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c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 4 Security Architecture and Assumptions
| The following security architecture and assumptions are applied to the present document:
- Annex V in TS 23.501[2] captures the architecture for NR Femto. The architecture option of NR Femto with a local UPF is reused as the basis for this study.
- The security architectural and requirements captured in TS 33.545 [... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5 Key issues
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.1 Key Issue #1: Detection of misconfigured/compromised 5G NR Femto devices
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| NR Femto devices are deployed outside operator domain and considered to be in un-trusted environments. Un-detected misconfigured or compromised NR Femto devices can lead to disruptions in services to UEs. A misconfigured or compromised NR Femto device with valid credentials and subscription to serve the victim UE can p... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.1.2 Security threats
| A misconfigured or compromised NR Femto device with valid credentials and subscription to serve the victim UE can pose various threats including authentication replay attacks, broadcasting CAG IDs that it is not authorized to serve, denial of service attacks, etc.to the connected UEs.
A misconfigured or compromised NR... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall be able to detect misconfigured or compromised femto devices and eliminate associated risks, e.g. preventing the abnormal traffics/signalling threats.
|
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.2 Key Issue #2: Security and privacy aspect for local access
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.2.1 Key issue details
| As defined in TS 23.501 [2] for NR Femto, if a local UPF is deployed close to the location of NR Femto node, the edge computing functionality shall be applied and the deployment options of NR Femto with a locally deployed UPF is also given the annex V. The security and privacy aspect for NR Femto and locally deployed U... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.2.2 Security threats
| The locally deployed UPF is located outside the operator’s security domain, if the 5GS core network topology is not hided towards locally deployed UPF, the core network topology and address information may be exposed outside the operator’s security domain.
|
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5GS should support a mechanism to provide secure local access services for NR Femto.
The 5GS should support a mechanism to hide the 5GS core network topology from the locally deployed UPF.
|
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.3 Key Issue #3: Security protection for the NR Femto MS
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.3.1 Key issue details
| As defined in clause 4.1 of TS 33.545 [3], an NR Femto node connects to NR Femto Management System (NR Femto MS) directly or connects to NR Femto MS via Security Gateway (SeGW) . The NR Femto MS server may be located inside the operator's access or core network (accessible on the MNO Intranet) or outside of it (accessi... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.3.2 Security threats
| The NR Femto MS may be subjected to attacks such as DDoS and Vulnerability exploitation, as it directly connect to a compromised NR Femto and is exposed to public internet when it located outside the operator’s network.
The NR Femto MS topology may be directly exposed to a compromised NR Femto device when it located i... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.3.3 Potential security requirements
| 3GPP shall provide deployment recommendations for NR Femto MS in the 5GS from a security perspective.
NOTE: Recommendation or Mandate to deploy the NR Femto MS server inside the operator’s network and connect to the NR Femto device via SeGW can help strengthen the security of NR Femto MS.
The 5GS shall provide a mean... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.4 Key Issue #4: Mitigation of QoSA in edge computing
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.4.1 Key issue details
| Quality of Service (QoS) based Attack (QoSA) exploits UE access to the user plane to cause a DoS attack on the control plane in the core network. It consists of using a set of compromised UEs or UPFs to forge and transmit incorrect QoS measurements to the network to trick core network into considering that a QoS violat... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.4.2 Security threats
| A set of compromised UEs or UPFs can forge and transmit incorrect QoS measurements to the core network can cause DoS attack on the NFs receiving the measurements.
Incorrect QoS measurement will affect the selection of local UPF and the quality of edge computing services.
|
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.4.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5GS shall provide mechanisms to detect and mitigate QoSA in NR Femto edge computing services.
|
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.5 Key Issue #5: Hardware hardening for the NR Femto
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.5.1 Key issue details
| Some commercial Femto nodes lack essential hardware hardening, e.g., disabling the debug interfaces, thus allowing an attacker to gain direct local access to the Femto nodes and perform further exploitation.
Common debug interfaces include the Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART), which allows serial co... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.5.2 Security threats
| Without hardware hardening, such as disabling debug interfaces, an attacker could gain direct access to NR Femto nodes to perform further exploitation, such as extracting embedded credentials.
If any hardware tampering of NR Femto devices gets un-detected by the 5GS, it can expose many threats including eavesdropping... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 5.5.3 Potential security requirements
| NR Femto nodes shall harden the hardware platform, including protecting the debug interfaces with strong authentication and authorization, and/or disabling the debug interfaces in commercial deployment.
