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| references
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dict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
gem-squad_v2-train-104700
|
573342a9d058e614000b57f4
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Prior to the crisis, financial institutions became highly leveraged, increasing their appetite for risky investments and reducing their resilience in case of losses. Much of this leverage was achieved using complex financial instruments such as off-balance sheet securitization and derivatives, which made it difficult for creditors and regulators to monitor and try to reduce financial institution risk levels. These instruments also made it virtually impossible to reorganize financial institutions in bankruptcy, and contributed to the need for government bailouts.
|
What are the type financial instruments that were difficult for creditors and regulators to monitor?
|
What are the type financial instruments that were difficult for creditors and regulators to monitor?
|
[
"What are the type financial instruments that were difficult for creditors and regulators to monitor?"
] |
{
"text": [
"complex financial instruments"
],
"answer_start": [
207
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104701
|
5733450ed058e614000b580e
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
From 2004 to 2007, the top five U.S. investment banks each significantly increased their financial leverage (see diagram), which increased their vulnerability to a financial shock. Changes in capital requirements, intended to keep U.S. banks competitive with their European counterparts, allowed lower risk weightings for AAA securities. The shift from first-loss tranches to AAA tranches was seen by regulators as a risk reduction that compensated the higher leverage. These five institutions reported over $4.1 trillion in debt for fiscal year 2007, about 30% of USA nominal GDP for 2007. Lehman Brothers went bankrupt and was liquidated, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were sold at fire-sale prices, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became commercial banks, subjecting themselves to more stringent regulation. With the exception of Lehman, these companies required or received government support. Lehman reported that it had been in talks with Bank of America and Barclays for the company's possible sale. However, both Barclays and Bank of America ultimately declined to purchase the entire company.
|
How many U.S. investment banks significantly increased their financial leverage from 2004 to 2007?
|
How many U.S. investment banks significantly increased their financial leverage from 2004 to 2007?
|
[
"How many U.S. investment banks significantly increased their financial leverage from 2004 to 2007?"
] |
{
"text": [
"five"
],
"answer_start": [
27
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104702
|
5733450ed058e614000b580f
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
From 2004 to 2007, the top five U.S. investment banks each significantly increased their financial leverage (see diagram), which increased their vulnerability to a financial shock. Changes in capital requirements, intended to keep U.S. banks competitive with their European counterparts, allowed lower risk weightings for AAA securities. The shift from first-loss tranches to AAA tranches was seen by regulators as a risk reduction that compensated the higher leverage. These five institutions reported over $4.1 trillion in debt for fiscal year 2007, about 30% of USA nominal GDP for 2007. Lehman Brothers went bankrupt and was liquidated, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were sold at fire-sale prices, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became commercial banks, subjecting themselves to more stringent regulation. With the exception of Lehman, these companies required or received government support. Lehman reported that it had been in talks with Bank of America and Barclays for the company's possible sale. However, both Barclays and Bank of America ultimately declined to purchase the entire company.
|
U.S. investment banks Increased their financial leverage and also increased their vulnerability to what?
|
U.S. investment banks Increased their financial leverage and also increased their vulnerability to what?
|
[
"U.S. investment banks Increased their financial leverage and also increased their vulnerability to what?"
] |
{
"text": [
"financial shock"
],
"answer_start": [
164
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104703
|
5733450ed058e614000b5810
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
From 2004 to 2007, the top five U.S. investment banks each significantly increased their financial leverage (see diagram), which increased their vulnerability to a financial shock. Changes in capital requirements, intended to keep U.S. banks competitive with their European counterparts, allowed lower risk weightings for AAA securities. The shift from first-loss tranches to AAA tranches was seen by regulators as a risk reduction that compensated the higher leverage. These five institutions reported over $4.1 trillion in debt for fiscal year 2007, about 30% of USA nominal GDP for 2007. Lehman Brothers went bankrupt and was liquidated, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were sold at fire-sale prices, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became commercial banks, subjecting themselves to more stringent regulation. With the exception of Lehman, these companies required or received government support. Lehman reported that it had been in talks with Bank of America and Barclays for the company's possible sale. However, both Barclays and Bank of America ultimately declined to purchase the entire company.
|
Changes in what intended to keep U.S. banks competitive with their European counterparts?
|
Changes in what intended to keep U.S. banks competitive with their European counterparts?
|
[
"Changes in what intended to keep U.S. banks competitive with their European counterparts?"
] |
{
"text": [
"capital requirements"
],
"answer_start": [
192
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104704
|
5733450ed058e614000b5811
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
From 2004 to 2007, the top five U.S. investment banks each significantly increased their financial leverage (see diagram), which increased their vulnerability to a financial shock. Changes in capital requirements, intended to keep U.S. banks competitive with their European counterparts, allowed lower risk weightings for AAA securities. The shift from first-loss tranches to AAA tranches was seen by regulators as a risk reduction that compensated the higher leverage. These five institutions reported over $4.1 trillion in debt for fiscal year 2007, about 30% of USA nominal GDP for 2007. Lehman Brothers went bankrupt and was liquidated, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were sold at fire-sale prices, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became commercial banks, subjecting themselves to more stringent regulation. With the exception of Lehman, these companies required or received government support. Lehman reported that it had been in talks with Bank of America and Barclays for the company's possible sale. However, both Barclays and Bank of America ultimately declined to purchase the entire company.
|
How much debt did the top five U.S. investment banks report in fiscal year 2007?
|
How much debt did the top five U.S. investment banks report in fiscal year 2007?
|
[
"How much debt did the top five U.S. investment banks report in fiscal year 2007?"
] |
{
"text": [
"over $4.1 trillion"
],
"answer_start": [
503
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104705
|
5733450ed058e614000b5812
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
From 2004 to 2007, the top five U.S. investment banks each significantly increased their financial leverage (see diagram), which increased their vulnerability to a financial shock. Changes in capital requirements, intended to keep U.S. banks competitive with their European counterparts, allowed lower risk weightings for AAA securities. The shift from first-loss tranches to AAA tranches was seen by regulators as a risk reduction that compensated the higher leverage. These five institutions reported over $4.1 trillion in debt for fiscal year 2007, about 30% of USA nominal GDP for 2007. Lehman Brothers went bankrupt and was liquidated, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were sold at fire-sale prices, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became commercial banks, subjecting themselves to more stringent regulation. With the exception of Lehman, these companies required or received government support. Lehman reported that it had been in talks with Bank of America and Barclays for the company's possible sale. However, both Barclays and Bank of America ultimately declined to purchase the entire company.
|
What financial institution went bankrupt and was liquidated in 2007?
|
What financial institution went bankrupt and was liquidated in 2007?
|
[
"What financial institution went bankrupt and was liquidated in 2007?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Lehman Brothers"
],
"answer_start": [
591
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104706
|
573346cc4776f419006607ec
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Behavior that may be optimal for an individual (e.g., saving more during adverse economic conditions) can be detrimental if too many individuals pursue the same behavior, as ultimately one person's consumption is another person's income. Too many consumers attempting to save (or pay down debt) simultaneously is called the paradox of thrift and can cause or deepen a recession. Economist Hyman Minsky also described a "paradox of deleveraging" as financial institutions that have too much leverage (debt relative to equity) cannot all de-leverage simultaneously without significant declines in the value of their assets.
|
What is an example of something that can be detrimental if too many individuals pursue the same behavior?
|
What is an example of something that can be detrimental if too many individuals pursue the same behavior?
|
[
"What is an example of something that can be detrimental if too many individuals pursue the same behavior?"
] |
{
"text": [
"saving more during adverse economic conditions"
],
"answer_start": [
54
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104707
|
573346cc4776f419006607ed
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Behavior that may be optimal for an individual (e.g., saving more during adverse economic conditions) can be detrimental if too many individuals pursue the same behavior, as ultimately one person's consumption is another person's income. Too many consumers attempting to save (or pay down debt) simultaneously is called the paradox of thrift and can cause or deepen a recession. Economist Hyman Minsky also described a "paradox of deleveraging" as financial institutions that have too much leverage (debt relative to equity) cannot all de-leverage simultaneously without significant declines in the value of their assets.
|
What is it called when too many consumers attempt to save or pay down debt at the same time?
|
What is it called when too many consumers attempt to save or pay down debt at the same time?
|
[
"What is it called when too many consumers attempt to save or pay down debt at the same time?"
] |
{
"text": [
"paradox of thrift"
],
"answer_start": [
324
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104708
|
573346cc4776f419006607ee
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Behavior that may be optimal for an individual (e.g., saving more during adverse economic conditions) can be detrimental if too many individuals pursue the same behavior, as ultimately one person's consumption is another person's income. Too many consumers attempting to save (or pay down debt) simultaneously is called the paradox of thrift and can cause or deepen a recession. Economist Hyman Minsky also described a "paradox of deleveraging" as financial institutions that have too much leverage (debt relative to equity) cannot all de-leverage simultaneously without significant declines in the value of their assets.
|
What will happen if too many consumers save or pay down debt simultaneously?
|
What will happen if too many consumers save or pay down debt simultaneously?
|
[
"What will happen if too many consumers save or pay down debt simultaneously?"
] |
{
"text": [
"can cause or deepen a recession"
],
"answer_start": [
346
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104709
|
573346cc4776f419006607ef
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Behavior that may be optimal for an individual (e.g., saving more during adverse economic conditions) can be detrimental if too many individuals pursue the same behavior, as ultimately one person's consumption is another person's income. Too many consumers attempting to save (or pay down debt) simultaneously is called the paradox of thrift and can cause or deepen a recession. Economist Hyman Minsky also described a "paradox of deleveraging" as financial institutions that have too much leverage (debt relative to equity) cannot all de-leverage simultaneously without significant declines in the value of their assets.
|
Who is the economist who described a "paradox of deleveraging"?
|
Who is the economist who described a "paradox of deleveraging"?
|
[
"Who is the economist who described a \"paradox of deleveraging\"?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Hyman Minsky"
],
"answer_start": [
389
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104710
|
573346cc4776f419006607f0
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Behavior that may be optimal for an individual (e.g., saving more during adverse economic conditions) can be detrimental if too many individuals pursue the same behavior, as ultimately one person's consumption is another person's income. Too many consumers attempting to save (or pay down debt) simultaneously is called the paradox of thrift and can cause or deepen a recession. Economist Hyman Minsky also described a "paradox of deleveraging" as financial institutions that have too much leverage (debt relative to equity) cannot all de-leverage simultaneously without significant declines in the value of their assets.
|
Financial institutions cannot all de-leverage simultaneously without a decline in the value of this?
|
Financial institutions cannot all de-leverage simultaneously without a decline in the value of this?
|
[
"Financial institutions cannot all de-leverage simultaneously without a decline in the value of this?"
