Technique
stringclasses 79
values | Technique_ID
stringclasses 79
values | Technique_Description
stringclasses 79
values | Tactic
stringclasses 22
values | Tactic_Description
stringclasses 22
values | Mitigation Name
stringclasses 51
values | Mitigation Technology Description
float64 | MIT_ID
stringclasses 51
values | Mitigation_Description
stringclasses 51
values | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4
stringclasses 26
values | IEC 62443-3-3:2013
stringclasses 18
values | IEC 62443-4-2:2019
stringclasses 22
values | References
stringclasses 24
values | Reference_Link
stringclasses 23
values | ICS_ASSET
stringclasses 8
values | DATA_Source
stringclasses 49
values | Purdue_Model_Level
stringclasses 5
values | MAT_MIT_REF_Links
stringclasses 51
values | MAT_TEC_REF_Links
stringclasses 79
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Module Firmware
|
T0839
|
Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment.
|
Persistence, Impair Process Control
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839
|
Module Firmware
|
T0839
|
Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment.
|
Persistence, Impair Process Control
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839
|
Module Firmware
|
T0839
|
Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment.
|
Persistence, Impair Process Control
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839
|
Module Firmware
|
T0839
|
Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment.
|
Persistence, Impair Process Control
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839
|
Monitor Process State
|
T0801
|
Adversaries may gather information about the physical process state. This information may be used to gain more information about the process itself or used as a trigger for malicious actions. The sources of process state information may vary such as, OPC tags, historian data, specific PLC block information, or network traffic.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Mitigation Limited or Not Effective
| null |
M0816
|
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventative controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| null | null | null | null | null |
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0816
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0801
|
Monitor Process State
|
T0801
|
Adversaries may gather information about the physical process state. This information may be used to gain more information about the process itself or used as a trigger for malicious actions. The sources of process state information may vary such as, OPC tags, historian data, specific PLC block information, or network traffic.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Mitigation Limited or Not Effective
| null |
M0816
|
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventative controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| null | null | null | null | null |
Data Historian
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0816
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0801
|
Monitor Process State
|
T0801
|
Adversaries may gather information about the physical process state. This information may be used to gain more information about the process itself or used as a trigger for malicious actions. The sources of process state information may vary such as, OPC tags, historian data, specific PLC block information, or network traffic.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Mitigation Limited or Not Effective
| null |
M0816
|
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventative controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| null | null | null | null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0816
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0801
|
Monitor Process State
|
T0801
|
Adversaries may gather information about the physical process state. This information may be used to gain more information about the process itself or used as a trigger for malicious actions. The sources of process state information may vary such as, OPC tags, historian data, specific PLC block information, or network traffic.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Mitigation Limited or Not Effective
| null |
M0816
|
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventative controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| null | null | null | null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0816
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0801
|
Monitor Process State
|
T0801
|
Adversaries may gather information about the physical process state. This information may be used to gain more information about the process itself or used as a trigger for malicious actions. The sources of process state information may vary such as, OPC tags, historian data, specific PLC block information, or network traffic.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Mitigation Limited or Not Effective
| null |
M0816
|
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventative controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| null | null | null | null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0816
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0801
|
Native API
|
T0834
|
Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Execution Prevention
| null |
M0938
|
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Process: OS API Execution
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0834
|
Native API
|
T0834
|
Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Execution Prevention
| null |
M0938
|
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
| null | null |
Data Historian
|
Process: OS API Execution
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0834
|
Native API
|
T0834
|
Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Execution Prevention
| null |
M0938
|
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Process: OS API Execution
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0834
|
Native API
|
T0834
|
Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Execution Prevention
| null |
M0938
|
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Process: OS API Execution
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0834
|
Native API
|
T0834
|
Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Execution Prevention
| null |
M0938
|
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
| null | null |
Input/Output Server
|
Process: OS API Execution
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0834
|
Native API
|
T0834
|
Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Execution Prevention
| null |
M0938
|
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Process: OS API Execution
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0834
|
Network Connection Enumeration
|
T0840
|
Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to discover information about device communication patterns. If an adversary can inspect the state of a network connection with tools, such as Netstat, in conjunction with System Firmware, then they can determine the role of certain devices on the network . The adversary can also use Network Sniffing to watch network traffic for details about the source, destination, protocol, and content.
|
Discovery
|
The adversary is locating information to assess and identify their targets in your environment.
|
Mitigation Limited or Not Effective
| null |
M0816
|
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventative controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| null | null | null | null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0816
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0840
|
Network Sniffing
|
T0842
|
Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information.
|
Discovery
|
The adversary is locating information to assess and identify their targets in your environment.
|
Encrypt Network Traffic
| null |
M0808
|
Utilize strong cryptographic techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping on network communications.
|
SC-8
|
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
|
1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0808
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0842
|
Network Sniffing
|
T0842
|
Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information.
|
Discovery
|
The adversary is locating information to assess and identify their targets in your environment.
|
Multi-factor Authentication
| null |
M0932
|
Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator. Within industrial control environments assets such as low-level controllers, workstations, and HMIs have real-time operational control and safety requirements which may restrict the use of multi-factor.
