hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
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ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.5 Solution #5: Privacy-preserving device identification responding to group paging using AICI
| |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.5.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#4: AIOT device ID protection in DO-A procedure. The solution describes how a device identifies itself to the network in response to a group paging message, when the device does not have an established session or registered state with the network. The solution uses AIoT Concealed Device Identi... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.5.2 Solution details
| Figure 5.5.2-1 presents a high-level message flow of the solution. The figure is described step-by-step in the following:
In Step 0, the ADM provides the AIOTF necessary information to page a group of devices — e.g., an identifier identifying a group (let us call it a group identifier) and an authentication challenge.... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.5.3 Evaluation
| The solution assumes that group paging is used to page DO-A capable devices that are not registered to the network.
Editor’s Note 1: Further Evaluation is FFS
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.6 Solution #6: Privacy-preserving group paging using Bloom filter
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ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.6.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#4: AIOT device ID protection in DO-A procedure. The solution uses a Bloom filter to page a group of devices. First the network generates privacy-preserving concealed identifiers for every device in the group to be paged. Then the network inserts the privacy preserving concealed identifiers in... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.6.2 Solution details
| The proposed solution is explained step-by-step in the following:
Step1. The AIOTF sends group identification information (e.g., Filtering Information) to the ADM for the group that the AIOT is intends to reach to.
Step2. the ADM computes a concealed temporary identifier CT-ID for each device in a group (let us call ... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.6.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Evaluation is FFS
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.7 DO-A Capable AIoT device identifier protection with Bloom filter
| |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.7.1 Introduction
| The solution addresses Key Issue #4: AIOT device ID protection in DO-A procedure. The solution introduces a Bloom filter-based procedure, together with filtering information, to efficiently page multiple DO-A Capable AIoT devices while protecting identifier privacy.
In this solution, the ADM determines the actually p... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.7.2 Solution details
| |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.7.2.1 Procedure
| The purpose of this solution is to enable multiple inventory operations while protecting the AIoT device permanent identifier during the AIoT device inventory procedure.
Figure 5.7.2.1-1: Inventory procedure
0. Step 1-6 of clause 6.2.2 Procedure for Inventory or clause 6.2.3 Procedure for command in TS 23.369 [7] i... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.7.2.2 Tag generation
| 1. TagD generation
The following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the k KDFs:
- FC = 0xNN,
- P0 = Device permanent identifier,
- L0 = length of Device permanent identifier,
The input key KEY shall be KAIOT_root. The P0 input is the stored AIoT device permanent identifier. The outputs of the k KD... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.7.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.8 Solution #8: SUCI
| |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.8.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #4 and applies to topology 1 and topology 2.
|
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.8.2 Solution details
| This solution proposes the use of SUCI (Subscription Concealed Identifier), as specified in TS 33.501 [9], to protect the AIoT device permanent ID. The SUCI is calculated with non-null scheme.
Editor’s note: how to protect AIoT device permanent ID in SNPN is FFS
Editor’s note: Whether AIoT devices have capability to... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 5.8.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses Key Issue #4 thanks to ID protection mechanism already specified in TS 33.501 [9].
The possibility to perform SUCI calculation depends on AIoT device capability.
Editor’s Note: Further evaluation is FFS.
5.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>
5.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution shou... |
ca180014f5532ca12c04dc24c74a1668 | 33.714 | 6 Conclusions
| Editor’s Note: This clause captures the conclusions of this study.
Annex <X>:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
10/2025
SA3#124
S3‑253300
Initial draft TR
0.0.1
10/2025
SA3#124
S3‑253732
Incorporated accepted contributions S3‑25... |
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies the security architecture and security requirements for WAB-nodes, security impacts of potentially compromised WAB nodes and requirements for countermeasures against any compromised WAB nodes.
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 4 Security Architecture and Assumptions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains security architecture and assumptions to be considered for the study (e.g., per work task/KI).
