Split (1)

train · 5.86k rows

text stringlengths 0 9.69k
First, why is this debate not about it's not okay for opposition to come up and talk to us about Russians needing to somehow invade Ukraine at some point in time because it geo politically makes sense for them to do it. What they have to do is defend the specific manner in which the invasion in 2022 happened, the specific timing of that invasion and that war and all the specifics attached to this case. It's not okay to say, oh, NATO was playing in your backyard, you have to do something about it they have to do it in a specific way that it happened, they have to defend this. What this debate is about, it's specifically about defining Putin's interest. I think fundamentally, we do that analogy by being very simple. Putin's interest most of the time, is the consolidation of power within the russian, within russian politics this is, by definition the only thing that matters to him because everything else extrapolates from that. It has to do with for example, flexing the muscles of russia requires him to keep the power within russia towards him, it requires for example, the opposition to be weak, it requires the oligarchs who he's very reliant on to be on his side. What we are going to claim from opening government today is, that this is significantly less likely in the light of the 2022 invasion in Ukraine the specific way in which it happened. We're going to do this in two ways from opening government. First, we're going to talk to you about the impact and consolidation of power we're going to have a b c d e f, six mechanisms on how this specifically happens and why it meant that the consolidation of power became significantly more difficult and the impacts of that in regards to desperation and scepticism and then secondly, we're going to talk to you about the future, i.e. perhaps, maybe i don't know, this is maybe too bad about the present right now for us, when it comes to putin campaign and the impact it had on his agenda. Before that, let's be very clear about what the comparative in this round is. We now have to attach ourselves to a very, very specific one, we can just simply say that number one, we would be significantly more okay with things such as leveraging the new oil channels which gave significant reliance of the eu and generally europe on russia further exports and their imports of oil, it also meant that perhaps you could spend the resources that you spent on the war on things, such as protecting yourself a bit more meaningfully against NATO, in case ukraine ended up becoming a member of it. Which is, by definition something which means that part of the comparison can also be things such as leveraging international law post 1945 about the sphere of influence of different countries and power in general, in a way that benefited russia, in a way that protected them against the potential membership of ukraine within nato, are there any clarifications? Yes, impact and consolidation of power. The first thing to note, is that when it comes to oligarchs the way that the, what's it called, the place where they all go together starts with k maybe, north crimea, the other one germany, yeah, the way the kremlin functions in general, is that we have largely reliance when it comes to oligarchs. It happens in a variety of ways, it happens we're just having the financial support of these individuals because you guarantee the value of the assets because we're talking about mad billionaires over there, we're talking about people such as I don't know, Abramovich right, that's the one example that comes to mind and the one i'll be using when it comes to saying how smart sanctions screwed over these individuals the point at which for example, their assets were frozen. The point at which, they have no ability to use their money, the point at which they have no ability to function or to operate businesses in other countries in europe, much like in the case of a problem which you had to sell for example, chelsea and he shares in chelsea in order to basically, be able to function in order to basically, abide by the sanctions and not get screwed over. What that means then is that when you have a lot of problems which is around the world and russian people are very rich and the point at which you have your assets frozen, is the point at which you're less likely to support building, the point at which you're unable to function and do the business that you would normally do. What that means is that you generally draw support back from the specific individual and perhaps you look at alternatives, these alternatives exist and i'm using past tense because as of last week they did, but now they don't, because they died because opposition did exist. Navalny was a very legitimate opposition, where effectively oligarchs started jumping ships perhaps by not explicitly but at the same time being okay, with the opposition because for example they looked at them as an alternative that perhaps is not as vilified. By the way, to the extent that Putin was, which is by the way mechanism number three, which is the fact that you have vilification a far more explicit fight between the west and putin, the point at which the west feels the obligation and has the perhaps, the legal capacity to join the war and basically try and fund for example, ukraine or to fight back against russia because they thought this was an illegitimate invasion. The point at which that happens, that's when you have a significantly more tension between the west and russia. What that means then and that's comparative right., it probably exists under either side of the house but the way that it happened, very explicitly meant that there's no way that you're going to have as much of trading as much of a corporation between the two in a way that benefits either one. Which has to do also with things such as oil and the fact that yeah okay the retaliation of putin was to take back oil and basically say we're not trading with you guys but that meant that you number one, fucked up the entire oil market but number two, it meant that perhaps you would have harms to the economy and the rule as it did happen, yes, okay now, it's turned back to normal but at the time the instability that was attached to the russian economy the fact that we had such spikes between the ruble and for example, euro or the dollar meant that you had issues. I'll say this way, in regards to people and their access to capital within russia, which then meant that you have all those trickle down harms to the russian people themselves right, which you may or may not care about and may or may not care about as putin but at the same time when you have a bunch of them, who are suddenly feeling this instability because note, you did have corruption and all of these things do exist but the model still remains one of performative legitimacy i.e. as long as you provide with stability i'll probably not go on and have an uprising against you or i won't go out on the streets or i won't for example use every opportunity i ever get in order to get in an opposition because strangely an opposition does exist. As a result you get domestic instability in politics as well, so from all those sources we see that putin is weakened. What does that mean practically? Before i go into that, closing, do you have a poi?
<poi>
Do you think Putin liked every single one of his oligarchs and why were there so many windows near them?
</poi>
I don't know you'll have to ask Putin, I'm not going to tell you about his relationships with all of your girls but i will say that whether or not you like all of your oligarchs or some of them, this affected all of them the mechanism i gave you is universal, it doesn't apply to specific people whether or not they were near windows and others thought they were killed or for example, whether or not they were in a airplane that perhaps went down. All that opposition at the time existed including the individual whose name I can't remember. All the conflict with the mercenaries are all things that created skepticism and the reason why is because the point at which you start killing people is when the desperation sows and when you're desperate you can't flex muscles anymore, because I don't have seen anyone being particularly intimidating the point at which they flex their muscles and at the same time they're crying because it's a cry out for help. The point of which you go through a process of trying to kill your opposition, where if for example, you have increased scepticism about whether or not you're going to be scared of russia anymore because they thought that this was an open and chat case where they intervene and then suddenly for example, they get rid of ukraine as a problem this is no longer the case, because now you have all this scepticism about whether or not the russian army is even effective in the first place and whether or not all those resources that they spend were even worth it and whether or not now they could be used in other ways. For all those reasons, proud to propose.
