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Thirdly, it's necessary to gain trust in government as a result of the aforementioned problems—the fact that they are corrupt and the fact that they are associated with previous members of the Awami League and the fact that they're unpopular. If you want trust in any new government, you need to remove the infrastructure of the old government; it's unpopular. |
Finally, the most important for justice: these people are evil people who deserve punishment. The student league should be considered a terrorist organization; the Awami League youth group should be disseminated and destroyed. They are a group of people who deserve justice to come to them. Could these youth leaders finally then be flexible even in the instances where these policies are bad? |
Firstly, they have explicitly set up a series of commissions to redesign their policy platform with experts involved. That legitimizes changes in refinement that occur in policy—not as backsliding, but as academic refinement on the policies they have established, which makes that change legitimate. But secondly, they're likely to believe in that flexibility and not be so heavy-handed because they're working with a new set of people. They're working with people like Hassan, the leader of the government, and the figures and academics they have put into these commissions in order to redefine their policy. They have a revealed preference towards redefining and establishing a new political platform that is likely to have positive outcomes even in the episode policy badly gets fixed. Okay |
<poi> |
15 seconds, OG already gave 5 reasons: the BNP is accountable. students are immensely advertised why the BNP race? BNP must satisfy protestor demands for politicians from entering; they can still operate outside politics, and the BNP needs to prove its change from the past. This beats your extension directly. |
</poi> |
It doesn't; Allowing the BNP to come into power at a moment of unique political back and crisis and high instability with a system of corruption already in place means that none of those democratic abilities exist. They might have potential pressure from young people or from other political parties, but if they rig the next election after this next election that they win, they don't get any of those better outcomes. |
But if you believe that's true, then the BNP should have accountability to get better accountability when there is more youth representation in Parliament. Next, to respond to opening government: first, they say this is going to empower parties that recognize that people have these leaders. Firstly, this is directly contradicted by their later claim which states leaders will be so popular they will end up having unchecked power. |
Secondly, these people are likely to be skeptical of anyone protecting the branding of being the consequence of the revolutionary movement. Next, they say that student leaders will have too much unchecked power and will become corrupt in the end. Firstly, if there's any meaningful degree of skepticism, that explains where the democratic ability on leaders comes from. |
Like, if you believe the BNP is likely to be successful—or at least a pushback, like they say—you should believe that there is pressure that forces them to continue to be democratic because there is someone pulling them out and forcing them to be better. How are they likely to go about gaining their legitimacy? Firstly, by doing the things they said about abolishing the quota system, which only makes sense. Secondly, by gaining the backing and approval of various groups who support them in the process of revolution, like university academics and the commissions they set up. |
Thirdly, by maintaining that commitment to democracy into the long term. So if you believe that the BNP is a meaningful opposition, it explains what youth leaders will continue to be long-term. If they do win, then the BNP winning is good; the BNP is horrible firstly they can do horrible to minorities, Secondly they is led by a corrupt person, thirdly and escalates tensions. But also, better make best. Proud to oppose |
</gw> |
<pm> |
This is a debate about courts and justices and judges. So, judges will interpret this as a sit and pride over certain appeals over Merchant Acquisitions after regulators have regulated and companies sue if they think that this is unfair. |
Secondly, I think this framing is important because regulators will know that this is the legal doctrine that judges and courts will adopt. Therefore, the way we approach regulating mergers and acquisitions will keep a broad scope in mind. For instance, they know they can get away with complaining that this merger acquisition has failed to conduct environmental information surveys on how this merger acquisition will deplete energy resources or, for instance, pollute the local environment. |
This is important because our first argument is that consumer welfare declines in this context. The first thing I want to talk about here is that we're going to be able to essentially create companies to self-regulate before they go into the merger acquisition process. So, here's the through line: they will perceive that regulators will regulate against them if they do not provide information on things like the way they operate. Therefore, they will preemptively have this information on hand to prevent issues like being sued. |
The reason why this is important is that there are three or four reasons for this. Firstly, investors are wary, so they'll be scared if it's too risky because of the media attention that will happen if they get sued, for instance. Other considerations come into play. Secondly, legal fees are incredibly expensive for lawyers and related costs. Thirdly, if you fail the first process in the district courts, you have to appeal again and again. Appeal phases take a long time as well, so as a company, you want to make sure that you cover all your bases. |
Fourthly, you are acquiring another firm, so it's likely that the other firm might get cold feet if they feel that you have not prepared enough for this process as a whole. The importance for this is that we reduce information asymmetry. |