Figure 5.49.1.1-1 in TS 23.501[2] shows the MWAB architecture for 5GS. In the architecture. There are two components in MWAB, i.e. MWAB-gNB and MWAB-UE. The WAB-node integration procedur... |
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5 Key issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.1 Key Issue #1: Security of the link between WAB-gNB and OAM
| |
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| Based on the WAB-node integration procedure, the WAB-gNB will receive the OAM of WAB through the WAB-MT’s network. The link between WAB-gNB and OAM needs to have sufficient security protection for configuration data transmission.
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.1.2 Security threats
| If the link between WAG-gNB and OAM is not well protected, the configuration data will be tampered or disclosure.
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.1.1 Potential security requirements
| The link between the MWAB-gNB and the OAM shall be ciphering and integrity protected.
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.2 Key Issue #2: Security Protection of Compromised WAB Nodes and Core Network Measures
| |
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.2.1 Key issue details
| Wireless Access Backhaul (WAB) nodes, consist of a WAB-gNB (gNB-like functionality) and a WAB-MT (UE-like functionality). These nodes operate in non-trusted environments and may serve as moving backhaul nodes for the 5GS, establishing NG, Xn, and OAM interfaces over PDU sessions through 3GPP backhauls. While 3GPP TR 33... |
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.2.2 Security threats
| Potential security threat:
• Rogue WAB-gNB Injection: A compromised WAB node may inject unauthorized signalling or reroute traffic maliciously, particularly via spoofed message. Furthermore, a compromised WAB-gNB can attempt to broadcast unauthorized network identifiers or initiate rogue Xn association attempts w... |
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The 3GPP system shall support security mechanisms to mitigate risks from compromised WAB nodes, preventing topology spoofing, rogue signalling, and mobility-related traceability threats.
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.3 Key Issue #3: Ensuring secure N2, N3 and Xn interfaces for MWAB nodes
| |
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.3.1 Key issue details
| According to the architecture in 23.501[2],the MWAB-gNB establishes the N2 interface with UE’s 5GC, and setup a Xn link with a traditional gNB.
Figure 5.3-1: Architecture for MWAB operation support - non-roaming with one PLMN
A MWAB may be mounted on a moving vehicle and may serve UEs inside or outside the vehicle... |
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.3.2 Security threats
| Lack of end-to-end protection for MWAB-gNB’s N2, N3 and Xn can lead to potential tampering of UE related signaling messages and potential breach of confidentiality, integrity and possible availability risks.
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.3.3 Potential security requirements
| Credentials for NDS/IP for Xn, N3 and N2 connection between MWAB and UE’s network shall be provided with confidentiality protection and integrity protection.
During movement of MWAB nodes, the end-to-end security of N2, N3 and Xn interfaces shall be ensured.
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.4 Key Issue #4: Protection and binding of MWAB-gNB control plane over BH-PDU sessions
| |
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.4.1 Key issue details
| In MWAB, OAM, N2, Xn and N3 traffic for the MWAB-gNB is carried over backhaul PDU session(s) that the MWAB-UE establishes and modifies based on traffic descriptors and OAM configuration. The MWAB broadcasted PLMN/SNPN may differ from the BH PLMN/SNPN which creates inter-PLMN/SNPN trust boundaries for these control plan... |
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.4.2 Security threats
| Interception or modification of OAM/N2/Xn control traffic over BH PDU session(s); misclassification of traffic due to descriptor or mapping error; cross-slice leakage; replay during mobility or BH PDU session changes are possible.
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 5.4.3 Potential security requirements
| Confidentiality and integrity protection for OAM/N2/Xn control traffic over BH PDU session(s), binding MWAB-gNB identity and traffic classes to BH PDU sessions.
5.X Key Issue #X: <Key Issue Name>
5.X.1 Key issue details
5.X.2 Security threats
5.X.3 Potential security requirements
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 6 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 6.0 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Editor's Note: This clause contains a table mapping between key issues and solutions.