</pm>
<lo>
Panel, three main points for me to take, why, about why Putin does not regret this, Putin does not regret Russia's invasion. Firstly, how it's, How making still making impact like territorially in Ukraine. Secondly, how benefiting his national interests and thirdly are benefiting his domestic interest, but first some rebuttal and some characterisation of what we do in the senate. We agree in some aspects with the proposition, we think that consolidating his power is one of putin main benefits. We think he can go about this the ways he's gone about this through an invasion of ukraine in particular. Number one, so the draining of western resources influence exception. Russia looks like putin and russia look like a stronger actor when the wests influence and the wests perception internationally is diminished. Secondly, when like west is just pouring money and losing money, that's good for putin because it means that like, one, they can't provide effective opposition against him. Two, it means there's like domestic turbulence and chaos, etc. I'm going to go on to expand on this. Second one is expanding the history of immigrants we already had from the open government ideas about like you know, fears that they had like growing and joining etc, we're also saying like territorially more land means more areas desert influence etc. We don't like political groups like, in the Ukraine. Like, all of this kind of stuff was important, not in Europe. We got some stuff from og about like, opposition in russia and how like this built up lots of opposition and what it was like, i'll show you a bit and two things on that, number one, whilst there was some protests happening after like, soon after war. A, it's mostly gone down, B, it was requests quite firmly, the protest once existed never really resulted in like, no galvanized in mass collective action or anything, it just kind of stayed to their level of opposition, C, yes there only was very much like a critic and a vocal opponent but he's been imprisoned for years. Everytime someone has taken active measures they have been requested but when you don't think that or has been a significant threat against what he's doing. Also, from the idea of the West joining, which I'm going to actually move on to my next point on, but his territorial interests in Ukraine, right? Putin is still making ground; just like in recent weeks, he's gained major cities. They're still making an impact there. He's taking, this is like one of his major interests, as we kind of spelled out. One, he's gaining more land. Two, he's continuing to diminish and chip away at Ukraine's authority on the stage. Like, the land, the house, the power continue to like innating this land, along with the horrible loss of life that comes with it. He's reducing spirits in Ukraine. The war has now been going on for like two years. Like, there are many in Washington, there are still some who continue to fight the cause. There's like high levels of discontent locally. It's like the death toll is extremely high and proportionately the death toll has a much greater impact on Ukraine than it does on Russia.
<poi>
How much of a success would you consider that entirety gaining some ground two years after he started this conflict?
</poi>
Yeah, sure, so I'm going to kind of move on to that. But, like, it means he’s continuing to gain land. Like, he's not being defeated. I'm going to kind of move on to undermine the rest, but also, like, he's not losing because, like, the loss of life is so disproportionate in Ukraine for the Russian army or at least considering his interests. He's not particularly concerned about the loss of life or the way it's affecting the people. So number two, kind of leads on to my rebuttal to you and my points, which is the way that it kind of impacts the West and affects the West. One of the best things for Putin is the fact that the West has poured money and resources and time into this war. One, it means that the West is not able to defeat him and that they haven't really like despite the fact that multiple countries have put troops and efforts into Ukraine, they haven't really been able to beat him, and he's still managing to gain ground despite that. The West is not as powerful as, like, it may think it is, or at least, like, he wants people to think it's not that powerful. It's not able to win and often raises questions about, like, to what extent the West's military at the moment is fit for purpose and whether it's functioning as it should, makes them look weak internationally. Two, like, it's a financial drain on the West. Not only are they spending this money, but because, you know, we currently have a cost of living crisis in this country and many others, inflation is high, and because of the oil prices that were impacted by his actions, following this domestically in the West, there's a lot of economic turbulence, frustration, anger, and constant questions about the spending in Ukraine, as well as the additional burden of taking on Ukrainian refugees. Because all about taking in people, etc. What he's achieved through this is he managed to essentially, A, undermine Western influence, but, B, also just increase, like, Western turbulence whilst also managing to damage the economy to quite a significant extent because it's not sustainable for the West to keep pouring money into this while he continues to gain ground. Also, at the moment, with the crisis in Gaza, global attention is away from him. He's not even getting that much criticism from the West anymore because people have really have diverted their attention greatly. The money that was like being funneled into Ukraine while money is kind of being split causes attention hence why it's being split. He's essentially getting away with what he's doing without the kind of global pressure and the protests in the same way that followed the immediate aftermath of the invasion, and all sorts of action from the West is being undermined because, like, you know, conferences like the UN are failing because despite attempted negotiations or attempts at stopping the Russians or damaging the Russian troops to such an extent that they leave or so is impossible. Third, I already spoke about in my rebuttal. Firstly, whilst there has been some backlash, it has not resulted in significant protests, so it hasn't really destabilized his control sufficiently. Some of the backlash is dealt with; most of it it's not like, he's still in power. He's managed to consolidate his power and essentially got rid of a lot of opposition. Two, it also means that the money can be spent on the way he wants to. He can spend money like divert money away from welfare, send budget on the army, and buy up military resources. It makes the country look strong. It does make the country strong; they have a strong military. Three also means, like, it also at least for a while was like much harder to—government, government, kind of became linked together and became anti-patriotic. There was conflict going on; it was disrupted. Anti-patriotic to take part in protest. All of these reasons I urge you to consider this.
</lo>
<dpm>
Putin regrets the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 because the war didn't really go out as he planned it or as he predicted it. Firstly, their plans and the results from Ukraine were very different. Putin didn't expect the Ukrainians to last so long because, like, generally the politicians in Eastern Europe have, at times, Putin didn't have a lot of influence over them, but this didn't happen in Ukraine. So this was very different and unpredictable for Putin himself, right? This was something that because the invasion of Ukraine was rushed. One day we woke up, and we found out that there had been shots fired across the border, right? That's how the war started. It was very quick and unpredictable. We think that Putin didn't really have the time to think it through and see how Zelensky and Ukraine would respond to it. It was very different than what we have all been used to since, as Mor told you, the 1945 post-war world order. Secondly, what we tell you was very different for Putin was the response from the West. Yes, you can have opposition telling you that there has been a lot of political, like, people not agreeing with the support going to Ukraine for the money spent, for the refugees taken into the country. That is like very normal, right? Not] one, although, no one has backed out from the support in Ukraine. What people are saying, what analysts are saying, is that the support that the West has had for Ukraine is the rebirthing of NATO. It has been something extremely well organized and the cooperation between the members of NATO was so great that it was never seen before. It was the first time that we have seen NATO in action in such a united way, where all countries from the West upheld the sanctions, right? Where even Hungary, for example, had some sanctions which generally do not agree with the countries of