Here's how I want to contextualize this: if a company knows that they will have the merger acquisition blocked because they have not provided the necessary information on pollution, they will go and hire consultants to make sure they conduct stuff like an environmental impact statement that reveals the total GHG emissions that will result from this merger acquisition. |
The reason why we think this is fine is because if you have a law of capital this or you have to have a law of capital in order to acquire another firm, so this will be calculated in your decision-making process. The reason why this information is good, firstly, is that it's good for the public to be aware of this information. That is to say, if you live in communities that are going to be near these stores or data centers, your energy prices might increase if they come in. |
It's good for you to engage in local campaigning for your local politicians to create ordinances against these types of companies coming in. Secondly, I think it's really good for investors too, who might want to invest in this company after the merger acquisition, to know the implications of what they're getting into. Revealing all this information to the public is good for the company and for the market as a whole. |
The second argument that I want to talk about is that we get more political will on our side of the house. I want to note that regulators do want to regulate because on their side of the house they might think that regulators are going to do this in a bad way. Firstly, the reason why they do so in a bad way in the status quo is that they have too narrow of a stick to adjudicate mergers and acquisitions. If it is the case that you can only assess mergers and acquisitions if they reduce competition and prices, it becomes a lot easier for a company to fudge the numbers and hire people to say that competitive prices are going to decrease. |
But because we've seen a proliferation of M&As in 100 like 450 past year, the Department of Justice and the FTC currently do not have enough resources to investigate all of this. It is easy for mergers and acquisitions to go unnoticed. Secondly, they also have a revealed preference for doing this because, for instance, they want to get promoted, want more funding from Congress, and want to gain like more media attention for their agency. |
Thirdly, because there is bipartisan support, this is why, for instance, a lot of people like Lisa Kahn, because Lisa is really harsh against tech. That's why we have support from conservatives. Because of this bipartisan support, we've seen a lot of like like like interest in this as a whole. The reason why this independently is not enough for them to block more M&As and acquisitions is that using this as a legal doctrine is too low. |
The second argument i want to; The third argument I want to pause on in this speech is that all the comparative aspects are part of why this is far worse. On the comparative, it is far worse to get environmental accountability and privacy accountability on their side. The first reason behind this is that privacy laws and environmental laws lag behind the industry. For instance, laws regarding the protection of consumer welfare on like data and AI often catch up to the emerging technology in the status quo. |
Things like environment, like the EPA and stuff like that, constantly get repealed in the status quo. like For instance, the "Halliburton loophole," which allows certain companies to not dispose of waste water properly, is something that was repealed by corporate interests. I'm going to prove to you why these types of regulations are not susceptible to these flaws, but before I continue I will take POI's, |
<poi> |
Still haven't explain why to solve any of these problems like why does it helps the environment, why does it help with privacy, why does it help with things? |
</poi> |
So, The thing that I mentioned is that it's a preemptive measure. This is proactive; before the merger occurs, they have to prove using data studies and stuff like that to prove that there's going to be like like less environmental harm and stuff like that. So This happens before the MNA happens and then and then I'm going to prove to you why you now give like like courts more ability to have legal prosecution on our side of the house. |
All right, So What happens on our side of the house. what we think happens is when regulators, by the way, when regulators like the DOJ and stuff like that like regulate M&As they are not susceptible to like acts and stuff like that. They get to create their own doctrine when they're trying to do this. So When these these like these rights get sued, if other companies think that this is weak, what happens is this goes through the court process and creates cases for future court decisions to be based on. |
For instance, if a utility company gets sued, then the facts of that case can be applied to future court cases. The reason why this is important is because these doctrines provide future courts with a legal basis to determine this information. The third argument I want to posit—sorry, the impact of this is that, firstly, what happens is we get less M&As on our side of the house because the barriers to that is much higher. Therefore, you have to ensure that your information you put out there is accurate. Proud to propose. |
</pm> |
<lo> |
This is a far worse, less important standard, and we can deal with this as a problem with the nature of other forms of direct regulation. If they want to argue that the state is weak and not enforcing direct regulation, those are the same weak states that will write this law incredibly badly, not to do the sets of things that they want to do, and instead to subvert democracy and make things worse. |
Two arguments from the opposition: first of all, this massively freezes out investment in mergers and acquisitions, both of which are not good. Secondly, why this is a worse, less easy, and ultimately more harmful standard to aim for. Let's start with why this freezes out investment. |
