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3.71k
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| references
list | answers
dict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
gem-squad_v2-train-104600
|
5732ac07328d981900602001
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
During a period of tough competition between mortgage lenders for revenue and market share, and when the supply of creditworthy borrowers was limited, mortgage lenders relaxed underwriting standards and originated riskier mortgages to less creditworthy borrowers. In the view of some analysts, the relatively conservative government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) policed mortgage originators and maintained relatively high underwriting standards prior to 2003. However, as market power shifted from securitizers to originators and as intense competition from private securitizers undermined GSE power, mortgage standards declined and risky loans proliferated. The worst loans were originated in 2004–2007, the years of the most intense competition between securitizers and the lowest market share for the GSEs.
|
Who policed mortgage originators and maintained relatively high standards prior to 2003?
|
Who policed mortgage originators and maintained relatively high standards prior to 2003?
|
[
"Who policed mortgage originators and maintained relatively high standards prior to 2003?"
] |
{
"text": [
"government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)"
],
"answer_start": [
322
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104601
|
5732add9cc179a14009dabf0
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, written by the six Democratic appointees, the minority report, written by 3 of the 4 Republican appointees, studies by Federal Reserve economists, and the work of several independent scholars generally contend that government affordable housing policy was not the primary cause of the financial crisis. Although they concede that governmental policies had some role in causing the crisis, they contend that GSE loans performed better than loans securitized by private investment banks, and performed better than some loans originated by institutions that held loans in their own portfolios. Paul Krugman has even claimed that the GSE never purchased subprime loans – a claim that is widely disputed.
|
How many Democratic appointees wrote the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission?
|
How many Democratic appointees wrote the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission?
|
[
"How many Democratic appointees wrote the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission?"
] |
{
"text": [
"six"
],
"answer_start": [
79
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104602
|
5732add9cc179a14009dabf1
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, written by the six Democratic appointees, the minority report, written by 3 of the 4 Republican appointees, studies by Federal Reserve economists, and the work of several independent scholars generally contend that government affordable housing policy was not the primary cause of the financial crisis. Although they concede that governmental policies had some role in causing the crisis, they contend that GSE loans performed better than loans securitized by private investment banks, and performed better than some loans originated by institutions that held loans in their own portfolios. Paul Krugman has even claimed that the GSE never purchased subprime loans – a claim that is widely disputed.
|
Who claimed that the GSE never purchased subprime loans - a claim that is widely disputed?
|
Who claimed that the GSE never purchased subprime loans - a claim that is widely disputed?
|
[
"Who claimed that the GSE never purchased subprime loans - a claim that is widely disputed?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Paul Krugman"
],
"answer_start": [
655
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104603
|
5732add9cc179a14009dabf2
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, written by the six Democratic appointees, the minority report, written by 3 of the 4 Republican appointees, studies by Federal Reserve economists, and the work of several independent scholars generally contend that government affordable housing policy was not the primary cause of the financial crisis. Although they concede that governmental policies had some role in causing the crisis, they contend that GSE loans performed better than loans securitized by private investment banks, and performed better than some loans originated by institutions that held loans in their own portfolios. Paul Krugman has even claimed that the GSE never purchased subprime loans – a claim that is widely disputed.
|
Several reports written by various agencies concluded that which policy was not the primary cause of the financial crisis?
|
Several reports written by various agencies concluded that which policy was not the primary cause of the financial crisis?
|
[
"Several reports written by various agencies concluded that which policy was not the primary cause of the financial crisis?"
] |
{
"text": [
"government affordable housing policy"
],
"answer_start": [
279
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104604
|
5732add9cc179a14009dabf3
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, written by the six Democratic appointees, the minority report, written by 3 of the 4 Republican appointees, studies by Federal Reserve economists, and the work of several independent scholars generally contend that government affordable housing policy was not the primary cause of the financial crisis. Although they concede that governmental policies had some role in causing the crisis, they contend that GSE loans performed better than loans securitized by private investment banks, and performed better than some loans originated by institutions that held loans in their own portfolios. Paul Krugman has even claimed that the GSE never purchased subprime loans – a claim that is widely disputed.
|
How many Republican appointees wrote the minority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission?
|
How many Republican appointees wrote the minority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission?
|
[
"How many Republican appointees wrote the minority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission?"
] |
{
"text": [
"4"
],
"answer_start": [
147
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104605
|
5732add9cc179a14009dabf4
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, written by the six Democratic appointees, the minority report, written by 3 of the 4 Republican appointees, studies by Federal Reserve economists, and the work of several independent scholars generally contend that government affordable housing policy was not the primary cause of the financial crisis. Although they concede that governmental policies had some role in causing the crisis, they contend that GSE loans performed better than loans securitized by private investment banks, and performed better than some loans originated by institutions that held loans in their own portfolios. Paul Krugman has even claimed that the GSE never purchased subprime loans – a claim that is widely disputed.
|
According to reports, which loans performed better than some loans securitized by private investment banks?
|
According to reports, which loans performed better than some loans securitized by private investment banks?
|
[
"According to reports, which loans performed better than some loans securitized by private investment banks?"
] |
{
"text": [
"GSE loans"
],
"answer_start": [
471
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104606
|
5732afd2328d981900602007
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In his dissent to the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, American Enterprise Institute fellow Peter J. Wallison stated his belief that the roots of the financial crisis can be traced directly and primarily to affordable housing policies initiated by HUD in the 1990s and to massive risky loan purchases by government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Later, based upon information in the SEC's December 2011 securities fraud case against 6 ex-executives of Fannie and Freddie, Peter Wallison and Edward Pinto estimated that, in 2008, Fannie and Freddie held 13 million substandard loans totaling over $2 trillion.
|
Which government-sponsored entities had massive risky loan purchases?
|
Which government-sponsored entities had massive risky loan purchases?
|
[
"Which government-sponsored entities had massive risky loan purchases?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac"
],
"answer_start": [
361
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104607
|
5732afd2328d981900602008
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In his dissent to the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, American Enterprise Institute fellow Peter J. Wallison stated his belief that the roots of the financial crisis can be traced directly and primarily to affordable housing policies initiated by HUD in the 1990s and to massive risky loan purchases by government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Later, based upon information in the SEC's December 2011 securities fraud case against 6 ex-executives of Fannie and Freddie, Peter Wallison and Edward Pinto estimated that, in 2008, Fannie and Freddie held 13 million substandard loans totaling over $2 trillion.
|
How many estimated substandard loans did Fannie and Freddie have in 2008?
|
How many estimated substandard loans did Fannie and Freddie have in 2008?
|
[
"How many estimated substandard loans did Fannie and Freddie have in 2008? "
] |
{
"text": [
"13 million"
],
"answer_start": [
596
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104608
|
5732afd2328d981900602009
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In his dissent to the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, American Enterprise Institute fellow Peter J. Wallison stated his belief that the roots of the financial crisis can be traced directly and primarily to affordable housing policies initiated by HUD in the 1990s and to massive risky loan purchases by government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Later, based upon information in the SEC's December 2011 securities fraud case against 6 ex-executives of Fannie and Freddie, Peter Wallison and Edward Pinto estimated that, in 2008, Fannie and Freddie held 13 million substandard loans totaling over $2 trillion.
|
What was the value of the estimated 13 million substandard loans held by Fannie and Freddie in 2008?
|
What was the value of the estimated 13 million substandard loans held by Fannie and Freddie in 2008?
|
[
"What was the value of the estimated 13 million substandard loans held by Fannie and Freddie in 2008?"
] |
{
"text": [
"over $2 trillion"
],
"answer_start": [
634
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104609
|
5732afd2328d98190060200a
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In his dissent to the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, American Enterprise Institute fellow Peter J. Wallison stated his belief that the roots of the financial crisis can be traced directly and primarily to affordable housing policies initiated by HUD in the 1990s and to massive risky loan purchases by government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Later, based upon information in the SEC's December 2011 securities fraud case against 6 ex-executives of Fannie and Freddie, Peter Wallison and Edward Pinto estimated that, in 2008, Fannie and Freddie held 13 million substandard loans totaling over $2 trillion.
|
How many ex-executives of Fannie and Freddie were named in the SEC's December 2011 securities fraud case?
|
How many ex-executives of Fannie and Freddie were named in the SEC's December 2011 securities fraud case?
|
[
"How many ex-executives of Fannie and Freddie were named in the SEC's December 2011 securities fraud case?"
] |
{
"text": [
"6"
],
"answer_start": [
476
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104610
|
5732afd2328d98190060200b
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In his dissent to the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, American Enterprise Institute fellow Peter J. Wallison stated his belief that the roots of the financial crisis can be traced directly and primarily to affordable housing policies initiated by HUD in the 1990s and to massive risky loan purchases by government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Later, based upon information in the SEC's December 2011 securities fraud case against 6 ex-executives of Fannie and Freddie, Peter Wallison and Edward Pinto estimated that, in 2008, Fannie and Freddie held 13 million substandard loans totaling over $2 trillion.
|
Peter J. Wallison believes that the one of the roots of the financial crisis can be traced to affordable housing policies by which agency in the 1990s?
|
Peter J. Wallison believes that the one of the roots of the financial crisis can be traced to affordable housing policies by which agency in the 1990s?
|
[
"Peter J. Wallison believes that the one of the roots of the financial crisis can be traced to affordable housing policies by which agency in the 1990s?"
] |
{
"text": [
"HUD"
],
"answer_start": [
275
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104611
|
5732b191d6dcfa19001e8a7c
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In the early and mid-2000s, the Bush administration called numerous times for investigation into the safety and soundness of the GSEs and their swelling portfolio of subprime mortgages. On September 10, 2003, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing at the urging of the administration to assess safety and soundness issues and to review a recent report by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) that had uncovered accounting discrepancies within the two entities. The hearings never resulted in new legislation or formal investigation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as many of the committee members refused to accept the report and instead rebuked OFHEO for their attempt at regulation. Some believe this was an early warning to the systemic risk that the growing market in subprime mortgages posed to the U.S. financial system that went unheeded.
|
Which administration called for investigation into the soundness of GSEs in the early and mid-2000s?
|
Which administration called for investigation into the soundness of GSEs in the early and mid-2000s?
|
[
"Which administration called for investigation into the soundness of GSEs in the early and mid-2000s?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Bush administration"
],
"answer_start": [
32
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104612
|
5732b191d6dcfa19001e8a7d
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In the early and mid-2000s, the Bush administration called numerous times for investigation into the safety and soundness of the GSEs and their swelling portfolio of subprime mortgages. On September 10, 2003, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing at the urging of the administration to assess safety and soundness issues and to review a recent report by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) that had uncovered accounting discrepancies within the two entities. The hearings never resulted in new legislation or formal investigation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as many of the committee members refused to accept the report and instead rebuked OFHEO for their attempt at regulation. Some believe this was an early warning to the systemic risk that the growing market in subprime mortgages posed to the U.S. financial system that went unheeded.
|
Who uncovered accounting discrepancies in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?
|
Who uncovered accounting discrepancies in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?
|
[
"Who uncovered accounting discrepancies in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)"
],
"answer_start": [
374
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104613
|
5732b191d6dcfa19001e8a7e
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In the early and mid-2000s, the Bush administration called numerous times for investigation into the safety and soundness of the GSEs and their swelling portfolio of subprime mortgages. On September 10, 2003, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing at the urging of the administration to assess safety and soundness issues and to review a recent report by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) that had uncovered accounting discrepancies within the two entities. The hearings never resulted in new legislation or formal investigation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as many of the committee members refused to accept the report and instead rebuked OFHEO for their attempt at regulation. Some believe this was an early warning to the systemic risk that the growing market in subprime mortgages posed to the U.S. financial system that went unheeded.
|
On what date did the House Financial Services Committee hold a hearing to assess safety and soundness issues regarding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?
|
On what date did the House Financial Services Committee hold a hearing to assess safety and soundness issues regarding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?
|
[
"On what date did the House Financial Services Committee hold a hearing to assess safety and soundness issues regarding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?"