the West, right? It was a time where the West came on Russia extremely united. And yes, obviously, you can have opposition talk to us about maybe some political opposition, maybe people disliking these parts, but comparing the actual support that the West sent out to Ukraine and has been sending for two years not retrieving that support it's extremely important. And Putin could not have predicted that because that had never happened before for NATO and for the West as a whole, right? So these are two things that were unpredicted for Putin. And thirdly, it's how long Ukraine lasted. So this was a war that wasn't really that much prepared, right? The way that Russia advanced into Ukraine, it wasn't like a classic war happening as we could have potentially thought, and it wasn't an attack as if an attack was made to Ukraine from Russia as what happened with, for example, Hamas and Israel, right? It wasn't like he prepared the attack himself and it wasn't really well executed. The way that they went into Ukraine. Ukrainian intelligence, with the help from the West, were able at a critical point during the war to turn over the war for Russia, right? What happened with the satellites and the intelligence that Ukraine was getting about the war efforts from Russia could really have tipped the war. Although the West didn't want to get involved, but you know what? That's not a point for opposition to make because that's completely reliant on a third party who didn't want to get involved himself, right? What we show you is that the war could have turned over for Russia not in the way that it was expecting, but the way that it invaded Ukraine in 2022. Now, they have this case about Putin caring a lot about the West being weaker.
<poi>
Do you really think that Putin didn't know that he only had four functional Su-57 fighters and that the rest of his fighter fleet really wasn't up to stuff?
</poi>
Yeah, maybe he knew, but I don't think that he knew that Ukraine would have been able to last so long. That's what I'm saying. Even if he knew, the reason why he rushed into that war was exactly that he thought that he could win this easily, and he didn't. That's what I'm saying. That's why it’s so important that Russia and Putin rushed into the war because they thought that it would be an easy war to win, because that was that's what precedent told for him. It was unprecedented for Russia to not win over an Eastern European country over which they have influence, right? So what I'm telling you is that Putin did not expect, and that's why he's now regretting it two years after. Now, about the West being weaker. Yes, we agree. Putin does care about the West being weaker, but that doesn't mean that he cares that much about that to happen at the expense of his own strength. What this means is that if the West being weaker means that Russia is also weaker and much weaker because, as Mor told you in his speech, Russia is now very reliant on China, for example, which obviously for a leader like Putin, he doesn't really like being under the influence of someone like China even if they're allies because their interests are not completely aligned. He would have preferred for him to stay strong as he was before the war. He has lost his influence exactly because, as Mor told you uniquely, he lost the support of the West by doing a war, while the alternative that people would have had at hand would have given him a much better advantage and not forced him to go under the influence of China completely. He could have been more independent, and that's what we tell you that autocratic leaders want the most. Autocratic leaders like Putin like their independence and like making their own decisions for their country. So yes, Putin wants the West weaker, but not at the expense of his own country, of his own economy, of support from the people. Right? You have now and the West is weakened, but also, as I told you before, the West is really united, and the West is not backing up. The West is continuing with the sanctions, and the West is finding alternatives to oil, which they wouldn't have done otherwise probably if it wasn't for the war that made them know that they had no other option but to stop having cooperation, any sort of economic cooperation with Russia because it is a war. That is what he regrets now. Thirdly, they tell us that people are dying, and Putin doesn't care. We tell you that he does care. Why? Because even if the war ends or it continues, and he's advancing and it's good for him, the people of the people of Ukraine and the people of Russia do not support him at this point because he has killed families, because he has invaded homes, right? Because he has gone wrong because the war does not go as he expected. We don't think that Putin wanted to go into the murders of Ukrainians, invade their homes, and start murdering them. The rash action which Putin did not want to do and therefore he's regretting it because he's losing the support of his own people, some people in Ukraine who would have been okay with having cooperation with Russia, and his own people. And what that will lead to is that after the war has ended or even during the war, he might lose the support of his own voters, of the people in his country, of the oligarchs, and he might be overturned. Not due to the fact that what they're also saying about after the war is over. He's probably going to turn to people that don't want him.
</dpm>
<dlo>
Panel, Putin doesn't care about voters, Putin doesn't care about elections, Putin doesn't care about oligarchs since they end up there. Therefore, weakening the West of consolidating power and spreading his influence. Obviously, he does not regrets. For two things in this speech. First, look at domestic interest, engaging with the proposition case. And secondly, look at international interest. The first, strange case by his opposition that basically oligarchs are being really unhappy, they lost money for their sanction. And therefore, going to support Navalny if he was alive, but maybe someone else. Five responses here. Firstly, their support of Navalny is never going to happen, given an anti-corruption campaign and exactly against the oligarchs. They pretend to be in a better comparison with them, or operation currently because of Putin; neither option happened. Secondly, we think there’s very much a perception among Russian oligarch that Russia is likely to win, right? They probably do not care about the short-term losses, puts them two years further, a session, and something really important to measure, just a few from day one. But say we're looking at this as two months into the conflict, and economically, they’re really struggling. Two years into the conflict, when is making this decision? Every case here, unless has just happened, and this is the decision we are making. Fourthly, we think oligarchs have supported Russia, but quite specifically Putin when he campaigned on an anti-Western sentiment. I'm very surprised all oligarchs are going to be like[inaudible]. Preferably, they do want to move away from; they have no option, right? We do follow the window and get poisoned. They do have to like, we just happen to, we just don't have the option; that's never going to happen, right. Next consolidation, on is very back; he controls the media, controls the perception in Russia. But also because there's much more going on in the world right now, it’s not just the Ukraine war. Also, wars in Palestine and Israel, right? We have a lot more consuming media. There is very little domestic backlash apparently, but also, also, he needs more money towards the military. From the beginning, he wanted to cooperate, money for more military. What we got told in competition and response there that people don't like it, fundamentally, even if they don't, he is democratically elected, right? Navalny is being held, I don't think it's a priority, and being irrelevant before.Before I go to Second, yeah, first.
<poi>
Okay, you've told us that Putin doesn't care about oligarchs. You've told us that Putin doesn't care about dead families. You've told us he doesn't care about support domestically. What the fuck does he care about?
</poi>
Well, he does care basically, not only oligarchs but on his perception in terms of international, it has been international protection right, it has been the west weakened, either stronger in terms of territorial gains. But that we brought to you, on our side. Let's take international interest, what do we have here, first tell massive gains in the the other week and territory had to flee from because they were doing so badly having quite they reducing considerably. Got POI saying what do look strong a few years into it, I think fundamentally, having people neglect to what going on. Second thing, it has huge impact in terms of the massive costs of living prices in terms of oil prices. About the west-wasted resources between in the West. Which means, I feel huge sums of money put into Ukraine, when Ukraine has actually made very little progress for having increased oil prices to an unreasonable extent and caused costs of living crisis for many millions of people around the world. Thirdly, World Political chaos in the US or the Senate debating whether or not to give money to Ukraine or not, literally disrupting the political processes in the West. Exactly what the west wanted to, from the very beginning. Fourth, we said because of gas to protect those of disruption, made into the idea against progress forward, and the reputation of the West looks so weak. They can't do anything except send some money. They can't agree on anything on the conference, they're coming together, just agree even on how much money to send. They look incredibly weak. But they can't against one country here.