The first thing to say is that it massively broadens the scope of what can be used so the first primacy why does this mergers way up. Firstly this massively broadens the scope of what can be used to reject a merger. Secondly, that scope becomes nearly boundless because non-economic harms they nearly boundlessly categorization, and it is incredibly easy, even if there are codifications, to argue for further expansions of it. You can say well the combination of this right and this right implies this further right, this implied rights natural laws that we ought to care about. So it's incredibly easy to go further. |
Thirdly, these are much more interpretable because they're a lot more about value trade-offs, which also means you raise the uncertainty because judge-specific risk is more specific; it's higher because particular judges are going to interpret this in many more different ways. Whereas judges at the moment, when it's a less subjective standard, would have more correlated views of how it works. |
And it also shows the willingness of courts and of your legislators to continue to expand antitrust legislation into the future, which means that you're incredibly likely to have people think that mergers are less likely. Why is this a harm? First, because you get less mergers, and secondly, you get less initial investments. |
Let's start with mergers. Obviously, when it's harder to get a merger approved, you're less likely to attempt that merger because there's a high level of investment that has to go into setting up a merger, finding a merger partner. You have to do things like due diligence, set it up; that is an incredibly high cost that you won't do. You might clear it sometimes, but on the margin, you're less likely to do it at the point where it's less likely to get through. |
And we think that mergers are, on net, good because they lead to larger scale. It means you can operate more efficiently because you get economies of scale. It makes firms more durable to idiosyncratic market risks; they're less likely to go down, leaving consumers without goods and workers without jobs. It means that you can reach more consumers more easily, to have more scale. It means that you can invest more on net; you can do more innovation. |
It means that profitable parts of the business can cross-subsidize non-profitable parts of those businesses. So, that means that these mergers are, on net, good. And I know that those mergers are likely to be pro-competitive for the reason, first of all, that under the consumer welfare standard, they wouldn't be let through if they were not brended. |
This team may just not notice the fact that a merger has happened in almost every jurisdiction around the world and, in a few months in Australia as well, there's mandatory notification of the regulator when you reach a certain threshold. They're not going to ignore that from happening. |
But secondly, I would argue that mergers are, on net, pro-competitive. The reason for that is that without mergers, you often get one or two large firms rise to the top, and then no one else is ever able to compete with them or grow to compete with them. If it's theoretical competition but I have 80% of the market and you're 2% of the market, you're never going to have the kind of economies of scale to be a reasonable competitor. |
But when all the smaller firms can merge, they can then become reasonable competition. So, actually, mergers are a net pro-competitive. I'll also note that there's now an incentive for larger firms not to provide business-to-business goods that allow the fixing of those externalities that would allow smaller firms to merge. |
So, take an example of this: Google letting you use their login on their website is really important for you being able to alleviate privacy concerns. But if Google knew that it would allow the small players in the market to merge, there might be a concern otherwise that they would have too much data and they would be privacy-concerned about it. |
They wouldn't want to let those smaller players use that Google login, so they no longer want to provide goods that allow the amelioration of those externalities because they know that the minimization of those externalities makes it easier for them to be competitive with them. |
So now we get more competition. And I'll also note that this now means that competition law becomes less popular on that side. First of all, because it's now making decisions about things that aren't universally agreed upon. Secondly, it's associated with the left, because under the status quo, the right can be pro-market but can say, "Oh, this is necessary for the market to function efficiently." |
Whereas now you're saying we should trade off market efficiency for other outcomes, which makes it far less popular. It can also be framed as a form of corruption because you're using it as a political weapon, and you're now likely to have lots of people who lose their jobs and can make the argument that my job is traded off a fucking squirrels, tat makes competition less popular. |
This means you're less likely to enforce in the first instance if they're worried about competition. We now get less investment into really important things, and if you don't do the initial investment, if you're worried you might not be able to merge or acquire, first, you often don't do the initial investment because you want to get bought out in the end. |
You're more likely to be able to make your business bigger if, along the way, you can buy out other firms. So, the likelihood to merge means that my initial investment is worth less, which means I'm less likely to do that initial investment. Yes, |
<poi> |
The issue is when these firms become too big to fail. You are unable to have these environmental and privacy regulations in the future because a few drops in the bucket produce large companies that need to have this proactive regulation. |
</poi> |
Then you have large fines, like there are incredibly large fines that have been put against huge companies in the order of billions of dollars, or you just ban it; you send people to jail. Regulation doesn't always work. |
One regulation has followed, come on, most debated argument in the world. The second argument: why is this a worse standard to aim for? Because when you're optimizing for their standard, you're optimizing for more things, you can less optimize for our standard of economic things. I'm going to explain why the economics is more important. |
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