] |
{
"text": [
"September 10, 2003"
],
"answer_start": [
189
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104614
|
5732b191d6dcfa19001e8a7f
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In the early and mid-2000s, the Bush administration called numerous times for investigation into the safety and soundness of the GSEs and their swelling portfolio of subprime mortgages. On September 10, 2003, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing at the urging of the administration to assess safety and soundness issues and to review a recent report by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) that had uncovered accounting discrepancies within the two entities. The hearings never resulted in new legislation or formal investigation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as many of the committee members refused to accept the report and instead rebuked OFHEO for their attempt at regulation. Some believe this was an early warning to the systemic risk that the growing market in subprime mortgages posed to the U.S. financial system that went unheeded.
|
What was the result of the House Financial Services Committee on September 10, 2003 regarding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?
|
What was the result of the House Financial Services Committee on September 10, 2003 regarding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?
|
[
"What was the result of the House Financial Services Committee on September 10, 2003 regarding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?"
] |
{
"text": [
"The hearings never resulted in new legislation or formal investigation"
],
"answer_start": [
498
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104615
|
5732b191d6dcfa19001e8a80
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In the early and mid-2000s, the Bush administration called numerous times for investigation into the safety and soundness of the GSEs and their swelling portfolio of subprime mortgages. On September 10, 2003, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing at the urging of the administration to assess safety and soundness issues and to review a recent report by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) that had uncovered accounting discrepancies within the two entities. The hearings never resulted in new legislation or formal investigation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as many of the committee members refused to accept the report and instead rebuked OFHEO for their attempt at regulation. Some believe this was an early warning to the systemic risk that the growing market in subprime mortgages posed to the U.S. financial system that went unheeded.
|
Who rebuked OFHEO in 2003 for their attempt at regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?
|
Who rebuked OFHEO in 2003 for their attempt at regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?
|
[
"Who rebuked OFHEO in 2003 for their attempt at regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?"
] |
{
"text": [
"House Financial Services Committee"
],
"answer_start": [
213
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104616
|
5732b3a5328d981900602017
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
A 2000 United States Department of the Treasury study of lending trends for 305 cities from 1993 to 1998 showed that $467 billion of mortgage lending was made by Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)-covered lenders into low and mid level income (LMI) borrowers and neighborhoods, representing 10% of all U.S. mortgage lending during the period. The majority of these were prime loans. Sub-prime loans made by CRA-covered institutions constituted a 3% market share of LMI loans in 1998, but in the run-up to the crisis, fully 25% of all sub-prime lending occurred at CRA-covered institutions and another 25% of sub-prime loans had some connection with CRA. In addition, an analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in 2009, however, concluded that the CRA was not responsible for the mortgage loan crisis, pointing out that CRA rules have been in place since 1995 whereas the poor lending emerged only a decade later. Furthermore, most sub-prime loans were not made to the LMI borrowers targeted by the CRA, especially in the years 2005–2006 leading up to the crisis. Nor did it find any evidence that lending under the CRA rules increased delinquency rates or that the CRA indirectly influenced independent mortgage lenders to ramp up sub-prime lending.
|
What was the value of mortgage lending made by Community Reinvestment Act covered lenders to low and mid level income borrowers and neighborhoods from 1993-1998?
|
What was the value of mortgage lending made by Community Reinvestment Act covered lenders to low and mid level income borrowers and neighborhoods from 1993-1998?
|
[
"What was the value of mortgage lending made by Community Reinvestment Act covered lenders to low and mid level income borrowers and neighborhoods from 1993-1998?"
] |
{
"text": [
"$467 billion"
],
"answer_start": [
117
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104617
|
5732b3a5328d981900602018
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
A 2000 United States Department of the Treasury study of lending trends for 305 cities from 1993 to 1998 showed that $467 billion of mortgage lending was made by Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)-covered lenders into low and mid level income (LMI) borrowers and neighborhoods, representing 10% of all U.S. mortgage lending during the period. The majority of these were prime loans. Sub-prime loans made by CRA-covered institutions constituted a 3% market share of LMI loans in 1998, but in the run-up to the crisis, fully 25% of all sub-prime lending occurred at CRA-covered institutions and another 25% of sub-prime loans had some connection with CRA. In addition, an analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in 2009, however, concluded that the CRA was not responsible for the mortgage loan crisis, pointing out that CRA rules have been in place since 1995 whereas the poor lending emerged only a decade later. Furthermore, most sub-prime loans were not made to the LMI borrowers targeted by the CRA, especially in the years 2005–2006 leading up to the crisis. Nor did it find any evidence that lending under the CRA rules increased delinquency rates or that the CRA indirectly influenced independent mortgage lenders to ramp up sub-prime lending.
|
What percent of mortgage lending was made by Community Reinvestment Act covered lenders from 1993 to 1998?
|
What percent of mortgage lending was made by Community Reinvestment Act covered lenders from 1993 to 1998?
|
[
"What percent of mortgage lending was made by Community Reinvestment Act covered lenders from 1993 to 1998?"
] |
{
"text": [
"10%"
],
"answer_start": [
289
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104618
|
5732b3a5328d981900602019
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
A 2000 United States Department of the Treasury study of lending trends for 305 cities from 1993 to 1998 showed that $467 billion of mortgage lending was made by Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)-covered lenders into low and mid level income (LMI) borrowers and neighborhoods, representing 10% of all U.S. mortgage lending during the period. The majority of these were prime loans. Sub-prime loans made by CRA-covered institutions constituted a 3% market share of LMI loans in 1998, but in the run-up to the crisis, fully 25% of all sub-prime lending occurred at CRA-covered institutions and another 25% of sub-prime loans had some connection with CRA. In addition, an analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in 2009, however, concluded that the CRA was not responsible for the mortgage loan crisis, pointing out that CRA rules have been in place since 1995 whereas the poor lending emerged only a decade later. Furthermore, most sub-prime loans were not made to the LMI borrowers targeted by the CRA, especially in the years 2005–2006 leading up to the crisis. Nor did it find any evidence that lending under the CRA rules increased delinquency rates or that the CRA indirectly influenced independent mortgage lenders to ramp up sub-prime lending.
|
What does CRA stand for?
|
What does CRA stand for?
|
[
"What does CRA stand for?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Community Reinvestment Act"
],
"answer_start": [
162
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104619
|
5732b3a5328d98190060201a
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
A 2000 United States Department of the Treasury study of lending trends for 305 cities from 1993 to 1998 showed that $467 billion of mortgage lending was made by Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)-covered lenders into low and mid level income (LMI) borrowers and neighborhoods, representing 10% of all U.S. mortgage lending during the period. The majority of these were prime loans. Sub-prime loans made by CRA-covered institutions constituted a 3% market share of LMI loans in 1998, but in the run-up to the crisis, fully 25% of all sub-prime lending occurred at CRA-covered institutions and another 25% of sub-prime loans had some connection with CRA. In addition, an analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in 2009, however, concluded that the CRA was not responsible for the mortgage loan crisis, pointing out that CRA rules have been in place since 1995 whereas the poor lending emerged only a decade later. Furthermore, most sub-prime loans were not made to the LMI borrowers targeted by the CRA, especially in the years 2005–2006 leading up to the crisis. Nor did it find any evidence that lending under the CRA rules increased delinquency rates or that the CRA indirectly influenced independent mortgage lenders to ramp up sub-prime lending.
|
What percent of sub-prime lending occurred at CRA-covered institutions in the run-up to the financial crisis?
|
What percent of sub-prime lending occurred at CRA-covered institutions in the run-up to the financial crisis?
|
[
"What percent of sub-prime lending occurred at CRA-covered institutions in the run-up to the financial crisis?"
] |
{
"text": [
"25%"
],
"answer_start": [
521
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104620
|
5732b3a5328d98190060201b
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
A 2000 United States Department of the Treasury study of lending trends for 305 cities from 1993 to 1998 showed that $467 billion of mortgage lending was made by Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)-covered lenders into low and mid level income (LMI) borrowers and neighborhoods, representing 10% of all U.S. mortgage lending during the period. The majority of these were prime loans. Sub-prime loans made by CRA-covered institutions constituted a 3% market share of LMI loans in 1998, but in the run-up to the crisis, fully 25% of all sub-prime lending occurred at CRA-covered institutions and another 25% of sub-prime loans had some connection with CRA. In addition, an analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in 2009, however, concluded that the CRA was not responsible for the mortgage loan crisis, pointing out that CRA rules have been in place since 1995 whereas the poor lending emerged only a decade later. Furthermore, most sub-prime loans were not made to the LMI borrowers targeted by the CRA, especially in the years 2005–2006 leading up to the crisis. Nor did it find any evidence that lending under the CRA rules increased delinquency rates or that the CRA indirectly influenced independent mortgage lenders to ramp up sub-prime lending.
|
What percent of sub-prime loans had some connection with CRA in the run-up to the financial crisis?
|
What percent of sub-prime loans had some connection with CRA in the run-up to the financial crisis?
|
[
"What percent of sub-prime loans had some connection with CRA in the run-up to the financial crisis?"
] |
{
"text": [
"25%"
],
"answer_start": [
599
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104621
|
5732b589cc179a14009dac1e
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
To other analysts the delay between CRA rule changes (in 1995) and the explosion of subprime lending is not surprising, and does not exonerate the CRA. They contend that there were two, connected causes to the crisis: the relaxation of underwriting standards in 1995 and the ultra-low interest rates initiated by the Federal Reserve after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Both causes had to be in place before the crisis could take place. Critics also point out that publicly announced CRA loan commitments were massive, totaling $4.5 trillion in the years between 1994 and 2007. They also argue that the Federal Reserve’s classification of CRA loans as “prime” is based on the faulty and self-serving assumption that high-interest-rate loans (3 percentage points over average) equal “subprime” loans.
|
When did CRA make rule changes to relax underwriting standards?
|
When did CRA make rule changes to relax underwriting standards?
|
[
"When did CRA make rule changes to relax underwriting standards?"