Table 6.0-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#1
KI#2
KI#3
KI#4
#1
X
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 6.1 Solution #1: reusing NDS/IP to N2 and Xn interfaces in WAB
| |
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 6.1.1 Introduction
| This solution proposes a the credential is provided to the WAB by OAM in the phase 2-1 of the WAB-node integration procedure defined in TS 38.401 [3]
|
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 6.1.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.1.2-1 Procedure to configure the credential for NDS/IP connection
0. The WAB-node is pre-configured a credential for accessing to the OAM of WAB
Phase 1. WAB-MT Setup. It is described in TS 38.401[3].
Phase 2-1. WAB-gNB initialization. Addition to the description in TS 38.401[3], the WAB-gNB uses the pre-... |
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 6.1.3 Evaluation
| The solution addresses the situation when the credential of UE’s 5GC or NG-RAN cannot be pre-configured at WAB. The phase 2-1 can be used to configure the credentials of potential serving UEs’ PLMN.
6.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>
6.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being ad... |
98de5ba8eb100652bf114945d3c0bf11 | 33.724 | 7 Conclusions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions that will form the basis for any normative work.
Annex <C>:
Change History
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-08
SA3#123
S3-252987
S3-252684 and S3-252686 for endorsed TR Skeleton for WAB Securi... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 1 Scope
| The present document …
|
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 3 Definitions of terms and abbreviations
| |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 3.2 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 4 Architecture assumptions
| The following architecture assumptions are applied to the study:
- The general features and the Split MME architecture of Store and Forward Satellite operation are described in Annex O.2 of TS 23.401 [2] are used as architecture assumptions in this study.
|
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 5 Key issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
|
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 5.1 Key Issue #1: Authenticated UE to exchange NAS messages with multiple satellites in split-MME architecture
| |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| One of the architectural assumptions for Store and Forward Satellite operation is that when the service link is available, there is no feeder link and inter satellite link. There are two example deployment options for Store and Forward Satellite operation given in Annex O of TS 23.401 [2], i.e. Split MME architecture a... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 5.1.2 Security threats
| If the NAS COUNTs are not synchronized across multiple satellites, an attacker may intercept and replay previously transmitted NAS messages. Since different satellites may accept outdated NAS COUNT values, the replay protection mechanism could be bypassed, leading to unauthorized actions.
Key stream may be reused if t... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 5.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The 3GPP system shall support means to secure NAS messages exchange in the store and forward satellite operations.
5.X Key Issue #X: <Key Issue Name>
5.X.1 Key issue details
5.X.2 Security threats
5.X.3 Potential security requirements
|
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.0 Mapping of Solutions to Key Issues
| Table 6.0-1: Mapping of Solutions to Key Issues
Key Issues
Solutions
1
1
X
2
X
3
X
4
X
5
X
6
X
7
X
8
X
|
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.1 Solution #1: Derivation of Satellite-Specific NAS keys for S&F Operation
| |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.1.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1: Authenticated UE to exchange NAS messages with multiple satellites in split-MME architecture.
This solution proposes a mechanism to derive unique NAS integrity and encryption keys for each satellite by using the satellite ID as an additional input parameter during the NAS key deri... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.1.2 Solution details
| In this solution, it is proposed to derive distinct set of NAS keys for each satellite from the common root key KASME. The satellite-specific NAS keys are derived by the UE and the network using the KDF as specified in TS 33.220 [x].
For a serving Satellite n, the NAS integrity key KNASint and the NAS encryption key K... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.1.3 Evaluation
| This solution proposed to use satellite-specific NAS keys for each satellite to prevent key stream reuse. There is no need to synchronize the NAS COUNT between satellites.
The solution has the following impacts:
- a new KDF needs to be defined;
- The UE and the MME-onboard needs to derive and store satellite-specifi... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.2 Solution #2: NAS Security Context Isolation via Satellite-Specific NAS COUNT
| |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.2.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1: Authenticated UE to exchange NAS messages with multiple satellites in split-MME architecture.
