hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
|---|---|---|---|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.3 Key issue #3: More granular authorization based on purpose information
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.3.1 Key issue details
| The purpose for data processing has been captured in TS 23.222 [2] in authorization, but it has not been addressed in TS 33.122 [3]. With the lack of more granular authorization based on purpose information, it will not be possible for the resource owner to give permission for data sharing only for some specific purpos... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.3.2 Threats
| The API Invoker can access to the resources of the resource owner for any purposes. This can lead to a threat of unauthorized access.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.3.3 Potential security requirements
| CAPIF RNAA should support the usage of purpose information in authorization and authorization revocation of the API Invoker to access the resources of the resource owner.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.4 Key Issue #4: Study on security aspects of Credentials unavailability
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.4.1 Key issue details
| KI#3 in TR 23.700-43 [4] aims to study how to manage entities which do not have access to their CCF provided certificate.
Due to the nature of the study around security credentials and their management, it is proposed to study such aspect in SA3. In particular, this key issue focuses on the unavailability of the API ... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.4.2 Threats
| Editor’s Note: Security threats are FFS.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.4.3 Potential security requirements
| Editor’s Note: Potential security requirements are FFS.
5.X Key issue #X: <Title>
5.X.1 Key issue details
5.X.2 Threats
5.X.3 Potential security requirements
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6 Proposed solutions
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.0 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Table 6.0-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#1
KI#2
KI#3
Solution #1
X
Solution #2
X
Solution #3
X
Solution #4
X
Solution #5
X
Solution #6
X
Solution #7
X
Solution #8
X
Solution #9
X
Solution #10
X
Solution #11
X
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.1 Solution #1: Addressing security aspects of "UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs’ resources of a group" procedure
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.1.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue #1 (Group Authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group) by taking the procedure specified in clause 8.34 of TS 23.222 [2] as the baseline. As stated in the specified procedure, how to obtain authorization data from the GRO is out of scope, which m... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.1.2 Solution details
| Security related addition to the procedure specified in clause 8.34 of TS 23.222 [2] is shown below.
- In step 2 of the procedure in clause 8.34.3 of TS 33.222 [2], the CCF also obtains the GPSI of UE2 (API Invoker) in an authenticated way and uses that authenticated UE2 GPSI information in step 3. This solution does ... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.1.3 Evaluation
| Editor's Note: Evaluation is FFS.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.2 Solution #2: Security aspect of group authorization
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.2.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#1: Group Authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group. The existing API invoker authorization mechanism for RNAA is enhanced to support group authorization.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.2.2 Solution details
| This solution reuses the procedure of UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs’ resources of a group defined in clause 8.34.3 of TS 23.222 [2].
Figure 6.2.2-1: Group Authorization mechanism for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group
1. With reference to step 1 in clause 8.34.3 of TS 23... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.2.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.3 Solution #3: Client credentials flow based group authorization
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.3.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#1.
This solution uses the client credentials flow to enable the group authorization.
Specifically, the CCF uses the locally stored group related authorization information to authorize the API invoker.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.3.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.3.2-1: Client credentials flow based group authorization
It is assumed that the group resource owner has provisioned the group authorization information to the CCF.
1-3. are identical to steps 1-3 defined in clause 8.34.3 of TS 23.222 [2].
4. The CCF identifies the group authorization information based on... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.3.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Evaluation is FFS.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.4 Solution #4: Supporting Group Authorization based on authorization information provided by GRO
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.4.1 Introduction
| This solution aims to address KI#1 to support authorization of a UE-hosted API invoker accessing resources owned by other UEs that belong to the same group.
The solution proposes to reuse the TS 33.122 [x] clause 6.5.3 with the following enhancement:
1) Authorization information provided by GRO(for simplicity called ... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.4.2 Solution details
| The authorization information provided by GRO(for simplicity called GRO authorization information) is transferred between the ROF and the CCF via the secure CAPIF-8 reference point.
Editor’s Note: the communication between ROF and CCF is FFS.
The GRO authorization information contains the same information of authoriz... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.4.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.5 Solution #5: Group authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.5.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the security requirements of Key issue#1. It is proposed to use the procedure as specified in clause 8.24 of TS 23.222 [2] and include group identifier as an optional parameter in the access token.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.5.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.5.2-1: Procedure for Group Authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group
1. The API invoker (e.g., in UE 2) sends an Obtain service API authorization request to the CCF for obtaining permission to access the service API for other UE's resources hosted in the network (e... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.5.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.6 Solution #6: Addressing security of Open Discovery Service API
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.6.1 Introduction
| Open service API introduces the possibility for a requestor of accessing non-sensitive API Information before on-boarding. Due to the publicity of the information, i.e., non-sensitive information, there is no need to authorize the requestor at CCF.
To ensure the correctness of the information provided by CCF to the re... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.6.2 Solution details
|
1. Requestor will initiate a TLS connection with server-side certificate verification, towards CCF.
2. Requestor initiates the open discovery service API request with CCF and retrieves the required information as detailed in TS 23.222 [2].