What do we get from saying proposition? They say, “Yes, we care internationally,” but we don't really care that much. We really have problems here. The DPM says, I'm going to tell you here, Putin ran on a campaign anti west, therefore going against the West, Weaken the West and have, and fundamentally says, “Look how we look at where we are. They don't have our oil; they don't have our support.” This will entrench his campaign. Make it unlikely to challenge them, right? We should know that does, right, that Russia and China are coming together an anti West block right. This always buys more into a campaign and like, look at the support we have for idea, look at I have I can create Mass opportunities, look at the Economic Opportunity he can get, military opportunity he can get with directly via entry. The last thing, that the West are united, I think this is fundamentally true, see the Trump recently happened the NATO country had spent almost inviting Russia into the West. Are disagreeing with each other all the time. The second thing, fundamentally realizes that there have been huge media reports recently about the fact that actually, they don't have military. So many people opt of the military, the money in the way and the resources they fail testing, they look weak. They may be united in your best case, but they are weak. Lastly, the West must regret it. He regrets it because the war had gone wrong. I think this is just not true. We can announce what has likely to happen, but our side of the house thinks fundamentally, objective here was to claim more territory, to project his interest in terms of the government interest, and to weaken the West and West perception. He has fundamentally been able to do this under this debate so far and clearly this is something he wanted interest to do. We quite clearly prove to you, among all the main aspects of his possession. Why you hear about Western perception and have been massively and consolidation of, for all these reasons.
</dlo>
<mg>
Everything is perfectly fine. Everything they say they're it back to's personal about domestic what debate is the international actually. Firstly, they explain to an extent about NATO and the European Union, I'm going to go for. So the one thing that we want to avoid altogether like since he came is to states be more Western, like expansion of anything towards towards ukraine absolutely why is they explain that don't explain how I'm explain to you how,
also like what big invasion is basically, create stronger and possibly bigger European, why? Firstly, he created he managed to do something amazing, which is to convince historically neutral Finland and Sweden to join NATO, unprecedented fate, it's actually quite amazing how Many. Secondly, countries like Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Albania countries that already were potential futuristic members of the European Union. Now there is a double incentive, first, from those countries to go toward the EU because they protection and because they want, um, integration and through the EU, towards those countries, so that nothing like that happens. It’s specifically important because western bartons, specifically, already have some pro russian sentiment like, but okay with an with an exception of already for Russian like Albania, that already had in to be so because of anti Nato anti sentiment. Now, they don't have that because they see the alternative is the better. So why does Putin care about Nato so much? because like that was his main goal to stop Nato was Putin versus Nato and what he did single-handedly but that Invasion two years ago was to basically, say hi NATO, you now have a massive incentive to basically go into those countries and basically contradict what I've been trying to do since 2004. Second case, he massively strengthened Ukraine. So the thing is, as of the essay that he wrote and the motivation behind. he never believed Ukraine should been an independent country by what what you did is insanely strengthened it, like first thing, as other dimensions, it receives amazing International help and this once again even though there are some tensions in the west about Ukraine. still it receive near unilateral help like, ukrainians are like, welcome in most of European count although, there are some protest and we not considering 100 people in the European like them. There is still more support than it was before but what's more important and the most important thing this the fact that they don't touch. Putin basically destroyed his entire political time because what was Putin's political time? to basically influence politics of neighboring countries through soft power non official ways. So since 2014, the orange revolution in Ukraine the war in Georgia crimea belarus like pro Russia within the European Union, that was his that was always his goal, right. He failed because like nothing of happen after 2004, nothing happened after his invasion of Georgia, nothing happened but now he made it, he just went too far, he just went too far to the extent that now every single person is going to look, oh, that company is from Russia, I'm not going to work with them even though that company may be completely fine. That party is rightwing and kinda says that we shouldn't take sides in Russia anymore now we're going to look at them those parties already have influence. The biggest Pro Russian party in Poland went from 18% to 6% in just four years, they lost triple of their NPS just single handedly because now considered like, something considered to be for Russian is an embarrassment and nobody wants to do anything with Russia. So, what he lost is his soft power, why is that specifically important? because there are three scenarios as to why how this war may end up. Firstly Ukraine wins, it's an embarrassment for him, it's an absolute embarrassment and I think there's no excuse like, I don't think there is coming back from politically socially economic, right. second one, there is a peace treaty that I know bilateral agreement whatever or also an embarrassment for him because everybody of everybody was expecting Putin to win and on the point he doesn't achieve that specific goal of winning, he already lost like the single biggest army in the world the great, the great country of Russia that's so organized and you know, Putin is like a very strong, it collapses immediately and third thing what if he wins because that's most he may get his short term goal he, may get his short term go of yes, taking half of Ukraine, let's take half of Ukraine, right. His short goal of like, scratching Ukraine and half worked however, that's about it because at the point where he won the war, NATO and the EU are going to be like okay we're going to send 70 million troops to the eastern border of the European Union and make sure that that never happens again. We're going to send even more troops to Georgia, we're going to send even more troops to Kazakhstan we're going to send, we're going to make sure that countries like baltics like, Finland European Union, Hungary that's not like, we're going to make sure that Pro Russian parties, do not have any more influence, we're going to make sure that not a single Russian influence in the west is ever going to be of any matter ever again and before that opening.
<poi>
NATO physically refused to go to war with Russia. Hence, why they don't send troops, why is this going to happen?
</poi>