] |
{
"text": [
"their assets"
],
"answer_start": [
608
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104711
|
57334868d058e614000b5822
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
During April 2009, U.S. Federal Reserve vice-chair Janet Yellen discussed these paradoxes: "Once this massive credit crunch hit, it didn’t take long before we were in a recession. The recession, in turn, deepened the credit crunch as demand and employment fell, and credit losses of financial institutions surged. Indeed, we have been in the grips of precisely this adverse feedback loop for more than a year. A process of balance sheet deleveraging has spread to nearly every corner of the economy. Consumers are pulling back on purchases, especially on durable goods, to build their savings. Businesses are cancelling planned investments and laying off workers to preserve cash. And, financial institutions are shrinking assets to bolster capital and improve their chances of weathering the current storm. Once again, Minsky understood this dynamic. He spoke of the paradox of deleveraging, in which precautions that may be smart for individuals and firms—and indeed essential to return the economy to a normal state—nevertheless magnify the distress of the economy as a whole."
|
Who was the U.S. Federal Reserve vice-chair in April 2009?
|
Who was the U.S. Federal Reserve vice-chair in April 2009?
|
[
"Who was the U.S. Federal Reserve vice-chair in April 2009?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Janet Yellen"
],
"answer_start": [
51
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104712
|
57334868d058e614000b5823
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
During April 2009, U.S. Federal Reserve vice-chair Janet Yellen discussed these paradoxes: "Once this massive credit crunch hit, it didn’t take long before we were in a recession. The recession, in turn, deepened the credit crunch as demand and employment fell, and credit losses of financial institutions surged. Indeed, we have been in the grips of precisely this adverse feedback loop for more than a year. A process of balance sheet deleveraging has spread to nearly every corner of the economy. Consumers are pulling back on purchases, especially on durable goods, to build their savings. Businesses are cancelling planned investments and laying off workers to preserve cash. And, financial institutions are shrinking assets to bolster capital and improve their chances of weathering the current storm. Once again, Minsky understood this dynamic. He spoke of the paradox of deleveraging, in which precautions that may be smart for individuals and firms—and indeed essential to return the economy to a normal state—nevertheless magnify the distress of the economy as a whole."
|
What happened soon after the massive credit crunch hit?
|
What happened soon after the massive credit crunch hit?
|
[
"What happened soon after the massive credit crunch hit?"
] |
{
"text": [
"we were in a recession"
],
"answer_start": [
156
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104713
|
57334868d058e614000b5824
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
During April 2009, U.S. Federal Reserve vice-chair Janet Yellen discussed these paradoxes: "Once this massive credit crunch hit, it didn’t take long before we were in a recession. The recession, in turn, deepened the credit crunch as demand and employment fell, and credit losses of financial institutions surged. Indeed, we have been in the grips of precisely this adverse feedback loop for more than a year. A process of balance sheet deleveraging has spread to nearly every corner of the economy. Consumers are pulling back on purchases, especially on durable goods, to build their savings. Businesses are cancelling planned investments and laying off workers to preserve cash. And, financial institutions are shrinking assets to bolster capital and improve their chances of weathering the current storm. Once again, Minsky understood this dynamic. He spoke of the paradox of deleveraging, in which precautions that may be smart for individuals and firms—and indeed essential to return the economy to a normal state—nevertheless magnify the distress of the economy as a whole."
|
What deepened the credit crunch when demand and employment fell?
|
What deepened the credit crunch when demand and employment fell?
|
[
"What deepened the credit crunch when demand and employment fell?"
] |
{
"text": [
"recession"
],
"answer_start": [
184
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104714
|
57334868d058e614000b5825
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
During April 2009, U.S. Federal Reserve vice-chair Janet Yellen discussed these paradoxes: "Once this massive credit crunch hit, it didn’t take long before we were in a recession. The recession, in turn, deepened the credit crunch as demand and employment fell, and credit losses of financial institutions surged. Indeed, we have been in the grips of precisely this adverse feedback loop for more than a year. A process of balance sheet deleveraging has spread to nearly every corner of the economy. Consumers are pulling back on purchases, especially on durable goods, to build their savings. Businesses are cancelling planned investments and laying off workers to preserve cash. And, financial institutions are shrinking assets to bolster capital and improve their chances of weathering the current storm. Once again, Minsky understood this dynamic. He spoke of the paradox of deleveraging, in which precautions that may be smart for individuals and firms—and indeed essential to return the economy to a normal state—nevertheless magnify the distress of the economy as a whole."
|
What was one of the actions businesses took to preserve cash?
|
What was one of the actions businesses took to preserve cash?
|
[
"What was one of the actions businesses took to preserve cash?"
] |
{
"text": [
"cancelling planned investments"
],
"answer_start": [
609
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104715
|
57334868d058e614000b5826
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
During April 2009, U.S. Federal Reserve vice-chair Janet Yellen discussed these paradoxes: "Once this massive credit crunch hit, it didn’t take long before we were in a recession. The recession, in turn, deepened the credit crunch as demand and employment fell, and credit losses of financial institutions surged. Indeed, we have been in the grips of precisely this adverse feedback loop for more than a year. A process of balance sheet deleveraging has spread to nearly every corner of the economy. Consumers are pulling back on purchases, especially on durable goods, to build their savings. Businesses are cancelling planned investments and laying off workers to preserve cash. And, financial institutions are shrinking assets to bolster capital and improve their chances of weathering the current storm. Once again, Minsky understood this dynamic. He spoke of the paradox of deleveraging, in which precautions that may be smart for individuals and firms—and indeed essential to return the economy to a normal state—nevertheless magnify the distress of the economy as a whole."
|
What occurred in nearly every corner of the economy after the financial crisis of 2007?
|
What occurred in nearly every corner of the economy after the financial crisis of 2007?
|
[
"What occurred in nearly every corner of the economy after the financial crisis of 2007?"
] |
{
"text": [
"balance sheet deleveraging"
],
"answer_start": [
423
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104716
|
573349f34776f41900660800
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The term financial innovation refers to the ongoing development of financial products designed to achieve particular client objectives, such as offsetting a particular risk exposure (such as the default of a borrower) or to assist with obtaining financing. Examples pertinent to this crisis included: the adjustable-rate mortgage; the bundling of subprime mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) or collateralized debt obligations (CDO) for sale to investors, a type of securitization; and a form of credit insurance called credit default swaps (CDS). The usage of these products expanded dramatically in the years leading up to the crisis. These products vary in complexity and the ease with which they can be valued on the books of financial institutions.
|
What term refers to the ongoing development of financial products?
|
What term refers to the ongoing development of financial products?
|
[
"What term refers to the ongoing development of financial products?"
] |
{
"text": [
"financial innovation"
],
"answer_start": [
9
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104717
|
573349f34776f41900660801
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The term financial innovation refers to the ongoing development of financial products designed to achieve particular client objectives, such as offsetting a particular risk exposure (such as the default of a borrower) or to assist with obtaining financing. Examples pertinent to this crisis included: the adjustable-rate mortgage; the bundling of subprime mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) or collateralized debt obligations (CDO) for sale to investors, a type of securitization; and a form of credit insurance called credit default swaps (CDS). The usage of these products expanded dramatically in the years leading up to the crisis. These products vary in complexity and the ease with which they can be valued on the books of financial institutions.
|
What is an example of financial innovation pertinent to the financial crisis?
|
What is an example of financial innovation pertinent to the financial crisis?
|
[
"What is an example of financial innovation pertinent to the financial crisis?"
] |
{
"text": [
"adjustable-rate mortgage"
],
"answer_start": [
305
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104718
|
573349f34776f41900660802
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The term financial innovation refers to the ongoing development of financial products designed to achieve particular client objectives, such as offsetting a particular risk exposure (such as the default of a borrower) or to assist with obtaining financing. Examples pertinent to this crisis included: the adjustable-rate mortgage; the bundling of subprime mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) or collateralized debt obligations (CDO) for sale to investors, a type of securitization; and a form of credit insurance called credit default swaps (CDS). The usage of these products expanded dramatically in the years leading up to the crisis. These products vary in complexity and the ease with which they can be valued on the books of financial institutions.
|
What is the abbreviation for a form of credit insurance called credit default swaps?
|
What is the abbreviation for a form of credit insurance called credit default swaps?
|
[
"What is the abbreviation for a form of credit insurance called credit default swaps?"
] |
{
"text": [
"CDS"
],
"answer_start": [
554
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104719
|
573349f34776f41900660803
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The term financial innovation refers to the ongoing development of financial products designed to achieve particular client objectives, such as offsetting a particular risk exposure (such as the default of a borrower) or to assist with obtaining financing. Examples pertinent to this crisis included: the adjustable-rate mortgage; the bundling of subprime mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) or collateralized debt obligations (CDO) for sale to investors, a type of securitization; and a form of credit insurance called credit default swaps (CDS). The usage of these products expanded dramatically in the years leading up to the crisis. These products vary in complexity and the ease with which they can be valued on the books of financial institutions.
|
What is the financial innovation that bundles subprime mortgages?
|
What is the financial innovation that bundles subprime mortgages?
|
[
"What is the financial innovation that bundles subprime mortgages?"
] |
{
"text": [
"mortgage-backed securities (MBS)"
],
"answer_start": [
371
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104720
|
573349f34776f41900660804
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The term financial innovation refers to the ongoing development of financial products designed to achieve particular client objectives, such as offsetting a particular risk exposure (such as the default of a borrower) or to assist with obtaining financing. Examples pertinent to this crisis included: the adjustable-rate mortgage; the bundling of subprime mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) or collateralized debt obligations (CDO) for sale to investors, a type of securitization; and a form of credit insurance called credit default swaps (CDS). The usage of these products expanded dramatically in the years leading up to the crisis. These products vary in complexity and the ease with which they can be valued on the books of financial institutions.
|
What happened to the usage of financial innovation products in the years leading up the financial crisis?
|
What happened to the usage of financial innovation products in the years leading up the financial crisis?
|
[
"What happened to the usage of financial innovation products in the years leading up the financial crisis?"