] |
{
"text": [
"1995"
],
"answer_start": [
262
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104622
|
5732b589cc179a14009dac1f
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
To other analysts the delay between CRA rule changes (in 1995) and the explosion of subprime lending is not surprising, and does not exonerate the CRA. They contend that there were two, connected causes to the crisis: the relaxation of underwriting standards in 1995 and the ultra-low interest rates initiated by the Federal Reserve after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Both causes had to be in place before the crisis could take place. Critics also point out that publicly announced CRA loan commitments were massive, totaling $4.5 trillion in the years between 1994 and 2007. They also argue that the Federal Reserve’s classification of CRA loans as “prime” is based on the faulty and self-serving assumption that high-interest-rate loans (3 percentage points over average) equal “subprime” loans.
|
How much were CRA loan commitments between 1994 and 2007?
|
How much were CRA loan commitments between 1994 and 2007?
|
[
"How much were CRA loan commitments between 1994 and 2007?"
] |
{
"text": [
"$4.5 trillion"
],
"answer_start": [
541
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104623
|
5732b589cc179a14009dac20
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
To other analysts the delay between CRA rule changes (in 1995) and the explosion of subprime lending is not surprising, and does not exonerate the CRA. They contend that there were two, connected causes to the crisis: the relaxation of underwriting standards in 1995 and the ultra-low interest rates initiated by the Federal Reserve after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Both causes had to be in place before the crisis could take place. Critics also point out that publicly announced CRA loan commitments were massive, totaling $4.5 trillion in the years between 1994 and 2007. They also argue that the Federal Reserve’s classification of CRA loans as “prime” is based on the faulty and self-serving assumption that high-interest-rate loans (3 percentage points over average) equal “subprime” loans.
|
What was the Federal Reserve's assumption regarding what makes a loan subprime?
|
What was the Federal Reserve's assumption regarding what makes a loan subprime?
|
[
"What was the Federal Reserve's assumption regarding what makes a loan subprime?"
] |
{
"text": [
"high-interest-rate loans (3 percentage points over average)"
],
"answer_start": [
729
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104624
|
5732b589cc179a14009dac21
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
To other analysts the delay between CRA rule changes (in 1995) and the explosion of subprime lending is not surprising, and does not exonerate the CRA. They contend that there were two, connected causes to the crisis: the relaxation of underwriting standards in 1995 and the ultra-low interest rates initiated by the Federal Reserve after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Both causes had to be in place before the crisis could take place. Critics also point out that publicly announced CRA loan commitments were massive, totaling $4.5 trillion in the years between 1994 and 2007. They also argue that the Federal Reserve’s classification of CRA loans as “prime” is based on the faulty and self-serving assumption that high-interest-rate loans (3 percentage points over average) equal “subprime” loans.
|
How did the Federal Reserve classify CRA loans?
|
How did the Federal Reserve classify CRA loans?
|
[
"How did the Federal Reserve classify CRA loans?"
] |
{
"text": [
"prime"
],
"answer_start": [
666
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104625
|
5732b589cc179a14009dac22
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
To other analysts the delay between CRA rule changes (in 1995) and the explosion of subprime lending is not surprising, and does not exonerate the CRA. They contend that there were two, connected causes to the crisis: the relaxation of underwriting standards in 1995 and the ultra-low interest rates initiated by the Federal Reserve after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Both causes had to be in place before the crisis could take place. Critics also point out that publicly announced CRA loan commitments were massive, totaling $4.5 trillion in the years between 1994 and 2007. They also argue that the Federal Reserve’s classification of CRA loans as “prime” is based on the faulty and self-serving assumption that high-interest-rate loans (3 percentage points over average) equal “subprime” loans.
|
When were ultra-low interest rates initiated by the Federal Reserve?
|
When were ultra-low interest rates initiated by the Federal Reserve?
|
[
"When were ultra-low interest rates initiated by the Federal Reserve?"
] |
{
"text": [
"after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001"
],
"answer_start": [
333
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104626
|
5732b89acc179a14009dac32
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Others have pointed out that there were not enough of these loans made to cause a crisis of this magnitude. In an article in Portfolio Magazine, Michael Lewis spoke with one trader who noted that "There weren’t enough Americans with [bad] credit taking out [bad loans] to satisfy investors' appetite for the end product." Essentially, investment banks and hedge funds used financial innovation to enable large wagers to be made, far beyond the actual value of the underlying mortgage loans, using derivatives called credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and synthetic CDOs.
|
What financial innovation enabled investment banks and hedge funds to make large wagers?
|
What financial innovation enabled investment banks and hedge funds to make large wagers?
|
[
"What financial innovation enabled investment banks and hedge funds to make large wagers?"
] |
{
"text": [
"credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and synthetic CDOs."
],
"answer_start": [
516
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104627
|
5732b89acc179a14009dac33
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Others have pointed out that there were not enough of these loans made to cause a crisis of this magnitude. In an article in Portfolio Magazine, Michael Lewis spoke with one trader who noted that "There weren’t enough Americans with [bad] credit taking out [bad loans] to satisfy investors' appetite for the end product." Essentially, investment banks and hedge funds used financial innovation to enable large wagers to be made, far beyond the actual value of the underlying mortgage loans, using derivatives called credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and synthetic CDOs.
|
Credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and CDOS are all types of what?
|
Credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and CDOS are all types of what?
|
[
"Credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and CDOS are all types of what?"
] |
{
"text": [
"derivatives"
],
"answer_start": [
497
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104628
|
5732b89acc179a14009dac34
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Others have pointed out that there were not enough of these loans made to cause a crisis of this magnitude. In an article in Portfolio Magazine, Michael Lewis spoke with one trader who noted that "There weren’t enough Americans with [bad] credit taking out [bad loans] to satisfy investors' appetite for the end product." Essentially, investment banks and hedge funds used financial innovation to enable large wagers to be made, far beyond the actual value of the underlying mortgage loans, using derivatives called credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and synthetic CDOs.
|
Which magazine had an article where Michael Lewis spoke with a trader about bad loans?
|
Which magazine had an article where Michael Lewis spoke with a trader about bad loans?
|
[
"Which magazine had an article where Michael Lewis spoke with a trader about bad loans?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Portfolio Magazine"
],
"answer_start": [
125
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104629
|
5732b89acc179a14009dac35
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Others have pointed out that there were not enough of these loans made to cause a crisis of this magnitude. In an article in Portfolio Magazine, Michael Lewis spoke with one trader who noted that "There weren’t enough Americans with [bad] credit taking out [bad loans] to satisfy investors' appetite for the end product." Essentially, investment banks and hedge funds used financial innovation to enable large wagers to be made, far beyond the actual value of the underlying mortgage loans, using derivatives called credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and synthetic CDOs.
|
What financial innovation allows investment banks and hedge banks to make large wagers?
|
What financial innovation allows investment banks and hedge banks to make large wagers?
|
[
"What financial innovation allows investment banks and hedge banks to make large wagers?"
] |
{
"text": [
"derivatives"
],
"answer_start": [
497
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104630
|
5732b89acc179a14009dac36
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Others have pointed out that there were not enough of these loans made to cause a crisis of this magnitude. In an article in Portfolio Magazine, Michael Lewis spoke with one trader who noted that "There weren’t enough Americans with [bad] credit taking out [bad loans] to satisfy investors' appetite for the end product." Essentially, investment banks and hedge funds used financial innovation to enable large wagers to be made, far beyond the actual value of the underlying mortgage loans, using derivatives called credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and synthetic CDOs.
|
What are some names of derivatives?
|
What are some names of derivatives?
|
[
"What are some names of derivatives?"
] |
{
"text": [
"credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and synthetic CDOs"
],
"answer_start": [
516
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104631
|
5732bad2cc179a14009dac3c
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Countering Krugman, Peter J. Wallison wrote: "It is not true that every bubble—even a large bubble—has the potential to cause a financial crisis when it deflates." Wallison notes that other developed countries had "large bubbles during the 1997–2007 period" but "the losses associated with mortgage delinquencies and defaults when these bubbles deflated were far lower than the losses suffered in the United States when the 1997–2007 [bubble] deflated." According to Wallison, the reason the U.S. residential housing bubble (as opposed to other types of bubbles) led to financial crisis was that it was supported by a huge number of substandard loans – generally with low or no downpayments.
|
Peter J. Wallison believes that the huge number of these loans led to the financial crisis?
|
Peter J. Wallison believes that the huge number of these loans led to the financial crisis?
|
[
"Peter J. Wallison believes that the huge number of these loans led to the financial crisis?"
] |
{
"text": [
"substandard"
],
"answer_start": [
633
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104632
|
5732bad2cc179a14009dac3d
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Countering Krugman, Peter J. Wallison wrote: "It is not true that every bubble—even a large bubble—has the potential to cause a financial crisis when it deflates." Wallison notes that other developed countries had "large bubbles during the 1997–2007 period" but "the losses associated with mortgage delinquencies and defaults when these bubbles deflated were far lower than the losses suffered in the United States when the 1997–2007 [bubble] deflated." According to Wallison, the reason the U.S. residential housing bubble (as opposed to other types of bubbles) led to financial crisis was that it was supported by a huge number of substandard loans – generally with low or no downpayments.
|
What type downpayments do substandard loans generally have?
|
What type downpayments do substandard loans generally have?
|
[
"What type downpayments do substandard loans generally have?"
] |
{
"text": [
"low or no downpayments"
],
"answer_start": [
668
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104633
|
5732bad2cc179a14009dac3e
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Countering Krugman, Peter J. Wallison wrote: "It is not true that every bubble—even a large bubble—has the potential to cause a financial crisis when it deflates." Wallison notes that other developed countries had "large bubbles during the 1997–2007 period" but "the losses associated with mortgage delinquencies and defaults when these bubbles deflated were far lower than the losses suffered in the United States when the 1997–2007 [bubble] deflated." According to Wallison, the reason the U.S. residential housing bubble (as opposed to other types of bubbles) led to financial crisis was that it was supported by a huge number of substandard loans – generally with low or no downpayments.
|
According to Peter J. Wallison, why did the U.S. residential housing bubble led to financial crisis?
|
According to Peter J. Wallison, why did the U.S. residential housing bubble led to financial crisis?
|
[
"According to Peter J. Wallison, why did the U.S. residential housing bubble led to financial crisis?"