Yes, NATO refuse, of course that's important because, A, NATO invaded Russia would have the right to invade Poland, Russia would have the right to invade any NATO member specifically, it's important because Ukraine isn't a NATO member yet. I know this kind of but if you like, if let's say, putin was in Poland, who is a NATO member, all of NATO would all invade Russia Ukraine isn't, like, NATO cannot invade because NATO is specifically, you have to be a NATO member or not a NATO member to invade or be invaded, that's specifically important. So actually how it works, he made look Russia like a fucking dog and I know this kind of goes towards what was saying but I think it goes a bit further because firstly, Russian military looks like a joke right now. At the point, where we have People go and basically going against him and basically saying hi, yeah, so we're soldiers, we're fighting right now, we have no ammo, we have no tanks, we have no guns, Putin basically duked us, we’ll be left alone this entire image of strong Russia, provided that they already win in the best case scenario, is still embarrassing because like everybody expects you to win in a absolutely crushing manner at the point where you win you as I explain you don't get any of the benefits you wanted, you still look embarrassing. So yeah, to conclude we take it over or take it over Alternative, they don't explain the international which we think matters much more because at the point where putin cares about the domestic stuff, then the consequences of the international explain to you are much much bigger. So what we explain this, how we actually strengthen nato in the European Union to the extent that it's actually unprecedented, how Ukraine specifically and he doesn't even believe country. He made Russia look like a joke so in conclusion the only thing that Putin did with invading Ukraine is to make sure that his political plan of entering other countries and his Persona will never be respected and again the government.
</mg>
<mo>
We have that all sides seem to agree on is, that Putin's ultimate interest is not whether Russia is good or not, is not whether the West thinks Russia is good or not but is rather how long and how hard he can control the Russian people and the Russian country until his death and this is why it's very easy for side CO to take this debate. Let's understand why Putin stays in power today and this is one simple argument coming from us today, his social contract, Putin took over in the early 2000s from Boris yeltsin the drunk right what Boris yeltsin did, was introduce democracy and change from the soviet union to this sort of more modern Russian Federation. He fucked it up, and what could he do? Because post-Soviet Russia was an area ruled by the mafia, whose economy was thrown to shit because of 10 years of war in Afghanistan, and he really couldn't do much. What Putin then promised to do was, by coming into power after Yeltsin, he specifically promised the people that voted him in that we were going back to these old Soviet ideals, and two of them were the most important, the first one was a strong and stable economy to ensure that nobody had to go hungry again, and the second one was the concept of a greater Russia and the Russification and the uniting of the Russian people, right. Putin cares about these people's support because people in Russia today aren't like what our side government believes, some sort of mindless drones just being oppressed by Putin, they genuinely actually care about him and actually support him. Sure, the elections themselves are farcical, but the actual fact that there exists a lot of jingoism and nationalism in Russia is extremely true. Why? because of how post-Soviet Russia was, right? Because Putin couldn't really do anything to make it worse, so even his small changes made something better, right? So people believed in his Putin plan. Moreover, Putin cares less about the international part of this, right? Because international posturing was already fucked up after the 2014 Crimea invasion, right? Russia was already a social pariah. They had even banned stuff like fresh food imports into Russia, right? But more than that, the West can't actively dethrone him, right? The people in his own country, with whom he owes this social contract obligation, they can actively do that. So he cares about them more than the US simply saying, “Hey, screw you, Russia, man, you're such a.” What we then say is he placed a greater emphasis on controlling the traditional Soviet people, right? His rise to power was on the back of Chechen separatists attacking Moscow, continuous interference with domestic policies, just as side government says of ex-Soviet states such as Georgia and in the Orange Revolution, continues to show public support for Putin interfering with that Russification, right? Because what it did was give him legitimacy when the economy failed, for example, in 2014, when there were huge sanctions levied on the Russian economy and for which, like, the people literally couldn't even find fresh fruit to eat, right? He then decided to invade Crimea, and even though they made the sanctions worse and even though it fucked up the economy even more, people still came out in droves to support Putin, and the people had a new nationalistic fervor, right? Why? Because they saw him fulfilling his goal of reuniting the Russian people and making the old Soviet Union as great as it once was. So see how when he failed on this economic front, which he was able to do somewhat successfully after normalizing ties with the rest of the world since 2008, he then turned to this other front of Russification and the Russian people to distract from economic objectives. Because ultimately, he does care about what people think, and this is what the OO gets fundamentally wrong because he does care about the internal oppression. He cares about it more than international oppression. Before I move on to how the economy works, let's take poi.
<poi>
It's unfair to compare Crimea to this specific scenario simply because there's a majority Russian population and their economic significance. But at the same time, it's less likely when taking over Ukraine, Prove, so difficult for you to actually get the great Russia you guys talk about.
</poi>
Yeah, I understand what you mean. I understand why it's unfair for you because it really kills your case. But if you, if closing government relies on the fact that interference in the Orange Revolution and Georgia is part of this greater idea of Russification, then I can't see why specifically Crimea shouldn't be included because it's more Russian than Georgia or more Russian than Ukraine. And see how even if I'm going to deal with this later, but I have a good flow. The economy, right? So the reason 2022 is so important is because in 2020 fucked the Russian economy, right, specifically COVID fucked everybody, but what made it worse is more competitive sources for Russian raw materials became available elsewhere. In 2020, Large lithium deposits were found in South America, and specifically in 2021, more uranium deposits were found in Canada. Uranium is of specific significance because even the CIA in the Cold War had to smuggle uranium out of Russia and titanium out of Russia because they were the only places you could get these raw materials, and they were such great economic significance. So even the CIA in the Cold War was willing to fund an enemy to get these materials. But suddenly, you get cheaper and better available sources of these materials elsewhere, right? So the Russian economy is fundamentally fucked over-relying on commodities. Moreover, there's a negative view of Russia after the 2016 election fiasco, which further worsened this and relit the tensions between Russia and the US, right? So the economy was unlikely to be fixed, no matter what Putin did because of the simple fact that he relied on these raw materials and that these raw materials are now uncompetitive in Russia means that he can't fix this. So note, now when he decides to, therefore, invade Ukraine as a result of this economic failing, it does not mean he has to even take fucking over Ukraine. Putin did not think he was going to take over Ukraine. Why would he posture for years like this? This is not something new, he's been doing this for like six years. Why did he choose 2022 specifically? Right? It's because people needed to see him fulfill his mandate. The Russian army was never good, and Putin was not under any circumstances, under any illusions. The reason he did it was because they needed people to get stirred up in favor of supporting him. There was rising unrest because of economic tension and economic distress, and in order to fulfill that social contract that he originally came to power because of, he needed to ensure that there was some reason the Russian people could be given back. So even if, in the long run, the Russian people turned against him, he needed to try and distract them try and distract them from the shit economy because the choice for Putin was not one of hey, will I win this war. The choice for Putin was a certain death from starved mobs coming and invading the criminal or him trying to fight this fiscal war for another five years. Because note, uniquely, that it's the time scale that's the problem because Putin wants to die a hero, how long do you really think this is going to last right? Putin knows the end is here and he wants to ensure that his power is Consolidated and the people love him until his last. We win because we prove that we had no other option to other than face certain death at the hands of a star, a fight award that may or may not win.
</mo>
<gw>