] |
{
"text": [
"expanded dramatically"
],
"answer_start": [
588
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104721
|
57334b0b4776f4190066080a
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
CDO issuance grew from an estimated $20 billion in Q1 2004 to its peak of over $180 billion by Q1 2007, then declined back under $20 billion by Q1 2008. Further, the credit quality of CDO's declined from 2000 to 2007, as the level of subprime and other non-prime mortgage debt increased from 5% to 36% of CDO assets. As described in the section on subprime lending, the CDS and portfolio of CDS called synthetic CDO enabled a theoretically infinite amount to be wagered on the finite value of housing loans outstanding, provided that buyers and sellers of the derivatives could be found. For example, buying a CDS to insure a CDO ended up giving the seller the same risk as if they owned the CDO, when those CDO's became worthless.
|
When did the issuance of CDO peak?
|
When did the issuance of CDO peak?
|
[
"When did the issuance of CDO peak?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Q1 2007"
],
"answer_start": [
95
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104722
|
57334b0b4776f4190066080b
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
CDO issuance grew from an estimated $20 billion in Q1 2004 to its peak of over $180 billion by Q1 2007, then declined back under $20 billion by Q1 2008. Further, the credit quality of CDO's declined from 2000 to 2007, as the level of subprime and other non-prime mortgage debt increased from 5% to 36% of CDO assets. As described in the section on subprime lending, the CDS and portfolio of CDS called synthetic CDO enabled a theoretically infinite amount to be wagered on the finite value of housing loans outstanding, provided that buyers and sellers of the derivatives could be found. For example, buying a CDS to insure a CDO ended up giving the seller the same risk as if they owned the CDO, when those CDO's became worthless.
|
What was the estimated value of CDO issuance in Q1 2004?
|
What was the estimated value of CDO issuance in Q1 2004?
|
[
"What was the estimated value of CDO issuance in Q1 2004?"
] |
{
"text": [
"$20 billion"
],
"answer_start": [
36
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104723
|
57334b0b4776f4190066080c
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
CDO issuance grew from an estimated $20 billion in Q1 2004 to its peak of over $180 billion by Q1 2007, then declined back under $20 billion by Q1 2008. Further, the credit quality of CDO's declined from 2000 to 2007, as the level of subprime and other non-prime mortgage debt increased from 5% to 36% of CDO assets. As described in the section on subprime lending, the CDS and portfolio of CDS called synthetic CDO enabled a theoretically infinite amount to be wagered on the finite value of housing loans outstanding, provided that buyers and sellers of the derivatives could be found. For example, buying a CDS to insure a CDO ended up giving the seller the same risk as if they owned the CDO, when those CDO's became worthless.
|
What was the estimated value of CDO issuance at it's peak in Q1 2007?
|
What was the estimated value of CDO issuance at it's peak in Q1 2007?
|
[
"What was the estimated value of CDO issuance at it's peak in Q1 2007?"
] |
{
"text": [
"over $180 billion"
],
"answer_start": [
74
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104724
|
57334b0b4776f4190066080d
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
CDO issuance grew from an estimated $20 billion in Q1 2004 to its peak of over $180 billion by Q1 2007, then declined back under $20 billion by Q1 2008. Further, the credit quality of CDO's declined from 2000 to 2007, as the level of subprime and other non-prime mortgage debt increased from 5% to 36% of CDO assets. As described in the section on subprime lending, the CDS and portfolio of CDS called synthetic CDO enabled a theoretically infinite amount to be wagered on the finite value of housing loans outstanding, provided that buyers and sellers of the derivatives could be found. For example, buying a CDS to insure a CDO ended up giving the seller the same risk as if they owned the CDO, when those CDO's became worthless.
|
What percent of CDO assets were subprime and other non-prime mortgage debt in 2007?
|
What percent of CDO assets were subprime and other non-prime mortgage debt in 2007?
|
[
"What percent of CDO assets were subprime and other non-prime mortgage debt in 2007?"
] |
{
"text": [
"36%"
],
"answer_start": [
298
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104725
|
57334b0b4776f4190066080e
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
CDO issuance grew from an estimated $20 billion in Q1 2004 to its peak of over $180 billion by Q1 2007, then declined back under $20 billion by Q1 2008. Further, the credit quality of CDO's declined from 2000 to 2007, as the level of subprime and other non-prime mortgage debt increased from 5% to 36% of CDO assets. As described in the section on subprime lending, the CDS and portfolio of CDS called synthetic CDO enabled a theoretically infinite amount to be wagered on the finite value of housing loans outstanding, provided that buyers and sellers of the derivatives could be found. For example, buying a CDS to insure a CDO ended up giving the seller the same risk as if they owned the CDO, when those CDO's became worthless.
|
What was the estimated value of CDO issuance in Q1 2008?
|
What was the estimated value of CDO issuance in Q1 2008?
|
[
"What was the estimated value of CDO issuance in Q1 2008?"
] |
{
"text": [
"under $20 billion"
],
"answer_start": [
123
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104726
|
57334d024776f41900660814
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
This boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators, the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and trading desks, and finally investors, insurances and providers of repo funding). With increasing distance from the underlying asset these actors relied more and more on indirect information (including FICO scores on creditworthiness, appraisals and due diligence checks by third party organizations, and most importantly the computer models of rating agencies and risk management desks). Instead of spreading risk this provided the ground for fraudulent acts, misjudgments and finally market collapse. In 2005 a group of computer scientists built a computational model for the mechanism of biased ratings produced by rating agencies, which turned out to be adequate to what actually happened in 2006–2008.[citation needed]
|
Which products created more complexity in the financial markets?
|
Which products created more complexity in the financial markets?
|
[
"Which products created more complexity in the financial markets?"
] |
{
"text": [
"innovative financial products"
],
"answer_start": [
13
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104727
|
57334d024776f41900660815
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
This boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators, the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and trading desks, and finally investors, insurances and providers of repo funding). With increasing distance from the underlying asset these actors relied more and more on indirect information (including FICO scores on creditworthiness, appraisals and due diligence checks by third party organizations, and most importantly the computer models of rating agencies and risk management desks). Instead of spreading risk this provided the ground for fraudulent acts, misjudgments and finally market collapse. In 2005 a group of computer scientists built a computational model for the mechanism of biased ratings produced by rating agencies, which turned out to be adequate to what actually happened in 2006–2008.[citation needed]
|
What effect did the introduction of innovative financial products have on a single mortgage?
|
What effect did the introduction of innovative financial products have on a single mortgage?
|
[
"What effect did the introduction of innovative financial products have on a single mortgage?"
] |
{
"text": [
"multiplied the number of actors connected"
],
"answer_start": [
86
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104728
|
57334d024776f41900660816
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
This boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators, the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and trading desks, and finally investors, insurances and providers of repo funding). With increasing distance from the underlying asset these actors relied more and more on indirect information (including FICO scores on creditworthiness, appraisals and due diligence checks by third party organizations, and most importantly the computer models of rating agencies and risk management desks). Instead of spreading risk this provided the ground for fraudulent acts, misjudgments and finally market collapse. In 2005 a group of computer scientists built a computational model for the mechanism of biased ratings produced by rating agencies, which turned out to be adequate to what actually happened in 2006–2008.[citation needed]
|
What did institutions rely more on as increasing distance from underlying assets occurred?
|
What did institutions rely more on as increasing distance from underlying assets occurred?
|
[
"What did institutions rely more on as increasing distance from underlying assets occurred?"
] |
{
"text": [
"indirect information"
],
"answer_start": [
440
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104729
|
57334d024776f41900660817
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
This boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators, the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and trading desks, and finally investors, insurances and providers of repo funding). With increasing distance from the underlying asset these actors relied more and more on indirect information (including FICO scores on creditworthiness, appraisals and due diligence checks by third party organizations, and most importantly the computer models of rating agencies and risk management desks). Instead of spreading risk this provided the ground for fraudulent acts, misjudgments and finally market collapse. In 2005 a group of computer scientists built a computational model for the mechanism of biased ratings produced by rating agencies, which turned out to be adequate to what actually happened in 2006–2008.[citation needed]
|
What is a type of indirect information that financial institutions and investors used to judge the risk?
|
What is a type of indirect information that financial institutions and investors used to judge the risk?
|
[
"What is a type of indirect information that financial institutions and investors used to judge the risk?"
] |
{
"text": [
"computer models of rating agencies"
],
"answer_start": [
596
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104730
|
57334d024776f41900660818
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
This boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators, the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and trading desks, and finally investors, insurances and providers of repo funding). With increasing distance from the underlying asset these actors relied more and more on indirect information (including FICO scores on creditworthiness, appraisals and due diligence checks by third party organizations, and most importantly the computer models of rating agencies and risk management desks). Instead of spreading risk this provided the ground for fraudulent acts, misjudgments and finally market collapse. In 2005 a group of computer scientists built a computational model for the mechanism of biased ratings produced by rating agencies, which turned out to be adequate to what actually happened in 2006–2008.[citation needed]
|
In what year did a group of computer scientists build a model for ratings produced by rating agencies that turned out to be accurate for what happened in 2006-2008?
|
In what year did a group of computer scientists build a model for ratings produced by rating agencies that turned out to be accurate for what happened in 2006-2008?
|
[
"In what year did a group of computer scientists build a model for ratings produced by rating agencies that turned out to be accurate for what happened in 2006-2008?"
] |
{
"text": [
"2005"
],
"answer_start": [
776
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104731
|
57334ed54776f41900660828
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The pricing of risk refers to the incremental compensation required by investors for taking on additional risk, which may be measured by interest rates or fees. Several scholars have argued that a lack of transparency about banks' risk exposures prevented markets from correctly pricing risk before the crisis, enabled the mortgage market to grow larger than it otherwise would have, and made the financial crisis far more disruptive than it would have been if risk levels had been disclosed in a straightforward, readily understandable format.
|
What is a measurement of pricing of risk?
|
What is a measurement of pricing of risk?
|
[
"What is a measurement of pricing of risk?"
] |
{
"text": [
"interest rates or fees"
],
"answer_start": [
137
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104732
|
57334ed54776f41900660829
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The pricing of risk refers to the incremental compensation required by investors for taking on additional risk, which may be measured by interest rates or fees. Several scholars have argued that a lack of transparency about banks' risk exposures prevented markets from correctly pricing risk before the crisis, enabled the mortgage market to grow larger than it otherwise would have, and made the financial crisis far more disruptive than it would have been if risk levels had been disclosed in a straightforward, readily understandable format.
|
What is the incremental compensation required by investors for taking on addition risk called?
|
What is the incremental compensation required by investors for taking on addition risk called?
|
[
"What is the incremental compensation required by investors for taking on addition risk called?"