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.7
|
CR 1.7
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0932
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0842
|
Network Sniffing
|
T0842
|
Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information.
|
Discovery
|
The adversary is locating information to assess and identify their targets in your environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0842
|
Network Sniffing
|
T0842
|
Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information.
|
Discovery
|
The adversary is locating information to assess and identify their targets in your environment.
|
Privileged Account Management
| null |
M0926
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0842
|
Network Sniffing
|
T0842
|
Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information.
|
Discovery
|
The adversary is locating information to assess and identify their targets in your environment.
|
Static Network Configuration
| null |
M0814
|
Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurations when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery/addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited device features or challenges introduced with different network configurations.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. D. Parsons and D. Wylie. (2019, September). Practical Industrial Control System (ICS) Cybersecurity: IT and OT Have Converged – Discover and Defend Your Assets. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
2. Colin Gray. (n.d.). How SDN Can Improve Cybersecurity in OT Networks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
3. Josh Rinaldi. (2016, April). Still a Thrill: OPC UA Device Discovery. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
4. Aditya K Sood. (2019, July). Discovering and fingerprinting BACnet devices. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
5. Langner. (2018, November). Why Ethernet/IP changes the OT asset discovery game. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://www.csiac.org/journal-article/practical-industrial-control-system-ics-cybersecurity-it-and-ot-have-converged-discover-and-defend-your-assets/
https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Technical%20Papers/6891_HowSDN_CG_20180720_Web2.pdf?v=20190312-231901
https://www.rtautomation.com/rtas-blog/still-a-thrill-opc-ua-device-discovery/
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/07/10/bacnet-devices/
https://www.langner.com/2018/11/why-ethernet-ip-changes-the-ot-asset-discovery-game/
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0814
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0842
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Data Historian
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Authorization Enforcement
| null |
M0800
|
The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector [1], while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions for users of IEDs. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Authorization Enforcement
| null |
M0800
|
The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector [1], while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions for users of IEDs. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html
|
Data Historian
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Authorization Enforcement
| null |
M0800
|
The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector [1], while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions for users of IEDs. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Data Historian
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Data Historian
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Data Historian
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Data Historian
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Data Historian
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Data Historian
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Point & Tag Identification
|
T0861
|
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Authorization Enforcement
| null |
M0800
|
The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector [1], while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions for users of IEDs. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Authorization Enforcement
| null |
M0800
|
The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector [1], while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions for users of IEDs. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Download
|
T0843
|
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Authorization Enforcement
| null |
M0800
|
The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector [1], while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions for users of IEDs. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Authorization Enforcement
| null |
M0800
|
The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector [1], while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions for users of IEDs. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Program Upload
|
T0845
|
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845
|
Project File Infection
|
T0873
|
Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further execution and persistence techniques.
|
Persistence
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Engineering Workstation
|
File: File Modification
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0873
|
Project File Infection
|
T0873
|
Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further execution and persistence techniques.
|
Persistence
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
File: File Modification
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0873
|
Project File Infection
|
T0873
|
Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further execution and persistence techniques.
|
Persistence
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
File: File Modification
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0873
|
Project File Infection
|
T0873
|
Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further execution and persistence techniques.
|
Persistence
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
File: File Modification
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0873
|
Project File Infection
|
T0873
|
Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further execution and persistence techniques.
|
Persistence
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
|
Encrypt Sensitive Information
| null |
M0941
|
Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption.
|
SC-28
|
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
|
1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdfc
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
File: File Modification
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0941
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0873
|
Project File Infection
|
T0873
|
Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further execution and persistence techniques.
|
Persistence
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
|
Encrypt Sensitive Information
| null |
M0941
|
Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption.
|
SC-28
|
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
|
1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdfc
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
File: File Modification
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0941
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0873
|
Project File Infection
|
T0873
|
Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further execution and persistence techniques.
|
Persistence
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
|
Restrict File and Directory Permissions
| null |
M0922
|
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
File: File Modification
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0873
|
Project File Infection
|
T0873
|
Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further execution and persistence techniques.
|
Persistence
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
|
Restrict File and Directory Permissions
| null |
M0922
|
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
File: File Modification
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0873
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Authorization Enforcement
| null |
M0800
|
The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector [1], while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions for users of IEDs. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html
|
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Authorization Enforcement
| null |
M0800
|
The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector [1], while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions for users of IEDs. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Authorization Enforcement
| null |
M0800
|
The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector [1], while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions for users of IEDs. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
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