I'm gonna be explaining more, be telling you what my partner said and reminding you why this is the most important case. And lastly, proving that our case trips down both opposition teams so clashes and why that's important. There are two main clashes. Everybody has been ignoring the debate that makes both sides symmetrical to the point where the impacts internationally are much larger. Putin controls the media, controls the narrative and spreads misinformation like any other authoritarian legal. What we have here is that we have, the fact, there much less impact in this kind of clash because it's more difficult for the Nato to achieve a unilateral response from the people. therefore, whether that Invasion happened or not, he will still and forever control the lead as an authoritarian leader. What the impacts we getting from both on the domestic impacts. I'm not sure about the actual impacts that come from the outside, not to undermine OO about how he does look bad especially, in the eyes of investors and investors that have actual power with Russia but we believe our case on International impact is much more important. now I'm going to remind you what that what my part like gonna look like, basically she talked about nato and how the book goes, became much more strong and are now unified against Russia. Mind you, everyone has agreed in this room that everyone that NATO and you did not like Russia beforehand. We have to go that happen not way too informed on every kind of different Clash that canes have between them but that's that's known, okay. Therefore, now, we have the country that take part in there, that are in the Tipping Point of, hey, Russia is a strong tower, we should go against them that much. Now the Tipping has shifted against them and and having to break the confusion of side even the mutual countries very well explained by my partner, that even mutual countries have have agreed to take part in potentially joining the EU. Therefore just this front Russia, it's fucking Enough by is losing the potential ally or mutual power that could go against them because those countries have money like economy and whatever. Second which I believe is extremely important was ignored by opposition side because made claims that the not the soft power that he has within the countries that are around him. Let's not forget, make USSR great again is what Putin wants the most and has wanted since the start. it has been known since 2004, has been known since the time he started talking about going into politics. that's why, he looks like an embarrassment on one side, I'm talk about and at the same time he lost the he the countries over on the other side the continent like, “hey, what we we keep them on our side, on religious because we have the same religion, we have history because they have money can help us” etc. but at the same time the embarrassment he looks like um, what he look like is making up, he explained very well how gray ukraine was when the treaty who might can still be for him with potential sanctions that come from the EU or the US and at the same time, if he wins he still can get shitty repercussions, the fact that NATO going to be even more unified potentially adding more members in, to feel more protected bordering Poland with a lot more guns and ammo and being ready for potential next. Yes, before I go.
<poi>
Ukrainian War and what has subsequently occurred has made NATO and Western countries look useless and this not exactly what.
</poi>
No, they haven't. The reason is because trust me, we do not want to get, to go immediately okay? this is not what we want to happen right now. we do not have as a NATO country, I'm to speak from a NATO perspective. the NATO does not have the jurisdiction to fight over Ukraine it would be shitty. that's one thing they would look like shit because there's no treaty to, there's no to accept the fact that Ukraine is in there okay. therefore, they don't know that's bad, that they do they're doing exactly what they're supposed to and when a went into Poland they actually responded accordingly, by putting more ammunition in borders of Thailand before they're doing exactly what they're supposed to do. but okay as I said, make does not work because said Look by because country like ukraine which because they don't have as many resources don't have as many alliances like Russian has or as much territory as wish should have the still look like shit in the rest of the world. Second, was influence on your Case OO, apart from, you ignore completely of the money that constantly going into Ukraine, the US has have sent money like twice since the start of 2024, you ignore that, it has Strarted with the unification of NATO and EU like my partner said very well, which is still important. The West having Financial struggle we need to the impact okay, yes, there impacts, I strongly believe that putin is not a bitch like you're trying to explain, the whole goal isn't to actually, okay, I'm want to me the West stubborn. when in fact the impact of he's getting here are substantially so sad, when all of his enemies are unifying with death, trust me even if the struggle a little bit, being a bitch way is not his main goal is to actually win something. Yes, last but not least, on outside support his most important potential allies are fucked, they are flipped on our side of the house. Very well, now, on CO, CO let's talk about your economy and about how his economy and domestic impacts have, domestic economy, it has been very well by Og that was bad strategy, I'm sorry, but your most like point about maken by you said motivations honestly have been, oh, that will OG due to the fact that yes, it's a domestic fact. Yeah, your case is there so I kind of both, we win against OG because um, we believe that International impact that has had, is a lot more important in it's a lot more important that potential domestic impact because without the would have a huge influence within the people of the country and the people that have money within the country. Therefore, sorry guys.
</gw>
<ow>
Crazy to call our case derided, when they ran the exact same opening. The main push was International stuff, mainly on NATO strengthening itself, which we got all from the Deputy Prime Minister. I'm sorry their case is completely derivative, it's ridiculous to be throwing cells in, you're in a glass house. but secondly, why is our case not derivative? because opening opposition's entire case is about incentives about the war, right. He is making ground so we doesn't regret it because he can make more ground, right. We actually give you the underlying incentives for why all of this occurring but also why he reached a flash point, where he had to make one decision or the other, the other decision, I’m telling you was probably certain death or Exile which is probably not very good to him. The case is completely different from opening. cool let's go down their case and explain why we are winning. Okay, what does opening government give us? opening government there a bunch of stuff going to focus on the international realm without actually justifying to us why the international realm is important to begin with, right, they tell us like, you have vilifications and like a far more specific between the or fight between the west and Putin, there's significantly more tension between the west and Russia and there's no way to have as much trading, as much cooperation way the benefits everyone. I reckon this is the case, it is really important that provided the reason that this doesn't apply is because the economy already got fucked, the economy was fucked, right. there is no scope for economic recovery on a high level in Putin's lifetime. why? because 2014 happened, why? because since I was a kid, Putin has been a villain on the world stage, in terms of his characterization in the west right. I grew up in Toronto, I grew up in London, I grew up in New York, in all three of those cities, Putin is seen as a villain, he's consistently be seen as such there was no chance of him regaining his reputation with the West, regaining his reputation internationally but they also don't play out the scenario. Sure, maybe NATO is United now, maybe they're a threat, I kind of agree with OO that they're wasting their money and they look weak but regardless, maybe they've Consolidated power, maybe Finland and Sweden have joined. So, what they're never going to engage in a direct war with Russia, it means nothing for Putin but also by the time you get to any stage that, that's severe Putin's probably already dead. I mean what's the guy like late 60s 70s something like, that the guy's getting old, right. Right now, his decision is to maintain and consolidate power domestically for as long as he can but also maintain the love and the support of the Russian people, right, and that is what he's doing, he's delivering on a social contract, ‘cause he can no longer deliver effectively on the economy. They have to proved likelihoods of that, when they tell us that all these economic harms happen, they have to tell us likely. there's no engagement with the comparative from go bench, I'm just incredibly confused, sure.