] |
{
"text": [
"pricing of risk"
],
"answer_start": [
4
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104733
|
57334ed54776f4190066082a
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The pricing of risk refers to the incremental compensation required by investors for taking on additional risk, which may be measured by interest rates or fees. Several scholars have argued that a lack of transparency about banks' risk exposures prevented markets from correctly pricing risk before the crisis, enabled the mortgage market to grow larger than it otherwise would have, and made the financial crisis far more disruptive than it would have been if risk levels had been disclosed in a straightforward, readily understandable format.
|
According to several scholars, what prevented markets from correctly pricing risk before the crisis?
|
According to several scholars, what prevented markets from correctly pricing risk before the crisis?
|
[
"According to several scholars, what prevented markets from correctly pricing risk before the crisis?"
] |
{
"text": [
"lack of transparency about banks' risk exposures"
],
"answer_start": [
197
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104734
|
57334ed54776f4190066082b
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The pricing of risk refers to the incremental compensation required by investors for taking on additional risk, which may be measured by interest rates or fees. Several scholars have argued that a lack of transparency about banks' risk exposures prevented markets from correctly pricing risk before the crisis, enabled the mortgage market to grow larger than it otherwise would have, and made the financial crisis far more disruptive than it would have been if risk levels had been disclosed in a straightforward, readily understandable format.
|
How should risk levels have been disclosed according to several scholars?
|
How should risk levels have been disclosed according to several scholars?
|
[
"How should risk levels have been disclosed according to several scholars?"
] |
{
"text": [
"straightforward, readily understandable format"
],
"answer_start": [
497
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104735
|
57334ed54776f4190066082c
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The pricing of risk refers to the incremental compensation required by investors for taking on additional risk, which may be measured by interest rates or fees. Several scholars have argued that a lack of transparency about banks' risk exposures prevented markets from correctly pricing risk before the crisis, enabled the mortgage market to grow larger than it otherwise would have, and made the financial crisis far more disruptive than it would have been if risk levels had been disclosed in a straightforward, readily understandable format.
|
What was the outcome of the financial crisis since risk levels were not adequately disclosed?
|
What was the outcome of the financial crisis since risk levels were not adequately disclosed?
|
[
"What was the outcome of the financial crisis since risk levels were not adequately disclosed?"
] |
{
"text": [
"far more disruptive"
],
"answer_start": [
414
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104736
|
57335048d058e614000b5836
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
For a variety of reasons, market participants did not accurately measure the risk inherent with financial innovation such as MBS and CDOs or understand its impact on the overall stability of the financial system. For example, the pricing model for CDOs clearly did not reflect the level of risk they introduced into the system. Banks estimated that $450bn of CDO were sold between "late 2005 to the middle of 2007"; among the $102bn of those that had been liquidated, JPMorgan estimated that the average recovery rate for "high quality" CDOs was approximately 32 cents on the dollar, while the recovery rate for mezzanine CDO was approximately five cents for every dollar.
|
What did market participants fail to measure accurately?
|
What did market participants fail to measure accurately?
|
[
"What did market participants fail to measure accurately?"
] |
{
"text": [
"risk inherent with financial innovation"
],
"answer_start": [
77
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104737
|
57335048d058e614000b5837
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
For a variety of reasons, market participants did not accurately measure the risk inherent with financial innovation such as MBS and CDOs or understand its impact on the overall stability of the financial system. For example, the pricing model for CDOs clearly did not reflect the level of risk they introduced into the system. Banks estimated that $450bn of CDO were sold between "late 2005 to the middle of 2007"; among the $102bn of those that had been liquidated, JPMorgan estimated that the average recovery rate for "high quality" CDOs was approximately 32 cents on the dollar, while the recovery rate for mezzanine CDO was approximately five cents for every dollar.
|
What are the reasons market participants did not understand the impact financial innovation products would have?
|
What are the reasons market participants did not understand the impact financial innovation products would have?
|
[
"What are the reasons market participants did not understand the impact financial innovation products would have?"
] |
{
"text": [
"a variety of reasons"
],
"answer_start": [
4
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104738
|
57335048d058e614000b5838
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
For a variety of reasons, market participants did not accurately measure the risk inherent with financial innovation such as MBS and CDOs or understand its impact on the overall stability of the financial system. For example, the pricing model for CDOs clearly did not reflect the level of risk they introduced into the system. Banks estimated that $450bn of CDO were sold between "late 2005 to the middle of 2007"; among the $102bn of those that had been liquidated, JPMorgan estimated that the average recovery rate for "high quality" CDOs was approximately 32 cents on the dollar, while the recovery rate for mezzanine CDO was approximately five cents for every dollar.
|
How much did JPMorgan estimate was the average recovery rate for high quality CDOs that had been liquidated?
|
How much did JPMorgan estimate was the average recovery rate for high quality CDOs that had been liquidated?
|
[
"How much did JPMorgan estimate was the average recovery rate for high quality CDOs that had been liquidated?"
] |
{
"text": [
"approximately 32 cents on the dollar"
],
"answer_start": [
546
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104739
|
57335048d058e614000b5839
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
For a variety of reasons, market participants did not accurately measure the risk inherent with financial innovation such as MBS and CDOs or understand its impact on the overall stability of the financial system. For example, the pricing model for CDOs clearly did not reflect the level of risk they introduced into the system. Banks estimated that $450bn of CDO were sold between "late 2005 to the middle of 2007"; among the $102bn of those that had been liquidated, JPMorgan estimated that the average recovery rate for "high quality" CDOs was approximately 32 cents on the dollar, while the recovery rate for mezzanine CDO was approximately five cents for every dollar.
|
How much did JPMorgan estimate was the average recovery rate for mezzanine CDOs that had been liquidated?
|
How much did JPMorgan estimate was the average recovery rate for mezzanine CDOs that had been liquidated?
|
[
"How much did JPMorgan estimate was the average recovery rate for mezzanine CDOs that had been liquidated?"
] |
{
"text": [
"approximately five cents for every dollar"
],
"answer_start": [
630
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104740
|
57335048d058e614000b583a
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
For a variety of reasons, market participants did not accurately measure the risk inherent with financial innovation such as MBS and CDOs or understand its impact on the overall stability of the financial system. For example, the pricing model for CDOs clearly did not reflect the level of risk they introduced into the system. Banks estimated that $450bn of CDO were sold between "late 2005 to the middle of 2007"; among the $102bn of those that had been liquidated, JPMorgan estimated that the average recovery rate for "high quality" CDOs was approximately 32 cents on the dollar, while the recovery rate for mezzanine CDO was approximately five cents for every dollar.
|
How much did banks estimate was the value of CDOs sold between late 2005 to the middle of 2007?
|
How much did banks estimate was the value of CDOs sold between late 2005 to the middle of 2007?
|
[
"How much did banks estimate was the value of CDOs sold between late 2005 to the middle of 2007?"
] |
{
"text": [
"$450bn"
],
"answer_start": [
349
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104741
|
57335128d058e614000b584a
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Another example relates to AIG, which insured obligations of various financial institutions through the usage of credit default swaps. The basic CDS transaction involved AIG receiving a premium in exchange for a promise to pay money to party A in the event party B defaulted. However, AIG did not have the financial strength to support its many CDS commitments as the crisis progressed and was taken over by the government in September 2008. U.S. taxpayers provided over $180 billion in government support to AIG during 2008 and early 2009, through which the money flowed to various counterparties to CDS transactions, including many large global financial institutions.
|
What firm insured obligations of various financial institutions using credit default swaps?
|
What firm insured obligations of various financial institutions using credit default swaps?
|
[
"What firm insured obligations of various financial institutions using credit default swaps?"
] |
{
"text": [
"AIG"
],
"answer_start": [
27
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104742
|
57335128d058e614000b584b
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Another example relates to AIG, which insured obligations of various financial institutions through the usage of credit default swaps. The basic CDS transaction involved AIG receiving a premium in exchange for a promise to pay money to party A in the event party B defaulted. However, AIG did not have the financial strength to support its many CDS commitments as the crisis progressed and was taken over by the government in September 2008. U.S. taxpayers provided over $180 billion in government support to AIG during 2008 and early 2009, through which the money flowed to various counterparties to CDS transactions, including many large global financial institutions.
|
What does the abbreviation CDS stand for?
|
What does the abbreviation CDS stand for?
|
[
"What does the abbreviation CDS stand for?"
] |
{
"text": [
"credit default swaps"
],
"answer_start": [
113
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104743
|
57335128d058e614000b584c
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Another example relates to AIG, which insured obligations of various financial institutions through the usage of credit default swaps. The basic CDS transaction involved AIG receiving a premium in exchange for a promise to pay money to party A in the event party B defaulted. However, AIG did not have the financial strength to support its many CDS commitments as the crisis progressed and was taken over by the government in September 2008. U.S. taxpayers provided over $180 billion in government support to AIG during 2008 and early 2009, through which the money flowed to various counterparties to CDS transactions, including many large global financial institutions.
|
When did the government take over AIG?
|
When did the government take over AIG?
|
[
"When did the government take over AIG?"
] |
{
"text": [
"September 2008"
],
"answer_start": [
426
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104744
|
57335128d058e614000b584d
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Another example relates to AIG, which insured obligations of various financial institutions through the usage of credit default swaps. The basic CDS transaction involved AIG receiving a premium in exchange for a promise to pay money to party A in the event party B defaulted. However, AIG did not have the financial strength to support its many CDS commitments as the crisis progressed and was taken over by the government in September 2008. U.S. taxpayers provided over $180 billion in government support to AIG during 2008 and early 2009, through which the money flowed to various counterparties to CDS transactions, including many large global financial institutions.
|
How much money did taxpayers provide in government support to AIG during 2008 and early 2009?
|
How much money did taxpayers provide in government support to AIG during 2008 and early 2009?
|
[
"How much money did taxpayers provide in government support to AIG during 2008 and early 2009?"