] |
{
"text": [
"it was supported by a huge number of substandard loans"
],
"answer_start": [
596
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104634
|
5732bad2cc179a14009dac3f
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Countering Krugman, Peter J. Wallison wrote: "It is not true that every bubble—even a large bubble—has the potential to cause a financial crisis when it deflates." Wallison notes that other developed countries had "large bubbles during the 1997–2007 period" but "the losses associated with mortgage delinquencies and defaults when these bubbles deflated were far lower than the losses suffered in the United States when the 1997–2007 [bubble] deflated." According to Wallison, the reason the U.S. residential housing bubble (as opposed to other types of bubbles) led to financial crisis was that it was supported by a huge number of substandard loans – generally with low or no downpayments.
|
Other countries had large residential housing bubbles that deflated during what years?
|
Other countries had large residential housing bubbles that deflated during what years?
|
[
"Other countries had large residential housing bubbles that deflated during what years?"
] |
{
"text": [
"1997–2007"
],
"answer_start": [
240
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104635
|
5732bad2cc179a14009dac40
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Countering Krugman, Peter J. Wallison wrote: "It is not true that every bubble—even a large bubble—has the potential to cause a financial crisis when it deflates." Wallison notes that other developed countries had "large bubbles during the 1997–2007 period" but "the losses associated with mortgage delinquencies and defaults when these bubbles deflated were far lower than the losses suffered in the United States when the 1997–2007 [bubble] deflated." According to Wallison, the reason the U.S. residential housing bubble (as opposed to other types of bubbles) led to financial crisis was that it was supported by a huge number of substandard loans – generally with low or no downpayments.
|
Peter J. Wallison's conclusions regarding the financial crisis are not in agreement with this economist's views?
|
Peter J. Wallison's conclusions regarding the financial crisis are not in agreement with this economist's views?
|
[
"Peter J. Wallison's conclusions regarding the financial crisis are not in agreement with this economist's views?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Krugman"
],
"answer_start": [
11
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104636
|
57332627d058e614000b5744
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Krugman's contention (that the growth of a commercial real estate bubble indicates that U.S. housing policy was not the cause of the crisis) is challenged by additional analysis. After researching the default of commercial loans during the financial crisis, Xudong An and Anthony B. Sanders reported (in December 2010): "We find limited evidence that substantial deterioration in CMBS [commercial mortgage-backed securities] loan underwriting occurred prior to the crisis." Other analysts support the contention that the crisis in commercial real estate and related lending took place after the crisis in residential real estate. Business journalist Kimberly Amadeo reports: "The first signs of decline in residential real estate occurred in 2006. Three years later, commercial real estate started feeling the effects. Denice A. Gierach, a real estate attorney and CPA, wrote:
|
Who believed that the growth of the commercial real estate bubble indicated that U.S. housing policy was not the cause of the crisis?
|
Who believed that the growth of the commercial real estate bubble indicated that U.S. housing policy was not the cause of the crisis?
|
[
"Who believed that the growth of the commercial real estate bubble indicated that U.S. housing policy was not the cause of the crisis?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Krugman"
],
"answer_start": [
0
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104637
|
57332627d058e614000b5745
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Krugman's contention (that the growth of a commercial real estate bubble indicates that U.S. housing policy was not the cause of the crisis) is challenged by additional analysis. After researching the default of commercial loans during the financial crisis, Xudong An and Anthony B. Sanders reported (in December 2010): "We find limited evidence that substantial deterioration in CMBS [commercial mortgage-backed securities] loan underwriting occurred prior to the crisis." Other analysts support the contention that the crisis in commercial real estate and related lending took place after the crisis in residential real estate. Business journalist Kimberly Amadeo reports: "The first signs of decline in residential real estate occurred in 2006. Three years later, commercial real estate started feeling the effects. Denice A. Gierach, a real estate attorney and CPA, wrote:
|
When did Xudong An and Anthony B. Sanders issue a report about commercial mortgage-backed securities?
|
When did Xudong An and Anthony B. Sanders issue a report about commercial mortgage-backed securities?
|
[
"When did Xudong An and Anthony B. Sanders issue a report about commercial mortgage-backed securities?"
] |
{
"text": [
"December 2010"
],
"answer_start": [
304
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104638
|
57332627d058e614000b5746
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Krugman's contention (that the growth of a commercial real estate bubble indicates that U.S. housing policy was not the cause of the crisis) is challenged by additional analysis. After researching the default of commercial loans during the financial crisis, Xudong An and Anthony B. Sanders reported (in December 2010): "We find limited evidence that substantial deterioration in CMBS [commercial mortgage-backed securities] loan underwriting occurred prior to the crisis." Other analysts support the contention that the crisis in commercial real estate and related lending took place after the crisis in residential real estate. Business journalist Kimberly Amadeo reports: "The first signs of decline in residential real estate occurred in 2006. Three years later, commercial real estate started feeling the effects. Denice A. Gierach, a real estate attorney and CPA, wrote:
|
According to business journalist Kimberly Amadeo, when did the first signs of decline in real estate occur?
|
According to business journalist Kimberly Amadeo, when did the first signs of decline in real estate occur?
|
[
"According to business journalist Kimberly Amadeo, when did the first signs of decline in real estate occur?"
] |
{
"text": [
"2006"
],
"answer_start": [
742
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104639
|
57332627d058e614000b5747
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Krugman's contention (that the growth of a commercial real estate bubble indicates that U.S. housing policy was not the cause of the crisis) is challenged by additional analysis. After researching the default of commercial loans during the financial crisis, Xudong An and Anthony B. Sanders reported (in December 2010): "We find limited evidence that substantial deterioration in CMBS [commercial mortgage-backed securities] loan underwriting occurred prior to the crisis." Other analysts support the contention that the crisis in commercial real estate and related lending took place after the crisis in residential real estate. Business journalist Kimberly Amadeo reports: "The first signs of decline in residential real estate occurred in 2006. Three years later, commercial real estate started feeling the effects. Denice A. Gierach, a real estate attorney and CPA, wrote:
|
What are CMBS?
|
What are CMBS?
|
[
"What are CMBS?"
] |
{
"text": [
"commercial mortgage-backed securities"
],
"answer_start": [
386
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104640
|
57332627d058e614000b5748
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Krugman's contention (that the growth of a commercial real estate bubble indicates that U.S. housing policy was not the cause of the crisis) is challenged by additional analysis. After researching the default of commercial loans during the financial crisis, Xudong An and Anthony B. Sanders reported (in December 2010): "We find limited evidence that substantial deterioration in CMBS [commercial mortgage-backed securities] loan underwriting occurred prior to the crisis." Other analysts support the contention that the crisis in commercial real estate and related lending took place after the crisis in residential real estate. Business journalist Kimberly Amadeo reports: "The first signs of decline in residential real estate occurred in 2006. Three years later, commercial real estate started feeling the effects. Denice A. Gierach, a real estate attorney and CPA, wrote:
|
According to most analysts, what crisis took place after the crisis in residential real estate?
|
According to most analysts, what crisis took place after the crisis in residential real estate?
|
[
"According to most analysts, what crisis took place after the crisis in residential real estate?"
] |
{
"text": [
"the crisis in commercial real estate"
],
"answer_start": [
517
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104641
|
573328a6d058e614000b574e
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In a Peabody Award winning program, NPR correspondents argued that a "Giant Pool of Money" (represented by $70 trillion in worldwide fixed income investments) sought higher yields than those offered by U.S. Treasury bonds early in the decade. This pool of money had roughly doubled in size from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively safe, income generating investments had not grown as fast. Investment banks on Wall Street answered this demand with products such as the mortgage-backed security and the collateralized debt obligation that were assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies.
|
What is one investment assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies?
|
What is one investment assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies?
|
[
"What is one investment assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies?"
] |
{
"text": [
"collateralized debt obligation"
],
"answer_start": [
509
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104642
|
573328a6d058e614000b574f
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In a Peabody Award winning program, NPR correspondents argued that a "Giant Pool of Money" (represented by $70 trillion in worldwide fixed income investments) sought higher yields than those offered by U.S. Treasury bonds early in the decade. This pool of money had roughly doubled in size from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively safe, income generating investments had not grown as fast. Investment banks on Wall Street answered this demand with products such as the mortgage-backed security and the collateralized debt obligation that were assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies.
|
How much was invested worldwide in fixed income investments?
|
How much was invested worldwide in fixed income investments?
|
[
"How much was invested worldwide in fixed income investments?"
] |
{
"text": [
"$70 trillion"
],
"answer_start": [
107
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104643
|
573328a6d058e614000b5750
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In a Peabody Award winning program, NPR correspondents argued that a "Giant Pool of Money" (represented by $70 trillion in worldwide fixed income investments) sought higher yields than those offered by U.S. Treasury bonds early in the decade. This pool of money had roughly doubled in size from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively safe, income generating investments had not grown as fast. Investment banks on Wall Street answered this demand with products such as the mortgage-backed security and the collateralized debt obligation that were assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies.
|
How much did the pool of money invested worldwide in fixed income investments grow in size from 2000 to 2007?
|
How much did the pool of money invested worldwide in fixed income investments grow in size from 2000 to 2007?
|
[
"How much did the pool of money invested worldwide in fixed income investments grow in size from 2000 to 2007?"
] |
{
"text": [
"roughly doubled in size"
],
"answer_start": [
266
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104644
|
573328a6d058e614000b5751
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In a Peabody Award winning program, NPR correspondents argued that a "Giant Pool of Money" (represented by $70 trillion in worldwide fixed income investments) sought higher yields than those offered by U.S. Treasury bonds early in the decade. This pool of money had roughly doubled in size from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively safe, income generating investments had not grown as fast. Investment banks on Wall Street answered this demand with products such as the mortgage-backed security and the collateralized debt obligation that were assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies.
|
What is an example of a product Wall Street invented to answer the demand for income generating investments?
|
What is an example of a product Wall Street invented to answer the demand for income generating investments?
|
[
"What is an example of a product Wall Street invented to answer the demand for income generating investments?"
] |
{
"text": [
"mortgage-backed security"
],
"answer_start": [
476
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104645
|
573328a6d058e614000b5752
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In a Peabody Award winning program, NPR correspondents argued that a "Giant Pool of Money" (represented by $70 trillion in worldwide fixed income investments) sought higher yields than those offered by U.S. Treasury bonds early in the decade. This pool of money had roughly doubled in size from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively safe, income generating investments had not grown as fast. Investment banks on Wall Street answered this demand with products such as the mortgage-backed security and the collateralized debt obligation that were assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies.
|
In the 2000s, investors were seeking higher yields than those offered by this investment?
|
In the 2000s, investors were seeking higher yields than those offered by this investment?
|
[
"In the 2000s, investors were seeking higher yields than those offered by this investment?"