<poi>
Speaking of comparatives, the reason why this whole thing started was because Ukraine was speaking with NATO. If the metric is the creation of great Russia, how does the example of this long war not give hope to the countries he wishes to take over in the future, thus, leading to Putin's failure on your very own metric or glass house.
</poi>
Sure, okay, so the reason that our case still works even given that you know, maybe Poland or Georgia. Whatever these countries may be, whatever he may want in terms of full unification. Of course that's not accessible, he can't invade every country and restart the Soviet Union now, you know what he can do, he can die as the man who took back Ukraine and put Russia on the front foot when it comes to consolidating the USSR. That is what his reputation will be historically grounded in, right. That's what the guy wants, he's not only an egomaniac that wants to deliver on his promises so he can be great, he also wants to deliver on his promises to be Russian people and this is how he does it, right. it's one foot forward, of course the complete Invasion to reunite the entire block is completely improvable in his lifeline, even if he started from day one but this is the most likely option, in terms of getting any kind of front foot and delivering on any of his promises in the little time he may have left. but also if he continues and didn't do any military action, didn't consolidate power, didn't enact martial law, what you probably see coming up is again, dissatisfaction amongst the Russian people who were economically starving and dying, right. They were going to comfort him eventually, the only way to prevent that is to distract them with a war but also this war delivers on the promises this is an actor in motion. It's about his incentives. These are the initial incentives he set out for himself. These are the only incentives he is able to deliver on now. The only incentives can actually recollect and actually grab, right? That is why we're winning this debate, because we actually tell you how you can still fulfill any of his last-minute incentives. The OG gave us this weird stuff about how, they don't have to engage with the comparative. They don't have to talk about the other side of things because there are other options that could have been good. But insofar as you're describing his incentives, you have to describe his incentives through the current status, but also through the counterfactual and how they compare and how they achieve none of the teams do this. Closing.
<poi>
Okay. She's losing, though. You have not proven how he's actually going to achieve what he wants, and the people in Russia still, the soldiers are still dying. There’s still an amount of money. There’s still economic instability.
</poi>
If you listen to Max, two things, right? First, he doesn't have to win. He just has to be the guy that stepped up and fucking tried. But secondly, all he has to do is maintain this war for a period of time to the point where he consolidated enough soft power domestically again that he can sit tight until he dies, right? That is all he has to do, and that is something that is very achievable. But also, in the status quo, insofar as NATO is not going to engage in the war and they're not going to essentially invade Russia or fight Russia directly, he has the power to do this insofar as OG already tells us he's slowly making ground. He's probably going to win. They show us no case. They give us three scenarios, but two of those scenarios are just so unlikely. Of course, he's not going to sit down at the table and form a bilateral agreement, and of course, he's not going to lose, right? These are completely ridiculous. There’s no actual characterization of any likelihood but illustration of how scenarios play out on the government bench. Cool, no. Okay, cool. Against our opening, if my timer will turn back on, never mind, someone hold up for me. Okay, cool. So here's what we have, right. From, let me deal with a member of government. Sorry, a member of government. Internal perception matters more than who and he managed to convince historically countries to join again. Then derivative of OG who’ve already done this right? They’ve already talked about NATO consolidating power international inputs, but we tell you, international realm no longer matters in this debate.
Putin failed on any incentives in the international realm, many, many years ago. You have to engage with who putin in 2022, who he is now and whether or not he regrets that decision, insofar as that is not leading to his death, insofar as he is still in power and he's consolidating it. Putin is delivering on the only incentives, he can possibly have left. This is the best outcome for him but also the only outcome for him where he doesn't die, doesn't get exiled. Mak proves this to you, for those reasons, this is the only decision he would have made. Putin cannot regret this decision, it's the best thing for his power, it's the best thing domestically, he's delivering on his promises, right. The opening government bench doesn't engage with the comparative, in the comparative in our world, he dies. It's not good. For all those reasons, proud to oppose.
</ow>
<pm>
Firstly, I think it's important for us to picturize how big the shaming would be or how the shaming would be at the very first place so that there's not really much content been later to the end of the debate. Firstly, how it's going to look like: first, we're going to call out people, for example, in social media, etc., even on the streets, for example, pointing fingers at them, calling them names if they do not follow all of the protocols, for example, during lockdown or something. Or, like, on a big scale, will happen on social media where you comment on their post, for example, when they do not follow sustainable environmental protocols.