] |
{
"text": [
"over $180 billion"
],
"answer_start": [
466
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104745
|
57335128d058e614000b584e
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Another example relates to AIG, which insured obligations of various financial institutions through the usage of credit default swaps. The basic CDS transaction involved AIG receiving a premium in exchange for a promise to pay money to party A in the event party B defaulted. However, AIG did not have the financial strength to support its many CDS commitments as the crisis progressed and was taken over by the government in September 2008. U.S. taxpayers provided over $180 billion in government support to AIG during 2008 and early 2009, through which the money flowed to various counterparties to CDS transactions, including many large global financial institutions.
|
What did AIG receive for promising to pay Party A in the event that Party B defaulted?
|
What did AIG receive for promising to pay Party A in the event that Party B defaulted?
|
[
"What did AIG receive for promising to pay Party A in the event that Party B defaulted?"
] |
{
"text": [
"a premium"
],
"answer_start": [
184
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104746
|
573352f24776f41900660832
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
As financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theoretically showed the risks were much smaller than they actually proved to be. George Soros commented that "The super-boom got out of hand when the new products became so complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate the risks and started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves. Similarly, the rating agencies relied on the information provided by the originators of synthetic products. It was a shocking abdication of responsibility."
|
Who commented that the super-boom got out of hand when products became so complicated that risk could not be accurately calculated?
|
Who commented that the super-boom got out of hand when products became so complicated that risk could not be accurately calculated?
|
[
"Who commented that the super-boom got out of hand when products became so complicated that risk could not be accurately calculated?"
] |
{
"text": [
"George Soros"
],
"answer_start": [
354
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104747
|
573352f24776f41900660833
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
As financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theoretically showed the risks were much smaller than they actually proved to be. George Soros commented that "The super-boom got out of hand when the new products became so complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate the risks and started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves. Similarly, the rating agencies relied on the information provided by the originators of synthetic products. It was a shocking abdication of responsibility."
|
What happened to financial assets that made them harder to value?
|
What happened to financial assets that made them harder to value?
|
[
"What happened to financial assets that made them harder to value?"
] |
{
"text": [
"more complex"
],
"answer_start": [
36
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104748
|
573352f24776f41900660834
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
As financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theoretically showed the risks were much smaller than they actually proved to be. George Soros commented that "The super-boom got out of hand when the new products became so complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate the risks and started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves. Similarly, the rating agencies relied on the information provided by the originators of synthetic products. It was a shocking abdication of responsibility."
|
Who did rating agencies rely on for information to rate financial innovation products?
|
Who did rating agencies rely on for information to rate financial innovation products?
|
[
"Who did rating agencies rely on for information to rate financial innovation products?"
] |
{
"text": [
"the originators of synthetic products"
],
"answer_start": [
660
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104749
|
573352f24776f41900660835
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
As financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theoretically showed the risks were much smaller than they actually proved to be. George Soros commented that "The super-boom got out of hand when the new products became so complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate the risks and started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves. Similarly, the rating agencies relied on the information provided by the originators of synthetic products. It was a shocking abdication of responsibility."
|
When authorities could no longer calculate the risks of complex financial innovation products, who did they rely on for information?
|
When authorities could no longer calculate the risks of complex financial innovation products, who did they rely on for information?
|
[
"When authorities could no longer calculate the risks of complex financial innovation products, who did they rely on for information?"
] |
{
"text": [
"the banks"
],
"answer_start": [
569
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104750
|
573352f24776f41900660836
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
As financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theoretically showed the risks were much smaller than they actually proved to be. George Soros commented that "The super-boom got out of hand when the new products became so complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate the risks and started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves. Similarly, the rating agencies relied on the information provided by the originators of synthetic products. It was a shocking abdication of responsibility."
|
Who reassured investors by showing the risk of complex financial innovation products was actually less than they proved to be?
|
Who reassured investors by showing the risk of complex financial innovation products was actually less than they proved to be?
|
[
"Who reassured investors by showing the risk of complex financial innovation products was actually less than they proved to be?"
] |
{
"text": [
"international bond rating agencies"
],
"answer_start": [
133
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104751
|
573354414776f41900660846
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Moreover, a conflict of interest between professional investment managers and their institutional clients, combined with a global glut in investment capital, led to bad investments by asset managers in over-priced credit assets. Professional investment managers generally are compensated based on the volume of client assets under management. There is, therefore, an incentive for asset managers to expand their assets under management in order to maximize their compensation. As the glut in global investment capital caused the yields on credit assets to decline, asset managers were faced with the choice of either investing in assets where returns did not reflect true credit risk or returning funds to clients. Many asset managers chose to continue to invest client funds in over-priced (under-yielding) investments, to the detriment of their clients, in order to maintain their assets under management. This choice was supported by a "plausible deniability" of the risks associated with subprime-based credit assets because the loss experience with early "vintages" of subprime loans was so low.
|
What led to bad investments by asset managers in over-priced credit assets?
|
What led to bad investments by asset managers in over-priced credit assets?
|
[
"What led to bad investments by asset managers in over-priced credit assets?"
] |
{
"text": [
"a conflict of interest"
],
"answer_start": [
10
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104752
|
573354414776f41900660847
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Moreover, a conflict of interest between professional investment managers and their institutional clients, combined with a global glut in investment capital, led to bad investments by asset managers in over-priced credit assets. Professional investment managers generally are compensated based on the volume of client assets under management. There is, therefore, an incentive for asset managers to expand their assets under management in order to maximize their compensation. As the glut in global investment capital caused the yields on credit assets to decline, asset managers were faced with the choice of either investing in assets where returns did not reflect true credit risk or returning funds to clients. Many asset managers chose to continue to invest client funds in over-priced (under-yielding) investments, to the detriment of their clients, in order to maintain their assets under management. This choice was supported by a "plausible deniability" of the risks associated with subprime-based credit assets because the loss experience with early "vintages" of subprime loans was so low.
|
Who is compensated based on the volume of client assets they have under management?
|
Who is compensated based on the volume of client assets they have under management?
|
[
"Who is compensated based on the volume of client assets they have under management?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Professional investment managers"
],
"answer_start": [
229
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104753
|
573354414776f41900660848
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Moreover, a conflict of interest between professional investment managers and their institutional clients, combined with a global glut in investment capital, led to bad investments by asset managers in over-priced credit assets. Professional investment managers generally are compensated based on the volume of client assets under management. There is, therefore, an incentive for asset managers to expand their assets under management in order to maximize their compensation. As the glut in global investment capital caused the yields on credit assets to decline, asset managers were faced with the choice of either investing in assets where returns did not reflect true credit risk or returning funds to clients. Many asset managers chose to continue to invest client funds in over-priced (under-yielding) investments, to the detriment of their clients, in order to maintain their assets under management. This choice was supported by a "plausible deniability" of the risks associated with subprime-based credit assets because the loss experience with early "vintages" of subprime loans was so low.
|
What is the incentive for asset managers to expand their assets under management?
|
What is the incentive for asset managers to expand their assets under management?
|
[
"What is the incentive for asset managers to expand their assets under management?"
] |
{
"text": [
"to maximize their compensation"
],
"answer_start": [
445
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104754
|
573354414776f41900660849
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Moreover, a conflict of interest between professional investment managers and their institutional clients, combined with a global glut in investment capital, led to bad investments by asset managers in over-priced credit assets. Professional investment managers generally are compensated based on the volume of client assets under management. There is, therefore, an incentive for asset managers to expand their assets under management in order to maximize their compensation. As the glut in global investment capital caused the yields on credit assets to decline, asset managers were faced with the choice of either investing in assets where returns did not reflect true credit risk or returning funds to clients. Many asset managers chose to continue to invest client funds in over-priced (under-yielding) investments, to the detriment of their clients, in order to maintain their assets under management. This choice was supported by a "plausible deniability" of the risks associated with subprime-based credit assets because the loss experience with early "vintages" of subprime loans was so low.
|
What did many asset managers decide to do to the detriment of their clients?
|
What did many asset managers decide to do to the detriment of their clients?
|
[
"What did many asset managers decide to do to the detriment of their clients?"
] |
{
"text": [
"continue to invest client funds in over-priced (under-yielding) investments"
],
"answer_start": [
744
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104755
|
573354414776f4190066084a
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Moreover, a conflict of interest between professional investment managers and their institutional clients, combined with a global glut in investment capital, led to bad investments by asset managers in over-priced credit assets. Professional investment managers generally are compensated based on the volume of client assets under management. There is, therefore, an incentive for asset managers to expand their assets under management in order to maximize their compensation. As the glut in global investment capital caused the yields on credit assets to decline, asset managers were faced with the choice of either investing in assets where returns did not reflect true credit risk or returning funds to clients. Many asset managers chose to continue to invest client funds in over-priced (under-yielding) investments, to the detriment of their clients, in order to maintain their assets under management. This choice was supported by a "plausible deniability" of the risks associated with subprime-based credit assets because the loss experience with early "vintages" of subprime loans was so low.
|
What rationale did asset managers who continued to invest in over-priced investments to the detriment of their clients use?
|
What rationale did asset managers who continued to invest in over-priced investments to the detriment of their clients use?
|
[
"What rationale did asset managers who continued to invest in over-priced investments to the detriment of their clients use?"
] |
{
"text": [
"plausible deniability"
],
"answer_start": [
940
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104756
|
5733558fd058e614000b586e
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Despite the dominance of the above formula, there are documented attempts of the financial industry, occurring before the crisis, to address the formula limitations, specifically the lack of dependence dynamics and the poor representation of extreme events. The volume "Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas", published in 2007 by World Scientific, summarizes a 2006 conference held by Merrill Lynch in London where several practitioners attempted to propose models rectifying some of the copula limitations. See also the article by Donnelly and Embrechts and the book by Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti, that reports relevant warnings and research on CDOs appeared in 2006.
|
Who published "Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas" in 2007?
|
Who published "Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas" in 2007?
|
[
"Who published \"Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas\" in 2007?"
] |
{
"text": [
"World Scientific"
],
"answer_start": [
332
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104757
|
5733558fd058e614000b586f
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Despite the dominance of the above formula, there are documented attempts of the financial industry, occurring before the crisis, to address the formula limitations, specifically the lack of dependence dynamics and the poor representation of extreme events. The volume "Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas", published in 2007 by World Scientific, summarizes a 2006 conference held by Merrill Lynch in London where several practitioners attempted to propose models rectifying some of the copula limitations. See also the article by Donnelly and Embrechts and the book by Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti, that reports relevant warnings and research on CDOs appeared in 2006.
|
When did relevant warnings and research on CDOs appear in an article by Donnelly and Embrechts?
|
When did relevant warnings and research on CDOs appear in an article by Donnelly and Embrechts?
|
[
"When did relevant warnings and research on CDOs appear in an article by Donnelly and Embrechts?"