This solution proposes a mechanism ensuing different satellite using different COUNT to protect NAS message and therefore eliminates the need for real-time NAS COUNT synchronization acros... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.2.2 Solution details
| This solution is based on the following assumptions and principles:
- the UE and each MME-onboard maintain independent pairs of NAS COUNTs (one for uplink, one for downlink) for their mutual communication. The NAS COUNTs are not synchronized with other satellites.
Based on the above principle, the existing procedures... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.2.3 Evaluation
| This solution proposed to use satellite-specific NAS COUNTs for each satellite to prevent key stream reuse. There is no need to synchronize the NAS COUNT between satellites, and no change to the NAS keys.
The solution has the following impacts:
- A new NAS COUNT construction mechanism is needed;
- The UE and MME-gro... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.3 Solution #3: UE context management for S&F operation
| |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.3.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1: Authenticated UE to exchange NAS messages with multiple satellites in split-MME architecture.
After the UE is authenticated and NAS security is established, the satellite will send a security token to the UE, which contains the UE's current context. When the UE attempts to connect... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.3.2 Solution details
| UE context management procedure for S&F operation is shown in the following figure.
Figure 6.3.2-1: UE context management procedure for S&F operation
0. The security key materials used to provide confidentiality and integrity protection for security tokens used in S&F operations are pre-configured in the satellites... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.3.3 Evaluation
| This solution uses the target UE as an intermediate entity to securely transmit the UE context from one satellite to another, thereby meeting the requirements of Key Issue #1.
The advantages of this method are:
- UE can connect to any satellite that supports S&F services.
The disadvantages of this method are:
- Nee... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.4 Solution #4: Separate NAS COUNT pair per SatelliteID within an EPS Security Context
| |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.4.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1.
This solution is based on using separate pairs of NAS counters per Satellite ID in the EPS security context when the UE is served by multiple satellites operating in S&F mode and the UE registration remains valid even the serving satellite changes over time (i.e., the UE is not re... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.4.2 Solution details
| This solution applies to a satellite network operating in S&F mode and, it’s especially relevant for deployments based on the split MME architecture (see TS 23.402 Annex O.2) in which a UE registration remains valid across multiple satellites (unlike a full EPC deployment, where registration is only valid in one satell... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.4.3 Evaluation
| The following impacts are needed:
- The EPS Security Context in the UE and MME needs to handle separate pairs of NAS COUNT per SatelliteID.
- A new NAS COUNT construction mechanism is needed to include the SatelliteID.
- To ensure backward compatibility, a new network capability and UE capability are needed to indic... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.5 Solution #5: Protection for NAS message of authenticated UE in split-MME architecture
| |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.5.1 Introduction
| This solution is proposed to address Key Issue #1, providing a protection method for exchanging the NAS message in the Store and Forward satellite operations.
As specified in TS 33.401 [3], the NAS security is terminated on the MME-onboard, and the ground segment of the network ensures that the latest NAS security con... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.5.2 Solution details
| 6.5.2.1 DL NAS signalling protection
Figure 6.5.2-1: Protection for DL NAS messages of authenticated UE
0. The UE and MME-ground hold the latest NAS COUNTs, including the UL NAS COUNT and DL NAS COUNT.
At Time 1:
1. The MME-ground receives the DL NAS signaling #1 of the authenticated UE from another EPS N... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.5.2.2 UL NAS signalling protection
| In the split-MME architecture, the UE includes the Satellite ID in the UL NAS signalling, then uses the NAS security keys to protect the UL NAS signalling, including the Satellite ID.
Once receiving the NAS signalling, the MME on-board verifies the integrity by using the NAS security key. If the verification is succe... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.5.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the security requirements of Key Issue #1.