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.6.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Evaluation is ffs.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.7 Solution #7: Security procedure for open discover service APIs
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.7.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue #2 (Security for open discover service API). Open Discover Service APIs procedure introduced in TS 23.222 allows API invokers not recognized by the CAPIF Core Function to discover APIs without being onboarded to the CAPIF Core Function.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.7.2 Solution details
| The requester who wants to discover service API information about the available set of APIs offered by CCF before onboarding and the CCF who supports open discover service APIs follows the procedure explained below for security of the open discover service APIs procedure specified in clause 8.38 of TS 23.222 [3].
The ... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.7.3 Evaluation
| Editor's Note: Evaluation is FFS.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.8 Solution #8: TLS based secure open service API discover
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.8.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#2.
Specifically, the TLS is used to protect the open service API discover procedure.
The CCF’s local policy is used for requestor authorization.6.8.2 Solution details
Figure 6.8.2-1: Open Discover service APIs
0. It is assumed that the requestor is preconfigured the certificate chain u... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.8.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Evaluation is FFS.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.9 Solution #9: Augmenting scope parameter with purpose information
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.9.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue #3 and consists of augmenting the scope parameter in the token/authorization request and the token with purpose information; the resource owner authorization revocation request would likewise include purpose information.
As aligned with the key issue description, the solution is not ... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.9.2 Solution details
| - For the client credential flow in CAPIF RNAA, the purpose information is included in the scope parameter of the token request.
- For the authorization code flow in CAPIF RNAA, the purpose information is included in the scope parameter of authorization request.
- The scope parameter in the issued token includes th... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.9.3 Evaluation
| Editor's Note: Evaluation is FFS.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.10 Solution #10: Purpose based authorization and authorization revocation
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.10.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the KI#3.
Specifically, if API invoker needs to obtain resource owner’s data from the network, the data processing purpose is used to determine whether CCF issues the token to the API invoker.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.10.2 Solution details
| For RNAA related client credentials flow, the following enhancements are needed to support the purpose based authorization.
• If the API invoker needs to get resource owner’s data from the network, the API invoker sends the data processing purpose (e.g., the location data is used for advertising) to the CCF.
... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.10.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Evaluation is FFS.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.11 Solution #11: Enhancing finer granularity for purpose of information
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.11.1 Introduction
| This solution is addressing KI#3 by enhancing authorization mechanism to validate the purpose for retrieving the information. The solution proposes to enhance the already existing mechanisms available in CAPIF ecosystems, i.e., the access token as part of RNAA procedure.
After authentication between the CCF and the A... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.11.2 Solution details
| 6.11.2.1 Authorization provisioning
Pre-requisites:
CAPIF-1e authentication and secure session establishment is performed as specified in subclause 6.3.1 of 33.122.
1. After successful establishment of TLS session over CAPIF-1e, the API invoker shall send an Access Token Request message to the CAPIF core funct... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 6.11.3 Evaluation
| 6.Y Solution #Y: <Title>
6.Y.1 Introduction
6.Y.2 Solution details
6.Y.3 Evaluation
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 7 Conclusions
|
Annex <X>:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253327
Skeleton
0.0.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253731
Incorporate pCRs that add S3‑253756, S3‑253757, S3‑253758, S3‑253759, S3‑253761, S3-253760
0.1.0
2025-11
SA3#125
... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 1 Scope
| Editor’s Note: This clause is going to capture the scope of this study.
This present document aims to identify potential threats and security requirements to support additional features for AIoT in Rel-20. Specifically,
• Security aspects of concluding on authorization of intermediate UE for AIoT services in To... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4 Key issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.1 Key Issue #1: Authorization of intermediate UE for 5G Ambient IoT services
| |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.1.1 Key issue details
| In TR 23.700-13 [2], Key Issues #1 and #3 describe the issues on the system architecture and procedure to support 5G Ambient IoT services, furthermore TR 23.700-30 [4], KI#1 describes the issues on the support AIoT services under the RRC-based option for UE Reader connectivity.
The architecture for topology 2 is defi... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.1.2 Security threats
| If the 5GC do not authorize the UE acting as an intermediate node, the attacker UE may misuse the Ambient IoT services provided by the core and hereby impersonate an authorised intermediate node.
Editor’s Note: The threats may be refined based on SA2 agreed procedures.
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5GS shall be able to support the authorization of the AIoT capable UE as an intermediate node.
Editor’s Note: Requirements are FFS.
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.2 Key Issue #2: Authentication for AIoT devices
| |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.2.1 Key issue details
| DO-A capable AIOT devices can inform the network of their presence and send data to the AIOTF autonomously. The TR 23.700-30 [4] studies the architecture framework and procedure for DO-A capable AIoT devices, including the device initiated registration-like procedure and data transfer procedure.
With the capability o... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.2.2 Security threats
| An attacker may impersonate the victim AIoT device and report fake identification to the network side. If the billing is based on per AIoT device’s identity, the fake identity may lead to charging problem. This can be used by an adversary to steal an AIoT device by replacing the AIoT device with a fake device, which mi... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall provide a means to perform mutual authentication between the DO-A capable AIoT device and the network.
NOTE 2: AIoT device Type 1 is restricted to isolated private network.