And it's going to be much amplified by all of this uproar that's happening, and also a lot of grassroots movements is also going to call out these behaviors from a lot of, uh, bodies. For example, not only individually but also towards the government, for example, towards all of the celebrities, like what's been happening with Taylor Swift, for example, with her carbon emissions. Those are the picturizations of how the shaming is going to happen.

What is the urgency of this then? Because, firstly, we think that people have limited knowledge, right? Even, um, in the current status quo, knowledge is available everywhere. Not everyone is really interested in actually knowing the causes and what it implicates to them, and they do not really have the feeling to actually want to change or the motivation to actually want to do something about the causes, for example, where it's environmental problems, where there are public health protocols, for example, etc., right?

But secondly, people would just not listen because it doesn't really implicate that any, uh, it doesn't implicate that there's any immediate behavioral impact towards them, right? People may gain knowledge from educational campaigns, for example, but this doesn't really result in immediate action. For example, many individuals understand the importance of, like, reducing carbon emissions because it's getting harder to breathe in this world, etc., but they lack those urgency.

Or, um, but shaming, on the other hand, can compel these immediate changes through societal pressure and a lot of uh responses, like guilt, for example, or fear of judgment from other people. But also, secondly, there's also a lot of, um, cognitive dissonance in a sense, right? Where people have their own beliefs in a sense, but they have their own lifestyle that they have been doing for tens of years, but they, uh, don't think that this education is, uh, that this education is actually implicating on their lifestyle, which means it's something that is, um, contradicting towards the things that they have done their whole life.

And thus, individuals reject this educational message. But with this with this shaming, in a sense, it gives people that urgency of at least it hurts their pride for them to change, for example, right? Which means this has to come uniquely from shaming because for four reasons. Firstly, because it hurts their pride, right? People, uh, feel embarrassment or guilt when they get called out, for example. Unlike softer tactics like education, for example, shaming directly confronts people with the problems that they currently do, for example, and as the fear for being publicly judged.

Or, like, um, because, uh, people constantly correct their behavior to, uh, further avoid embarrassment from other people. For instance, people who are ashamed for, like, not adhering to eco-friendly practices might quickly, for example, adopt more sustainable habits to restore their image in their social circle. For example, when they've been called out by their friends or they've been called out by the people around them, their neighbors, etc.

Right? But then secondly, there's so many things like peer pressure; this is also amplifies through social media, right? With trends, for example, a lot of people are following more eco-friendly approaches, like instead of using plastic bags, they start using eco-friendly bags, like tote bags, for example, for them to go to the store. And this is more compelling, and it's, like, much closer in proximity because, like, people around you are starting to do those as well.

Which means this amplification turns into a trend that is going to, uh, actually make people listen. But also, uh, people also fear public backlash, like what I've said before. Do people would listen? What is the conclusion of the second point? This has to come uniquely from shaming because it is directly and is more proximate towards the people, and it gives them immediate backlash from their actions, for example, right?

But then I'm going to, uh, preempt this by saying that, oh, maybe, uh, yeah, opposition is going to say that this is going to tamper on the social movement's reputation, for example. But two responses to this, if this is going to happen, right? Firstly, you need to make sure that you actually fulfill the purpose of your causes at the very first place, right? If you were to uphold your reputation, you need to make sure that you actually uphold your causes.

But we have told you the urgency of education does not work, which means people will think that, oh, they're only doing campaigns for education, for example, etc. They're not doing anything about their causes anyway. You need to raise this awareness and actually mobilize those actions to actually happen in the very first place for the social movements to actually uphold their, uh, values, etc.

Right? And also, secondly, you are the ones that actually fulfill the purpose and values. You are the ones that actively fulfill the promise. You shame people that do not uphold your causes. You, uh, actively shame people that do not, uh, align with your principles of the movement, for example, right? The social movement also relies on creating a strong sense of identity and reinforcing those values by taking active actions.

With shaming also shows that their reputation and their identity is something that is to be upheld. But yes, I'm going to take one from CO.

<poi>
Uh, given that most individuals aren't responsible for huge social changes, how are you actually going to change the people at the top's feelings just by shaming them?
</poi>

Oh, yeah, I'm going to talk about that after this. Yeah, nice segue. But for, but I'm going now, I'm going to explain how this shaming not only shames the individuals but also trickles down to the forces of government to also listen to these social causes. Firstly, because it creates this public pressure towards the leader, right? When social movements engage in these public shaming, especially like what I said, it's been amplified with social media, etc., it will happen on a really large scale, right?

Which means they generate significant public pressure that the government leaders cannot easily ignore. Right? For example, a lot of people are violating environmental standards, which means, like, for example, it also highlights the gap in the government, right? For example, when these individuals cannot do eco-friendly practices, this means that the government is not actually providing these people with those, uh, that enables them to actually do these eco-friendly practices as well.

Right? Which means these individuals would not want to be shamed. Uh, for example, like you tell me, oh, why are you not recycling your stuff, for example? But I could just say, oh, the government doesn't really provide me with the practices that I need to adhere to towards all of this stuff because it's just so inherently very expensive, right? Which means also it highlights the gaps in the government, etc.

Subsets and Splits

No community queries yet

The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.