5.X Key Issue #X: <Key Issue Name>
5.X.1 Key issue details
5.X.2 Security threats
5.X.3 Potential security requi... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6 Solutions
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.1 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Table 6.0-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#1
KI#2
KI#3
KI#4
KI#5
1
X
2
X
3
X
4
X
5
X
6
X
|
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.2 Solution #1: Security detection of misconfigured 5G NR Femto node
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.2.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the requirements of KI #1 and KI #5.
It is proposed to enhance the 5G NR Femto node to support to report itself configuration information for security detection and monitoring to the security management function which is a part of the 5G NR Femto MS.
It is proposed to enhance the 5G NR Femto... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.2.2 Solution details
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.2.2.1 Security procedure for security detection of NR Femto node
| The security procedure for security detection of 5G NR Femto node are further depicted in Figure 6.2.2.1-1.
Figure 6.2.2.1-1: Security procedure for security detection of 5G NR Femto node
0a. The 5G NR Femto node and Security gateway has established a secure connection of management plane with the Security Manageme... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.2.2.2 Recommended configuration information for detection
| Based on typical attack threats targeting the NR Femto node, the table 6.2.2.2-1 lists the recommended configuration information to be collected for security detection and monitoring from the NR Femto node.
Table 6.2.2.2-1: Recommended configuration information for detection
Configuration information for security det... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.2.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Evaluation is FFS.
|
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.3 Solution #2: Security for detection of misconfigured/compromised NR Femto
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.3.1 Introduction
| A misconfigured or compromised NR Femto device with valid credentials and subscription to connect to the SeGW can pose various threats on the UEs as well as on the operator’s network. NR Femto nodes are expected to comply with location restrictions. Residential or enterprise Femto nodes are allowed to cover a limited g... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.3.2 Solution details
| Following steps are followed:
• Following information about a valid registered NR Femto can be stored in UDM:
◦ NR Femto's geographic location information
◦ NR Femto's neighboring cell IDs, PCI, etc.
◦ NR Femto's neighboring cell locations
• After successful authentication and NAS s... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.3.3 Evaluation
| This solution has the following limitations:
• This solution applies only to a compromised Femto that has moved its location. A compromised NR Femto that has not moved its location cannot be detected by this solution.
• The locations of multiple UEs can be checked before confirming that the NR Femto is compr... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.4 Solution #3: Enhance SeGW to support security protection for N4 interface
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.4.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue #2. Considering the locally deployed UPF is located outside the operator’s security domain and interact with core network through N4 interface, which leads to the exposure threats to the core network, this solution propose to enhance the Security Gateway as defined in TS 33.545 [3] to ... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.4.2 Solution details
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.4.2.1 Security architecture
| The security aspect enhancements to system architecture of clause 4.1 in TS 33.545 [3] for security protection for N4 interface are further depicted in Figure 6.4.2.1-1.
Figure 6.4.2.1-1: Enhancement for security architecture of NR Femto
Security protections provided by the Security Gateway for the traffic through ... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.4.2.2 Topology hiding
| The core network topology shall not be directly exposed to the locally deployed UPF through N4 interface.
The SeGW hide the 5GC topology so that the core network entity address information (such as IP addresses of SMF etc.) are not inadvertently exposed to the locally deployed UPF.
|
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.4.2.3 Signalling message filtration
| The Security Gateway supports to discard malformed signalling messages sent from the locally deployed UPF through N4 interface over the trust boundary according to 3GPP specifications.
The Security Gateway supports to block messages with wrong NF types sent from the locally deployed UPF through N4 interface over the t... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.4.2.4 Security protection
| Security requirements and functions as defined in clause 4.2.1.7 of TS 33.545 [3] can provide the mutual authentication and transport protection between the locally deployed UPF and the Security Gateway.
|
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.4.2.5 Access control
| The Security Gateway supports the access control mechanism for the locally deployed UPF accessing the SMF deployed in core network, e.g. configure the access control list.
|
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.4.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the requirements of KI #2 by enhancing the SeGW in architecture of NR Femto to provide security protection for N4 interface between the locally UPF and core network, including topology hiding, signalling message filtration, security protection for traffics over N4, access control.
It is assumed... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.5 Solution #4: Security of local UPF
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.5.1 Introduction
| This solution proposes the following:
• Perform additional verification of parameters when UE attempts to setup PDU session or sends service requests to local UPF.