] |
{
"text": [
"U.S. Treasury bonds"
],
"answer_start": [
202
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104646
|
57332ba74776f41900660730
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The collateralized debt obligation in particular enabled financial institutions to obtain investor funds to finance subprime and other lending, extending or increasing the housing bubble and generating large fees. This essentially places cash payments from multiple mortgages or other debt obligations into a single pool from which specific securities draw in a specific sequence of priority. Those securities first in line received investment-grade ratings from rating agencies. Securities with lower priority had lower credit ratings but theoretically a higher rate of return on the amount invested.
|
What is the name of the securities that enabled financial institutions to obtain investor funds to finance subprime?
|
What is the name of the securities that enabled financial institutions to obtain investor funds to finance subprime?
|
[
"What is the name of the securities that enabled financial institutions to obtain investor funds to finance subprime?"
] |
{
"text": [
"collateralized debt obligation"
],
"answer_start": [
4
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104647
|
57332ba74776f41900660731
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The collateralized debt obligation in particular enabled financial institutions to obtain investor funds to finance subprime and other lending, extending or increasing the housing bubble and generating large fees. This essentially places cash payments from multiple mortgages or other debt obligations into a single pool from which specific securities draw in a specific sequence of priority. Those securities first in line received investment-grade ratings from rating agencies. Securities with lower priority had lower credit ratings but theoretically a higher rate of return on the amount invested.
|
What was the outcome of collateralized debt obligations?
|
What was the outcome of collateralized debt obligations?
|
[
"What was the outcome of collateralized debt obligations?"
] |
{
"text": [
"extending or increasing the housing bubble"
],
"answer_start": [
144
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104648
|
57332ba74776f41900660732
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The collateralized debt obligation in particular enabled financial institutions to obtain investor funds to finance subprime and other lending, extending or increasing the housing bubble and generating large fees. This essentially places cash payments from multiple mortgages or other debt obligations into a single pool from which specific securities draw in a specific sequence of priority. Those securities first in line received investment-grade ratings from rating agencies. Securities with lower priority had lower credit ratings but theoretically a higher rate of return on the amount invested.
|
What type ratings did securities first in line receive from rating agencies?
|
What type ratings did securities first in line receive from rating agencies?
|
[
"What type ratings did securities first in line receive from rating agencies?"
] |
{
"text": [
"investment-grade ratings"
],
"answer_start": [
433
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104649
|
57332ba74776f41900660733
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The collateralized debt obligation in particular enabled financial institutions to obtain investor funds to finance subprime and other lending, extending or increasing the housing bubble and generating large fees. This essentially places cash payments from multiple mortgages or other debt obligations into a single pool from which specific securities draw in a specific sequence of priority. Those securities first in line received investment-grade ratings from rating agencies. Securities with lower priority had lower credit ratings but theoretically a higher rate of return on the amount invested.
|
What type pool do collateralized debt obligations place their payments from mortgages into?
|
What type pool do collateralized debt obligations place their payments from mortgages into?
|
[
"What type pool do collateralized debt obligations place their payments from mortgages into?"
] |
{
"text": [
"single pool"
],
"answer_start": [
309
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104650
|
57332ba74776f41900660734
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The collateralized debt obligation in particular enabled financial institutions to obtain investor funds to finance subprime and other lending, extending or increasing the housing bubble and generating large fees. This essentially places cash payments from multiple mortgages or other debt obligations into a single pool from which specific securities draw in a specific sequence of priority. Those securities first in line received investment-grade ratings from rating agencies. Securities with lower priority had lower credit ratings but theoretically a higher rate of return on the amount invested.
|
What securities had lower credit ratings but potentially a higher rate of return?
|
What securities had lower credit ratings but potentially a higher rate of return?
|
[
"What securities had lower credit ratings but potentially a higher rate of return?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Securities with lower priority"
],
"answer_start": [
480
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104651
|
57332d064776f4190066074e
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
By September 2008, average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20% from their mid-2006 peak. As prices declined, borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages could not refinance to avoid the higher payments associated with rising interest rates and began to default. During 2007, lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006. This increased to 2.3 million in 2008, an 81% increase vs. 2007. By August 2008, 9.2% of all U.S. mortgages outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure. By September 2009, this had risen to 14.4%.
|
How much had average U.S. housing prices declined by September 2008?
|
How much had average U.S. housing prices declined by September 2008?
|
[
"How much had average U.S. housing prices declined by September 2008?"
] |
{
"text": [
"over 20%"
],
"answer_start": [
63
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104652
|
57332d064776f4190066074f
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
By September 2008, average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20% from their mid-2006 peak. As prices declined, borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages could not refinance to avoid the higher payments associated with rising interest rates and began to default. During 2007, lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006. This increased to 2.3 million in 2008, an 81% increase vs. 2007. By August 2008, 9.2% of all U.S. mortgages outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure. By September 2009, this had risen to 14.4%.
|
When was the peak of U.S. housing prices?
|
When was the peak of U.S. housing prices?
|
[
"When was the peak of U.S. housing prices?"
] |
{
"text": [
"mid-2006"
],
"answer_start": [
83
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104653
|
57332d064776f41900660750
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
By September 2008, average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20% from their mid-2006 peak. As prices declined, borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages could not refinance to avoid the higher payments associated with rising interest rates and began to default. During 2007, lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006. This increased to 2.3 million in 2008, an 81% increase vs. 2007. By August 2008, 9.2% of all U.S. mortgages outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure. By September 2009, this had risen to 14.4%.
|
How many foreclosure proceedings were initiated by lenders in 2007?
|
How many foreclosure proceedings were initiated by lenders in 2007?
|
[
"How many foreclosure proceedings were initiated by lenders in 2007?"
] |
{
"text": [
"nearly 1.3 million"
],
"answer_start": [
322
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104654
|
57332d064776f41900660751
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
By September 2008, average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20% from their mid-2006 peak. As prices declined, borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages could not refinance to avoid the higher payments associated with rising interest rates and began to default. During 2007, lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006. This increased to 2.3 million in 2008, an 81% increase vs. 2007. By August 2008, 9.2% of all U.S. mortgages outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure. By September 2009, this had risen to 14.4%.
|
What was the percentage increase on foreclosure proceedings from 2007 to 2008?
|
What was the percentage increase on foreclosure proceedings from 2007 to 2008?
|
[
"What was the percentage increase on foreclosure proceedings from 2007 to 2008?"
] |
{
"text": [
"81%"
],
"answer_start": [
421
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104655
|
57332d064776f41900660752
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
By September 2008, average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20% from their mid-2006 peak. As prices declined, borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages could not refinance to avoid the higher payments associated with rising interest rates and began to default. During 2007, lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006. This increased to 2.3 million in 2008, an 81% increase vs. 2007. By August 2008, 9.2% of all U.S. mortgages outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure. By September 2009, this had risen to 14.4%.
|
How many U.S. mortgages were either delinquent or in foreclosure by September 2009?
|
How many U.S. mortgages were either delinquent or in foreclosure by September 2009?
|
[
"How many U.S. mortgages were either delinquent or in foreclosure by September 2009?"
] |
{
"text": [
"14.4%"
],
"answer_start": [
578
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104656
|
573332054776f41900660774
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Lower interest rates encouraged borrowing. From 2000 to 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target from 6.5% to 1.0%. This was done to soften the effects of the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the September 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as to combat a perceived risk of deflation. As early as 2002 it was apparent that credit was fueling housing instead of business investment as some economists went so far as to advocate that the Fed "needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble". Moreover, empirical studies using data from advanced countries show that excessive credit growth contributed greatly to the severity of the crisis.
|
Was was the federal funds rate target lowered to by the Federal Reserve in 2003?
|
Was was the federal funds rate target lowered to by the Federal Reserve in 2003?
|
[
"Was was the federal funds rate target lowered to by the Federal Reserve in 2003?"
] |
{
"text": [
"1.0%"
],
"answer_start": [
133
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104657
|
573332054776f41900660775
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Lower interest rates encouraged borrowing. From 2000 to 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target from 6.5% to 1.0%. This was done to soften the effects of the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the September 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as to combat a perceived risk of deflation. As early as 2002 it was apparent that credit was fueling housing instead of business investment as some economists went so far as to advocate that the Fed "needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble". Moreover, empirical studies using data from advanced countries show that excessive credit growth contributed greatly to the severity of the crisis.
|
What is one reason the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target to 1.0% in 2003?
|
What is one reason the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target to 1.0% in 2003?
|
[
"What is one reason the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target to 1.0% in 2003?"
] |
{
"text": [
"to combat a perceived risk of deflation"
],
"answer_start": [
266
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104658
|
573332054776f41900660776
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Lower interest rates encouraged borrowing. From 2000 to 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target from 6.5% to 1.0%. This was done to soften the effects of the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the September 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as to combat a perceived risk of deflation. As early as 2002 it was apparent that credit was fueling housing instead of business investment as some economists went so far as to advocate that the Fed "needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble". Moreover, empirical studies using data from advanced countries show that excessive credit growth contributed greatly to the severity of the crisis.
|
In the early 2000s, what type bubble did some economists believe the Fed needed to create to replace the Nasdaq bubble?
|
In the early 2000s, what type bubble did some economists believe the Fed needed to create to replace the Nasdaq bubble?
|
[
"In the early 2000s, what type bubble did some economists believe the Fed needed to create to replace the Nasdaq bubble?"
] |
{
"text": [
"a housing bubble"
],
"answer_start": [
479
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104659
|
573332054776f41900660777
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Lower interest rates encouraged borrowing. From 2000 to 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target from 6.5% to 1.0%. This was done to soften the effects of the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the September 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as to combat a perceived risk of deflation. As early as 2002 it was apparent that credit was fueling housing instead of business investment as some economists went so far as to advocate that the Fed "needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble". Moreover, empirical studies using data from advanced countries show that excessive credit growth contributed greatly to the severity of the crisis.
|
What contributed greatly to the severity of the financial crisis of 2007?
|
What contributed greatly to the severity of the financial crisis of 2007?
|
[
"What contributed greatly to the severity of the financial crisis of 2007?"