] |
{
"text": [
"2006"
],
"answer_start": [
672
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104758
|
5733558fd058e614000b5870
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Despite the dominance of the above formula, there are documented attempts of the financial industry, occurring before the crisis, to address the formula limitations, specifically the lack of dependence dynamics and the poor representation of extreme events. The volume "Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas", published in 2007 by World Scientific, summarizes a 2006 conference held by Merrill Lynch in London where several practitioners attempted to propose models rectifying some of the copula limitations. See also the article by Donnelly and Embrechts and the book by Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti, that reports relevant warnings and research on CDOs appeared in 2006.
|
The volume "Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas" summarizes a 2006 conference held by what firm in London?
|
The volume "Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas" summarizes a 2006 conference held by what firm in London?
|
[
"The volume \"Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas\" summarizes a 2006 conference held by what firm in London?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Merrill Lynch"
],
"answer_start": [
387
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104759
|
5733558fd058e614000b5871
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Despite the dominance of the above formula, there are documented attempts of the financial industry, occurring before the crisis, to address the formula limitations, specifically the lack of dependence dynamics and the poor representation of extreme events. The volume "Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas", published in 2007 by World Scientific, summarizes a 2006 conference held by Merrill Lynch in London where several practitioners attempted to propose models rectifying some of the copula limitations. See also the article by Donnelly and Embrechts and the book by Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti, that reports relevant warnings and research on CDOs appeared in 2006.
|
What did the volume "Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas" propose models to rectify?
|
What did the volume "Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas" propose models to rectify?
|
[
"What did the volume \"Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas\" propose models to rectify?"
] |
{
"text": [
"some of the copula limitations"
],
"answer_start": [
478
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104760
|
5733558fd058e614000b5872
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Despite the dominance of the above formula, there are documented attempts of the financial industry, occurring before the crisis, to address the formula limitations, specifically the lack of dependence dynamics and the poor representation of extreme events. The volume "Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas", published in 2007 by World Scientific, summarizes a 2006 conference held by Merrill Lynch in London where several practitioners attempted to propose models rectifying some of the copula limitations. See also the article by Donnelly and Embrechts and the book by Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti, that reports relevant warnings and research on CDOs appeared in 2006.
|
What year did the book by Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti report warnings and research on CDOs?
|
What year did the book by Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti report warnings and research on CDOs?
|
[
"What year did the book by Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti report warnings and research on CDOs?"
] |
{
"text": [
"2006"
],
"answer_start": [
672
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104761
|
573357204776f41900660850
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In a June 2008 speech, President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank Timothy Geithner—who in 2009 became Secretary of the United States Treasury—placed significant blame for the freezing of credit markets on a "run" on the entities in the "parallel" banking system, also called the shadow banking system. These entities became critical to the credit markets underpinning the financial system, but were not subject to the same regulatory controls. Further, these entities were vulnerable because of maturity mismatch, meaning that they borrowed short-term in liquid markets to purchase long-term, illiquid and risky assets. This meant that disruptions in credit markets would make them subject to rapid deleveraging, selling their long-term assets at depressed prices. He described the significance of these entities:
|
Who was President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank in June 2008?
|
Who was President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank in June 2008?
|
[
"Who was President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank in June 2008?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Timothy Geithner"
],
"answer_start": [
78
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104762
|
573357204776f41900660851
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In a June 2008 speech, President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank Timothy Geithner—who in 2009 became Secretary of the United States Treasury—placed significant blame for the freezing of credit markets on a "run" on the entities in the "parallel" banking system, also called the shadow banking system. These entities became critical to the credit markets underpinning the financial system, but were not subject to the same regulatory controls. Further, these entities were vulnerable because of maturity mismatch, meaning that they borrowed short-term in liquid markets to purchase long-term, illiquid and risky assets. This meant that disruptions in credit markets would make them subject to rapid deleveraging, selling their long-term assets at depressed prices. He described the significance of these entities:
|
What year did Timothy Geithner become U.S. Treasury Secretary?
|
What year did Timothy Geithner become U.S. Treasury Secretary?
|
[
"What year did Timothy Geithner become U.S. Treasury Secretary?"
] |
{
"text": [
"2009"
],
"answer_start": [
102
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104763
|
573357204776f41900660852
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In a June 2008 speech, President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank Timothy Geithner—who in 2009 became Secretary of the United States Treasury—placed significant blame for the freezing of credit markets on a "run" on the entities in the "parallel" banking system, also called the shadow banking system. These entities became critical to the credit markets underpinning the financial system, but were not subject to the same regulatory controls. Further, these entities were vulnerable because of maturity mismatch, meaning that they borrowed short-term in liquid markets to purchase long-term, illiquid and risky assets. This meant that disruptions in credit markets would make them subject to rapid deleveraging, selling their long-term assets at depressed prices. He described the significance of these entities:
|
In a June 2008 speech, Timoty Geithner placed blame for credit market freezing on which system?
|
In a June 2008 speech, Timoty Geithner placed blame for credit market freezing on which system?
|
[
"In a June 2008 speech, Timoty Geithner placed blame for credit market freezing on which system?"
] |
{
"text": [
"\"parallel\" banking system"
],
"answer_start": [
248
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104764
|
573357204776f41900660853
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In a June 2008 speech, President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank Timothy Geithner—who in 2009 became Secretary of the United States Treasury—placed significant blame for the freezing of credit markets on a "run" on the entities in the "parallel" banking system, also called the shadow banking system. These entities became critical to the credit markets underpinning the financial system, but were not subject to the same regulatory controls. Further, these entities were vulnerable because of maturity mismatch, meaning that they borrowed short-term in liquid markets to purchase long-term, illiquid and risky assets. This meant that disruptions in credit markets would make them subject to rapid deleveraging, selling their long-term assets at depressed prices. He described the significance of these entities:
|
What is the "parallel" banking system also called?
|
What is the "parallel" banking system also called?
|
[
"What is the \"parallel\" banking system also called?"
] |
{
"text": [
"shadow banking system"
],
"answer_start": [
291
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104765
|
573357204776f41900660854
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In a June 2008 speech, President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank Timothy Geithner—who in 2009 became Secretary of the United States Treasury—placed significant blame for the freezing of credit markets on a "run" on the entities in the "parallel" banking system, also called the shadow banking system. These entities became critical to the credit markets underpinning the financial system, but were not subject to the same regulatory controls. Further, these entities were vulnerable because of maturity mismatch, meaning that they borrowed short-term in liquid markets to purchase long-term, illiquid and risky assets. This meant that disruptions in credit markets would make them subject to rapid deleveraging, selling their long-term assets at depressed prices. He described the significance of these entities:
|
What is the term defined as being vulnerable by borrowing short-term in liquid markets to purchase long-term illiquid and risky assets?
|
What is the term defined as being vulnerable by borrowing short-term in liquid markets to purchase long-term illiquid and risky assets?
|
[
"What is the term defined as being vulnerable by borrowing short-term in liquid markets to purchase long-term illiquid and risky assets?"
] |
{
"text": [
"maturity mismatch"
],
"answer_start": [
507
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104766
|
5733582fd058e614000b5882
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system started to close down in the spring of 2007 and nearly shut-down in the fall of 2008. More than a third of the private credit markets thus became unavailable as a source of funds. According to the Brookings Institution, the traditional banking system does not have the capital to close this gap as of June 2009: "It would take a number of years of strong profits to generate sufficient capital to support that additional lending volume." The authors also indicate that some forms of securitization are "likely to vanish forever, having been an artifact of excessively loose credit conditions."
|
When did the securitization markets supported by the shadow banking systems start to close down?
|
When did the securitization markets supported by the shadow banking systems start to close down?
|
[
"When did the securitization markets supported by the shadow banking systems start to close down?"
] |
{
"text": [
"spring of 2007"
],
"answer_start": [
95
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104767
|
5733582fd058e614000b5883
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system started to close down in the spring of 2007 and nearly shut-down in the fall of 2008. More than a third of the private credit markets thus became unavailable as a source of funds. According to the Brookings Institution, the traditional banking system does not have the capital to close this gap as of June 2009: "It would take a number of years of strong profits to generate sufficient capital to support that additional lending volume." The authors also indicate that some forms of securitization are "likely to vanish forever, having been an artifact of excessively loose credit conditions."
|
When did the securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system nearly shut-down completely?
|
When did the securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system nearly shut-down completely?
|
[
"When did the securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system nearly shut-down completely?"
] |
{
"text": [
"fall of 2008"
],
"answer_start": [
138
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104768
|
5733582fd058e614000b5884
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system started to close down in the spring of 2007 and nearly shut-down in the fall of 2008. More than a third of the private credit markets thus became unavailable as a source of funds. According to the Brookings Institution, the traditional banking system does not have the capital to close this gap as of June 2009: "It would take a number of years of strong profits to generate sufficient capital to support that additional lending volume." The authors also indicate that some forms of securitization are "likely to vanish forever, having been an artifact of excessively loose credit conditions."
|
How much of the private credit markets become unavailable as a source of funds?
|
How much of the private credit markets become unavailable as a source of funds?
|
[
"How much of the private credit markets become unavailable as a source of funds?"
] |
{
"text": [
"More than a third"
],
"answer_start": [
152
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104769
|
5733582fd058e614000b5885
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system started to close down in the spring of 2007 and nearly shut-down in the fall of 2008. More than a third of the private credit markets thus became unavailable as a source of funds. According to the Brookings Institution, the traditional banking system does not have the capital to close this gap as of June 2009: "It would take a number of years of strong profits to generate sufficient capital to support that additional lending volume." The authors also indicate that some forms of securitization are "likely to vanish forever, having been an artifact of excessively loose credit conditions."
|
What is the firm who reported that the traditional banking system does not have capital to close the gap as of June 2009?
|
What is the firm who reported that the traditional banking system does not have capital to close the gap as of June 2009?
|
[
"What is the firm who reported that the traditional banking system does not have capital to close the gap as of June 2009?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Brookings Institution"
],
"answer_start": [
263
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104770
|
5733582fd058e614000b5886
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system started to close down in the spring of 2007 and nearly shut-down in the fall of 2008. More than a third of the private credit markets thus became unavailable as a source of funds. According to the Brookings Institution, the traditional banking system does not have the capital to close this gap as of June 2009: "It would take a number of years of strong profits to generate sufficient capital to support that additional lending volume." The authors also indicate that some forms of securitization are "likely to vanish forever, having been an artifact of excessively loose credit conditions."
|
How many years would of strong profit would it take to generate enough capital to support additional lending?
|
How many years would of strong profit would it take to generate enough capital to support additional lending?
|
[
"How many years would of strong profit would it take to generate enough capital to support additional lending?"