• Use either NATing OR Femto Gateway to hide network topology from local UPF
|
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.5.2 Solution details
| When UE attempts PDU session establishment or sends service request to local UPF, following additional steps are followed for additional verification:
• 5GC performs additional verfication for local UPF by:
◦ Verifying that the gNB ID maps to NR Femto node
◦ Verifying that the local UPF ID maps t... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.5.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2: “Security and privacy aspect for local access”.
The solution addresses the following:
• With additional verification of parameters, this solution provides stricter checks to enhance security of local access services for NR Femto. This caters to the potential security requir... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.6 Solution #5: Security protection for NR Femto MS
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.6.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the KI #3: security protection for NR Femto MS. It is propose to enhance the security architecture and requirements of NR Femto which is defined in clause 4.1 of TS 33.545 [3] as the follow aspects:
- Provide deployment recommendations for NR Femto MS in the 5GS from a security perspective.
- ... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.6.2 Solution details
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.6.2.1 Enhancement for security architecture of NR Femto
| The security aspect enhancements to system architecture of NR Femto for security purpose are further depicted in Figure 6.6.2.1-1.
Figure 6.6.2.1-1: Enhancement for security architecture of NR Femto
Consider the NR Femto MS may be subjected to attacks when it located outside the operator’s network, such as DDoS and... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.6.2.1 Topology hiding between the NR Femto and the NR Femto MS
| The NR Femto Management System server topology shall not be directly exposed to the NR Femto.
When the NR Femto MS server located inside the operator’s network, the SeGW hide the NR Femto Management System server topology so that the NR Femto Management System server address information (such as IP addresses and port ... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.6.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the requirements of KI#3 i.e. provide deployment recommendations for NR Femto MS in the 5GS from a security perspective, support the topology hiding between the NR Femto and the NR Femto MS.
This solution proposes to enhance the security Architecture of NR Femto as defined in clause 4.1 of TS 3... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.7 Solution #6: Enhance SeGW to support QoSA mitigation
| |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.7.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the KI#4: mitigation of QoSA in edge computing. It is proposed to enhance the NR Femto security architecture in follow aspects:
- Enhance the SeGW to perform N4 Session Report monitoring and report the QoS attack to the SMF.
- Enhance the SMF to support the edge relocation after receiving the ... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.7.2 Solution details
| The security procedure for QoSA mitigation is further depicted in Figure 6.7.2-1. It is assumed that NR Femto GW is integrated with SeGW in this solution.
Figure 6.7.2-1: Security procedure for QoSA mitigation
1. After or during the establishment of the PDU session, the SMF sends QoSA Report Notify to the SeGW.... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 6.7.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Evaluation is FFS.
6.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>
6.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
6.Y.2 Solution details
6.Y.3 Evaluation
Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addr... |
c2dec694608a380e98d070db670d21f3 | 33.746 | 7 Conclusions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions that will form the basis for any normative work.
Annex <X> :
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-08
SA3#123
S3-252616
TR skeleton.
0.0.0
2025-08
SA3#123
S3-253007
Incorpor... |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies the applicability and adaptation of the GNP threats/assets in TR 33.926 [2], the GVNP threats/assets in TR 33.927 [3] and the existing general SCAS test cases in TS 33.117 [4] to generic 3GPP container-based network products (GCNPs).
It identifies:
- Critical assets and threats relevant... |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
CISM Container Infrastructure Service Management
CNF Containerized Netw... |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 4 Assumptions
|
A Generic Container-based Network Product (GCNP) constitutes a minimal container product consisting of:
- Container image(s) containing the network function implementation and dependencies
- Image registry reference with associated metadata (tags, manifests)
- Basic configuration parameters (environment variables,... |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5 Assets and threats for Container-based Products
| |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.1 Introduction
| The present clause contains assets and threats that are believed to apply to more than one container-based network product (GCNP).
The format follows TR 33.926 [2] and TR 33.927 [3] to allow alignment with existing SCAS threat catalogues, with adaptations for containerized deployments.
Container-based network product... |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.2.1 Mapping of existing Critical Assets from GNP
| Mapping of critical assets of GNP (see TR 33.926 [2], clause 5.2) to GCNP.
Critical Asset for GNP
Applicablity for GCNP
User account data and credentials (e.g. passwords)
applicable for GCNP
Log data
applicable for GCNP
Configuration data, e.g. GNP's IP address, ports, VPN ID, Management Objects (e.g. user group... |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.2.2 Mapping of existing Critical Assets from GVNP
| Mapping of critical assets of GVNP (see TR 33.927 [3], clause 5.2.1) to GCNP.