] |
{
"text": [
"excessive credit growth"
],
"answer_start": [
600
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104660
|
573332054776f41900660778
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Lower interest rates encouraged borrowing. From 2000 to 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target from 6.5% to 1.0%. This was done to soften the effects of the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the September 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as to combat a perceived risk of deflation. As early as 2002 it was apparent that credit was fueling housing instead of business investment as some economists went so far as to advocate that the Fed "needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble". Moreover, empirical studies using data from advanced countries show that excessive credit growth contributed greatly to the severity of the crisis.
|
What encouraged borrowing from 2000 to 2003?
|
What encouraged borrowing from 2000 to 2003?
|
[
"What encouraged borrowing from 2000 to 2003?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Lower interest rates"
],
"answer_start": [
0
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104661
|
573334094776f41900660786
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Bernanke explained that between 1996 and 2004, the U.S. current account deficit increased by $650 billion, from 1.5% to 5.8% of GDP. Financing these deficits required the country to borrow large sums from abroad, much of it from countries running trade surpluses. These were mainly the emerging economies in Asia and oil-exporting nations. The balance of payments identity requires that a country (such as the U.S.) running a current account deficit also have a capital account (investment) surplus of the same amount. Hence large and growing amounts of foreign funds (capital) flowed into the U.S. to finance its imports.
|
Per Bernanke, how much did the U.S. current account deficit increase between 1996 and 2004?
|
Per Bernanke, how much did the U.S. current account deficit increase between 1996 and 2004?
|
[
"Per Bernanke, how much did the U.S. current account deficit increase between 1996 and 2004?"
] |
{
"text": [
"$650 billion"
],
"answer_start": [
93
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104662
|
573334094776f41900660787
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Bernanke explained that between 1996 and 2004, the U.S. current account deficit increased by $650 billion, from 1.5% to 5.8% of GDP. Financing these deficits required the country to borrow large sums from abroad, much of it from countries running trade surpluses. These were mainly the emerging economies in Asia and oil-exporting nations. The balance of payments identity requires that a country (such as the U.S.) running a current account deficit also have a capital account (investment) surplus of the same amount. Hence large and growing amounts of foreign funds (capital) flowed into the U.S. to finance its imports.
|
What percentage of GDP was the U.S. current account deficit in 2004?
|
What percentage of GDP was the U.S. current account deficit in 2004?
|
[
"What percentage of GDP was the U.S. current account deficit in 2004?"
] |
{
"text": [
"5.8%"
],
"answer_start": [
120
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104663
|
573334094776f41900660788
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Bernanke explained that between 1996 and 2004, the U.S. current account deficit increased by $650 billion, from 1.5% to 5.8% of GDP. Financing these deficits required the country to borrow large sums from abroad, much of it from countries running trade surpluses. These were mainly the emerging economies in Asia and oil-exporting nations. The balance of payments identity requires that a country (such as the U.S.) running a current account deficit also have a capital account (investment) surplus of the same amount. Hence large and growing amounts of foreign funds (capital) flowed into the U.S. to finance its imports.
|
What emerging economies did the U.S. borrow money from between 1996 and 2004 to finance its imports?
|
What emerging economies did the U.S. borrow money from between 1996 and 2004 to finance its imports?
|
[
"What emerging economies did the U.S. borrow money from between 1996 and 2004 to finance its imports?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Asia and oil-exporting nations"
],
"answer_start": [
308
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104664
|
573334094776f41900660789
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Bernanke explained that between 1996 and 2004, the U.S. current account deficit increased by $650 billion, from 1.5% to 5.8% of GDP. Financing these deficits required the country to borrow large sums from abroad, much of it from countries running trade surpluses. These were mainly the emerging economies in Asia and oil-exporting nations. The balance of payments identity requires that a country (such as the U.S.) running a current account deficit also have a capital account (investment) surplus of the same amount. Hence large and growing amounts of foreign funds (capital) flowed into the U.S. to finance its imports.
|
What type account is needed by the U.S. to balance an account deficit?
|
What type account is needed by the U.S. to balance an account deficit?
|
[
"What type account is needed by the U.S. to balance an account deficit?"
] |
{
"text": [
"capital account"
],
"answer_start": [
462
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104665
|
573334094776f4190066078a
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Bernanke explained that between 1996 and 2004, the U.S. current account deficit increased by $650 billion, from 1.5% to 5.8% of GDP. Financing these deficits required the country to borrow large sums from abroad, much of it from countries running trade surpluses. These were mainly the emerging economies in Asia and oil-exporting nations. The balance of payments identity requires that a country (such as the U.S.) running a current account deficit also have a capital account (investment) surplus of the same amount. Hence large and growing amounts of foreign funds (capital) flowed into the U.S. to finance its imports.
|
Where did the U.S. obtain capital to finance its imports?
|
Where did the U.S. obtain capital to finance its imports?
|
[
"Where did the U.S. obtain capital to finance its imports?"
] |
{
"text": [
"foreign funds"
],
"answer_start": [
554
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104666
|
573335cbd058e614000b5780
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The Fed then raised the Fed funds rate significantly between July 2004 and July 2006. This contributed to an increase in 1-year and 5-year adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) rates, making ARM interest rate resets more expensive for homeowners. This may have also contributed to the deflating of the housing bubble, as asset prices generally move inversely to interest rates, and it became riskier to speculate in housing. U.S. housing and financial assets dramatically declined in value after the housing bubble burst.
|
When did the Fed begin raising Fed funds rate significantly?
|
When did the Fed begin raising Fed funds rate significantly?
|
[
"When did the Fed begin raising Fed funds rate significantly?"
] |
{
"text": [
"July 2004"
],
"answer_start": [
61
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104667
|
573335cbd058e614000b5781
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The Fed then raised the Fed funds rate significantly between July 2004 and July 2006. This contributed to an increase in 1-year and 5-year adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) rates, making ARM interest rate resets more expensive for homeowners. This may have also contributed to the deflating of the housing bubble, as asset prices generally move inversely to interest rates, and it became riskier to speculate in housing. U.S. housing and financial assets dramatically declined in value after the housing bubble burst.
|
What does ARM stand for:
|
What does ARM stand for:
|
[
"What does ARM stand for:"
] |
{
"text": [
"adjustable-rate mortgage"
],
"answer_start": [
139
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104668
|
573335cbd058e614000b5782
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The Fed then raised the Fed funds rate significantly between July 2004 and July 2006. This contributed to an increase in 1-year and 5-year adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) rates, making ARM interest rate resets more expensive for homeowners. This may have also contributed to the deflating of the housing bubble, as asset prices generally move inversely to interest rates, and it became riskier to speculate in housing. U.S. housing and financial assets dramatically declined in value after the housing bubble burst.
|
How do asset prices generally move in relation to interest rates?
|
How do asset prices generally move in relation to interest rates?
|
[
"How do asset prices generally move in relation to interest rates?"
] |
{
"text": [
"inversely"
],
"answer_start": [
342
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104669
|
573335cbd058e614000b5783
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The Fed then raised the Fed funds rate significantly between July 2004 and July 2006. This contributed to an increase in 1-year and 5-year adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) rates, making ARM interest rate resets more expensive for homeowners. This may have also contributed to the deflating of the housing bubble, as asset prices generally move inversely to interest rates, and it became riskier to speculate in housing. U.S. housing and financial assets dramatically declined in value after the housing bubble burst.
|
Beginning in July 2004, what did the Fed do to make ARM rates more expensive for homeowners?
|
Beginning in July 2004, what did the Fed do to make ARM rates more expensive for homeowners?
|
[
"Beginning in July 2004, what did the Fed do to make ARM rates more expensive for homeowners?"
] |
{
"text": [
"raised the Fed funds rate"
],
"answer_start": [
13
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104670
|
573335cbd058e614000b5784
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The Fed then raised the Fed funds rate significantly between July 2004 and July 2006. This contributed to an increase in 1-year and 5-year adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) rates, making ARM interest rate resets more expensive for homeowners. This may have also contributed to the deflating of the housing bubble, as asset prices generally move inversely to interest rates, and it became riskier to speculate in housing. U.S. housing and financial assets dramatically declined in value after the housing bubble burst.
|
How did U.S. housing and financial assets react to the housing bubble burst?
|
How did U.S. housing and financial assets react to the housing bubble burst?
|
[
"How did U.S. housing and financial assets react to the housing bubble burst?"
] |
{
"text": [
"dramatically declined in value"
],
"answer_start": [
452
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104671
|
573337db4776f41900660798
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Testimony given to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission by Richard M. Bowen III on events during his tenure as the Business Chief Underwriter for Correspondent Lending in the Consumer Lending Group for Citigroup (where he was responsible for over 220 professional underwriters) suggests that by the final years of the U.S. housing bubble (2006–2007), the collapse of mortgage underwriting standards was endemic. His testimony stated that by 2006, 60% of mortgages purchased by Citi from some 1,600 mortgage companies were "defective" (were not underwritten to policy, or did not contain all policy-required documents) – this, despite the fact that each of these 1,600 originators was contractually responsible (certified via representations and warrantees) that its mortgage originations met Citi's standards. Moreover, during 2007, "defective mortgages (from mortgage originators contractually bound to perform underwriting to Citi's standards) increased... to over 80% of production".
|
Richard M. Bowen III testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission regarding his tenure at which financial institution?
|
Richard M. Bowen III testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission regarding his tenure at which financial institution?
|
[
"Richard M. Bowen III testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission regarding his tenure at which financial institution?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Citigroup"
],
"answer_start": [
205
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104672
|
573337db4776f41900660799
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Testimony given to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission by Richard M. Bowen III on events during his tenure as the Business Chief Underwriter for Correspondent Lending in the Consumer Lending Group for Citigroup (where he was responsible for over 220 professional underwriters) suggests that by the final years of the U.S. housing bubble (2006–2007), the collapse of mortgage underwriting standards was endemic. His testimony stated that by 2006, 60% of mortgages purchased by Citi from some 1,600 mortgage companies were "defective" (were not underwritten to policy, or did not contain all policy-required documents) – this, despite the fact that each of these 1,600 originators was contractually responsible (certified via representations and warrantees) that its mortgage originations met Citi's standards. Moreover, during 2007, "defective mortgages (from mortgage originators contractually bound to perform underwriting to Citi's standards) increased... to over 80% of production".
|
How many underwriters was Richard M. Bowen III responsible for at Citigroup?
|
How many underwriters was Richard M. Bowen III responsible for at Citigroup?
|
[
"How many underwriters was Richard M. Bowen III responsible for at Citigroup?"
] |
{
"text": [
"220"
],
"answer_start": [
250
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104673
|
573337db4776f4190066079a
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Testimony given to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission by Richard M. Bowen III on events during his tenure as the Business Chief Underwriter for Correspondent Lending in the Consumer Lending Group for Citigroup (where he was responsible for over 220 professional underwriters) suggests that by the final years of the U.S. housing bubble (2006–2007), the collapse of mortgage underwriting standards was endemic. His testimony stated that by 2006, 60% of mortgages purchased by Citi from some 1,600 mortgage companies were "defective" (were not underwritten to policy, or did not contain all policy-required documents) – this, despite the fact that each of these 1,600 originators was contractually responsible (certified via representations and warrantees) that its mortgage originations met Citi's standards. Moreover, during 2007, "defective mortgages (from mortgage originators contractually bound to perform underwriting to Citi's standards) increased... to over 80% of production".
|
What percent of mortgages purchased by Citigroup in 2006 were defective?
|
What percent of mortgages purchased by Citigroup in 2006 were defective?
|
[
"What percent of mortgages purchased by Citigroup in 2006 were defective?"