] |
{
"text": [
"a number of years"
],
"answer_start": [
393
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104771
|
573359544776f41900660870
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Economist Mark Zandi testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010: "The securitization markets also remain impaired, as investors anticipate more loan losses. Investors are also uncertain about coming legal and accounting rule changes and regulatory reforms. Private bond issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, and CDOs peaked in 2006 at close to $2 trillion...In 2009, private issuance was less than $150 billion, and almost all of it was asset-backed issuance supported by the Federal Reserve's TALF program to aid credit card, auto and small-business lenders. Issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities and CDOs remains dormant."
|
What economist testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010?
|
What economist testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010?
|
[
"What economist testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Mark Zandi"
],
"answer_start": [
10
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104772
|
573359544776f41900660871
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Economist Mark Zandi testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010: "The securitization markets also remain impaired, as investors anticipate more loan losses. Investors are also uncertain about coming legal and accounting rule changes and regulatory reforms. Private bond issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, and CDOs peaked in 2006 at close to $2 trillion...In 2009, private issuance was less than $150 billion, and almost all of it was asset-backed issuance supported by the Federal Reserve's TALF program to aid credit card, auto and small-business lenders. Issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities and CDOs remains dormant."
|
In January 2010, what markets did Mark Zandi testify about that remain impaired and investors anticipate more loan losses?
|
In January 2010, what markets did Mark Zandi testify about that remain impaired and investors anticipate more loan losses?
|
[
"In January 2010, what markets did Mark Zandi testify about that remain impaired and investors anticipate more loan losses?"
] |
{
"text": [
"securitization markets"
],
"answer_start": [
96
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104773
|
573359544776f41900660872
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Economist Mark Zandi testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010: "The securitization markets also remain impaired, as investors anticipate more loan losses. Investors are also uncertain about coming legal and accounting rule changes and regulatory reforms. Private bond issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, and CDOs peaked in 2006 at close to $2 trillion...In 2009, private issuance was less than $150 billion, and almost all of it was asset-backed issuance supported by the Federal Reserve's TALF program to aid credit card, auto and small-business lenders. Issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities and CDOs remains dormant."
|
What was the value of CDOs at their peak in 2006?
|
What was the value of CDOs at their peak in 2006?
|
[
"What was the value of CDOs at their peak in 2006?"
] |
{
"text": [
"close to $2 trillion"
],
"answer_start": [
415
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104774
|
573359544776f41900660873
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Economist Mark Zandi testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010: "The securitization markets also remain impaired, as investors anticipate more loan losses. Investors are also uncertain about coming legal and accounting rule changes and regulatory reforms. Private bond issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, and CDOs peaked in 2006 at close to $2 trillion...In 2009, private issuance was less than $150 billion, and almost all of it was asset-backed issuance supported by the Federal Reserve's TALF program to aid credit card, auto and small-business lenders. Issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities and CDOs remains dormant."
|
What was the private issuance of CDOs in 2009?
|
What was the private issuance of CDOs in 2009?
|
[
"What was the private issuance of CDOs in 2009?"
] |
{
"text": [
"less than $150 billion"
],
"answer_start": [
468
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104775
|
573359544776f41900660874
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Economist Mark Zandi testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010: "The securitization markets also remain impaired, as investors anticipate more loan losses. Investors are also uncertain about coming legal and accounting rule changes and regulatory reforms. Private bond issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, and CDOs peaked in 2006 at close to $2 trillion...In 2009, private issuance was less than $150 billion, and almost all of it was asset-backed issuance supported by the Federal Reserve's TALF program to aid credit card, auto and small-business lenders. Issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities and CDOs remains dormant."
|
Almost all of the asset-backed issuance in 2009 was supported by what Federal Reserve program?
|
Almost all of the asset-backed issuance in 2009 was supported by what Federal Reserve program?
|
[
"Almost all of the asset-backed issuance in 2009 was supported by what Federal Reserve program?"
] |
{
"text": [
"TALF"
],
"answer_start": [
574
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104776
|
57335b42d058e614000b58e1
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Rapid increases in a number of commodity prices followed the collapse in the housing bubble. The price of oil nearly tripled from $50 to $147 from early 2007 to 2008, before plunging as the financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008. Experts debate the causes, with some attributing it to speculative flow of money from housing and other investments into commodities, some to monetary policy, and some to the increasing feeling of raw materials scarcity in a fast-growing world, leading to long positions taken on those markets, such as Chinese increasing presence in Africa. An increase in oil prices tends to divert a larger share of consumer spending into gasoline, which creates downward pressure on economic growth in oil importing countries, as wealth flows to oil-producing states. A pattern of spiking instability in the price of oil over the decade leading up to the price high of 2008 has been recently identified. The destabilizing effects of this price variance has been proposed as a contributory factor in the financial crisis.
|
Following the collapse in the housing bubble, what happened to a number of commodity prices?
|
Following the collapse in the housing bubble, what happened to a number of commodity prices?
|
[
"Following the collapse in the housing bubble, what happened to a number of commodity prices?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Rapid increases"
],
"answer_start": [
0
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104777
|
57335b42d058e614000b58e2
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Rapid increases in a number of commodity prices followed the collapse in the housing bubble. The price of oil nearly tripled from $50 to $147 from early 2007 to 2008, before plunging as the financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008. Experts debate the causes, with some attributing it to speculative flow of money from housing and other investments into commodities, some to monetary policy, and some to the increasing feeling of raw materials scarcity in a fast-growing world, leading to long positions taken on those markets, such as Chinese increasing presence in Africa. An increase in oil prices tends to divert a larger share of consumer spending into gasoline, which creates downward pressure on economic growth in oil importing countries, as wealth flows to oil-producing states. A pattern of spiking instability in the price of oil over the decade leading up to the price high of 2008 has been recently identified. The destabilizing effects of this price variance has been proposed as a contributory factor in the financial crisis.
|
How much did the price of oil increase from early 2007 to 2008?
|
How much did the price of oil increase from early 2007 to 2008?
|
[
"How much did the price of oil increase from early 2007 to 2008?"
] |
{
"text": [
"nearly tripled from $50 to $147"
],
"answer_start": [
110
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104778
|
57335b42d058e614000b58e3
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Rapid increases in a number of commodity prices followed the collapse in the housing bubble. The price of oil nearly tripled from $50 to $147 from early 2007 to 2008, before plunging as the financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008. Experts debate the causes, with some attributing it to speculative flow of money from housing and other investments into commodities, some to monetary policy, and some to the increasing feeling of raw materials scarcity in a fast-growing world, leading to long positions taken on those markets, such as Chinese increasing presence in Africa. An increase in oil prices tends to divert a larger share of consumer spending into gasoline, which creates downward pressure on economic growth in oil importing countries, as wealth flows to oil-producing states. A pattern of spiking instability in the price of oil over the decade leading up to the price high of 2008 has been recently identified. The destabilizing effects of this price variance has been proposed as a contributory factor in the financial crisis.
|
What did the price of oil began doing when the financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008?
|
What did the price of oil began doing when the financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008?
|
[
"What did the price of oil began doing when the financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008?"
] |
{
"text": [
"plunging"
],
"answer_start": [
174
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104779
|
57335b42d058e614000b58e4
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Rapid increases in a number of commodity prices followed the collapse in the housing bubble. The price of oil nearly tripled from $50 to $147 from early 2007 to 2008, before plunging as the financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008. Experts debate the causes, with some attributing it to speculative flow of money from housing and other investments into commodities, some to monetary policy, and some to the increasing feeling of raw materials scarcity in a fast-growing world, leading to long positions taken on those markets, such as Chinese increasing presence in Africa. An increase in oil prices tends to divert a larger share of consumer spending into gasoline, which creates downward pressure on economic growth in oil importing countries, as wealth flows to oil-producing states. A pattern of spiking instability in the price of oil over the decade leading up to the price high of 2008 has been recently identified. The destabilizing effects of this price variance has been proposed as a contributory factor in the financial crisis.
|
What is one of the reasons experts believe contributed to the volatilaty in oil prices in 2008?
|
What is one of the reasons experts believe contributed to the volatilaty in oil prices in 2008?
|
[
"What is one of the reasons experts believe contributed to the volatilaty in oil prices in 2008? "
] |
{
"text": [
"monetary policy"
],
"answer_start": [
382
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104780
|
57335b42d058e614000b58e5
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Rapid increases in a number of commodity prices followed the collapse in the housing bubble. The price of oil nearly tripled from $50 to $147 from early 2007 to 2008, before plunging as the financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008. Experts debate the causes, with some attributing it to speculative flow of money from housing and other investments into commodities, some to monetary policy, and some to the increasing feeling of raw materials scarcity in a fast-growing world, leading to long positions taken on those markets, such as Chinese increasing presence in Africa. An increase in oil prices tends to divert a larger share of consumer spending into gasoline, which creates downward pressure on economic growth in oil importing countries, as wealth flows to oil-producing states. A pattern of spiking instability in the price of oil over the decade leading up to the price high of 2008 has been recently identified. The destabilizing effects of this price variance has been proposed as a contributory factor in the financial crisis.
|
Consumers tend to have less money to spend on other goods, when the price of which commodity is higher?
|
Consumers tend to have less money to spend on other goods, when the price of which commodity is higher?
|
[
"Consumers tend to have less money to spend on other goods, when the price of which commodity is higher?"
] |
{
"text": [
"gasoline"
],
"answer_start": [
665
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104781
|
57335c77d058e614000b5907
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008, former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the regulated futures exchanges in London and New York. However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter.
|
Who was the former director of the CFTC that testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008?
|
Who was the former director of the CFTC that testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008?
|
[
"Who was the former director of the CFTC that testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Michael Greenberger"
],
"answer_start": [
187
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104782
|
57335c77d058e614000b5908
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008, former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the regulated futures exchanges in London and New York. However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter.
|
Who did Michael Greenberger erronesously name as a key player in speculative run-up of oil futures?
|
Who did Michael Greenberger erronesously name as a key player in speculative run-up of oil futures?
|
[
"Who did Michael Greenberger erronesously name as a key player in speculative run-up of oil futures?"