Editor’s Note: The aspect outlined in NOTE 2 needs to be reflected in the AIoT phase 2 Study Item update.
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.3 Key Issue #3: Protection of information to support DO-A Capable AIoT Devices during AIoT service communication
| |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.3.1 Key issue details
| As per TS 22.369 [6], Ambient power-enabled IoT (AIoT) services aim to support various use cases, including inventory taking, sensor data collection, asset tracking, and actuator control. These services intended to operate with lower power consumption and complexity than the existing IoT technologies such as eMTC, NB-I... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.3.2 Security threats
| In addition to the command operation (e.g., write, read) as specified in TS 23.369 [7], DO-A Capable AIoT Device can send data to the AIOTF autonomously. The following threats are still applicable:
An attacker may acquire data transmitted to/from AIoT devices by eavesdropping messages if the communication of AIoT serv... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.3.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall support a means to ensure confidentiality, integrity and/or replay protection of information transmitted between DO-A Capable AIoT Device and the network.
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.4 Key Issue #4: DO-A capable AIOT device ID protection
| |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.4.1 Key issue details
| For AIoT device type 1, all communications between the network and the AIOT device are initiated by the network. Unlike AIOT device type 1, the DO-A AIOT device could autonomously initiate communication by sending a message to the network. Due to this change, privacy mechanisms specified in TS 33.369[8] for AIOT device... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.4.2 Threats
| An attacker can identify, monitor and track a DO-A AIoT devices based on the identifiers associated with the AIoT device if the identifiers are not privacy protected.
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.4.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall support mechanisms to prevent privacy threats (e.g., identifying, linking, and tracking) against the identifier of the DO-A capable AIOT device(s).
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.5 Key Issue #5: Amplification of resource exhaustion by exploiting AIoT paging messages
| |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.5.1 Key issue details
| Paging of AIoT devices is different than "regular" paging of regular UEs. In AIOT, one single paging message coming from the reader/network can be used to trigger multiple devices to respond by using, for example, a mask/filter based on target device identification, or by a group ID of the target devices. Once the targ... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.5.2 Security threats
| An adversary can cause the core network of a PLMN or the AF wasting computational resources by corrupting or spoofing one single paging message, which is surprisingly little work on the adversary’s behalf, that triggers a lot of devices to send a paging response to the legitimate reader.
The above attack can also caus... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 4.5.3 Potential security requirements
| Editor’s Note: Potential security requirements are FFS
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.0 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause captures mapping between key issues and solutions.
Table 5.1-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Key Issues
Solutions
1
2
3
4
5
1
X
2
X
3
X
4
X
5
X
6
X
7
X
8
X
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.1 Solution #1: Information protection after registration
| |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.1.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#3.
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.1.2 Solution details
| |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.1.2.1 Registration procedure
| The following figure depicts the AIoT registration procedure to activate information protection.
Figure 5.1.2.1-1: AIoT registration procedure
1. AIoT device sends initial Register Request (Device ID, Device security capabilities) towards AIoTF.
Editor’s Note: How to protect security capabilities is ffs.
Editor's... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.1.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
TBD
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.2 Solution #2: Protection of information during AIoT service communication
| |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.2.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue#3 on protection of information during AIoT service communication. The solution reuses the security mechanisms for NAS protection from TS 33.501 [9] modulo some simplifications in order to avoid the need for an additional security activation procedure. By comparison to the mechanisms sp... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.2.2 Solution details
| It is assumed that following a successful authentication procedure, the device and the network derive a session key called KAIOTF, for example in a similar manner to the procedure in TS 33.369 [8]. The device stores this key as part of the security context until a new authentication run. The authentication procedure is... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.2.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.3 Solution #3: Protecting information for DO-A communication
| |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.3.1 Introduction
| KI#3 describes the need to “support a means to ensure confidentiality, integrity and/or replay protection of information transmitted between DO-A Capable AIoT Device and the network.” This solution intends to fulfill this requirement.
The solution makes the following assumption:
- DO-A communication is a new procedu... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.3.2 Solution Details
|
1. DO-A device has data to send and initiates an AIoT DO-a data transmission request to NG-RAN.
1a. NG-RAN sends AIoT DO-A data transmission to AIOTF.
1b. If AIOTF does not already have the DO-A AIoT device context (e.g., Kaiotf or device counter value), AIOTF and ADM performs an AIOTF key retrieval procedure for t... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.3.3 Evaluation
| TBD.
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.4 Solution #4: ID privacy based on stored type T-ID
| |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.4.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#4.
This solution proposes to reuse T-ID update method of release 19 as much as possible. In release 19, two T-ID types are defined: concealed and stored. This solution propose to reuse stored type T-ID and corresponding update method.
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.4.2 Solution details
| The following figure depicts the AIoT device ID protection based on stored type T-ID.
Figure 5.4.2-1: AIoT Device ID protection based on stored type T-ID
1. AIoT device is preconfigured with initial T-ID (i.e. T-ID0), which can be derived from AIoT device permanent ID. The ADM also stores the initial T-ID for the A... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.4.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
Editor’s Note: Evaluation of T-ID storage on device side in de-registration state is ffs.
TBD
|
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