We just don't think that this policy adds to a significant amount of necessary gives them a significant amount of more ammo to be able to, like, what, like, to be able to then to be able to necessarily act against, like, ideologically or spread propaganda against their politicians. What the incentive, once again, the incentive that this does create for them is a fear that this is going to be a significant burden on their budget or that's simply for, in fact, that they'll have to concede, right? I think like most of them don't want their image to suffer, but their image will suffer in a world where they necessarily need to provide compensation to people where then their opposition can say, "Hey, look, you are such a bad leader that people would rather like take money, they'll rather step out of the political system and rather than just vote for you." Everything in fact gives the opposition a lot more ammo in any case, right? But again going back to why extension is important, right? So again in the status quo, there's a trend of right-wing populism, there's a trend to increasing global capitalism, like corporations are stronger than they've ever been before, which means they lobby governments to enact certain policies. Neoliberal policies in developing countries are very common because the IMF has been implementing its programs for years. The problem here is that these parties have no incentive to cater to these people because of things like geographical distance or Essan gave you the example of in Pakistan, where if a party gives a shit about one province, they are likely to win the entire federation or national election. If in the electoral college, the Republicans give a shit about certain states and certain constituencies because the proportionality ends them winning the debate and even winning the match, like winning the election even if they don't win the popular world. In our model, you are unable to do that simply because you are now fearful of the consequences that that can have of your image of the policies that you implement, the fact that people are now potentially at least there is a potential fear of people choosing the insurance option. Word for sight, CG. |
</GW> |
<OW> |
I want to start off by being very clear: CG doesn't have an extension. Their extension rest on a faulty mechanism that suggests that individuals, like politicians, sorry, are really afraid of having to pay compensation because it detracts from all the amazing economic policies that they want to pass in developing countries like Pakistan and India. Here are some responses that we think are just trivially true. One, insuring against that party doesn't actually stop them from coming to power, which therefore suggests that to the extent to which political office grants you things like patronage networks and personal benefit, there's no reason why they're particularly afraid of vast laws of individuals insuring against them as long as they actually get to power. Two, they don't actually respond to any of Joshua's arguments about the incentives of governments that don't really give a shit about having to spend money. One, because of time lag. Two just because, like, it puts them in power anyway like nations go to war, it's a multi-trillion dollar business, they still do it. Three, presumably if they are so discriminatory, they already expend a significant amount of money, like oppressing these areas. I'm going to assume separatist conflict in Aceh, for instance, is really expensive for you to deal with. That's not really an argument. But lastly, I want to argue that if whatever they say is true and these people are already being discriminated, the counterfactual, as Joshua tells you, is one which you're able to vilify these individuals. I'm going to take it one step further and explain that, given that to be the case and given that the mechanism that you're using is the vote that these people have, it's just more incentive for them to push for things like non-voter, non-citizenship laws, like what we've just seen happen in India recently, where four million Muslims would give like, not given the right to vote because now literally it also saves you money as well. There's just no reason why, in such a horrible context as one that the CG paints, the government is slightly going to become benevolent enough to have the long-term foresight of having to save money so they can implement fantastic regulations. I just don't understand how those outcomes come about. What exactly did we present to you in this debate that we thought was important? We argued that the primary criteria in which individuals should care about in a democracy is the concept of norms. We agree to some extent with the OG, but we also think that this debate means to note something that's again trivially true but something that we've all been arguing on, which is that we want democracy as a method of expressing our preferences, and we want democracy to be the method to which we choose our governments. Presumably this is because, to some extent, we just can't think of a better system that enables the representation of a pluralistic community and enables some measure of fairness. Even that to be the case, how many do we deal with the arguments on the OG? Who can argue a few things? The first thing we argue is a very strange and unknown argument that there is no agency in voting and it is ultimately irrational. We think we've responded to this quite well when we argued that this notion of irrationality is to the extent to which the notion of collectivization in the democracy means that your vote must have the equivalent voice of everyone else. So yes, it might be irrational that you don't know the outcome, but ultimately the choice itself is an exercise of agency that on a collective basis enables this form of government to happen in the first place. Their side literally just argues against democracy, in which case this particular motion in terms of principles is just inherently contradictory to whatever they want to stand for. Number two, let's talk about radicalization. They told us that in terms of radicalization, this is going to make things less radical because, you know, you get the people from the far out away because now they want like, I don't know, like they argue that now only people in the center will really be voting. You don't get the people outside because they want money, etc. All argues against this through the platform of the politician, i.e. they become more radical because they want people to insure against them, and that's how they're able to capture more votes. We argue to you this on the notion of the voters themselves, i.e. the people who are actually voting. The problem is the debate presumes that politics happens on a scale of left to right. That's not true. The politics actually happens on the granular levels of various identity groups that may have specific positions that don't align perfectly in any one particular party, but they choose to express those preferences, one, to the vote, which we agree doesn't necessarily express those intensity or preferences, but because they have those votes, they are able to engage in conversation and dialogue that enables them to use their position as voting members and communities to negotiate with the people in democracies to create those incremental changes that OG cares about. So given that to be the case, then the illusion of agency is ultimately important. Why is that the case? We argue that counterfactual that the undergirding notion of democracy theory to care about is the notion that individuals recognize the other side as being a legitimate representative of parliament, even if they don't personally agree with what those spencers are, but still recognizing that these people care about forwarding the interests of the country. The reason why this is important is that democratic institutions are necessarily fragile and are only held together by the norms and the conception that people have about democracy. The tolerance and forbearance they are willing to practice because they recognize that the democratic vote is not at all or nothing, but rather something that shows the preferences of individuals that are on the ground. But crucially, this requires individuals to believe at heart that democracy is working for them. What is the unique difference between this particular policy and everything else that exists currently? Before I move on to explain this, I'll take OG. |