] |
{
"text": [
"IntercontinentalExchange"
],
"answer_start": [
244
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104783
|
57335c77d058e614000b5909
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008, former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the regulated futures exchanges in London and New York. However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter.
|
Who founded the Atlanta-based Intercontinental Exchange?
|
Who founded the Atlanta-based Intercontinental Exchange?
|
[
"Who founded the Atlanta-based Intercontinental Exchange?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP"
],
"answer_start": [
281
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104784
|
57335c77d058e614000b590a
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008, former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the regulated futures exchanges in London and New York. However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter.
|
Who purchased the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001?
|
Who purchased the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001?
|
[
"Who purchased the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001?"
] |
{
"text": [
"IntercontinentalExchange (ICE)"
],
"answer_start": [
464
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104785
|
57335c77d058e614000b590b
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008, former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the regulated futures exchanges in London and New York. However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter.
|
Where are regulated future exchanges located?
|
Where are regulated future exchanges located?
|
[
"Where are regulated future exchanges located?"
] |
{
"text": [
"London and New York"
],
"answer_start": [
430
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104786
|
57335ed14776f419006608d5
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjørnholt argue that the financial crisis and the response to it revealed a crisis of ideas in mainstream economics and within the economics profession, and call for a reshaping of both the economy, economic theory and the economics profession. They argue that such a reshaping should include new advances within feminist economics and ecological economics that take as their starting point the socially responsible, sensible and accountable subject in creating an economy and economic theories that fully acknowledge care for each other as well as the planet.
|
Who is one of the feminist economists that believe the financial crisis revealed a crisis of mainstream economics and call for a complete reshaping of the economy?
|
Who is one of the feminist economists that believe the financial crisis revealed a crisis of mainstream economics and call for a complete reshaping of the economy?
|
[
"Who is one of the feminist economists that believe the financial crisis revealed a crisis of mainstream economics and call for a complete reshaping of the economy?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Ailsa McKay"
],
"answer_start": [
20
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104787
|
57335ed14776f419006608d6
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjørnholt argue that the financial crisis and the response to it revealed a crisis of ideas in mainstream economics and within the economics profession, and call for a reshaping of both the economy, economic theory and the economics profession. They argue that such a reshaping should include new advances within feminist economics and ecological economics that take as their starting point the socially responsible, sensible and accountable subject in creating an economy and economic theories that fully acknowledge care for each other as well as the planet.
|
Feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjornhold believe that the financial crisis and response reveal a crisis of ideas in this?
|
Feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjornhold believe that the financial crisis and response reveal a crisis of ideas in this?
|
[
"Feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjornhold believe that the financial crisis and response reveal a crisis of ideas in this?"
] |
{
"text": [
"mainstream economics"
],
"answer_start": [
139
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104788
|
57335ed14776f419006608d7
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjørnholt argue that the financial crisis and the response to it revealed a crisis of ideas in mainstream economics and within the economics profession, and call for a reshaping of both the economy, economic theory and the economics profession. They argue that such a reshaping should include new advances within feminist economics and ecological economics that take as their starting point the socially responsible, sensible and accountable subject in creating an economy and economic theories that fully acknowledge care for each other as well as the planet.
|
According to feminist economists McKay and Bjornholt, would type economics should be included in a reshaping?
|
According to feminist economists McKay and Bjornholt, would type economics should be included in a reshaping?
|
[
"According to feminist economists McKay and Bjornholt, would type economics should be included in a reshaping?"
] |
{
"text": [
"feminist economics"
],
"answer_start": [
357
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104789
|
57335ed14776f419006608d8
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjørnholt argue that the financial crisis and the response to it revealed a crisis of ideas in mainstream economics and within the economics profession, and call for a reshaping of both the economy, economic theory and the economics profession. They argue that such a reshaping should include new advances within feminist economics and ecological economics that take as their starting point the socially responsible, sensible and accountable subject in creating an economy and economic theories that fully acknowledge care for each other as well as the planet.
|
What do economists McKay and Bjornholt want to occur in the economy, economic theory, and economics profession?
|
What do economists McKay and Bjornholt want to occur in the economy, economic theory, and economics profession?
|
[
"What do economists McKay and Bjornholt want to occur in the economy, economic theory, and economics profession?"
] |
{
"text": [
"a reshaping"
],
"answer_start": [
210
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104790
|
573360014776f4190066090a
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan had predicted the crisis in 2005 when he became chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.In 2005, at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan, who was about to retire as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Rajan delivered a controversial paper that was critical of the financial sector. In that paper, "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", Rajan "argued that disaster might loom." Rajan argued that financial sector managers were encouraged to "take risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks. But perhaps the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if the tail risk does materialise, financial positions can be unwound and losses allocated so that the consequences to the real economy are minimised."
|
Who was the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India that predicted the crisis in 2005?
|
Who was the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India that predicted the crisis in 2005?
|
[
"Who was the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India that predicted the crisis in 2005?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Raghuram Rajan"
],
"answer_start": [
46
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104791
|
573360014776f4190066090b
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan had predicted the crisis in 2005 when he became chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.In 2005, at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan, who was about to retire as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Rajan delivered a controversial paper that was critical of the financial sector. In that paper, "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", Rajan "argued that disaster might loom." Rajan argued that financial sector managers were encouraged to "take risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks. But perhaps the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if the tail risk does materialise, financial positions can be unwound and losses allocated so that the consequences to the real economy are minimised."
|
When did Raghuram Rajan become chief economist the the International Monetary Fund?
|
When did Raghuram Rajan become chief economist the the International Monetary Fund?
|
[
"When did Raghuram Rajan become chief economist the the International Monetary Fund?"
] |
{
"text": [
"2005"
],
"answer_start": [
89
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104792
|
573360014776f4190066090c
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan had predicted the crisis in 2005 when he became chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.In 2005, at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan, who was about to retire as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Rajan delivered a controversial paper that was critical of the financial sector. In that paper, "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", Rajan "argued that disaster might loom." Rajan argued that financial sector managers were encouraged to "take risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks. But perhaps the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if the tail risk does materialise, financial positions can be unwound and losses allocated so that the consequences to the real economy are minimised."
|
In 2005, where did Rajan deliver a controversial paper that was critical of the financial paper?
|
In 2005, where did Rajan deliver a controversial paper that was critical of the financial paper?
|
[
"In 2005, where did Rajan deliver a controversial paper that was critical of the financial paper?"
] |
{
"text": [
"at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan"
],
"answer_start": [
169
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104793
|
573360014776f4190066090d
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan had predicted the crisis in 2005 when he became chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.In 2005, at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan, who was about to retire as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Rajan delivered a controversial paper that was critical of the financial sector. In that paper, "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", Rajan "argued that disaster might loom." Rajan argued that financial sector managers were encouraged to "take risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks. But perhaps the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if the tail risk does materialise, financial positions can be unwound and losses allocated so that the consequences to the real economy are minimised."
|
What was the name of Raghuram Rajan's controversial paper delivered in 2005?
|
What was the name of Raghuram Rajan's controversial paper delivered in 2005?
|
[
"What was the name of Raghuram Rajan's controversial paper delivered in 2005?"
] |
{
"text": [
"\"Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?\""
],
"answer_start": [
371
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104794
|
573360014776f4190066090e
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
Current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan had predicted the crisis in 2005 when he became chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.In 2005, at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan, who was about to retire as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Rajan delivered a controversial paper that was critical of the financial sector. In that paper, "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", Rajan "argued that disaster might loom." Rajan argued that financial sector managers were encouraged to "take risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks. But perhaps the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if the tail risk does materialise, financial positions can be unwound and losses allocated so that the consequences to the real economy are minimised."
|
What are risks called that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but generous compensation the rest of the time?
|
What are risks called that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but generous compensation the rest of the time?
|
[
"What are risks called that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but generous compensation the rest of the time?"
] |
{
"text": [
"tail risks"
],
"answer_start": [
696
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104795
|
5733612b4776f41900660932
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The financial crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists except Raghuram Rajan, who instead spoke of the Great Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US). Examples of other experts who gave indications of a financial crisis have also been given. Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply, a perspective that even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to.
|
Who was one of the only mainstream economist to predict the financial crisis?
|
Who was one of the only mainstream economist to predict the financial crisis?
|
[
"Who was one of the only mainstream economist to predict the financial crisis?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Raghuram Rajan"
],
"answer_start": [
78
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104796
|
5733612b4776f41900660933
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The financial crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists except Raghuram Rajan, who instead spoke of the Great Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US). Examples of other experts who gave indications of a financial crisis have also been given. Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply, a perspective that even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to.
|
What did Raghuram Rajan speak of?
|
What did Raghuram Rajan speak of?
|
[
"What did Raghuram Rajan speak of?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Great Moderation"
],
"answer_start": [
119
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104797
|
5733612b4776f41900660934
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The financial crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists except Raghuram Rajan, who instead spoke of the Great Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US). Examples of other experts who gave indications of a financial crisis have also been given. Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply, a perspective that even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to.
|
Who credit 12 heterodox economists with predicting the crisis in his research credits?
|
Who credit 12 heterodox economists with predicting the crisis in his research credits?
|
[
"Who credit 12 heterodox economists with predicting the crisis in his research credits?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Dirk Bezemer"
],
"answer_start": [
216
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104798
|
5733612b4776f41900660935
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The financial crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists except Raghuram Rajan, who instead spoke of the Great Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US). Examples of other experts who gave indications of a financial crisis have also been given. Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply, a perspective that even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to.
|
How did the Austrian economic school regard the crisis?
|
How did the Austrian economic school regard the crisis?
|
[
"How did the Austrian economic school regard the crisis?"
] |
{
"text": [
"as a vindication"
],
"answer_start": [
768
]
}
|
gem-squad_v2-train-104799
|
5733612b4776f41900660936
|
Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308
|
The financial crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists except Raghuram Rajan, who instead spoke of the Great Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US). Examples of other experts who gave indications of a financial crisis have also been given. Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply, a perspective that even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to.
|
Which former Fed Chair confessed in Congressional testimony to being forced to return to lax monetary supply?
|
Which former Fed Chair confessed in Congressional testimony to being forced to return to lax monetary supply?
|
[
"Which former Fed Chair confessed in Congressional testimony to being forced to return to lax monetary supply?"
] |
{
"text": [
"Alan Greenspan"
],
"answer_start": [
1005
]
}
|
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