Critical Asset for GVNP
Applicablity for GCNP
User account data and credentials (e.g. passwords, private key)
applicable for GCNP
Log data
applicable for GCNP
Configuration data, e.g. GVNP's IP address, ports, VPN ID, Management Object... |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.2.3 Critical Assets for GCNP
| List of new, copied and derived critical assets for GCNP.
Critical Asset for GCNP
Origin
User account data and credentials (e.g. passwords, private key, API tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens)
copied from GNP and GVNP
Log data (container logs, orchestrator audit logs, security event logs)
copied from GNP a... |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.1 Generic threats format
| Threats are described using the following format:
- Threat Name:
- Threat Category:
- Threat Description:
- Threatened Asset:
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2 Generic threats for GCNP
| |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.1 Introduction
| The common STRIDE threat categories used in TR 33.926 [2], clause 5.3.1 also apply to GCNP. Many generic threats from TR 33.926 clause 5.3 are applicable with adaptation for container contexts. In addition, GCNP have unique threats due to container runtime, orchestration APIs, and image distribution.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.2 Threats related to 3GPP-defined interfaces
| GCNP inherit all the threats related to 3GPP-defined interfaces in TR 33.926 [2], clause 5.3.2, without any changes. It means that there is no need repeat the threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces which are covered in 3GPP security specifications. If threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces are found to be not... |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.3 Threats related to interfaces introduced in container environments
| Two interfaces unique to GCNP are identified as critical assets:
- Interface between GCNP workloads and the orchestration control plane (e.g. Kubernetes API).
- Interface between GCNP workloads and the container runtime API (e.g. Docker socket, containerd API).
If unprotected, these interfaces can be exploited for p... |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4 Spoofing identity
| |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.1 Default Accounts
| The threat in clause 5.3.3.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
The difference is that VNF is accessed through VNC (Virtual Network Console) rather than through the physical console interface, an attacker can use a default account to access a CNF via VNC.
Default accounts can be present in container images.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.2 Weak Password Policies
| The threat in clause 5.3.3.2 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
However, the attacker using the weak password accesses GCNP through VNC (Virtual Network Console) rather than through the physical console interface.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.3 Password peek
| The threat in clause 5.3.3.3 of TR 33.926 applies to GCNP.
However, the attacker using the peeked password accesses GCNP through VNC (Virtual Network Console) rather than through the physical console interface.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.4 Direct Root Access
| The threat in clause 5.3.3.4 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.5 IP Spoofing
| The threat in clause 5.3.3.5 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
However, the objective of unauthorized access is a VNF, not a computer.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.6 Malware
| The threat in clause 5.3.3.6 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.7 Eavesdropping
| The threat in clause 5.3.3.7 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.8 Service Account Token Abuse
| - Threat Name: Service Account Token Abuse
- Threat Category: Spoofing identity
- Threat Description: An attacker could steal a Kubernetes service account token from a pod and use it to impersonate the GCNP, resulting in the attacker being able to interact with the container API, enumerate resources, privilege escala... |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.9 API Endpoint Impersonation
| An attacker could spoof an orchestration API or SBA endpoint to mislead GCNP components.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5 Tampering
| |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.1 Software Tampering
| The threat in clause 5.3.4.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
Different from traditional physical network products, the entire GCNP is instantiated from the container image(s) and other information (e.g. configuration data, software environmental parameters, license terms information, script, manifest file, checksum... |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.2 Ownership File Misuse
| The threat in clause 5.3.4.2 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.3 Boot tampering
| This threat is not applicable for GCNP since GCNP do not have a boot process in the traditional sense.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.4 Log Tampering
| The threat in clause 5.3.4.4 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.5 OAM traffic Tampering
| The threat in clause 5.3.4.5 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.6 File Write Permissions Abuse
| The threat in clause 5.3.4.6 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.7 User Session Tampering
| The threat in clause 5.3.4.7 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.8 Exposed Containerization API
| - Threat Name: Exposed Containerization API
- Threat Category: Tampering
- Threat Description: An attacker who gains access to this API can exploit it to escalate their privileges within the system, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive container configurations, network settings, and runtime data. This... |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.9 Image Registry Tampering
| - Threat Name: Image Registry Tampering
- Threat Category: Tampering
- Threat Description: An attacker who gains unauthorized access to a container image registry can insert malicious layers or replace trusted images with backdoored versions. This allows the attacker to embed malware, backdoors, or exploit code withi... |
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