<POI> |
The belief that the individual vote is your only way to have recourse where the system is specifically the reason why people feel powerless and disrupt the system today, our policy, anything creates the awareness that the state is aware that the system may harm you and is known to compensate you for it to compensate you for it, that probably increases trust in the system which is your metric. |
</POI> |
Yeah, it's perfect I was just about to move into this and explain why this specific shift in that narrative is so particularly harmful. So presumably the difference between this and any other policy that we've had so far, is that even if we acknowledge that democracy is broken, what we don't do is not make people lose faith in democracy altogether. I think Joshua demonstrates certain positive trends to which we are able to achieve this I'll build about this in just a little bit. I think crucially, the difference between this specific policy is that the notion that you ensure against a candidate coming in, is the first acknowledgement of the system that the other side is reprehensible will destroy you and will never represent your interest and that these people cannot be seen as legitimate hates on state. That is actually what you're doing when you insure against damages to yourself when a political party that's legitimate like is seen to be a potential legitimate representation of your state comes into power. But also, given governance as a whole deals with necessary tradeoffs, that notion of insuring yourself against harm means that you don't actually accept that government has any ability to make tradeoffs in your welfare with regards to the common good of society. We think that will break democracy entirely. But I think that Joshua demonstrates to you that we've already seen civil society recognize that democracy is somewhat damaged. The crucial difference is they believe that democracy can be reformed which is why they work within civil society in terms of agitating the collectivization of these granular identity groups that don't feel represented to push for things like more members of like more female or progressive members in the senate, for example, in congress in order to show that their voice, can work towards reforming the system bit by bit. This also works crucially in CJ's arguments on developing countries, where we often believe that the articulation of these political and ethnic identities means to find space in parliament and the only way that that can happen is if people check into the system and able to check out of it through insurance. We're very happy to oppose. |
</OW> |
<pm> |
Let's be clear as to what the goals are of these types of organizations, which are major nationals like, not national, major professional sports leagues for individual women's sports your goals are very long-termist. That's to say that currently, you have an established fan base but cultivating a new rabid fan base who is going to expand into the future is something that takes years of effort and isn't something that just like a one-time quick fix is going to be able to solve which means that your goals are the following, generally speaking, it is more views and people who are watching your show so that way you can get more advertisers and consequently more money to your players into your individual profit given that you are a league that exists for profit and who has negotiating with their players. This is likely your primary goal but what we're going to establish from opening governments is that the primary way that you can ensure long-term engagement from fans, is through making sure that as many people as possible are playing your sport and I want to be clear here, as these types of leagues, you are not competing against the british premier league, you are not playing against you know the uefa champions league, you're not playing against the nba, you are often competing in terms of television ad space for things like you know, uh, for things like sorry, sorry, sorry darts or poker which regularly get like 3 p.m time slots which are quite prime but often are things that are male dominated to the greatest extent and that you have the financial capacity to compete with directly so why is it then that prioritizing men and men’s competitiveness within these sports is a better way to ensure a large amount of participation and therefore viewership in these sports. Let's be clear as to how it is that people as a society and as a culture ends up playing a sport, it is fundamentally through access to this sport, let's look at all of the soccer fields that exist globally right, that are just in parts. That are built by governments or that private organizations in establishing any sort of league for young kids to play in have already built. The consequence of this is that it has meant that many, many children have been able to play soccer for free or for very close to free for many years, right. Which means that you get a large amount of player base who's already invested into this sport because it means that they've familiarized themselves with the rules which means when they go to watch this game happen on T.V, they're invested in what's happening because without much education required on their behalf, they're intuitively aware of what is a good play of what they are interested in, of which players they like or dislike just off of the intuition that they have about the rules but further in the long term you would argue that this means that they're more likely to pass down these games to their children, right, because in a lot of circumstances, if parents are deciding what sport of all of the many different sports they want to put their kids into, in many circumstances parents tend to choose ones that they themselves played. So that way they have the capacity to teach their child the very game that they enjoyed playing and that they were quite good at, so that way they can have a better relationship with their own child right so when we end up prioritizing men to be able to play these games by hyping up how men can just enjoy a lot of these games, what ends up happening is, you get to be able to co-opt a lot of the family structures that already exist because when it comes to deciding which sport a child is going to play. In many circumstances, it is men who make the decision about this because men are often prioritized when it comes to understanding what family finances are going to take or in regards to athleticism in sports often they are prioritized so if they see your sport as something that they had a lot of fun participating in as a kid, they're significantly more likely to start putting this up within areas but it also means that you're much more likely to see a large amount of sports leagues built around this sport because a problem that exists in the states quo, is that because a lot of sexist narratives continue to exist, girls tend to drop out of playing sports once they hit puberty. Which means that a lot of house leagues don't make that much money because they see a massive, for girls sorry, drop off, they see a massive drop-off in the amount of people that play their sport. If we get more men to play these sports, it means that these leagues are significantly more profitable because they are doubling the amount of people who are playing the sport but also massively increasing the amount of time, some of their consumers are playing this sport. Which means that you get a large amount of infrastructure that exists to be able to play this sport, but notably when we're talking about things like figure skating or gymnastics or other types of sports. The barrier to entry under status quo is incredibly high, right, because the access to a lot of these equipment are very, very expensive, on our side it gets significantly cheaper because we're able to just produce more of this equipment, which in turn means that the price of it is much more likely to go down in the long run, closing. |
<poi> |
yeah can you please clarify how exactly is it going to look like that they're going to get mail engagement like, what are the things they're going to do? |
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