For the protection of DL NAS messages, the coverage availability information is used by the MME-ground for selecting the MME on-board. By using the coverage availability information, this solution assumes that the UE can receive the DL NAS messages fro... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.6 Solution #6: Secure NAS messages via using different NAS keys in multiple satellites
| |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.6.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses “Key issue #1: Authenticated UE to exchange NAS messages with multiple satellites in split-MME architecture”.
This solution is based on split MME architecture. S&F Satellite operation may involve multiple satellites allocated by an S&F Monitoring List. In order to prevent reusing key stream, o... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.6.2 Solution details
| Based on the existing authentication procedures, this solution proposes to use different NAS keys when UE exchanges data with multiple satellites.
Figure 6.6.2-1 Enhanced NAS security for multiple satellites in S&F mode
SAT#1 has available Service Link.
1. The UE sends the Attach Request to SAT#1.
2. If... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.6.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the Key Issue #1, and it applies for S&F operations with multiple satellites. In this solution, the UE can exchange data with multiple satellites efficiently without security risk.
The solution has the following impacts:
This solution requires the MME-ground and the UE to derive new keys (i... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.7 Solution #7: Solution for NAS COUNT synchronization in store-and-forward operations
| |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.7.1 Introduction
| As per the threat described in the key issue #1, an attacker may intercept and replay previously transmitted NAS messages. This solution proposes the following to address this threat:
• A new “Satellite access information” can be included as part of Initial UE message sent from satellite eNB to MME. This informati... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.7.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.7.2-1: Message sequence showing NAS COUNT verification at MME
As shown in Figure 6.7.2-1:
- In Step 2, UL and DL NAS COUNTs are synchronized between MME-onboard and MME-onground entities. Note that from UE’s perspective, MME is expected to be seen as a single logical entity. Hence, in this solution, the pr... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.7.3 Evaluation
| TBD
Editor’s Note: The impact on signaling to mme on-ground needs to be noted.
|
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.8 Solution #8: New specific rules to handle NAS Counter Overflow in S&F mode
| |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.8.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#1.
In S&F Satellite operation, the subset of satellites operating in S&F Mode in which a given UE registration is valid (i.e. satellites included in the S&F Monitoring List), are expected to maintain a synchronised UE context, even though the synchronisation mechanism is outside the scope of... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.8.2 Solution details
| This section provides further details on this solution by analysing the uplink case (UE MME-onboard) and the downlink case (UE MME-onboard) when considering (1) UE is served by multiple satellites as per the S&F Monitoring List provided to the UE and (2) UE assumes that NAS counters in the MME-onboard(s) of those s... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.8.2.1 Uplink case
| Figure 6.8.2.1-1 shows the steps taken by the MME-onboard. Changes introduced by this solution are marked in red.
a) Upon receiving an integrity protected NAS uplink message, the MME-onboard retrieves the SQN and the NAS message authentication code (NAS-MAC) which are then used to compute the expected NAS message ... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.8.2.2 Downlink case
| Figure 6.8.2.2-1 shows the steps taken by the UE. Changes introduced by this solution are marked in red.
a) Upon receiving an integrity protected NAS downlink message, the UE retrieves the SQN and the NAS message authentication code (NAS-MAC) which are then used to compute the expected NAS message authentication c... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 6.8.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
6.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>
6.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
6.Y.2 Solution details
6.Y.3 Evaluation
Editor’s Note: ... |
6cba009aef02ddb1c451c3c3fe4d2645 | 33.700-30 | 7 Conclusions
| 7.Z Key Issue #Z: <Key Issue Name>
Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions of Key Issue #Z.
Annex <A>:
<Informative annex title for a Technical Report>
Annex <X>:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253723
... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies the potential security enhancements for 5G NR Femto. More specifically, the study investigates potential security enhancements in the following areas:
- The security requirements and potential solutions to enhance the security of NR Femto devices, to detect misconfigured or compromised NR ... |
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