] |
{
"text": [
"60%"
],
"answer_start": [
450
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104674
|
573337db4776f4190066079b
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Testimony given to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission by Richard M. Bowen III on events during his tenure as the Business Chief Underwriter for Correspondent Lending in the Consumer Lending Group for Citigroup (where he was responsible for over 220 professional underwriters) suggests that by the final years of the U.S. housing bubble (2006–2007), the collapse of mortgage underwriting standards was endemic. His testimony stated that by 2006, 60% of mortgages purchased by Citi from some 1,600 mortgage companies were "defective" (were not underwritten to policy, or did not contain all policy-required documents) – this, despite the fact that each of these 1,600 originators was contractually responsible (certified via representations and warrantees) that its mortgage originations met Citi's standards. Moreover, during 2007, "defective mortgages (from mortgage originators contractually bound to perform underwriting to Citi's standards) increased... to over 80% of production".
|
In 2006, how many mortgage companies were contractually responsible to meet Citi's standards?
|
In 2006, how many mortgage companies were contractually responsible to meet Citi's standards?
|
[
"In 2006, how many mortgage companies were contractually responsible to meet Citi's standards?"
] |
{
"text": [
"1,600"
],
"answer_start": [
665
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104675
|
573337db4776f4190066079c
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Testimony given to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission by Richard M. Bowen III on events during his tenure as the Business Chief Underwriter for Correspondent Lending in the Consumer Lending Group for Citigroup (where he was responsible for over 220 professional underwriters) suggests that by the final years of the U.S. housing bubble (2006–2007), the collapse of mortgage underwriting standards was endemic. His testimony stated that by 2006, 60% of mortgages purchased by Citi from some 1,600 mortgage companies were "defective" (were not underwritten to policy, or did not contain all policy-required documents) – this, despite the fact that each of these 1,600 originators was contractually responsible (certified via representations and warrantees) that its mortgage originations met Citi's standards. Moreover, during 2007, "defective mortgages (from mortgage originators contractually bound to perform underwriting to Citi's standards) increased... to over 80% of production".
|
During 2007, what was the percent of defective mortgages not underwritten to Citi's standards?
|
During 2007, what was the percent of defective mortgages not underwritten to Citi's standards?
|
[
"During 2007, what was the percent of defective mortgages not underwritten to Citi's standards?"
] |
{
"text": [
"over 80%"
],
"answer_start": [
965
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104676
|
5733399bd058e614000b5794
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In separate testimony to Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, officers of Clayton Holdings—the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company in the United States and Europe—testified that Clayton's review of over 900,000 mortgages issued from January 2006 to June 2007 revealed that scarcely 54% of the loans met their originators’ underwriting standards. The analysis (conducted on behalf of 23 investment and commercial banks, including 7 "too big to fail" banks) additionally showed that 28% of the sampled loans did not meet the minimal standards of any issuer. Clayton's analysis further showed that 39% of these loans (i.e. those not meeting any issuer's minimal underwriting standards) were subsequently securitized and sold to investors.
|
Who was the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company?
|
Who was the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company?
|
[
"Who was the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Clayton Holdings"
],
"answer_start": [
74
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104677
|
5733399bd058e614000b5795
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In separate testimony to Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, officers of Clayton Holdings—the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company in the United States and Europe—testified that Clayton's review of over 900,000 mortgages issued from January 2006 to June 2007 revealed that scarcely 54% of the loans met their originators’ underwriting standards. The analysis (conducted on behalf of 23 investment and commercial banks, including 7 "too big to fail" banks) additionally showed that 28% of the sampled loans did not meet the minimal standards of any issuer. Clayton's analysis further showed that 39% of these loans (i.e. those not meeting any issuer's minimal underwriting standards) were subsequently securitized and sold to investors.
|
According to Clayton Holdings, how many mortgages issued from January 2006 to June 2007 met underwriting standards?
|
According to Clayton Holdings, how many mortgages issued from January 2006 to June 2007 met underwriting standards?
|
[
"According to Clayton Holdings, how many mortgages issued from January 2006 to June 2007 met underwriting standards?"
] |
{
"text": [
"54%"
],
"answer_start": [
325
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104678
|
5733399bd058e614000b5796
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In separate testimony to Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, officers of Clayton Holdings—the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company in the United States and Europe—testified that Clayton's review of over 900,000 mortgages issued from January 2006 to June 2007 revealed that scarcely 54% of the loans met their originators’ underwriting standards. The analysis (conducted on behalf of 23 investment and commercial banks, including 7 "too big to fail" banks) additionally showed that 28% of the sampled loans did not meet the minimal standards of any issuer. Clayton's analysis further showed that 39% of these loans (i.e. those not meeting any issuer's minimal underwriting standards) were subsequently securitized and sold to investors.
|
How many investment and commercial banks were included in Clayton Holdings' analysis of January 2006 to June 2007 loans?
|
How many investment and commercial banks were included in Clayton Holdings' analysis of January 2006 to June 2007 loans?
|
[
"How many investment and commercial banks were included in Clayton Holdings' analysis of January 2006 to June 2007 loans? "
] |
{
"text": [
"23"
],
"answer_start": [
426
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104679
|
5733399bd058e614000b5797
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In separate testimony to Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, officers of Clayton Holdings—the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company in the United States and Europe—testified that Clayton's review of over 900,000 mortgages issued from January 2006 to June 2007 revealed that scarcely 54% of the loans met their originators’ underwriting standards. The analysis (conducted on behalf of 23 investment and commercial banks, including 7 "too big to fail" banks) additionally showed that 28% of the sampled loans did not meet the minimal standards of any issuer. Clayton's analysis further showed that 39% of these loans (i.e. those not meeting any issuer's minimal underwriting standards) were subsequently securitized and sold to investors.
|
Per Clayton's analysis of loans issued from January 2006 to June 2007, what percent of loans did not meet minimal standards of any issuer?
|
Per Clayton's analysis of loans issued from January 2006 to June 2007, what percent of loans did not meet minimal standards of any issuer?
|
[
"Per Clayton's analysis of loans issued from January 2006 to June 2007, what percent of loans did not meet minimal standards of any issuer?"
] |
{
"text": [
"28%"
],
"answer_start": [
524
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104680
|
5733399bd058e614000b5798
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In separate testimony to Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, officers of Clayton Holdings—the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company in the United States and Europe—testified that Clayton's review of over 900,000 mortgages issued from January 2006 to June 2007 revealed that scarcely 54% of the loans met their originators’ underwriting standards. The analysis (conducted on behalf of 23 investment and commercial banks, including 7 "too big to fail" banks) additionally showed that 28% of the sampled loans did not meet the minimal standards of any issuer. Clayton's analysis further showed that 39% of these loans (i.e. those not meeting any issuer's minimal underwriting standards) were subsequently securitized and sold to investors.
|
How many mortgage loans did Clayton Holdings review in their analysis?
|
How many mortgage loans did Clayton Holdings review in their analysis?
|
[
"How many mortgage loans did Clayton Holdings review in their analysis?"
] |
{
"text": [
"900,000"
],
"answer_start": [
246
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104681
|
57333ba64776f419006607ac
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Predatory lending refers to the practice of unscrupulous lenders, enticing borrowers to enter into "unsafe" or "unsound" secured loans for inappropriate purposes. A classic bait-and-switch method was used by Countrywide Financial, advertising low interest rates for home refinancing. Such loans were written into extensively detailed contracts, and swapped for more expensive loan products on the day of closing. Whereas the advertisement might state that 1% or 1.5% interest would be charged, the consumer would be put into an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) in which the interest charged would be greater than the amount of interest paid. This created negative amortization, which the credit consumer might not notice until long after the loan transaction had been consummated.
|
What is the name for lending that entices borrowers to enter into unsafe secured loans?
|
What is the name for lending that entices borrowers to enter into unsafe secured loans?
|
[
"What is the name for lending that entices borrowers to enter into unsafe secured loans?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Predatory lending"
],
"answer_start": [
0
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104682
|
57333ba64776f419006607ad
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Predatory lending refers to the practice of unscrupulous lenders, enticing borrowers to enter into "unsafe" or "unsound" secured loans for inappropriate purposes. A classic bait-and-switch method was used by Countrywide Financial, advertising low interest rates for home refinancing. Such loans were written into extensively detailed contracts, and swapped for more expensive loan products on the day of closing. Whereas the advertisement might state that 1% or 1.5% interest would be charged, the consumer would be put into an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) in which the interest charged would be greater than the amount of interest paid. This created negative amortization, which the credit consumer might not notice until long after the loan transaction had been consummated.
|
What company used a classic bait-and-switch method by advertising low interest rates?
|
What company used a classic bait-and-switch method by advertising low interest rates?
|
[
"What company used a classic bait-and-switch method by advertising low interest rates?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Countrywide Financial"
],
"answer_start": [
208
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104683
|
57333ba64776f419006607ae
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Predatory lending refers to the practice of unscrupulous lenders, enticing borrowers to enter into "unsafe" or "unsound" secured loans for inappropriate purposes. A classic bait-and-switch method was used by Countrywide Financial, advertising low interest rates for home refinancing. Such loans were written into extensively detailed contracts, and swapped for more expensive loan products on the day of closing. Whereas the advertisement might state that 1% or 1.5% interest would be charged, the consumer would be put into an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) in which the interest charged would be greater than the amount of interest paid. This created negative amortization, which the credit consumer might not notice until long after the loan transaction had been consummated.
|
Which type loan would the consumer be put into instead of the 1% or 1.5% interest rate loan as advertised?
|
Which type loan would the consumer be put into instead of the 1% or 1.5% interest rate loan as advertised?
|
[
"Which type loan would the consumer be put into instead of the 1% or 1.5% interest rate loan as advertised?"
] |
{
"text": [
"adjustable rate mortgage (ARM)"
],
"answer_start": [
528
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104684
|
57333ba64776f419006607af
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Predatory lending refers to the practice of unscrupulous lenders, enticing borrowers to enter into "unsafe" or "unsound" secured loans for inappropriate purposes. A classic bait-and-switch method was used by Countrywide Financial, advertising low interest rates for home refinancing. Such loans were written into extensively detailed contracts, and swapped for more expensive loan products on the day of closing. Whereas the advertisement might state that 1% or 1.5% interest would be charged, the consumer would be put into an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) in which the interest charged would be greater than the amount of interest paid. This created negative amortization, which the credit consumer might not notice until long after the loan transaction had been consummated.
|
What was created when the interest charged was greater than the amount of interest paid?
|
What was created when the interest charged was greater than the amount of interest paid?
|
[
"What was created when the interest charged was greater than the amount of interest paid?"
] |
{
"text": [
"negative amortization"
],
"answer_start": [
653
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104685
|
57333ba64776f419006607b0
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Predatory lending refers to the practice of unscrupulous lenders, enticing borrowers to enter into "unsafe" or "unsound" secured loans for inappropriate purposes. A classic bait-and-switch method was used by Countrywide Financial, advertising low interest rates for home refinancing. Such loans were written into extensively detailed contracts, and swapped for more expensive loan products on the day of closing. Whereas the advertisement might state that 1% or 1.5% interest would be charged, the consumer would be put into an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) in which the interest charged would be greater than the amount of interest paid. This created negative amortization, which the credit consumer might not notice until long after the loan transaction had been consummated.
|
What type predatory lending method did Countrywide Financial use?
|
What type predatory lending method did Countrywide Financial use?
|
[
"What type predatory lending method did Countrywide Financial use?"
] |
{
"text": [
"classic bait-and-switch"
],
"answer_start": [
165
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104686
|
57333da94776f419006607be
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Countrywide, sued by California Attorney General Jerry Brown for "unfair business practices" and "false advertising" was making high cost mortgages "to homeowners with weak credit, adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) that allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments". When housing prices decreased, homeowners in ARMs then had little incentive to pay their monthly payments, since their home equity had disappeared. This caused Countrywide's financial condition to deteriorate, ultimately resulting in a decision by the Office of Thrift Supervision to seize the lender.
|
Who sued Countrywide for unfair business practices and false advertising?
|
Who sued Countrywide for unfair business practices and false advertising?
|
[
"Who sued Countrywide for unfair business practices and false advertising?"
] |
{
"text": [
"California Attorney General Jerry Brown"
],
"answer_start": [
21
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104687
|
57333da94776f419006607bf
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Countrywide, sued by California Attorney General Jerry Brown for "unfair business practices" and "false advertising" was making high cost mortgages "to homeowners with weak credit, adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) that allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments". When housing prices decreased, homeowners in ARMs then had little incentive to pay their monthly payments, since their home equity had disappeared. This caused Countrywide's financial condition to deteriorate, ultimately resulting in a decision by the Office of Thrift Supervision to seize the lender.
|
What type mortgages allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments?
|
What type mortgages allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments?
|
[
"What type mortgages allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments?"
] |
{
"text": [
"adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs)"
],
"answer_start": [
181
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104688
|
57333da94776f419006607c0
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Countrywide, sued by California Attorney General Jerry Brown for "unfair business practices" and "false advertising" was making high cost mortgages "to homeowners with weak credit, adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) that allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments". When housing prices decreased, homeowners in ARMs then had little incentive to pay their monthly payments, since their home equity had disappeared. This caused Countrywide's financial condition to deteriorate, ultimately resulting in a decision by the Office of Thrift Supervision to seize the lender.
|
What happened to home equity when housing prices decreased?
|
What happened to home equity when housing prices decreased?
|
[
"What happened to home equity when housing prices decreased?"
] |
{
"text": [
"disappeared"
],
"answer_start": [
406
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104689
|
57333da94776f419006607c1
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Countrywide, sued by California Attorney General Jerry Brown for "unfair business practices" and "false advertising" was making high cost mortgages "to homeowners with weak credit, adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) that allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments". When housing prices decreased, homeowners in ARMs then had little incentive to pay their monthly payments, since their home equity had disappeared. This caused Countrywide's financial condition to deteriorate, ultimately resulting in a decision by the Office of Thrift Supervision to seize the lender.
|
Who made the decision to seize Countrywide after their financial condition deteriorated?
|
Who made the decision to seize Countrywide after their financial condition deteriorated?
|
[
"Who made the decision to seize Countrywide after their financial condition deteriorated?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Office of Thrift Supervision"
],
"answer_start": [
523
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104690
|
57333da94776f419006607c2
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Countrywide, sued by California Attorney General Jerry Brown for "unfair business practices" and "false advertising" was making high cost mortgages "to homeowners with weak credit, adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) that allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments". When housing prices decreased, homeowners in ARMs then had little incentive to pay their monthly payments, since their home equity had disappeared. This caused Countrywide's financial condition to deteriorate, ultimately resulting in a decision by the Office of Thrift Supervision to seize the lender.
|
What type credit did borrowers obtaining mortgages from Countrywide have?
|
What type credit did borrowers obtaining mortgages from Countrywide have?
|
[
"What type credit did borrowers obtaining mortgages from Countrywide have?"
] |
{
"text": [
"weak credit"
],
"answer_start": [
168
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104691
|
57333f7dd058e614000b57c8
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Critics such as economist Paul Krugman and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner have argued that the regulatory framework did not keep pace with financial innovation, such as the increasing importance of the shadow banking system, derivatives and off-balance sheet financing. A recent OECD study suggest that bank regulation based on the Basel accords encourage unconventional business practices and contributed to or even reinforced the financial crisis. In other cases, laws were changed or enforcement weakened in parts of the financial system. Key examples include:
|
What economist believed that regulations did not keep up with financial innovation?
|
What economist believed that regulations did not keep up with financial innovation?
|
[
"What economist believed that regulations did not keep up with financial innovation?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Paul Krugman"
],
"answer_start": [
26
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104692
|
57333f7dd058e614000b57c9
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Critics such as economist Paul Krugman and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner have argued that the regulatory framework did not keep pace with financial innovation, such as the increasing importance of the shadow banking system, derivatives and off-balance sheet financing. A recent OECD study suggest that bank regulation based on the Basel accords encourage unconventional business practices and contributed to or even reinforced the financial crisis. In other cases, laws were changed or enforcement weakened in parts of the financial system. Key examples include:
|
Who was the U.S. Treasury Secretary dealing with the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007?
|
Who was the U.S. Treasury Secretary dealing with the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007?
|
[
"Who was the U.S. Treasury Secretary dealing with the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Timothy Geithner"
],
"answer_start": [
67
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104693
|
57333f7dd058e614000b57ca
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Critics such as economist Paul Krugman and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner have argued that the regulatory framework did not keep pace with financial innovation, such as the increasing importance of the shadow banking system, derivatives and off-balance sheet financing. A recent OECD study suggest that bank regulation based on the Basel accords encourage unconventional business practices and contributed to or even reinforced the financial crisis. In other cases, laws were changed or enforcement weakened in parts of the financial system. Key examples include:
|
Which group's study suggested that Basel accords encourage unconventional business practices?
|
Which group's study suggested that Basel accords encourage unconventional business practices?
|
[
"Which group's study suggested that Basel accords encourage unconventional business practices?"
] |
{
"text": [
"OECD"
],
"answer_start": [
289
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104694
|
57333f7dd058e614000b57cb
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Critics such as economist Paul Krugman and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner have argued that the regulatory framework did not keep pace with financial innovation, such as the increasing importance of the shadow banking system, derivatives and off-balance sheet financing. A recent OECD study suggest that bank regulation based on the Basel accords encourage unconventional business practices and contributed to or even reinforced the financial crisis. In other cases, laws were changed or enforcement weakened in parts of the financial system. Key examples include:
|
It has been argued that what did not keep up with financial innovation?
|
It has been argued that what did not keep up with financial innovation?
|
[
"It has been argued that what did not keep up with financial innovation?"
] |
{
"text": [
"regulatory framework"
],
"answer_start": [
105
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104695
|
57333f7dd058e614000b57cc
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Critics such as economist Paul Krugman and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner have argued that the regulatory framework did not keep pace with financial innovation, such as the increasing importance of the shadow banking system, derivatives and off-balance sheet financing. A recent OECD study suggest that bank regulation based on the Basel accords encourage unconventional business practices and contributed to or even reinforced the financial crisis. In other cases, laws were changed or enforcement weakened in parts of the financial system. Key examples include:
|
What accords possibly contributed to or reinforced the financial crisis?
|
What accords possibly contributed to or reinforced the financial crisis?
|
[
"What accords possibly contributed to or reinforced the financial crisis?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Basel"
],
"answer_start": [
342
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104696
|
573342a9d058e614000b57f0
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Prior to the crisis, financial institutions became highly leveraged, increasing their appetite for risky investments and reducing their resilience in case of losses. Much of this leverage was achieved using complex financial instruments such as off-balance sheet securitization and derivatives, which made it difficult for creditors and regulators to monitor and try to reduce financial institution risk levels. These instruments also made it virtually impossible to reorganize financial institutions in bankruptcy, and contributed to the need for government bailouts.
|
What did financial institutions do prior to the crisis?
|
What did financial institutions do prior to the crisis?
|
[
"What did financial institutions do prior to the crisis?"
] |
{
"text": [
"became highly leveraged"
],
"answer_start": [
44
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104697
|
573342a9d058e614000b57f1
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Prior to the crisis, financial institutions became highly leveraged, increasing their appetite for risky investments and reducing their resilience in case of losses. Much of this leverage was achieved using complex financial instruments such as off-balance sheet securitization and derivatives, which made it difficult for creditors and regulators to monitor and try to reduce financial institution risk levels. These instruments also made it virtually impossible to reorganize financial institutions in bankruptcy, and contributed to the need for government bailouts.
|
What type financial instruments are off-balance sheet securitization and derivatives?
|
What type financial instruments are off-balance sheet securitization and derivatives?
|
[
"What type financial instruments are off-balance sheet securitization and derivatives?"
] |
{
"text": [
"complex"
],
"answer_start": [
207
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104698
|
573342a9d058e614000b57f2
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Prior to the crisis, financial institutions became highly leveraged, increasing their appetite for risky investments and reducing their resilience in case of losses. Much of this leverage was achieved using complex financial instruments such as off-balance sheet securitization and derivatives, which made it difficult for creditors and regulators to monitor and try to reduce financial institution risk levels. These instruments also made it virtually impossible to reorganize financial institutions in bankruptcy, and contributed to the need for government bailouts.
|
Who bailed out financial institutions?
|
Who bailed out financial institutions?
|
[
"Who bailed out financial institutions?"
] |
{
"text": [
"government"
],
"answer_start": [
548
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104699
|
573342a9d058e614000b57f3
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Prior to the crisis, financial institutions became highly leveraged, increasing their appetite for risky investments and reducing their resilience in case of losses. Much of this leverage was achieved using complex financial instruments such as off-balance sheet securitization and derivatives, which made it difficult for creditors and regulators to monitor and try to reduce financial institution risk levels. These instruments also made it virtually impossible to reorganize financial institutions in bankruptcy, and contributed to the need for government bailouts.
|
Which option was nearly impossible for financial institutions to reorganize under?
|
Which option was nearly impossible for financial institutions to reorganize under?
|
[
"Which option was nearly impossible for financial institutions to reorganize under?"
] |
{
"text": [
"bankruptcy"
],
"answer_start": [
504
]
}
|
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